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Welcome and Opening 
Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, dear colleagues and friends, 
Good morning and welcome. 
My name is Irmgard Niemeyer, and in my capacity as the current president of the European 
Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), and also as a local, it is my 
great pleasure to welcome you to the 39th Annual Meeting of ESARDA here in Düsseldorf.  
Since the first ESARDA Annual Meeting in 1979, this year’s meeting is the fifth Annual 
Meeting being held in Germany. The other meetings took place in Karlsruhe in 1981 and 
1988, Aachen in 1995 and Dresden in 2000. 
ESARDA existed already for a while – 10 years to be precise - before the first Annual Meeting 
was held. Created in 1969, our association slowly but surely heads towards its 50th 
anniversary.  
Those of you who may be in a similar phase of their own lives or may have passed it already, 
possibly have realised that this can be the time for increased reflection. Reflections about the 
many routines and habits in your life, about long-established patterns of thought, structures 
and controlled procedures, including question like “Did I really imagine my life this way?”. At 
the same time, you may realise that it takes you much longer than ten or twenty years ago to 
make yourself familiar with new approaches, topics or technologies. 
Is this, to some extent, also true for ESARDA? Does it apply to ESARDA at all? 
Let’s spend a few minutes on the current state of ESARDA. 
ESARDA is a network of organisations including national regulatory authorities, nuclear 
facilities operators, nuclear industry, research centres, and universities, aiming to bring 
together the international nuclear safeguards community. Its main goals are research 
collaboration, exchange of information and joint implementation of research and 
development programmes. ESARDA is currently formed by 32 Parties from the European 
Union (EU), 7 non-EU Associated Members as well as 10 Individual Members, bound by the 
ESARDA Agreement. In recent years, usually one to three new organisations have joined 
Irmgard Niemeyer, president of ESARDA  
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ESARDA per year, with an increase of Associated Members from the US in the last couple of 
years. 
If you look at the list of participants of this year’s Symposium, you will understand the variety 
of countries and professional groups involved in ESARDA (Figure 1). 
  
Figure 1: Participants per country (left) and professional groups (right). 
 
The Symposium has attracted 194 participants from 26 countries worldwide. While Germany, 
as the host country, forms the largest group of participants, the second largest group of 
attendees comes from the US. Nearly 80% of the participants belong to institutions in Europe, 
and the European Union is represented by 150 participants from 16 out of the 28 countries.  
In terms of professional groups, most of the participants work at research organisations (44%) 
or authorities (28%). Universities (13%) and industry (12%) provide one-eighth of the 
participants each. 
The geographical and professional distributions of the Symposium participants may not be 
representative for ESARDA in general; however, it at least illustrates the interest in this 
particular ESARDA activity. For future symposia, we may consider how to increase the 
number of European Union countries, and possibly also whether we would like to see a higher 
percentage of universities and nuclear industry, including operators. 
Lastly, I also wanted to mention the number of female participants at the Symposium. 
Whereas more and more women have got involved in safeguards-related activities in the past 
years, the share of women among the attendees – only a quarter - is still not satisfying. 
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The main activities of ESARDA were already in place when I got involved 15 years ago:  
1. Annual Meetings and Symposia, providing an opportunity for collaboration and 
information exchange.  
2. Dedicated working group (WG) activities, with eight WGs being the “backbone” of 
ESARDA. 
3. The one-week ESARDA Course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation, which 
complements nuclear engineering studies by including nuclear safeguards in the 
academic curriculum.  
4. Technical publications, in particular the ESARDA Bulletin including peer-reviewed 
articles.  
Those activities come along with particular well-functioning schedules, processes and 
procedures. Can we assume these schedules, processes and procedures to be proven 
practices or do we need to review them in light of the current and future challenges for 
research collaboration, exchange of information and joint implementation of R&D 
programmes? 
Overall, while ESARDA is a vital network with many active members today, it might be worth 
considering some kind of preventive measures in terms of “anti-aging”. 
In addition, strategies for supporting safeguards implementation and promoting safeguards-
related research and development require a substantial rethinking in certain intervals if they 
are to remain relevant.  
It is also important to take into account that ESARDA doesn’t act in isolation. This is all the 
more true in a world which is changing ever faster and is becoming increasingly complex.  
Therefore, after the activities and recommendations of the ESARDA Reflection Groups in 
2000 and 2010, the Executive Board agreed it its meeting of January 23-24, 2017, that the 
time has come to reassess ESARDA’s future strategic direction in light of current and future 
non-proliferation and safeguards challenges. Thus, a new Reflection Group will be established 
with the objectives to review the strategy planning process within ESARDA and to draw a 
roadmap by 2019 (which marks ESARDA’s 50th anniversary), possibly for the next three to 
five years, subject to the adoption of the terms of references. 
The Reflection Group will be kicked off by the panel discussion on “Reflecting on ESARDA’s 
future strategic direction” on Thursday, and I cordially invite you to attend this event. The 
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panel is aimed at learning about strategic planning and strategy plans of other organisations 
and at exchanging views on strategic partnerships and cooperation. 
Each of the parties, members and other partners of ESARDA has its own challenges, as we 
will hear from some of our today’s keynote speaker.  
I invite you all to take part in this process. A questionnaire will be developed by the Reflection 
Group in order to get as many opinions and proposals for ESARDA’s future strategic direction 
from you as possible. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, the year 2017 marks the 20th anniversary of the ‘Model Protocol 
Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
for the Application of Safeguards’, as laid down in INFCIRC/540(Corrected) – a good reason 
to reflect on its achievements, lessons learned, and future prospects. 
In this line, we would like to invite you to attend the roundtable discussion on “20 years of the 
Additional Protocol” tonight, together with the IAEA, Euratom and Member States, and share 
your views on and experiences in the implementation of the Additional Protocol (AP). 
Finally, I want to encourage you to take advantage of your time here, attend the technical 
sessions and interact with your colleagues. For continuing your discussion after the 
programme, the Old Town's 300 pubs, bars, restaurants, and cafés also named the "The 
Longest Bar in the World, will definitely provide a place for all of you. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, while ESARDA may be only a tiny piece in the global system, I am 
confident that we can prove successful European collaboration, successful international 
cooperation, and the ability of providing sound scientific factual findings. 
 
With this, I would like to open the 39th ESARDA Annual Meeting, the Symposium on Nuclear 
Safeguards and Non-proliferation. I wish you a fruitful meeting and a very pleasant stay in the 
city of Düsseldorf. 
 
Thank you all for attending the Symposium and thank you for the attention. 
Irmgard Niemeyer, ESARDA President 
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Phase-out and Safeguards in Germany 
Keynote 
Ursula Borak 
Deputy Director General 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 
Dear Ms Niemeyer and Mr Sevini, 
good morning to the fellow keynote speakers this morning, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
thank you for the invitation to this plenary. 
1. Introduction
Safeguards measures are most relevant for the German government. The prevention of the 
abuse of nuclear material for non-civil uses is crucial for us. 
We have always supported verification measures. 
And we appreciate every opportunity for an exchange of views and information with the IAEA, 
Euratom and all the other national and international experts in the field of safeguards.  
My first key message is: the political decision in Germany to phase out nuclear energy for 
electricity production does by no means have the effect that we are no more interested in the 
field of safeguards. Just the opposite is the case! 
2. Energiewende
The major topic in Energy politics in Germany is, of course, the Energy Transition or 
Energiewende. 
Just a few figures of the energy mix at the current phase of the Energy Transition: 
The share of renewables in power generation has reached 30 %. 
Whereas nuclear energy contributes about 13 %. 
With regards to power consumption, the share of renewables has reached over 32 %, already. 
Compared to 2010 almost a doubling. 
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The aim for the share of renewables for the year 2025 is over 40 %. 
The biggest challenge for the “Energiewende” stems from the delayed grid expansion. This is 
especially relevant for the north-south corridor from the wind power regions in the north to the 
industrial centers in the south. 
But despite growing demand on the grids, grid quality in Germany remains very high, and is 
thereby contributing to the security of supply: 
The supply failures were limited to only  
12 minutes per customer in 2015.  
In comparison, the failures in the US were over 100 minutes and in France and the UK 50 
minutes. 
Nevertheless, we have to further advance grid integration and expansion. 
3. Phase-out of nuclear energy
But certainly, for this conference another aspect of energy policy in our country might be more 
relevant: 
As I mentioned in the beginning: 
The Energy Transition includes the phase-out of nuclear energy for electricity production. 
In Germany, this decision is based on a solid and stable political consensus in our society. 
Since 1962, a total of 37 nuclear power plants have been built in Germany and put into 
commercial operation. Today, eight commercial reactors are still operating. 
In less than six years – at the end of 2022 at the latest – the last nuclear power plant in 
Germany will be shut down. 
As a result of this decision, the amount of radioactive waste requiring final storage is now limited 
and easier to calculate than before. 
At the same time, the amount of time during which income can be generated from the 
operations is limited, too. 
And more limited as before is the time in which provisions can be made for the disposal of the 
waste. 
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4. Foundation under public law
In line with the polluter-pays principle and the respective legal requirements, it is the operators 
of nuclear power plants that must pay for the decommissioning and dismantling, as well as for 
the management of the nuclear waste, including the cost of final storage. 
As a consequence of the phase-out, an equally solid and broad consensus was needed for the 
adjustment of the financing of the disposal of the waste. 
Therefore, the Federal Government in 2015 set up an independent commission of experts, with 
members and stakeholders from all parts of society: the Commission to Review the Financing 
for the Nuclear Phase-Out, or as the German abbreviation sounds: KFK. 
The task of the commission was, to assess how the financing for decommissioning and 
dismantling of nuclear power plants and for nuclear waste disposal can be organised most 
efficiently, given the new situation. 
The companies responsible should still be financially capable of meeting their obligations, 
including in the long term. 
The final report was unanimously adopted by the commission in April 2016 and presented to the 
Federal Government. It sets out a proposal on how this can be achieved in a way that is 
acceptable to policy-makers across party lines, and to society at large. 
The proposal was: 
1. The responsibility for interim and final
storage is to lie with the government,
2. the financial burden is to be borne by the companies. The companies are to provide the
necessary liquidity by paying into a fund established under public law. This means: In future, 
operational as well as financial responsibility are combined in the hands of the government. 
My second key message is: The work of the commission paved the way for a solid, broadly 
accepted political roadmap. 
On the basis of this recommendation of the independent commission an act was drafted by the 
Federal Government. 
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The German parliament in December 2016 voted with a broad majority for the 
“Act reorganizing responsibility for nuclear waste management”.  
Under the new regulations, on the one hand, the operators will continue to bear the full 
responsibility for the decommissioning and dismantling of the nuclear power plants, as well as 
for the packaging of the waste. 
On the other hand, the Federal Republic will assume responsibility for the management and 
financing of interim and final storage. - The management of final storage has been the state’s 
responsibility, already. 
The funds for the interim and final storage will be provided by the operators of nuclear power 
plants. For this purpose, they will be obliged to transfer a total of about 17 billion to a public 
fund. This amount is due on July 1. 
The amount corresponds to the total amount of provisions built by the energy companies in 
order to finance the management of the nuclear waste.  
In addition, the operators will have the opportunity to pay a voluntary risk surcharge, amounting 
to a total of 6 billion euros. Paying this surcharge, they will not be obliged to provide additional 
capital to the fund in case of a capital shortage in the future. 
As a sum, somewhat over 24 billion euros could be the overall volume of the fund. 
The fund collecting the payments of the operators will be set up as a foundation under public 
law. 
It will invest the funds provided by the operators and reimburse the costs incurred by the 
Federal Republic in connection with the interim and final storage of nuclear waste. 
For the management of interim storage, the Federal government has taken the first steps to 
establish a new state-owned company. 
It will take over the operators’ various interim storage sites as of 1 January 2019 (for high active 
nuclear waste), and as of 1 January 2020 (for low and medium active nuclear waste). 
My third key message is: 
In the next 10 years, the sheer number of waste packages that have to be verified, will increase 
considerably. 
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This is not only relevant for Germany, of course, but in many countries of the EU. More than 50 
of the operated nuclear power plants will be shut down till 2025. 
5. German Joint Safeguards Programme with the IAEA
Therefore, efficient methods and techniques for safeguarding will be essential. 
As you know, in Germany the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy is funding the 
German Joint Safeguards Programme with the IAEA. Forschungszentrum Jülich is the scientific 
coordinator. 
And as an aside: 
Next autumn – around the time of the IAEA’s General Conference in September - our “Joint 
Programme on the Technical Development and further improvement of IAEA Safeguards” will 
be active 40 years. 
I am optimistic that the various member state support programmes, including the German, can 
deliver adequate tools and expertise to support verification and safeguarding for the 
intermediate dry storage facilities in the coming years. 
The German Safeguards Support Programme will continue to deliver expertise and research 
funding on a reliable basis. 
6. Conclusion
In the first section, this afternoon already, probably some of the “Challenges for Safeguards in 
Germany” will be discussed in more detail. 
Until Thursday, there are as much as 18 sections with different topics on the agenda. 
For all of these, I wish fruitful discussions and success to ESARDA for this symposium. 
Thank you for your attention. 
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IAEA SAFEGUARDS: INCREASING CHALLENGES, NEW OPPORTUNITIES 
ESARDA Symposium – 16 MAY 2017 
Tero Varjoranta, Deputy Director General and Head of the Safeguards Department, IAEA 
Over the past two weeks in Vienna, the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty met in 
Preparatory Committee in advance of the 2020 NPT Review Conference.  It was an 
opportunity to remind everyone that the verification assurance provided by IAEA 
safeguards is the foundation of the non-proliferation pillar of the NPT. And that the 
credibility of the IAEA’s safeguards conclusions is, by extension, vital to international 
peace and security.  
Today, across the world, IAEA safeguards are being implemented in 181 States. We 
are safeguarding nearly 1,290 nuclear facilities and locations - containing nuclear 
material sufficient to make over 204,000 nuclear explosive devices. This is over ten 
times more than the actual number of nuclear weapons in the world today. It is a 
truly global effort, conducted 24/7 that will need to continue for the foreseeable 
future. 
I believe the IAEA’s safeguards work is something of which we can be proud. But we 
cannot afford to be complacent. The nuclear landscape is constantly changing: 
throwing up new challenges as it does so. More nuclear facilities and nuclear 
material are coming under safeguards all the time, the complexity of the facilities 
that we are safeguarding is increasing, and in an ever more globalized world, there is 
more nuclear cooperation and trade than ever before. In addition, we are seeing 
more transfers of spent fuel and decommissioning of nuclear plants. These trends 
look set to continue.  
Money is another challenge. Funding for IAEA safeguards has not kept pace with 
demand, and in the present economic climate, it is unlikely to do so anytime soon. 
Like any business, the Department of Safeguards has to provide value for money to 
our customers – in this case, our Member States. Similarly, we have to be results 
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driven – we need to produce credible safeguards conclusions for each and every 
State in which we apply safeguards. And the key word here is “credible”, because if 
our safeguards conclusions lack credibility they will reassure no-one and – in time – 
could lead to an unravelling of the non-proliferation regime itself. 
In light of this and given that our workload is driven by the need to fulfil our legal 
obligations, the answer can only lie in improving our productivity.  
There are three main ways in which we are doing this: 
• First, through streamlining our processes. We are constantly seeking ways to
do things more effectively and efficiently inside the Department, including
through the pursuit of a lean management agenda, which I have introduced.
• Second, through improving cooperation with States in daily safeguards
implementation. There are a number of areas where better cooperation from
States would make our job of implementing safeguards easier and more
efficient.
• Third, through the use of modern technology.
The Safeguards Department regularly monitors and assesses developments in its 
operating environment, including in the area of technology. As part of that effort, in 
February this year we organized an Emerging Technologies Workshop, to increase 
our awareness of, and prepare for, new technologies. During the course of this 
workshop a number of new challenges were identified that we will need to address. 
• New types of nuclear reactor are advancing and diversifying – some of which
will present new challenges for safeguards: for example, transportable
reactors.
• The development of laser technologies may also pose challenges.
• Accelerator-driven systems could enable the misuse of subcritical reactors.
• Some non-nuclear technologies may increase proliferation risks (e.g. additive
manufacturing/3D printing)
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On the other hand, the workshop also highlighted a number of opportunities for 
safeguards in terms of newly emerging technologies which could serve our purpose. 
• Data collection, integration, processing and analysis are constantly being
improved, with artificial intelligence and machine learning offering the means
to automate and reduce repetitive tasks.
• Data visualization tools enable safeguards analysts to focus on better
understanding, analyzing and presenting data.
• The transparency and security features of shared ledger technology show
potential for safeguards application (e.g. nuclear material accounting).
Investing in new technologies can bring significant improvements in efficiencies – 
whether it is new IT software that can collect safeguards–relevant information faster; 
or the greater use of remote data transmission, thereby relieving inspectors of the 
task of collecting such data themselves; or installing instruments in our laboratories 
that can analyze nuclear samples with greater precision than ever before.    
Investment decisions obviously need to be made years in advance and this requires 
proper planning. That is why we are currently updating the Department’s Long-Term 
Research and Development (R&D) Plan. But as well as our longer term planning in 
relation to investments in new technologies we need to be agile – to be responsive 
to changing international circumstances, some of which may be unexpected. Let me 
take the example of the JCPOA – the Iran nuclear deal – where the Agency was 
required to ensure that Iran’s enrichment of uranium in UF6 does not go above 
3.67% U–235. This required us to procure and speedily deploy a new piece of 
technology from the US – the On-Line Enrichment Monitor (OLEM). This technology 
is now installed in Natanz and verifying one of Iran’s key nuclear commitments under 
the deal.    
In the context of R&D and investment in new technologies, the IAEA is heavily 
dependent on support from our Member States, as it does not have its own R&D 
capability. These Member State Support Programmes - as they are known – provide 
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significant “extrabudgetary” contributions to the effective and efficient 
implementation of safeguards. For example, they provide funds for the 
modernization of our IT system and to improvements in our nuclear material 
sampling capability. These are not “nice to have” add-ons: they are an intrinsic part 
of our effective operations. We are now in the process of establishing a new review 
mechanism involving MSSPs in assessing projects from the ‘Development and 
Implementation Support (D&IS) Programme for Nuclear Verification’ to ensure that 
we can improve our interface with the support programmes. [David Peranteau will 
be making a presentation on MSSPs later in the symposium] 
As I look to the future, I emphasize once again that our overarching objective must 
be to sustain the credibility of safeguards conclusions.  To achieve that goal we in the 
Department of Safeguards will need to continue to rely on the support of our 
Member States, particularly in the area of R&D and emerging technologies. We will 
need to plan carefully for the future and to exercise agility in response to changing 
circumstances.    
In this way we can ensure that the IAEA – and safeguards in particular – will continue 
to make a vital contribution to international security in the interest of all humanity. 
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ESARDA 2017 Plenary talk 
Mrs President, dear colleagues and friends, 
It is a great pleasure for me to be with you today as representative of Euratom 
Safeguards, the Commission's service for safeguards in the European Union. 
Let me first convey to you the best wishes of the Euratom Safeguards Director, 
Mr Stephan Lechner, who cannot not be with us this morning but who will be with 
us later today to attend the round-table discussion in the evening. 
[Introduction]
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
This meeting of the ESARDA Community takes place at a very particular 
moment: This year, we have celebrated 60 years of the Euratom Treaty! 
This Treaty has been the basis for fostering nuclear energy and research in the 
European Union and beyond! It has made sure that there was no diversion of 
nuclear materials, for now sixty years. It has made sure that the EU today is the 
most controlled area in the world, in what concerns Safeguards. 
This Euratom Treaty has served us very well for sixty years: It is now for us to 
adapt our current rules for safeguards to new challenges and to learn from the 
experiences of the past. We must make sure that we continue to provide the 
European citizen and the international community with the highest level possible 
of nuclear safety, security and safeguards.
Paul Meylemans, DG Energy, Euratom Safeguards Directorate 
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Many of my colleagues and I, have devoted a large part of our professional 
career to Euratom safeguards and, knowing that we were doing something 
indispensable and useful, we have done so with pride! 
In our complex world of today, comprehensive undertakings such as safeguards 
are, usually, not undertaken by one institution or one service alone: In order to 
succeed you need to cooperate with partners and you need to liaise with 
interlocutors all across the globe.
At Euratom, we are very aware that we cannot succeed all by ourselves:  We 
need the exchange and discussion with our partners to succeed: We need the 
continuous exchange with our Member States, with the IAEA, with the third 
countries, with the Joint Research Centre, the European Commission’s in house 
scientific service, with the global R&D community, the INMM, and, last but by no 
means least, with you: ESARDA. 
This is why, in this contribution, I would like to firstly look at the evolution of the 
wider Euratom safeguards context, at the related challenges for the future, and 
then at the cooperation with our partners including the IAEA and ESARDA. 
[Evolution of political context for Euratom safeguards] 
The nuclear safeguards landscape is constantly evolving, both in terms of 
political context as well as of technological development, presenting both 
challenges and opportunities.   
In spite of a wider context marked, on one hand, by increasing amounts of 
nuclear material and, on the other, by shrinking resources, we invest into the 
improvement of Safeguards in Europe on a constant basis. Nonetheless, we 
make every effort to fulfill our mandate as well as ever.
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Since 2007, the Commission’s Staff Working Document “Implementing Euratom 
Treaty Safeguards”, abbreviated as IETS, has provided the practical orientation 
for our daily work. 
Almost a decade later and in view of considerable changes in our political 
context, it seems about time to revisit this guidance document, in order to see 
how and to what extent it still reflects current as well as new challenges for 
Safeguards in the EU of today.  
The political opportunity for doing so could not be better as we are currently 
framing the European Energy Union in a number of fields of energy policy so as 
to prepare ourselves for the future. 
Our main aim in the IETS review process will be to identify and implement all 
possible means and measures for improving the quality and reliability of our 
verification results and conclusions, while facing all current Safeguards 
challenges. We identify these challenges and we analyse the options by which 
we can address them.
It goes without saying that in this review of the IETS document, we shall take the 
Member States comments on board. Following our preliminary internal study and 
analysis in the coming months, we shall be in a position to engage in further 
dialogue with Member States and stakeholders in the appropriate fora. 
This is how we intend to go ahead in adapting the Euratom safeguards to 
continue to deliver on our Euratom Treaty mandate – on the basis of an 
unchanged Treaty but under constantly changing circumstances. 
[Challenges for the future] 
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Adapting to change does not only mean adapting to a change of the wider 
political circumstances. For us, it also means focusing on our internal 
demographics and trying to assure continuity and keeping up our specialized 
knowledge in view of a strong evolution of our personnel: In other words: In some 
years time, we will have to deliver on our mandate with what I would dare to call 
"a new generation of nuclear inspectors". And, as you would expect, we are 
already about to select the officials for this highly responsible set of tasks.
A number of fascinating professional challenges await this new generation of 
officials:  They will be involved into a wide variety of tasks many of which are 
either new or unprecedented in type and scale of the operation to be undertaken: 
x the defueling of German reactors being phased out of service with the
eventual transfers of all spent fuel into CASTOR containers; x the expansion of  Remote Data Transmission in order to save resources
invested in our costly on-site verifications;   x addressing the new challenges arising from the construction of new types
of facilities, such as reactors of new design or else the first underground 
geological repositories and related encapsulation plants for spent fuel.  
[Cooperation with our partners] 
Cooperation with the IAEA 
We are closely cooperating with the IAEA as regards safeguards within EU 
borders, and we fully support the IAEA in the process of implementing their State 
Level Concept. 
The IAEA is rightly attempting to demonstrate that every State is treated on an 
equal footing, taking into account State-specific factors. We are very pleased to 
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note that the IAEA increasingly recognizes the opportunities that cooperation with 
EURATOM can offer. 
In terms of practical cooperation with the IAEA, we have established, inter alia, a 
prioritised list of Facility Attachments that need to be drafted and we implement a 
similar campaign with respect to the Commission Decisions on Particular 
Safeguards Provisions that need to be updated. 
We have also advanced on further practical joint actions with the IAEA, such as: 
- Joint Use of Equipment; 
- Remote Data Transmission; and 
- Joint training of inspectors, 
just to name some of the most important ones. 
Together with the Commission's Joint Research Centre, we hold meetings with 
the IAEA to further improve the coordination in the field of safeguards equipment 
and we attempt to improve the processes of developing new safeguards 
equipment. Here also the Member States Support Programmes to the IAEA play 
a crucial role for the entire safeguards community, including Euratom. 
In concluding, I think it is only fair to say that, in spite of our diverging mandates, 
we have made good progress in our cooperation with the IAEA and that is how it 
should be. 
Cooperation with the JRC 
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It is, of course, not only important to cooperate with other international players 
but certainly at least as important to also cooperate with your partners inside your 
own institution. In this context, we have been very pleased to cooperate with the 
Commission's Joint Research Centre, or in today`s politically correct language, 
with the Commission's "in-house science and knowledge management service" 
and in line with our cooperation agreement. 
The JRC has strongly supported us with a view to the on-site laboratories but has 
also provided us with significant technology support. For the future, we would 
very much like to further expand our cooperation with the JRC in the fields of 
"commercial off the shelf" as well as data analysis. 
Cooperation with ESARDA 
We have to prove that our resources are well spent and could not be spent any 
better.
This will require that in doing our job we use the most advanced equipment 
available which is based on the latest technology available. And this is where 
you, the Safeguards R&D community, come into play.  
The EU R&D has to anticipate and address the future needs of international 
safeguards. This is done by extrapolating and expanding on the evolution of 
safeguards from a material and technology-based control system to one that has 
a lot more information to acquire and process. This will require substantial 
investment in R&D and novel technologies.
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The integration of innovative technologies in modern Euratom approaches has 
multiple aims, namely the creation of improved tools for more effective and 
efficient inspections, reduction of inspectors' dose uptakes and important 
financial savings.
Amongst the innovative technologies for safeguards, I would wish to highlight: 
x Tomographic and radiographic imaging techniquesx Unattended monitoring systems with Remote Data Transmissionx Next Generation Surveillance Systems (NGSS)x Electronic Sealsx Nuclear forensic methods.
In this regard, the various thematic working groups of ESARDA: 
- are providing substantial input and expertise in R&D domains that are 
crucial for safeguards; 
- are paving the way for new solutions and cutting-edge technologies; 
- are enriching the toolbox available to Euratom for the fulfilment of its 
objectives.
Along with the Joint Research Centre, ESARDA is a key partner for the 
Commission who helps to broaden our R&D horizon.
All of your ESARDA members: Operators, national regulators, the academic and 
commercial sector, they all are called upon to contribute from their own 
perspective and with their specific knowledge and abilities to the provision of new 
solutions addressing modern safeguards challenges. 
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Euratom is pleased to benefit from its presence at the ESARDA board and from 
its participation in all ESARDA working groups, witnessing the development of 
new concepts and techniques that will shape tomorrow's safeguards. 
We are very glad to see ESARDA expanding, attracting new membership, 
extending their outreach to universities and to the younger generation and also 
opening up channels with the IAEA. 
As we have underlined on the occasion of previous ESARDA Conferences: “We 
need ingenuity, innovation and technological advancement. For that, we strongly 
count on the contribution of ESARDA.”
Next year we shall be celebrating the 40th ESARDA Annual Symposium. We 
shall be very privileged and happy to host that event in Luxembourg and you can 
already earmark 15-17 May 2018 as a date for this event. 
In this spirit, let me thank you very much, more generally, for the past years of 
fruitful cooperation and, much more specifically, let me thank you very much for 
your attention for the past minutes in listening to this speech! 
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Development and updating of State-level safeguards approaches: 
Experience and lessons learned 
Therese Renis, Van Zyl de Villiers, Zbigniew Radecki, Edgar W Vela Espinoza 
Department of Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency 
Vienna International Centre, P O Box 100, 
A-1400 Vienna, Austria 
Abstract: 
In order to maintain effective and efficient safeguards over time, the IAEA continues to address new 
challenges, taking into account experience gained from previous safeguards implementation and 
taking advantage of new techniques and technologies. In recent years the IAEA has continued to 
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards by making greater use of its ability to consider 
a State’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities and capabilities as a whole, within the scope of the 
State’s safeguards agreement. In doing so, more systematic consideration has been given to, and 
better use made of, State-specific factors in updating and developing State-level safeguards 
approaches (SLAs) for all States with safeguards agreements, beginning with the updating of SLAs for 
States under integrated safeguards. By the end of April 2017, the IAEA has updated SLAs for 53 
States (and Taiwan, China) with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in 
force, for which the broader conclusion1 had been drawn, and for twelve other States. This process 
has been carried out in close consultation with the States, particularly on the implementation of in-field 
measures. In order to ensure that SLAs are developed in a consistent and non-discriminatory manner 
the IAEA uses uniform processes and well-defined procedures to guide the development and 
implementation of the SLAs. Based on the experience gained, there has been further development 
and documentation of internal procedures, guidance and tools, and adjustments to the training 
programme. This paper provides an overview of the IAEA’s experience to date in the updating of SLAs 
and the further development of internal guidance and procedures based on lessons learned. 
Keywords: State-level safeguards approach; acquisition path analysis; State-specific factors. 
1. Introduction
International nuclear safeguards are implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
on the basis of safeguards agreements between the State or States concerned and the IAEA.2 For 
many years after 1972 when the IAEA first started implementing safeguards pursuant to 
comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs), safeguards activities were primarily focused on 
nuclear material and facilities declared by States to provide assurances that there was no diversion of 
declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. 
In the early 1990s, the IAEA embarked on a series of efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and 
efficiency of safeguards to provide for IAEA verification of the correctness and completeness of the 
declarations of States with CSAs, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear 
material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in 
the State. For States with a CSA and an additional protocol (AP) to that agreement in force, when the 
IAEA has carried out sufficient activities and conducted comprehensive State evaluation based on all 
safeguards relevant information available about the State’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities and 
has found no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material and no undeclared nuclear material 
or activities in a State, the IAEA can draw the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in a State 
remained in peaceful activities. Beginning in 2001, the IAEA has developed State-level safeguards 
approaches (SLAs) for those States, then referred to as ‘integrated safeguards’ approaches for States, 
based on an ‘optimized’ combination of measures available under the CSA and AP for the State. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
23
Those early approaches were, for the most part, based on facility-specific ‘model’ integrated 
safeguards approaches. 
The term ‘State-level concept’ was first introduced in the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) to 
the IAEA Board of Governors for 2004 to describe safeguards implementation that is based on SLAs 
developed using safeguards objectives common to all States with CSAs and taking State-specific 
factors into account. As the SIR for 2004 noted, the State-level concept was being implemented for 
States with integrated safeguards and would be extended to all other States with CSAs. 
In recent years, the IAEA has given more systematic consideration to, and made better use of, State-
specific factors when updating and developing SLAs. For States with CSAs in force with the IAEA, it 
does so by analysing all technically plausible paths by which a State could pursue the acquisition of 
nuclear material for the development of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device; this 
process is known as ‘acquisition path analysis’ (APA). The IAEA then establishes and prioritises 
technical objectives and identifies safeguards measures for addressing those technical objectives. 
These are all done in consideration of State-specific factors. An SLA is developed in close 
consultation with State and regional authorities, particularly with regard to the means of implementing 
in-field verification activities. 
Using this process, since 2014 SLAs have been updated for 53 States (and Taiwan, China) that were 
under ‘integrated safeguards’ and new SLAs are being progressively developed for other States with 
safeguards agreements in force. SLAs have been developed for twelve other States as of the end of 
April 2017. During the process of updating and developing the SLAs, experience gained has been 
used to refine the associated processes, procedures and tools to ensure consistency and non-
discrimination in safeguards implementation. This paper elaborates on that experience and how it has 
been used to improve the processes and guidance. 
2. Process of developing State-level safeguards approaches
An SLA is a customized approach to implementing safeguards for an individual State. It consists of 
technical objectives as well as applicable safeguards measures to achieve those objectives. 
SLAs are developed by State evaluation groups (SEGs) that have been established for each State. 
SEGs consist of staff members with the appropriate expertise to evaluate all safeguards relevant 
information, typically safeguards inspectors and safeguards analysts. The SEGs conduct acquisition 
path analysis and develop SLAs for States with a CSA using internal guidance documents. They also 
use collaborative analysis techniques and tools.  
The process of developing an SLA begins with the consolidation of all safeguards relevant information 
about the State available to the IAEA. Using that information, the SEG identifies the technically 
possible paths by which the State could acquire nuclear material suitable for a nuclear weapon or 
other nuclear explosive device. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the strategies that could be 
used by the State and the time needed to accomplish each step of the possible acquisition paths. 
Once those steps have been analysed, an overall assessment is made of the approximate amount of 
time that it might take to accomplish each possible path, specifically to determine which paths would 
be technically plausible within five years. [1] 
Technical objectives are then established to fulfil the generic safeguards objectives for the State. 
Technical objectives are established for the detection of each step in the technically plausible 
acquisition paths. The technical objectives are prioritized based on the assessment of acquisition path 
steps to determine where to most effectively apply IAEA safeguards resources for the State. Next, 
safeguards measures are identified for each technical objective. Identifying more than one safeguards 
measure, if possible, provides flexibility and options thereby allowing safeguards implementation to be 
less predictable. The frequency and intensity of the safeguards activities are determined based on the 
priority of the technical objectives and in consideration of State-specific factors and key assessments 
made during acquisition path analysis. 
In conducting acquisition path analysis and developing SLAs, more systematic consideration has been 
given to and better use made of State-specific factors. Those State-specific factors are: 
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i. The type of safeguards agreement in force for the State and the nature of the safeguards
conclusion drawn by the IAEA;
ii. The nuclear fuel cycle and related technical capabilities of the State;
iii. The technical capabilities of the State or regional system of accounting for and control of
nuclear material (SSAC/RSAC);
iv. The ability of the IAEA to implement certain safeguards measures in the State;
v. The nature and scope of cooperation between the State and the IAEA in the implementation of
safeguards; and
vi. The IAEA’s experience in implementing safeguards in the State.
State-specific factors (i) and (ii) are used during acquisition path analysis and all factors are used at 
various stages of developing SLAs.  
Senior inspectors and Section Heads guide the work of the SEGs and review their progress. In order 
to ensure consistency in the processes and non-discrimination in the results, all SLAs undergo review 
by an internal committee and are subject to final approval for implementation by the Deputy Director 
General, Head of the Department of Safeguards. 
During the updating of the SLAs, Operations Divisions consult with State and regional authorities, 
particularly with regard to possible modifications to in-field verification measures and the practical 
means for implementing them. In cases when there were no proposed changes to in-field measures, 
States are informed of this. 
3. Experience and lessons learned
The Department has systematically recorded feedback from the SEGs on their insights and 
experience in updating and developing SLAs. The following outlines that experience and the lessons 
learned to date. 
Overall, the process of updating SLAs has been carried out using a structured and analytical approach 
to ensure the effectiveness of safeguards for the State. Through the process of conducting more in-
depth acquisition path analysis, SEG members gained a greater understanding of the nuclear 
programme and nuclear-related capabilities of the States for which they are responsible. In many 
cases, they needed to supplement their knowledge of the State’s nuclear fuel cycle-related 
capabilities, including historical capabilities and current research and development activities. They did 
this by searching through safeguards information archives and previous versions of State evaluation 
reports, by conducting targeted searches for a wider range of information about a State’s industrial 
infrastructure and by conducting specific in-field activities.  
SEGs recognized that - in addition to State evaluation reports (SERs), SLAs and annual 
implementation plans as key internal documents - lower level information, results of analyses and key 
assessments had to be documented. This has led to more high quality and structured documentation 
to support the SLAs. This also contributes to the capture and management of related knowledge that 
will facilitate future analyses and support future country officers and SEG members in understanding 
the safeguards relevant information about a State. 
Many SEGs identified the challenges in managing large amounts of safeguards relevant information 
and the need to organize it well. Different ways of storing the data were explored, from organizing it by 
facility and fuel cycle stage in a Wiki format to condensing it into a more meaningful and ‘digestible’ 
format. It was recognized that additional tools may be needed to facilitate the organization of and 
efficient access to the information. 
The SEGs appreciated the opportunity to apply critical thinking. In-depth discussions in the SEGs 
created a unified and soundly based common understanding of the safeguards relevant information 
about the State. The analytical processes have also led to more informed, knowledgeable country 
officers and inspectors who more fully understand the objectives of their safeguards activities.  
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In approaching the task of updating an SLA, many SEGs sought the advice of country officers and 
senior inspectors who had already undertaken such an exercise for other States. They also called 
upon experts in selected nuclear fuel cycle technologies to assist in their assessments. In some cases, 
SEGs working on SLAs for States with a similar level of nuclear activities worked together, particularly 
when tackling some challenging aspects of the analysis. The sharing of experiences and good 
practices among SEGs, senior inspectors and drafters of related guidance documents led to 
streamlining and greater consistency of the processes. 
Although acquisition path analysis has been a key aspect of the State evaluation process, experience 
has shown that a much more detailed and structured analysis was needed for developing an SLA. 
Conducting the initial in-depth acquisition path analysis, particularly for States with significant nuclear 
activities has often been a lengthy process. The APA guidance document has been updated based on 
early experience, and supplemental templates and examples were developed which have facilitated 
the analyses. However, there is a need for the development of software tools to assist in conducting 
APA and documenting the results. APAs will need to be updated periodically, as triggered by time or 
new information. However it is expected that with the initial good documentation of the analyses, the 
updating will require much less time and will be done as part of the periodic State evaluation process. 
In addition, many SEGs identified the need for further assistance in assessing the capabilities of the 
State and the time required for the State to complete an acquisition path step, particularly with regard 
to development of new nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. 
In describing and assessing the scenarios for diversion of declared nuclear material and the misuse of 
facilities, SEGs developed a clearer insight into specific safeguards activities that should be conducted 
in the field, particularly with respect to visual observation and design information verification.  
Because of the articulation and prioritization of technical objectives, headquarters activities (such as 
collection and analysis of open source information) were better targeted at areas of priority for a 
particular State. This focus has also led to more effective safeguards approaches, shifting activities to 
where they were most needed to address priority technical objectives, while avoiding conducting more 
activities than needed to address lower priority objectives. 
When determining the frequency and intensity of safeguards activities in the field, many SEGs were 
hesitant to make significant changes based on APA assessments. SEGs tended to make conservative 
assessments that did not substantially deviate from current safeguards practices. Nevertheless, the 
SEGs came to better understand why each activity is performed and how it connects to the technical 
objectives. As experience is gained, additional guidance will be needed on setting verification goals 
based on the prioritization of technical objectives and the time required to complete any acquisition 
path. 
For States with a sizable nuclear fuel cycle, the updating of an SLA is being done in phases. 
Additional safeguards ‘sub-approaches’ addressing aspects of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle will need to 
be updated over the next few years to reflect the objectives and verification goals set at the State 
level. 
4. Development of internal processes, procedures and tools
Throughout the process of updating and developing SLAs, SEGs were asked to give feedback in order 
for the Department to develop and refine its processes, procedures and tools, as needed. The 
following summarizes some of the key areas of improvement. 
4.1 Update guidance documents for conducting acquisition path analysis and 
developing an SLA for a State with a CSA 
The Department conducted an intensive series of individual meetings with SEGs to gather practical 
feedback based on their experience while conducting APAs and developing SLAs. Such feedback 
contributed to a better understanding of areas in the existing guidance documents that needed further 
elaboration to be more helpful. Revision of the guidance has provided clarification and streamlining of 
the processes. Some of the key areas of improvement include: clarification of terminology, how to 
document key assessments, examples of the use of State-specific factors and better guidance on 
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establishing and prioritizing technical objectives. The updating included the development of more 
figures, templates and example cases to facilitate this understanding. Complementing the updated 
guidance documents, fully developed APA and SLA examples for fictitious States with different levels 
of nuclear development are being developed. 
4.2 Internal processes for review and approval of APAs and SLAs 
A well-structured yet flexible process for review and approval of APAs and SLAs has been 
documented. In particular, the notion of a ‘peer review’ of draft APA results has been adopted. 
Moreover, additional clarification on the available assistance and expert advice within the Department, 
streamlined requirements for the documentation of APA results and conditions for revising and 
updating APAs and SLAs have been provided. The process for the review and clearance of SLAs, 
including within a Division, by a departmental committee and by the Head of the Department have 
been documented. All these are being used in practice and incorporated into updated APA and SLA 
guidance documents. Further refinement and clarification will be provided as more experience is 
gained. 
4.3 Means for SEGs to exchange experience and tips 
The following practices have been adopted to share experience. SEGs for States with similar nuclear 
fuel cycles have been sharing experience with each other through seminars, meetings and informal 
exchanges. Some staff members that participate in several SEGs are bringing the experience gained 
to other SEGs. Senior inspectors and country officers are also sharing experience and advising SEGs. 
At the departmental level, lessons learned are distributed in the form of minutes following the 
departmental review committee meetings and incorporated, whenever deemed appropriate, into the 
revised guidance documents. In addition, the establishment of an internal website to share these 
lessons is under consideration. 
4.4 Software tools for developing, documenting and visualizing APAs and SLAs 
APA involves technical assessments of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle related capabilities; software can 
help to record, analyse, report and visualize information in variety of formats to support those 
assessments. Prototypes of the APA methodologies and software have been developed by three 
Member State support programmes. Elements of those technical methodologies are being considered 
for introduction into software that is being developed in-house. 
As part of the Modernization of Safeguards Information Technology (MOSAIC) project, software is also 
under development to use the elements of SLAs to support and integrate the safeguards processes 
for the planning, implementation and evaluation of safeguards verification activities. 
4.5 Document guidelines for SLA-related consultations with State (and regional) 
authorities  
The IAEA must protect sensitive information and methods to maintain the independence of its 
conclusions. While the consultation process facilitates the exchange of information with the State (and 
regional) authorities on the implementation of in-field safeguards activities, it has to be conducted in a 
way that ensures that sensitive information is not disclosed. 
Guidance documentation was developed to ensure consistency in aspects of SLA-related 
consultations. The guidance clarifies the scope and subject of consultations, what information can be 
shared and discussed and what should be discussed with the State cautiously in order not to reveal 
information that might undermine safeguards effectiveness. It also addresses the means of official 
communications during consultations. 
The guidance recognizes the need for the IAEA and State (and regional) authorities to have a clear 
understanding of how in-field verification activities will be conducted. Therefore consultations may 
include the joint development of detailed implementation procedures. 
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4.6  Use of analytical techniques during the process of APA and developing SLAs. 
The departmental training programme, for many years, has included dedicated training on a variety of 
analytical techniques that contribute to conducting APA and developing SLAs. There is an internal 
reference manual on structured analytical techniques and the use of these techniques has been 
elaborated in the updated APA and SLA guidance documents. Facilitators in the use of analytical 
techniques have been trained and, upon the request of SEGs, are available to assist in the use of the 
techniques when analysing acquisition paths and developing an SLA. 
5. Summary
The IAEA Department of Safeguards completed the updating of SLAs for 53 States (and for Taiwan, 
China) under integrated safeguards by the end of 2016 and SLAs had been developed for twelve 
other States by the end of April 2017. 
Experience gained in conducting acquisition path analysis and developing SLAs has been used to 
update and elaborate the guidance documents and to streamline and improve internal processes and 
procedures accordingly. This has led to increased consistency, uniformity and objectivity of the SLAs. 
While there have not been significant changes to safeguards approaches or significant cost savings, 
the process has led to the implementation of modified approaches to conducting some in-field 
activities. Through the process of conducting in-depth acquisition path analysis, SEG members have 
gained greater understanding of the nuclear programme and nuclear-related capabilities of the States 
for which they are responsible. Because of the need to document the analyses and key assessments 
that led to the SLAs, there is more high quality and structured documentation to support those 
approaches and to contribute to the capture and management of related knowledge that will facilitate 
future analyses and support future country officers and SEG members in understanding the 
safeguards relevant information about a State. The analytical processes have also led to more 
informed, knowledgeable country officers and inspectors who more fully understand the objectives of 
their safeguards activities. 
Because of the articulation and prioritization of technical objectives, headquarters activities, such as 
collection and analysis of open source information, are more targeted at areas of priority for a 
particular State. This focus has also led to greater effectiveness of safeguards approaches and 
optimization with regard to shifting activities where most needed to address priority technical 
objectives and while avoiding conducting more activities than needed to address other objectives. In 
some cases, SLAs put more emphasis on some technical objectives while reducing activities for lower 
priority technical objectives. 
The IAEA will continue to progressively develop SLAs for other States, in close cooperation with State 
and regional authorities. In order to do so, it will continue to develop and update the guidance relevant 
to States with item-specific or voluntary offer safeguards agreements. SLAs will continue to be 
updated periodically, or as necessary based on new information. State-specific annual implementation 
plans will be developed based on the SLAs.  
The guidance and software needed to conduct these processes in an efficient and consistent manner 
will continue to be enhanced. While the development of some software tools has begun, further 
development is needed to record and assist in documenting the APA, record the technical objectives 
of the SLA, assist in developing and recording plans for safeguards activities in an annual 
implementation plan for each State based on the SLA, and tracking the implementation of activities 
that will provide the basis for the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness based on achievement of 
technical objectives. 
Guidance is also being developed on the assessment of a State’s ability to conduct acquisition path 
steps, particularly with regard to development of new nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. 
The IAEA continues to further enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation 
by making better use of its ability to consider the State’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities and 
capabilities as a whole in developing a customized State-level safeguards approach for each State, 
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within the scope of the State’s safeguards agreement. In doing so, the emphasis continues to be on 
the attainment of safeguards objectives, with consideration of all safeguards relevant information and 
of State-specific factors. This allows the IAEA to concentrate its efforts on areas of greater safeguards 
significance and implement safeguards in a manner that is more responsive to changing 
circumstances. As the processes, guidance documents and tools evolve, SLAs will continue to be 
updated accordingly. 
As requested by the Safeguards resolution from the General Conference of the IAEA during its sixtieth 
session in September 2016 [2], the Director General will report to the Board of Governors about 
lessons learned and experience gained in SLAs for States under integrated safeguards after SLAs 
have been updated and are being implemented for all such States. 
1 That all nuclear material remained in peaceful nuclear activities. 
2 Some agreements include two or more States parties and/or third parties, such as their regional safeguards organizations. 
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In order to tackle this challenge, an approach is the cask sealing by the operator in the absence of 
Euratom and IAEA. An EOSS seal interface was developed to guide the operator through the sealing 
procedure and confirm its successful termination as a saveable message. According to the act of site 
selection, the operation of the repository might start in 2055 and cease in 2095. Therefore, an 
extension of the dry interim storage period that is currently limited to 40 years will become necessary. 
This timeline emphasizes the importance of dry interim storage for Spent Fuel Management and the 
need for long-term reliable unattended Safeguards measures in order to maintain continuity of 
knowledge. Remote transmission of Safeguards-data from the dry storage facilities in Germany to 
Euratom and IAEA can be regarded as a reasonable step towards this goal.  
 
 
2. Use and Application of New Techniques and Procedures 
Approaches to tackle the challenging situation in Germany are mainly based on four different 
measures. Apart from the NPP specific information, which is given to Euratom by the operator, VGB 
as an association for the German nuclear power plant operators regularly hands in the planning for the 
future cask loading campaigns to Euratom. The planning is provided on a half year basis and contains 
the loading campaigns for all German NPPs in total with a time horizon of approx. 3 years. These 
planning data shall support Euratom with their preparation on inspection planning, especially during 
the current situation of high number of cask loading campaigns per year. Accordingly, the number of 
cask loading planned for 2017 is higher than 100 cask loadings. 
 
 
Figure 2: Approaches to tackle high number of cask loading campaigns 
 
 
Sealing by the operator  
Sealing by the operator is another opportunity to reduce operators´ and inspectors´ effort during long 
lasting loading campaigns. Sealing of casks by the operators in the absence of Euratom and IAEA 
inspectors requires the acknowledgment of successful sealing execution as a printable and saveable 
message by EOSS Enhanced Seal Interface (ESI) connected to the electronic EOSS-seal linked to the 
surveillance camera. 
In June 2014 a pilot trial at NPP Unterweser was executed and sealing by the operator using the new 
developed ESI was tested. Before the first cask had been loaded operators employees were 
familiarized with the sealing process and trained by Euratom in the correct setting of seals and the use 
of ESI. After successful training the first cask sealing was done by the operator in the presence of 
Euratom Inspector. From this point of time operators were well prepared for the following sealing 
processes in the absence of Euratom. 
 
Outlook of Future 
Cask Loading
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NPP Specific
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The figure 3 shows a part of the equipment, which is used during the sealing procedure and 
transport: EOSS, ESI, cables and a device -developed by the operator - to store EOSS safely at 
the cask during the transport to the SFSF. 
 
 
Figure 3: Sealing Equipment - Source: NPP Unterweser, PreussenElektra 
 
Cask sealing is carried out by the operators in the reactor but its verification and seal replacement is 
done by Euratom/IAEA in the SFSF. It is important that the verification of the seals is done if a row of 
cask inside the SFSF has been filled completely. If there is a big time-delay of verification, it is 
possible that due to placements of subsequent casks the possibility for verification is no longer given. 
 
Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) 
DCVD first application had been taken place at NPP Biblis and Unterweser. Results of these first 
applications showed that through the use of DCVD inspections can be planned and measurements 
executed time-flexible and (far) before a cask loading campaign starts. This fact made the new 
technique attractive for its application in the field. Especially for those NPP who faces long loading 
campaigns consisting of more than five casks within a loading campaign. In case of shorter campaigns 
the use of DCVD is not efficient due to the high installation and verification time. This applies in 
particular NPP which are still in operation.  
Euratoms´ requirement for usage of this verification method includes that there is no shifting of spent 
fuel in the pool between DCVD-measuring and the beginning of the cask loading campaign. After the 
successful appliance of DCVD at NPP Biblis and Unterweser further German operators are willing to 
or have already applied this technique. 
 
Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) and cask-sealing by the operator 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the simultaneous application of the two new techniques 
and methods: 
Application of DCVD and cask-sealing by the operator run smoothly. However, due to the fact that 
DCVD-measurements of the whole spent fuel pool last up to 5 days in a week, the measurement time 
per day is bound to the maximum working hours of the NPP employees e.g. platform driver. 
Furthermore, the operators observed that cooperation with Euratom and IAEA is result-oriented and 
efficient. The work is most efficient if both, inspectors as well as technicians of the team of IAEA and 
Euratom are experienced and well trained. 
 
The usage of DCVD in combination with cask-sealing by the operator leads to the benefit that the 
presence of both - inspectors of IAEA and Euratom - during the loading campaign is not necessary 
any longer. But verification of the cask in the SFSF is required, at the latest when a row in the SFSF is 
filled and the next casks are placed in front of the complete row. Consequently, a verification or an 
exchange of seals is not any longer possible or leads to a higher radiation exposure of the inspectors 
involved. 
 
Defueling the spent fuel pool 
As already described, the aim of the operators of NPP in decommissioning is to get the reactor and 
the spent fuel pool free from spent fuel as soon as possible. The parallel application of both, DCVD 
and cask-sealing by the operators, guaranteed time flexibility for the long-term cask loading 
campaigns with minor communication effort for both, the inspectorates and the operators. 
Another challenge is to handle the broad range of fuel rods, which exist for example in the form of 
irradiated or non-irradiated fuel, test rods, broken rods, single pellets or smaller pieces. In cooperation 
with the German nuclear power plant operators GNS developed a technical solution in order to be able 
to store such fuel in CASTOR® casks: a quiver for damaged fuel rods. 
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Through the VGB-Working Group “Safeguards” both German power plant operators and GNS involved 
Euratom at an early phase in the quiver development. This enabled Euratom to give their opinion and 
come forward with their ideas on how a quiver could be verified and to develop a Safeguards concept. 
The cold trial run of the quiver was done in April 2017. The first hot dispatch of a PWR-quiver is 
planned for the second half of 2018. At the moment different verification methods (DCVD and 
tomography) are being tested in the field by IAEA and Euratom. 
 
 
3. Remote Data Transmission 
Remote Data Transmission (RDT) at SFSF 
According to the new Site Selection Act from July 2013, the final decision for a repository site has to 
be made in the end of 2031. Based on this milestone initial operation of the repository may be 
expected in the 2050ies due to the process of licensing and the construction phase. This timeline 
emphasizes the importance of dry interim storage for SF management and the need for long-term 
reliable unattended Safeguards measures in order to maintain continuity of knowledge. 
Remote transmission of Safeguards data from SFSF in Germany to Euratom and IAEA can be 
regarded as a reasonable step towards this goal since RDT in dry SFSF promises a fast response to 
the functional loss of permanently installed Safeguards equipment consisting of seals proving the 
integrity of spent fuel stored in casks and cameras for optical surveillance of cask and consequently 
spent fuel cask movements. RDT contributes to continuity of knowledge, since failures of the SF-
equipment are not currently returned to Euratom and IAEA. 
 
For the German operators, it is important that RDT has no impact on plant operation and that the 
transmission of operating data and the monitoring of personnel and storage operation are excluded. 
The easiest way to achieve this is a communication line that is completely isolated from the operators’ 
own data network. Furthermore it is essential for the operator to differentiate between state of health 
data (SoH) for monitoring of surveillance equipment and functional states of electronic seals on one 
hand and image data on the other hand. Images of the material balance area may affect the physical 
protection of the storage or economic interests. Efficiency gains under IS substantially depend on the 
condition that no re-verification of the nuclear inventory will be required. Therefore, remote 
transmission of SoH during the period between inspection notification and inspection execution is also 
in the operators` interest. Compared to SoH, the transmission of sensitive image data needs higher 
security requirements for the RDT system in order to counteract the growing threat of targeted attacks 
to spy and manipulate data. The image transmission with a delay of 24 h is important for the operators 
enabling the operators to be on the same level of information as Euratom and IAEA. On the other 
hand a delay of 24 h represents no impairment in the routine image transmission for Euratom. 
 
In preparation of the RDT-implementation in all German interim dry SFSF, a full-functional solution 
was established by performing a field test in 2012/2013 as a task of the German support programme 
to the IAEA. The RDT system provided a complete and reliable data transmission applicable under 
daily use conditions. Interruptions of the RDT-operation for several days remained without 
consequences due to the local storage capacity of the RDT system and its subsequent automatic 
synchronization. From the operators‘ point of view, it is essential that the technical solution for RDT 
meets the German security requirements for sensitive data. Through the application of security 
technologies certified by the Federal Office for Information Security, the operators‘ main concern of a 
risk of an unauthorized access to safeguards data was taken into account. 
 
During the early phase of RDT implementation Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety approved RDT implementation in all German dry SFSF on 
the federal level. In the next step the Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy (BMWi) instructed the 
Federal state authorities to support the implementation of RDT in German interim dry SFSF officially 
by a letter on 28 May 2014 and also informed the German operators on the upcoming RDT 
implementation in their dry SFSFs in the mid of June 2014. The first RDT that has then been in 
operation was limited to the transmission of EOSS data from the research reactor FRM II in Munich, 
where no camera is installed, to Euratom/IAEA. Due to the deliveries of HEU, the uranium usually 
exceeds the significant amount of 25 kg so that a monthly inspection of nuclear material has been 
mandatory. Upon the RDT-implementation, the number of inspections was halved thus enabling a 
significant reduction of man-days on-site. 
The RDT system of the interim storage facility “Zwischenlager Nord” (ZLN) in Rubenow was already 
installed in the mid of September 2014. Currently, RDT implementation phase is still going on. Up to 
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date RDT-Implementation in eight SFSF is finalized. It is expected that further the RDT implementation 
of all German dry SFSFs will be finished in 2017 or 2018 at the latest.  
 
 
Table 1: Overview of RDT-Implementation in Germany SFSF 
 
RDT at Nuclear Power Plants 
In contrast to the interim dry SFSF, Safeguards by Design with regard to RDT has not been taken into 
account in the case of NPPs in Germany. Therefore the situation for RDT implementation in German 
reactors is much more difficult compared to dry SFSF, especially because of the higher protection 
requirements to data and IT-systems in NPPs. Besides that, the availability of an isolated 
communication line is not usual in a reactor compartment as it is the case in the SFSF. Last but not 
least there is no long term perspective for RDT from reactors, since the shut-down of the last German 
reactor is expected in 2022 at the latest. 
Due to the fact that EURATOM aimed at performing a pilot field trial for RDT from a German reactor, 
the German operators offered two NPPs to carry out pilot projects. As first pilot plant NPP 
Neckarwestheim II was selected as a NPP in operation, as second pilot plant NPP Kruemmel was 
chosen as a NPP that is currently being shut down. 
For Remote Data Connection the system already installed in the SFSF are used: 
NPP (Containment)  SFSF  Euratom  IAEA 
 
RDT was already implemented at NPP Neckarwestheim in July 2016. The data connection to Euratom 
Headquarter showed no problems so far. In September 2016, the RDT implementation started at NPP 
Kruemmel, but the installation of the camera system has been planned for the end of April 2017. 
In both cases, RDT at SFSF and NPPs the language of the contract between Euratom and the 
operator is still an issue, because from the operators’ point of view the contract has to be written in the 
language of the respective member state. 
 
 
4. Challenges and Perspective 
In Germany, new nuclear acts have or will be entered into force. The act on the transfer of disposal 
tasks together with the act on the reorganization of responsibility in nuclear waste management, 
regulate the future financing and responsibility of decommissioning, waste management and final 
disposal in Germany. All SFSF at the NPP sites including the two central storages located at Gorleben 
and Ahaus will be transferred from the operator to a state owned company at the latest on 1st January 
2019.  
Date of Implementation SFSF
09/2012‐01‐2013 Ahaus 
10/2014 Zwischenlager Nord
03/2015 Biblis
06/2015 Krümmel
10‐11/2015 Emsland
10‐11/2015 Gundremmingen
planned in 2017 Brunsbüttel
planned in 2017 Philippsburg
01/2016 Neckarwestheim
04/2016 Gorleben
planned in 2017 Brokdorf
planned in 2017 Grafenrheinfeld
planned in 2017 Grohnde
planned in 2017 Isar
planned in 2017 Unterweser
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French system for accountancy and control 
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B.P. 17 – 92262 Fontenay-aux-roses Cedex France 
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Abstract 
IRSN is the French Technical Support Organization in nuclear and radiation risks. Among its numerous 
activities, it carries out the centralized accountancy of nuclear materials as part of the French 
obligations towards international non-proliferation agreements. The purpose of this paper is to 
demonstrate how a centralized accountancy, within the context of a national regulatory framework, is a 
strong contributor for safeguards. 
Any operator who wishes to carry out activities involving nuclear material should obtain authorization 
from the competent authority before it begins operation. The authorization regime requires: 
o an accounting at the facility level;
o the communication to the centralized accountancy of a daily report for any inventory change;
o a monthly verification conducted with the centralized accountancy.
Specific areas for accounting purposes have to be defined. They are mainly safeguarded “accountancy 
zones”. The centralized accountancy processes every working day the accounting records sent by all 
the facilities in the country. These records have to be sent by a secure transfer system not later than 
one day before the transaction (e.g. receipt, shipment, enrichment, blending operation, category 
change, transfer to waste). They include a lot of information such as the accountancy zone in which the 
activity occurred, type of nuclear material, characteristics and quantities, etc. By crossing information, 
the system verifies the validity of the data and their consistency (e. g. matching of the data between 
shipper and receiver, availability in stocks, international obligations, enrichment). The data are if 
necessary, corrected by the operators and lead for each accountancy zone to monthly accounting 
reports. The centralized accountancy enables the knowledge in real-time of all the stocks of nuclear 
materials and their localization in the country. The monthly verification of the accounting books 
between every single accountancy zone in the facilities and the centralized accountancy allows the 
required accuracy. 
This procedure together with an enhanced computer control enables to ensure the fulfillment of 
domestic and international obligations. 
Key Words: Nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards, international obligations 
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1. Introduction
IRSN – the French Institute for radiological protection and nuclear safety - is the French Technical 
Support Organization in nuclear and radiation risks. It provides technical support to all the government 
authorities involved in the safety and security of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, transportation and 
protection of the population. Among these many activities, IRSN carries out the centralized 
accountancy of nuclear materials as part of the French obligations towards international non-
proliferation agreements. 
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate and demonstrate: 
 How the accountancy of nuclear materials, within both the context of a national structured
regulatory framework and the context of international obligations, operates on a daily basis
at local and centralized levels;
 How the Centralized Accountancy Unit as constituent part of the Non-Proliferation
Department, acts in an integrated approach to achieve the objective of compliance with the
international safeguards agreements.
2. The French national legislative and regulatory framework
2.1 Historical context 
In the second half of the twentieth century France developed a nuclear program of great magnitude. 
For a long time, a public state institution known as the CEA has been the sole owner of the nuclear 
materials present on French soil. The transition to the industrial stage has led to the multiplication of 
private stakeholders in the civil nuclear fuel cycle. This has resulted in the need to create in the early 
eighties a national legislative and regulatory framework especially for nuclear materials., which is a part 
of the French Code of Defense which deals with the protection of nuclear material, nuclear facilities 
and the transportation of nuclear material against malicious acts. 
In parallel, France developed a defense program and is a nuclear weapon state. 
2.2 Administrative organization 
This legislative and regulatory framework has an integrated approach including physical monitoring and 
accountancy measures designed to track with accuracy the quantities of nuclear material present at 
facilities and its location, together with physical protection measures. It also establishes a centralized 
accountancy of all nuclear material used for civil purposes in France which is managed by IRSN. 
2.3 The different regimes set out in the French regulation 
A graded approach is applied for the licensing of operators according to the nature and quantity of the 
nuclear material. Different requirements are set in order to cover the wide range of operators. For this 
reason, three regimes have been defined by the French regulations (see Table I) in regards with the 
physical follow-up and accountancy. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
38
TABLE I: The different regimes 
Exemption Declaration License 
Plutonium <1 g Between 1 and 3 g > 3 g 
Uranium 233 <1 g Between 1 and 3 g > 3 g 
Uranium ≥ 20% <1 g Between 1 and 15 g of 235U > 15 g 235U
Uranium < 20% <1 g Between 1 and 250 g of 235U > 250 g 235U
Natural Uranium <1 kg Between 1 and 500 kg > 500 kg 
Depleted uranium <1 kg Between 1 and 500 kg > 500 kg 
Thorium <1 kg Between 1 and 500 kg > 500 kg 
Deuterium <1 kg >1 kg 
Tritium <0.01 g Between 0.01 and 2 g > 2 g 
Lithium (6Li) <1 g Between 1 g and 1 kg > 1 kg 6Li
The above mentioned criteria are consistent with the stringency of measures to be taken based on the 
quantities of the nuclear materials in the context of a graded approach. 
2.4  Requirements concerning the accounting 
2.4.1 License 
For the issuance and maintaining of a license, any operator shall demonstrate the following: 
 Accurate knowledge of any variation such as shipment, receipt, conversion, processing,
blending operation, irradiation, etc … with full description of the type, characteristics and
quantity of each nuclear material;
 Accurate knowledge for each nuclear material of the particular obligation code as well as,
for safeguarded zones, of the key measurement point, measurement code and material
container code;
 Daily recording of the identified variation in the accounting ledger.
The following conditions should be met: 
 The recorded variations shall be communicated on a daily basis to the centralized
accountancy;
 At any time on request, a book inventory including all the possessed materials can be
produced;
 Systematically at the end of each month a complete accounting closure shall be produced;
 Verification shall be carried out on a monthly basis of the local accounting balance in
comparison with the existing balance of the centralized accountancy in order to identify any
discrepancy;
 When a discrepancy is identified, it shall be communicated within twelve working days in a
report called Reconciliation Report to the centralized accountancy and the operator has the
obligation to resolve the issue in a timely manner.
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The above mentioned requirements target six categories of nuclear material: Plutonium, Uranium 
(depleted, natural or divided into three enrichment ranges), Thorium, Lithium enriched in 6Li, 
Deuterium, and Tritium. 
Besides these accounting requirements, the French legislation set forth organizational requirements. 
The licensee has to appoint a “special representative” who formalizes and assigns responsibilities and 
missions and shape the staffing structure for both physical follow-up and accountancy with the 
following features: 
 Staff in charge of accounting or physical protection system cannot handle nuclear material;
 Staff in charge of physical follow-up cannot perform tasks related to accounting or to
physical protection;
 Physical follow-up, physical protection and accounting systems do not share any equipment
or procedure.
2.4.2 Declaration 
Small-holders of nuclear materials are submitted to less stringent obligations: 
 The operator has to record any inventory changes (type, characteristics and quantity) on
nuclear material in his accounting ledger;
 Potential mistakes in the accountancy must be corrected in light of a physical inventory
taking;
 An annual report with variations and book inventory as of 31 December has to be
transmitted to the centralized accountancy;
 The separation of duties between physical follow-up and accounting is not required.
3. The French international obligations towards safeguards agreements
3.1 Signed agreements 
France has made commitments to several major agreements with IAEA, Euratom, and other bilateral 
agreements with countries such as USA, Australia, Canada, Japan in favour of a non- proliferation 
regime and a safeguarded system. France is thus mainly a party of: 
 the Non-Proliferation-Treaty;
 INFIRC/207 (advance notification to the Agency of exports and imports);
 a “voluntary offer” concluded with the trilateral agreement INFIRC/290;
 the additional protocol (trilateral agreement) INFIRC/290/add.1;
 the Commission Regulation 302/2005.
On the basis of these agreements, France has committed to fulfilling many requirements such as, 
among others, collecting, analyzing, producing and providing various accounting data and reports. 
3.2 Administrative organization 
The Euratom Technical Committee (CTE), placed directly under the authority of the Prime Minister 
services, is in charge of the implementation of international controls on nuclear materials, equipment 
and technologies on French territory in relationship with IAEA and the European Commission. The 
CTE benefits from the technical support from IRSN’s Non-Proliferation and Accounting Department for 
all aspects such as escorting international inspections, assisting the operators, checking, analyzing 
data and producing reports, assessing documentation. A unit of this department is specifically 
dedicated to the national Centralized Accountancy and the collecting of international data. 
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4. The operations of the French centralized accountancy
4.1 The breakdown in accountancy zone and physical monitoring zone 
An “accountancy zone” is a part of an installation subject to license that may contain nuclear materials 
and in which any operation affecting the book inventory is registered. An accountancy zone may 
contain one or more physical monitoring zones. 
A “physical monitoring zone” is a part of an installation subject to inspection of arrivals and departures 
of nuclear materials. 
As part of the issuance of the license, the operator has to define the most relevant breakdown of the 
facility in one or several accounting zones. The accounting breakdown in France is in many cases 
reduced to a smaller area compared to the MBA (Material Balance Area) established for international 
safeguards. The purpose is to make control easier and to reduce the size of the area to which an 
unauthorized removal or loss can be imputed. They are mainly safeguarded zones.  
4.2 The flows and crossing of information 
The efficiency of the accounting system is mainly based on: 
 A daily information flow between facilities and the centralized accountancy; 
 An ongoing verification of the transmitted data and of their consistency. 
All the French authorized facilities daily transmit their variation reports to the centralized accountancy 
through a VPN (Virtual Private Network) connection. These variations data are recorded on the same 
day in the accountancy at facility level- also called local accountancy- where the transaction occurred. 
Transactions include receipt, shipment, enrichment, blending operation, category change, transfer to 
waste, etc... They include a lot of information such as accounting zones, type of nuclear material, 
characteristics, irradiation status, quantities, etc. 
The variations mainly reflect operations among licensed facilities but, to a lesser extent, between 
licensed and small-holders entities. 
The data are checked in order to verify any inconsistency (non- matching data between shippers and 
receivers, material stock smaller than quantity to be cleared, anomaly in enrichment, non-conservation 
of mass etc…) or prohibited transactions (unauthorized change in particular obligation, incorrect 
rebatching etc…). After possible corrections, the postings are made both at facility level and at 
centralized accountancy level.  
The stock lines are affected by the daily variations according to the combination of these five 
parameters: Element category / Isotopic composition / Irradiation / Safeguards obligation / Material 
form. 
Following closure of each monthly accounting, the centralized accountancy sends for each accounting 
area a monthly report to facilities in regards with: 
 The variations;
 The book inventory.
A reconciliation of the national data with those of the local accountancy has to be carried out by the 
assigned persons at facility level. A signed report identifying any possible discrepancy and its 
justification has to be sent back within twelve calendar days to the centralized accountancy. This report 
is binding. 
The flows of information with the small-holders take place annually. Each facility has to transmit a 
report that includes a book inventory closing on December 31 together with the annual variation 
records. The official deadline for transmission of the report is January 31. 
Afterwards a thorough analysis of small-holders variation data is conducted by the centralized 
accountancy. It includes cross-checks between:  
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 Small-holders;
 Small-holders and licensed facilities (in conjunction with daily declarations).
Any possible inconsistency has to be investigated and resolved by the operator and a new revised 
version of the report has to be sent. Furthermore, in case the report shows that one or more of the 
thresholds are exceeded, the competent authority may decide to adapt the legal regime to be applied. 
4.3 The data collecting and processing for Euratom 
In addition to this data processing work for national purposes within the French centralized 
accountancy structure, the Accountancy Unit carries out a data collecting and first level control work 
dedicated for Euratom purposes. As a matter of fact, the Accountancy Units is in charge to collect 
Euratom accountancy reports (Inventory Change Reports, Physical Inventory Listings, and Material 
Balance Reports) from French operators every month. 
Table II and III show guidance on the annual volume of respectively national and Euratom data 
processed. 
TABLE II: Annual volume of processed national data in 2016 by the Accountancy Unit 
Accounting areas Lines of records 
Variation 
records 
Annual declarations (Small-
holders) 
405 209 122 77 264 458 
TABLE III : Annual volume of processed Euratom data in 2016 by the Accountancy Unit 
ZBM ICR PIL MBR 
171 244 891 309 859 9 874 
5. The contribution of the centralized accountancy for international
safeguards
The efficiency of both the safeguards system depends greatly upon the accuracy and reliability of the 
accountancy in every facility. The French system is characterized by a double level of control to 
increase its efficiency: 
 An organizational and human separation between physical follow-up and accountancy at
facility level;
 An ongoing cross-checking of accounting data between the local and the centralized level.
The system implies more constraints at facility level and requires human and material resources at 
central level. In return, a good reliability of the accounting is strengthened through this permanent 
auditing. 
The French regulation also stipulates that the transport of nuclear material is done by authorized 
carriers. The latter are required to declare each shipment to IRSN based on information of physical 
follow-up, independently of the accounting declaration of the shipper and the receiver. In the end, IRSN 
has therefore the accounting declaration not only of the shipper but also of the receiver and the carrier. 
These declarations are systematically cross examined to detect any irregularities. It allows 
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consolidating at all times the relevance of data stored in the accounts based on separate databases. 
This organizational and operating system was primarily implemented for national security purposes, 
however safeguards concerns have been integrated. As a matter of fact, some of the computer 
controls focus more specifically on safeguards aspects (particular obligation code, reference(s) of 
authorization(s) in case of change, import/export notification, etc … ).  
The Accountancy Unit relies on these national accounting data, crossed-checked with other sources, 
to produce following reports for international purposes: 
 imports/Exports of nuclear materials;
 passage of material under Safeguards to non-Safeguards and vice-versa;
 swaps;
 production of mines;
 transparency regarding stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
In addition, the verification of the completeness and correctness of the Euratom reports, benefits from 
the upstream work and cross-checked possibilities within the national centralized accountancy. 
Of course, the providing of accounting data and reports is only one part of the task required to meet 
the international commitments. The Non-Proliferation Department plays a leading part to live up to 
following expectations: 
 supplying of additional extensive information on activities carried out in cooperation with non-
nuclear weapon states (irrespective of wether nuclear materials are involved or not);
 support and technical assistance to the authorities, operators and industrialists;
 accompanying a number of international inspections following-up of complementary access
required by the Agency.
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Abstract: 
States with additional protocols [1] to comprehensive safeguards agreements in force are required 
under Article 2.a.(iii) to submit to the IAEA a map for each site. As the current guidelines [2] do not 
specify a special format for the map submission, they are typically delivered in a variety of formats. 
Using modern geographic information systems (GIS) to assist with the site map creation and annual 
updates, a joint Member State Support Programme (MSSP) task on Digital Declaration Site Maps 
(DDSM) is investigating how the submission procedures could be improved in line with new 
Information Technology (IT) infrastructure and software developments at the IAEA. Specifically, this 
includes the Protocol Reporter 3 (PR3) and the Geospatial Exploitation System (GES) software. This 
paper provides an overview of some of the activities under the MSSP task, including the typical 
submission process beginning with the creation of an operator’s site map through the submission 
process cycle for the annual updates using Protocol Reporter or the Commission's Additional Protocol 
Editor (CAPE) software. To demonstrate how site maps are created by operators and how these new 
procedures might benefit operators, State or regional authorities (SRA) and the IAEA, this paper will 
document some of the common challenges in converting site maps from paper maps to digital GIS 
data formats. It will also address the preparation of site entries and declarations using the Protocol 
Reporter software for the submission to the IAEA. 
Keywords: Digital Declaration Site Map, Geographical Information System (GIS), IAEA, Model 
Additional Protocol, Protocol Reporter 
1. Introduction
Using existing geographic information technology to support State declaration activities demonstrates 
new ways that the Department of Safeguards can utilize current information technology infrastructure 
to support the mission of the IAEA Department of Safeguards. Four IAEA Member States participate in 
a support programme task which investigates the potential for using Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) for the declaration site maps related to the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements 
(INFCIRC/540) (hereafter referred as Additional Protocol or AP) section 2.a.(iii). To date, Germany has 
contributed by drafting of the initial framework document titled Framework Document on Digital 
Delivery of Spatial Data to the IAEA as a part of the Declaration Activities of the Member States and 
updating subsequent versions to provide comprehensive standards, specifications and guidance for 
the use of the participating States. In 2015 and 2016, the IAEA enhanced the submission protocols 
and guidelines for digital declaration site map submission by creating a draft specification document 
which was tested and evaluated by selected site operators in the participating States. This paper 
highlights some of these activities by examining the existing Additional Protocol requirements and 
associated guidelines [2], explaining the objectives, status and expected benefits of this task, 
describing a typical workflow procedure for converting existing site maps to the newly proposed 
standardized data templates and finally by examining some of the challenges associated with adopting 
the standards and specifications designed under this task.  
Geographic Information Systems is the general term used to describe the “complex computer systems 
for storing, manipulating, and displaying geospatial data” [3] and is used in many industries. Examples 
of GIS used in nuclear fuel cycle related industries include: mapping and surveying for mining 
operations, asset management for power plants, power line utility planning and monitoring, planning 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
44
and monitoring for shipment and material transportations. Cartographic products (maps) are a 
common output from a GIS. Since the Additional Protocol 2.a.(iii) relies on a declaration site map for 
each site within a State, a GIS is commonly used as part of the preparation for declaration submission. 
While static map products (paper or pdf files) are still common, the underlying spatial and attribute 
information used to create the maps are usually stored in a GIS. Benefits of using GIS have been 
realized by operators since the GIS is able to act as a central data store, increase clear 
communication due to inherent geographic attributes and permit spatial and temporal data tracking 
and analysis. The aim of the this paper is not to advocate for the use of GIS in any given site but the 
authors wanted to note the importance that GIS already plays in planning, implementing, managing 
and monitoring industrial sites worldwide. Since many site operators have already implemented GIS in 
their operative processes, the IAEA would clearly benefit from using common GIS datasets in their 
mission to verify States’ annual AP declarations. Sharing and using one common site map would 
improve the efficiently and overall verification process at the IAEA. Simplified and standardized 
processes for individual sites result in more consistency across different sites within a State. 
2. Safeguards Additional Protocol and State declarations
The Additional Protocol was approved in May 1997 by the IAEA Board of Governors. The Additional 
Protocol is a legal document that supplements States’ IAEA safeguards agreements and grants the 
IAEA complementary legal authority to verify State’s safeguards reporting obligations. The information 
to be provided to the IAEA by States under the AP is identified in Article 2. The section on 2.a.(iii) 
provides specific guidance of the Model Protocol as follows: 
Article 2.a.(iii) 
“.......... shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing: 
(iii) A general description of each building on each site, including its use and, if not 
apparent from that description, its contents. The description shall include a map of the site.” 
Currently (as of October 2016), Additional Protocols are in force with 129 States and EURATOM, and 
another 17 States have signed an Additional Protocol but have yet to bring it into force. 
The initial Additional Protocol reporting guidelines of the IAEA were published in August 1997 and the 
revised version of the guidelines, based on cumulative experience of States and the IAEA, was 
published in May 2004. The guidelines provide a standard format for the preparation of AP 
declarations by States pursuant to Article 2 and 3 of the AP. The guidelines have generally been 
effective in providing specificity of what information is required, the appropriate level of detail and a 
standardized, consistent reporting format for submission. These guidelines are not mandatory but 
rather intended as advice for States on preparing declarations. The text of the Additional Protocol 
remains the only legally binding document. The IAEA plans to update the guidelines in the near future. 
The section 7 in the guidelines document provides specific guidance of a declaration site map as 
follows: 
“A current diagram or map of the site showing the exact boundary of the site, the location of all 
buildings and other structures, railways, roads, rivers, etc., is to be attached to the Article 2.a.(iii) 
declaration for each site. The scale and geographical orientation to the North of the map or diagram 
should be indicated. If possible, geographical coordinates for at least one reference location in the 
map or diagram should be provided. The availability of coordinates will facilitate the identification by 
the Agency of buildings on maps and satellite images.”  
The guidelines have been supplemented with the Protocol Reporter software developed by the IAEA 
for States to prepare their AP declarations in electronic format. Presently, States use different versions 
of the Protocol Reporter software: Protocol Reporter 1 (PR1.0.0), Protocol Reporter 2 (PR2.0) and 
Protocol Reporter 3 (PR3). A few States still provide AP declarations in hardcopies. In addition, a 
derivation of the Protocol Reporter, the European Commission's Additional Protocol Editor (CAPE) 
software, which is adapted to the specific requirements of EURATOM members, is being used by 
EURATOM and by several EURATOM States. Some EURATOM States are using PR2.0 and PR1.0.0 
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for the preparation of AP declarations, also for the part they send as non-side letter States to 
EURATOM, which has to be converted by EURATOM into CAPE for processing and use and thereon 
forwarded in CAPE format to the IAEA.  
The IAEA typically receives AP declarations in electronic format but also sometimes in hardcopies. If 
States use PR1.0.0 or PR2.0 for the preparation of AP declarations, .txt or .xml files are received 
which can be directly loaded into the IAEA’s Additional Protocol System (APS). However, even when 
the IAEA receives electronic declarations prepared in PR1.0.0 or PR2.0, the attachments to 
declarations (including maps) cannot be linked to the respective declarations. This separation of AP 
declarations from attached documents and maps causes problems in subsequent data storage and 
retrieval. 
In 2013, the IAEA partnered with the United States’ Department of Energy (DOE) to update the 
Protocol Reporter software. The new version, Protocol Reporter 3 (PR3), provides for the first time a 
capability to include attachments (documents or maps) in the AP submission packages which are sent 
to the IAEA. An attachment can be linked to a single entry of a declaration, to a declaration, or to the 
whole AP submission in PR3 regardless of the format of the attachment. This includes maps 
generated with GIS or CAD software and maps in pdf format. The roll-out of PR3 to States began in 
September 2016. The first quarterly declarations in PR3 format were received at the IAEA in October 
2016 and the first annual updates in December 2016. Newcomer States to the AP and, increasingly, 
States which face compatibility problems of PR 2 and PR 1 with newer operating systems, have 
already requested the PR3 software for the preparation of their AP declarations. 
Although the use of the PR3 software for the preparation of AP declarations is not mandatory for 
States, the compatibility problems of previous versions with currently used operating systems and the 
incentives to profit of the advantages of PR3 will most likely push forward the roll-out of the software. 
The regular use and the acceptance of the PR3 by States will reveal the necessity for further updates 
or improvements. 
3. Overview of this Member State Support Programme task
The German Member State Support Programme has a longstanding relationship with the IAEA dating 
back to 1978. The joint development of methods and techniques by various research groups within 
Germany have contributed to the mission of the IAEA Department of Safeguards and continues a 
strong partnership with the Department. As recently presented at the 2016 INMM annual meeting, the 
German support programme offers certain field tests in commercial sites within Germany [4]. Such 
opportunities to interact with site operators for research purposes broaden the understanding of 
specific research tasks by using real examples to illustrate promising research. In this line, the IAEA 
issued a call for a MSSP regarding the submission of digital declaration site maps for the Additional 
Protocol 2.a.(iii).  
As mentioned in the introduction, GIS offers advantages for site operators, States and the IAEA. Static 
maps (paper or pdf files) are basic representations of geographic information and unfortunately do not 
offer the full potential to exploit the underlying datasets used to create the map. These static maps can 
only be used as a reference and cannot be used to directly access and further use their original data 
content. For instance, the transportation networks (roads, railways, etc.) in paper or pdf map might 
contain simple labels indicating the name of certain roads but the underlying data layers usually 
contain much more information such as road construction type, date of construction, accurate length 
and width, etc. In other words, various attribute information linked to each geometry feature on the 
static map cannot be queried or analyzed and therefore remains inaccessible to the map reader. 
Similarly, building attribute information is often extensive but cannot be accessed in these types of 
maps. On the other hand, a GIS offers the user to access all attribute information associated with each 
feature on the map. Such access lends itself to assist in clearer communication about the location and 
function of entities represented on the map, assures spatial accuracy of features’ geometries and 
enables integration of current and historical datasets due to the geographic context. Thus, other 
datasets may be added to the GIS for seamless user interrogation.  
Beginning of 2012, the University of Bonn’s Center for Remote Sensing of Land Surfaces drafted a 
preliminary framework document describing the efforts required to submit the site maps in a digital GIS 
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format which complies with the current guidelines from the IAEA. In addition, the University created 
several site maps in a GIS for nuclear sites within Germany using satellite imagery as the primary 
source for digitization of building and ancillary structures on the sites. Since German site operators are 
obliged to submit similar information to EURATOM, this was also considered in part of the task. This 
work laid the foundation for creating a support programme task proposal since it demonstrated the 
utility of submitting specific information, namely information required under 2.a (iii) of the Additional 
Protocol, using digital, geographically attributed information.  
In 2013, the IAEA issued a call to participate in a support programme task proposal on this subject. 
The task was aligned with the Development and Implementation Support (D&IS) Programme with a 
specific emphasis on key objective 2 “Enhance geospatial data storage, management, dissemination” 
[5] and aimed to contribute to the goals of the IAEA Long-term R&D plan 2012-2023 section 9.1 
“Develop updated software tools for use by SRAs in creating and submitting accountancy reports and 
additional protocol declarations, supporting the further integration of State declared information within 
the electronic State file” [6]. The digital declaration site map task was accepted by four IAEA member 
states: Canada, Finland, Germany and Japan. This paper will focus solely on the activities of the 
German Support Programme participation in this task. The task contains three phases of which phase 
1 surveyed site operators in Germany to understand which technologies are currently in practice for 
creating and updating declaration site maps at the site. This information was supplied to the IAEA and 
will not be reported here. In phase 2, the IAEA created a data specification document and standard 
data schema for the use of States. The document is intended to provide adequate guidance on the 
creation of digital site maps by giving the necessary background information, published guidelines and 
detailed specifications of the data model used in this task and compatible with IAEA’s Geospatial 
Exploitation System (GES). In addition, the participating States’ operators were asked to provide 
feedback on the document and share comments on the design and further editing of the Framework 
document. Phase 3 of the task aims at understanding how site operators may change their existing 
procedures to accommodate new methods for preparing and submitting site maps. The lessons 
learned from this phase contribute to the latter part of this paper for data conversion processes and 
common challenges faced. The third phase is on-going and the IAEA continues to work closely with 
the selected site operators, SRAs and the task managers in the respective States.  
These phases can only be realized due to the implementation of the Integrated Safeguards 
Environment (ISE) in the Department of Safeguards’ information technology (IT) infrastructure. This 
isolated, secure computing environment that hosts Safeguards applications, data, and services 
creates a platform for implementing the results from this task. ISE was implemented to facilitate a 
Department-wide, improved collaboration environment, while securely hosting, processing and 
delivering relevant safeguards data, information and applications in a timely manner to those who 
need it in Headquarters, Regional Offices (Toronto and Tokyo) and in the field. 
The Department of Safeguards has set on objective to have a modernised Information Technology (IT) 
system in place in 2018 that will allow it to perform safeguards implementation processes more 
efficiently, effectively, and securely [7]. The Modernization of Safeguards Information Technology 
(MOSAIC) programme was initiated in 2015 and the programme comprises over 20 projects, each of 
which is developing applications and software to take Safeguards IT capabilities into the future, enable 
major upgrade to safeguards implementation and allow the Department to be more productive in all 
areas of safeguards where collecting, processing or evaluating safeguards-related information, or 
establishing findings.  
Since 2001, the current Additional Protocol System (APS) has assured the secure storage and 
handling of information that the IAEA has obtained from States in the context of the AP as well as 
information pertaining to planning and performing Complementary Access (CA) activities. The APS 
has been used by IAEA analysts, inspectors and managers who are responsible for State evaluation. 
The aim of the APS project under the MOSAIC programme is to reengineer the parts of the APS to 
ensure completeness and correctness of the State-supplied AP information by providing enhanced 
tools for the initial data review and processing as well as analysis of AP declarations. One of the 
expected benefits is to enable processing of State declarations submitted using the PR3 software. The 
project also investigates the ways of and enables connecting the AP declarations and declaration 
entries to other databases in other applications such as to building objects in the GES. 
Another MOSAIC initiative, the State Declarations Portal (SDP) project will create a web-based portal 
for the use of States and the IAEA to support secure, bidirectional information exchange and reporting 
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between States (SRAs) and the IAEA. The new system will streamline the submission of safeguards 
declaration by States, make the process more efficient and reduce the overall time needed for the 
IAEA to process them [8]. The portal provides a platform for more direct transfer of information 
between the IAEA and SRAs. Secure authentication and authorization controls will ensure proper 
handling of sensitive State information. Declarations submitted through the portal will be automatically 
transferred to the ISE network. The SDP will complement the current means of communicating State 
declarations between the SRAs and the IAEA, such as email, postal and fax submissions. The SDP is 
expected to be available to States in 2017. 
The Geospatial Exploitation System (GES) was designed to provide a full enterprise-wide Geographic 
Information System (GIS) which is used to support the analysis of satellite imagery, geospatial data 
and associated assets for staff within the Department of Safeguards [9]. The GES was the first 
analytical application specifically developed and successfully deployed into the IAEA’s ISE network in 
December 2011. The GES demonstrates the integration of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software 
with customized imagery analysis, mapping and analytical tools for the development of desktop 
applications that support processing, analysis, visualization, and dissemination of imagery, geospatial 
data, and derived products securely to authorized users. In order to enable the sharing of these data 
and products, the GES uses service-oriented architecture (SOA) to share and consume valuable 
information from disparate applications and sources from across the Department. As an example, the 
GES uses facility information from the Safeguards Master Data (SGMD) to identify the facilities on a 
site. The GES provides capabilities for evaluating temporal changes in the nuclear site’s infrastructure 
based on imagery analysis, AP declaration data and SGMD that are used by the IAEA geospatial 
analysts to generate geospatial products referred as ‘site plans’.  
As part of the MOSAIC programme, the Geospatial Exploitation System 2 (GES 2) project will create a 
web-based GIS portal that replaces the current GES system deployed since 2011. The GES 2 is 
expected to be operational in mid-2017 and to be used mainly by the satellite imagery and geospatial 
analysts. The GES 2 will evolve, including through the adaptation of its data model architecture and 
performance, and improvement of the tools, to exploit imagery, geospatial data, and other safeguards-
relevant information such as State reports and AP declarations. Conversely, other applications within 
ISE may benefit from imagery, geospatial data (e.g. site plan 
s), and analytic products generated and published in GES that will further interoperability among 
different software applications within a collaborative environment. The Geobased Data Integration 
(GDI) project will provide geospatial data (e.g. from GES 2) to support the needs of inspectors, country 
officers, and SEG (State Evaluation Group) members in their activities related to the implementation of 
safeguards in assigned States. 
4. Description of typical data conversions
This section reviews a common workflow involving the conversion of site map information from 
conventional static maps or Computer Aid Software (CAD) data format into GIS formats. In general, 
the process usually undergoes several steps using one or more software packages. To begin, the map 
or set of maps for the site must be scanned as raster datasets. Afterwards, the data processor must 
extract the features on the map, e.g. road networks, building footprints, etc. Extracting such 
information is either done through heads-up digitizing or using automated software extraction 
software. The features are extracted and stored in vector format. This process ought to also include 
referencing the files to a geographic coordinate system either before the data is converted to vector or 
afterwards. 
Many sites began operation before modern GIS or CAD software packages existed. Based on the 
survey information gained during phase 1 of this task, some site operators have retained paper maps 
as their primary source for map generation. Such a case typically exists when there was no later need 
to update the technology for map generation. More common though, is a steady progression by site 
operators to update their map data and associated workflows according to current cartographic 
technology, primarily to GIS or CAD. Site operators oftentimes use maps and their underlying data for 
other purposes besides submitting declarations to the IAEA or EURATOM. 
Maps, and their underlying data, usually contain the utility infrastructure of the site, including gas 
pipes, power lines, material flow patterns, transportation networks, etc. CAD files are common in many 
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industries including nuclear industry. More recently, the use of GIS for site management has been 
trending in the industrial settings and the integration of geographic coordinates for CAD is becoming 
more commonplace. Many of the major CAD software packages now contain GIS plugins to facilitate 
conversion and maintenance of geographic information [10] in a GIS format. However, CAD data 
oftentimes does not contain all of the necessary attribute information required to generate datasets 
desired under this task. In addition, not all CAD datasets contain geographic coordinates and 
oftentimes require updates in order to be projected in a geographic coordinate plane.  
Although GIS is the IAEA preferred file format, it is possible to convert most CAD drawing files, which 
contain geospatial information, to a format compatible with the GES. The conversion workflow from 
CAD to GIS, however, typically requires several steps including quality control of the output. The 
process and results also depend on how (software, methods, standards, data quality requirements 
etc.) the CAD data was initially generated. Thus, CAD should be a solution for the digital data 
submission only if CAD software is already being used by a site operator or State and there are 
existing CAD datasets available. Thus, if there is neither pre-existing CAD software nor CAD data yet 
in use, GIS should be considered as the optimal solution for digital declaration site map submission to 
the IAEA. In addition to the support for IAEA digital site declarations, GIS technology has 
acknowledged benefits and it is routinely being used to support nuclear operators in their asset 
management for civil infrastructure, capital planning and site management [11].   
In many cases, site operators use GIS or CAD for preparing their declaration site maps but submit the 
maps to the IAEA in a static picture format (e.g. pdf) that does not allow IAEA to access the underlying 
data but use the map as a reference only. For instance, attribute information stored in a GIS database 
and associated with each feature on the map cannot be analysed unless they are visible on the map. 
Depending on the data format (CAD or GIS) currently used in the site, operators need to either apply 
conversion workflow from CAD to GIS (see above) or apply IAEA standards and specifications for the 
preparation of their existing GIS data (see below). 
The Framework Document on Digital Delivery of Spatial Data to the IAEA as a part of the Declaration 
Activities of the Member States supports States that are participating or planning to participate in this 
pilot project on the submission of digital declaration site maps (DDSM) to the IAEA. The document 
provides detailed guidance, specifications and standards for the preparation of DDSM data with 
appropriate data structure and content. As part of the document, the IAEA provides data templates in 
a geodatabase and shapefile formats that should be used by States to populate the geospatial 
declaration site map data with all relevant features and their attributes. This will ensure that the data is 
compatible with the IAEA’s infrastructure, namely GES. These empty template data files contain 
standard data structure for all classes of possible geographic features (e.g. roads) and AP information 
table on a declaration site map. Numeric coded domain values (e.g. 1 or 2) or corresponding 
descriptions (e.g. single lane road or multiple lane road) should be used for each geographic feature to 
describe the characteristics of data, e.g. the type of a road. Additionally, the document provides 
detailed instructions on how to prepare the data appropriately, an example of a complete digital 
declaration site map based on the data templates, a sample dataset in both geodatabase and 
shapefile formats, and instructions on how to provide an appropriate metadata to describe the content, 
quality, condition, origin, processing and other characteristics of the data.  
A common scenario encountered in this task and anticipated in future data conversion scenarios is 
when a site operator had paper copies of the site maps submitted to the IAEA. The ultimate goal of 
this process is to contain all the existing map information (feature geometries and attribute 
information) and the descriptive tables from 2.a.iii declarations in a GIS file format. As mentioned 
previously in this paper, such a file format permits clearer communication and eases the verification 
activities by providing a more precise site map which can be more easily interrogated by Department 
of Safeguards. The desired file format specifications are given in detail to site operators participating in 
this task. Each of the features specified in the Framework document were derived from the current AP 
guidelines document. Therefore, the existing guidelines are still honored with the new format but are 
formatted for better exploitation.  
According to the AP guidelines [1] [2], the following categories of data should be part of a digital 
declaration site map submission: site boundary, buildings and structures, transportation and rivers. 
Additionally, fences and walls, utilities (supply lines) and water features are requested to be voluntarily 
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provided. Each of these categories is further distinguished within the category. For example, the site 
boundary category may distinguish between site boundary, facility boundary, location outside facility 
(LOF) boundary or other important distinctions which clarify ownership or responsibility within a site. In 
addition to these categories, a table describing building related information, specified in the AP 
guidelines document is also included in the dataset. The initial declaration contains information about 
each building on a site but subsequent annual declarations only need to mention changes to existing 
building, whether the changes related to building function or location. This means that subsequent 
declarations will possibly have a different number of records than the initial declaration. The new PR3 
software will help to keep track of changes in site declarations in the way that each annual update 
should represent a consolidated update of a site, meaning that always the full picture of a site has to 
be reported in each annual update when using PR3 software. Such changes can also be easily 
tracked in a GIS since tabular and spatial changes may be detected during analysis. Detailed 
instructions on how to prepare the data is provided in the Framework document. Once the site map is 
properly formatted in GIS compatible software, it needs to be edited in order to conform to the IAEA 
specifications. Under this task, several site operators provided feedback to the IAEA on this matter. 
Each site faced unique situations that are categorized and discussed in the next section of this paper. 
5. Common challenges observed during task activities
The previous section detailed a typical workflow required to convert paper, electronic or CAD site 
maps into a GIS format as observed by several site operators under this task. In a broader view, 
certain challenges exist if an IAEA Member State adopted the new data format for their annual AP 
declaration site map submissions. This section will examine some of the issues. A Canadian case 
study was presented at the 2016 INMM annual meeting [12] and noted some issues including three 
broad challenges for implementing a new digital declaration site map submission process: 
1) The need to harmonize data between each location within a country
2) Data model differences between CAD and GIS
3) Need for State or regional authority responsible for the implementation of Safeguards to
review and analyse the data using a GIS software and analysis
Additionally, some more challenges are as follows, in no particular ranking of significance. 
5.1 Data conversion 
Legacy data stored in different formats present a challenge to users faced with using such data. CAD 
data is often used by civil engineers for construction and maintenance work within sites. While CAD 
datasets contain a coordinate system, they are often are not referenced to a common geographic 
datum and therefore must be transformed to a well-known datum. Each dataset may contain unique 
parameters which prevent an automated transformation process. Additionally, the CAD storage uses 
layers with minimal attribute information compared to a GIS attribute database. The process of linking 
attributes may be painstaking. This conversion process is not uncommon in the CAD and GIS industry 
but does require foresight and planning. As part of this task and the Framework document, standards 
and guidelines for converting CAD to GIS data were created since several of the participating site 
operators in States are using CAD to store their site information. 
5.2 Knowledge management of site map design and submission process 
This topic is not special to the site map requirements for the Additional Protocol but rather extends to 
most parts of the submission process. Training and retaining knowledgeable staff on safeguards 
requirements is ongoing for most sites. Adding an additional sophisticated tool to the process may 
sound daunting but the recent advances of GIS technology for decentralized IT infrastructure (cloud 
computing and portal technology) mean that users may, depending on the implementation of the GIS, 
use web browsers to add, manipulate and publish site maps. This means that datasets are no longer 
required to be stored in a local file system or one central server. Such an environment can also force 
data conformity through data integrity and standard checks upon data upload. The “garbage in- 
garbage out” idea may be avoided here with some thoughtful pre-planning. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
50
5.3 GIS software compatibility 
Licensed software, such as ArcGIS or AutoCAD, use proprietary data files but some of these files such 
as the ESRI file geodatabase are compatible with other software programs with limited functionality. 
The Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) is an international industry consortium of over 521 
companies, government agencies and universities participating in a consensus process to develop 
publicly available interface standards” [13]. These standards make it possible to share geospatial data 
in common formats. The use of web platforms for GIS technology means that the server software 
running the website pages become much less important to the users as long as their requirements are 
met.  
5.4 AP software compatibility with GIS data 
During the submission process, a State may use a different version of the Protocol Reporter software 
or submit their declarations in CAPE, MS Excel or in paper format. As mentioned earlier in this paper, 
the PR3 software provides the capability to include attachments in various formats (e.g. GIS) in the AP 
submission packages. Likewise, future versions of the CAPE software should consider GIS datasets 
for the submission. The current version of the APS at the IAEA is lacking the capability to link the AP 
data declaration entries (in case of 2.a.(iii) declaration equivalent to buildings) to data in other 
applications (e.g. building geometries in GES). Therefore, geospatial analysts must link each AP 
building entry manually to its corresponding building geometry in GIS. Connections between the APS 
and GES databases should be created to avoid duplicate data creation in these two systems. 
5.5 Different data schemas and standards used by the IAEA and States 
States may have used more detailed data schemas, different methodology and standards for creating 
their data than what is needed for the purpose of IAEA verification activities. Converting data into IAEA 
standards may take additional efforts. For example, a site where the standard for storing road data 
features as small segments is not preferred by the IAEA. 
5.6 Secure data transfer from States to IAEA 
The importance of a secure data transfer method for AP data submission and different security 
standards and encryption methods have been acknowledged as challenges during the task. Protocol 
Report software does not include transfer of the AP data but only the preparation of a submission 
package in a standard data format (.xml file). Provision method of the data depends on a State; some 
States used encrypted emails or similar secure methods whereas other States may submit their 
declarations in a paper format. In the future, States may adopt the future State Declarations Portal for 
their method of secure data transfer and communication to/from the IAEA. 
6. Conclusion
This paper provides an overview of the activities under the Digital Declaration Site Maps (DDSM) 
MSSP task, including the typical submission process beginning with the creation of an operator’s site 
map through the submission process cycle for the annual updates using Protocol Reporter 3 software. 
The expected benefits of the task highlighted in this paper as well as the latest development of the 
Department of Safeguards’ information technology (IT) will permit the task to move forward. 
Furthermore, the concept of the Safeguards Additional Protocol Article 2.a.(iii), its related guidelines 
document, different software used by the IAEA, States and EURATOM and the development of the 
Protocol Reporter 3 software were introduced. The MSSP task history, current events and future 
activities were presented. The typical data conversion processes from existing static maps, from CAD 
to GIS format and the limitations of the static maps and CAD for the purpose of the task were broadly 
explained. The content of IAEA’s Framework document was briefly presented to provide 
understanding of the standards, specifications and guidance for the implementation of the task by 
States. Finally, some of the common challenges faced in this task and expected to be faced in the 
future were discussed. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
51
7. Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Germany, through 
the German Safeguards Support Programme to the IAEA under task B.29/D1983. 
References 
[1] International Atomic Energy Agency. INFCIRC/540 (Corrected). Model Protocol Additional to 
the Agreemens(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the 
Application of Safeguards. 1997 September. 
[2] International Atomic Energy Agency, Services Series 11: Guidelines and Format for 
Preparation and Submission of Declarations Pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 of the Model 
Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements, D.o. Safeguards, Editor. 2004, International 
Atomic Energy Agency: Vienna. 
[3] Westra, E., Python geospatial development. 2016: Packt Publishing Ltd. 
[4] Niemeyer, I., et al. Join Programme on the Technical Development and Further Improvement 
of IAEA Safeguards - The German MSSP. in Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual 
Meeting. 2016. Atlanta, Georgia, USA: INMM. 
[5] International Atomic Energy Agency, STR-377: Development and Implementation Support 
Programme for Nuclear Verification 2015-2015. 2013, International Atomic Energy Agency: 
Vienna. 
[6] International Atomic Energy Agency, STR-375: Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D 
Plan, 2012-2023. 2012, International Atomic Energy Agency: Vienna. 
[7] Agency, I.A.E., MOSAIC, The Modernization of Safeguards Information Technology: 
Completing the picture, I.A.E. Agency, Editor. 2016: Vienna. 
[8] Li, J. New Web-Based System Streamlines Safeguards Information Exchange With IAEA. 
2017 Thursday 13 April 2017 15:45 CEST [cited 2017 28 April 2017]; Available from: 
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/new-web-based-system-streamlines-safeguards-
information-exchange-with-iaea. 
[9] Rutkowski, J., et al., The Implementation and Use of the Geospatial Exploitation System within 
the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards. Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, 2016. 
XLIV(2): p. 39-44. 
[10] See http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis/arcgis-for-autocad or 
https://www.bentley.com/en/products/product-line/asset-performance/bentley-map 
[11] Smith, G. Exploiting Spatial Data for Site Declarations. in IAEA-CN-220 Book of Abstracts, 
Presentations and Papers. 2014. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency. 
[12] Qureshi, F., et al. Digital Declaration Site Maps for Additional Protocol Update - Collaborative 
Pilot Project undertaken by the CNSC, IAEA and Bruce Power. in Institute of Nuclear 
Materials Management Annual Meeting. 2016. Atlanta, Georgia, USA. 
[13] Open Geospatial Consortium. About OGC. 2016  [cited 2016 Jan 18]; Available from: 
http://www.opengeospatial.org/ogc. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
52
Euratom On Site Laboratories Refurbishments and Developments 
Lily Duinslaegera, Karin Casteleyna, Claudia-Iustina Andora, Razvan Budaa, 
Ramon Carlos Marqueza, Lorelei Commina, Francesco D'Amatia, Lorenza 
Emblicoa, Timothy Enrighta, Marc Hilda, Joan Horta Domenecha, Arnaud Le 
Terriera, Klaus Luetzenkirchena, Sebastien Miallea, Sylvain Morela, Artur 
Muehleisena, Adrian Nicholla, Christophe Nourrya, David Poublana, Miguel 
Ramos Pascuala, Gert Rasmussena, Ana Maria Sanchez Hernandeza, Francesco 
Sarlia, Stephen Streeta, Gert Suurkuuska, Gabriel Tomaa, Magdalena Tomaa, 
Octavian Sorin Valua, Pieter Van Bellea, Denis Wojnowskia, Evelyn Zulegera  
Ferenc Lipcseib, Peter Schwalbachb, Sotiris Synetosb 
aEuropean Commission, Joint Research Centre, Directorate for Nuclear Safety and 
Security, P.O. Box 2340, D-76125 Karlsruhe, Germany 
bEuropean Commission, Directorate General Energy, Directorate Euratom 
Safeguards, L-2920 Luxembourg 
Abstract: 
The two Euratom On Site Laboratories located at the reprocessing plants in Sellafield, UK (the OSL) 
and La Hague, France (the LSS) have been operational for more than 15 years. Both On Site 
Laboratories, operated by DG JRC on behalf of DG ENER, are instrumental in providing independent 
assurance to the European Commission that nuclear material is not diverted from its declared use. 
Over the years, the laboratories have been in constant evolution, some equipment became outdated 
and in need of refurbishment or replacement. Renewals in the laboratories are foreseen to continue 
over the coming years. The larger projects entailed replacement of a thermal ionization mass 
spectrometer, including decommissioning of its connected glove boxes and installation of a new glove 
box; renewal of the complete Hybrid K-edge analysis system, including installation of an independent 
gamma station and refurbishment of two glove boxes. Such tasks include the design, manufacture, 
purchase, installation and testing of the required equipment both at JRC-Karlsruhe and on site, as well 
as fulfilling elaborate procedures to obtain the operator's permission prior to any non-routine work 
being allowed to take place. 
Over the years, a series of innovative equipment was developed at JRC-Karlsruhe, all tailored to the 
specific needs of the On Site Laboratories and taking into account the operational boundary conditions 
of industrial nuclear facilities. Examples are an infra-red based heater for alpha spectrometry with 
enhanced safety features, a hotplate based on a flexible low power heating element, a semi-automatic 
chemical separation unit, etc. The replacement of certain equipment parts (e.g. LEMO connections on 
glove boxes) also required ingenious solutions. 
Keywords: Safeguards; refurbishment; equipment; On Site Laboratories 
1. Introduction
In the European Union, irradiated fuel from nuclear power reactors is reprocessed at La Hague in 
France and Sellafield in the United Kingdom. The four reprocessing plants in these two sites are the 
largest nuclear facilities within the EU, processing hundreds of tons of nuclear material in a year. 
Under the Euratom Treaty, celebrating its 60th anniversary this year, the European Commission has 
the duty to assure that nuclear material is only used for declared purposes. The Directorate General 
for Energy (DG ENER), acting for the Commission, assures itself that the terms of Article 77 of 
Chapter VII of the Treaty have been complied with. In contrast to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 
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Euratom Treaty requires to safeguard all civil nuclear material in all EU member states – including the 
nuclear weapons states. 
The considerable amount of fissile material separated per year (including several tonnes of Pu) calls 
for a stringent system of safeguards measures. The aim of safeguards is to deter diversion of nuclear 
material from peaceful use by maximising the chance of early detection. At a broader level, it provides 
assurance to the public that the European nuclear industry, the EU member states and the European 
Union honour their legal duties under the Euratom Treaty and their commitments to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. 
A thorough analysis of the options to perform nuclear material accountancy and safeguard nuclear 
material at these reprocessing plants concluded – in the early 1990s – that sampling of material from 
the process streams would be required. Transport of the samples to a central Euratom laboratory 
should be avoided for reasons of cost effectiveness, timeliness and risk reduction [1]. Therefore, 
laboratories were established on the sites of Sellafield and La Hague that opened in 1999 and 2000, 
respectively. 
The major advantages of On Site Laboratories are: inspectors receive sample results quickly 
(timeliness), in case of doubt re-verifications can be done with little delay, measures to make sure 
samples are authentic are simpler to implement, efficiency and cost effectiveness, waste reduction 
and reduced transport needs. 
2. The Euratom Safeguards On Site Laboratories [2]
In October 1999, DG ENER, the JRC, and the plant operator started up the first “On-Site Laboratory” 
(OSL) at the site of the reprocessing plants in Sellafield to cover principally the activities of the newly 
constructed THORP plant together with several additional samples from the older Magnox plant [3] 
and with a capacity to add samples from the fuel fabrication plants in the UK (Sellafield MOX Plant, 
then under construction, and the LEU plant at Springfields). In June 2000, the second On Site 
Laboratory, the “Laboratoire-Sur-Site” (LSS) began operations at the reprocessing site in La Hague 
[4].  
The official start of operations took place after a process of conception, planning, design, 
development, and construction which lasted about one decade. Analysts of JRC-Karlsruhe have since 
been operating both On Site Laboratories on behalf of Euratom Safeguards. Both On Site 
Laboratories were integrated into existing or new operator laboratories. The On Site Laboratories are 
run under the operator's site licence and can use supporting services. They have to follow all the site 
safety, operating, and security rules. Staff of the On Site Laboratories must be trained and certified 
under the existing site regulations and must comply with the same rules as the operator's staff. 
Analysts of JRC-Karlsruhe are present on-site, ensuring a continuous flow of samples and results. The 
laboratories receive samples from all the plants on the respective sites, with dissolved spent fuel, 
plutonium products – including mixed oxide fuel – and inventory samples being the most important 
types of material from accountancy viewpoint. Since the start of the On Site Laboratories almost 
15000 samples were received. The obtained analytical data are used by DG ENER for direct 
comparison with the operator’s declarations and allow evaluating the material flows and balance in a 
timely manner. 
2.1. Methodology 
As the nominal output of Pu can reach the order of a few tonnes per year for the big reprocessing 
plants, safeguards inspectors need high accuracy to have a chance to detect diversions of a few kg, 
which are significant. The sample measurement methods were thus selected using the criteria of 
highest possible measurement accuracy (less than 0.1 % uncertainty 1s relative) and a minimum of 
resource consumption. Most of the samples are analysed by radiometric methods: K-Edge 
Densitometry (KED) for plutonium or uranium concentration, X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) for the 
uranium/plutonium ratio, and High Resolution Gamma Spectrometry (HGRS) for the analysis of 
individual uranium and plutonium isotopes. The combination of KED with XRF is called Hybrid K-edge 
(HKED). 
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The radiometric X-ray techniques must be calibrated against an absolute standard. Isotope Dilution 
Mass Spectrometry (IDMS) was chosen as the primary technique which also serves for quality control 
of the radiometric methods due to its superior accuracy. IDMS is more labour intensive and is 
therefore typically carried out only on a subset of about 10 % of the samples and allows measuring 
both the uranium and plutonium concentrations and the respective isotopic compositions. Thermal 
Ionisation Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) is used for analysis of individual uranium and plutonium 
isotopes. 
Quality assurance measures – both internal and external quality control – are of particular importance 
for accountancy measurements at facilities with a large throughput of nuclear material. The work at the 
On Site Laboratories is performed according to quality management principles and follows the 
requirements of an ISO 17025 accredited laboratory. Analytical methods and procedures are 
whenever possible being improved and the laboratories are benchmarked through regular participation 
to inter-laboratory comparison exercises, such as EQRAIN (organised by CETAMA, France) and 
REIMEP (organised by JRC-Geel, Belgium). The On Site Laboratories aim to conform to the latest 
international standards and achieve this at daily operation. 
2.2. Laboratory infrastructure and analytical capacity 
The On Site Laboratories were designed with sufficient capacity, both in terms of instruments and 
staff, to analyse a certain number of samples. This number relates to the reprocessing capacity of the 
plants, to nuclear material accountancy regulations, the safeguards verification requirements, the 
material parameters to be measured, and the capacity of the different analytical methods. The 
analytical facilities are operated for about 45 weeks a year by typically 2-4 analysts a week. During 
operation, a minimum of two analysts must be present in the On Site Laboratories according to safety-
at-work rules. 
The type of samples the On Site Laboratories would receive was also identified during the conception 
phase. The newer reprocessing plants, such as UP3 and UP2-800 at La Hague and THORP at 
Sellafield, have different sample taking regimes than the older Magnox plant. The sample types 
foreseen to be analysed were decisive for layout and infrastructure of the individual laboratories. 
2.2.1. The OSL laboratory at Sellafield 
The OSL Sellafield receives samples both from the front-end but mainly from the back-end of the 
reprocessing cycle. The radioactivity levels are such that samples can be manipulated in the 
laboratory's glove boxes. The sample types are diverse and most of them require labour-intensive 
sample preparation steps. The OSL is located in a building which is part of Sellafield’s Analytical 
Services. It comprises two ‘active’ laboratories, one ‘cold’ laboratory and an office space. All work with 
radioactive substances is performed in the two ‘active’ laboratories in glove boxes. There are 10 glove 
boxes of which the key boxes are: 
• The “non-destructive analysis” glove box, where initial processing, analysis and sample
preparation operations are carried out on product materials. Nearly all samples are analysed
in this box. The glove box contains an analytical balance, a microwave oven (for dissolutions),
a densitometer and the equipment to perform radiometric analytical measurements (HKED,
XRF, HRGS).
• A glove box dedicated to prepare reference materials for mass spectrometry and for
quantitative dilution of samples. The box is equipped with a bag-less transport system to
transfer material to the chemical separation boxes that are also equipped with this system.
• Each laboratory houses a chain of glove boxes for mass spectrometry. The chain consists of a
box used for chemical separation of uranium and plutonium from fission products and other
actinides and for alpha spectrometry, and the glove boxes for preparing the mass
spectrometer's sample holder. The mass spectrometer is connected to the sample preparation
box so that the prepared aliquots can be introduced directly into the mass spectrometer.
Samples taken at the front-end of the reprocessing plants – at the Head End Accountancy Tanks -, so 
called ‘Input samples’, are spiked in the Sellafield Thorp High Active hot cells. Only fractions 
sufficiently diluted to radiation levels acceptable for processing in a glove box are sent over to the OSL 
for chemical separation and mass spectrometry. 
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2.2.2. The LSS laboratory at La Hague 
The majority of the samples received in the LSS La Hague are highly active input liquor samples. The 
LSS is located in an annex building to the UP3 plant. It houses three active laboratories and an office. 
• The “product laboratory” is equipped with a glove box for preparation of uranyl-nitrate samples
for K-edge and mass spectrometry measurement, and to prepare mass spectrometry
reference solutions. The laboratory further hosts a suite of five boxes partly equipped with
master-slave manipulators, and is dedicated to the measurement of isotopic compositions of
PuO2 product samples. Samples are received directly into the box by pneumatic transfer. The
suite is connected to a gamma detector, and houses a hotplate and balance for dissolution
and dilution of samples prior to TIMS measurement.
• The “hot cell facilities”: The very high beta-gamma activities of input solutions and some
product samples require the use of well-shielded hot cells equipped with master-slave
manipulators. Because of the large number of input samples from different origin, and to avoid
cross contamination, the hot cell suite consists of three interconnected hot cells which are all
equipped with HKED spectrometers, balances and density measurement devices. The hot
cells are connected to the plant’s pneumatic transfer for automated sample receipt and to a
liquid waste tank for the disposal of measured sample material. A small glove box is available
for storage and treatment of reference materials.
• The “IDMS laboratory” consists of a suite of four glove boxes. The chain consists of a box for
reception of diluted samples from all other LSS facilities by pneumatic transfer, a box used for
chemical separation of uranium and plutonium and for alpha spectrometry, a box for the
assembly of the mass spectrometer's sample holder, and a box that allows introducing the
sample holder into the mass spectrometer.
3. Methodology changes in the early years
The Euratom On Site Laboratories have been operated successfully since their start-up. Naturally, 
there were a number of unexpected difficulties to which the laboratories had to adapt. Whenever 
necessary, methods and procedures were changed in order to improve quality of results and/or overall 
efficiency. 
3.1. Reference Materials 
When the On Site Laboratories were installed it was planned to obtain certified reference materials 
from JRC-Geel, Belgium. Working spikes would be prepared and calibrated in JRC-Karlsruhe and sent 
over to the On Site Laboratories ready for use. Long delays in the delivery of reference materials, 
difficulties in organising nuclear transports and the fact that solutions with higher plutonium 
concentrations are to some extent unstable forced the On Site Laboratories to produce and certify 
their own calibration reference solutions and working spikes. The Large-Sized Dried spikes produced 
at JRC-Geel, IRMM-1027, serve as reference basis for these measurements. Hence, the quality and 
reliability of these reference materials determine the accuracy to which the laboratories can operate. 
3.2. Analytical method changes 
3.2.1. Separation chemistry in the OSL Sellafield 
A fundamental step of the sample preparation for alpha spectrometry and mass spectrometry 
analyses is the separation of uranium and plutonium fractions from fission products and minor 
actinides in the various sample types. A fully automatic system, developed by JRC-Karlsruhe, based 
on a Zymark robot, was originally installed in both On Site laboratories. The separation method 
implemented in the OSL Sellafield was based on the PUREX process, a liquid-liquid extraction 
method. By the time the LSS La Hague was constructed a robotised method using chromatographic 
separation on resin (UTEVA®: Eichrom) had been developed [5]. The main advantage of the 
chromatographic separation method is a better recovery of U and Pu, meaning a smaller quantity of 
sample is needed, and no ozone depleting reagents are used. 
When the lifetime of the robot installed in the OSL came to an end, the OSL abandoned the PUREX 
process in favour of the UTEVA® chromatography. 
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3.2.2. Additional pre-separation chemistry in the LSS La Hague 
IDMS plays a key role in the On Site Laboratories as part of the quality control system. Strict 
limitations apply to the radiation level of samples allowed to be treated in glove boxes. An 
improvement which highly contributed to the quality of the IDMS technique involved the pre-separation 
of fission products from the input sample in the LSS hot-cell enclosures. This allowed transfer of 
solutions containing higher quantities of Pu and U allowing comfortable chemical separation of the two 
elements and simple mass spectrometry measurements on each fraction [6]. 
4. Refurbishment projects
After the On Site Laboratories had been running without interruption for some 10 years, it became 
apparent that some refurbishments and renewals were due in order to keep the laboratories 
functional, and to guarantee that the instrumentation remains up to the latest standard allowing high 
quality measurements. A major project started in 2010 with the replacement of a thermal ionisation 
mass spectrometer in the OSL Sellafield. Currently, a modernisation of the hybrid K-edge 
measurement system is ongoing in both On Site laboratories, and further upgrades of mass 
spectrometers are planned for 2017-2018. 
Refurbishments in the On Site Laboratories tend to be rather complex. As a result of the multilateral 
nature of the On Site Laboratories projects (DG ENER, JRC-Karlsruhe, site operator, and in the case 
of refurbishments often also a contractor having to work on the site to install new equipment), clear 
agreements and contracts have to be established. DG ENER is the owner of the laboratories and 
provides the necessary budgets for operations, routine maintenance, and refurbishments. The On Site 
Laboratories are working under the respective Site Licences of the site operator and have to meet the 
requirements defined in these licences. They furthermore must comply with site specific safety rules, 
and follow site and building procedures. The site operators have specific procedures to be followed 
before any non-routine work is allowed to take place, and permission is needed before any new 
equipment may be installed. As a result, a huge amount of paperwork is to be completed and to be 
reviewed and accepted by the site operator. In most cases, the site operator is involved in the 
execution of the work, as they are responsible for the provision and operation of the infrastructure. It is 
challenging to set up a sound time schedule and align the activities of all the stakeholders. Small 
refurbishments, such as the installation of a small piece of new equipment, or a like for like 
replacement, are usually handled directly between the On Site Laboratories analysts and the relevant 
site operator's staff. For big projects, it is necessary to set up a dedicated contract to engage a site 
operator projects team. 
4.1. IT Hardware replacement project 
The first substantial refurbishment project done in the On Site Laboratories was the replacement of the 
IT hardware. The On Site Laboratories Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS) was 
developed in the nineties in the JRC-Karlsruhe, and consisted of a combination of software modules 
running under the OS/2 WARP operating system. The original computer network was put in place 
during installation of the On Site Laboratories and had been running for almost ten years. 
Modernisation had been blocked until the OS2 version of Windows XP became available, allowing an 
economic solution for the upgrade. The LIMS software packages were migrated from OS/2 WARP to a 
Web based Microsoft XP using emulation software (Virtual PC). All new hardware was prepared and 
tested in JRC-Karlsruhe and thereafter sent to the On Site Laboratories for installation. In the OSL 
Sellafield, the computer renewals also required an upgrading of the computer cables by the site 
operator. 
4.2. Hybrid K-edge related projects 
Improvements, developments, upgrades and renewals of the Hybrid K-edge system have been a 
continuous process since the early years of On Site Laboratories. Improvements were done to 
increase the efficiency of the laboratory and inevitably some broken equipment had to be replaced. 
Measures were taken to put a fall-back option in place to keep the OSL Sellafield operational in case 
of a fatal failure of the "non-destructive analysis" box. In the last couple of years preparations started 
for a complete modernisation of the Hybrid K-edge systems. 
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4.2.1. Installation of an independent gamma station (OSL Sellafield) 
Gamma spectrometry combined with Multiple Group Analysis (MGA) spectrum evaluation is a non-
destructive means of measuring the 238Pu/239Pu, 240Pu/239Pu and 241Pu/239Pu isotopic ratios present in 
a sample and is the only practical means to quantify the americium/plutonium ratio via the 241Am/241Pu 
nuclide ratio. Owing to the exceptionally low γ-activity of 242Pu, the 242Pu/239Pu ratio cannot be 
measured, but the ratio can nonetheless be estimated using isotope correlation data [7, 8]. 
Sample throughput in the OSL Sellafield is limited by the "non-destructive analysis" glove box, where 
nearly all product samples are analysed. Originally, also the gamma measurements took place in this 
glove box. However, gamma measurements could only be carried out when the x-ray generator of the 
Hybrid K-edge/XRF was switched off. In addition, the γ -spectrometer arrangement in that glove box 
offered no means for optimisation of detector count rates, leading to exceptionally long counting times 
for MOX samples and to prohibitively long counting times for oxalate mother solutions. For a gamma 
measurement there is actually no need to remove the sample from its protective packaging, and, 
provided that the samples are adequately double bagged, the samples can be measured outside the 
confinement of a glove box. To improve the sample throughput, to prevent an unnecessary shutdown 
of the X-ray generator and to allow all samples, including low-activity oxalate mother solutions, to be 
measured to better accuracy and with a reduced measurement time, it was decided to equip the OSL 
Sellafield with an external gamma station similar to the external gamma stations developed and in use 
at the JRC-Karlsruhe. 
The external gamma station was manufactured in JRC-Karlsruhe. It consists of a high purity 
germanium detector, connected to a shielded sample cavity. The station is mounted on a trolley. 
Pending samples are stored in a lockable shielded safe. The external gamma station is connected to 
the data-taking electronics traditionally used for the glove box based gamma measurements. The 
gamma measurements, evaluation of the spectra and reporting of measurements to the LIMS are 
therefore under control of the Alpha Workstation. 
Figure 1. Drawing of the independent gamma station. 
The use of the external gamma station in the OSL Sellafield represents a considerable improvement 
for the non-destructive analysis routine work in terms of sample throughput and quality of 
measurement and in terms of work organisation and flexibility. The station enables the whole sample 
to be viewed rather than a highly collimated portion of it; the gamma detector receives a noticeably 
higher amount of gamma rays, offers better count rate control and leads to quicker and more precise 
analysis. Also, the use of the external gamma station drastically improves the flexibility of the analysts 
work planning as gamma measurement can be performed in parallel to sample measurements 
involving K-edge/XRF. 
4.2.2. Refurbishment of two glove boxes (OSL Sellafield) 
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In the OSL Sellafield nearly all product samples are prepared in the "non-destructive analysis" glove 
box and measured by the equipment inside or connected to the glove box using radiometric 
techniques. The high radiation of the samples as well as the acids used for sample preparation has 
caused and may continue to cause degradation of the glove box. The glove box will continue to be 
used with improvements and equipment repairs as needed. However, an alternative analysis route, 
based on chemistry/mass spectrometry, has been installed as a fall-back option in case of a major 
disruption in the "non-destructive analysis" glove box. This fall-back option was the subject of an "OSL 
glove box refurbishment project" involving DG ENER, the plant operator and the OSL, and consisted 
of the refurbishment of two glove boxes: 
• Conversion of a uranium glove box which was used previously for preparation and initial
analysis of pure uranium samples. The glove box was re-categorised as a uranium/plutonium
box for performing second-step dilutions on sample aliquots to a concentration which is
suitable for separation chemistry, and for preparation of reference solutions needed for the
calibration of the OSL instrumentation.
• Conversion of the existing uranium/plutonium dilution glove box into a "dissolution-spiking"
box. The glove box was refurbished to take over initial processing and sample preparation
operations on all product samples: weighing, dissolution, dilution and spiking. No radiometric
techniques are foreseen to be performed in this glove box.
All design was made in JRC-Karlsruhe and submitted to the plant operator for approval. Manufacturing 
of the new equipment and materials needed was mostly done in the JRC-Karlsruhe workshops, and 
thereafter sent over to the OSL Sellafield for installation by the OSL analysts. One of the most 
challenging tasks was to design all materials such that they could be introduced in the glove box via 
the existing posting ports, e.g. a new glove box floor. Some of the innovative design is described 
further in this paper. 
4.2.3. Modernisation of the Hybrid K-edge densitometry system 
The Hybrid K-edge / X-ray Fluorescence Densitometer instrumentation is used by Euratom and by the 
IAEA for Nuclear Material Accountancy Measurements [9]. It is the instrument of choice for 
Safeguards measurements at Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plants such as Sellafield, La Hague and 
Rokkasho. The instrument has been developed at JRC-Karlsruhe, some 30 years ago and continues 
to play an important role in Nuclear Safeguards measurements. 
Although most of the instrument’s original OpenVMS-based software is still very capable, the 
instrument's hardware is getting very old. The Alpha workstation computers, which run the software, 
and the spectroscopy electronic modules, which measure the K-edge and XRF spectra, are no longer 
made and must be replaced by modern equivalents. However, a ready to use combination of all 
modules replacing the whole interface cannot be purchased on the market. An innovative solution 
needed to be worked out in JRC-Karlsruhe. A further improvement of hardware tackled at the same 
time is the replacement of the traditional liquid nitrogen-cooled HRGS detectors by electrically cooled 
detectors. 
4.2.3.1. Installation of emulated Open VMS software 
The Virtual Alpha emulator is a software application installed on a PC with Microsoft Windows® 7 OS 
(Host system) which emulates the functions of an Alpha workstation with OpenVMS operating system 
(Guest system). The guest system is saved as a virtual hard drive. This virtual hard drive is an image 
of a real hard drive of the VMS system running on an Alpha workstation. The emulator software 
enables the Open VMS and all the VMS software installed in the virtual hard drive to run on modern 
and most advanced PC architecture (x86 and the latest Intel Processors) with Windows® OS although 
designed for the Alpha workstation architecture. Hence this allows continuing to use VMS specific 
software (i.e. Canberra k-edge software, Neutron Counting software etc.) on modern hardware. 
The system was first set up and tested in JRC-Karlsruhe in collaboration with an external contractor 
(Migration Specialties Europe, Tarthorst, Netherlands). Meanwhile most of the Alpha workstations in 
the On Site Laboratories have been replaced. 
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Figure 2. Virtual Alpha emulator installed on PC. 
4.2.3.2. Replacement of NIM electronic modules by Lynx 
The traditional Nuclear Instrumentation Modules (NIM) are no longer manufactured and the repair of 
broken NIM units is no longer guaranteed. The Lynx hardware produced by Canberra is a good 
alternative to traditional NIM. A software driver to allow Lynx to run with the Hybrid K-edge/XRF's 
OpenVMS operating system has been developed and tested in JRC-Karlsruhe, so the Hybrid K-
edge/XRF software is now capable of using modern Lynx spectroscopy hardware. The Lynx hardware 
outperforms the traditional NIM hardware except for digital peak stabilization. The HKED system uses 
two peaks (22.1 and 88.04 keV), originating from a 109Cd-source located close to the detector, as 
reference peaks for the digital stabilisation of the electronics. Properly peak-stabilized spectra are a 
crucial requirement for reliable Hybrid K-edge/XRF spectrum evaluation, and it is essential that this 
problem is remedied before the Lynx hardware can be used to replace the aging NIM electronics. An 
algorithm to improve upon the deficient Lynx peak stabilization has been developed at JRC-Karlsruhe. 
The computational approach performs better than the Lynx peak stabilization and even performs 
better than NIM-based peak stabilization. Tests on the post-processing algorithm have been 
completed, and the algorithm now has to be integrated into the OpenVMS-based Hybrid K-edge/XRF 
software. An additional advantage is that the new algorithm will be able to cope better with weaker 
109Cd radio-active sources. 
4.2.3.3. Replacement of the X-ray generators (LSS La Hague) 
The LSS has 4 Hybrid K-edge densitometry systems each equipped with a high voltage generator of 
160 kV and 15 mA and X-ray tube control unit. The generators have exhibited increased breakdowns 
and reduced reliability. It is furthermore becoming more and more difficult to repair the instruments as 
spare parts are lacking. Merion – Canberra have indicated that future repairs cannot be guaranteed. 
New HV generators (GE Titan Isovolt) capable to deliver 160 kV and up to 15 mA and compatible with 
the existing X-ray tubes (Comet MIR 160/12) were ordered and will be installed in the near future. The 
replacement will ensure reliable operation for many years to come. 
4.2.3.4. Installation of electrically cooled detectors 
Replacement of the traditional liquid nitrogen-cooled detectors by electrically cooled detectors 
eliminates the need for liquid nitrogen, which has the following advantages:  
• Independence from the availability of liquid nitrogen in the controlled areas of the operator site
• Elimination of the risks of working with liquid nitrogen (frostbite, asphyxiation)
• Use of an environment-friendly alternative to liquid nitrogen
• Significant savings in running costs (labour, liquid nitrogen)
In the OSL Sellafield three detectors with their associated 25L Dewars will be replaced by three Cryo-
pulse® CP-5 U-style Ge detectors. The Canberra Cryo-Pulse® 5 Plus is an electrically powered 
cryostat for use with HPGe radiation detectors. It utilizes a pulse tube cooler, a highly reliable 
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technology originally used in military and space applications, which has proven its value for 
germanium detectors in the original Cryo-Pulse 5. As stated by the producer, like its predecessor, the 
Cryo-Pulse 5 Plus consists of a cold-head-assembly, to which the detector is attached, and an 
external power controller. The basic external design and interface of the cold-head have been 
preserved to maximize interchangeability between the previous and the new version. However, the 
cold-head internals and the controller have been completely redesigned and new features have been 
added to improve the performance and reliability and to better answer customers’ requirements. In 
order to deal with the restricted space under the “non-destructive analysis” glove box and in the 
external gamma station, the CP5 have been custom built to offer a sideways-viewing detector head. 
The cryostats will be placed on metal support frames, manufactured in the JRC-Karlsruhe, so that the 
units can be positioned in the exact required location. The cryostats have been tested in the JRC-
Karlsruhe prior to shipment to the OSL. They are ready for installation as soon as the administrative 
procedure to obtain permission from the site operator will be finalised. 
A similar replacement action is foreseen for the seven HPGe detectors at the LSS La Hague since two 
of the detectors cannot be repaired anymore. As space restrictions are not an issue, the LSS opted for 
the hybrid detector cooling system, a combination of an electrically cooled detector with a liquid 
nitrogen cryostat, the Canberra Cryo-cycle II. Cooling is guaranteed by the liquid nitrogen in case of 
power outages. The cryostat can do without extra nitrogen for at least 6 months. A substantial 
reduction of liquid nitrogen consumption is to be expected.  
Figure 3. Cryo-pulse® CP-5 U-style Ge detectors (left) for the OSL and Cryo-cycle II Ge detectors (right) for the 
LSS. 
4.2.4. Replacement of K-edge cooling 
In both On Site Laboratories, the refrigeration chillers which serve to cool down the X-ray tubes have 
been replaced when they became unrepairable. In the LSS La Hague a preliminary infrastructure 
study was performed by the JRC-Karlsruhe, the work itself was outsourced to a contractor. In the OSL 
Sellafield, the exchange of the refrigeration chiller was handled by the site operator's project team. 
4.2.5. Replacement of Anton Paar densitometers 
The instrumentation currently in use is the Anton Paar DMA 48 in conjunction with an external 
measuring cell DMA 401. Both the DMA 48 and the DMA 401 are equipped with a borosilicate glass 
U-tube. The resolution of the instrument is 0.00001 g/cm3 and the accuracy can be as low as 0.00005 
g/cm3. The internal measuring tube is not used. The external measuring cell requires some 
modification before installation in the hot cells in the LSS and a glove box in the OSL. To maintain the 
temperature at 25 °C (in the LSS) or 20 °C (in the OSL) a water circulation is available.  
The DMA 48 and the DMA 401 are no longer available on the market. JRC-Karlsruhe has successfully 
used the spare internal measuring cells to manufacture external measuring cells. Now, there are no 
cells available anymore. The densitometers currently available on the market are integrated within a 
desktop model. A modification of these models for use in a nuclear environment is not possible since 
too many important components are not resistant to radiation. Anton Paar offers a new external 
measuring cell with a hollow U- tube made of Hastelloy C-276 (DMA HPM) to be used in conjunction 
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with the mPDS5 evaluation unit. JRC-Karlsruhe is modifying and testing this instrument for future use 
in the On Site Laboratories.   
4.3. Mass spectrometry refurbishment projects 
Mass spectrometry serves a twofold purpose at the On Site Laboratories. Thermal Ionisation Mass 
Spectrometry is used to measure the uranium and plutonium isotopic compositions. Isotope Dilution 
Mass Spectrometry is employed to determine uranium and plutonium mass fractions using a well-
characterized reference material, for example, "Large-Sized Dried Spikes" (LSD) [10, 11]. The latter 
results are also used to characterise the calibration solutions for the HKED densitometers.  
4.3.1. Decommissioning of an old TIMS MAT261 mass spectrometer and installation of a Triton 
In 2009, a project was set up to replace a broken down MAT261 mass spectrometer in the OSL 
Sellafield, and replace it with a Triton (Thermo Fisher Scientific GmbH) instrument. It was the first 
major refurbishment project in the OSL, involving four parties (DG ENER, JRC-Karlsruhe, Sellafield 
Ltd. and Thermo Fischer). A dedicated contract was signed between DG ENER and the site operator 
for their Projects' team to bring the project forward and perform the necessary infrastructure works. 
The purchase of the Triton was handled by JRC-Karlsruhe on behalf of DG ENER. Additional 
equipment such as a dedicated glove box was developed and manufactured in the JRC-Karlsruhe. 
The following work phases were identified on site: 
• Disconnection of two glove boxes from the mass spectrometry chain and their
decommissioning 
• Decommissioning of the broken MAT 261 mass spectrometer
• Preparation of the laboratory infrastructure to accommodate the Triton specifications
• Installation of the new mass spectrometer
• Installation of a new glove box and connection to the separation chemistry box and the new
mass spectrometer
• Commissioning and validation
With the installation of the Triton the OSL acquired a state-of-the-art instrument for mass 
spectrometry. The number of samples that can be loaded on one magazine is significantly higher than 
for the MAT261, and the instrument can run in independent mode, allowing overnight measurements. 
Hence, due to the Triton the OSL managed to increase the efficiency of the laboratory with delivery of 
high quality results. 
Figure 4. Triton connected to glove box (left) installed in the OSL and photo of the inauguration (right). 
4.3.2. Upgrade of the Filament Degassing Unit (OSL Sellafield) 
The Filament Degassing Unit (FDD) is needed to degas filaments before they can be used as sample 
holders for mass spectrometry. The FDD installed in the OSL Sellafield was a 30 years old instrument 
with limited capacity. Shortly after the installation of the Triton, the Filament Degassing Unit was 
refurbished: 
• Upgrade of the electronics
• Replacement of the filament rack, the new rack containing 30 positions
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Since the upgrade, the Filament Degassing Unit is more reliable, with the main advantage that 30 
filaments can be baked at once, saving valuable time for the mass spectrometry analyst. 
Figure 5. Filament rack containing 30 positions. 
The FDD unit in the LSS La Hague has become dysfunctional and can only work on one side, thus 
degassing only half of its capacity. It will be replaced by a new instrument in the near future. 
4.3.3. Upgrade of three TIMS MAT26x mass spectrometers 
The JRC has three TIMS MAT261 mass spectrometers operational, one in the JRC-Karlsruhe, one in 
the LSS La Hague and one in the OSL Sellafield. Due to their different age (from 18 to 35 years old), 
the hardware/software components and the operation of the instruments is somewhat different. For 
the oldest instrument, located in the JRC-Karlsruhe, electronic modules are becoming sparse and it 
has become difficult to purchase original spare parts. Despite its age, the instrument remains 
important for training new analysts before they are allowed to work in the On Site Laboratories. 
Therefore it was decided to upgrade the three mass spectrometers. The company Spectromat 
provides commercial options for refurbishment of MAT26x instruments, such as the provision of 
modern electronics for operation and data acquisition, and some hardware components. The 
installation of Spectromat software is required for communication with the new electronic modules. 
Due to the different ages of the three mass spectrometers, the upgrades will be individually different, 
from new software only for the OSL instrument, to some hardware plus software upgrade for the LSS 
instrument and of a complete exchange of electronics, some hardware and software in JRC-Karlsruhe. 
The approach will allow the three instruments to remain in operation over the coming 10+ years at a 
cost which is far lower than the purchase cost of new instruments. Moreover, all three mass 
spectrometers will be running with exactly the same software, which simplifies the work of the 
analysts. 
5. Innovating developments
Over the years, the On Site Laboratories faced specific problems which required creative solutions. 
Also in the frame work of the extended refurbishment projects, some ideas were worked out and led to 
many innovative developments that could be relevant for other laboratories. 
5.1. Modifications to the densitometers located in hot cells (LSS La Hague) 
To introduce a liquid in the glass U-tube of the external measuring cell of the Anton Paar density meter 
the cell is equipped with a screwed on metal tube with an external diameter of 1.6 mm. It is however 
extremely difficult to mount a new tube or new flexible tubing. Although very resistant, the flexible 
tubing occasionally needs to be replaced. Also, the Teflon tips connected to the metal tube making 
contact with the glass cell break off after a certain time. The output side of the glass cell is connected 
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to a 3-way valve via a similar system. A breakdown of this tube connection system usually meant a 
long downtime for the density meter as only a very experienced analyst was able to perform the repair. 
Since no useable alternative was available on the market, JRC-Karlsruhe has developed a new 
flexible tubing connection system for the glass cell, and quick-snap connections in stainless steel for 
the 3-way valve. 
Figure 6. Flexible tubing connection for use with manipulators (left) and small stainless steel quick snap 
connections (right). 
5.2. Infrared heater for preparation of alpha planchets 
Alpha spectrometry measurements are required for all Pu fractions to be measured by mass 
spectrometry in order to de-convolute any possible isobaric interference from 238U with 238Pu. The 
system originally installed in the On Site Laboratories for the preparation of alpha measurement 
planchets (metal sample holders), was prone to frequent breakdowns of its heating element. The 
system was also limited to a maximum planchet temperature of 180 °C, and planchets had to be 
prepared one at a time. JRC-Karlsruhe developed and manufactured a stand-alone heating unit 
containing a 100 W infra-red element. The unit is foreseen with safety features to prevent the 
inadvertent contact of the heating platform with glove box gloves or other combustible material. It also 
incorporates a timer which locks the unit until sufficient cooling time has elapsed before the analyst 
can access the heating platform. The new unit delivers a planchet temperature of approximately 290 
°C which in turn prepares better quality planchets. As a result almost no alpha planchets need 
repetition. Moreover, it is possible to prepare 4 planchets simultaneously, therefore reducing the 
overall preparation time. 
Figure 7. Infrared heater for preparation of alpha planchets. 
5.3. Semi-automated separation unit 
A fully automated Zymark robot was originally installed in the On Site Laboratories for chemical 
processing of the samples. Chemical separation is required to remove decay and fission products and 
provide separated U and Pu fractions for mass spectrometry. After ten years of use the robots came to 
the end of their lifetime and repeated breakdowns led to long downtimes, while it became increasingly 
difficult to obtain spare parts after the commercially available device was withdrawn from the market. 
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While routine operations continued performing manual separations, a new solution was needed to 
replace the outdated robots. The device had to be safe to operate in a glove box, and be compact 
enough to allow posting it into the existing boxes via the posting ports. A semi-automated separation 
device for chromatographic separation on resin (UTEVA®: Eichrom) has been developed by the JRC-
Karlsruhe in collaboration with the IAEA under the framework of the EC support programme to the 
IAEA [12]. The JRC-Karlsruhe planned and built the unit while the IAEA developed the controlling 
software based on an early version of JRC-Karlsruhe. The main features of the semi-automated 
separation unit are its modular construction for simple replacement of components, minimum need for 
operator intervention, its light structure built using materials resistant to acid environment and its 
remote control function via a LabView based software. The benefits of the semi-automated separation 
unit are a reduction of the radiation dose rates in the vicinity of the operators and an increase of the 
sample throughput. The device is expected to be installed in the LSS La Hague in the near future. 
Figure 8. Semi-automated separation unit. 
5.4. Foil heater, a hotplate based on a flexible low power heating element 
A hotplate, fit-for-purpose of dissolving spiked samples or powders/pellets in a glove box has been 
designed, manufactured and tested at JRC-Karlsruhe. Heat is provided with a flexible heating element 
that can be purchased from several manufacturers (Minco, Termya, and Synomas). The element is 
made of wires insulated in a polyimide film (Kapton®). The operational range to dissolve samples is 
between 16 V and 20 V: within this operational range the power dissipated per unit of the hotplate 
surface varies from 0.26 W/cm2 to 0.32 W/cm2. Even lower voltages are suitable for spike-dissolutions. 
The heating element is enclosed in an outer casing made of polycarbonate with UL94 V-0 certification. 
The outer temperature on the surface of the outer casing reaches no more than 60 °C. Heat output 
and external-surface temperature of the foil heater enclosure are therefore acceptable for use inside a 
glove box. An outlet in the casing is connected to the ventilation system to remove acid fumes. The 
hotplate has inserts allowing secure placement of spike vials or various sizes of Erlenmeyer flasks. 
Several heating devices can be connected in series. The case(s) containing the flexible heating 
system and the temperature sensor are located in the glove box, while the power supply and the 
temperature control unit are located outside the glove box. The cabling is connected via feed-through 
"LEMO" connectors. 
Figure 9. Foil heater for use with Erlenmeyer (left) or spike vials (middle) and prototype (right). 
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5.5. Mounting of additional lead shielding to glove boxes 
The glove boxes installed in the OSL Sellafield are Perspex type boxes. The glove box window panels 
and ceiling consist of 12 mm Perspex, and the bottom plate is made of stainless steel. The glove 
boxes are supported on a steel frame. During installation, those glove boxes that would be used for 
the more active samples were foreseen with additional 2 cm thick lead glass window panels. In the 
framework of the OSL refurbishment, additional shielding has been mounted to some glove boxes to 
protect the operators from the increased radiation. 
5.5.1. Additional shielding surrounding an existing Perspex type glove box 
The steel frame work on which the Perspex glove box is resting, had no features foreseen to add 
heavy additional shielding. A design was made to clamp a second support frame to the existing glove 
box support frame. The arrangement did not require welding or drilling. The shielding comprised of 
half-thickness leaded-panels (in front of the Perspex side-windows) and painted lead shielding fitted to 
the forth side where a bagless transport system was in place. 
5.5.2. Additional shielding underneath an existing glove box 
Additional lead shielding was installed underneath two OSL Sellafield glove boxes. Lead sheets with a 
thickness of 2-3 mm (and sheathed with a 2 mm layer of aluminium) were inserted under the glove 
box, thereby increasing the shielding efficiency of the glove box’s floor and protecting the lower half of 
the operator’s body from radiation uptake. The installation of the extra shielding required neither 
particular intervention nor modification of the infrastructure. The lead sheets slide in between the 
existing glove box frame and existing lead window frame so that they are positioned under the glove 
box but on the top of the glove box stand. The lead sheets are secured in place with steel clips and an 
additional support bar. The overall weight, estimated of 55 kg, is well within the tolerance limit of the 
glove box stand.  
5.6. Replacement of a glove box's flooring 
In the framework of the refurbishment of a glove box in the OSL Sellafield it was decided to replace 
the glove box flooring. Several pieces of equipment were removed during the cleanout of the box, 
leaving the original plastic floor in an un-even and un-complete way. Not only would this have posed 
some restrictions in the possible layout of the refurbished box, but also the risk of accidental spillages 
would have been considerable. 
5.6.1. Removal of the old flooring 
The plastic floor sheet which covered 75% of the glove box floor had to be removed to allow the fitting 
of a new floor. JRC-Karlsruhe selected and trialled a powered cutting tool (Multimaster) for the cutting-
up of the plastic floor sheet. Also some silicon sealing had to be removed, taking care not to damage 
any of the materials that form part of the glove box containment, such as the Perspex panels or the 
rubber sealant between Perspex and metal frame. An aluminium adjustable spacer was designed and 
attached to the cutting tool which allowed controlling the depth of the cut with high precision. Tests 
were performed and videoed in the JRC-Karlsruhe workshop and submitted to the plant operator to 
prove the safety of the tool. Training was given to the analysts in the use of the Multimaster in a mock-
up glove box in JRC-Karlsruhe prior to performing the work on site. 
5.6.2. Installation of new polycarbonate glove box flooring 
The design of the new glove box floor was quite challenging: 
• All materials needed had to be introduced into the glove box via the existing posting ports.
Glove boxes in the OSL Sellafield have 8 inch ports, with one 16 inch port in the roof of the 
box. 
• Only non-combustible or fire retardant and heat resistant materials are allowed to be used
throughout the facility. The plant operator insisted on the use of a UL94 V-0 certified material, 
which is difficult to obtain in Europe in small quantities. 
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• The design must allow regular inspection of the area underneath the floor for spillages, as well
as the possibility to clean up such spills
The new glove box floor is made from polycarbonate rods that slot together to form a frame, then 
levelled and covered by polycarbonate tiles. The polycarbonate used is Makrolon GP Clear 099 with 
the required UL94 V-0 certification. Once in place, the middle tiles are removable with the aid of a 
rubber plunger. A trial assembly was carried out in the JRC-Karlsruhe workshop prior to the flooring 
being delivered to site.  
Figure 10. New polycarbonate glove box floor. 
5.7. Replacement of feed-through LEMO connectors 
The feed-through LEMO connectors originally fitted to the glove box panels in the On Site 
Laboratories were showing signs of corrosion and were going green in colour due to the material of 
manufacture and the glove box environment. JRC-Karlsruhe has developed two ways of addressing 
the problem.  
5.7.1. Installation of additional LEMO connectors via a glove or posting port 
In JRC-Karlsruhe, additional LEMO feed-through connectors are installed via a glove or posting port. 
An un-used port is closed off by a port cap containing the necessary feed-through connectors. The 
system is also used for throughput of reagents tubing. 
Figure 11. Posting port with LEMO feed-through connectors. 
In the LSS La Hague, additional feed-through connectors will also be installed via a posting port. 
However, the choice fell on titanium connectors from Souriau (formally Jupiter) in line with the plant 
operator practices.  
5.7.2. Exchange of feed-through LEMO connectors (OSL) 
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In the OSL Sellafield feed-through LEMO connectors were replaced at the occasion of the 
refurbishment of two glove boxes. LEMO connectors which are no longer needed have been covered 
by stainless steel caps. All other LEMO connectors were replaced by stainless steel bulkhead LEMO 
plug/socket connectors. In the first glove box the contamination levels were so low, that, apart from 
wearing gloves and respirator protection, no additional measures were required. The contamination 
level in the second glove box called for a more stringent method to be developed. A set of specifically 
designed tools were developed to be used as safeguards during the exchanging procedure. The entire 
procedure is being patented by JRC-Karlsruhe and can therefore not be described in detail for the 
time being. The advantages of the developed method are that only the area immediately surrounding 
the feed-through connector had to be cleaned to "contamination free" levels, which facilitates the 
contamination monitoring, and all the steps of the process are protected via engineered safeguards 
which guarantees that no contamination can be released from the glove box during the exchange 
procedure. 
6. Conclusions
The Euratom On Site Laboratories have been operated successfully for more than 15 years. Based on 
the operational experience, processes have continually been optimised and procedures streamlined. 
After the first ten years, optimisation alone was no longer sufficient to keep the laboratories 
operational in the long term. Therefore, laboratory refurbishment had to be looked at with an open 
mind for future needs. Renewals in the On Site Laboratories mostly involve specialised and fit for 
purpose equipment that cannot be purchased on the market without adaptations, or cannot be 
purchased at all. The analysts working in the On Site Laboratories have always been dedicated to 
come up with creative, purpose built, problem oriented solutions. The JRC-Karlsruhe in house design 
team and workshop have proved to be of utmost importance to support the On Site Laboratories. This 
cooperation resulted in a whole series of innovative developments, which may be useful for other 
laboratories in the nuclear and/or other fields. Also, the site operators play an important role in any 
refurbishment project. The refurbishment programs are still ongoing, and are foreseen to continue 
over the coming years. The On Site Laboratories are well placed to continue to deliver high quality 
results to DG ENER. 
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work/article in whole or in part in all ESARDA publications – the bulletin, meeting proceedings, and on 
the website. 
The author declares that their work/article is original and not a violation or infringement of any existing 
copyright. 
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The ENEA Contribution to the Implementation of the National 
Nuclear Safeguards 
Alessandro Dodaro, Giorgio Giorgiantoni, Nadia Cherubini, Giuseppe A. Marzo 
ENEA, C. R. Casaccia, Roma, Italy 
Abstract: 
ENEA, The Italian Agency for New Technologies, Energy, and Sustainable Economic Development, the 
second R&D Institute in Italy, through its experts of the nuclear Division is one of the main  consultant 
- since 2004 - of the Ministry of Economic Development (Mise) for the obligations stated in the 
Additional Protocol, since the government signed the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty) that was ratified 
in 2003. Furthermore, in the periodic action plans that are submitted every three years to the 
Ministry, a great part of the economic resources allocated by MiSE are finalized to R&D activities. By 
means of this agreement, new instruments, new proposals, new information events and recently a 
mobile laboratory have been implemented to reach a prompt reaction in case of detection of 
suspicious materials during the various phases of the international and national trade that might 
result in illicit trafficking of nuclear material. In this framework ENEA is also member of ESARDA and 
follows all the main international events that are regarding R&D for the implementation of the 
safeguards. The final implementation of measures and practices under the safeguards regimes is a 
wide spectrum of disciplines, in which what is really important is the knowledge and the experience of 
the experts of our Division. Our Agency is by law committed in many activities that are involving the 
nuclear industry, also through its participated firm NUCLECO and the continuous effort to improve 
and diffuse procedures and tradition are a solid asset in the Italian scenario.  
Keywords: Implementation, Nuclear Safeguards, Additional Protocol, Characterization of suspicious 
radioactive materials, Mobile laboratory, Analytical Instrumentation 
1. Introduction
From IAEA definition: “Safeguards are a set of technical measures applied by the IAEA on nuclear
material and activities, through which the Agency seeks to independently verify that nuclear facilities 
are not misused and nuclear material not diverted from peaceful uses. States accept these measures 
through the conclusion of safeguards agreements
IAEA safeguards are an essential component of the international security system. The Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the centrepiece of global efforts to prevent the further 
spread of nuclear weapons. Under the Treaty’s Article 3, each Non-Nuclear Weapon State is required 
to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA “.  
The Additional Protocol to the NPT extends the control actions to materials and activities which are not 
specifically nuclear but that may directly or indirectly be used in the nuclear field. Furthermore the 
collection of information on these materials and activities is widened, includes also the verification and 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
70
inspections on use, possible presence of undeclared materials, adoption of new control systems and a 
better coordination among the public institutions…. 
Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Italian Law 332/2003 identifies ENEA, the Italian Agency for Energy, the 
Environment and the Sustainable Economic Development, as one of the Agancies to which MISE (the 
Italian Ministry of the Economic Development) can entrust the execution of studies and analysis and 
other specific activities related to the AP (Additional Protocol). 
2. Methods
2.1 The Integrated Service 
The ENEA  Board of Directors, with a resolution of 4 June 1986 Doc. ENEA, (86) n. 33/CA Rev.1 
approved the establishment of an «Integrated Service» for the management of low and medium 
radioactive wastes generated by external operators and defined that such a Service were undertaken 
partly directly by ENEA and partly entrusted to NUCLECO. The relations between the parties, to apply 
such a resolution are regulated through a specific Convention, whose first implementation goes back 
to the 15th June 1989. 
The legal framework in which the Agency acts and supervises the authorized operators which are in 
the business, includes two main legislative decrees: the D.Lgs. 230/95, the general Italian act on the 
nuclear activities and mainly D.Lgs. 52/2007 [1].  
• D.Lgs. 52/2007 Transposition and implementation of the Directive 2003/122/CE EURATOM
on the control of the HASS (High Activity Sealed radioactive Sources) and orphan sources.
• Art. 2 paragraph 1 letter m). «Integrated Service» technical operative tool able to take charge
of all the phases of the management cycle of the disused source.
• Art. 12 The ENEA Agency with no further charges to the government funding, is required to
organize and manage training courses for the personnel who are operating in those
installations in which orphan sources are likely to be found (i.e. customs, metal industries, the
great scrap metal repositories, the intermodal shipping nodes) to achieve adequate knowledge
and competence in the field. In such a context, the Agency makes available through internet
characteristics, pictures, and features of radioactive sources collected in posters and other
means of immediate consultation to minimize the danger of illicit trafficking of suspicious
radioactive materials (see “de minimis” trading)
• Art. 17 paragraph 3, The Integrated Service guarantees all the phases of the management
cycle of the disused sources like the preparation for shipment, the transport, eventually the
conditioning and the temporary storage. All the plants and operators which undertake
collection activities and eventual temporary storage of disused sources are allowed to join the
Service.  (They must be in possession of the relevant authorizations issued by the Ministry of
Economic Development as regulated by the 230/95 act).
Under this act of the Italian parliament issued in May 2007, ENEA is responsible for providing an 
Integrated Service able to manage the collection and the storage of low and medium activity 
radioactive materials, including disused radioactive sources. 
It can be imagined that the international legislative outline is in rapid evolution through a deeper 
harmonization among the European Union, encouraged by means of the IAEA guidelines. Italy is 
following this process, since all the legislative acts of the government and parliament are in compliant 
with the recommendations of the Agency and the EURATOM directives. 
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Fig. 1 Scheme of the integrated Service 
In this area, ENEA makes consultation to the Italian Prefectures for the preparation of schemes, 
intervention plans and procedures in case of recovery of orphan sources or suspicious presence of 
sources in the territory of the province (art. 14 Dlgs. 52/2007). 
If procedures and responsibilities were not clear, we could reach the stage in which serious accidents 
due to thefts, misuse,or illicit detention or abandoning could be unfortunately recorded. IAEA  records 
in the last decades at least ten significant accidents worldwide in which orphan sources were involved 
due to poor quality of supervision and management.  
ENEA is also the manager of the integrated service, at the end of the characterization phase, these 
radioactive materials including the sources, are hosted in the temporary NUCLECO repository where 
the liquid and solid wastes are treated, conditioned, and kept in custody, before their shipment to our 
final/temporary repository. 
In this processes, the contractual obligations with our participated firm NUCLECO, prescribe the 
fulfilment of IAEA-EURATOM Directives, as far as all the accountancy records and material balance 
files are carefully kept and available in case of inspection. 
Whenever these inspection are undertaken, experts and the personnel in general are recommended 
and have a cooperative and transparent behavior. In all circumstances Agency issues letters that 
everything complies with the clauses of the international treaties. 
We have to point out that this continuous discussions between the experts of the Regulator body, R&D 
institutions, and operators has given a beneficial thrust to the updating of the so called “nuclear right”
that implies the correct transposition of the European Directives and IAEA recommendations into the 
national law, because even in this field a strong rate of legal disputes is found and at the same time 
the necessity to update the background of lawyers and men of law. 
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2.2 Convention ENEA-MISE 
Italy through the act n. 332 October 1st 2003 [1] ratified the Additional Protocol to the Non Proliferation 
Treaty which actually includes 188 countries and it commits the NWS (Nuclear Weapon States) not to 
provide nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices to the NNWS (Non Nuclear Weapon States), 
these must not to acquire nuclear weapons, accepting safeguards on all nuclear material. All the 
States parties agree in an export controls regime to facilitate the technology exchange and to pursue 
negotiations on nuclear disarmament [2]. 
The Additional Protocol to the NPT extends the control actions to materials and activities which are not 
specifically nuclear, but that may direct or indirect be used in the nuclear field. Furthermore the 
collection of information on these materials and activities is widened, also the verification and 
inspections on use, eventual presence of undeclared materials, adoption of new control systems and a 
better coordination.among the public institutions. 
MISE and ENEA agreed that the most appropriate instrument to undertake the activities in this 
scenario was a so-called “Convention” that was signed for the first time on October 6th 2004, to be
renewed on three years basis provided the approval of an agreed technical program [3]. The  
Convention went in detail and was essentially focused at first on the fulfilment of the clauses of the 
Additional Protocol. In fact the articles of the AP were carefully studied and were grouped for 
homogeneous areas; a data bank on the potentially interested sites was developed and the Agency 
played a dual role: body subjected to determined obligations and active part of coordination and 
support between the identified actors for the presentations of the declarations as per art. 2 of the 
treaty. There was also a fruitful interface with the international Authorities like EURATOM to implement 
the new regime of the safeguards. This phase was critical in the Italian scenario since the actuation 
decrees in the act 332 were initially outstanding and ENEA then was the actor that implemented in an 
essential way the operative modes for the presentation of the declarations that are required in art. 2, 
also with more intense cooperation with IAEA. The organization of the inspections of IAEA-EURATOM 
experts to the interested sites was also organized. The signature of the Convention led to the 
strengthening of the involvement of the Institute in the consultancy in the national Committees that are 
evaluating the export applications of the firms as far as the international commerce is concerned, to 
prevent the diversion of the technologies, the dual use, suitable to divert technologies for military 
purposes. In this scenario the membership of ENEA to ESARDA has to be mentioned. Top 
management understood the benefit of being part of an international organization specially dealing 
with the aspects of the strengthening of the safeguards, facilitating and enabling the circulation of the 
scientific information, widening interests and improving technological capability. 
In this framework, the nuclear Division was asked to give evaluations and comments in the case of 
adoption of new commercial directives, advising for the approval or modification of the European 
Directives, since the rapid technological evolution needs continuous revision and updating to the 
national norms.  
Ours is a research institute, then the aspect of R&D was always kept in the highest consideration. 
Being one of the few national institution highly specialized in the nuclear field, new inspection 
techniques and in general new technologies dedicated to improve the safeguard systems were 
investigated, new instrumentation has been procured for the detection of fissile materials. 
In these last three years art. 2.a.x raised importance; it foresees the realization of the general plan 
regarding the activities related to the fuel cycle including the research activities approved by the 
Government for the following decade. Such a circumstance gives the possibility for a detailed 
investigation on studies on the fuel cycle that don’t foresee the use of nuclear material and that are
required to be submitted to the Agency in the most detailed way. 
ENEA is committed in the identification and screening of those institutions that are undertaking 
activities following in the articles. 2.a.i, 2.a.x and 2.b.i, through meetings, interviews and cooperation. 
This is especially the field of interaction with the Universities and the other research institutions of the 
national scenario.  
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Using publicly available data ENEA implemented the list of the national subjects who deal with goods 
or services whose production is of potential interest of the Additional Protocol. In particular, the 
investigation identified those subjects which are performing activities following in the Annex I and are 
producing components and systems suitable to be used in the nuclear sector and listed in Annex II. 
Our Division then advises Ministry about the new technological developments and acts which are 
developed in the international institutions and committees and that are often under revision and 
modification, to make a comparison with the Annex II of the AP.  
In this framework, the activity of training, organization of meetings and events in which European 
institutions representatives, industry managers and state bodies like customs and Ministry of 
Economic development might exchange experiences and information were organized with the scope 
of non proliferation purposes and knowledge of technologies and norms(see also ESARDA events in 
Rome). 
It was commonly understood and not fully recognized previously, how qualified in technology and 
systems were the national companies that were involved in the international trading scenario and how 
much sensitive were the task to advise Ministry having the final scope not to create hurdles to the 
national capacity in the international trading of advanced components. 
This of course, i.e. the participation to important events or active working groups had the purpose to 
make the diffusion of the results and make a more effective action not limited to the narrow bounds of 
the national landscape.     
Another field that drew the attention of our management in the last three years in our Division was the 
increasing of our lab instrumentation set, gamma spectrometers, alpha and Raman, (every instrument 
was experimentally validated even through computer models), electronic dosimeters were procured 
and finally these instruments were acquired with the specific scope to be installed on a mobile vehicle 
which could cover the needing of a prompt action in the national territory. 
In this area, a mobile laboratory was procured. Further to ENEA specifications, it was handed over in 
February 2016. 
ENEA Agency has assigned (D.Lgs. 52/2007) the task of giving specific analytical service for 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of unidentified and suspicious materials. 
The characterization of the nuclear material is performed by the staff of the of Nuclear Materials 
Characterization Laboratory of ENEA directly involved, by its own means and their own 
instrumentation, on the site with the mobile laboratory.  
Fig.1: The ENEA Mobile Laboratory 
If necessary, the sample can be transported, after a first radiological characterization, to the Nuclear 
Materials Characterization Laboratory operated at ENEA Casaccia Research Center for the execution 
of additional measurements not achievable using portable or transportable measurement techniques. 
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The mobile laboratory was specially designed to undertake “in situ” analysis on the wide spectrum of
possible cases of intervention and the multiplicity of types with which components and suspicious 
radiological materials may arise, especially in case of loss of traceability and in the event of improper 
storage at intermodal shipment points (ports, airports or railway stations), waste controls or 
environmental samples containing fissile or radioactive material. 
The presence of "suspect" material alerts the various actors in emergency management: the discovery 
of a "suspicious" material requires the coordinated action of more bodies and organizations to carry 
out complex tasks like: 
 urgent intervention to limit risks to the population and the environment;
 identification and evaluation of the radioactive material;
 on site remediation and safe management of the material to be identified;
 investigative activity, where the substance has been the subject of theft.
The Agency ENEA is involved for the radiological characterization of the material to be identified. The 
objective of the radiological characterization is the identification and quantification of emitters 
radionuclides in nuclear material in order to make a proper management of material to be controlled. 
The material to be identified is initially characterized in situ, using portable and/or transportable 
instrumentation. The operations performed during the first phase of finding and sample identification 
can be summarized as follows: 
a) verify the integrity and visual examination of the sample;
b) acquisition of photographic images of the sample;
c) measure the size and weight of the sample;
d) measurement of beta / gamma and neutron contact dose rate;
e) measurement of surface contamination by "smear test".
The next phase consists in the real radiological characterization of the material to be identified that 
can be articulated as follows: 
f) identification of the radioisotopes present in the sample;
g) evaluation of the activity of the sample and, possibly, the specific activity (with the relative
measurement uncertainties); 
h) assessment of the physical state of the sample and its size in order to identify the type of container
suitable for transport in accordance with national and international regulations. 
The instrumentation used for the purposes mentioned above is of a portable type or transportable. 
It is essentially a version of a utility vehicle of common commercial production and is equipped for the 
characterization on site of radioactive materials. In the rear part a mobile platform is installed to have 
an easy handling of the ISOCS (In Situ Object Counting System). 
The instrumentation which is fitted inside the mobile laboratory was acquired in the previous years of 
the Convention, and it is essentially based on the following equipment: 
Radiochemical fumehood. This device is installed in the technical volume of the van and allows to 
safely manage small samples guaranteeing the operator and environmental protection from eventual 
risks of contamination. 
ISOCS. (In Situ Object Counting System).  The In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) developed 
by Canberra, Inc. is the portable, in-situ gamma spectroscopy system, to identify radioactive isotopes 
and to qualitatively determine the amount of radioactive material in the considered sample. 
Portable Instrumentation 
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Inspector 1000. It is a portable system that uses a neutron probe and a gammaradiation detector. 
LP 123P Berthold Plutonium Monitor. Portable system, designed to achieve the maximum efficiency 
in the detection of fission neutrons. It assesses also quantitatively the presence of Plutonium.  
NT 200. It is used to evaluate an eventual surface contamination. It is a portable analyzer for on filter 
“smear test” measurements and in air contamination.
SSNC, Small Samples Neutron Counter. Transportable system for  gamma contaminated materials 
based on passive neutron techniques. 
The special authorization for the transport of radioactive materials (ADR) which the Radiochemical 
Mobile Laboratory is going to obtain will allow a radiological complete characterization of the “suspect” 
sample carried out in the Nuclear Materials Characterization Laboratory of ENEA Casaccia Research 
Center if the in situ characterization is incomplete. 
Furthermore the ADR authorization will allow to use on site a newly designed Non Destructive Assay 
equipment [4] developed at the Nuclear Materials Characterization Laboratory that, by means of a 
neutron generator coupled with neutron and gamma measurement systems, allows the identification of 
dirty bombs or buried materials containing fissile radioisotopes. 
2.3 Future 
For the next years, ENEA will carry on the activities which started in the previous periods of validity of 
the Convention; the investigation and the detailed description of the activities of R&D on the fuel cycle 
without the use of nuclear materials and that are not directly authorized and funded by the state and 
the sites where these activities are developed will be revised.  
The task of identifying those institutions that are committed in various ways and that are issuing 
publications and studies in this area will be continuously considered. 
The complete list of the firms that are involved in the activities of the Annex I and are producing 
systems and components suitable in the nuclear sector will be subjected to a maintainance phase and 
will stand a geolocalization process. 
The renovation will have three main aspects: a) control of the company name, b) typology of the 
activity and of the production, c) insertion of new firms or cancellation of those firms out of business. 
As far as Annex II is concerned the ENEA activity will pursue two objectives: a) keep the record of the 
updates of the Trigger List (Nuclear Suppliers Group), to control and follow up eventual modifications, 
b) implementation of the interface between the geolocalization system of the firms and the list
including the classification and the sensitive components listed in Annex II. 
Another sector in which ENEA is a focal point in the country is the training activity and the preparation 
to dedicated events which will be tuned on the following aspects: 
 International regulation developments, following up the technological evolution on the control
instruments, exploring also further fields like the Intangible Technology.
 Dissemination of the control methodologies discussed internationally. This may result in great
help for the national industrial operators. The presence of ENEA in these institutions can be
encouraged and should be advisable.
 Coordination between operators and institutions. This was experimented when the ESARDA
meeting Export control WG was held in Rome.
 Technical evolution of processes, materials and components that are resulting in a better
efficiency of the nuclear works.
Since 2004, ENEA was entrusted by MiSE both for tetween the of the country’s capacity in the field of
the nuclear safeguards. ENEA is the Agency that in Italy has peculiar capacity and knowledge in the 
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nuclear field, starting from the beginning of the implementation of this technology in the Italian 
scenario. The body ENEA is a research institute and the action of our Division is focused on the 
radiation survey, in particular in the field of the nuclear safeguards. For instance an instrument 
prototype utilizing neutronic interrogation technique was made able to detect small quantities of fissile 
material inside shielded containers. 
The R&D activity, on the basis of the international trends will be based on two main guidelines: 
 Improvement of the actual technology to increase its efficiency and make it more sensitive to
the detection of small quantities of fissile material and possibly portable.
 Exploration of other physical principles that are at the basis of revelation technologies, like the
muonic interrogation.
Therefore R&D activity will be directed to the study of measurement techniques that will allow the 
quantification of the mass of fissile and fertile materials in suspected samples. For these last low limits 
of revelation will be pursued to allow the use of non destructive analysis techniques. Imaging 
techniques will be improved. 
The Institute will work to design and prototype a new characterization system for SF from research 
reactors, in particular a transportable measurement system based on gamma spettrometry able to 
assess “in situ” the fuel burn up degree, the relevant isotope composition and the concentration of of 
fissile and fertile material in the fuel. 
The work in the safeguards is for its nature international, then the institute intends to participate and to 
be part of the main institutions and points of discussion and bring its contribution to the studies that the 
international community encourage and support. 
The Convention includes the submittal of a three years based action program which can start after 
Ministry’s approval and is specified year by year. 
3. Conclusions
The safeguards as it is stated in the introduction, in which the definition has been given, is an 
environment of wide consistency, it involves before all the soundness of laws, regulations, clear 
responsibilities of the managers, qualification of the staff who must be efficiently trained and updated 
and should be efficiently organized in institutions transmitting knowledge and tradition. 
The participation to the task forces of the supranational or European Organizations like IAEA and 
EURATOM gives a chance to give a contribution at first in the technical issues to be finalized in the 
political scenario to the final level of EC. It is not an improvised chain, but a heritage that should be 
encouraged with time. 
We can also conclude that the treaties and agreements in this matter between the various countries 
that have signed them showed their effectiveness, we can mention the Verification Agreement 
between the IAEA and EURATOM of 1973 in which the States are accepting the inspection regime, 
with all the controls on the accountancy and storage of the materials used in the nuclear activities to 
prevent the diversion of their use. 
The Additional Protocol to the Non Proliferation Treaty, ratified in Italy by Law 332/2003, aims to the 
strengthening of control actions of facilities and nuclear materials, enforces controls both on 
technologies and components that, even if basically for conventional use, could be used for nuclear 
weapons manufacturing, and on the exports to other Countries.  
The good feedback of these measures is that the number of the states that signed the Additional 
Protocol raised from 37 at mid 2004 to 153 at mid 2014. The inspections with clarifications requests 
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declined from 350 to 20 nowdays, this is a synthom that these legal and political tools are worldwide 
robust and sound, means that operators and complying with the stringent clauses of inspection and 
report for accountancy of nuclear material and also that staff is more educated, trained, and more 
opened to cooperation.  
The instrumentations and tools that ENEA is procuring through many years of implementation of the 
agreements with MiSE (Ministry of Economic Development) will enhance the response readiness in 
case in which suspect materials are detected in the normal circulation of the goods, and raw materials, 
potentially in all the intermodal transportation points. We find that the Institute feels constantly involved 
in this effort of improvement of experience and knowledge, and this is recognized by the credibility 
gained in all the country. 
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Abstract: 
The capability of the FRAM software to accurately determine the enrichment of shielded uranium by 
portable electrically cooled HPGe detectors was studied. This can have applications in the future, e.g., 
for the verification of aged uranium-bearing products, scrap, and waste materials, especially during 
short-notice random or unannounced inspections, when detector cooling with liquid nitrogen is not 
feasible.  More than 7000 high-resolution gamma spectra of certified reference materials were taken 
by the ORTEC "Detective" detector under well-defined measurement conditions. Up to 16 mm of steel 
was used for shielding. The 235U enrichment of the reference materials varied from 0.31% to 4.46%.
The settings of an existing FRAM parameter set were optimized and all the collected spectra were 
analysed using the default and the optimized parameter sets. The results obtained with these 
parameter sets are compared in this paper. 
Keywords: FRAM, gamma-ray spectrometry, shielded uranium, electrically cooled detector 
1. Introduction
The purpose of this work was to study and possibly improve the capability of the FRAM software to 
determine the enrichment of shielded uranium by portable electrically cooled HPGe detectors. This 
task was carried out at the JRC Karlsruhe site, within the support programme to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In particular, new customized FRAM parameter sets were developed 
and can be used to get more accurate results for 235U enrichment than with the default parameter sets.
An advantage of electrically cooled high-resolution gamma spectrometers (ECGS) for in-field use by 
safeguards inspectors is that they do not require liquid nitrogen for cooling. This makes them suitable 
for short notice random or unannounced inspections for the verification of aged uranium-bearing 
products, scrap, and waste materials. 
FRAM is software that calculates uranium and plutonium isotopic composition from the gamma 
spectra of these materials [1], [2]. It has been developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (USA) 
and it has been commercialized by ORTEC and Canberra. The version used in this study was 5.1 [3]. 
The so called parameter sets determine what FRAM exactly does. They define the type of material (U, 
Pu, MOX) and the type of detector. They also contain information about the isotopes and gamma 
peaks to be analyzed, peak fitting parameters, energy calibration, relative efficiency constraints, etc. 
FRAM contains a number of default parameter sets built into the software, which cover a large number 
of typical measurement configurations. However, users can also prepare modified or new parameter 
sets to suit their specific measurement configuration. In this work we focused on parameters sets for 
uranium. An analogous study with plutonium parameter sets is in progress. 
More than 7000 high-resolution gamma spectra of various certified reference materials were taken by 
the ORTEC "Detective" detector under well-defined measurement conditions with different steel 
shielding. These spectra were used to develop a parameter set suitable for determining the isotopic 
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composition of shielded uranium. Using this parameter set, the difference between the 235U 
enrichment determined by FRAM and the certified value (FRAM's bias) can be reduced to below 2%. 
2. Method and equipment
The ORTEC Detective electrically cooled spectrometer was used to record the gamma spectra. It has 
a high-purity germanium (HPGe) crystal of 50 mm diameter and 30 mm depth (length). Its warranted 
resolution is ≤ 2.0 keV at 1332 keV and ≤1.0 keV at 122 keV, while its efficiency relative to a standard 
2x2 inch NaI is 10%. The conversion gain of its amplifier is set in the factory so that it can take spectra 
up to 3 MeV. The electronics settings cannot be changed by the user. 
Spectra of all 5 items from the certified reference material set EC NRM-171 (also known as the 
"CBNM uranium set") [4] were recorded in 8 different geometries (5x8=40 configurations): 
 At 2 cm from the detector, with 0 mm Fe shielding
 At 5 cm from the detector, with 0, 2, 4, 8, and 16 mm Fe shielding
 At 10 cm from the detector, with 0 mm Fe shielding
 At 15 cm from the detector, with 0 mm Fe shielding
For each configuration 192 spectra were recorded with 5 minute real time (16 hours total 
measurement time), i.e., 40x192 = 7680 spectra were recorded. Each item of the reference material 
set contained 200 g of UO2 in container with 2 mm Al window. The certified 235U enrichments are
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Certified 235U enrichment of the reference samples [4]
Sample name Certified enrichment ± Uncertainty (2s) 
[mass %] 
CBNM U031 0.3166 ± 0.0002 
CBNM U071 0.7119 ± 0.0005 
CBNM U194 1.9420 ± 0.0014 
CBNM U295 2.9492 ± 0.0021 
CBNM U446 4.4623 ± 0.0032 
To investigate the effect of counting statistics on the results of FRAM the 5-minute spectra were added 
up to make spectra with various real times which are multiples of 5 minutes. A script was written in the 
Python 3.5 programming language for adding the spectra. To automatically analyse the large number 
of spectra an Excel macro was used, which interacts with the command-line mode of FRAM v5.1 and 
puts the results into an Excel sheet. 
To measure the performance of FRAM and different parameter sets, two quantities were used: the 
average relative bias and the mean absolute value of the relative deviation (MARD) of the 235U results.
These two quantities were calculated for each configuration (defined by enrichment, distance and 
shield thickness) as 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 =
∑
𝑥𝑖−𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑓
𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑓
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
 ,   𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐷 =
∑
|𝑥𝑖−𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑓|
𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑓
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
 , 
where n is the number of spectra analysed (e.g. n=192 for the 5-minute spectra), xi is the 235U 
enrichment calculated by FRAM and xRef is the certified reference value for the 235U enrichment. The
average relative bias can be either positive or negative. It describes the expected accuracy of many 
(n) measurements. The MARD is always positive and it describes expected accuracy of a single 
measurement. 
To see how the results from FRAM can be improved all spectra were first analysed using a "default" 
parameter set for the Detective supplied by ORTEC on the installation CD of FRAM 5.1. This is not 
one of the built-in parameter sets of FRAM, though it was made by the FRAM developers [5]. After 
each modification of the parameter set, the entire set of spectra was reanalysed and the average 
relative bias and the MARD recalculated for each configuration.  
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3. Results
3.1. Results with the "default" parameter set 
To take a snapshot of the performance of FRAM using the default Detective parameter set [5], the 5-
minute and the 80-minute spectra were analysed. The average relative bias and the MARD for these 
analyses are shown in Figure 1. The spectra were taken at a 5 cm source-to-detector distance. This 
distance was an acceptable guess for having a compromise between sufficient count rate and 
coincidence summing effects. 
For the configuration with the depleted uranium sample, CBNM U031, and 16 mm Fe shielding the 
average bias is much higher (more negative than -14 %) than for the other configurations and is 
outside of the scale of the graphs. This large bias is probably due to two reasons. First, the heavy 
shielding extremely reduces the already low number of counts in the peaks of 235U. E.g. the number of
counts in the 186 keV peak with 16 mm shielding is about 8 times lower than with no shielding while 
the 143 keV peak is not even visible for the 5 minute spectra with 16 mm shielding. Even for 80 
minutes measurement time the number of counts for the 235U peaks stays low with 16 mm shielding.
Second, the Compton scattering in the heavy shielding greatly increases the background below the 
235U peaks.  Therefore, the 235U peaks in the spectra of heavily shielded depleted uranium are very
difficult to fit. 
 a) b) 
c)       d) 
Figure 1. "Default" Detective parameter set: Average relative bias and MARD as a function of Fe shielding 
thickness for measurements at 5 cm from the detector: a) and b) for 5-minute spectra; c) and d) for 80-minute 
spectra. The error bars for the average bias are the corresponding MARDs divided by the square root of the 
number of measurements, while the error bars for the MARD are the corresponding average uncertainties 
reported by FRAM divided by the square root of the number of measurements. 
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3.2. Evolution of the parameter set 
The parameter set was modified step-by-step, changing only one type of parameter at a time, to see 
the influence of each parameter on the bias and MARD. For Figure 2 the average biases for the 
various configurations were averaged over all samples and plotted for each step during the evolution 
of the parameter set and for each shield thickness. The outlier corresponding to the configuration for 
depleted uranium, CBNM U031, with 16 mm shielding was not included in this average. 
a)      b) 
Figure 2. Steps in improving the parameter set: The average (over different enrichments) of average biases as a 
function of shield thickness is shown for each step for different Fe shield thicknesses. Error bars are the 
corresponding average MARDs divided by the square root of the number of spectra. a) for the 5-minute spectra, 
b) for the 80-minute spectra.
After a few trial-and-errors, the correct steps in modifying the parameter set were the following: 
1. Turning off the coincidence summing correction. This dramatically improves the average bias of
the results obtained from the measurements at 5 cm source-to-detector distance. This means that
at this distance the coincidence summing effects are relatively small and FRAM overestimates the
correction due to coincidence summing.
2. Fine-tuning the peak fitting parameters (energy calibration and peak-shape parameters), to
improve the accuracy of the peak areas determined by FRAM. This has a minor impact on the
results
3. Modifying the boundaries and types of absorber materials, to account for the effects of shielding.
This involved removing Cd and adding Al as absorber (0-50 mm), and modifying the boundary
values for effective Fe thickness (0-50 mm). This step has a major impact for the spectra taken
with heavy shielding.
3.3. Results with the "optimal" parameter set 
The optimal parameter set is Step 3 in Figure 2. The detailed results for the average relative bias and 
MARD obtained using this parameter set are shown in Figure 3. Just as for the default parameter set, 
the average bias for the configuration with the depleted uranium sample, CBNM U031, and 16 mm Fe 
shielding is outside of the scale of the graphs (it is more negative than -14 %). 
The improvement of the average relative bias is evident by comparing Figure 3 to Figure 1. However, 
the modifications of the parameter set have hardly any impact on the MARD. This is because the 
MARD is mainly determined by the counting statistics, and is not much influenced by the bias. 
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a) b) 
c)       d) 
Figure 3. "Optimal" parameter set: Average relative bias and MARD as a function of Fe shielding thickness for 
measurements at 5 cm from the detector. a) and b) for 5-minute spectra; c) and d) for 80-minute spectra. Error 
bars are as in Figure 1. 
3.4. Influence of sample-to-detector distance 
As mentioned above, turning off the coincidence summing correction in the parameter set improves 
the results obtained from the spectra recorded at 5 cm source-to-detector distance. To further 
investigate the performance of the coincidence summing correction algorithm of FRAM, the spectra 
taken at different distances from the detector with no shielding were analysed by the default and the 
modified parameter set, as shown in Figure 4. 
..
a)       b) 
Figure 4. Average relative bias for unshielded samples as a function of source-to-detector distance with 5-minute 
measurement time. a) With default parameter set. b) With the modified parameter set, "Step 3". Error bars are as 
in Figure 1. 
It can be seen in Figure 4 that the newly developed parameter set provides better results for most 
configurations. However, at 2 cm from the detector the effects of coincidence summing seem to be 
significant, and the correction algorithm would probably have to be turned on. 
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3.5. Influence of counting statistics 
As observed by comparing Figure 1 and Figure 3, the MARD does not improve much by modifying the 
parameter set. This is because the MARD is mainly determined by the counting statistics, and the 
improvements in the relative bias are much smaller than the MARD. To investigate the influence of the 
counting statistics and measurement time on the MARD, an indicator has to be constructed which 
describes the statistical quality of the spectra. In this work we used a number constructed as the 
reciprocal value of the combined relative uncertainties of the 186 keV peak of 235U and of the 1001
keV peak of 238U:
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟=
1
√(
∆𝑆186
𝑆186
)
2
+(
∆𝑆1001
𝑆1001
)
2
 , 
where S186, ∆S186, S1001 and ∆S1001 denote the peak area and its absolute uncertainty of the 186 keV 
and 1001 keV peaks, respectively. 
a)      b) 
Figure 5. a) Dependence of the MARD on the statistics indicator for the samples U031 and U446 measured at 5 
cm with 0 mm and 16 mm of Fe shielding, for different parameter sets. b) Dependence of statistics indicator on 
the measurement time, for the sample U031 and U446 measured at 5 cm with 0 mm and 16 mm Fe shielding. 
It can be seen from Figure 5a) that the MARD becomes smaller than 2 % if the statistics indicator is 
higher than about 200, almost independently of the sample (enrichment), shield thickness and 
parameter set used for obtaining the MARD. Furthermore, Figure 5b) shows that the statistics indicator 
does not go above 200 for most of the 5-minute and 80-minute spectra evaluated in this paper. That 
means that the statistics of most of the spectra used in this work is not enough for getting better 
precision (MARD) of the 235U result calculated from a single spectrum, regardless of the improvements
of the parameter set. Nevertheless, the analysis of the large number of spectra shows that the 
accuracy (bias) of the results is reduced by using the improved parameter set. 
4. Conclusion
A new FRAM parameter set has been developed for analysing shielded LEU spectra taken with the 
ORTEC Detective. The performance of the default and the newly developed set was evaluated in 
detail for the 235U enrichment range from 0.31% to 4.46 % and for Fe shield thicknesses up to 16 mm.
It was shown that the new parameter set performs better, especially for heavily shielded samples. This 
parameter set can be equally used for shielded or unshielded samples. The parameter set will be 
made available to the IAEA within EC support programme. 
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Measurement of Uranium Enrichment Standards Using High 
Resolution Gamma Spectrometry with High Precision and Accuracy 
Ramkumar Venkataraman and Stephen Croft 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN 37831, USA 
Abstract: 
The purpose of this work was to produce a quality data set of gamma-ray spectra that can be shared, 
thus facilitating independent analyses. This work is part of a larger research effort to quantify 
uncertainties for nuclear material measurements. Established gamma-ray isotopic analysis codes 
MGAU (Multi-Group Analysis for Uranium) and FRAM (Fixed Energy, Response Function Analysis 
with Multiple Efficiencies) use nuclear data including half-lives and gamma-ray absolute emission 
probabilities, along with measured peak intensities to determine enrichment or isotopic abundance) 
the isotopic composition of nuclear material. The propagated uncertainty in the measured enrichment 
is a combination of measurement uncertainties as well as the nuclear data uncertainties. In principle, 
by performing a careful measurement campaign, minimizing the measurement uncertainty component, 
it would be possible to determine the limiting uncertainty in the enrichment due only to nuclear data, 
and possibly identify the need for improvement. High-quality gamma-ray spectra of uranium 
enrichment standards were collected using a High-Purity Germanium spectrometry system. The 
Certified Reference Materials (CRM) 969 and CRM 146 uranium standards were measured, spanning 
a range of enrichments from. 0.3206 at. % to 93.233 at %. A Region of Interest (ROI)-based approach 
was used to analyze gamma-ray peaks from 
235
U. The analysis was carried out using data from four
different gamma ray peaks from 
235
U, including the 185.715 keV peak.  Correction factors were 
determined and applied for the attenuation through the wall, and the non-infinite thickness of the U3O8 
layer in the CRM sources. A thorough evaluation of various sources of uncertainties was performed, 
and uncertainties quantified. The count rates from key gamma-ray peaks from 
235
U were plotted as a
function of uranium enrichment (atom %), based on the enrichment meter principle convention.  Future 
analysis will focus on determining specific or atomic emission ratios between nuclides, which is aimed 
at improving relative nuclear data for internally calibrated isotopic codes. 
Keywords: Uranium Enrichment Gamma Spectrometry Uncertainty Quantification 
1. Introduction
Isotopic codes such as MGAU [1] and FRAM [2] use nuclear data such as the half-lives and gamma-
ray absolute emission probabilities along with measured peak intensities to determine isotopic ratios 
(enrichment or isotopic abundance) as a measure of the isotopic composition of nuclear material.  
(1) 
In Eqn. (1), Ni and Nk are the number of atoms of isotopes i and k, C(Eij) and C(Eik) are the net peak
area or peak intensities, respectively, at gamma-ray energies Ej and El, B(Rij) and B(Rkl) are the
absolute emission probabilities (gamma-ray yields), and RE(Ej) and RE(El) are the relative efficiencies 
of the detector at energies Ej and El, respectively. The propagated uncertainty in the measured 
enrichment is a combination of measurement uncertainties as well as nuclear data uncertainties. Item-
specific uncertainty estimates are difficult to make, and the reported uncertainties are usually limited to 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
87
precision. Furthermore, these codes currently use “adjusted” gamma-ray yields to obtain consistent 
analysis results, thus making the first principle uncertainty quantification impossible. If the accuracy of 
the nuclear data can be improved, one would not have to “adjust” the gamma-ray yields. By 
performing a careful measurement campaign, minimizing or eliminating the various sources of 
measurement uncertainties, it would be possible to determine the limiting uncertainty in the 
enrichment due to nuclear data.  
High-quality gamma-ray spectra of uranium enrichment standards were collected using a High-Purity 
Germanium (HPGe) spectrometry system. The Certified Reference Materials (CRM) 969 [3] and CRM 
146 [4] uranium enrichment standards were measured . The CRM 969 consists of a set of five 
standards with enrichments ranging from 0.32 at. % 235U to 4.52 at. % 235U. CRM 146 consists of a set
of three uranium standards with enrichments ranging from 20.31 at. % 235U to 93.23 at. % 235U.
The spectra were collected by following good measurement practices, including: (i) using an HPGe 
detector of the Broad Energy Ge (BEGe) model with an energy resolution of 600 eV or better at 122 
keV, (ii) stable electronics, (iii) graded shielding around the sides and the back of the HPGe detector, 
(iv) a reproducible source-to-detector geometry, (v) source placed far enough away from the detector 
to minimize the dependence on geometry and to avoid true coincidence summing effects, (vi) avoid 
count rate related losses due to random summing and pile-up, (vii) frequent background 
measurements, and (viii) acquire spectra in smaller time intervals and sum the counts, rather than 
acquire a single spectrum over a lengthy period of time. For each standard, 48 consecutive one-hour 
counting trials were conducted. This was done to monitor the stability of the counting system, and also 
to monitor any fluctuations in the background conditions.  
The spectra were analyzed using the Peak Easy software package [5] provided by Los Alamos 
National Laboratory. In the results reported here, a Region of Interest (ROI)-based approach was used 
to analyze gamma-ray peaks from 235U. The count rates were plotted as a function of uranium 
enrichment in atomic %. The data was fit using the Deming statistical analysis code [6], taking into 
account the uncertainties in both the x and y coordinates. Various uncertainty components were 
considered, and bounding values for uncertainties were assigned. Review of the data in this way is a 
powerful overall quality check because a direct proportionality is expected between the full energy 
peak intensity and atomic %. The spectra and the analysis results will be shared with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to facilitate independent analysis. Future spectral analysis will be aimed 
at improving relative nuclear data for internally calibrated isotopic codes. 
2. Experimental Set-up and Measurement Procedure
The certified 235U/U fractions for CRM 969 and CRM 146 standards are given in Table 1 and Table 2,
respectively. The uncertainties in the certified values of 235U fractions are quoted at the 2 level of
confidence.  A photograph of the calibration standards are shown in Figure 1. 
Material ID 031 071 194 295 446 
Atom Percent 
(2 uncert.) 
0.3206 
±0.0002 
0.7209 
±0.0005 
1.9664 
±0.0014 
2.9857 
±0.0021 
4.5168 
±0.0032 
Mass Percent 
(2 uncert.) 
0.3166 
±0.0002 
0.7119 
±0.0005 
1.9420 
±0.0014 
2.9492 
±0.0021 
4.4623 
±0.0032 
Table 1. CRM 969 - Certified 235U/U fractions 
Source ID NBL 0021 NBL 0022 NBL 0023 
Atom Percent 
(2 uncert.) 
20.311 ±0.02 52.800 ±0.042 93.233 ±0.0053 
Mass Percent 
(2 uncert.) 
20.107 ±0.02 52.488 ±0.042 93.1703 ±0.0052 
Table 2. CRM 146 - Certified 235U/U fractions
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Figure 1. U Enrichment Standard Sources (supplied by NBL) 
The measurement system consisted of a Canberra Model BE3825 Broad Energy Germanium detector 
(Ge crystal of 3800 mm2 area and 25 mm thick), a Canberra Model Inspector 2000 Digital Signal
Processor, and a personal computer for data acquisition. The detector was mounted on an ISOCS (In 
Situ Object Counting System) [6] cart and shielded on the sides and at the back with 2 in. thick lead. A 
Sn-Cu liner was configured on the inner surface of the lead shield (“graded shielding”) to block the 
secondary the lead x rays. Figure 2 shows the top view of the shielded detector. 
Figure 2. Top view of the BEGE detector showing the graded  shielding 
The conversion gain of the analog-to-digital converter (ADC) was set at 16,192 channels. The gain 
was adjusted such that the slope of the linear energy calibration fit was 0.075 keV/channel, a 
commonly used and recommended value for performing isotopic analyses using MGAU and FRAM in 
low-energy mode. Prior to measuring uranium sources, the stability of the digital signal processor 
(DSP) was studied using 57Co and 137Cs measurements. Forty-eight (48) counting trials were
performed, each trial lasting for 1 h. The digital gain stabilizer in the IN2K DSP does not have the zero 
stabilization capability. During the first set of 48 counting trials with 57Co and 137Cs, the gain
stabilization was turned off and the spectra were acquired. The average variations in the energy 
corresponding to the centroid channels and the standard deviations were: (121.982 ±0.007) keV and 
(661.442 ±0.041) keV. This is equivalent of less than one channel drift). The variations in the Full 
Width at Half Maximum (FWHM) were: (0.588 ±0.005) keV at 122 keV, (1.271 ±0.008) keV at 662 keV. 
The gain stabilization was turned on and a second set of 48 one hour counting trials were performed. 
The results were: (122.026 ±0.007) keV and (661.546 ±0.036) keV. It was decided to turn gain 
stabilization off for the uranium measurements since the system stability was practically the same. The 
gain drift was negligible. 
A fixture was used to locate the uranium standards reproducibly, on-axis with respect to the detector, 
and at a distance of 63 cm from the front face of the detector. Source-detector distance was 
maintained the same for all standards for convenience, as well as to simplify interpretation of the 
results.  
Good measurement practices were followed in setting up and acquiring the spectra. These are listed 
below. 
(i) By locating the sample “far” away from the detector, several sources of systematic 
uncertainties were minimized. These include; 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
89
a. Minimization of uncertainty due to sample positioning.
b. Minimization of the high count rate related effects such as those due to pulse pile-up,
and random summing. The dead time was approximately 3% for the highest
enrichment standard, and it was lesser for lower enrichments.
c. Avoiding the bias due to loss or gain of counts because of true coincidence summing
between gamma rays from 235U decay.
(ii) Each standard was counted for a long period of time (48 h) to ensure good counting precision 
in the key gamma-ray peaks from 235U.  The counting period was divided into 48 one-hour trials (rather
than one long 48 h count) so that the stability of the gamma spectrometry system could be monitored, 
and also so that any fluctuations in the ambient background could be flagged. The net peak areas 
from the 48 trials (at a given gamma energy) were summed, and the statistical uncertainties were 
propagated.  
(iii) Background measurements were performed at the beginning and end of the campaign, and 
they were interspersed between standard measurements. 
3. Discussion of uncertainty components and correction factors
The following uncertainty components were estimated. 
• Uncertainty due to sample positioning 
• Uncertainty due to counting statistics 
• Uncertainty in system dead time correction 
• Correction for non-infinite thickness and its uncertainty 
• Correction factor for container wall attenuation 
• Uncertainty in mass attenuation coefficient values due to isotopic enrichment 
These are discussed in the sections below. 
3.1. Uncertainty due to sample positioning 
The source-to-detector distance was maintained at 63 cm using a custom fixture. An indentation in the 
fixture helped in holding the sample such that the bottom of the cylindrical sample was on-axis with 
respect to the detector. An uncertainty of ±0.1 cm (or ±0.32% on the rate) was estimated for the 
reproducibility of the source position. This was based on the tolerance of the indentation in the source 
holder where the bottom of the NBL can rested. 
If a single spectrum was analyzed to determine quantitative results, the uncertainties in sample 
positioning would cause a systematic bias. In the present analysis where results from various trials 
using various standard sources are pooled and are assumed to be from the same population, the 
positioning uncertainty of ±0.32% ought to be considered as a random uncertainty. 
3.2 Uncertainty due to counting statistics 
The uncertainty range due to counting statistics obtained for the highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 
low-enriched uranium (LEU) standards are given in Table 3 below. For the HEU standards, the lower 
and upper bounds for precision correspond to an enrichment (atomic %) of 20.311 at. % and 93.233 
at. %, respectively. For the LEU standards, the lower and upper bounds correspond to 0.3206 at. % 
and 4.5168 at. %, respectively. 
Gamma Energy (keV) Counting Statistics (HEU standards) 
Counting Statistics 
(LEU standards) 
140.76+143.76 0.036% - 0.080% 0.204% - 1.494% 
163.356 0.048% - 0.106% 0.264% - 1.802% 
182.62+185.715 0.011% - 0.024% 0.053% - 0.301% 
205.316 0.035% - 0.078% 0.190% - 1.292% 
Table 3.  Uncertainty due to counting statistics 
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3.3 Uncertainty in system dead time correction 
The gamma spectra were acquired by setting the DSP in the Live Time Correction (LTC) mode, which 
extends the live time to compensate for the loss of counts due to system dead time. However, there is 
an inherent uncertainty in how the dead time is determined for the DSP, which in turn would result in 
an uncertainty in the correction that is applied. 
Canberra’s IN2K DSP uses a filter with a trapezoidal shape. The trapezoidal pulse shape is made up 
of two parameters, the rise time (RT) and the flat-top (FT). The dead time  is calculated as follows. 
    (2) 
For the current measurement campaign, the rise time and the flat-top were set to RT = 5.6 s and 
FT = 0.8 s, respectively. Therefore the system dead time will be 12 s. An uncertainty of ±5% was 
assigned to the system dead time parameter based on the information provided by the manufacturer 
0.6 s). 
Assuming a paralyzable dead time model for the system, the count rate recorded by the multichannel 
analyzer (MCA) can be written as follows. 
(3) 
In Eqn. (3), R0 is the true count rate, Rm is the measured or recorded count rate and  is the dead time 
parameter whose value is dictated by the shaping times used in pulse processing. At low count rates, 
the exponential term in the denominator of Eqn. (3) can be approximated as (1+R0.). Our objective is 
to determine the true count rate R0, knowing the recorded count rate Rm, and the dead time parameter 
. Using the approximation for the exponential and re-arranging terms, Eqn. (3) can be re-written as 
follows. 
(4) 
The uncertainty in the true count rate due to the uncertainty in dead time can then be calculated. 
(5) 
The true count rate from Eqn. (4) and the uncertainty in the true count rate from Eqn. (5) were 
determined for the three HEU standards. The results are given in Table 4. 
Enrichment (at%) Measured Count Rate (Rm ) cps 
Corrected count 
rate (R0 ) cps 
Uncertainty in R0  
due to dead time 
R0 cps 
Relative. 
Uncertainty 
(R0/R0 ) 
20.311 600 604.3 0.21 0.03% 
52.800 1500 1527.5 1.35 0.09% 
93.233 2300 2365.3 3.17 0.13% 
Table 4.  Uncertainty in system dead time correction 
The relative uncertainty in the dead time correction factor is likely systematic, trending with the count 
rate. It is negligible for LEU in this work, and it somewhat scales with enrichment for HEU. 
3.4 Correction for non-infinite thickness and its uncertainty 
For relating the enrichment of 235U to the measured net peak count rate from one of the gamma lines
of 235U, the sample being measured must be infinitely thick to the gamma rays at the given energy.
The transmission TS of gamma rays through the sample can be calculated or measured. For infinitely 
thick samples, TS will be zero. Therefore, the factor 1/(1-TS) is a measure of the correction that must 
be applied to the full energy peak count rates in order to correct for the non-infinite thickness of the 
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sample. In this work, the correction factor and the uncertainty were calculated using equations 6,7, 
and 8. 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
The mass attenuation coefficients (MACs) (total – coherent scattering) for the sample material, U3O8,
at the four gamma energies (143.76, 163.356, 185.715, and 205.315 keV) were obtained from the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) XCOM database [7]. The parameter t in 
Eqn. (6) is the mass density in units of g·cm2. The uncertainty in the mass density values of the LEU
standards are given in the NBL CRM standards. These were propagated to yield the uncertainty in the 
correction factor 1/(1-Ts). 
The non-infinite thickness correction factors are tabulated in Tables 5 for the 185.715 keV gamma ray 
energy for all the LEU and HEU standards. The uncertainties in the correction factors are given in the 
CRM certificates for the LEU standards only. The correction factors and their uncertainties for other 
(143.76, 163.356  and 205.315 keV) gamma energies from 235U have been calculated and tabulated in
an extended report of the work by the authors [8]. 
NBL 
Standard 
Mass 
thickness 
t 
(g·cm2)
Uncertainty 
in t 
(g·cm2)
(cm2/g)
Tot-Coh 
185.715 
keV 
Correction for  
non-infinite 
thickness 
(185.715 keV) 
Uncertainty 
in non-inf 
thickness 
correction 
(185.715 keV) 
031-078 5.22 0.3 1.2584 1.001442 0.000545 
071-078 5.22 0.3 1.2584 1.001442 0.000545 
194-078 5.22 0.3 1.2583 1.001445 0.000546 
295-078 5.22 0.3 1.2583 1.001450 0.000548 
446-078 5.22 0.3 1.2583 1.001457 0.000550 
NBL0021 5.98 unavailable 1.2579 1.000541 - 
NBL0022 5.98 unavailable 1.2572 1.000540 - 
NBL0023 5.98 unavailable 1.2583 1.000540 - 
Table 5. Correction for non-infinite thickness and its uncertainty 
From the results presented in Table 5, it is seen that for the LEU standards, the correction for non-
infinite thickness overlaps with unity at the 2 level of its uncertainty. The mass density uncertainties 
for the HEU set are not provided in the CRM certificates. So the uncertainty in the correction factor 
could not be propagated for HEU standards. 
3.5 Container wall attenuation: Correction factor and its uncertainty 
The thickness of the bottom aluminum wall of the NBL standards is given in the certificates for the 
CRM 969 and CRM 146 standards, along with their uncertainties. The uncertainties in the wall 
thickness are random uncertainties since they are the standard deviation of the thickness values 
measured at various points on the surface of the bottom wall. The uncertainty in the correction factor 
for attenuation through the container wall was estimated using the uncertainty in the wall thickness. 
The correction factor due to gamma-ray attenuation through the container wall and its uncertainty are 
calculated using Equations (9) and (10). 
(9) 
In Eqn. (9), T is the transmission factor,  is the mass attenuation coefficient for aluminum,  is the 
density of aluminum, and t is the wall thickness.  
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
92
(10) 
CFwall and t are the uncertainties in the transmission factor and the aluminum wall thickness, 
respectively. 
The correction factor due to attenuation through the wall thickness and the uncertainty in the 
correction factor are given in Table 6 for the 185.715 keV gamma ray energy from 235U.
NBL 
Standard 
Al Wall 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Uncertainty 
in Al wall 
thickness 
(1(mm) 
CFwall 
(185.715 keV) 
CFwall 
(185.715 keV) 
031-078 1.996 0.010 1.06796 0.00035 
071-078 1.996 0.010 1.06796 0.00035 
194-078 1.996 0.007 1.06796 0.00025 
295-078 1.997 0.005 1.06799 0.00018 
446-078 1.996 0.006 1.06796 0.00021 
NBL0021 1.994 0.0052 1.06789 0.00018 
NBL0022 1.994 0.0052 1.06789 0.00018 
NBL0023 1.994 0.0052 1.06789 0.00018 
Table 6. Wall attenuation correction and its uncertainty 
3.6 Variation in mass attenuation coefficient values of U3O8 for different U enrichments 
When the MAC values for uranium oxide (or other compounds) are obtained from the national 
database (e.g., NIST XCOM), it must be recognized that these are for the natural oxide, and not 
necessarily for the actual oxide that may have a different isotopic enrichment. The differences 
between the MAC for the natural U3O8 compound versus the MAC values for U3O8 with different 235U
enrichments were calculated for 235U gamma energies. Results are given for the185.715 keV gamma.
NBL 
Standard 
Enrichment 
(atom%) 
MAC for U3O8 
cm2/g
Diff. in MAC values 
w.r.t. nat. U3O8 
031-078 0.3206 1.258294 0.00% 
071-078 0.7209 1.258285 0.00% 
194-078 1.9664 1.258258 0.00% 
295-078 2.9857 1.258236 0.00% 
446-078 4.5168 1.258203 -0.01% 
NBL0021 20.311 1.257855 -0.03% 
NBL0022 52.800 1.257137 -0.09% 
NBL0023 93.233 1.256219 -0.16% 
Table 7. Influence of enrichment on MAC of U3O8 
The influence of enrichment on MAC does not introduce an uncertainty in any attenuation factor 
calculation because the appropriate mass density of U3O8 is used with the corresponding MAC. 
4. Analysis results and discussions
An ROI approach was adopted because of its simplicity and its amenability for propagating the 
uncertainties in a clear and technically defensible way. The objective of the ROI analysis was to verify 
whether the count rates from the 235U gamma-ray peaks varied linearly with respect to the enrichment
(atom %) The Peak Easy software supplied by Los Alamos National Laboratory was used to extract 
the 235U net peak areas from the spectra that were collected. Figure 3 shows an example spectrum
with the ROI that includes the 182.6 keV and 185.715 keV peaks from 235U.
The 182.6-keV gamma ray from 235U has an abundance of 0.39%, much smaller compared to the
abundance of the 185.715-keV gamma ray (57.0%). However, at enrichments of 20% and higher, the 
intensity of the 182.6-keV peak is non-negligible. The ROI was therefore defined to include the 
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182.6-keV peak to avoid biases that may be induced while attempting to estimate the continuum 
counts to the left of the 185.715-keV peak. Including the 182.6-keV peak would yield more consistent 
results while studying the trends in the data from standards of different enrichments. Data from other 
235U gamma-ray peaks at energies of (140.76 + 143.76) keV, 163.356 keV, and 205.316 keV were 
also analyzed and the uncertainties propagated [8]. The analysis results from multiple gamma-ray 
peaks would help identify sources of biases that may selectively impact one of the energies and those 
that may impact all energies. 
Figure 3. Example spectrum from the 93.233 at% NBL standard; ROI at (182.6 + 185.715) keV 
The same ROI settings were used to analyze the spectra from all 48 trials for all the enrichment 
standards. The net peak area (counts) and its uncertainty (counts) were determined. The continuum 
under the peak was estimated using a linear model. . The peaked background contribution to the 
(182.62 + 185.715) keV ROI was subtracted (Eqn. 11) and the uncertainties propagated.  
The same ROI settings were used to analyze the spectra from all 48 trials for all the enrichment 
standards. The net peak area (counts) and its uncertainty (counts) were determined using the 
following equations. 
(11) 
In Eqn. (11), S is the net peak area signal from the sample, G is the gross area in the peak ROI, B is 
the continuum counts under the peak ROI, and I is the peaked interference due to gamma rays 
present in the background. The continuum B was determined using a linear model, as given in 
Eqn. (12) below. 
(12) 
In Eqn. (11), B1 and B2 are the summed counts in the continuum ROIs to the left and the right of the 
peak ROI, n1 and n2 are the number of channels in the continuum ROIs to the left and right of the peak 
ROI, and N is the number of channels in the peak ROI. 
The propagated uncertainty in the continuum counts under the peak is calculated as follows. 
(13) 
Since the counts B1 and B2, as well as the gross count G, are expected to reasonably obey Poisson 
statistics, variance is equal to the mean. Therefore the uncertainty in the net peak area is written as 
follows. 
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(14) 
The contribution from background interference, I, was estimated using the same ROI settings used for 
the true signa I, in the ambient background net peak ROI was propagated using 
the uncertainties in the gross and continuum counts in the background ROI 
The peak count rates from the ROIs of interest were corrected for the non-infinite thickness of the 
measured samples and the attenuation through the bottom wall of the container. The uncertainties due 
to counting statistics were propagated along with the uncertainties in the correction factors, and the 
uncertainty in sample positioning. The corrected count rates were plotted as a function of enrichment 
(atom%). 
  The net peak area, the gross peak area, and the continuum counts at the 182.62 + 185.715-keV ROI 
were plotted as a function of 235U enrichment (in atom %). The plots are shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6.
The Deming curve fit program was used to fit a linear function through the data points. Uncertainties in 
both x and y axes (the corrected count rate and atomic %) were taken into consideration while 
performing the curve fit. The results of the curve fit are shown in Table 8.  
The ratio of absolute value of residuals to measurement uncertainty for the 182.6 + 185.7-keV data 
are plotted in Figures 7, 8, and 9 for net peak count rate, gross count rate, and the continuum count 
rate at the  182.6 + 185.7 keV ROI. The y axis is thus a deviation in terms of the number of sigma 
values (n 
Figure 4. Net peak count rate at 182.6 + 185.7 keV ROI vs. 235U enrichment
Figure 5. Gross count rate at 182.6 + 185.7 keV ROI vs. 235U enrichment
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Figure 7. Continuum count rate at 182.6 + 185.7 keV ROI vs. 235U enrichment
Data Parameter a Parameter b Covariance Reduced 
Net peak area 0 5.729 ± 0.007 - 1.65 
Gross peak 
area 
1.212 ±0.014 5.875 ± 0.009 -5.078E-05 1.82 
Continuum 
counts 
1.211 ± 0.009 0.145 ± 0.0008 -2.696E-06 11.41 
Table 8. Deming curve fit results for the count rates at 182.6 + 185.7 keV ROI 
From the data presented in the plots (Figures 4,5, and 6) and Table 8, it is evident that the gross, 
continuum background, and net peak counts show a linear relationship with respect to uranium 
enrichment. This is to be expected because in the ROI-based analysis, the net count is derived from 
the gross and continuum background counts. 
A two-parameter linear fit (Y intercept and slope) was performed for the gross and continuum count 
rate data. If a sample with a 235U fraction of zero was measured, the gross count rate in the 235U peak
ROIs would be non-zero because of counts due to down-scattering of gamma rays emitted by 238U
and other isotopes present in the sample. The environmental background was subtracted since those 
gamma rays did not originate in the sample.  The continuum background does not go down to zero at 
when the 235U enrichment goes to zero. This is to be expected since the down-scattered photons
emitted by other isotopes of uranium (namely 238U) will contribute to the counts in the continuum at
the (182.6 + 185.7)-keV peak ROI. 
For the net peak count rate and gross peak count rate, the reduced value is very reasonable, 
signifying that the observed deviation among the data points is consistent with the estimated 
uncertainties in the count rates. However, for the continuum count rate, the reduced  is high 
indicating that the deviation in the data are much higher than the propagated uncertainties. Possibly 
there are sources of uncertainties that have not been accounted for in the continuum count rate. 
The plots showing the ratio of absolute value of the residuals to the propagated uncertainty  are 
given below in Figures 7,8, and  9. 
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Figure 7. Net peak count rate data: Abs(Deviation /  ) vs. at. % 235U enrichment
Figure 8. Gross count rate data: Abs(Deviation /  ) vs. at. % 235U enrichment
Figure 9. Continuum count rate data: Abs(Deviation /  ) vs. at. % 235U enrichment
The n values for the net peak count rate and gross count rate data are within ±3. In an ideal 
scenario, reduced  equals 1, and the data points will scatter normally about n = 0. As mentioned 
earlier, for the continuum count data, the n values show a higher scatter, and the reduced 2  value is
11.41, much higher than unity than what was observed for the  net peak and gross count rate data. 
The likely reason for this is an underestimation of uncertainty or unknown sources of uncertainties that 
were not considered. 
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In this paper, the results for the 185.715 keV gamma ray have been presented. The reader is referred 
to the ORNL report [8] that contains the analysis and results for data from the 143.76, 163.356, and 
205.315 keV gamma rays. 
5. Conclusions and Future work
The current analysis was performed based on an ROI approach and for four prominent gamma lines 
emitted by 235U, namely143.76, 163.356, 185.715, and 205.315 keV. Future analysis will focus on
determining specific or atomic emission ratios between nuclides, which is aimed at improving relative 
nuclear data for internally calibrated isotopic codes. The spectra and a summary of the work will be 
provided to the IAEA for its own evaluation and will also be made available to the international 
community e.g., International Working Group on Gamma-ray Spectrometry Techniques. The data set 
may be used in training classes gamma-ray spectroscopy and measurement uncertainty. 
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Abstract: 
High-purity Germanium (HpGe) detectors have traditionally been the detectors of choice for 
quantitative gamma-ray spectroscopy in safeguards applications. They benefit from the best resolution 
achievable nowadays yielding in the possibility to distinguish closely positioned peaks in complex 
spectra such as those of Pu or mixed materials. Their response has been very well characterized and 
a variety of existing software algorithms is available for isotopic composition determination tasks of U 
and Pu materials in safeguards applications. However, HpGe detectors require cooling either via the 
means of liquid nitrogen or thermoelectric cooling making the equipment heavy, bulky and thus 
inconvenient to use for hand held devices for nuclear inspectors, limited space locations or unattended 
nuclear installations.  
CdZnTe (CZT) room temperature semiconductor detectors have been proposed as a viable 
alternative. These detectors exhibit usually an asymmetrical peak shape and worse resolution in 
comparison to HpGe detectors; therefore, their application to isotopic composition determination tasks 
in safeguards is not straightforward. CZT detectors have now been optimized in their design yielding 
resolution of 1.5% at 661 keV for a 10 mm x 10 mm x 5 mm device. Such detectors are also used in 
the framework of the Inter-Comparison Exercise on U and Pu Isotopic Measurements with Medium 
Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectrometers organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the ESARDA NDA 
Working Group and the International Working Group on Gamma-Spectrometry Techniques (IWG-
GST). 
The response function of these CZT detectors differs in important ways from that of HpGe detectors, 
requiring changes to the analytical software used for isotopic composition tasks in safeguards. This 
study will characterize the response of one of the latest generation of CZT detectors – the 500 mm3 
hemispheric type at energies ranging from 59 keV to 1332 keV using analytical peak response 
models. It will present issues of CZT spectra gamma-ray analysis, including tailing on the low energy 
side of the peaks arising from incomplete charge collection efficiency, energy dependence of the peak 
shape and strategy to tackle them using mathematical detector response models. Finally, it will 
quantitatively compare two mathematical models that describe the peak shape of CZT detectors in 
terms of how well they describe the peak shape and the optimal energy range of application for each. 
Keywords: CZT; CZT peak shape; tailing effect; isotopic composition; safeguards 
1. Introduction
Due to continuous improvements in their design and related instrumentation room temperature, 
semiconductor detectors as CZT are finding numerous applications in the fields of radiation detection 
in industry, science and medicine1,2,3. CZT detectors offer several attractive features for quantitative 
gamma ray spectroscopy. They are characterized by a wide energy band gap allowing room 
temperature operation of these detectors2. Their high atomic number yields a high intrinsic efficiency 
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of gamma absorption (and thus a reduced size of the detector2). Finally, the spectral resolution of 
these detectors is significantly better in comparison with other room temperature semiconductor or 
scintillation devices, as shown in figure 1. 
Figure 1: Comparison of detector resolution for different detectors with 207Bi source. 
Nuclear safeguards is one of the applications for these detectors because these detectors present a 
viable alternative to HpGe detectors used for quantitative gamma ray spectroscopy of uranium 
samples, plutonium samples and spent fuel assemblies4,5.  
Measurements of isotopic composition of U and Pu bearing samples in safeguards applications are 
usually based on non-destructive gamma assay methods. HpGe detectors have traditionally been 
used for these tasks accompanied by  highly developed spectra analysis algorithms for isotopic 
composition determination tasks that are implemented in such commercially available codes as 
FRAM6, MGA7 and MGAU8. 
However, the necessity of cooling makes the equipment heavy, bulky and thus inconvenient to use for 
hand-held devices or in limited space locations, underwater applications and unattended nuclear 
installations which require small but efficient room-temperature detectors with good energy resolution9. 
CZT detectors, although being available nowadays in a wide range of types and sizes, are however 
limited in their practical application for U and Pu isotopic composition determination tasks due to the 
following issues. Indeed, these detectors exhibit a peak asymmetry due to incomplete charge 
collection processes and a high degree of peak overlapping in complex spectra, such as that of 
plutonium. Moreover, the existing isotopic composition determination algorithms were optimized for 
HpGe detectors. 
The various algorithms developed to quantitatively unfold the information carried by the peaks in 
unknown spectra10,11  are different in methodology. However, the conventional unfolding technique for 
the peaks in spectra is based on the correspondingly accurate knowledge of the peak shape and its 
dependence on energy. Several approaches have already been proposed for both small-size and 
large-size CZT detectors. Assessment of small size CZT detector characterization is available in 
review articles12-15.  
As for medium- to large-size CZT detectors various peak shape mathematical models have been 
proposed, differing in the number of parameters used to parameterize peaks and the way the tailing 
component is treated16-19. In this work we devote more attention to the study of possible peak shape 
mathematical models to be implemented in software for isotopic composition determination tasks 
specifically suited for CZT detectors. 
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The primary purpose of this paper is to quantitatively compare the performance of selected 
mathematical peak shape models in a wide range of energies from 59 keV to 1332 keV applied to a 
500 mm3 CZT detector response, and to determine the effective range of their application. 
The current manuscript is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short description of the point 
sources, instrumentation, measurement setup and data acquisition software used to obtain and 
process the data. Section 3 describes the analytical functions used for background and peak shape 
modelling as well as the fitting method implemented in a specially written for this purpose Matlab code. 
Section 4 presents the results of the study and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Equipment, software and data acquisition
Source. We used well-characterized point sources to determine the response of a 500 mm3 CZT 
detector. The available point sources and their energies are listed in Table 1.  
Source type Energy, keV 
241Am 59 
109Cd 88 
57Co 122 
139Ce 165 
113Sn 391 
85Sr 514 
137Cs 661 
54Mn 834 
65Zn 1115 
60Co 1173 
22Na 1274 
60Co 1332 
Table 1: List of point sources and their energies. 
Instrumentation. The measurements were performed on a hemispheric CZT detector with 10 mm x 10 
mm size and 5 mm thickness, fabricated by RITEC (Riga, Latvia)20. The detector was coupled with a 
digital GBS Elektronik Multi Channel Analyzer (MCA), model 527. The high-voltage bias applied to the 
detector was 1400 V. The preamp signals were processed by MCA using trapezoidal shaping with 1.2 
μs constant and 4096 channels spectrum size. The coarse gain setting was 10 and fine gain setting 
was 1.5, the trigger filter was (+1,0,-2,0,+1) and the flat top parameter was 1 μs. 
Software. The MCA-527 was controlled from a Dell Z00478 Optiplex 740HT desktop computer. The 
spectra were acquired using the WinSpec data collection software21.  
Measurement setup. The distance between the point source sample and the detector surface was 
30.1 ±0.2 mm. 
3. Analytical functions
3.1. Step-like contribution to background 
According to Helmer and Lee23 the background under the region of a peak is formed by the following 
main components: 
(1) the pulses related to radiation from other sources (i.e., construction materials, cosmic radiation); 
(2) the scattered pulses from higher energy gamma-rays of the source being measured; 
(3) the pulses from the desired gamma-ray which due to loss of significant amount of energy in 
sensitive volume fall below the full absorption peak in the spectral distribution. 
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The first two contributions can be approximated by a low order polynomial, whereas the third 
contribution should be approximated by a step-like function. As discussed in the literature23, if an ideal 
case is assumed when a detector has an infinitely narrow resolution and no tailing, the step-like 
increase in the counts probably results from events in which part of the gamma-ray energy escapes 
from the sensitive volume of the detector. This results in a step-function pulse distribution which cuts 
off at the peak maximum. However, in a real detector the resolution has a finite shape determined by 
the Gaussian distribution arising from the statistical fluctuation of the charge carriers and the division 
of absorbed energy between ionization and heating of the crystal lattice (Fano factor)24. Besides, 
incomplete charge collection due to the different lifetimes and mobilities of electrons and holes yields 
tailing on the low-energy side of the peak, what even more complicates the resulting peak shape2. 
Given these particularities of real detectors, the step-like function should be also broadened in order to 
reflect the physical aspects of the mentioned processes of a given detector. 
A number of functions have been suggested in the literature to represent the step-like background. 
Helmer and Lee23 have investigated the performance and summarized results for the major step-like 
functions used in quantitative gamma-ray spectroscopy.  
In our study we have used a complimentary error corrected step-like function to model the background 
under the peak. We modify this function in such a way that not only the constant representing the 
background level on the high-energy side of the peak but also the constant representing former on the 
low energy side of the peak are both fitting parameters: 
Where step_height is the parameter that represents the height of the background level on the low-
energy side of the peak and offset is the parameter that represents the background level on the high-
energy side of the peak. 
In our implementation we add the background function to the analytical peak shape model as a 
component and fit together with the Gaussian and Tailing components. 
3.2. Analytical peak shape models 
Accurate modelling of the detector response is a challenging task due to complex nature of the 
physical and statistical phenomena involved. Besides, a peak shape can be very sensitive to such 
experimental parameters as count rate (quality of spectra), degree of collimation and scattering. Due 
to these particularities, it is desirable to determine an approximate functional representation of the 
peak shape directly from the measured data.  
Thus, all mathematical representations of the peak shape include a central Gaussian part to account 
for fluctuations of the charge carriers and Fano factor. The differences between different mathematical 
peak shape models suggested in the literature17,18,19,23 arise from the functional form of the tailing 
component to account for the distortion of the central Gaussian part. The functional forms investigated 
in this paper can be categorized into three groups. The first group contains only the Gaussian. The 
second group contains the Gaussian and one tailing component and the third one contains the 
Gaussian and two tailing components. 
Although it is expected that a simple Gaussian can be applied for the mathematical representation of 
the complex peak shape of a CZT detector only at low energies where the incomplete charge 
collection effects do not yet cause serious asymmetry, it was included in the study only to contrast with 
more realistic approximations. 
The second group of functions, consisting of a basic Gaussian shape with one tailing component to 
account for peak asymmetry caused by incomplete charge collection processes, includes contributions 
from several authors19,25. In both cases the tailing is represented by an exponential multiplied by a 
complementary error corrected function.  
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Thus, the sIGAle19 peak shape model is represented in the following form with model(i) being the net 
counts in channel i, σ the Gaussian half width, x the channel number or independent variable, x0 the 
peak centroid at maximum height, T(i) the tailing component at channel i, p1 the relative tail height 
parameter and p2 the tail slope parameter: 
Due to considerations described in section 4.1 there are seven fitting parameters in our 
implementation of the sIGAle19 peak shape model: Gaussian peak height (y0), Gaussian half width (σ), 
centroid position (x0), relative tail height (p1), tail slope (p2), background height at the low energy side 
of the peak (step_height) and background height at the high-energy side of the peak (offset). 
An alternative approach to single tailed peak shape models is the two-component tailing function used 
in the FRAM6 code, with x being the channel number or independent variable, x0 the peak centroid at 
maximum height, T(i) tailing components at channel i, A the short tailing height parameter, B the short 
tailing slope parameter, C the short tailing height parameter, D the short tailing slope parameter and δ 
terminating both tails at the gamma-ray energy limiting the contribution of both tails only on the low 
energy side of the peak (i.e. the Heaviside function): 
This third group approach separates the low energy tailing into two components – one tailing 
component represents a faster decaying contribution due to trapping and recombination (long-term 
tail) and the second component represents the low-energy step caused by photoelectron escape from 
the active region of the detector (short term tail). 
In our implementation, the FRAM6 peak shape model has nine fitting parameters – Gaussian peak 
height (y0), Gaussian width parameter (𝛼), centroid position (x0), short-term tail height (A), short-term 
tail slope parameter (B), long-term tail height parameter (C), long-term tail slope parameter  (D), 
background height at the low energy side of the peak (step_height) and background height at the high-
energy side of the peak (offset). 
3.3. Fitting method 
Each of the functions described above was fitted to the point source peaks in a wide range of energies 
(see table 1 for details). For this purpose, the corresponding Matlab-based code was developed from 
scratch; it performs a non-linear least-squares fitting routine to minimize the reduced chi-square 
(corrected to the number of degrees of freedom being the number of free parameters used in each of 
the peak shape models): 
Where roi_l, roi_r specify the fitting interval (region of interest); NPAR is the number of degrees of 
freedom (number of fitting parameters); modeli is the analytic approximation at channel i, expi is the 
counts at channel i and σi is the variance. 
Identical regions were used for all fits of a particular full-energy peak in order to compare the various 
peak shape models directly. The optimization solver used in the fitting routine was a geometric 
(derivative-free) Nelder-simplex method.   
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4. Results and discussion
4.1. Quality of fitting 
The 𝜒2R values obtained for the functions investigated in this paper are shown in table 2. From the 
table it is clear that the best fit is achieved with a single-component tailing sIGAle19 function within the 
whole range of energies. The more complex FRAM6 function with two-component tailing, although 
giving fits that are quite acceptable, is less appreciable. 
Source type Energy, keV Goodness of fit (𝜒2 reduced) 
FRAM6 model sIGAle19 model Gaussian only 
241Am 59 1.5 1.2 5.8 
109Cd 88 2.6 1.0 29.2 
57Co 122 4.0 2.0 45.7 
139Ce 165 3.1 1.2 - 
113Sn 391 3.9 1.5 - 
85Sr 514 3.1 2.7 - 
137Cs 661 3.2 3.0 - 
54Mn 834 10.1 8.5 - 
65Zn 1115 6.8 4.6 - 
60Co 1173 4.4 4.3 - 
22Na 1274 3.4 2.5 - 
60Co 1332 4.3 4.2 - 
Table 2: Comparison of 𝜒2R for different peak shape models. 
The less attractive performance of the FRAM6 model is due to the functional form of the equation 
describing the tailing components – as shown in section 3.2. The FRAM6 equation for the tailing 
components terminates both tails at the gamma-ray energy, thus limiting their contribution strongly to 
the low energy side of the peak. However, as described in literature the charge collection efficiency is 
interaction-position dependent2 and restriction noted above cannot adequately approximate the 
complex nature of an energy-dependent peak shape of a CZT detector. 
To contrast these results a simple Gaussian fit to the data in the range of energies from 59 keV to 122 
keV is included in the results in table 2. It is apparent that the underestimate of the data points 
dramatically increases with energy. 
4.2. Components analysis 
In order to analyze the performance of the two functions investigated in this paper, we have calculated 
the individual contributions of the peak components (Gaussian, tail(s)) normalized to the total net peak 
area. The total net peak area value was numerically calculated by integrating the background 
subtracted peak shape model functions with fitted parameters at given energies.  As shown in figures 
2 and 3 the Gaussian area for both functions decreases with energy. However, the behaviour of the 
tailing components is different. For the FRAM6 function, the relative areas of both tails are significantly 
smaller than the Gaussian area. This behaviour is due to termination of both tails at the gamma-ray 
energy. Such a performance is acceptable in the cases where the physical origin of the events leading 
to asymmetry (such as incomplete charge collection) is relatively small compared to the other events 
(such as the fluctuation of the number of the charge carriers created in the sensitive volume of the 
detector). However, in case of a CZT detector it cannot adequately approximate the complex 
behaviour of an energy-dependent peak shape with significant asymmetry which was indicated by the 
values of  𝜒2R. 
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Figure 2: Relative contributions to the net peak area in FRAM6 peak shape model. 
Figure 3: Relative contributions to the net peak area in sIGAle19 peak shape model. 
In contrast, the sIGAle19 tailing function is not restricted to the low-energy side of the peak and its area 
can be significant relative to the Gaussian area, as indicated in figure 3. In case of a CZT detector with 
a large amount of tailing such a contribution may be realistic. Indeed, for a CZT detector the peak 
asymmetry is dependent on the charge collection efficiency which is a function of the incident photon 
interaction depth in the detector. For large volume CZT detectors, as considered in this study, for high-
energy photons interacting in deeper regions of the detector, the distortion of the peak due to 
incomplete charge collection can be quite severe. Its contribution is thus comparable to the Gaussian 
part of the peak. 
4.3. Parameters 
The fitted parameters and corresponding uncertainties as a function of energy are shown in tables 3, 4 
and 5. The width parameter increases with the energy for both peak shape models as shown in table 
3. The width of the Gaussian fitted with no tailing components to the data is clearly larger than that for
the fits with tailing components. 
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Source type Energy, keV Gaussian width 
FRAM6 model sIGAle19 model Gaussian only 
241Am 59 6.22 6.08 6.43 
109Cd 88 6.04 5.82 6.45 
57Co 122 6.72 6.43 7.26 
139Ce 165 6.96 6.62 - 
113Sn 391 9.03 8.49 - 
85Sr 514 10.27 9.76 - 
137Cs 661 12.09 11.59 - 
54Mn 834 14.49 13.87 - 
65Zn 1115 17.88 17.21 - 
60Co 1173 17.51 16.73 - 
22Na 1274 19.6 18.91 - 
60Co 1332 20.01 19.03 - 
Table 3: Gaussian peak width comparison. 
The inverse tailing slopes for both tailing components of the FRAM6 function decrease with energy as 
shown in table 4 along with the corresponding uncertainties. For the sIGAle19 function the inverse 
tailing slope given by 1/(p2*sigma) decreases with energy, as shown in table 4 with the corresponding 
uncertainties. 
Source 
type 
Energy, 
keV 
FRAM6 model parameters 
Short 
tail 
slope 
(B) 
Short tail slope 
(B) uncertainty 
Long tail 
slope 
(D) 
Long tail slope 
(D) uncertainty 
Gaussian 
width 
Gaussian 
width 
uncertainty 
241Am 59 1.58 0.29 0.33 0.09 6.22 0.11 
109Cd 88 1.31 0.28 0.35 0.07 6.04 0.26 
57Co 122 0.30 0.54 0.27 0.03 6.72 0.12 
139Ce 165 0.40 0.05 0.24 0.04 6.96 0.25 
113Sn 391 0.18 0.13 0.11 0.01 9.03 0.35 
85Sr 514 0.15 0.03 0.11 0.02 10.27 0.55 
137Cs 661 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.02 12.09 0.47 
54Mn 834 0.11 0.01 0.05 <0.01 14.49 0.22 
65Zn 1115 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.01 17.88 2.03 
60Co 1173 0.06 0.01 0.06 <0.01 17.51 0.34 
22Na 1274 0.05 0.01 0.05 <0.01 19.60 0.43 
60Co 1332 0.05 <0.01 0.04 <0.01 20.01 0.35 
Table 4: FRAM6 peak shape model parameters and uncertainties. 
Source 
type 
Energy, 
keV 
sIGAle19 model parameters 
Tail slope 
(p2) 
Tail slope (p2) 
uncertainty 
Gaussian 
width 
Gaussian width 
uncertainty 
241Am 59 0.69 0.04 6.08 0.10 
109Cd 88 0.80 0.07 5.82 0.27 
57Co 122 1.04 0.06 6.43 0.29 
139Ce 165 1.32 0.05 6.62 0.25 
113Sn 391 2.15 0.09 8.49 0.38 
85Sr 514 2.19 0.08 9.76 0.36 
137Cs 661 2.35 0.11 11.59 0.23 
54Mn 834 2.91 0.14 13.87 0.38 
65Zn 1115 3.18 0.09 17.21 0.36 
60Co 1173 2.75 0.08 16.73 0.28 
22Na 1274 3.18 0.12 18.91 0.55 
60Co 1332 3.07 0.10 19.03 0.34 
Table 5: sIGAle19 peak shape model parameters. 
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The absolute values of peak component areas as well as the total net peak area uncertainties for both 
peak shape models investigated in this paper are shown in table 6. The results indicate that for both 
peak shape models the net peak areas do not significantly differ, however the contribution of the peak 
components to the total net peak area is significantly different between the two peak shape models. 
Thus, for all energies the Gaussian areas of the single-component tailing sIGAle19 peak shape model 
are significantly smaller in comparison to those of the two-component tailing FRAM6 peak shape 
model. Indeed, because the tailing component of the sIGAle19 peak shape models is not terminated at 
the gamma-ray energy its area is significant to the Gaussian area and is larger for all energies in 
comparison with the FRAM6 peak shape model where both tails are terminated at the gamma-ray 
energy.  The net peak area uncertainties are larger for the more complicated two-component tailing 
FRAM6 peak shape model  due to its additional parameters. The net peak areas calculated using 
channel-by-channel summation technique indicate that both peak shape models estimate the net peak 
areas quite accurately. 
Source 
type 
Energy, 
keV 
Net peak area calculation mode 
FRAM6 peak shape model sIGAle19 peak shape model 
Channel-by-
channel 
summation 
Net 
peak 
area, 
counts 
Net 
peak 
area 
σ, %
Gaussian 
relative 
area, % 
Σ tails 
relative 
area, 
% 
Net 
peak 
area, 
counts 
Net 
peak 
area 
σ, %
Gaussian 
relative 
area, % 
Tail 
relative 
area, 
% 
Net 
peak 
area, 
counts 
Net 
peak 
area 
σ, %
241Am 59 93573 2.69 93 7 92135 1.16 68 22 91015 0.37 
109Cd 88 100803 3.96 92 8 99519 1.57 59 41 100037 0.35 
57Co 122 108387 2.98 91 9 107676 1.71 64 36 110477 0.34 
139Ce 165 104871 3.95 86 14 104277 1.26 56 44 107441 0.35 
113Sn 391 100502 4.71 77 23 99297 1.30 49 51 102382 0.41 
85Sr 514 148864 5.46 75 25 149650 1.02 47 53 155048 0.35 
137Cs 661 91098 5.56 76 24 92191 0.88 50 50 95670 0.46 
54Mn 834 423511 2.83 71 29 423098 1.26 50 50 448043 0.23 
65Zn 1115 194558 7.04 72 28 203497 0.61 49 51 216495 0.37 
60Co 1173 111729 3.11 76 24 114130 0.51 51 49 119375 0.65 
22Na 1274 54031 2.54 73 27 58504 0.85 47 53 61252 0.72 
60Co 1332 95843 3.10 70 30 98140 0.54 45 55 100514 0.53 
Table 6: FRAM6 & sIGAle19 peak shape models net peak areas & uncertainties. 
5. Conclusions
The performance of the two mathematical peak shape models was investigated in application to the 
response of a 500 mm3 hemispheric CZT detector in a range of energies from 59 to 1332 keV. The 
investigated peak shape models have different functional representation of the tailing component to 
account for the peak asymmetry.  
The results of this study indicate that there is no significant improvement in the quality of fit with a 
complex two-component tailing function. However, one tailing component is definitely necessary as 
shown in comparison with a single Gaussian fit. It is also apparent that a tailing component that does 
not terminate at the gamma-ray energy is preferable for a CZT detector due to a more realistic 
representation of the processes causing the asymmetry. The net peak areas for both peak shape 
models do not significantly differ, while the behaviour of the peak components is significantly different. 
The net peak area uncertainties are larger for a more complicated two-component tailing FRAM6 peak 
shape model due to its additional parameters.  
The results of this study will be further used in a uranium and plutonium isotopic composition 
determination algorithm that specifically suits the particularities of medium resolution spectra obtained 
on CZT detectors. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
107
6. Legal matters
6.1. Privacy regulations and protection of personal data 
In order to comply with the European Directive 95/46/EC as approved by the European Parliament 
and the Council of Ministers on the 24th October 1995 relating to the protection of individuals with 
respect to the processing of data of personal nature and on the free circulation of such data, it is 
necessary that you provide us with written consent. Feel free to use the example below as a template: 
"I agree that ESARDA may print my name/contact data/photograph/article in the ESARDA 
Bulletin/Symposium proceedings or any other ESARDA publications and when necessary for any 
other purposes connected with ESARDA activities." 
6.2. Copyright 
The author agrees that submission of an article automatically authorises ESARDA to publish the 
work/article in whole or in part in all ESARDA publications – the bulletin, meeting proceedings, and on 
the website. 
The author declares that their work/article is original and not a violation or infringement of any existing 
copyright. 
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Abstract: 
Nuclear materials accountancy is an important instrument of a control over non-proliferation regime 
and implementation of passive non-destructive assay (NDA) methods by nuclear safeguards at the 
inspection of nuclear facilities is a common practice. 
In this article a characterization of a neutron source having unknown plutonium mass and isotopic 
composition using classical methods of passive NDA is described. From gamma-ray energy spectrum 
of the source and neutron measurements it was confirmed that this is a 
238
Pu-Į-Li neutron source.
Mass of plutonium-238 was measured using calorimetry. Mass-ratios of 
238
Pu to 
239
Pu, 
241
Pu and 
241
Am were determined by high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometry, a three duplets method for the 
analysis of 
238
Pu-Į-Li neutron sources on radio-isotopic composition is suggested.
Keywords: 
238
Pu-Į-Li source, gamma-ray spectrometry, calorimetry
1. Introduction
In the beginning of 2016 we have been asked for the characterisation of an orphan neutron source of 
unknown isotopic composition and mass. Source had markings: MRC-Pu8Li-17 and 10 µCi. In the 
result of the search for the information in the internet it became clear that MRC stands for Monsanto 
Research Corporation and Pu8Li possibly means 
238
Pu-Į-Li source.
Monsanto Research Corporation was responsible for the production of plutonium-238 primary for 
radioisotope thermoelectric generators since 1960
th 
[1].  
Plutonium-238 was produced in different chemical forms (metal, plutonium-zirconium alloy and in the 
form of dioxide) and average values of 80.2% and 91.6% of plutonium-238 enrichment have been 
reported for standard and high assay plutonium dioxide microspheres [2] which are most suitable for 
the alpha-n source fabrication. 
For the confirmation of source type and for its radiological characterisation standard passive NDA 
methods have been applied, including neutron coincidence counting, high-resolution gamma-ray 
spectrometry and calorimetry.  
2. Materials and methods
Neutron coincidence measurements were primary focused on the determination of source type and 
were made with JCC-31 high-level neutron coincidence counter; rates of singles and doubles were 
acquired with JSR-12 coincidence analyzer with a shift register. 
Gamma-ray energy spectra were acquired with coaxial and planar high-purity germanium (HPGe) 
detectors and these measurements were done for the confirmation of source type and for the 
determination of its radio-isotopic composition. 
Calorimetric measurements were made by means of small samples calorimeter (ANTECH, model 
601C) using heat flow differences in twin (empty and loaded) measurement cells and were aimed on 
the determination of plutonium mass. Prior heat-flow measurement from the sample an electric-sample 
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calibration in range from 1 mW to 200 mW was made. Calorimeter was well characterized before by 
means of plutonium-gallium reference standards [3].  
3. Experimental results
3.1. Determination of source type 
Neutron measurements were made with JCC-31 counter having measured detection efficiency of 
16.8% and die away time of 41.2 µs. From neutron measurements (Table 1) one may conclude that 
this is an alpha-n source, since rate of singles is much higher than doubles rate, and may observe that 
rate of doubles is not negligible, so an alpha-emitter is characterized by a certain fission rate. 
Table 1 – Results of neutron measurements 
Source ID Measurement time, s Singles rate, s
-1
Doubles rate, s
-1
Background 7200 4.5 ±0.8 0.09 ±0.04 
MRC-Pu8Li-17 7200 164165 ±5.1 54.4 ±22.0 
From the broad energy range spectrum (Figure 1) measured with a coaxial HPGe detector it is evident 
that this is a 
238
Pu-Į-Li source as long as there are intense 238Pu spectral lines, as well as 478 keV
peak with characteristic Doppler broadening produced by photons emitted from the source in the result 
of de-excitation of 
7
Li nucleus. Excited state of 
7
Li nucleus is formed in the result of 
7
Li(Į, Į’)7Li* (0.48)
nuclear reaction which is concurrent to 
7
Li(Į, n)10B nuclear reaction.
208
Tl lines are observed in the tail of the spectrum due to the presence in the source of 
232
U which is a
decay product of 
236
Pu. 
 Figure 1 – Spectrum of source measured with coaxial HPGe detector 
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3.2. Determination of plutonium isotopic composition 
Mass-ratios of 
238
Pu to 
239
Pu, 
241
Pu and 
241
Am were determined using high-resolution gamma-ray 
spectrometry. No signal from 
240
Pu and 
242
Pu was measured. Two different HPGe detectors (planar 
and coaxial) have been used: planar detector (Ø500×13mm) to get optimal energy resolution in 
125 keV energy region of interest (ROI) and coaxial detector (with nominal relative detection efficiency 
of 12%) to cover broad energy range from 40 keV to 1 MeV.  
Measurement with planar detector was made with an amplifier gain of 75 eV/channel, so spectrum 
(Figure 2) can be processed with Multi-Group Analysis (MGA) software code [4]. 
Figure 2 – Spectrum of source measured with planar HPGe detector 
In the result of processing of the spectrum measured with planar HPGe detector with the MGA code 
an error message was generated by the program:  
“ABORT: 239, 240 or 241Pu result was negative”. 
Manual analysis on isotopic composition was made. Analysis shows that in the spectrum of the planar 
detector a 100 keV ROI has a dominant 
238
Pu line and 208 keV ROI is influenced by a Compton 
continuum induced by 478 keV photons, so in the result  
a) multiplets of spectral lines in 100 keV ROI can’t be resolved,
b) 160 keV spectral line of 
240
Pu is suppressed by a Compton continuum,
c) in principle 125 keV ROI is suitable for the determination of plutonium isotopic composition.
For the manual determination of plutonium isotopic composition three duplets have been used. Two 
duplets (125/129 keV and 148/152 keV) from the 125 keV ROI (Figure 3) to obtain mass ratios of 
241
Am/
239
Pu and 
241
Pu/
238
Pu isotopes and third duplet (662/742 keV) from the spectrum measured with 
coaxial HPGe detector which allows to obtain 
241
Am/
238
Pu mass-ratio (Figure 4). 
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Figure 3 – Region of interest of the spectrum of source measured with planar HPGe detector 
Figure 4 – Region of interest of the spectrum of source measured with coaxial HPGe detector 
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Since corresponding spectral lines of the third duplet are rather separated in energy (by 80 keV), a 
correction for the detection efficiency was made. Linear correction factor for the detection efficiency 
was calculated based on the measured intensities of 511, 583 and 860 keV spectral lines of 
208
Tl 
normalized to corresponding branching ratios (Table 2, Figure 5). Correction factor calculated from the 
ratio of relative detection efficiencies at 662 keV and 742 keV is equal to the 1.126. 
Table 2 – Determination of relative detection efficiency based on the 
208
Tl spectral lines
Isotope 
Energy, 
keV 
Net count 
rate, cps 
Branching ratio, 
photons/disintegration 
Normalized net 
count rate 
Relative detection 
efficiency 
208
Tl 511 9.32 0.226 41.23893805 1 
208
Tl 583 27.97 0.845 33.10059172 0.802654 
208
Tl 860 2.95 0.1242 23.75201288 0.575961 
Figure 5 – Relative detection efficiency in energy range from 511 to 860 keV calculated from the 
intensities of 
208
Tl spectral lines (linear fit)
To get mass-ratios of radionuclides, first, a measured net count rate in full-energy absorption peaks 
was normalized to specific activities of radionuclides at given energies and then ratios of the obtained 
values (Table 3, last column) have been calculated for the three duplets (Table 4, second column). 
For the third duplet linear correction for the detector detection efficiency was made based on the 
intensities of 511, 583 and 860 keV spectral lines of 
208
Tl and corresponding branching ratios.
Emission probabilities used in calculations (branching ratios, specific activities) have been taken from 
the following reference works [5, 6]. 
Table 3 – Measured mass fractions of radionuclides for a given geometry and detection efficiency 
Isotope Energy, keV Net count rate, s
-1
Uncertainty, s
-1
Activity, s
-1
g
-1
Measured mass fraction, g 
Planar detector 
241
Am 125.26 9.786 0.045 5.16E+06 1.90E-06 
239
Pu 129.29 6.955 0.041 1.44E+05 4.83E-05 
241
Pu 148.57 1.786 0.037 7.15E+06 2.50E-07 
238
Pu 152.68 1153.1 0.09 6.05E+06 1.91E-04 
Coaxial detector 
241
Am 662.42 0.505 0.007 4.61E+05 1.10E-06 
238
Pu 742.82 2.485 0.007 3.28E+04 7.58E-05 
y = -0.0011x + 1.5122
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0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
400 500 600 700 800 900
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 d
e
te
c
ti
o
n
 e
ff
ic
ie
n
c
y
Energy, keV
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
114
Table 4 – Measured mass ratios of radionuclides 
Isotopes Mass ratio Relative uncertainty, % Notes 
239
Pu/
241
Am 25.42 1.05 1
st
 duplet
238
Pu/
241
Pu 764 2.08 2
nd
 duplet
238
Pu/
241
Am 77.59 1.67 3
rd
 duplet with detection efficiency correction
238
Pu/
239
Pu 3.05 2.72 3
rd
/1
st
 duplet
241
Am/
241
Pu 9.85 3.75 2
nd
/3
rd
 duplet
3.3. Determination of plutonium mass 
Heat flow from the source was measured by calorimetry. 
Based on the measured 
238
Pu/
241
Am and 
239
Pu/
241
Am mass-ratios and corresponding values of 
specific power for these radionuclides (567.57 mW/g for 
238
Pu, 114.2 mW/g for 
241
Am and 1.93 mW/g 
for 
239
Pu) it is calculated that only 0.26% of the total heat flow is produced by 
241
Am and only 0.11% by
239
Pu.  
Prior heat flow measurements from the source a calorimeter was calibrated using electrical samples in 
the range from 1 to 200 mW (Table 5, Figure 6). Duration of each calibration measurement and 
interval between them was 180 minutes. For the calibration an average value of measured voltage for 
the last 5 minutes was used.  
Table 5 – Results of calorimeter calibration 
Run 
Applied power, 
mW 
Measured voltage, mV Measurement time, min 
Last 5 minutes average 
1 1 0.13011 180 
2 4 0.488556 180 
3 7 0.847408 180 
4 10 1.203614 180 
5 40 4.789346 180 
6 70 8.375567 180 
7 100 11.94437 180 
8 200 23.83546 180 
Figure 6 – Electrical calibration of small-samples calorimeter 
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Measurement of heat flow from source was made (Figure 7). Measured value is 370.9 mW what 
corresponds to 0.65 g of plutonium-238. 
Figure 7 – Long term calorimetry measurement of the heat flow from the 
238
Pu-Į-Li source
4. Measurement errors
4.1. Gamma-ray spectrometry 
Net peak areas have been calculated according to the equation 1: 
ேܰா் ൌ ீܰோைௌௌ െ௞ುଶ ቀேಳభ௞ಳభ ൅ேಳమ௞ಳమቁ  (1) 
NNET = net peak area  
NGROSS – gross area of peak region 
NB1 – gross area of 1
st
 background region
NB2 – gross area of 2
nd
 background region
kp – number of channels in the peak
kB1, kB2 – number of channels in the background regions 
kB1 = kB2 = 4 
In all calculations first background region corresponds to the 4 channel region before the peak (3 
channels prior the peak plus first peak channel) and second background region corresponds to the 4 
channel region after the peak (last peak channel plus three following channels). 
Peak area uncertainties (U) have been calculated according to the equation 2: ܷ ൌ ට ீܰோைௌௌ ൅ ቀ ௞೛௞ಳభା௞ಳమቁଶ ൈ ሺ ஻ܰଵ ൅ ஻ܰଶሻ  (2) 
Mass-ratio uncertainties have been determined purely as a sum of relative uncertainties of the 
count-rate in corresponding duplet peaks. 
4.2. Calorimetry 
Error of calorimetry measurements is illustrated by long-term measurement with a source (Figure 7). 
Deviation of measured heat flow value after 180 minutes (red point = 370 mW) from the average 
measured value of 370.9 mW calculated for the time interval from 1500 to 4200 minutes is 0.25%.  
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5. Summary of experimental results
Summary of measured masses of radionuclides is given in Table 6. 
241
Pu decays by Į-decay to 241Am with half-life 14.35 years. Age of plutonium was determined by
gamma-ray spectrometry using mass-ratio of 
241
Am
 241
Pu to and assuming absence of 
241
Am in 
plutonium at the date of plutonium production (chemical separation). 
238
Pu decays by Į-decay to 234U with a half-life of 87.7 years. Mass of 234U was determined based on
measured mass of 
238
Pu, age of source and half-live of 
238
Pu. 
Table 6 – Masses of radionuclides in MRC-Pu8Li-17 source 
Radionuclide Mass, g Uncertainty, % Method 
238
Pu 0.652 ± 0.25 Calorimetry 
239
Pu 0.214 ±  2.72 HRGS (
238
Pu/
239
Pu mass ratio)
240
Pu - - 
241
Pu 0.000853 ± 2.08 HRGS (
238
Pu/
241
Pu mass ratio)
242
Pu - - 
241
Am 0.008403 ± 1.67 HRGS (
238
Pu/
241
Am mass ratio)
234
U 0.315 ± 1.90 
238
Pu half-life, age of source* (
241
Am/
241
Pu mass ratio)
Pu mass, g 0.867 
Total mass, g 1.190 *Age of plutonium = 50.1 ±0.8 years
6. Conclusion
In this article a characterization of a neutron source of unknown plutonium mass and isotopic 
composition using classical methods of passive NDA is described. From gamma-ray energy spectrum 
of the source and neutron measurements it was confirmed that this is a 
238
Pu-Į-Li neutron source.
Mass-ratios of 
238
Pu to 
239
Pu, 
241
Pu and 
241
Am have been determined by gamma-ray spectrometry 
using method of three duplets: two duplets form the spectrum measured with planar HPGe detector 
(125/129 keV and 148/152 keV) and third duplet from the spectrum measured with coaxial HPGe 
detector (662/742 keV). 
Mass of plutonium-238 was measured using calorimetry and masses of 
239
Pu, 
241
Pu and 
241
Am were 
calculated relative to the mass of 
238
Pu based on the results obtained with gamma-ray spectrometry. 
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Abstract: 
This paper presents a comparative study of the two multichannel analysers MCA-166 and its 
successor the MCA-527 from GBS electronic with the focus of the operation at high counting rates. 
The MCA-166 is widely used by the IAEA and Euratom for safeguards inspections in the field. The 
performed tests included the influence of peak shaping parameters, count rate and temperature on the 
operation of the two multichannel analysers. 
Keywords: Gamma measurement, Multichannel analyzer, comparative study 
1. Introduction
In recent years the pulse height analysis of signals from all kinds of gamma detectors has largely 
shifted from analogue to digital electronics. Digital multichannel analysers promise better stability due 
to less analogue components with varying tolerances, lower dead time, and increased throughput 
because of digital signal processing and thus improved performance. The MCA-527 from 
GBS Elektronik is such a digital multichannel analyser and the successor of the widely deployed and 
successful MCA-166. In addition to a completely new and modern architecture, it features many minor 
improvements.  
Under the German support program to the IAEA, Fraunhofer INT has conducted comparative 
performance tests with these two multichannel analysers in order to access the differences and 
similarities. These include the stability of gamma peak parameters as function of input count rate, time, 
and ambient temperature. Special attention was put to the performance under high count rate 
conditions. At Forschungszentrum Jülich, supplementary comparative testing was performed on LN-
cooled HPGe detectors, these results will be presented elsewhere. Further tests included the 
performance of the multichannel scaling and multispectrum scaling modes and the non-linearity of the 
two MCAs. In a last test series, the influence of electromagnetic radiation on the operation of the 
MCA-527 and the effect on the recorded spectrum was examined. Performance test of these MCAs 
have been performed before [1,2], but these measurements were aimed especially for a comparative 
testing of both MCAs and especially under high count rate conditions. 
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2. Description of performed measurements
For the measurement at the Fraunhofer INT, the equipment was provided by the IAEA. This included 
one MCA-166 and one MCA-527, NaI and LaBr scintillation detectors, two different CZT 
semiconductor detectors, two laptops with the WinSpec software, as well as necessary accessories 
like a serial to USB converter. For the tests, radioactive sources of 60Co (up to 380  MBq), 137Cs (up to
1 GBq), 133Ba (1 MBq) and 152Eu (1 MBq) were available at Fraunhofer INT. With the two strong 
sources of 60Co and 137Cs count rates in the range of 10,000 to 200,000 cps were achievable. This
allowed investigating the effect of different count rates on the performance of both MCAs and 
comparing the observations. 
The performed tests included the influence of the count rates and peak shape parameters on the peak 
resolution, the influence of count rate, temperature, and time on the peak channel stability, 
measurements of the integral and differential nonlinearity, and the performance of the multichannel 
and multispectral scaling depending on the input count rate. Additionally, the battery performance at 
different environmental temperatures, the stability of the high voltage supply and the timing accuracy 
were compared. For the MCA-527 the possible effects of electromagnetic interferences on MCA 
operations were evaluated. 
For the measurement of temperature effects, a small environmental chamber with forced air circulation 
was used. It allows changing the temperature according to a predetermined profile with fixed ramps 
and holding times. Both MCAs were placed inside the chamber at the same time to optimally utilize 
the measurement time. The temperature within the climate environmental chamber and at the 
surfaces of the MCAs was recorded by PT 100 sensors every 5 seconds. During these tests, only the 
MCAs were subjected to the varying temperatures, the source and detectors were placed outside the 
chamber and signals were routed to the MCAs by feedthroughs. 
The electromagnetic influence tests were carried out in a TEM waveguide with fields of 10 V/m in the 
frequency range from 80 MHz to 1 GHz, with 3 V/m from 1.4 GHz to 2 GHz and with 1 V/m from 
2 GHz to 2.7 GHz. Several distinct frequencies used for wireless communication were tested with 
30 V/m. The MCA-527 was placed in the waveguide, along with the LaBr detector and all cabling. In 
order to avoid data transmission disturbances caused by malfunction due to RF, the connection to the 
laptop was via USB-to-fiber-optics-converters. During these tests, a small 60Co source was used, in
order to have the MCA to record a real spectrum with sufficient count rate in the order of 1000 cps. 
The WinSpec software was used in automatic measurement mode to record one spectrum every 10 
seconds. While the frequency was ramped in the waveguide, this spectrum was observed by the 
operator and a possible deviation from the intended operation would have been recorded by him. 
These tests were performed in two orientations, with the E-Field in parallel and perpendicular to the 
cable harness, respectively. 
During the course of these tests, more than 45,000 spectrum files have been recorded. In order to 
handle this large amount of data, a set of python scripts have been written and used to semi-
automatically extract the relevant information. Both MCAs performed very well without any outage 
during the complete measurement campaign. 
Comparative tests of the MCA-166 and the MCA-527 were performed with a High Purity Ge-Detector 
(Canberra Detector GL 0515R)  at Forschungszentrum Jülich using a Ra-226 and a Am-241 source. 
For the MCA-527 digital pulse processing settings (Shaping Time, Flat Top, Trigger Filter, Base Line 
Restorer, Coarse/Fine Gain) were evaluated to find the optimal combination with respect to resolution 
and peak stability in the 0-300 keV energy window. These optimal settings were used to compare the 
performance with the MCA-166 for different count rates ranging from below 5,000 to a maximum count 
rate of approximately 125,000 cps. For each count rate 20 spectra with 300s live time were acquired. 
The peaks selected for evaluation where the gamma peak at 59 keV for Am-241 and 186 keV for Ra-
226. 
2.1 The two multichannel analysers MCA-166 and MCA-527 
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Figure 1: The two multichannel analysers under test, to the left, the analogue MCA-166, to the right 
the digital successor MCA-527. Both devices have roughly the same size. 
The two multichannel analysers are both compact, battery powered devices, which integrate in 
addition to the multichannel analyser, a preamplifier power supply, a high voltage modules and the 
main amplifier. Together with a detector and a laptop, they form a complete detection system. The 
MCA-166 is now obsolete, because some of its electronic components are no longer available. Thus 
GBS Elektronik developed the MCA-527 as its successor, with similar features and some 
improvements. 
MCA-166 MCA-527 
Technology Analog Digital, 14 bit ADC, 10 MSps 
Channels Max. 4k Max. 16k 
Main Amplifier Gaussian shaping amplifier Corse Amp. With 5 gains 
Pulse Shaping Shaping Time 1 and 2 µs 
Pile up rejection 
Shaping Time 0.1 .. 25 µs 
Flat Top Time 0 .. 5 µs 
Battery Li-Ion, 32 Wh Li-Ion, 10-25 h 
Size 155 mm x 95 mm x 45 mm 164 mm x 111 mm x 45 mm 
Weight 700 g 820 g 
Environment 0°C … +50°C -20°C … + 60°C 
Temp. class TK 100 (ADC), TK500 (Amp) TK50 
Interface RS-232  (USB) Ethernet, USB, RS-232 
Table 1: Comparison of technical features the MCA-166 and the MCA-527. 
Information taken from the manual [3,4]. 
3. Results of the tests
In the following, we will present some exemplary results from the whole measurement campaign. 
These are data from the influence of the count rate and the peak shaping parameters on the recorded 
peak width and peak position for one combination of MCA and detector, the outcome of peak 
parameter dependence on the temperature and the results of the electromagnetic influence tests. 
3.1. Influence of count rate and peak shaping parameters on peak parameters 
One major difference between the MCA-166 and the MCA-527 is the implementation of the peak 
shape parameters. The MCA-166 only has two settings for the shaping time, 1 µs and 2 µs, 
respectively and in addition one can enable or disable the pile up rejection. This leaves exactly four 
different combinations for the peak shaping parameters, which were all used in these tests. The 
MCA527 on the other hand offers to set the shaping time and the flat-top time of its digital input filter. 
The shaping time is adjustable from 0.1 µs to 25 µs in 0.1 µs steps, the flat top time from 0 µs to 5 µs 
in 0.1 µs steps. Here, we used the parameters as supplied by the IAEA as a starting point and from 
these adjusted either the shaping time or the flat top time, but not both at the same time. 
For each parameter set, the distance from the source to the detector was adjusted, so that a specific 
count rate was recorded. Five to seven different count rates were measured and the spectra recorded 
for 120 s. For each spectrum, the peaks of the used isotope were fit (662 keV for 137Cs, 1173 keV and
1332 keV for 60Co) with a gaussian and the peak position, area and FWHM were extracted. Figure 2
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shows these data for one particular data set, the measurement of 60Co with the LaBr detector and the
MCA-527.  
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Figure 2: Influence of peak shape parameters on the peak area and width for different count rates for the MCA-
527 and a LaBr detector. The supplied values for shaping and flat top time were 1.0 µs and 1.2 µs, respectively. 
A 380 MBq 60Co source was used for these tests.
An increase in the shaping time leads to an increase in the peak width and a decrease in the peak 
area. The peak broadening is severe for count rate above 100 kcps. For lower than the nominal 
shaping time, the peak shape is still well defined. For the flat top time, the picture is different. While 
the peak area shows a similar behaviour as function of the flat top time compared to the shaping time 
dependence, the peak width shows a clear minimum as function of the flat top time. The best flat top 
time for this system is about 0.7 µs, while the value supplied by the IAEA was 1.2 µs. The effect in the 
peak broadening is only pronounced for count rates above 100 kcps. 
3.2. Influence of ambient temperature on peak width and peak position 
To determine the influence of the ambient temperature on the performance of the MCAs, tests with an 
environmental chamber were carried out. Both MCAs were subjected to the temperature program at 
the same time, but with different detectors, in order to save measurement time. One such temperature 
ramp could be finished per day. As explained in the experimental section, only the MCAs were 
subjected to temperature changes, the source and the detectors were placed outside the 
environmental chamber in the air-conditioned laboratory. The resulting spectra were automatically 
fitted and the peak position, peak with and peak area were extracted. 
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Figure 3: Peak position (lower panel) and peak width (upper panel) for three different count rates and both MCAs 
as the function of time and temperature. During the experiment time of 24 h, the temperature is first decreased 
from 20°C to -15°C, then heated to 60°C and finally decreased back to 20°C. The white vertical bands indicate 
times, for which the temperature was held constant, the grey band indicate temperature changes with a ramp of 
15 K/h. The temperatures at the band boundaries are given at the upper scale.  
Figure 3 shows the results of these tests for the LaBr detector. The data for the MCA-166 show a 
strong peak shift and peak broadening for the high count rate, the curves for 200 kcps is shifted up. 
The same is evident for the MCA-527, but to a much lesser extent and these effects are in line with 
the observations from e.g. the test described in section 3.1. 
Additionally both MCA show a temperature dependency of the peak parameters. Most prominent 
feature is the increase in peak position for the MCA-166 at a temperature of 60°C. When increasing 
the temperature from -15°C to 60°C, also a slight increase of the peak width is visible. The high count 
rate data shows a large decrease of the peak width, while the MCA-166 is held at 60°C. The MCA-527 
shows less pronounced features. But also here, a slight increase in peak position is identifiable the 
lowest temperature, and upon heating from -15°C a spike in the peak width is observable. One clear 
difference is the fact that the variations for the MCA-166 are a smooth function of temperature and 
time, while the smaller variations for the MCA-527 are somewhat noisier. This might indicate a varying 
component value (e.g. temperature dependencies of resistors or of capacitors), while the MCA-527 
might use its internal temperature sensor to mitigate these effects by the firmware. In this case, BGS 
electronic might improve the behaviour at -15°C with a firmware upgrade. 
On the other hand, these effects show no increase or decrease in strength with different count rates, 
with the exception of the peak with decrease at elevated temperature. So, while both MCAs show 
some effect on the peak parameters with ambient temperature, this is not strongly correlated to the 
count rate. 
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3.3. Results of the electromagnetic influence tests 
The MCA-527 together with the LaBr detector was tested as an entire system for RF immunity 
according CE EMC standards. Is has been assumed that the single devices passed these tests 
individually as CE conform products. No visible changes in the spectrum have been observed by the 
test site operator during the RF exposure. As this was the defined failure criterion within these tests, 
no failure or anomaly was observed.  
Figure 4: Setup for the electromagnetic influence tests. The MCA-527 and the LaBr detector are located inside 
the TEM waveguide. A 60Co source is placed next to the detector. Upper insert: The recorded spectrum is shown
to the site operator. 
In retrospect, it was possible to examine the recorded spectra in more detail. Fits of the peak width 
and peak position showed virtually no effect. But combining all spectra for one frequency ramp in a 
waterfall diagram revealed finally three minor changes in the recorded spectra, as seen in figure 5. 
The set of spectra could not be linked afterwards to the recordings of the RF system, so an 
assignment of a frequency to these changes is not credibly possible. The changes were observed 
during the measurements in the 80 MHz to 1 GHz frequency band and for the distinct communication 
frequencies. No changes in the spectra were observed for the measurements in the 1.4 GHz to 2 GHz 
and the 2 GHz to 2.7 GHz bands. The exact frequency, where these changes happened and deeper 
investigation of the impact on a longer measurement or the possible cause could not be determined 
during this project. 
3.4. Results of the comparative testing with HPGe detector 
For each count rate and the average of 5 spectra was calculated and the FWHM in the ROI centered 
on the 59 keV (Am-241) and the 186 keV (Ra-226) peak was determined. Additionally, the peak 
stability is assessed by the variability of the centroid peak channel over the five measurements, which 
is calculated from the standard deviation of the centroid peak channel in each respective ROI. In 
Figure 5 the FWHM values (in [keV]) for both MCAs are plotted for both ROIs. The x-axis presents the 
five different count rate regimes. The values from the Ra-226 186.1keV peak resulted in higher FWHM 
values with larger error bars, which is a result of the low counting statistics for the gamma-line from the 
300 s live time with a branching ratio of this gamma peak of only 3.28 %. 
LaBr 
Detector
MCA-527 
60
Co-Source 
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Figure 5: Waterfall diagrams of the recorded spectra during the electromagnetic influence tests. The x-axis 
shows the spectrum number since the start of the frequency sweep. The y-axis shows the channel number. The 
two 60Co lines of 1173 keV and 1332 keV are located in the proximity of channel 200. The four graphs show the
frequency sweeps from a) 80 MHz to 1 GHz, b) 1.4 GHz to 2 GHz, c) 2 GHz to 2.7 GHz and d) the distinct 
communication frequencies. Marked are the observed minor changes in the runs a) and d).  
Figure 6: Comparison of resolution (FWHM in [keV] between MCA-166 and MCA-527 for two different gamma 
peaks at 59 keV and 186 keV. 
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As a conclusion of this comparison, the MCA-527 is at least as good as the MCA-166 in terms of 
resolution because the FWHM values for each line only differ by max. 0.04. What indicates an 
improvement of the MCA-527 is the lower variability of values and the slow, continuous slope of the 
lines. In the User Manual of the MCA-527 [3]Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. 
a resolution for typical 500 mm2 planar HPGe detector (count rate ≤10.000cps) of ≤510eV at 1 μs
shaping time (Am-241 source at 59keV) and ≤460eV at 2 μs shaping time (Am-241 source at 59keV) 
is listed. Figure 6 shows values between 520eV and 550eV. A possible reason may be the different 
detector used and the influence of the laboratory environment during the measurement. It is 
noteworthy, that the MCA-527 has a lower dead time which allows for a higher effective throughput 
(see Table 2), and therefore, in this respect outperforms the MCA-166. 
< 5 kcps 5-20 kcps 20-50 kcps 50-100 kcps > 100 kcps 
MCA-166 0.6 % 2.4 % 7.28 % 9.99 % 15.93 % 
MCA-527 0.5 % 1.6 % 3.7 % 5.04 % 7.3 % 
Table 2: Comparison of the dead time for acquisition of gamma spectra with the HPGe detector. 
4. Conclusions
The presented results of this paper show a small part of the obtained results for the comparative study 
of the two multichannel analysers. Both MCAs showed a good performance during these tests and 
there was no indication that the MCA-527 would perform worse than its predecessor. 
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Abstract: 
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) nuclear verification mission relies on cutting edge 
capabilities across multiple scientific and technical domains. For forty years, these capabilities have 
been modernized and sharpened through a unique set of partnerships with Member States. These 
partnerships, known as Member State Support Programmes to IAEA Safeguards (MSSPs), have 
yielded a significant proportion of the methodologies and equipment that the IAEA currently deploys in 
182 States around the world for its verification activities. With a steadily increasing workload and 
ongoing budget constraints in years to come, the Department of Safeguards must continue to become 
more agile and productive. Streamlined processes, smart use of technology, and strengthened 
partnerships form the core of the Department’s strategy moving forward. As the challenges and 
opportunities for IAEA verification have evolved over four decades, so too has the nature of needed 
support. This paper makes use of IAEA plans, task statistics, trend data, case studies and analysis in 
an effort to tell that story and to offer insights into what the changing face of IAEA cooperation with 
MSSPs means for the future of these vital partnerships. 
Keywords: partnerships; development; capabilities; statistics; MSSPs 
1. Introduction
Member State Support Programmes to IAEA Safeguards (MSSPs) were first established in 1976. 
They came about for two main reasons: (1) A decision by the Board that any development needs 
would best be met through Member State assistance rather than having the IAEA develop its own in-
house R&D capability; and (2) the recognition by the IAEA that certain safeguards needs could only be 
met through the continuous development of new equipment and techniques.[1] Today, 20 Member 
States and the European Commission have established MSSPs, which pursue tasks across the full 
range of the Department’s multi-disciplinary technical work. This includes not only the development of 
instruments and techniques, but also facility and nuclear material access for training, nuclear material 
and environmental sample analysis through the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL), expert 
consulting, quality control and much more.  
Aspects of the MSSP system have remained largely unchanged for many years. For example, the 
primary task lifecycle, the conduct of Annual Review Meetings, and the publication of biennial planning 
documents are all long-standing practices. The nature of and mechanisms for support to the 
Department of Safeguards, however, are continuously evolving. This paper focuses on some 
prominent changes from recent years, with data and examples to illustrate key trends.  
The main trends that will be reviewed include: (1) a reduction in custom equipment development 
towards commercial-off-the-shelf options and late-stage customization; (2) an increase in the number 
and diversity of training activities and analytical services support tasks; (3) an increase in in-house 
development, evaluation and direct user engagement related to Departmental information technology 
(IT) needs and the inspector tool-kit; and (4) the use of ‘umbrella’ tasks for activities that require more 
agility, collaboration or are inherently unsuited to extensive, up-front planning. In conclusion, the paper 
will highlight the need to maintain balance between supporting agile responses to emerging 
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challenges and opportunities and the structured, systematic pursuit of objectives that emerge from the 
Department’s strategic planning process.  
2. Review of Key Trends
2.1 Minimizing Custom Equipment Development 
The Department of Safeguards must ensure that the inspectorate is equipped with effective, reliable, 
affordable, and user-friendly tools for in-field verification. Given the range of verification activities for 
which the Department is responsible, the number of potentially applicable technologies, both existing 
and under development, is vast. Such technologies must, however, be assessed within the context of 
demanding Departmental requirements for robustness and sustainability, as well as clear operational 
needs. Moreover, any unchecked proliferation of available tools poses a considerable risk to 
Departmental effectiveness and efficiency. Not only does it become harder to cope with increased 
maintenance and training burdens for each tool, but it makes inconsistent approaches to 
measurement situations more likely. As a result, the goal is to maintain an optimized and regularly 
reviewed ‘pool’ of proven, user-friendly equipment to address both routine and non-standard 
verification needs for meeting safeguards technical objectives and drawing safeguards conclusions. 
At the same time, it is incumbent upon the Department of Safeguards to maintain awareness of new 
innovations that offer significant improvements to current practices and ‘best available’ measurement 
techniques to remain capable in a world of increasing responsibility and static resources. In rare but 
significant cases, the Department may be compelled to steer the development of technical solutions 
where none are commercially available. Past examples of this include the Next Generation 
Surveillance System (NGSS), the Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device (DCVD), the On-line Enrichment 
Monitor (OLEM) and the Next Generation Autonomous Data Acquisition Module (NGAM). In other 
cases, MSSPs support customisation of existing commercial equipment for safeguards activities, such 
as the HM-5 hand held assay probe, which was originally developed for nuclear security applications. 
A less successful case was the Universal Nondestructive Assay Data Acquisition Platform, in which a 
large investment of MSSP resources did not ultimately result in a deployed solution, prompting 
proposals to reform each stage of large development projects and including regular business case re-
evaluation.  
Since their inception, Member State Support Programmes have played a vital role in R&D and 
equipment development for the Department of Safeguards- including leading roles in each of the 
aforementioned examples. Given the unique nature of its mission, the Department of Safeguards is 
likely to rely on periodic requests for bespoke tools. A successor to the NGSS is likely to be a 
forthcoming example, requiring many years for full specification of requirements, proto-typing, testing, 
procurement and deployment.  
Given the high cost, long timeframes and inherent risk associated with developing custom equipment, 
however, these activities are pursued only when commercial alternatives are unavailable. In recent 
years, the IAEA has accordingly requested fewer new equipment development tasks of MSSPs. This 
decrease, however, has been accompanied by crucial and practical MSSP support in equipment-
related areas, such as the provision of advanced measurement expertise (e.g. through Cost-Free 
Experts and Junior Professional Officers), consulting, maintenance, vulnerability assessments and 
customisation of features, documentation, software, and firmware. Most of this work is achieved 
through a few long-lived support tasks with involved MSSPs, under which periodic new requests for 
work are issued as needed. As a result (as illustrated in Figure 1), there has been a decrease in the 
overall number of MSSP tasks related to equipment development. 
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Figure 1: Total numbers of MSSP tasks within SGTS, grouped by Project area from the Development and 
Implementation Support Programme, 2016-2017. [2] 
It is important not to overstate the scope of this trend. The Department is, for example, currently 
poised to derive benefits from bespoke equipment developed with considerable MSSP support over 
many years. The use of the Combined Procedure for Uranium Concentration and Enrichment Assay 
(COMPUCEA) for in-field analysis of uranium samples, the use of gamma emission tomography for 
spent fuel verification, and the potential offered by custom systems for unattended verification of UF6 
cylinders in enrichment facilities are notable cases. For each, the path forward will depend on 
operational demand and experience.  
The Department will continue to rely on Member State Support Programmes to provide technical 
advice, scan and evaluate new innovations with potential to augment its capabilities and to assist on 
occasion with the transfer of technologies that have attained a certain level of maturity. Full, long-
running development activities, however, are likely to remain exceptional.  
2.2. A Focus on Training and Analytical Services 
The nature and goals of Member State Support Programmes are well suited to helping the 
Department with training and analytical services tasks. Both are areas of continuous need for IAEA 
Safeguards that rely on the availability of specialist facilities, expertise and materials to ensure that 
inspector and laboratory analysis capabilities, respectively, are kept up-to-date. It is therefore not 
surprising that activities in these areas have been growing steadily in number, diversity and 
importance over the past decade. Indeed, both training and analytical services have active tasks with 
18 of the 21 current Member State Support Programmes, a greater fraction than that enjoyed by any 
other area of Departmental work with MSSPs. As underlined in an internal programme evaluation 
report, “Support from Member States has been essential to the safeguards training programme, 
particularly to host courses involving practical works on nuclear facilities and material. Without this 
cooperation, safeguards training activities would suffer seriously.” [3] 
Figure 2 illustrates some of this growth in terms of the number of associated tasks with Member State 
Support Programmes since 2005.  
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Figure 2: Total numbers of MSSP tasks under Analytical Service Projects and the Training project from the 
Development and Implementation Support Programme, 2016-2017. 
2.2.1  Training 
Since 2011, about 15 new or significantly reviewed training courses triggered new tasks with MSSP 
support to complete the Departmental Training Programme. Table 1 displays the new tasks that have 
been initiated to support this coursework with multiple MSSPs.  
Task ID Title Year Requested Status
ROK B 1907 Development of Virtual Training for Bulk Handling Facilities 2011 Active
JPN B 1897 Training on Reprocessing Activities at a Commercial, Engineering or...(JE-43 2011 Active
UK B 1903 Advanced Training on NFC Facilities to Assist State Evaluation (C1(w)) 2011 Active
UK B 1940 Developing Analytical Skills for Safeguards (C1(x)) 2012 Stand-by
JPN B 1926 DCVD Training for Spent Fuel Verification 2012 Completed
CAN B 1930 DCVD Training for Spent Fuel Verification 2012 Active
SWE B 1933 DCVD Training for Spent Fuel Verification 2012 Active
FIN B 1949 Specialized Training and Visits to Nuclear Facilities 2012 Stand-by
UK B 1936 Specialized Training and Visits to Nuclear Facilities (C1(y)) 2012 Active
USA B 2256 Training Course on Plutonium Diversion Detection Scenario 2013 Active
UK B 1990 Design Information Verification at Bulk Handling Facilities Training Course 2013 Active
UK B 1991 Training on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Indicators and Proliferation Pathways 2013 Active
EC B 2019 Training on Application of iRAP Software for Unattended and Remote… 2014 Active
CAN B 2103 Radiation Safety Training 2014 Stand-by
USA B 2093 Radiation Safety Training (B.112) 2014 Active
USA B 2154 Support for Safeguards Leadership Development (B.115) 2015 Active
JPN B 2155 Training for Inspectors for the JNC-1 Site Facilities (JE-50) 2015 Active
ROK B 2217 Pyroprocessing Course at an Engineering Scale Demonstration Facility 2015 Active
USA B 2202 Hot Cell and Glove Box Verification Training (B.116) 2016 Active
JNT B 2237 JPN DCVD Training for Spent Fuel Verification 2016 Active
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Table 1: New MSSP tasks since 2011 related to the development of new courses or significant changes in 
existing courses for the Department of Safeguards. Note: table does not include tasks related to CFEs, JPOs or 
SSAC-related work. 
As the table illustrates, new training often accompanies the release of new equipment or software (e.g. 
the Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) and the Integrated Review and Analysis Software 
(iRAP)) or is initiated to take advantage of unique opportunities (e.g. making use of Georgian hot cells 
for USA B 2202) or to meet training needs for safeguarding new technologies (e.g. at the Pyro-
processing Integrated inactive Demonstration Facility (PRIDE) for ROK B 2217). Another point was to 
ensure the alignment of all courses with the implementation of the State-level Concept and the 
development of more robust techniques supporting collaborative analysis and the use of tools 
(Collaborative Analysis Platform).  
At the same time, the need for offerings of long-established training courses has also increased, 
driven by increasing turn-over in the inspectorate. Training a new inspector is a multi-year endeavour, 
requiring many months of dedicated coursework even after the half-year Introductory Course for 
Agency Safeguards (ICAS). This impacts initial training like for the Comprehensive Inspection 
Exercise at the end of ICAS, or the non-destructive assay training. These courses have strict limits on 
class sizes given the need to ensure proper access to equipment, material, facilities and qualified 
trainers; an increasing flow of newly recruited inspectors requires more courses. This also impacts 
advanced training, which must be organized more frequently to maintain the same level of 
competencies. These circumstances compel the IAEA to periodically request multiple offerings of the 
same course in a given year to accommodate operational needs, which can be challenging for MSSPs 
to accommodate.  
2.2.2 Analytical Services 
For the IAEA’s nuclear verification mission, Destructive Analysis (DA) of nuclear material and the 
analysis of environmental samples via the NWAL are core capabilities underlying credible safeguards 
conclusions. Analytical results must be accurate, timely, and reliable. The Department has initiated 
and grown a significant number of new partnerships with MSSPs in recent years to fulfil this mandate.  
Figure 2 shows a significant increase in numbers of these analytical service tasks with MSSPs, but 
this is only part of the story. With analytical services in particular, a single task often represents a large 
and continuous commitment of MSSP resources to, for example, qualify an NWAL laboratory and 
support a certain number of sample analyses each year. The Department has also been working with 
MSSP counterparts to develop new sampling and measurement techniques to cope with challenges in 
the field and in the laboratory.  
Recent priorities being supported by Member State Support Programmes include, inter alia: 
• Development of the ABACC Cristallini method for reducing UF6 sample sizes to cope with
potential changes in shipment regulations; 
• Improving analysis capabilities at the Joint On-Site analytical Laboratory in Rokkasho, Japan;
• Improving identification and isolation methods for individual uranium and plutonium particles
from environmental swipe samples;
• Developing new particle production techniques for quality control purposes;
• Expansion of the NWAL, particularly for particle analysis of environmental samples and quality
assurance support; and
• Production of new reference materials.
For MSSPs, support to analytical services is often among their highest priorities, making full use of 
technically advanced infrastructure with tangible results that support safeguards conclusions. 
2.3. A Focus on the User: MSSP Support for In-house and Non-Traditional 
Development Activities 
2.3.1 The Modernisation of Safeguards IT (MOSAIC) programme 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
131
In the context of software development, the use of agile development methodologies has been one 
way that large organizations, from governments to companies to NGOs, have successfully enhanced 
their capabilities in a fast, cost-effective manner that focuses on business needs. Agile development 
methodology involves an intense focus on users and user feedback to guide work. This necessitates 
the rapid production and demonstration of deliverables that can then be evaluated by users and 
adjusted to suit business needs.  
Within the Department of Safeguards, the primary users of software and new technology are 
inspectors, technicians, analysts, managers and other technical staff. In an agile framework, making 
use of close and continuous proximity to these users is crucial to understanding and meeting their 
evolving needs. This is an important reason that the Department of Safeguards opted for an in-house 
approach to the Modernisation of Safeguards IT (MOSAIC) programme, which began in 2015 and now 
comprises over 20 individual projects.  
MOSAIC has found success with a combination of PRINCE2 project management techniques and a 
particular agile methodology, the SCRUM agile framework. (For details on the goals, approach, 
achievements and plans of MOSAIC, see the IAEA publication MOSAIC- The Modernization of 
Safeguards Information Technology: Completing the picture. [4]) 
MOSAIC is an in-house programme that has worked with Member State Support Programmes to 
obtain financial support and provide key stakeholders with timely information on progress and plans. 
The in-house development approach, supported by external contributions, offers considerable 
advantages (particularly in the IT space) in terms of user interaction, safeguards information security, 
cost, sustainability, inter-operability and quality to alternatives that involve financing of off-site 
development from commercial vendors. 
2.3.2 Technology Foresight 
Agile project management, with its focus on iterative development, has applications that extend 
beyond software. The Technology Foresight effort within the Department is a prime example. As with 
the MOSAIC programme, the effort is characterized by a relentless focus on users (inspectors in this 
case), as well as rapid deployment and evaluation cycles to shape deliverables around user needs 
and feedback. Rather than focusing on over-the-horizon technology that may emerge someday, 
Technology Foresight looks to what has already emerged in other fields, working to understand 
whether Departmental users can derive significant benefit from modest expenditures and 
customization.  
Examples of current projects include: 
• The Instrument Records Integrator for Safeguards (IRIS), which makes use of time correlated
indoor positioning data to organize the many different types of data collected on inspections; 
• Gamma imaging, for identification of gamma sources during inspection activities;
• Exploration of robotics to support repetitive in-field activities; and
• A modular photogrammetric platform to provide inspectors with the capability to obtain
different types of information from optical images, such as 2D and 3D object dimensions,
thermal IR radiation, geo-location, etc.
For these and other Technology Foresight activities, MSSPs can contribute to identification, 
recommendation and support of technology providers from their respective Member States. 
A new approach to technology transfer from the recent past offers an additional mechanism for 
MSSPs to support practical, low-cost solutions for non-unique safeguards equipment needs. In 2016, 
as part of the Technology Foresight effort, the Department launched a public, incentive-based 
‘technology challenge’. In this case, the goal was to explore whether an image stacking algorithm 
could improve the quality of images obtained from the improved Cerenkov viewing device (ICVD), 
which is used extensively by inspectors to verify spent fuel assemblies stored underwater. 
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Figure 3:  The social media announcement of the ICVD challenge from Technology Foresight, which 
garnered more than two million views and ten final submissions.  
The results, as demonstrated in Figure 4, are striking. Grainy images, such as those on the left, can 
increase the uncertainty and time required for spent fuel verification. Real-time image clean-up would 
help inspectors cope with an ever-increasing amount of aging spent fuel around the world, which 
becomes harder to verify as Cerenkov emissions dim. SGTS is currently working to deploy a solution 
incorporating the winning algorithm for regular in-field use.  
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Figure 4:  Example of original ICVD images (left) and improved results after processing (right). 
In the future, MSSPs may be invited to support incentive-based challenges of this nature through the 
contribution of an award (12 000 EUR in the case of the ICVD challenge) or the support and 
identification of participants. The next technology challenge, already being developed, will focus on 
robotics.  
2.4. ‘Umbrella’ Tasks 
While the use of ‘umbrella’ tasks with MSSPs in the Department of Safeguards is not new, the uses to 
which such tasks are being put has changed in the past few years. At first, umbrella tasks were 
intended as a framework to conduct broad activities with multiple sub-components over a long period 
of time. Examples of this from the 1990s include support for information review and evaluation, 
development of integrated safeguards, improving the security of the safeguards network and 
communication infrastructure, and support work for remote monitoring and unattended surveillance 
systems.  
Recent umbrella tasks have focused on identifying areas of support for which specific needs are 
evolving rapidly enough to make the initiation of detailed new task proposals and work plans 
impractical. The Technology Foresight work described above is perhaps the primary example of this. 
Other examples include a productive umbrella task with the European Commission Support 
Programme for the development and refinement of new containment techniques and an effort to work 
with multiple MSSPs to solicit expert guidance on estimating the timelines for hypothetical 
development by a State of undeclared fuel cycle capabilities for acquisition path analysis.  
In each case, rather than specifying a full and detailed scope of work for each respective task with 
MSSPs up front, initial work focuses on establishing partnerships for a set of overarching and mutually 
agreed objectives. Subsequent individual work scopes are then established in close coordination with 
each MSSP based on its interests and available resources, and formalized via individual additional 
requests. 
This approach can be seen in other current tasks that do not formally include the name ‘umbrella’ in 
their task titles. Examples include an effort to develop E-Learning content to support States in 
preparation of their declarations to the IAEA, and an initiative to establish a repository of well-
characterized non-nuclear materials (metals at this stage) for the testing and evaluation of commercial 
tools for complementary access. Nevertheless, clear expectations remain a basic communication 
principle for Department-MSSP interactions to ensure prudent management practices for these 
productive partnerships.  
3. Conclusion: Leveraging MSSPs for Agility and Strategy Execution
As the pace of technological change accelerates, the Department of Safeguards faces new challenges 
and opportunities every year. Success requires both flexibility and strategy. Flexibility with respect to 
approaches, tools, and arrangements is essential for navigating change. Strategy, which involves 
systematic efforts to identify what matters and where gaps exist, planning for attainable future states, 
and following-through on objectives, is essential for coherent communication and decision-making. 
The partnerships that the Department of Safeguards has built with Member State Support 
Programmes are a vital mechanism to address both needs. Success relies on good communication, 
ensuring that the context, objectives and timeframes for requests are well understood.  
To this end, the Department of Safeguards employs a thorough strategic planning process. The 
purpose of this process is to promote longer-term thinking within the Department, to sustain existing 
capabilities, prepare for the future, to ensure that short-term initiatives fit into longer-term goals, to 
support prioritization and resource allocation decisions, and to enable better communication with 
Member States.  
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The Department’s strategic planning process and its history of interactions with MSSPs provide a firm 
basis for confidence that new task proposals from the Department of Safeguards are genuine priorities 
that form part of a coherent planning process rather than ad-hoc or fleeting desires. There is a 
difference, however, between knowing where you want to go and knowing exactly how best to get 
there. Unexpected obstacles and short-cuts can arise. Course corrections should be common and 
smooth.  
The Department will continue to rely on MSSPs for advice, road-mapping and provision of the 
necessary human, financial and technological resources to meet its development and implementation 
support needs. Increasingly, however, the Department is calling upon MSSPs to help the Department 
obtain and make smart use of in-house resources, to work with the Department to identify solutions to 
complex, evolving problems, and to be flexible in identifying and taking advantage of opportunities that 
arise. 
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Abstract: 
Spent fuel (SF) transfers from two shut-down reactors to interim dry storage facilities at the Ignalina 
nuclear power plant (NPP) and decommissioning of the reactors are currently the major nuclear 
activities in Lithuania. In preparation for safeguards verification of these transfers, which normally 
requires substantial resources both from the IAEA and the EC, cooperation between both State 
Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) and the Ignalina NPP operator during 2014-2016 was 
organized in such a way as to optimise human and financial resources, share responsibilities for the 
installation of different safeguards equipment and to develop specific safeguards approach for SF 
verification during transfer campaign. 
As a result of such cooperation all safeguards technical systems (containment and surveillance, non-
destructive assay, etc.) were successfully installed at a new dry storage facility, upgraded at both 
reactor unit SF ponds, and tested during recent “cold” and “hot” tests. 
Ignalina NPP is equipped with two RBMK-1500 on-load, water-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors. 
Experience gained by the IAEA in safeguarding this type of reactor has been used to develop, in 
cooperation with the EC, VATESI and the facility operator, an innovative safeguards approach. This 
new safeguards approach is designed to reduce the inspectors’ presence and maintain continuity of 
knowledge on nuclear material during the transfer process. This approach makes full use of available 
technical devices, including Next Generation Surveillance System (NGSS) overhead and underwater 
cameras, neutron detectors and electronic seals (EOSS). Most of the data from technical devices is 
remotely transmitted to the IAEA and EC Headquarters, supporting scheduled and random safeguards 
inspections at Ignalina NPP facilities. 
Full cooperation and support obtained by the IAEA and the EC from the Ignalina NPP operator 
(including early provision of information through an authorised mailbox system, and sealing of SF 
casks) will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards implementation at the Ignalina 
NPP.  
Keywords: spent fuel transfers; dry storage facility; safeguards approach; verification; cooperation 
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1. Introduction
The Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP, WLTA) in Lithuania consists of two RBMK-1500 on-load, 
water-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor units. Unit 1 was permanently shut down on 31 December 
2004, and Unit 2 – five years later, on 31 December 2009. The plant is now in the process of 
decommissioning and one of the main activities going on there is removal of all spent nuclear fuel 
stored at both reactor units and its transfer to the dry storage facilities [1]. The process of spent fuel 
(SF) transfers started in 1999 when INPP was still in operation and when the open air dry spent fuel 
storage (WLTD) was commissioned. WLTD reached the full capacity in 2010, and after that the 
transfer campaign was suspended until the time when a new dry spent fuel storage (WLTE) was 
constructed. Special project called B-1 funded by European Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) was established for that purpose, and it took more than ten years to complete it. Finally, in 
October 2016 the new dry storage (WLTE) started receiving spent fuel from INPP. 
It is planned to transfer all SF in Dry Storage Casks (DSCs) from WLTA to WLTE in about five years. 
Verifying SF transfers under the approach used before (during transfers to WLTD) would require 
weekly inspector presence over this five-year-period. 
As a result of enhanced cooperation among all parties participating in the process (INPP operator, 
Lithuanian State Authority (VATESI), the EC and the IAEA) innovative safeguards approach using full 
support from INPP operator was developed. The approach is based on the verification/inspection 
activities as well as on the combination of containment, surveillance (C/S) and non-destructive assay 
(NDA) measures which allow maintaining continuity of knowledge (CoK) about SF during the whole 
loading and transfer process. The objective of this approach is to optimise inspection efforts, use 
available techniques and cooperation with the State/Regional authorities/operator to the extent 
possible, maintaining safeguards effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards verifications 
for the spent fuel (SF) transfers. 
2. Spent fuel loading and transfer processes
Each reactor unit at INPP includes a SF pond, adjacent to the reactor complex and a hot cell. At each 
pond there are SF compartments used for storing discharged ‘uncut’ SF assemblies (SFAs) and SF 
compartments used for storing ‘cut’ SF. The hot cell is used to cut SFAs into two half-assemblies 
(FBs) and then place them into a metallic basket (32M basket). After loading the cut SFAs into the 
32M baskets (which can only occur in the hot cell), the full basket is moved from the hot cell to the SF 
pond. Before placement in SF pond FBs in the baskets are verified for gross defect and the baskets 
are placed under seals. After about 10 years of cooling, the SF basket is loaded into a DSC and then 
transferred to a SF dry storage (SFDS) facility for interim storage. Re-verification is not needed as long 
as the CoK is maintained for previously verified SF items. 
The loading/transfer process to be used for WLTE is different from the one used for WLTD. The 
difference lies in the different DSC capacity and the loading sequence. For WLTD only one 32M 
basket was loaded into one DSC, but for the new DSC (CONSTOR RBMK-1500/M2, Figure 1) multiple 
32M baskets are involved in the loading of one DSC and some partially emptied baskets could remain 
in SF pond after the loading is complete. This makes the loading process more complicated and time 
consuming. 
The loading and transfer processes have the following sequence: 
• A 32M basket is loaded into the central cavity of the DSC.
• Individual FBs are then lifted from this basket and placed into the outer ring of the DSC.
• When the loading of the outer ring is complete, the partially basket is removed from the central
cavity and relocated to a storage position in the SF pond. Depending on the number of FBs
taken from the first basket, further baskets may be needed – outer ring loading may involve
one or multiple 32M baskets.
• After the ring basket is filled, a full 32M basket is loaded into the central cavity, thereby making
the DSC fully loaded.
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• The loaded DSC is lowered through a hatch in the SF ponds area and placed onto a special
rail car.
• The DSC on the rail car is transported from the reactor unit (WLTA) to ISFSF (WLTE).
• At WLTE the transport lid is removed from the DSC and the outer lids are welded together.
Protective lids are then positioned and bolted securely.
• When the lids installation process is completed, the DSC is transferred to its storage position
and placed under seals.
• Next, an empty DSC is placed onto the rail car and transported to the loading pit in one of the
SF ponds at WLTA, in preparation for the next SF cask loading and transfer.
Figure 1: RBMK-1500/M2 Dry Storage Cask (DSC) 
3. Safeguards approach, measures and devices
3.1. Containment, surveillance and NDA 
At each of the two WLTA SF ponds, the DSC loading process is monitored by a Next Generation 
Surveillance System (NGSS) which include overhead cameras and underwater (UW) cameras at a 
DSC loading pit. In addition to being under surveillance, the previously verified SF is stored in 32M 
baskets under seals. 
Baskets scheduled for loading need to be pre-positioned and the correspondent seals to be detached 
either by the operator (with prior notification) or by the inspector(s). All baskets not scheduled to be 
used in the current loading campaign should remain under seal. The pre-positioned baskets are 
queued in the same sequence as required for DSC loadings; any other relocation of SF is done only 
during inspector presence. The CoK on all baskets is maintained via surveillance, the data of which is 
remotely transmitted to IAEA and EC Headquarters for safeguards review and evaluation. 
The UW surveillance cameras installed in the loading pit (see Figure 2) allow for monitoring of the 
DSC loading and item counting of loaded SF half-assemblies. The reactor Exit Hatch is also covered 
by the existing surveillance system. Essentially, under these conditions, no undetected movements of 
SF can take place in and out of the loading pit. 
A sealable bar located in the SF pond separates the hot cell from the loading pit. No baskets from the 
hot cell can be added to the existing SF basket population with this sealable bar in place. Additionally, 
exit routes from the hot cell are monitored by a hot cell monitoring system (HCMS) equipped with 
neutron and gamma detectors. Re-verification of SF that has been previously verified is not required, 
as long as CoK on that fuel is maintained during the loading and transfer process. Containment and 
isolation of the SFAs involved in the loading process is the key to maintaining this CoK during DSC 
loading. SFAs in the partially emptied baskets left after loading will be later verified and sealed by the 
inspectors. 
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Figure 2: DSC loading pit with underwater cameras 
Safeguards equipment for the actual DSC transfer process from WLTA to WLTE includes a NGSS 
camera in each of the SF transfer corridors (where DSC is placed on the rail car) and a NGSS camera 
and a Mobile Unit Neutron Detector (MUND) installed on the SF transfer rail car. These measures 
(surveillance and NDA monitoring) provide CoK on the DSC content during transfer. Since the MUND 
and NGSS camera installed on the rail car are battery powered, in order to keep them operating and in 
order to transfer collected data to the IAEA and the EC Headquarters, a special docking station has 
been installed at WLTE. Every time the rail car arrives at WLTE, it is connected to the docking station 
to charge the batteries and transfer the data. 
At WLTE, unloading of the DSC from the rail car, welding of the outer lids, moving of the cask to the 
storage hall and re-loading the DSC in the hot cell (if and when the necessity arises) is monitored by 
the NGSS surveillance system and the Spent Fuel Monitoring System (SFMS) covering all possible SF 
routes. Both systems are equipped with remote data transfer (RDT) capabilities. 
At the final position in the storage hall each DSC is sealed by fibre optic seal (COBRA) and each 
group of DSCs (up to six) is sealed with electronic seal (EOSS, see Figure 3). All EOSS seals have 
RDT capabilities. 
Figure 3: DSCs sealed with COBRA seals and EOSS group seal 
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3.2. Inspection activities during SF transfers 
Inspection activities during SF transfer campaign include scheduled inspections (with the frequency 
depending on the number of transfers planned) at both WLTA and WLTE and random interim 
inspections (RII). RIIs can also include unannounced inspections (UI). 
The scheduled inspection activities will include the following: 
• Review of operator DSC loading records;
• Verification of the contents of any unsealed SF baskets and attachment of seals;
• Collection of operator detached seals (in case of seal contamination the verification can be
performed at the facility);
• Detachment of the seals to release any baskets to be loaded;
• Verification of the content of the SF baskets to be loaded by item counting and gross defect;
• Confirmation of the basket identification number;
• Verification of the sealing arrangement applied by the operator (WLTE);
• Item counting and tag check of newly arrived DSCs;
• Placement of newly arrived DSCs under group sealing.
The review of surveillance and NDA data is normally performed at the Headquarters. In addition to 
scheduled inspections, at least one UI in a calendar year will be conducted during SF transfer 
campaign with the main purpose to assure the absence of undeclared production or processing of 
nuclear material by visual observation, using radiation devices and taking of environmental samples. 
RIIs could also be conducted if needed with the activities the same as during scheduled inspections.  
3.3. Provision of information and assistance by the INPP operator 
In order for the IAEA and the EC to implement inspections for SF transfer and cover all verification 
needs, the Lithuanian State Authority (VATESI) and the facility operator shall provide both 
inspectorates with the detailed advanced information and periodic updates, as follows: 
• Annual SF transfer plan;
• Monthly SF transfer plan as an update of the annual plan;
• DSC loading and transfer-related activities at each stage of the transfer process for each DSC
including date and time;
• The number of SFAs and the basket identification number for any basket in the hot cell;
• The basket identification number, location, nuclear material weights and the date and time of
discharge (for the baskets discharged from the hot cell);
• The date, time and number of any seal detached by the operator;
• General Ledger updates;
• DSC loading and transfer records (including basket loading sequence, identification numbers,
loading maps of DSC central cavity and ring basket, amounts of nuclear material involved, the
date and time of loading and the date and time of transfer);
• Location maps (including SF pond maps before and after DSC loading and WLTE storage
map after each DSC receipt).
All relevant information (including updates) is provided by the operator to both inspectorates through 
authorized mailbox system installed and operating at INPP. The updates are normally provided on a 
weekly basis or as soon as the necessity in such update occurs. During the inspection activities 
inspectors can ask for any other additional documents/declarations required for successful fulfilment of 
their duties. 
In addition to provision of necessary information and as a result of close cooperation among 
inspectorates, the INPP operator and VATESI, it was agreed that certain assistance will be provided 
by the operator. It will allow reducing the inspectors’ presence and efforts during SF transfers, but at 
the same time enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards verifications. The agreed 
activities to be conducted by the operator at the SF ponds and at the dry SF storage are the following: 
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• Detachment of the seals at SF ponds to release 32M baskets to be loaded in DSCs. Such
detachment will be done with prior notification to both inspectorates through authorized mail
box system. After detachment, the full information including seal number, position, date and
time of detachment will also be sent to the IAEA and the EC;
• Support in implementation of NDA devices (i.e. IRAT) for re-verification of SF bundles loaded
in DSC (if ICVD verification is not possible);
• Attachment of COBRA seals at the dry storage after all lids are installed on the newly arrived
DSC and later attachment of a group seal when this DSC is placed in the storage hall. During
the next inspection those seal attachments will be checked by an inspector.
• Connection of the rail car to the docking station at WLTE to charge the batteries and transmit
NDA and surveillance data. Normally this activity is performed every time the rail car arrives at
WLTE. If the rail car is not used for a long period of time, it was agreed that the connection will
be performed on a weekly basis.
4. Results of multilateral cooperation
The safeguards approach described above is a result of close multilateral cooperation among two 
inspectorates (IAEA and EC), facility operator and State authority (VATESI) during 2014-2016. A 
number of meetings and video conferences, as well as technical visits to INPP were conducted and it 
took great deal of discussions involving a lot of people in order to develop such a unique approach. 
The safeguards equipment purchase and delivery were shared between the IAEA and the EC, and its 
installation at WLTE and upgrade at WLTA were performed by the IAEA technicians with essential 
assistance provided by the facility operator and its sub-contractors. The IAEA and the EC also 
provided support in development of new accountancy software to be used at WLTE. VATESI also 
participated in all activities and provided useful support and assistance when it was necessary to 
facilitate the processes. 
The developed approach is being tested now while the “hot” tests are in progress at INPP. Since such 
approach on loadings and transfers are done for the first time, both inspectorates as well as the 
operator are learning and gaining necessary experience. As a result of the experience gained and 
lessons learnt the Partnership approach for SF verification during transfers will be developed and used 
by the IAEA and the EC.  
5. Conclusion
The safeguards approach born as a result of effective cooperation among all participating parties 
utilises a scheme of monthly inspections that provides for verification of all SF involved in the loading 
process, in combination with random inspections and remote transmission of data from safeguards 
devices to the IAEA and the EC Headquarters in Vienna and Luxembourg and relies upon the 
extensive support provided by the facility operator. It allows dramatically reduce the inspectors’ 
presence during loading and transfer operations, but at the same time enhances the effectiveness and 
efficiency of verification activities. By gaining additional experience during routine verification of SF 
transfers the designed approach will be further improved and optimized if necessary. 
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7. Legal matters
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Abstract: 
Nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control is a worldwide issue that not only affects 
nuclear power states. Overarching authority and cooperation between states are needed in order to 
regain control over these sources and share information about them. Several governmental control 
measures are needed, such as an international and national legal framework, border controls and 
emergency preparedness plans. This paper starts with an overview of the Swedish system for control 
of radioactive sources and the systems in place for regaining control over sources previously out of 
regulatory control.  
The Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is 
used for sharing information about incidents in which nuclear or other radioactive sources are, or 
were, out of regulatory control. The paper contains a subsequent description of the work carried out by 
the Section for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Security at the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority 
(SSM) to collect and share information using this tool. Over the past three years, SSM has stepped up 
its efforts in collecting information about incidents in Sweden, and work has been ongoing to expand 
the information sharing network within SSM and with other relevant authorities in Sweden.  
Through its Office for International Relations, SSM is also highly involved in projects aimed at 
combating illicit trafficking abroad. Since 1999, many projects have been conducted in Central and 
Eastern Europe with the objective of strengthening the institutional capacity of the states’ regulatory 
authorities by means of international conferences, workshops, training courses and field exercises. 
The paper concludes with an overview of this work. 
Keywords: ITDB information sharing; International cooperation; Illicit trafficking 
1. Introduction
Nuclear material and other radioactive sources out of sufficient control can be harmful to humans, 
animals and the environment. There are many initiatives being taken around the world to minimize the 
potentially harmful effects of such sources, from financial and outreach initiatives to collect 
unregistered and unwanted sources, to projects aimed at stopping malicious use of the sources and 
illegal trade in the same. Information sharing and training are also important aspects of the area, 
where sharing information about sources that have gone missing to a community that might be 
affected, or educating and training people who might be alerted to recover a source, can be essential 
for the safety of the individuals.  
This paper will present the situation in Sweden today in terms of regaining control over nuclear and 
other radioactive materials out of regulatory control as well as other initiatives taken by Sweden in an 
international setting to further this cause.  
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In section 2, some of the more important parts of the international framework concerning nuclear and 
other radioactive material are presented, followed by presentations on border control in Sweden. 
Sweden shares a land border with Finland and Norway, and is connected to Denmark by the Øresund 
Bridge. Sweden has several ports for importing and exporting goods, the largest one being the 
Skandia port in Gothenburg where about 50% of all cross-border container traffic passes [1]. Arlanda 
Airport, close to Stockholm, is the largest hub for goods arriving by plane. Thus Sweden is a country 
that shares borders with European Union (EU) member states and third countries (outside of the EU).  
This is followed by a presentation describing the Swedish emergency preparedness and response 
systems. Here, the major focus of emergency planning in this area is on accidents at nuclear facilities, 
in particular the nuclear power plants. Sweden is a state with a substantial proportion of the nuclear 
fuel cycle involving ten nuclear power reactors in operation, one fuel fabrication facility, one research 
and waste facility and a central interim storage facility for spent fuel. However, radioactive sources and 
nuclear material are also used in various research activities, industries and healthcare facilities. The 
next section, section 5, briefly presents the national legal framework for registering and controlling 
nuclear material and other radioactive sources, and the following section describes the endpoint for 
many radioactive sources outside regulatory control: the metal recycling industry.  
When it has been discovered that nuclear or other radioactive material is, or was, out of regulatory 
control, it is defined as an incident that falls under the scope of the Incident and Trafficking Database 
(ITDB). The Database is a forum for international cooperation for the purpose of collecting information. 
The ITDB is managed by the IAEA. The following section, section 7, gives an introduction to the ITDB 
and describes incidents reported by Sweden and efforts to expand the national network for reporting 
of incidents.  
In the area of nuclear and other radioactive material outside regulatory control, Sweden–through 
SSM’s Office for International Relations–has participated actively in the international community by 
sponsoring and participating in many projects with the goal of regaining control. Here the emphasis is 
on countries formerly belonging to the USSR. The last chapter of this paper gives an introduction to 
this work, with some recent examples of projects.  
2. International legal framework, binding resolutions and recommendations
The international framework for nuclear security is made up of a number of both binding and non-
binding documents. There is a pronounced difference between the field of security as opposed to the 
nuclear safeguards field, where the legally binding system is broader and more detailed. Nuclear 
security is governed more on state level through international recommendations, conventions and 
codes of conduct. This section briefly presents some of the more important documents addressing the 
security of nuclear material and other radioactive sources related to the topic of this paper.  
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 [2] is a binding resolution for all members of the UN and 
establishes inter alia that all states should take and enforce measures to establish domestic controls 
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by, among other things, 
developing and maintaining appropriate and effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to 
detect, deter, prevent and combat illicit trafficking of such items. All states must also establish laws 
and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export of such items. In an 
investigation from 2008 [3] on the possibility of strengthening Swedish export control and non-
proliferation work with reference to Resolution 1540, the investigator came to the conclusion that 
Sweden did not have a complete national legal framework to ensure compliance with all parts of 
Resolution 1540.  
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) [4] is a binding convention 
that entered into force in 1987. An addition that entered into force in May 2016 broadens the 
convention to also require states to establish, implement and maintain a national regime for physical 
protection and control, which includes maintaining the capability to swiftly identify and recover material 
out of regulatory control.  
In the Council Regulation (Euratom) on shipments of radioactive substances between Member States 
[5], Article 3 states that controls of shipments for the purpose of radiation protection should be 
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performed as part of control procedures applied in a non-discriminatory manner throughout the 
territory of the Member State.  
In addition to the binding agreements, there are several non-binding recommendations, for example in 
the IAEA Nuclear Security Series, which are aimed at giving guidance to states in the field of security 
of nuclear and radioactive material. This series includes the Code of Conduct on the Safety and 
Security of Radioactive Sources [6] and Response to Events Involving the Inadvertent Movement or 
Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive Materials [7].  
3. Border controls of nuclear material and other radioactive sources
Swedish Customs is responsible for monitoring and checking international traffic across the Swedish 
border to ensure compliance with import and export regulations. No regular measurements to detect 
radioactivity are performed by Swedish Customs, with the exception of containers leaving Sweden for 
the USA, which is a requirement under the US Container Security Initiative, CSI [1].  
Due to the Swedish interpretation of the EU’s internal market regulations, Swedish Customs does not 
have a mandate to perform checks within the EU without having special indications that the cargo 
contains radioactive sources or nuclear material. More systematic checks would presuppose a change 
to national legislation [8]. However, if a vehicle is selected for control at the Skandia port in 
Gothenburg for some reason other than checking for radioactive sources, the vehicle is automatically 
scanned for radioactivity due to it passing the CSI portal on its way to the area of control. In this 
manner approximately 700 entities (containers and other vehicles) are scanned for radioactivity each 
year on a semi-random basis. Around ten alarms are triggered each year, though to date, only one 
alarm was due to an undeclared shipment of radioactive material. Due to the high sensitivity of portal 
monitors, naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) can sometimes trigger an alarm although no 
action is necessary.  
Swedish Customs also does not perform systematic checks of goods from countries outside the EU 
(‘third countries’) due to a lack of resources. In 2011 the Swedish Government assigned SSM together 
with Swedish Customs to review the capacity for detecting shipments of radioactive sources and 
nuclear materials across Swedish borders, from both the internal and external markets. In the final 
report it was suggested by SSM that the capacity of customs controls should be increased by installing 
eight portal monitors at the Skandia port in Gothenburg and six monitors at Arlanda Airport. The 
checks that occur due to searches for other reasons are deemed insufficient to ensure satisfactory 
control of incoming goods. The report is still under consideration by the Swedish Government.  
In SSM’s risk and vulnerability study of 2016 [9], it is stated that due to the lack of radiation controls at 
Swedish borders, Sweden runs the risk of becoming the gateway into the EU with respect to 
radioactive or other nuclear materials, which can injure public health and also damage the reputation 
of Sweden in an international setting.  
Together with other authorities that oversee aspects of transportation, SSM does carry out 
unannounced inspections of vehicles. These inspections, coordinated by the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency (MSB), are performed together with public authorities such as the Police, 
Swedish Customs, Coast Guard, Swedish Work Environment Authority, Swedish Transport Agency, 
county administrative boards and SSM. The inspections can be performed at any location, but the 
focus is mainly on the harbours of Stockholm and Gothenburg. Around 12 such inspections are carried 
out annually, with each authority present checking issues that fall under their responsibility. Radiation 
measurements are mainly performed from outside the vehicles using a GR-110 Gamma-Ray 
Scintillometer radiation detector. Some vehicles are opened and inspected internally. To date, no 
undeclared sources of radiation have been found during these inspections. Any nuclear material or 
other radioactive sources identified as being out of regulatory control must be reported to the ITDB, as 
will be further explained in section 7. 
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4. Emergency preparedness and response to events concerning nuclear or
other radioactive material out of regulatory control 
The nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness system in Sweden is governed by a graded 
approach, where the emergency preparedness categories, as defined by IAEA Safety Standard GSR 
Part 7 [10], are partly used as a basis for the determination. All nuclear power plants are placed in the 
highest emergency preparedness category, and the national emergency response plan for 
management of a nuclear accident [11] mainly focuses on accidents at these facilities, although the 
plan states that it also covers accidents at other nuclear facilities. The response plan describes the 
legal bases, authorities involved in the response to a nuclear accident, and the responsibilities of 
these authorities. The plan does not address the possibility of internal or external sabotage and is not 
based on a threat/hazard assessment, as was pointed out in the follow-up Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service (IRRS) Mission [12] conducted in Sweden in 2016. 
A similar national plan for responding to accidents involving nuclear or other radioactive material 
outside the nuclear facilities, or for other types of incidents (possibly involving malicious intent), does 
not exist in the same way as the national response plan for accidents at nuclear power plants. In the 
event of such an incident the emergency response follows a set of general principles, i.e. the 
principles of responsibility, parity and proximity [13]. The principle of responsibility means that the 
entity (authority, county, etc.) that is responsible for an activity under normal conditions also should 
have the responsibility in an emergency. The county administrative board is responsible for planning 
and leading regional emergency preparedness work in the case of an accident at a nuclear facility 
which could warrant protective actions for the public. The board also decides on measures to be taken 
to protect the public, provide information and alert the public, and is responsible for managing 
decontamination activities. In the case of other radiological incidents the municipality has the 
corresponding responsibilities. The Government is responsible for crisis management on a national 
level, where the mandate is primarily strategic issues. For coordination on a national level, the 
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) is responsible, and supervises preparedness for off-site 
rescue services response to radioactive releases.  
The role of SSM is regulated in Sections 15 to 17 of the Ordinance [14] with instructions for SSM. 
SSM is responsible for coordination of necessary emergency preparedness measures for preventing, 
identifying and detecting nuclear and radiological incidents. In the context of such an incident, SSM 
must (among other things) advise on radiation protection and decontamination, maintain and lead a 
national organisation for expert response, provide technical advice to other public authorities, and 
maintain the capability to perform radiation monitoring and sampling. If a criminal act is suspected, the 
Police, under the coordination of the National Operations Department, assumes a larger role and is 
responsible for investigating the crime, collecting information, restoring order and keeping the barriers 
necessary for securing evidence as well as for protecting the public.  
SSM performs a risk and vulnerability study [9] every other year (prior to 2016, each year) in order to 
assess the preparedness of SSM within its areas of responsibilities. The risk analysis is partly based 
on a number of identified scenarios, covering both intentional actions and accidents. They are divided 
into three main categories: nuclear reactors, radioactive substances, and nuclear explosive devices 
and weapons. The category of radioactive substances contains the scenarios most relevant to the 
topic of this paper, e.g. theft, smuggling or illegal transfers of nuclear or other radioactive sources, and 
different types of accidents involving radioactive materials. The consequences of such incidents are 
typically limited to a smaller geographical area compared to a serious accident at a nuclear facility, but 
can have life-threatening effects on individuals. In the case of a dirty bomb, i.e. a conventional 
explosive device mixed with radioactive material, there is a risk that the radioactivity will remain 
undetected until the effect of radiation damage is detected on individuals. The risk and vulnerability 
study also points out complex areas of responsibilities in the event of an incident involving radioactive 
sources outside a facility, and underlines shortcomings in the radiation protection legislation governing 
e.g. police and rescue personnel response to an incident involving a radioactive source. Exercises in 
this area are needed to ensure swift and correct response. As already mentioned in the previous 
section, the study also underlines the fact that border controls in Sweden are very limited when it 
comes to detecting radioactivity.  
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5. Controlling nuclear material and other radioactive sources in Sweden
All nuclear material in Sweden is registered and subjected to international safeguards. SSM keeps a 
national registry for nuclear material. In addition, Swedish nuclear facilities report material balances 
and other information to the European Commission in accordance with Commission Regulation 
(Euratom) 302/2005 on the application of Euratom Safeguards [15]. Sealed radioactive sources with 
activity levels above those stated in the Council Directive on Basic Safety Standards [16] require an 
individual licence and are registered in a national registry. There are some exceptions, such as fire 
alarms and telescopic sights. Other unsealed sources fall under a more general licensing procedure 
where the individual source is not registered in a national registry. The handling and licensing 
procedures for nuclear and other radioactive sources are regulated by the Radiation Protection Act 
[17], Radiation Protection Ordinance [18], Act on Nuclear Activities [19], Ordinance on Nuclear 
Activities [20], and by regulations [21] issued by SSM.  
All licensed holders of radioactive sources are required to keep an in-house registry of their sources, 
maintain adequate physical protection of the sources, and have an emergency plan for incidents. The 
licensee must also report all incidents to SSM. Incidents might involve accidental mishandling of a 
source or discovering that a source has been lost. Information that should be reported is usually 
specified by the terms of the licence. Details received by SSM through these incident reports are 
entered as part of the reporting made by SSM to the ITDB.  
6. Metal recycling facilities and orphan sources
As already stated, most incoming goods are not subject to checks for radioactivity at the Swedish 
border. However, the metal recycling industry has realised the value of conducting their own 
measurements of both imported and domestic material before melting it or reselling scrap metal. This 
is to avoid running the risk of accidentally melting radioactive sources together with other metals, 
which can lead to contamination of the final product and, in a worst case scenario, the entire plant. For 
this reason, many of the largest companies in this industry have invested in portal monitors and pass 
all incoming and most outgoing goods through these portals. Portal monitors and other forms of 
controls for radioactivity are not regulated by SSM, implying that SSM cannot require the companies to 
report incidents where their detectors triggered alarms. However, since many items that trigger alarms 
in the portals are subject to regulations deriving from the Radiation Protection Act [17], SSM has 
included conditions for the portal monitors in licences for other equipment that the companies have, 
such as XRF detectors (X-ray fluorescent detectors). The conditions for example require the 
companies to safely handle and store the discovered radioactive materials and to report such 
incidents to SSM. There are around a dozen or so private firms in Sweden that have one or more 
portal monitors subject to licence conditions requiring incident reporting to SSM if any radioactive 
material is detected by the portals.  
In the Ordinance [14] with instructions for SSM it is stated that SSM is responsible for regaining and 
maintaining control over orphan sources. Earmarked funding is provided to SSM each year from the 
Swedish Government, through the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, for this purpose. 
Anyone who finds an orphan source or radioactive waste of any kind can contact SSM and apply for 
help to get the source taken care of. If SSM cannot find the original owner of the source, SSM 
commissions a company licensed to handle radioactive sources to collect the source and store it 
safely [22]. This mode of operation is often used by the metal recycling industry when radioactive 
sources are found among scrap metal loads, but a number of private individuals also apply each year 
for help to take care of unwanted radioactive material. This is another source of information used 
when reporting to the ITDB, as will be explained in the next section.  
7. Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)
In 1995 the Board of Governors at the IAEA requested the Director General to develop a reliable 
database of information on incidents of illicit trafficking in order to assist Member States and to better 
inform the public [23]. In August 1995, the Illicit Trafficking Database was operational and the IAEA 
began accumulating information. In 2012 the name of the database was changed in order to better 
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reflect the scope of the database. The database is intended to cover illicit trafficking events, but also 
has a broader scope in that it encompasses all nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory 
control [24]. The new name was decided to be “Incident and Trafficking Database: Incidents of nuclear 
and other radioactive material out of regulatory control”.  
The scope of the information in the ITDB is specified in the Terms of Reference as follows: 
“The ITDB covers incidents involving unauthorized acquisition, provision, possession, use, transfer or 
disposal of nuclear and other radioactive materials, whether intentionally or unintentionally, with or 
without crossing international borders. It also covers unsuccessful or thwarted acts of the above type, 
the loss of materials and the discovery of uncontrolled materials.” 
The IAEA states a number of purposes of the database: to assist states with the timely exchange of 
authoritative information on incidents within the scope of the ITDB; to maintain and analyse reported 
information with a view to identifying common threats, trends and patterns; to assist states in 
determining what actions may need to be taken or to help formulate policy towards combating illicit 
trafficking; and to support the Agency’s nuclear security activities. When appropriate, the information 
reported to the ITDB can also be used to provide media with reliable information concerning a region 
or a particular incident.  
It is voluntary for states to join the ITDB programme. The member states of the ITDB are not identical 
to those that have signed the NPT [25] or to those that are member states of the IAEA. By April 2017, 
134 states have signed up to join the programme, and nearly 3,000 incidents have been reported to 
the database since its inception in 1995. Of these incidents, 259 have been reported as Group I 
incidents, meaning that an incident is confirmed as, or likely to be, an act of trafficking or malicious 
use, or an instance of scam/fraud, or an attempt thereof. 807 incidents have been categorized in 
Group II, where it has not been deemed possible to determine whether the incident is related to 
trafficking or to malicious use. This group includes a number of incidents involving theft and missing 
material. A number of very old incidents are not placed in any group due to insufficient information, but 
the vast majority are Group III incidents involving a confirmed or likely absence of trafficking or 
malicious use. Note: This method of structuring the incidents into groups has evolved over time, as 
have the definitions of incidents, implying that one must be careful when using the entire database to 
view statistics and to draw conclusions.  
7.1. Incidents reported by Sweden to the ITDB 
Sweden has been a member of the ITDB programme almost since the very beginning, joining on 12 
December 1995. The Point of Contact (PoC) for reporting to the ITDB is presently located in the 
Section for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Security at SSM. Fortunately, during the lifespan of the ITDB 
programme, no incidents of trafficking or malicious use of nuclear or radioactive material have been 
discovered taking place in Sweden. However, Sweden has not been actively reporting all incidents 
falling under the scope of the ITDB throughout this time period.  
Over the past three years, SSM has stepped up its efforts in collecting and sharing information about 
incidents falling under the scope of the ITDB. The majority of incidents discovered and reported fall 
under the incident description ‘unauthorized disposal’, which means that nuclear or other radioactive 
materials have been disposed of at facilities where these materials are not accepted. The second 
most common type of incident is ‘undeclared or unauthorized storage’ where, typically, a business or 
university is in possession of undeclared nuclear material, often historical material or materials used 
for non-nuclear research. Figure 1 is a graph displaying the number of reported incidents over time (up 
until April 2017), where the year on the x-axis reflects the incident date, not the reporting date. There 
is typically a time lag of a few months between an incident occurring and the incident being reported. 
The data is to be interpreted as reflecting an increase in reporting frequency and not as an increase in 
the actual number of incidents occurring. However, with greater international trade in scrap metals and 
a growing number of waste facilities installing portal monitors for detecting radiation, the number of 
detected incidents in the category ‘unauthorized disposal’ may be increasing over time.  
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Figure 1: Number of incidents reported to the ITDB between 1999 and April 2017. The year on the x-axis reflects 
the date when the incident occurred, not the reporting date. 
Around half of the incidents reported involved nuclear material, often uranium or thorium salts. Radium 
226 is also a commonly occurring isotope in the reported incidents. Figure 2 shows a breakdown of 
the type of incident and material involved in the incidents reported between 1999 and April 2017. One 
incident can encompass several types of radiation sources and/or types of nuclear material.  
There is a connection between some incidents reported to ITDB and ‘accidental gain’ and ‘loss’ of 
nuclear material reported under safeguards. Nuclear material that is found as unregistered under 
safeguards automatically comprises an incident to be reported to the ITDB, typically under the types 
‘unauthorized storage’ or ‘possession’, or, if found at any type of waste treatment facility, under 
‘unauthorized disposal’. To date, the reason behind failing to report the material under safeguards has 
been either a lack of knowledge of the regulations or being unaware of the type of material. For this 
reason all these incidents have been Group III incidents, i.e. neither related to trafficking nor to 
malicious use.  
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Figure 2: Breakdown of types of incidents reported by Sweden and the nuclear and radioactive source involved, 
from 1999 to April 2017. One incident can encompass several radiation sources and/or types of nuclear material. 
Screenshot from the ITDB dashboard on 19 April 2017. 
7.2. Network for ITDB reporting 
SSM is the competent authority on issues related to radiation. Therefore, most incidents falling within 
the scope of the ITDB are dealt with by one of the 16 sections belonging to SSM’s departments. The 
challenge is to make the approximately 200 people working in these sections aware of when an 
incident they are processing should be communicated to the PoC for ITDB reporting. To increase 
awareness of the ITDB within SSM and to communicate the obligation each member state has to 
report incidents to the ITDB, the ITDB reporting group has started to initiate meetings with each 
section to communicate about and explain the purpose of the ITDB, and to discuss the types of 
incidents that a specific section might encounter in their daily work. Implementation of this in-house 
cooperation has mainly taken place with the Section for Transport and Waste and the Section for 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Security. Work on establishing a way to share information is currently 
ongoing with the Section for Medical Exposures and Section for Occupational Practices and Work 
Activities. A collaboration project with the national INES coordinator has also been established; here, 
reported information is shared between the two coordinators. The plan is to gradually expand this 
network throughout SSM.  
Because some types of incidents might not come to the attention of SSM, at least not immediately, 
there is a need to expand the network to encompass other national authorities. In the case of theft 
(and attempt thereof), cooperation with the Police is needed, and in the case of scam/fraud in which 
no nuclear or other radioactive material was actually present, it might first and foremost come to the 
attention of Swedish Security Services. Some established groups are already in place with 
representatives attending from relevant authorities, e.g. within the area of export control, that could 
also potentially be used to establish a network for questions related to ITDB and reporting of incidents. 
SSM presently shares information from the ITDB with several Swedish authorities.  
8. International cooperation to combat illicit trafficking
The collapse of the USSR between 1991 and 1992 initiated international cooperation between 
Sweden and a number of the new states that once were republics of the Soviet Union [26]. Over 
nearly 25 years now, several hundred projects have been implemented by SSM 
(Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority) and its predecessors, the 
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, SSI (Statens strålskyddsinstitut) and the Swedish Nuclear 
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Power Inspectorate, SKI (Statens kärnkraftinspektion) to ensure that radioactive and nuclear material 
and facilities are kept safe and secure.  
In the early days of the new states’ independence following the USSR’s demise, the primary goal for 
the international community was to ensure control over nuclear weapons and to channel former Soviet 
military activities in the nuclear field into new structures of ownership and responsibility in the 
successor states. The United States was then heavily involved in funding and organizing the 
transportation of weapons-grade nuclear material from the former satellite states in the USSR to 
Russia, which is the state that succeeded the USSR as a nuclear weapons state under the NPT. In 
more recent times, the focus has shifted towards increasing the safety and security of civilian uses of 
nuclear material and other radioactive sources and facilities, where much work remains to be done.  
The current Swedish commitments stem from the political objectives stated in the Nuclear Security 
Summits held from 2010, in addition to the objectives of the G-7 and its Declarations from Kananaskis 
in 2002 and Deauville in 2011. A legal basis is set through the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 
[2] which requires all states to take measures to secure materials and facilities that could be used to 
manufacture weapons of mass destruction (see also section 2). Sweden carries out projects in 
cooperation with recipient states, often together with other partners, primarily in Norway, Finland, the 
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Poland. Figure 3 shows the main locations where 
projects were implemented in 2015.  
Figure 3: The main locations in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Belarus where SSM, together with 
cooperation partners, implemented projects in 2015. From “Nuclear Security, Safety and Non-Proliferation: 
Sweden’s International Cooperation in 2015” [26].  
8.1. Projects related to combating illicit trafficking 
Bilateral cooperation has gradually expanded between Sweden and Black Sea region states in the 
areas of nuclear security and non-proliferation, as well as in emergency preparedness work. The focus 
is on activities aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of the states’ regulatory authorities. 
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Problems in this region due to political instability, weak governance and corruption, in combination 
with poverty and weak rule of law, give scope for organized crime to increase. Since a number of 
nuclear facilities and large quantities of radioactive material are located in this region, the risk of illegal 
activities, including illegal trade and trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive materials, is increased.  
Statistics from the ITDB1 show that out of a total of 57 reported Group I incidents worldwide (related to 
trafficking or malicious use, or attempts thereof) since 2010, 32 of them were reported by either 
Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia. This is further motivation for working towards regaining control over 
nuclear and radioactive sources, as well as strengthening institutions and increasing border control to 
combat illegal trade in such materials.  
Some of the projects in the Black Sea region that SSM participates in or has completed are presented 
in the following sections. As this is only a small selection of projects, the authors refer the reader to the 
webpage of SSM2 for further information about other completed or ongoing projects.  
8.1.1. Ukraine 
Ukraine is a country with a vast number of radioactive sources, where around 25,000 sources are still 
in use and around half a million are disused. SSM has sponsored a project on modernizing the 
Ukrainian state registry of ionizing radiation sources by improving the technical infrastructure and the 
system’s functionality to comply with new regulations. An outreach campaign on recovering orphan 
radioactive sources under institutional supervision was carried out in 2016, where SSM, in cooperation 
with the State Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU), set up a website to promote nuclear and 
radiological safety. Amnesty legislation with the purpose of encouraging enterprises, organisations 
and the general public to turn in orphan radioactive sources to Ukrainian authorities was passed in 
October 2016 and was promoted by the public website.  
All disused radioactive sources in Ukraine are to be moved to the newly built central repository, 
VEKTOR, located in the Chernobyl exclusion zone. Many disused radioactive sources are presently 
stored in well-type storages with little documentation on the type and activity of the sources. SSM 
completed a project in 2016 with the Ukrainian national waste management operator on a feasibility 
study that resulted in recommendations on how to best move the sources from the wells to the new 
storage facility. A follow-up project will be carried out in 2017 involving a detailed design for removal of 
sources from a representative well-type storage located at the Kiev RADON site.  
8.1.2. Republic of Moldova 
A longstanding project in Moldova is to regain control over nuclear and other radioactive material out 
of regulatory control. In these efforts, SSM has delivered technical and financial support to the 
National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities in Moldova (NARNRA). During 
the period 2014-2016, 329 radioactive sources, including five cases containing nuclear materials, were 
discovered by NARNRA and transported to the State Radioactive Waste Repository for safe storage. 
Information on the identified sources has been submitted to the ITDB. A parallel pilot project on 
tracking of radioactive sources through social media has been implemented by the James Martin 
Center for Non-proliferation Studies in Monterey, California.  
In September 2015, at the request of NARNRA, SSM supported organization of an international 
response exercise in Moldova on combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. The 
exercise was conducted at the Giurgiulesti International Free Port, on the border between Moldova 
and Romania. The main purpose of the exercise was to test the effectiveness of existing response 
procedures for illicit trafficking incidents and the procedures’ compatibility with those of EU border 
states. Participants included regulators, customs officials, border guards, police officers and 
intelligence organizations, as well as observers from international organizations.  
1 Search parameters of the ITDB from 2010-01-01 to 2017-04-20, Group I incidents. 
2 http://www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten.se/In-English/Facts-about-us/International-work/ 
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8.1.3. Georgia 
With support from SSM, Georgia has recently established a comprehensive legal and regulatory 
framework for the management of radioactive waste. The Law on Radioactive Waste has been 
adopted by the Parliament of Georgia and a new, independent Agency of Nuclear and Radiation 
Safety (ANRS) has been established under the supervision of the Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources Protection of Georgia. The work and experience gained in collaboration with Swedish 
experts in 2016 facilitated elaboration of the National Waste Management Strategy and Action Plan, 
which were adopted by the Georgian Government in December 2016.  
In September 2016, SSM supported several exercises on responses to the seizure of radiological 
materials at the Sarpi checkpoint located on the Georgian-Turkish border, as well as at the Batumi 
airport and Batumi seaport. More than 40 members of emergency teams and experts from Sweden, 
USA, Ukraine, Moldova and Romania participated in the exercises. The outcome of the evaluation 
demonstrated the relevant status and systems in place to detect, prevent and respond to the cases of 
smuggling attempts of nuclear and radioactive materials.  
9. Summary and conclusions
Nuclear and other radioactive sources out of regulatory control can lead to unwanted and dangerous 
radioactive exposure of people, animals and the environment, either due to accidents, or in a worst 
case scenario, due to malicious use. The chain of individuals or entities running the risk of possible 
exposure to radiation can be quite long, from customs officials and transport companies to the end 
users or recycling facilities. Depending on the type of situation, several governmental and local 
institutions might be involved, having different areas of responsibilities. Coordination and sharing of 
relevant information become key elements for success.  
This paper has given a brief overview of the Swedish system designed to maintain control over 
nuclear and other radioactive material, as well as the system in place to regain control over sources 
when they have been lost. Some shortcomings have been pointed out, such as the (according to 
many professionals) insufficient checks for radioactivity carried out on incoming goods across the 
Swedish border.  
An additional effort made by SSM over the past three years is sharing information through the Incident 
and Trafficking Database (ITDB) about incidents when nuclear or other radioactive material is, or was, 
out of regulatory control. Expanding the national network to spread information is an ongoing and very 
important part of this work.  
Last but not least, the paper presents some of the work being performed through SSM’s Office for 
International Relations in the international arena to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive 
material out of regulatory control. The Black Sea region is a part of the world that is heavily affected by 
trafficking in these types of materials. Thus, it is an important and a strategic region to support in these 
countries’ own government efforts to combat these activities and regain control over such materials.  
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Abstract: 
The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) Office of 
Proliferation Detection funds research and development (R&D) that improves the efficiency and 
effectiveness of current safeguards and efforts to strengthen existing safeguards measures to detect 
material diversion In declared facilities.  DNN R&D develops advanced tools and methods to provide for 
comprehensive monitoring, detection and analysis of civilian nuclear fuel cycle programs. Sponsored 
research provides confidence that special nuclear material (SNM) is not being diverted or misused for the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. A safeguards-specific goal is to develop and demonstrate new 
technologies and capabilities to cooperatively quantify and track SNM throughout a nuclear fuel cycle and 
detect any illicit diversion of these materials. These goals align with that of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency’s Long Term Strategy for 2012-2023 to improve “technical capabilities by making use of scientific 
and technological innovation, and to enhance its readiness to safeguard new nuclear technology and 
support new verification missions.” [1]  
DNN supports research and development of technologies and methodologies that can significantly improve 
or enhance nondestructive assay methods, the tools needed to provide effective containment and 
surveillance, process and environmental monitoring, and destructive analyses.  This paper will provide an 
overview of select R&D efforts; some that are currently underway and others that have recently transitioned 
to sponsors for deployment and implementation. 
Keywords: safeguards, monitoring, detection, material, technology 
1. Introduction
The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and 
Development’s (DNN R&D) mission is to advance U.S. capabilities to detect weapons development 
activities, including material production & movement and nuclear explosions globally.. The mission space 
of DNN R&D is applied research. A core DNN R&D research objective is the advancement of safeguards 
technologies.  DNN R&D Safeguards focuses on developing and demonstrating new technologies and 
capabilities that: 1) Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of current safeguards and 2) Strengthen 
existing safeguard measures to ensure timely detection of material diversion and undeclared material 
production. . 
DNN R&D Safeguards is required to develop and demonstrate new technologies and capabilities that 
provide comprehensive monitoring, detection, and analysis of civilian fuel cycle activities to ensure that SNM 
is not being diverted or misused for nuclear weapons programs. To meet this requirement Safeguards R&D 
strives to develop, through proof of principle, the next generation of technologies that can provide accurate 
and timely nuclear material accountancy. Our ultimate vision is to provide technologies and tools that can 
continuously and unobtrusively monitor, all SNM production and movements while providing instantaneous 
accountancy at safeguarded facilities. This paper will discuss some of the DNN R&D Safeguards projects 
that are nearing completion. 
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2. Current DNN R&D Safeguards Projects
The projects highlighted here represent current R&D efforts that are mid development cycle and will be 
available for transition to mission partners soon. The vignettes presented are summaries derived from the 
work of the principle investigators at the US National Laboratories. 
2.1 Current R&D for Improving DA methods for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Materials 
Field portable instrumentation that provides in-field sample collection and analysis of SNM at safeguarded 
facilities continues to be of high interest to the Safeguards community. DNN Safeguards R&D invests in 
new technologies and methods that can provide more efficient and safe sampling UF6 and improve isotopic 
determination of UF6 samples. The technologies described below focus on enhancing efficiency, reducing 
risk, reducing cost, and providing more timely information to the Safeguards community. 
2.1.1. Development of Solid Materials for UF6 Sampling 
Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) samples must be taken for enrichment verification as part of the comprehensive 
safeguards agreements at gaseous enrichment facilities. Sampling of these gases can be performed at 
cylinders or from process lines. In an effort to increase efficiency and freedom of operation at a UF6 facility, 
a method based on the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials 
Cristallini technique (ABACC-Cristallini) is currently under development by Argonne National Laboratory 
through the DNN Safeguards R&D portfolio. 
The ABACC- Cristallini Method allows   UF6 samples to be captured and stored as an inert salt, which 
mitigates hazards associated with transportation and handling. This project is developing a field-portable, 
hand-carried system to utilize the ABACC-Cristallini method for sampling UF6 cylinders and storing the 
material as uranyl fluoride. This system is expected to reduce the weight of sampling materials and 
equipment carried by an inspector and reduce the necessary sampling time. The handheld operation for 
Uranium Sampling (HORUS) can be used to collect measurements at existing facilities using inspector-
controlled technology. [2] 
Figure 1. Left, image of the laboratory engineering prototype of HORUS. Right, image of uranyl band capture 
chamber. 
HORUS uses an onboard power system and vacuum to actively pull the sample into a removable trap. A 
pressure transducer is used to read vacuum and UF6 source pressure, and a timing circuit controls the mass 
of collected material. The HORUS system has been successfully tested with tungsten hexafluoride and 
uranium hexafluoride (DU). These tests demonstrated repeatability and good recovery for sampling. The 
initial tests have been successful and the lab device will undergo some additional refinements and systems 
engineering work to meet the requirements for safety and portability. The HORUS device has the potential 
to change the way inspection agencies are able to collect samples at uranium enrichment plants.  The UF6 
samples will be able to be easily transported, the HORUS device can be brought to a site during inspections 
or left at the facility in secure storage until needed. The amount of sample and sampling time can greatly be 
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reduced from the time and amounts required by traditional methods.  The device prototype will be completed 
and readied for testing at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory by the end of FY17. [3] 
2.1.2. Fieldable Atomic Beam Laser Spectrometer for Isotopic Analysis 
Los Alamos National Laboratory is developing a fieldable prototype device for the isotopic determination of 
uranium samples.  The device can measure isotopic composition with high sensitivity, resolution, and speed. 
The method is based on generating a highly collimated atomic beam by heating the sample to 2500°C in 
rough vacuum, and measuring laser absorption through it. The use of an ultra-narrow linewidth diode laser 
allows the isotopic splitting of atomic absorption lines to be easily resolved. All of the system components 
are compact and rugged, and will be integrated into a vibration-immune prototype having a size under 2 ft3, 
and requiring < 1500W of electrical power. 
The system will be capable of determining the isotopic compositions of uranium/plutonium in the field with 
high precision and speed, in an easy-to-use system that requires no sample preparation steps, and no need 
for the transportation of chemical reagents. Samples are loaded directly in the system, and the instrument 
could be used in support of environmental sampling and inventory verification.  
The immediate detection and characterization of isotopic signatures in the field aids in reassessing the 
course of an inspection if for example, the presence of undeclared nuclear materials are detected. When 
used as a method for on-site inventory verifications during routine inspections, better precision and 
sensitivity than currently used NDA measurements is expected, thus, the number of item verifications could 
be reduced while still meeting the required detection probability. [4] 
Figure 2. Left, Erbium spectrum showing several isotopes of Erbium. Right, heating element and nozzle of the micro-
oven for atomic beam generation. 
Using an atomic beam system allows for measurement of absorption lines virtually free from Doppler and 
collision broadening effects. The atomic beam width and laser beam width can be matched to ensure all the 
sample atoms travel through the interrogation volume.  The result of this is a continuous signal that is nearly 
background free depending on the choice of the analyte. 
This year the device will undergo analysis of highly enriched uranium, uranium oxide, and finalization of 
design for a fieldable prototype. This advantages of this technology over traditional mass spectrometry will 
allow for the immediate in-field isotopic analysis of SNM, and reassessment of the course of an ongoing 
inspection becomes a new possibility. 
2.2 New Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA) Methods for SNM 
The IAEA uses more than 100 different NDA systems to verify, check and monitor nuclear materials without 
changing their physical or chemical properties. NDA instruments range in size and complexity from small 
portable units used by safeguards inspectors during on-site verification activities to large in situ NDA 
systems designed for continuous unattended in-plant use.[5] Highly accurate, nondestructive assay 
methods represent major investment area for DNN Safeguards R&D.  These investments are made with 
the intent of increasing current capabilities available to inspection agencies, enhancing function and 
portability, and supporting unattended process monitoring.  
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2.2.1. Commercially Viable Magnetic Micro-calorimeter -Detectors with Ultra-high Energy 
Resolution 
Cryogenic gamma -detectors operated at temperatures below 0.1 K have been developed for the last 
decade because they offer ten times higher energy resolution than conventional high-purity Ge detectors, 
well below 100 eV FWHM at 100 keV. The reduction in errors from line overlap and background counts 
increases the accuracy of non-destructive isotope analysis (NDA) in nuclear safeguards applications. The 
high energy resolution trade-off is small detector volume and low count rates, providing the impetus for the 
development of -detector arrays. This work adapts metallic magnetic calorimeters (MMCs) based on Er-
doped Au as -detectors for ultra-high resolution NDA. MMCs are paramagnetic sensors in which the 
absorption of a -ray produces a change in magnetization that can be read out with a superconducting 
quantum interference device (SQUID) preamplifier. Since MMCs have fewer noise sources and thus higher 
energy resolution than transition edge sensors (TESs), or larger pixel volume for the same energy 
resolution. They are also more linear than TESs and better suited for scaling to large detector arrays. Finally, 
MMC signals decay with a single thermal time constant. This should allow the use of novel pulse processing 
algorithms to increase their count rates by an order of magnitude, provided that the SQUID readout noise 
is sufficiently low.  
Figure 3. -spectrum of a mixed isotope of Pu sample. The MMCs can separate the 242Pu line at 45.244 keV (green 
line). Note that the HPGe detector cannot separate these features (red line). 
This technology has been applied to a number of case studies.  With the MMCs one can conduct a total 
assay of Pu and directly detect 242Pu (Figure 3) with accuracy of <1% 242Pu being achievable. The MMCs 
can reduce the error in measurement of 242Pu providing an independent measure of the initial enrichment 
in spent fuel, providing a check on operator declarations of initial enrichment of fuel rods. High resolution 
spectra provided by the MMCs can assist in the detection of undeclared uranium mining activities. In the 
absence of mining uranium will be in secular equilibrium with its decay products. Mining will alter the isotope 
ratios. Short lived isotopes (226Ra/235U) can then be used to characterize non-disturbed ore, tails, or 
products. Ge detectors suffer from line overlap for 266Ra (186.21 keV) and the 235U (185.71 keV) -lines.  
The high resolution MMC -detectors solves the line overlap issue and can aid in determining age 
estimations. The high resolution of the MMC -detectors can also be applied to resolving overlapping bands 
in the XKα region of uranium where lines from 235U, 238U, 231Th, and 234Th interfere in HPGe detectors. The 
higher resolution of the MMC -detectors will provide better accuracy of this measurement. Concerns about 
the fissile isotope, 233U, from the thorium fuel cycle has led to the desire to more accurately measure the 
energies and branching ratios of 233U. The MMC -detectors are uniquely capable to aid in these 
determinations. Improvements to the pixel design and addition of a liquid-cryogen-free dilution refrigerator 
high resolution operation at 10 mK will make MMC operation accessible to non-experts. Ultra-high energy 
resolution of MMCs will increase accuracy of NDA when HPGe detectors are limited by line overlap. [6]  
2.2.2. List Mode Response Matrix for Advanced Correlated Neutron Analysis for Nuclear 
Safeguards 
Partial defect detection presents a technical challenge for nuclear safeguards. Within the current safeguards 
technology toolkit and installed base of neutron non-destructive assay (NDA) systems, there is no existing 
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3He-based detection capability to verify fuel pin loading patterns and partial defects in fresh fuel assemblies 
for nuclear safeguards applications. While current neutron collar detectors used for fresh fuel assay 
measurements employ twenty-four or more individual neutron detectors, only a single pulse train is analyzed 
from the combined detector array to derive two neutron counting rates from which safeguards conclusions 
must be drawn. Enhancing the capability of these NDA systems by extracting spatial information has not 
previously been explored, but it could prove crucial to detect fuel pin diversion.  
To address the need for partial defect detection, a new correlated neutron analysis method, the “List Mode
Response Matrix”, is under development for implementation in a prototype 3He-based List Mode Collar 
(LMCL). This system is designed to acquire and analyze pulse trains from the detector array to enable the 
verification of spatial information about the assay item for safeguards inspections. This spatial analysis has 
not previously been implemented in neutron collar detectors. Furthermore, spatial information will be 
combined with pattern recognition algorithms to detect changes in fresh fuel assemblies such as missing 
pins or pin replacement. The purpose of this research is to explore whether partial defect detection can be 
achieved using neutron NDA systems that have already been authorized for safeguards inspection use. 
One practical goal is to demonstrate that upgrading existing systems with new software and hardware is 
more cost-effective than system replacement, and show that this approach will maintain NDA system 
reliability and ease of use for safeguards inspections. The end goal of this research is to help nuclear 
safeguards inspectors to draw stronger conclusions about nuclear material diversion and partial defect 
scenarios. [7] 
Figure 4: An Illustration of a standard neutron coincidence collar detector of the design fielded by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
2.3 Containment and Surveillance/ Unattended Process Monitoring 
Containment and surveillance (C&S) and process monitoring are important measures that compliment 
material accountancy and aid in the timely detection of diversion of SNM.  These devices may include 
passive and active tags and seals, camera systems, and unattended process monitoring devices and 
systems like the online enrichment monitoring device (OLEM). Expanded deployment of unattended and 
remote monitoring systems has become an increasingly important element of IAEA efforts to maintain and 
increase safeguards effectiveness while reducing overall costs. [8] Ideally these systems are self-contained, 
have low power requirements, are easily maintained, and are unobtrusive to plant operations. DNN 
Safeguards R&D has recently invested in the following C&S/process monitoring devices to more efficiently 
monitor SNM activities and improve continuity of knowledge. 
2.3.1. Whole Container Seal (WCS) for Sealing Existing Items and Equipment 
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Many safeguard sealing applications rely on loop type seals that can be inserted through a secure hasp 
type orifice associated with the item or object requiring protection. However there are many cases when 
adequate hasps do not exist or the containment of the item or device is inadequate for effective sealing.  
For these cases, a team from Oak Ridge National Laboratory has developed a versatile, inexpensive option 
for sealing things that were not initially designed for effective sealing.  The Whole Container Seal is an 
actively monitored flexible conductive seal capable of enclosing monitored items of various shapes and 
sizes. It provides active monitoring that verifies the integrity of an entire object using commercially available 
components. 
Breaches are indicated by changes in sensitive, four-point resistance measurements performed on the 
material at a plurality of measurement points.  Multiple resistance measurements are performed over the 
entire enclosures in a short period of time to build up a signature of the conductive shield.  Changes in the 
resistance signature indicate a breach. The sealing method can also support a variety of sensors that can 
be utilized to monitor the environmental conditions, detect movement and transport, or detect changes in 
physical attributes. [9] 
Figure 5: Prototype whole container seal for encapsulating existing items or equipment in a tamper indicating shell 
made of novel material. 
2.3.2. Viability of Acoustic Techniques for Density and Mass Flow in Enrichment Plants 
The primary purpose of this research is to study the feasibility of acoustic signatures and sensors that 
support the accurate, noninvasive and unattended measurement of UF6 gas density and mass flow rate in 
scenarios representative of uranium enrichment plants under safeguards by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). Non-invasive, unattended mass flow measurement at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants 
would enable independent mass balance accounting. Current COTS acoustic techniques are capable of 
measuring mass flow down to 1 to 2 atmosphere pressures (760-1520 Torr). Header pipes at gaseous 
centrifuge enrichment plants typically operate in the range of 10-40 Torr. This technique has demonstrated 
sensitivity of acoustic signal to density at representative gas pressures. 
For this safeguards application, acoustic measurements are two orders of magnitude more difficult: due to 
a very weak acoustic signal that passes through the gas. The acoustic signal that passes through the pipe 
wall is much stronger and provides clean reflections that can be used to gate the signal as it passes through 
the gas (see Figure 6). 
This approach, coupled with a device like the On-line Enrichment Monitor (OLEM), may eliminate reliance 
on the use of in-line pressure sensor to determine the mass balance at gaseous centrifuge enrichment 
plants under international safeguards.  This could be implemented in the current OLEM system and would 
eliminate the need to obtain host supplied data from a host owned pressure sensor. [10] 
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Figure 6. Path of the ultrasonic pulse through pipe walls and gaseous media to determine mass flow of UF6. 
3. Concluding Summary
The DNN mission focuses on utilizing world class resources to provide advanced technologies and 
methodologies that can achieve measureable impacts to the efficiency and effectiveness of domestic and 
international safeguards.    
Figure 7: Facility Safeguards Vision: Unobtrusive Surveillance with Instantaneous Accountability. 
The above is a depiction that represents the types of Safeguards systems envisioned for future facility 
Safeguards.   This figure illustrates a facility where all SNM materials and personnel are continuously tracked 
and monitored.  All materials are contained (kept in either monitored storage arrays or in containment that 
prevents direct access by personnel) and unattended real-time process monitoring is accomplished as the 
materials are processed and move through the facility.   
Future safeguards approaches need to modernize by implementing new tools and technologies that provide 
timely detection of material diversion, maintain continuity of knowledge, and provide indications of facility 
misuse; while minimizing operational impacts and enhancing security, safety, and overall process efficiency.  
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The objective of current DNN Safeguards R&D is to provide support for this vision in these functional areas.  
 Nuclear Material Measurements
 Unattended Monitoring of Material Inventories and Processes
 Containment and Surveillance
 Destructive Analysis Methods and Environmental Sampling
 Design Information Verification
The projects mentioned in this paper showcase some of the current R&D efforts that are being undertaken 
to support the full spectrum of needs associated with global safeguards. 
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Abstract: 
Pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, individual Safeguards Agreements were 
produced for France, the Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) 
(signed but not ratified) and United States of America (U.S.) with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). Because there are minimal or no nuclear material or activities in the affected 
territories of these States, these agreements include a small quantities protocol (SQP) that holds in 
abeyance a majority of the IAEA reporting and access requirements. The Agreement between the 
U.S. and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (US-IAEA Caribbean Territories Safeguards Agreement) 
entered into force on April 6, 1989, along with its SQP to the agreement. In 2005, the IAEA identified 
proliferation concerns associated with holding most of the requirements in abeyance through an SQP, 
and has since urged States with an original SQP to adopt the modified model SQP. To ensure 
consistent reporting and access under the new requirements of the modified SQP, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has initiated rulemaking to modify Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR) Part 75 “Safeguards on Nuclear Material-Implementation of US-IAEA 
Agreement.” Additionally, the NRC has developed a robust outreach plan with the affected licensees 
in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in order to ensure effective and timely implementation, once 
the modified SQP enters into force. This paper will address the basis for adopting the modified SQP, 
new requirements of the modified SQP, along with outreach and implementation efforts, to date, with 
affected NRC licensees in the U.S. Caribbean Territories. 
Keywords: SQP; IAEA; Tlatelolco; NRC 
Introduction 
On April 6, 1989, The Agreement between the United States of America (U.S.) and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (US-IAEA Caribbean Territories Safeguards 
Agreement) entered into force, along with its original small quantities protocol (SQP). This non-
nuclear weapons State (NNWS) style comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) was documented 
in IAEA Information Circular 366 (INFCIRC/366), pursuant to treaty obligations of the U.S. under 
Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty). The U.S. agreed to accept International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) safeguards in U.S. territories in the zone of application of the Tlatelolco Treaty — the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands of the United States, Navassa Island, Serranilla 
Bank, Baja Nuevo Bank (Petrel Island), and the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay. In 2005, the 
IAEA identified proliferation concerns associated with holding most of the requirements in abeyance 
through an SQP, and has since urged States with an original SQP to adopt the amended model SQP. 
The US-IAEA Caribbean Territories Safeguard Agreement, unlike the US-IAEA Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/288), is not a Voluntary Offer Agreement and does not have a national security 
exclusion currently exercised by the five nuclear weapons States (NWS); China, France, Russia, 
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United Kingdom and United States. The modified SQP (ModSQP) only applies to articles in Part II of 
the US-IAEA Caribbean Territories Agreement. All paragraphs in Part I of the Agreement are in effect 
for the territories in the zone of application of the Tlatelolco Treaty.  
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) revised part 75 of title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR), “Part 75—Safeguards on Nuclear Material—Implementation of Safeguards 
Agreements between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency,” in order to meet 
the U.S. Government obligations under the Agreement. These revised regulations apply to any NRC 
applicant, licensee, certificate holder, or possessor of nuclear material (any source or special nuclear 
material) outside facilities in the U.S. Caribbean Territories to accommodate additional obligations 
created as a result of the ModSQP. The revised regulations ensure the U.S. provides timely, correct 
and complete reports and declarations to the IAEA, and respond to IAEA requests. IAEA access 
under an ad hoc or special inspection to the physical location of nuclear material outside facilities 
(NMOF) is provided for in the revision.  
Nuclear Material Reporting 
A number of changes were made to U.S. regulations related to implementation of IAEA safeguards 
under the ModSQP which removed abeyance of several of the Articles of INFCIRC/366; 31-37, 39, 
47, 48, 58, 60, 66, 67, 69, 71-75, 81, 83-89, 93 and 94 (slight variation from model). Regulation 
changes to 10 CFR Part 75 explain terms of reference describing possessors of NMOF as holders of 
nuclear material that is not in a facility, and is customarily used in amounts of one effective kilogram or 
less. Physical location of each possessor of NMOF (para. 47 of INFCIRC/366) is described as a 
specific geographical point or area, where either nuclear material subject to the US-IAEA Caribbean 
Territories Safeguards Agreement resides or activity subject to this agreement occurs.  
Currently, possessors of NMOF are scattered throughout Puerto Rico and hold very small amounts of 
nuclear material, well below the thresholds defined to maintain an SQP, as outlined in Article 35. In 
order to improve efficiency, the U.S. declarations and reports originating from these Possessors of 
NMOF are considered one location outside facility (LOF) material balance area (MBA). Quantities of 
nuclear material transferred into/out of the MBA are regarded as imports/exports and reported on an 
annual basis to the IAEA. The annual physical inventory within the MBA is a composite of all nuclear 
material present at key measurement points assigned to each Possessor of NMOF. 
Initial inventory taking of nuclear material held by Possessors of NMOF was based on domestic 
reporting requirements of licensees to the NRC under either a specific license or general license for 
use of nuclear material. A physical inventory is verified by the NRC to confirm the presence of nuclear 
material and ensure the initial inventory declared to the IAEA was correct and complete. The initial 
declaration constitutes the majority of the work required under the modified SQP. Subsequent 
reporting to the IAEA is required when there is a loss or suspected loss of material; an inability to 
detect unauthorized removal and when there are transfers of material into and out of MBA. A report 
may be generated when at the request of the IAEA to clarify a previous report. 
Subsidiary Arrangements (SA) between the U.S. and IAEA establish how IAEA safeguards will be 
implemented in the U.S. Caribbean Territories, including codes for reporting nuclear material chemical 
and physical form, container, and irradiated status that are used when reporting the MBA inventory 
and import/exports. Under the ModSQP, the obligation to have a SA as described in paragraph 37 of 
INFCIRC/366 is not held in abeyance. Reporting codes outlined in the SA are captured under a MBA 
specific cache in the U.S. national database for tracking nuclear material, the Nuclear Material 
Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). Although a Facility Attachment (FA) is not required 
for LOF MBAs, NMMSS programming errors are minimized by using agreed upon KMPs and strata 
codes for nuclear material in the MBA.  
Outreach to the Possessors of NMOF included instructions on how to maintain on-site records 
regarding all the nuclear material in their physical inventory, which is reported to the NRC via the 
NMMSS database. These records will be accessible for review by the NRC and IAEA inspectors as 
needed. Shipping records to States outside the U.S. Caribbean Territories and logs of movements of 
nuclear material within the U.S. Caribbean Territories will be maintained by the Possessors of NMOF 
and provided to NMMSS for annual reporting to the IAEA. Shipments and receipts between U.S. 
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territories and one of the 50 United States covered by the US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement 
(INFCIRC/288) are considered foreign shipments/receipts. 
Communications 
Formal communications associated with implementation of IAEA safeguards in the U.S. and its 
territories is routed through the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna (UNVIE). Having 
a single point for information flow minimizes inaccuracies and ensures a timely response when 
needed. UNVIE conveys communications to the appropriate U.S. Department or Agency in the U.S. 
Government for information purposes or resolution of an issue. This pathway of formal communication 
applies to all US-IAEA Agreements related to IAEA safeguards. 
However, a Possessor of NMOF may request that information of particular sensitivity that it 
customarily holds in confidence not be transmitted physically to the IAEA. A Possessor of NMOF who 
makes this request shall, at the time the information is submitted, identify the pertinent document or 
part thereof and make a full statement of the reasons supporting the request. The NRC takes into 
account the obligation of the IAEA to take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial 
secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the 
safeguards agreements.  
Several committees work together to form the majority of the U.S State System of Accounting and 
Control of nuclear material. Responsibilities of these committees, chairs and their members are briefly 
described as:  
 The Department of State (DOS) Chairs the Subcommittee on International Safeguards and
Monitoring (SISM)1 of the interagency IAEA Steering Committee, and, through the United States
Mission to International Organizations in Vienna, serves as the official communications link
between the IAEA and the U.S. Government (USG).
 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is responsible for activities related to safeguards and
Additional Protocol (AP) implementation that take place at NRC licensed locations, except at
Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) locations.  NRC chairs the
interagency Sub-group on IAEA Safeguards in the United States (SISUS).2
 The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for activities related to safeguards or AP
implementation at DOD owned, operated or leased locations.
 The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for activities related to safeguards and AP
implementation at DOE owned, operated or leased locations.  The DOE chairs the interagency
Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS)3.
 The Department of Commerce (DOC) is responsible for AP implementation activities that take
place at locations outside the responsibility of DOE, DOD and NRC.  Within the USG, DOC
compiles the information required under Articles 3(b), 3(c), and 3(d) of the Additional Protocol as
provided from a range of sources
Working level communications for specific technical issues usually takes place through a designated 
point of contact. Addressing licensee reporting issues and facilitating IAEA inspections at licensed 
NMOF physical locations in the U.S. Caribbean Territories is the responsibility of the NRC.   
1 SISM is a standing group of U.S. government officials tasked with developing and coordinating U.S. 
policy on all aspects of the IAEA’s safeguards and monitoring programs. 
2 SISUS tasks include coordinating and monitoring activities of the relevant U.S. Agencies with regard 
to implementation of (1) the U.S.-IAEA safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/288), the Reporting Protocol, 
and the Additional Protocol thereto; (2) The U.S.-IAEA Caribbean Territories Safeguards Agreement 
(INFCIRC/366) and the Small Quantities Protocol thereto; (3) other U.S. commitments for reporting of 
nuclear exports and related safeguards information to the IAEA (e.g. INFCIRC/207 and the voluntary 
reporting scheme), and (4) additional U.S. undertakings as may be appropriate. 
3 SSTS is the U.S. government interagency committee responsible for oversight, direction, and 
coordination of the United States Support Program (USSP). 
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Terms and Conditions of the Modified SQP 
The U.S. Caribbean Territories eligibility for maintaining the INFIRC/366 ModSQP will no longer be in 
effect when the U.S. takes a decision to authorize construction of a facility, or exceed the limits stated 
in Article 35 of the US-IAEA Caribbean Territories Safeguard Agreement: 
1) One kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the
following:
(i) Plutonium;
(ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20%) and above, taken account of by multiplying its
weight by its enrichment; and 
(iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural uranium, taken
account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment; 
2) Ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above
0.005 (0.5%); 
3) Twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below; and
4) Twenty metric tons of thorium.
As a consequence, the safeguards procedures in Part II INFCIRC/366 that were previously held in 
abeyance cease to be held in abeyance. If this were to occur an exchange of letters between the U.S. 
and the IAEA would acknowledge that the ModSQP was rescinded and no longer operational, and the 
full terms of the Agreement would apply 
Additionally, the U.S. may request exemptions from or termination of IAEA safeguards. Exemptions 
may be requested for nuclear material that is either less than one effective kilogram or used for non-
nuclear purposes (such as counterweights in a crane, or shielding in a container).   
Articles 33 - 36 describe what may be exempted or terminated from safeguards. Article 34 of the U.S.-
IAEA Caribbean Territories Safeguards Agreement states the following material may be exempted 
from safeguards: 
• Special fissionable material used in gram quantities or less as a sensing component in
instruments;
• Nuclear material when it is used in non-nuclear activities, but is considered recoverable (in
contrast to material deemed practically irrecoverable); and
• Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of Pu-238 exceeding 80%
Termination of safeguards as described in Article 33 of the U.S.-IAEA Caribbean Territories 
Safeguards Agreement set forth in Article 11: “Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material upon 
determination by the Agency that the material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way 
that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has 
become practically irrecoverable.” Safeguards may also be terminated on material used in non-
nuclear activities, “such as in the production of alloys or ceramics”4 and on material transferred out of 
the Territories. 
Outreach to U.S. NRC Licensees 
Based on a detailed review of current licensing documents, the NRC developed a robust outreach 
plan with our licensees in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the only known U.S. Caribbean 
Territories to possess nuclear material.   
4 Article 33 also references Article 13 of the U.S.-IAEA Caribbean Territories Safeguards Agreement only 
addresses use in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics.  This Article is identical to 
Article 13 of the VOA.  Not included in either the U.S.-IAEA Caribbean Territories Safeguards Agreement or the 
VOA is the article discussing termination of safeguards used in non-peaceful activities (Article 14 of 
INFCIRC/153).  This article states that if material is withdrawn from safeguards it will only be used in a peaceful 
nuclear activity and that it will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices.   
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The first outreach trip in 2016 included NRC staff responsible for safeguards implementation in the 
U.S., and regional NRC inspectors who had inspection oversight of the U.S. Caribbean Territories. 
After documenting the quantities and types of nuclear material present during the site visit, staff 
provided guidance on the upcoming reporting and IAEA inspection access requirements. NRC staff 
also provided the IAEA Service Series 22 (Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small 
Quantities Protocols). Staff found it especially helpful to provide the Service Series in English and 
Spanish (the native language used in Puerto Rico). Of vital importance when presenting this new 
information was that licensees in the U.S. Caribbean Territories had little knowledge of IAEA 
international safeguards. To account for this, the NRC created a high-level summary guide (in English 
and Spanish), to explain the concept of the modified SQP and the requirements that must be met by 
NRC licensees. This guide was also shared with the IAEA. 
Based on the results of the first outreach visit, there are currently nine NRC licensees (all possessing 
only source material) that must comply with the new requirements of the modified SQP.  Currently, 
there are no NRC licensees in the U.S. Caribbean Territories possessing special nuclear material. The 
identified source material consists of depleted uranium used for medical and industrial radiography 
shielding and small laboratory-scale samples (such as uranyl acetate and uranyl nitrate). The 
laboratory-scale samples were typically not in use by the licensee, and pending future disposal. 
NRC staff conducted a second outreach visit in 2017 to provide more in-depth instruction on how to fill 
out domestic nuclear material accountancy forms, which are already used by licensees in the U.S. 
Special instructions were provided to licensees that frequently ship and receive nuclear material, and 
will need to fill out an Inventory Change Report from time-to-time. All accountancy forms will be 
submitted by licensees to the U.S. system of accounting for reconciliation by NMMSS.  
Conclusion 
The Agreement between the U.S. and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with 
the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America entered into force on April 6, 1989. 
Pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Safeguards Agreement signed by 
the U.S. with the IAEA a modified small quantities protocol was adopted due to minimal or no nuclear 
material or activities occurring in the affected U. S. Territories. The MSQP holds in abeyance a 
majority of the IAEA reporting and access requirements. To ensure consistent reporting and access 
under the requirements of the MSQP, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has initiated 
rulemaking to modify Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 75 “Safeguards on 
Nuclear Material-Implementation of US-IAEA Agreement.” Additionally, the NRC has developed a 
robust outreach plan with the affected licensees in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in order to 
ensure effective and timely implementation, once the modified SQP enters into force.  
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Abstract:
Based on a statistical  test  for  the equality  of  polarimetric  matrices following the complex Wishart
distribution and a  factorization of  the  test  statistic,  change analysis  in  a  time series of  multi-look
polarimetric SAR data in variance-covariance or polarimetric matrix representation is carried out. The
test  statistic  and its  factorization detect  if  and when change(s)  occur.  This  paper  provides  a  short
explanation of the method, describes available software, and gives examples of potential applications
for site monitoring.
Keywords: multi-temporal SAR imagery, polarimetry, change detection, site monitoring
1. Introduction
Space-borne synthetic  aperture  radar  (SAR)  sensors  with  spatial  resolutions of  the order  of  5-20
meters,  revisit times of the order of weeks and complete independence from solar illumination and
cloud cover offer an attractive potential source of information remote for site-monitoring. Additionally,
many of these platforms collect polarimetric data, increasing their capability to discriminate surface
features.  Satellite  platforms  with  these  capabilities  include  the  Japanese  ALOS-2,  the  Canadian
Radarsat-2, the Italian COSMO-Skymed, the German TerraSAR-X, and the European Sentinel-1. 
A characteristic  task in  site  monitoring under  some civil,  military  or  environmental  control  regime
involves  the  automatic  registration  of  significant  changes  which  might  involve  unreported  or
clandestine activity or environmentally significant events.  In [1]  change detection in a time series of
polarimetric SAR data is described involving a so-called omnibus test statistic (and its factorization) for
the equality  of   polarimetric matrices following the complex Wishart  distribution.  The procedure is
capable of determining, on a per-pixel basis, if and when a change at any prescribed significance level
has occurred in a time series of SAR images. Single polarization (intensity data), dual polarization (for
example vertically polarized emission, vertical and horizontal reception) and full quad polarization (all
four combinations of vertical and horizontal emission/reception) can be analyzed.
Since  the  omnibus  method  can  detect  not  only  if  changes  occur  but  also,  within  the  temporal
resolution of an image sequence, when they occur,  long time series of frequent acquisitions over
relevant sites are of especial interest. One convenient source of such data is the Google Earth Engine
(GEE) [2] which ingests Sentinel-1a and Sentinel-1b data as soon as they are made available by the
European Space Agency (ESA) and provides a very convenient application programming interface
(API) for accessing and processing the data.
In the Section 2 below we provide a brief, qualitative description of the omnibus method. In Section 3
the available software tools are outlined and in Section 4 some examples involving Sentinel-1 data are
presented. The paper concludes in Section 5 with an outlook to future developments and possibilities.
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2. The omnibus method
The  term  “multi-look”  in  SAR  imagery  refers  to  the  number  of  independent  observations  of  a
surface pixel area that have been averaged in order to reduce the effect of  speckle,  a noise-like
consequence of the coherent nature of the radar signal emitted from the sensor.  The observed
signals are multivariate complex Gaussian distributed and their variance-covariance representations,
when multiplied by the number of  looks,  are correspondingly  complex Wishart distributed.  This
distribution is the multivariate complex analogue of the well-known chi-square distribution for the
variance of Gaussian-distributed scalar observations. 
The complex Wishart distribution is completely determined by a singe parameter ∑, the covariance
matrix.  Given two observations of  the same area at different times,  one can set up a so-called
hypothesis  test  in  order  to  decide  whether  or  not  a  change  has  occurred  between  the  two
acquisitions. The  null hypothesis is that ∑1 = ∑2,  i.e., the two observations were sampled from the
same distribution and no change has occurred, and the  alternative hypothesis  is  ∑1  ≠ ∑2,  in other
words,  there  was  a  change.  Since  the  distributions  are  known,  a  likelihood  ratio  test can  be
formulated which allows one to decide to a desired degree of significance whether or not to reject
the null hypothesis. Acceptance or rejection is based on the so-called p-value, which in turn may be
derived from the (approximately known) distribution of the likelihood ratio test statistic. In the case
of k > 2 observations this procedure can be generalized to test a null hypothesis that all of the k
pixels are characterized by the same ∑, against the alternative that at least one of the ∑ i , I = 1...k, are
different, i.e., that at least one change has taken place. Furthermore the omnibus test procedure
can be factored into a sequence of  tests involving hypotheses of the form:
∑1 = ∑2  against  ∑1 ≠ ∑2
∑1  = ∑2 = ∑3 against ∑1  = ∑2 ≠ ∑3
and so forth.  The tests  are statistically  independent under  the null  hypothesis.  In  the event  of
rejection of the null hypothesis at some point in the test sequence, the procedure is restarted from
that point, so that multiple changes within the time series can be identified.
3. Software
The authors  provide access to Matlab [2] and Python [3] code  which is suitable for the analysis of
multi-temporal polarimetric SAR imagery with the sequential omnibus algorithm. Data from any of
the aforementioned platforms can be processed. For users with access to the Google Earth Engine
[4] a web-based application is also available [5] with which long time series of Sentinel-1 images can
be accessed from a browser. The data can either be downloaded for processing off-line  with the
Matlab or Python code, or evaluated directly on the Google servers. In the latter case the algorithm
is programmed with the Earth Engine Python API.
3. Examples
The  following  examples  are  based  exclusively  on  Sentinel-1  images  obtained  from  the  GEE
database.  The data, acquired in instrument Interferometric Wide Swath (IW) mode, are S1 Ground
Range Detected (GRD) scenes, processed using the Sentinel-1 Toolbox [6] to generate a calibrated,
ortho-corrected product. This processing includes thermal noise removal, radiometric calibration,
and terrain correction using Shuttle Radar Topography Mission 30 m (SRTM 30) data. The change
detection analyses were performed on-line with the GEE Python API on time series of  5-look, dual
polarimetry diagonal  only  (VV,  VH)  images with a spatial  resolution of 20m. The GEE software
described in [5] allows the user to search anywhere on the globe for time series of Sentinel-1 SAR
images, clipping the data to the time period and spatial region of interest, the desired viewing angle
(relative orbit number, ascending or descending node) and polarization (dual or single). 
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Figures 1 and 2 show a change frequency map derived from a 24-image time series over the NATO
air base at Geilenkirchen, Germany. The frequent movements of aircraft (in this case often AWACS
training machines) to and from their parking positions are clearly evident.
Figure 1. Change frequency map over the NATO Airbase at Geilenkirchen, Germany. The data were
derived from a time series of 24 Sentinel-1 acquisitions, beginning Feb. 3, 2016, ending Oct. 10,
2016. The map is overlain onto a Google Maps background.
Figure 2. Frequency map as in Figure 1, now overlain onto a Google Earth background. 
Figure  3  shows  an  example  of  flood  monitoring,  tracing  the  dangerous  filling  of  the  Oroville,
California reservoir in late 2016, early 2017, which threatened to burst the retaining dam.
Figures 4 and 5 show two seaports on the Libyan coast, Tripolis and Benghazi, respectively. In the
former one sees considerable shipping activity, whereas in the latter none at all.
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Figure 3. Change map showing the time of the first significant change in the Oroville, California
reservoir over a time sequence of seven Sentinel-1 images beginning March 14,  2016 and ending
Jan. 26, 2017: blue indicates change in  the first, red in the last (sixth) interval.
Figure 4. Change frequency map of the port of Tripolis, Libya. Time series of 28 images beginning
Feb. 2, 2016 and ending Nov. 30, 2016.
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Figure 5. Change frequency map for the port of Benghazi for the same time period as Figure 4.
4. Conclusion
While the GEE platform has obvious advantages for historical or on-going site monitoring, there are
currently some disadvantages: First, the complex off-diagonal elements of the polarimetric matrix
are not available, implying some loss in discrimination. Second, the stored pixel values in the GEE
database  are  clamped  to  the  first  and  99th  percentile  to  preserve  the  dynamic  range  against
anomalous outliers, and quantized to 16 bits. The resulting saturation of the brightest pixels tends
to  be concentrated in  built-up areas  or  to  be associated with other  man-made  objects,  further
reducing  sensitivity.  Finally,  the  ground  resolution  of  20m  restricts  the  applicability  of  site
monitoring  to  detection  of  correspondingly  large  changes.  The  examples  chosen  reflect  this
restriction in particular.
Nevertheless,  we  have  demonstrated,  making  use  a  sound,  statistically-based   algorithm,  that
change detection for site monitoring with archived SAR data is both  feasible and convenient. 
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Abstract: 
This paper provides an overview of the investigations performed at DLR with respect to the application 
of high resolution SAR and optical data for 3D analysis in the context of Safeguards. TerraSAR data 
acquisition was performed, and various ways to visualize and analyze stacks of radar images were 
evaluated. Interferometric coherence map interpretation allows the detection of traffic on dirt roads. 
The applicability of lower resolution, but freely available Sentinel-1 data was evaluated. For optical 
data, spaceborne video is becoming available. SkySat data is evaluated for geometric accuracy and it 
use for extraction of digital elevation models. Furthermore, digital elevation models were generated 
from 12 stereo datasets over Yongbyon and used for analysis tasks such as building height 
estimation. Height accuracy and completeness strongly depend on the stereo convergence, and off-
nadir angles of the imagery. 
Keywords: Remote Sensing; Radar; Optical; Safeguards 
1. Introduction
The primary remote sensing datasets used for safeguards purposes are optical satellite images with a 
resolution from 0.5 to 1 m. Most information is obtained by visual analysis of the scenes by expert 
image analysts. However, optical data depends on good weather conditions and is typically acquired 
only in the late morning. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) data is a complementary data source, as it 
provides weather independent datasets, but its unintuitive depiction of complex industrial facilities 
hampers visual interpretation of the data.  
During a multi-year study, DLR has acquired extensive stacks of very high resolution TerraSAR-X 
high-resolution spotlight images over the Forschungszentrum Jülich as an example site with complex, 
industrial structure and adjacent mining areas. [1] The goal of the study was to better understand SAR 
imagery and to develop methodologies for exploitation of SAR imagery in context of safeguards 
relevant applications, focussing on applications such as visual interpretation, determination of 3D 
information such as building heights or volume change in mines and waste dumps. Additionally 
generation of digital surface models (DSM) were evaluated [2]. New work in this paper includes the 
evaluation of freely available, lower resolution Sentinel-1 SAR data, and evaluation of optical 
spaceborne video from the SkySat satellites, as well as a study on the impacts of various stereo 
image acquisition parameters on the DSM quality and interpretability. 
2. SAR
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is a powerful instrument in the monitoring of structures, 
displacements and topography due to its intrinsic ability to be independent of solar illumination and 
local weather. Many applications have been exploited in our previous studies [1, 2]. They can be 
grouped in single-image and multi-image applications.  
Single-image applications involve low-level operations such as the exploration of the SAR amplitude to 
inspect content of the acquisition (e.g. the number of buildings) or high-level operations such as the 
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measure of the building heights (e.g. from shadowing [2]). Image resolution is a fundamental 
parameter for these applications. For inspection at the building level, it is obvious that the higher 
resolution the better. For this reason, X-band imagery at the sub-meter resolution from missions like 
the TerraSAR-X [3] or the Cosmo-SkyMed one should be preferred over free medium-resolution 
(~10m) imagery from Sentinel-1. A comparison between a single TerraSAR-X High-Resolution 
Spotlight amplitude image over Berlin (Germany) and a mean of all the available Sentinel-1 
amplitudes is shown in Figure 1. From this figure it can be appreciated how the quantity of information 
is much higher for the single high-res data. 
Figure 1: Comparison between a single sub-meter resolution TerraSAR-X image and an average of all the 
available decameter resolution Sentinel-1 images over Berlin, Germany. 
Multiple-image image applications can be further categorized in two branches: interferometric and 
tomographic applications. These applications can be seen in the temporal domain, e.g. to characterize 
changes of any kind, such as topographical changes, land cover changes and displacements. 
Interferometric applications require two images. By properly combining the complex images, products 
such as the interferometric coherence, the differential phase and eventually (in case of bistatic 
configuration) the digital elevation model can be derived with specialized software. The interferometric 
coherence can be seen as an instrument to detect temporal changes between the two images. An 
example in in Figure 2, where a network of dirt used roads can be recognized in black color [2]. 
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Figure 2. Interferometric coherence (11 days) over Fort Irwin (USA). 
The differential phase shows instead the terrain deformations (e.g. deformations, fault slips, 
subsidence and etc.) occurred within the temporal frame of the two images. Typical examples are the 
detection of displacements from pre and post-earthquakes scenarios and subsidence generated by 
mining activities (e.g. the detection of illegal mining). 
Digital elevation models (DEMs) at medium-high resolution (~10m) can be generated with TanDEM-X 
data, currently the only SAR interferometer in space [3, 4, 5]. While single DEMs can be of interest for 
a direct measurement of the elevation of the area of interest, multiple-DEMs show a very direct 
measure of topographical changes and can be used for instance in measuring the volume of 
excavations or material accumulations [2]. 
When a stack of images is acquired over a specific area under test, then advanced techniques like the 
Persistent Scatterer Interferometric (PSI) technique can be exploited to derive very precise (mm-level) 
displacement values for selected point on ground. An exemplary result of deformation map generated 
with PSI is shown in Figure 3. These maps are powerful tools for the evaluation of local subsidence or 
local uplift and nowadays are standard products of SAR service providers and research centres like 
DLR. 
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Figure 3: PSI deformation map over FZ Jülich using the descending HRS TerraSAR-X stack. 
All these techniques have been exploited through the different phases of the collaboration between 
DLR and IAEA, providing to the IAEA the knowledge about the potential of SAR data for safeguards 
activities and set of routines finalized to the exploitation of SAR imagery in this context.  
3. Optical images
In addition to radar imagery, optical images are widely employed for monitoring of safeguards relevant 
sides. Most safeguards relevant information can be derived with visual interpretation by image 
analysts. Additionally, advanced image matching techniques, together with sub-meter resolution 
stereo imagery can provide high resolution digital surface models (DSM) that resolve details of 
industrial buildings and provide a good base for monitoring of changes to buildings or excavation, 
dumping and mining activities.  
In addition to satellites acquiring static images, a few systems for spaceborne videos exist, most 
notably the SkySat Satellites [6]. 
3.1. Spaceborne Video 
The SkySat satellites of Skybox Imaging are a very interesting platform, as they provide new data with 
a resolution of 1 m or better, and can acquire both mapping products and Full HD video sequences of 
up to 90 seconds in length. The space segment is simplified as much as possible, and tasks usually 
executed on board of the satellites are performed by the ground station software. This reduces 
complexity of the space segment and allows construction of smaller and less expensive satellites and 
possibly the creation of large constellations with high revisit capabilities. 
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a) SkySat images
b) SkySat pansharpend image
c) Worldview-3 multispectral image
d) NAIP reference image
Figure 4: Skysat Chicago acquisition and comparison to WorldView-3 and reference imagery used for evaluation 
of geolocation performance. 
Most optical satellites use a single line of detectors in push-broom mode, which captures image rows 
with a high frequency. A two dimensional image is thus generated as the satellite rotates, and the 
imaged line scans across the earth’s surface. To archive high image quality, a stable satellite platform 
is required, increasing cost of the satellites. In contrast, the SkySat satellites use conventional 2D 
frame sensors, similar to the ones used in ordinary digital cameras, and capture a full 2D image at a 
time, avoiding the requirement for a highly stable platform. To compensate for the lower image quality 
of each single image, multiple images with high overlap are captured and merged on the ground, 
resulting in a final image with lower noise and slightly improved image resolution. The use of frame 
sensors also enables capturing of short video sequences as the satellite passes over a region of 
interest. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
181
3.2. SkySat Image evaluation 
Both the SkyBox still image and the video products were evaluated. The still image product resembles 
classical VHR (very high resolution) satellite imagery, with a swath width of 8km and a resolution of 90 
cm at nadir, with panchromatic image and 4 channel multi-spectral image covering the blue, green, 
red and near infrared bands. Image coverage, resolution and quality are thus roughly comparable to 
data from the IKONOS satellite. When “Still Imagery” SkySat products are used, the user receives a 
set of individual image frames. These will need to be oriented, orthorectified and merged into a mosaic 
covering the whole area. Figure 4 shows the individual image footprints of a SkySat-2 acquisition 
covering Chicago. As the satellite uses lower quality attitude determination systems compared to the 
much larger push-broom satellites, absolute accuracy of direct georeferencing is in the order of 100m. 
To archive a good absolute georeferenced accuracy, a bundle block adjustment using many GCPs 
(ground control points) needs to be performed [7], at least when using typical COTS software, which 
does not understand the specific camera system used on board of the SkySat satellites. An absolute 
accuracy of 5 m was archived when using 51 GCP for orientation of the Chicago scene, cf. Figure 4. A 
WorldView-3 scene acquired 23 days before the SkySat-2 scene required only 2 GCPs for high quality 
orthorectification. It is thus advisable to directly order orthorectified SkySat products, even if this later 
leads to slightly increased co-registration errors when comparing acquisitions from different satellites 
and acquisition times. 
Video sequences of the Yongbyon site and various other sites were available. Skysat can provide 
panchromatic video frames with a size of 2560x1080 pixels with 30 frames per second for a maximum 
time of 90 seconds. 
The videos of the Yongbyon site showed little activity, so its main value are images taken from 
different viewing angles, which can be used for generation of DEMs (digital elevation models), and 
derivation of 3D information of the scene. If everything works as planned, 13 second generation 
SkySat satellites will be in orbit by the end of 2017, providing revisit rates of up to 3 times per day, 
which might improve the value of video for surveillance applications. During this work, the videos 
where used for DSM generation only. 
3.3. DSM Generation 
The algorithms used for DSM generation were described in the prior work [2]. Good results in 
industrial areas can be archived with stereo pairs with a convergence angle between 15 to 25 
degrees, otherwise too many occlusions would occur. This will result in incomplete height 
measurements in dense building areas. For best quality, tri-stereo acquisitions with a relative 
convergence angle of around 15 degrees are recommended [8]. The scenes should be acquired in the 
same satellite pass, otherwise temporal and illumination changes can lead to incomplete DSMs. 
In practise, these constraints can often not be fulfilled, leading to DSMs with many occluded areas, no-
data zones and an increased amount of outliers. From generic site monitoring, mono acquisitions with 
larger time differences are usually available, as stereo dataset incur extra costs. Several DSM 
generation experiments with using images acquired at site monitoring at different dates mostly yielded 
height models of insufficient quality. For dense matching it is thus usually required to use images 
acquired on the same date, or at least temporally very close images. 
To provide image analysts with a better understanding of the DSM quality to be expected with varying 
stereo configurations, 12 stereo pairs over the Yongbyon site were processed and the resulting DSMs 
were compared. Data processing was performed using the tools available to IAEA. Figure 5 shows the 
datasets used in this comparison. 
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Date Sensor 
2006-02-23 Ikonos Stereo 
2009-09-22 WV-1 Stereo 
2011-01-07 Ikonos Stereo 
2011-05-02 Ikonos Stereo 
2012-01-26 WV-2 Stereo 
2012-10-11/17 GE-1 across track 
2013-04-24 Pleiades Stereo 
2013-06-14 Pleiades Stereo 
2013-06-19 WV-1 Stereo 
2013-07-29 Pleiades Stereo 
2013-11-01 GE-1 Stereo 
2014-08-07 SkySat-1 Video 
Figure 5: Stereo datasets over Yongbyon. The skyplot on the right shows the satellites azimuth and elevation 
angles of each stereo pair. The legend also includes the stereo convergence angles. 
The Worldview-1 Stereo pair from 2009-09-22 was processed first, and the resulting Ortho image and 
DSM were used as reference for the remaining stereo pairs. The images of each pair were acquired 
on the same orbit, except for the GeoEye-1 images from 11th and 17th of October 2012. For the 
SkySat-1 video, using the first and last frame only resulted in noisy height values. Instead, the frames 
were temporally subsampled to 1 second, and all possible pairs with a temporal distance of 15 
seconds or more were matched. The resulting 120 DSMs were merged using a pixel-wise median.  
Results for all datasets are shown in Figure 6. It can be noticed that stereo pairs with a larger 
convergence angle are less complete due to an increased amount of occlusions. A good example for 
this is the 2012-01-26 scene, which has a 38° stereo convergence angle, and the second image was 
acquired almost 40° off nadir. The large convergence angle hinders dense image matching, and the 
large of nadir angle additionally leads to large occlusions on the northern side of buildings. The same 
effect is visible in the 2013-04-24, 2013-06-19 and 2013-11-01 scenes. 
It is interesting to note that all images acquired by Ikonos, GeoEye and WorldView satellites had large 
stereo convergence angles, with a minimum angle of 30°, whereas the Pleiades acquisition were all 
captured with extremely small convergence angles of less than 6°. There is no technical reason for 
this, except that the default tasking of DigitalGlobe seems to favour convergence angles > 30°. This 
leads to high elevation accuracy in flat areas without steep objects, but complicates dense image 
matching, and leads to larger voids in the produced DSMs. In contrast the Pleiades angle is extremely 
small, as a result, dense image matching can easily find correspondences for almost all pixels, leading 
to a high completeness. The height accuracy suffers from this low angle, thus the shaded DSMs look 
quite noisy. 
The largest no-data areas are present the DSM generated from images acquired on different days. 
The time difference of 6 days for the 2012-10-11/17 scenes still allowed successful matching of the 
buildings but resulted in voids in ground areas that changed between the image acquisitions, for 
example, the construction site, shadow areas and some vegetated areas. However it still contains 
useful information for manual or semi-automatic interpretation, for example the building heights can 
still be measured. While such data is not useable for most applications, which usually require gapless 
data, it is still useful for careful evaluated by image analysts. For example, building heights can still be 
determined. 
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2006-02-23 
30° 
2009-09-22 
31.5° 
2011-01-07 
39° 
2011-05-02 
30.3° 
2012-01-26 
38.5° 
2012-10-11/17 
34.8° 
2013-04-24 
4.9° 
2013-06-14 
4.8° 
2013-06-19 
37.1° 
2013-07-29 
5.2° 
2013-11-01 
30.2° 
2014-08-09 
21.7° 
Figure 6. Images and DSMs of the light-water reactor at Yongbyon, from different stereo pairs. For 
each DSM, the acquisition date and the stereo convergence angle are given. No height could be 
determined for areas marked in black. 
4. Summary and conclusion
The study has shown that valuable information can be derived from SAR images, although some 
techniques are not readily applicable without large stacks of data, such as persistent scatterer 
analysis. This large amount of data is often not available, as acquisition of stacks needs to be 
performed over a long time period, and results in large data costs.  
Therefore techniques that require only one or at most two SAR images are most relevant in a practical 
scenario. High resolution SAR imagery is important, observation of industrial complexes with free, but 
lower resolution Sentinel-1 showed only limited success. 
Evaluation of the SkySat satellites showed that video acquisitions need to be performed at the right 
time, often only limited or no action is visible in the short acquisitions. For still imagery, it is preferable 
to order ortho-rectified imagery, as properly ortho-rectifying the SkySat still imagery product is a 
challenge with RPC based COTS software. The raw video product has been successfully used for 
generation of digital elevation models. 
An evalution of 12 stereo acquisitions over Yongbyon showed that stereo convergence angle is the 
most important factor for DSMs of industrial areas. The standard DigitalGlobe stereo convergence 
angle of 30° or more leads to large occlusions and increased mismatches when applying automatic 
dense image matching. The resulting DSMs still contain valuable height information about buildings, 
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but need to be interpreted carefully, increasing image analysis effort. Effort which would not be 
required when using smaller stereo convergence angles of 15 to 20 degrees. On the other hand, very 
small stereo convergence angles as seen in the Pleiades products used in this study lead to increased 
height noise. Thus it is important to specify the desired stereo convergence angle range when tasking 
stereo observations of complex, built-up areas. 
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Seismic Monitoring of Final Repositories: 
The Contribution from Analytical Theory 
Jürgen Altmann 
Experimentelle Physik III, Technische Universität Dortmund, 
44221 Dortmund, Germany 
Abstract: 
The potential of seismic sensing for detecting undeclared activities in/near an underground repository 
had been studied 2010-2015, focusing on a salt dome, first with measurements, then with three-
dimensional numerical modelling using a complex underground structure. The modelling allowed 
frequency-dependent attenuation but had limited time and space resolution due to the large model 
volume: typical mesh size was limited to about 20 m, with the required low-pass filtering signal 
frequencies were below a few hundred Hz. The results showed that the changes of the seismic-wave 
amplitude on transmission through media boundaries were relatively modest, not very relevant for 
detection. Thus the underground is conceived as a homogeneous medium without any boundaries. 
Here the seismic excitation from a force pulse or an explosion can be described by analytic formulae, 
with the source time function as input, and arbitrarily high signal frequencies can be used, better 
corresponding to the excitation by real mining activities. This has been done for explosions first. The 
analytically derived amplitudes fit very well to the numerical ones; at distances beyond 50 to 100 m the 
far-field term dominates by far. With signals limited to a few hundred hertz, in salt and other 
consolidated sediments the numerically gained amplitudes start to fall below the analytic ones at 
around 1 km, probably because the latter do not include attenuation. It seems that the analytic 
treatment by a homogeneous medium can give useful results for the estimation of signal strengths at 
relevant distances in various media, such as salt, clay or granite, by using appropriate values of the 
seismic parameters (density, P- and S-wave velocity). Such amplitudes can be compared with the 
seismic background noise at potential sensor sites, allowing a first estimate of the capabilities of a 
monitoring system. Beside extension to force-pulse excitation, for more realistic results for higher 
frequencies at longer ranges frequency-dependent attenuation needs to be included. 
Keywords: final repository, seismic monitoring, seismology 
1. Introduction
Without reprocessing spent nuclear fuel contains plutonium, thus such material should remain under 
IAEA safeguards even after emplacement in an underground final repository. This presents a new 
challenge for monitoring; geophysical techniques and methods have been proposed for this task. 
During operation, the creation of undeclared cavities needs to be detected, and those parts of the 
mine already filled with refuse have to be kept under surveillance for undeclared re-opening. After the 
emplacement phase, when drifts and shafts will have been closed, and the above-ground parts of the 
final repository will have been cleared for other uses, the IAEA needs the capability of long-term 
monitoring for covert access to the mine. 
One potential technique is seismic sensing. Mining and other underground operations produce 
vibration directly as well as via acoustic noise. Seismic excitation propagates through the ambient 
medium and can thus be used to detect activities at a distance. The main question with seismic 
monitoring is whether signals from undeclared activities can be separated from signals from other 
sources and from background noise. In the operational phase of the repository most noise stems from 
the normal activity (mining, transport, filling, etc.), and sensors can be deployed at many sites in the 
mine. After closure, no sensors and cables can remain in the mine; in this phase sensors need to be 
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located at some distance, but still underground in order to reduce seismic background, produced by 
traffic, industry, agriculture and weather at the surface. 
The German Support Programme to the IAEA has since decades taken an interest in seismic 
monitoring for final-repository safeguards. In order to gain information on the capabilities, a project had 
been carried out 2010-2012, measuring the properties of seismic signals from mining activities [1, 2]. 
This had been followed by a project where seismic propagation was modelled numerically [3, 4]. Both 
projects had focused on the Gorleben salt dome that for decades had been the only possible 
repository site in Germany.1 Exploration there, done since 1979 with seismic surveys, drill holes and
since 1986 with an exploratory mine, has provided much information on the salt dome. The mine gave 
the opportunity to deploy seismic and acoustic sensors at various positions underground and at the 
surface and to measure various mining machines and vehicles. However, underground positions 
outside of the mine or even outside of the salt dome, as they would be used for seismic monitoring, 
could not be covered. The actual strengths and other properties of the signals from mining activities at 
such positions could in principle be determined from measurements, but these would require 
expensive drilling. The modelling project served as a prior step. 
The measurements and their evaluations produced many results, among others about seismic 
amplitudes and their distance dependences. The modelling gave information about amplitudes and 
distance dependences as well. While the relative decrease with distance was roughly similar, there 
remained open questions about the absolute amplitudes. In the model, the source strengths had to be 
specified in terms of a force or, in case of an explosion, of a seismic moment. These values were not 
available, there had been no possibility to measure them in the measurement project. Thus, nominal 
values of 1 Newton (N) or of 1 Newton-metre (Nm) had been used. It was expected that once 
estimates of the real source strengths would become available, due to linearity in an elastic medium 
(outside of the fracture and non-linear zone close to the source) the model amplitudes could be 
scaled. One approach to such estimates is to use the total energy in the seismic waves and to 
compare it to the energy of the sources that are available for the case of explosions as well as for 
blows by a pick hammer. This approach is described here for explosions. 
2. Some results of the measurements and the modelling
From the measurements [1,2] it turned out that explosions (ignited in 5-m long drill holes to extend a 
tunnel by this length) produced by far the strongest amplitudes, with seismic velocity around 10-1 m/s
at 100 m distance in the 4.5-kHz bandwidth recorded. The next-strong source, a grader with its 
compactor plates vibrating, was at about 1.610-4 m/s at such range, all other sources were between
710-5 and 410-7 m/s. In particular the pick hammer, the blows of which were to be used in the
modelling, had about 510-6 m/s. Another important result was that the amplitudes varied by a factor
1/3 to 3 for similar conditions. Thus for the question of detectability (amplitude sufficiently above 
background noise) order-of-magnitude estimates are advisable, more precise determination would not 
make much sense. 
Because of the complicated structure of the salt dome and its surroundings, numerical modelling in 
three dimensions had been done [3,4], with the spectral-finite-element code called SpecFEM3D 
[6,7,8]. The model extended for 5.5 km * 1.0 km * 3.6 km, it was gained by sweeping a simplified two-
dimensional section (Figure 1) through the third dimension. With the computing resources available 
(the LiDO computer cluster of TU Dortmund, of which 340 cores could be used for maximally 48 h for 
one run) typical mesh size was limited to about 20 m, resulting in about 2.5 million mesh elements. 
Time resolution was limited steps of 0.02 ms. With the required low-pass filtering the signal 
frequencies were limited to a few 100 Hz, one order of magnitude lower than the bandwidth of the 
measurements (4.5 kHz). As source time functions for a force pulse a quasi-Dirac function, modelled 
by a Gaussian function with so-called half duration (referring to a similar triangle function, see Figure 
2b) htr = 5 or 10 ms was used. To model repeated pulses from a pick hammer, 100 pulses with 23 ms 
temporal spacing were superposed. An explosion was modelled by a quasi-Heaviside function for the 
seismic moment, approximated by a shifted error function (the integral of a Gaussian function) with the 
same “half duration” (Figure 2a). As mentioned, nominal source values for the (maximum) force had 
1 With the German Site Selection Act (Standortauswahlgesetz) of 2013 the site and geological medium is open 
again. 
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been F0 = 1 N, for the (final) moment M0 = 1 Nm. With these parameters, seismic velocity at 100 m 
had been around 410-9 m/s for a force pulse and 110-13 m/s for an explosion. As Table 1 shows, there
are about twelve orders of magnitude between the explosion values, and about three between those 
of (repeated) force pulses. Such ratios were not understood and were flagged as topics for further 
research in 2015 (Figs. 10, 12 in [3] where comparison at several 100 m distance and a half duration 
of htr = 5 ms gave different ratios). 
Figure 1:  Simplified geological cross section in NW-SE direction through the Gorleben salt dome. A possible 
repository level at about 930 m depth is indicated. The x and z axes of the chosen co-ordinate system are shown, 
the y axis points into the section plane (with extension 1.0 km in the model). The section measures 5.52 km in the 
x and 3.57 km in the z direction, respectively. x is roughly south-east. In the model runs discussed here the 
source was put at 900 m depth (X). Red dots denote the sensor Positions 1 to 56 that lie in the centre plane at y = 
-500 m. (Based on Figure 36 in [5]) 
  vPP / (m/s) Measurements Model Ratio 
Explosion M0 = 1 Nm, htr = 10 ms 110-1 110-13 11012
Force pulse F0 = 1 N, htr = 10 ms 510-6 110-9 5103
Table 1:  Comparison of the measured and model seismic peak-to-peak velocity at 100 m distance from the 
source for an explosion and a force pulse, approximate values. Model, explosion: spherical expansion at the 
source; given is the radial velocity component – only compressional (P) waves should be produced, propagating 
spherically symmetrically. Model, force pulse: force vertically downward, vertical velocity component at 100 m 
horizontal distance (there only shear (S) waves should occur). Model parameters as in Table 2. 
Medium  /(kg/m3) vP /(m/s) vS /(m/s) Q Q 
Main salt (z4HS) 2,200 4,400 2,600  9,999     125 
Table 2:  Seismic properties of the model; the first three are the ones of the central medium in the measurements. 
Given are the density , the P-wave velocity vP, the S-wave velocity vS, the bulk quality Q and the shear quality 
Q. In order to have only shear attenuation, the Q values were set to fictitious 9,999. 
x 
z 
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3. Analytical expressions for a homogeneous medium
3.1 General aspects 
In case of a homogeneous, infinite elastic medium excited at one point by a force of arbitrary time 
course the displacement can be described by an analytic equation. The same holds for a complicated 
system of force couples as they are needed to describe an earthquake or an explosion. Seismic 
velocity, the quantity measured with geophones or seismometers, is just the time derivative of the 
displacement. The analytic formulae have the advantage that it arbitrary time courses can be input, in 
particular those with fast change or, in other words, those containing high frequencies. This is different 
from the case of a discrete model where the spatial and the temporal resolution is limited by the 
available computing power. However, the numerical program for the discrete model includes 
frequency-dependent attenuation that is not included in the straightforward analytical expressions. 
How relevant is analytical theory in the present case? A salt dome as well as any other medium 
foreseen for a final repository will be approximately homogeneous in a certain volume around a 
repository. As long as the seismic waves originating from within have not yet hit a boundary to another 
medium, they should behave as in an infinite medium, provided attenuation is sufficiently low. In 
seismology the attenuation often increases linearly with frequency , described by exp(-π  r/(c Q)) 
where r is the distance and c the propagation velocity. In salt with a quality value of Q 125 as used in 
the model, frequencies of several 100 Hz have a range of several 100 m, at 100 Hz the range is nearly 
2 km. Up to such a range the neglect of attenuation in the analytical equations should not produce 
marked deviations. 
A final potential problem is the existence of media boundaries in real underground structures. 
Preferentially monitoring sensors should be placed outside of the repository medium so that at least 
one boundary will have to be crossed if excitation is inside the inner medium. At such boundaries, 
depending on the differences in densities and wave speeds and on the incidence angle, waves are 
partially reflected and partially transmitted, with conversion from P to S type and vice versa. Test 
computations for two boundaries of the salt dome showed that the transmitted amplitude did not 
change by more than a factor 1.5 (Section 5.4 in [3]), markedly less than the variation by a factor 1/3 
to 3 that had been observed in the measured signals. Thus media boundaries have some effect, but 
for an order-of-magnitude estimation of signal amplitude for detectability they have no real importance. 
3.2 Single force 
For a force acting in the j co-ordinate direction at the origin with the time course Fj(t) the displacement 
vector ui (i=1, 2, 3 for the x, y, z co-ordinate) at an arbitrary point x with distance r from the origin at 
time t is given by [9] 
 
    (1) 
with: : density of the medium; : speed of compressional (P) wave;  speed of translational (S) wave, 
      the Kronecker symbol,                      ,    ,                  the directional cosines of the co-ordinates; 
the summation convention holds. 
The first term is the near field, due to the integral it decays in proportion to r-2. The second term is the
far field of the P wave, the third the far field of the S wave; both far fields decrease with r-1. The
displacement is proportional to the time course of the force, delayed by the respective propagation 
time. Thus the velocity is proportional to the time derivative of the force. 
For a point on the 1 (x) axis, if the force is in j = 1 direction, the displacement in i =1 direction becomes 
                                                        ,  (2) 
in 1 direction in the far field only a P wave propagates. If the force acts in the 3 direction (z, usually 
vertical), the displacement on the 1 axis is only vertical, in 3 direction. Along the 1 axis in the far field 
only an S wave propagates: 
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                                                                   .  (3)  
3.3 Force couples for earthquake or explosion 
A system of force couples is described by a seismic-moment tensor Mjk(t).2 In this case the
displacement at x is given by [10] 
 
 
                                                                                                   .  (4) 
The first term, the near field, decreases with to r-3. The next two, the intermediate fields of P and S
waves, respectively, decrease with to r-2. The final two terms are the far fields of P and S waves,
respectively, decreasing with to r-1; their time course is proportional to the time derivative of the
moment. Whereas earthquakes have complicated components Mjk of the moment, in case of a 
spherically symmetric explosion the off-diagonal elements are zero and the diagonal ones are equal: 
M(t). In this case only spherical P waves are produced, without loss of generality the 1 component in 1 
direction becomes 
                                                                       .  (5) 
As an example Figure 2a shows the moment time function as it is used in the SpecFEM3D program: 
modelling a step function by a shifted error function. Its time derivative – proportional to the far-field 
displacement – is a Gaussian function (Figure 2 b). In the program the width parameter of this signal h 
is defined by the half duration of a similar triangle function.3 The velocity is proportional to the second
derivative (Figure 2 c). 
As examples Figure 3 shows the displacement and velocity signals resulting from the moment “step” 
of Figure 2a at two different distances, 10 m and 100 m. The displacement intermediate field is 
proportional to the “step”, but its amplitude decreases with distance in proportion to r-2. The far field is
proportional to the derivative, decreasing only with r-1, thus dominating the sum of both already at 100
m. The velocity is given by forming another derivative.
2 The moment is the usual product of force times lever, but concentrated in one point by shrinking the lever 
length to zero while keeping the product constant. 
3 The Gaussian is described by a width parameter h = htr / 1.628, the standard deviation is  = htr / (1.628 2). 
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Figure 2:  Time course of seismic moment for an explosion (a) and its first (b) and second (c) derivatives. The far-
field displacement is proportional to the first derivative, the far-field velocity to the second. The black triangle 
function of half duration htr in b simulates the Gaussian. The black curves in a and c are its integral and derivative, 
respectively. Parameters: M0 = 1 Nm, htr = 0.01 s, thus h = 0.00614 s. 
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Figure 3:  Displacement (top) and velocity (bottom) in 1 direction resulting from the seismic moment of Figure 2 at 
two points on the 1 axis, at 10 m (left) and at 100 m (right) according to Equation (5). Blue: intermediate, brown: 
far field, red: sum of both. 
Figure 4 gives the peak-to-peak value of the far-field velocity and the one of the sum versus distance; 
obviously with the parameters chosen the intermediate field can be neglected already below 100 m. In 
addition several values from the numerical model are shown. Up to about 1 km there is no significant 
difference from the analytical curve. The decrease at larger distances is probably caused by the 
frequency-dependent attenuation of the model that was not included in the analytical signal. It is 
noteworthy that the transmission through the medium boundary from Main Salt to Upper Cretaceous 
(at about 2200 m, close to Sensor 12 in Figure 1) does not lead to a significant amplitude loss. 
4. Comparison with measurements for explosions via an energy approach
Whereas with a moment-step of M0 = 1 Nm and a half duration of htr = 10 ms in the analytical theory 
as well as in the numerical model the peak-to-peak velocity at 100 m is around 10-13 m/s, with real
blasts values around 10-1 m/s had been measured (Figure 10 in [3]), 12 orders of magnitude higher.4
In a plane seismic wave the densities of kinetic and potential energy are given by [11] 
             ,                     ,     (6) 
(V volume,  mass density, u displacement, ij stress tensor, eij strain tensor, summation convention), 
and both are equal. Thus the total energy density at distance r at time t is  
                                                          .   (7) (v: velocity). 
At a distance where the far field dominates, using the second derivative of the moment function in 
Figure 2 c, the velocity becomes 
                                                                        ,   (8) 
4 With htr = 5 ms in the model the ratio had been 61010 [3, Section 5.2].
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Figure 4:  Peak-to-peak value of far-field velocity and of the sum signal (1 component) versus distance along the 
1 (x) direction for the moment time course of Figure 2 and the Main-Salt parameters of Table 2. In addition the 
values from the numerical model at the Sensors 7 to 14 (see Figure 1) are given. The boundary between Main 
Salt and Upper Cretaceous is somewhat right of Sensor 12. 
thus the total energy density is 
                                                               .   (9) 
The total seismic-wave energy in the full volume at a time t is given by the volume integral of the 
energy density. Due to the spherical symmetry with an explosion, this is 
                                                                        ,   (10) 
the integral resulting in 
                                                                                ,   (11) 
thus 
                  .  (12) 
Putting in the values M0 = 1.0 Nm, htr = 0.01 s, h = 6.14 ms,  = 2.20 Mg/m3,  = 4.40 km/s (see table
2), the total wave energy becomes Etot = 3.77610-17 J. In the numerical program there is the option of
summing the total energy over the volume, this resulted in Etot = 3.7710-17 J if attenuation is switched
off, in excellent agreement.  
In a typical single blast shot, around 20 kg of explosive is consumed (possibly simultaneously in 
several boreholes). Thus I assume an energy yield of Y = 20 kg TNT equivalent = 8.4107 J. In
different media 1.5 to 17% of the yield goes into the seismic wave, in salt about 10% [12].5 Thus the
5 The rest goes into fracturing of rock and heat. 
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seismic energy from one shot should be Etot = 106 .. 107 J – 23 orders of magnitude above the 
theoretical values. Can one bridge this discrepancy by adapting the parameters M0 and htr? 
Let us first look at the half duration of the source time function. The detonation velocity of the used 
explosive (Andex) is vDeton = 3.0 km/s. Ignited at one end, propagation through the hole of length l = 5 
m takes the time tDeton = l/vDeton = 1.67 ms, that is a half duration of 0.83 ms in case of a triangle 
function, smaller by 1/12.0 than the model value of 10 ms, thus h = 0.51 ms for the error-function 
model. Since h enters Equation 12 by the third power, this explains a factor 1750, leaving 5.71019 of
the 1023 discrepancy.
How about the second parameter M0? Increasing it from 1 Nm to (5.71019)1/2 Nm = 7.6109 Nm would
close the gap. Is an M0 value around 8109 Nm reasonable? Figure 5 shows empirical values of the
seismic moment for a large set of explosions in salt, from small chemical to large nuclear [13]. For Y = 
20 kg TNT equivalent the trend line gives a seismic moment of M0 = 2109 Nm, in the correct order of
magnitude; the missing factor 4 can easily be explained by the scatter in the data of Figure 5, the 
rough estimates of the yield itself, of the portion of the yield going into seismic-wave energy, and of the 
duration and time course of the blast. 
Figure 6 compares the analytical far-field data gained from Equation (5) with htr = 0.83 ms and M0 = 
8109 Nm with the ones from the measurements. They agree at 100 m distance. Beyond that the
power-law trend line of the measurement data decreases with distance according to an exponent -2.2, 
not -1 as in Equation (5). This stronger decrease may be caused by the stronger attenuation at higher 
frequencies. 
Thus for explosions the earlier discrepancy has been explained: to fit to the measured seismic-velocity 
values, the theoretical ones from a moment of 1 Nm and a triangle half duration of 0.01 s have to be 
increased by a factor around 1012. Correspondingly the total energy – that is proportional to velocity
squared – is higher by a factor 1023.
It is hoped that a similar total-energy analysis for a force pulse will resolve the discrepancy there. With 
the parameters used (htr = 5 ms, F0 = 1 N) the theoretical peak-to-peak seismic velocities had been 
lower by a factor 1/700 than the ones measured with a pick hammer. Since for a single force P- and S-
waves are excited and the respective amplitudes are no longer spherically symmetric, the derivation of 
the total-energy expression will be somewhat more complicated than with an explosion. 
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Figure 5:  Empirical relationship between energy yield and seismic moment for chemical and nuclear explosions 
in salt (Figure 8 in [12]), with indications at 20 kg TNT equivalent and 2109 Nm. The abscissa numbers go from
1E-6 to 1E4 kt TNT, the ordinate ones from 1E7 to 1E18 Nm. 
Figure 6:  Peak-to-peak value of seismic velocity from analytical theory (from Equation (5) with htr = 0.83 ms, M0 
= 8109 Nm and salt parameters of Table 2, far field only) and of the measurements. The power-law trend line of
the latter hits the theoretical curve at 100 m. The decrease with distance with a stronger exponent than -1 may be 
a consequence of frequency-dependent attenuation that is not contained in the analytical equation. This holds in 
particular for sensors at the surface where the wave had to pass through about 300 m of loose sediment with a 
much lower Q value. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
195
5. Ratio between signal strength from force versus explosion
To compare the signal strength from a single force with that from an explosion, model runs had been 
done with the source at the central position of Figure 1. The force direction had been horizontal in x 
direction. Thus for propagation in x direction both types of source produce mainly P waves (with 
horizontal movement of the medium). The x components of seismic velocity at the Sensors 7 to 14 
(Figure 1) had been very similar. However, the peak-to-peak amplitudes of the explosion with moment 
M0 = 1 Nm had been lower by a factor 1/4,400 than those of the force pulse of F0 = 1 N (using the 
same half duration htr = 10 ms). This was flagged as a problem requiring further investigations [3, 
Section 5.4]. 
Using the analytical formulae this ratio can be explained now. For an explosion, the far-field 
displacement term for the 1 component of Equation (5) is 
                                  ,    (13) 
while the 1 component of a single force in 1 direction of Equation (2) is 
                                      .   (14) 
Since the force time function in the SpecFEM3D software is an area-normalised Gaussian function, 
expressed in Newton it is numerically equal to the time derivative of the error-function expression for 
the seismic moment, expressed in Nm/s: 
              .   (15) 
 
Thus the difference between blast and force pulse is an additional factor (m/s) / . Since  = 4,400 
m/s this nicely explains the discrepancy found.6
5. Conclusion and outlook
Analytical theory can give important contributions to the problem of estimating the seismic-signal 
strength at various locations around a seismic source. This source can either exert a force in some 
direction or excite the ground in a spherically symmetric way as with an explosion. Strictly speaking 
the formulae hold only in a homogeneous medium. But the transmission through a boundary to a 
different underground medium often does not change the seismic-wave amplitude markedly. In the 
measurements much stronger variation of the strengths, e.g. by a factor 1/3 to 3, had been found. 
Thus for the probability of detection by an amplitude criterion smaller variations due to transmission do 
not really change the picture. As a consequence it is to be expected that for different media than salt, 
for example clay or granite, relatively good estimates of the signal strength versus distance can be 
gained from the analytical equations if the seismic properties of the respective medium are put into 
them. The time courses and peak/final values of force or seismic moment have to be known for this, 
they will depend on the medium. 
One effect is not included in these equations, namely the seismic attenuation. In many cases the 
attenuation coefficient in the exponential amplitude decrease with distance is proportional to 
frequency, attenuation can be described by a quality factor (see Section 3.1). This means that higher 
frequencies in a seismic wave are attenuated preferentially; at a certain distance, they may have 
effectively vanished. This attenuation can be included by considering the spectra of the signals. Thus, 
knowledge of the quality factor of a medium is very relevant for estimating the detection ranges for 
certain excitation sources. 
Consideration of the theoretical expression for the total seismic-wave energy allowed deriving an 
estimate for the final seismic moment and the duration of the moment step of explosions which had 
not been accessible directly during the measurements. The value range found fits to earlier literature 
data, providing confidence that it is about correct (within an order of magnitude). This solves one of 
the questions that came up in the evaluation of the model calculations. 
Another earlier problem could also be solved: the ratio between the seismic amplitudes in the P waves 
from a force pulse on the one hand and from an explosion on the other. The explanation follows 
6 This is the ratio of the displacements, but the same ratio holds for the velocities (the time derivatives). 
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directly from the power of the P-wave velocity in the respective equations (and the way the force pulse 
and the moment step are defined in the seismic modelling program). 
Two main tasks remain to be done:  
- Deriving the source strength of a force pulse from the total seismic-wave energy similarly to 
the procedure used for an explosion. Possibly this can be compared with estimates from a 
mechanical model of e.g. a pick hammer. 
- Including frequency-dependent attenuation in the analytical calculation. 
More in-depth research may be interesting, such as the influence of broken-up and mixed layers or the 
difference from a spherical explosion of a cylindrical blast-hole geometry. But it may well be that for 
order-of magnitude estimates such investigations are not required. 
In conclusion, analytical theory provides a tool to gain estimates of signal strengths at various potential 
monitoring locations around a planned final repository. It can become an important method in 
designing a safeguards monitoring system and can reduce the amount of confirmatory measurements 
at a potential site. 
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Abstract: 
The long term safety assessment of a nuclear repository implies the investigation of different 
scenarios of the repository and their influence to the safety. A feasibility study in the framework of the 
German Support Programme investigates the applicability of the 3D radar method for the monitoring of 
a geological repository. The aim of technical solution is the detection and localisation of clandestine 
underground mining activities. The radar system should form a kind of protective shield around a 
repository to detect and localise possible activities in an early stage and in a sufficient distance. 
Repetitive surveys out of boreholes or drifts are conducted with disadvantages concerning safeguards 
requirements as high maintenance and positioning inaccuracies. In this study a static radar system is 
selected to omit these disadvantages. A monitoring system consisting of an array of static radar 
probes could probably be realized as a highly accurate, durable and low-maintenance automatic early 
warning system. 
The detectability of different possible clandestine mining activities is investigated by simulations of 
radar wave propagation. The simulations involve the influence of baseline conditions to the data. By 
the use of real data examples the sensitivity of different radar antennas are analysed. Based on the 
real data an example for a possible monitoring system in a salt mine is given. Discussed are the 
requirements on a geophysical underground safeguards monitoring system as well as possibilities and 
limitations of radar for the monitoring task at various sites. 
Keywords: safeguards; monitoring; directional radar; repository; salt dome 
1. Introduction
Geophysical methods are suited for the monitoring of the environment of a geological repository. In 
this presentation, the usability of ground-penetrating radar (GPR) is examined as a possible method. 
The objective is to use radar to detect and localize undeclared underground activities in and around a 
geological nuclear repository. To this end, the idea is to use a radar monitoring system setting up a 
"shield" of electromagnetic waves around a nuclear repository enabling an early detection of activities 
in a sufficient distance to the stored material. 
The motivation of an unauthorized access could be theft, sabotage or illegal transfers. Access types 
for those activities could be drillings, cavern leaching, hydraulic fracturing, explosives or heading 
techniques which could occur from all sides of the repository.  
Mining activities like cavern leaching and hydraulic fracturing are directly related to drillings. In 
advance of heading also exploration drillings could be expected. For the impact of the barrier system 
by explosives an access route is needed, e.g. by a borehole. It is most likely that a drilling would 
precede every access type. 
Within geotechnical engineering radar is mainly used in form of repetitive linear measurements. For 
safeguarding, repetitive surveys out of boreholes or drifts are conducted with disadvantages as high 
maintenance and positioning inaccuracies. In this study a static radar system is selected to omit these 
disadvantages. Directive radar antennas provide the direction of activities. A monitoring system 
consisting of an array of directed static radar probes could probably be realized as a highly accurate, 
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durable and low-maintenance automatic early warning system. The applicability of the radar method is 
restricted to locations with low conductive conditions like in dry rock salt and in some crystalline 
formations. 
2. Modelling of unauthorized activities
The influence of geology and mining activities on the data of a stationary radar antenna is investigated 
by 2D finite difference simulations [1]. As a basis for the first simulations a section of the Gorleben salt 
dome is used. An area of 250 m x 200 m of the north western flank of the salt dome is selected for the 
modelling work. The model of the section of the Gorleben salt dome is shown in FIG 1a. The 
electromagnetic parameter of the model layers are chosen as mean values from different references. 
As a compromise of resolution and range a measuring frequency of 50 MHz was chosen for the 
simulations. According to the wavelength of this frequency in rock salt, a discretization distance of 
0.125 m in both directions and a time increment of 0.2 ns were selected. The maximum travel time of 
the modelling work is 1,600 ns. To prevent reflections at the borders of the model, absorbing boundary 
conditions are used. The simulations are carried out with a idealized point source of the type “Küpper”
which consists of two half cycles. The position of the point source in the model is (0 m/816.5 m). 
Figure 1: 2D finite difference simulations. a) Model of a section of the Gorleben salt dome used for the 
simulations. A horizontal borehole with diameter of 0.125 m approaches the potassium salt in a depth of about 
856 m. b) Simulated wave field of the model in a) at a travel time of 536 ns. 
The electromagnetic wave is transmitted at the source point and is spread in all directions. After 
certain travel times reflections at the geologic boundaries and at the drifts occur. Figure 1b shows the 
modelled wave field at a travel time of 536 ns.  
With the following simulations an access attempt in the form of a thin conductive borehole to the 
repository is examined. Examined is a static case in the past-closure phase, in which a repository cask 
was brought into the storage gallery and all open galleries in the model were filled with crushed salt. 
The borehole with a diameter of 0.125 m approaches the repository area from the left at a depth of 
approximately 854 m. 
The first data trace in Figure 2a shows the respective baseline data without any borehole. In the 
following data records the access attempt gradually reaches the geological layer boundaries of clay 
(b), potassium salt (c), kieserite layers (d) and the Staßfurt rock salt (e). In part, the simulated data 
show low-amplitude changes at a travel time of approximately 900 ns. 
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Figure 2: Simulated data regarding the progress of an access attempt in the form of a thin borehole. 
The calculation of the difference of the data with regard to the baseline record makes the changes 
clearly visible (Figure 3). When the borehole reaches clay (b), no data changes are registered 
compared to the baseline data (a). After reaching potassium salt (c) a low-amplitude signal shows at a 
travel time of about 900 ns. Starting with the kieserite layers (d) the change of the data traces 
becomes more and more visible. 
Figure 3: Simulated data regarding the progress of an access attempt in the form of a thin borehole, difference 
between measured data and baseline data. Changes of the measured data caused by the borehole become 
visible. 
Due to the high electric conductivity of clay, severe reflection and absorption occurs at the boundary 
layer salt to clay. For this reason, with the radar system it is impossible to obtain information from the 
area within and behind a thick clay layer. This shows that a geological layer boundary may have a 
possible shielding effect on the radar waves. After passing through the shielding layer, the access 
attempt can be located with radar. 
The positioning of stationary antennas is very exact, whereby also the geological noise occurring is 
identical at different measuring times. By subtracting the measuring data, the geological noise can be 
eliminated completely, whereas uncorrelated data would become visible. This means a higher 
sensitivity of stationary antennas for the detection of unauthorized activities. 
3. Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity area of an antenna is defined as the volume, in which a very weak signal is at least 
barely be distinguishable from the noise. The boundaries of this sensitivity are equivalent to the range 
of the radar. The range of an antenna is based on the system properties and the site parameters and 
can be estimated applying the radar equation. This equation summarizes the losses regarding the 
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travelling radar signals, allowing for a more accurate assessment of the depth of penetration to be 
expected for a diffractor [2]: 
(I) 
With 
received signal power in W, 
transmitted signal power in W, 
antenna gain of the combined transmitting-receiving antenna relative to a sphere dipole, 
wavelength of the centre frequency in rock in m, 
effective reflecting area (radar cross section) in m², 
attenuation factor in 1/m, 
distance of the reflector in m. 
In this study, a sensitivity analysis of a borehole radar is performed based on a real data example. The 
data was recorded at a cavern storage site in rock salt by a direction-sensitive borehole radar. The 
data record in Figure 4 shows a section of the measurement result in depths of approximately 750 m 
to 950 m. The length of the radargram of approximately 11,000 ns in dry rock salt corresponds to a 
distance of approximately 700 m from the borehole. Numerous reflections were recorded on the profile 
which can be correlated to geological layer boundaries and technical structures like boreholes and 
caverns. 
Figure 4: Real data example of a borehole measurement. 
The sensitivity of the radar system is estimated by the detection limit, up to which a known borehole 
can be located, before its signal is superposed by noise. Therefore, the amplitude of the reflection of 
the borehole and the magnitude of the noise level are determined. The investigated borehole has a 
diameter of 300 mm and a distance of approximately 210 m to the profile (Figure 5). For the 
measurement a transmitter (dipole) with a transmitting power of 6 kW was used. The reflection of the 
investigated borehole was registered with a reflected power of 10 nW. 
The noise level is determined in a section with high attenuation at a large distance to the borehole 
(Figure 4). In this example the noise level amounts to approx. 200 pW. This value applies to a signal in 
the direction of maximum radiation. A radar signal in this main direction of the ray can be detected, if 
its amplitude is above this level.  
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Figure 5: Selection of a reflection in form of a borehole. 
A criterion for the directivity of an antenna is the opening angle, also referred to as peak width at half-
height. The opening angle  is defined as the range within the radiation field, in which the power 
density does not fall below -3 dB which corresponds to a factor of approximately 0.5 of the maximum 
amplitude. That means, in this range signals can definitely be detected when the amplitude exceeds 
twice the determined noise level. Hence, the following considerations assume a noise level of 400 pW. 
The opening angle of a dipole signal corresponds to 360°. By using a planar reflector, the directivity 
can be increased while the opening angle decreases. The directivity of a planar reflector (3 m x 3 m) 
achieves an antenna gain of approximately 2 dB (Figure 6). The opening angle decreases to 
approximately 72°. 
Figure 6: Radiation pattern of a dipole in front of a planar reflector (3 m x 3 m), a) 3D presentation, b) in xy-plane. 
According to the aforementioned explanations, a signal level must exceed 400 pW to detect it with the 
radar system. Applying the radar equation (I) results in the diagram in Figure 7. The parameters 
specified in the equation are the wavelength of the centre frequency of the radar antenna used, the 
signal power, the antenna gain, the attenuation within the medium, the distance of the borehole and 
the effective reflecting area of the investigated reflection. 
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Figure 7: Range estimation based on sensitivity analysis. 
Resulting from the calculations, the diagram in Figure 7 shows the drop of the power level as a 
function of the distance to the borehole. The brown curve illustrates the power level of a simple dipole 
antenna. D1 is the point at which the borehole was detected at a distance of approximately 210 m. 
The black horizontal line corresponds to the signal level generated by the reflection of this borehole 
(10 nW). The red horizontal line shows the lowest power level, in which the signal of the borehole is 
still just above the noise level of 400 pW. Thus, the intersection of the red line and the power level of 
the dipole mark the maximum depth D3, at which the borehole can be still detected. Accordingly, the 
detection limit of a standard dipole is approximately 370 m. 
Owing to the higher directivity, a directional antenna is expected to have a larger range. For the 
comparison, a directional antenna consisting of a dipole with a planar reflector of 3 m x 3 m (see also 
Figure 6) was selected. This antenna shows a decrease of the power level according to the green 
curve in Figure 7. In comparison to the dipole signal (brown), the power level of the directed antenna 
is higher over the whole depth. Thus, with the respective antenna, a higher maximum range is to be 
expected. The range is marked by the intersection of the noise level (red) with the power level of the 
directed antenna (green) and corresponds to a value of approximately 550 m (D4). 
By the combination of these results with the radiation field of the directional antenna (Figure 6) it is 
possible to determine the sensitivity of an individual radar antenna (Figure 8). The sensitivity volume is 
defined via the opening angle. The opening angle is defined as the range within the radiation field, in 
which the power density does not fall short of 3 dB (approximately half amplitude). This area is defined 
in the presentation of the directivity in Figure 8 a by orange, red and purple areas. The sensitive 
volume can be extracted from the three-dimensional radiation field. In this work, the sensitivity volume 
is approximated by a cone-shaped volume (Figure 8b). At the tip of the cone, the antenna is 
positioned. The radiating cone shows the sensitivity range and thus also the range area of the radar 
antenna. 
The sensitivity cone can now be used to develop a radar “protective shield” consisting of several 
antennas. The result of the aforementioned calculations is a maximum range of a dipole antenna of 
approximately 370 m and range of a directional antenna of approximately 550 m. Since the 
environment of the repository can be disturbed by mine workings and geological layer boundaries, 
which may decrease the range, a lower value of 450 m was selected for the detection limit. 
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Figure 8: Range estimation based on sensitivity analysis. 
The example of a radar “protective shield” is shown in Figures 9. In the example several single 
antennas of the monitoring system are positioned around a plane repository of 900 m x 300 m 
(yellow). The detection volume of the horizontal monitoring area is shown in grey and the vertical 
monitoring area in green. The tips of the sensitivity cones each present the sensor positions. This is 
an idealized view, since usually transmitter and receiver of a sensor are separated from one another 
also spatially. For a better overview, two different cross sectional views of the possible layouts are 
presented in the figures. 
The sensitivity of a radar monitoring system is the product of the sensitivities of all single radar 
antennas. A warning system in form of a “protective shield” can be implemented by a special sensors 
arrangement. To ensure a complete coverage all around the repository, the sensitivity should not 
show any gaps in the surfaces. 
In the example the horizontal area of the layout was fully covered using 10 directional antennas (grey 
in Figures 29 and 30). To cover the edges of the repository, in every repository corner, two antennas 
were positioned with different orientations. The horizontal shield was completed on the long sides of 
the repository by one more antenna on each side. 
Figure 9: Left: Horizontal section through the layout. Right: Layout of a three-quarter section. Yellow: repository, 
grey/green: protective shield estimation based on sensitivity analysis. 
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The example shows that theoretically a repository with the dimensions 900 m x 300 m located in dry 
rock salt can be safeguarded by a monitoring system consisting of 26 antennas. At other sites, such 
as in solid crystalline rock, lower ranges are expected. With a lower range, the number of individual 
sensors must be increased accordingly. In the example presented, half the range would require 
approximately twice as many detectors to enable a complete coverage of the repository. However, the 
amount of detectors is depending on the repository concept and may be even higher. 
5. Conclusions
Simulation calculations of various unauthorized activities show that under favourable conditions even 
very minor activities at a large distance to the radar antenna can be detected. However, the range is 
affected severely by the mass conductivity of the rock or the filling of the pores as well as by the 
conductivity or magnetizability of fractures. The respective range should be determined in advance by 
test measurements at various locations of a site. In addition, certain geological layer boundaries may 
have a shielding effect so that areas behind them can either be monitored to a limited degree or not at 
all. 
At suitable sites, radar has a high potential as a monitoring technique. The use of stationary antennas 
facilitates zero maintenance and a clear positioning. The use of directional antennas allows the 
localization of underground activities; moreover, the influence of known events from the inside of the 
mine is reduced. 
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Abstract: 
Crucial to the process of multi-lateral nuclear disarmament are three key principles: transparency; 
irreversibility and verifiability. Without these, nuclear disarmament cannot be credibly assured or 
provide the trust and confidence needed by all States in their quest for a world without nuclear 
weapons. This has been repeatedly emphasised in many international forums including, most 
recently, in the final report of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly’s Open-ended Working 
Group Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations and in Resolution 71/67 
adopted on 14 December 2016 by UNGA. Currently, not many agreed verification solutions exist. 
However, there are valuable previous and ongoing initiatives in this field and lessons that can be 
learnt from other processes in order to tackle the complex technical, legal and political issues 
surrounding multilateral verification. 
This paper will explore the benefits of creating a multilateral Group of Scientific Experts on Nuclear 
Disarmament Verification as a means to increase the international knowledge-base of verification 
options as reflected in the outcomes of two recently held workshops with European and African 
stakeholders. It will also examine how such a Group could address the challenges moving forward 
including strategies for sustainable and inclusive verification capacity building and how to address 
unforeseen technological advancements. 
Keywords: Disarmament; Verification; Nuclear; Scientific Experts 
1. Introduction
The importance of verification has repeatedly been emphasised in many international forums 
including recently in Resolution 71/67 adopted on 14 December 2016 by the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA). The resolution, with 175 states voting in favour and none against, mandates the 
UN Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts (GGE) to consider the role of 
verification in advancing nuclear disarmament. 
Effective nuclear disarmament verification is an essential precondition for achieving 'a world without 
nuclear weapons'. Without verification and the two fundamental principles of transparency and 
irreversibility, nuclear disarmament activities may not credibly provide the trust and confidence 
needed by all states in a world where all nuclear weapons have been abolished. While verification is 
not an end in itself, further development of the multilateral nuclear disarmament verification 
capabilities will be required for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear 
weapons. Resolution 71/67 expresses the General Assembly’s conviction that 'identifying and 
developing practical and effective measures of nuclear disarmament verification and monitoring' will 
'foster confidence and facilitate efforts to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.' 
International co-operation in addressing the underlying scientific and technical questions on nuclear 
disarmament verification measures is of great importance. 
While past and on-going initiatives in this field have carried out valuable research and explored useful 
approaches, this work needs to be not only be captured and preserved but sustained, better co-
ordinated and continuously renewed as technology advances. Thus, the creation of a multilateral 
Group of Scientific Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (GSE-NDV) could, in the long-term, 
assist in the development of a truly shared and trusted understanding of the technical, procedural and 
policy challenges of nuclear disarmament verification (especially between nuclear and non-nuclear 
weapon armed states and between the nuclear armed states themselves). It could also generate 
sustained dialogue between scientific and technical experts, diplomats and policy-makers within and 
between the nuclear- and non-nuclear weapon states. A GSE-NDV could also consolidate efforts in 
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the field to date, identify and co-ordinate research needs and initiate ways and means to undertake 
such research within limited budgets and organisational capacity. 
2. Background to the GSE-CTBT
The establishment of groups of qualified experts in the form of a Group of Governmental Experts 
(GGE) or a Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) is a relatively common approach within the United 
Nations system as well as in other intergovernmental organisations such as the European Union. 
These groups are often mandated to undertake in-depth studies on a particular topic and to make 
recommendations to the body that created them. Importantly, they are not mandated to negotiate, for 
example, a treaty or convention. 
There are many examples of such bodies in the arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament 
fields as well as in other areas of international concern. Examples include the GGE tasked with 
making recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to a treaty banning the production 
of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Another example is the 
GGE on lethal autonomous weapons systems. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) is perhaps the 
most well-known expert group with a long-term mandate in a non-arms control field. The IPCC’s 
mission is to provide a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge on climate change and 
its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts. 
A regional example is the European Commission’s GSE that focussed on ways to counter potential 
biological and chemical terrorism. It undertook an assessment of knowledge and capacity regarding 
bio-defence and looked into future research requirements. 
In the context of disarmament verification, a prime example is the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts 
to Consider International Co-Operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, commonly 
referred to as the ‘Group of Scientific Experts’ (GSE-CTBT). 
While a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing had been a foreign policy objective for many 
governments since the mid-1950s, US-Soviet relations were coloured by the Cold War. There were 
also scientific and political disagreements over the verifiability of a proposed treaty prohibiting nuclear 
testing. To achieve at least partial progress on the issue, Sweden proposed the establishment of a 
group to study the technical aspects of verification. This GSE was established under the auspices of 
the Conference on Disarmament (CD). 
This GSE comprised mostly of seismologists, was active for 20 years, from 1976 until 1996. The 
group was tasked to ‘specify the characteristics of an international monitoring system’ using 
seismological monitoring. It reported directly to the CD and produced several substantive reports 
throughout its lifetime. Four senior political officers from the United Nations (UN) supported the Group 
as secretaries over the years that it met. 
This GSE helped to keep the notion of a comprehensive test ban alive despite being established at a 
time when there was little or no political appetite for such a treaty. During the cold war, it was the only 
ongoing multilateral dialogue on disarmament issues and while progress was slow, the work to design 
a global verification system allowed for the sharing of knowledge on how a seismic verification system 
could, in principle, be achieved. 
It is a key example of how expert groups can be used to provide capabilities that facilitate agreement 
on difficult technical issues for the monitoring or verification of compliance with a treaty.ii 
Its research agenda and the scientific progress that came out of it were unconnected to political 
negotiations. Its agenda was broad enough to enable continuous work through two decades, 
ultimately leading to the creation of a shared understanding of verification options. The GSE-CTBT 
also shows that scientists from across the political divide, working side-by-side over many years, can 
significantly assist diplomatic processes and ensure that later agreements can be implemented.iii 
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3. Key considerations when applying the concept to NDV
A key question is whether this concept can be exported to the institutional realities of 2017. 
Presently, political conditions are challenging. Deep divisions between major nuclear powers, 
especially the United States (US) and Russia; uncertainty about the Trump Administration's future 
nuclear posture and its apparent disdain for arms control and disarmament; rising tensions on the 
Korean Peninsula; lack of progress in the context of the NPT review process and no progress toward 
entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), to list but a few. 
Moreover, views on approaches to nuclear disarmament vary. However, all states remain committed 
to the long-term goal of irreversible disarmament. The unanimous support for Resolution 71/67 on 
nuclear disarmament verification demonstrates this commitment. 
Clearly, the research scope for multilateral disarmament verification would have to be much broader 
than was the case for the GSE-CTBT as the ‘objects of verification’ includes many different types of 
materials, processes, equipment and facilities, some of which are highly sensitive. Defining a scope 
and set of research tasks would be more complex and would require that no political assumptions on 
what disarmament activities states should or will take are made. 
However, as was undoubtedly shown by the GSE-CTBT, it is possible to conduct preparatory 
scientific and technical analysis before political negotiations or indeed without a commitment to 
commence such negotiations, in other words, in world not conducive to global disarmament.  
A GSE mandated to explore nuclear disarmament verification measures (like the GSE-CTBT) would 
need to be linked to a multilateral body such as the Conference on Disarmament or the UNGA in 
order to provide a formal framework allowing states, to not only commit experts to participate in 
meetings, but also to make considerable investments in research and outreach activities and for its 
efforts to be sustained, consistent, and focused.iv 
Such a group would need to take into account previous and current initiatives on verification, such as 
the UK-Norway Initiative and its successor – the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership – as well as 
the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), which is due to enter 
phase two of its programme of work in 2018. Other older processes would also need to be examined 
for applicability – including, for example, the Black Sea Experiments of the late 1980s and the 
Trilateral Initiative which was launched in 1996 by the US, Russia and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA).  
With this in mind, and to possibly feed into the GGE's deliberations in 2018 and 2019, VERTIC has 
designed a series of four regional consultations: in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America to be 
hosted in 2017. Importantly, VERTIC aimed not to prejudge or pre-empt any recommendation that 
may be made by the GGE established by UNGA/RES/71/67. 
4. VERTIC Workshops
VERTIC has so far hosted two of the four workshops – one in Vienna for European states and 
organisations and one in South Africa for Africans – both in April 2017. The workshops were 
structured in such a way that participants could discuss whether a multilateral GSE-NDV would be 
able to: 
a. consolidate efforts in the field to date;
b. identify and co-ordinate research needs and initiate ways and means to undertake such
research within limited budgets and organisational capacity; and
c. generate sustained dialogue between scientific and technical experts, diplomats and policy-
makers within and between the nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states.
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The two-day consultations involved 33 researchers, diplomats and policy makers, drawn from eleven 
countries and 16 organisations on the two continents. Half of the participants were drawn from 
governments. All individuals took part in their personal capacity although they were also able to 
articulate what they thought their government’s or organisation’s view might be. Each participant 
contributed subject to the Chatham House rule. 
Each workshop was guided by a set of discussion papers designed to stimulate debate and produce 
practical suggestions. Discussion papers focussed on: 
1. ‘The Importance of Verification and Transparency for Nuclear Disarmament’—which
examined why nuclear disarmament verification is an issue of concern for both non-armed
weapon states and nuclear armed states and the important role of the scientific community in
arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation activities;
2. ‘The Role of the Group of Scientific Experts in the Negotiation of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty’ — this paper examined what, if any, lessons can be learned from this experience
and what role this group played in preparing the foundation for political progress until CTBT
negotiations started;
3. ‘An Overview of Past and Present Networks and Groupings Devoted to Nuclear Disarmament
Verification’ — this paper focused on current and past initiatives of direct relevance to nuclear
disarmament verification. They included the United Kingdom-Norway Initiative (UKNi) – now
with the addition of the USA and Sweden and renamed the Quad Nuclear Verification
Partnership; the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), the
US-UK Technical Cooperation Programme, and the so-called 'Trilateral Initiative'; as well as
other initiatives such as those of ESARDA and the German Disarmament Verification
Network;
4. ‘What Role Could European/African States and Scientists Play in Nuclear Disarmament
Verification?’—these food-for-thought papers, one produced for each meeting, served as a
basis for discussion on how such a GGE-NDV could contribute to regional security and how
involvement by the relevant bodies, such as the European Union and the African Union (AU),
could move the debate forward; and
5. A final paper which provided a select list and description of GGEs and GSEs from other arms
control, disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives and other fields.
VERTIC will hold two further workshops in the latter half of 2017, one for South American and one for 
Asian stakeholders. It will deliver its final report during the UN First Committee in October or 
November 2017. 
5. Interim conclusions
The purpose of these workshops was neither to reach consensus nor to draw definitive conclusions 
regarding the feasibility or desirability of a GSE-NDV. Nevertheless, participants in both Vienna and 
Pretoria concurred that: 
1. Nuclear disarmament verification is probably one thing that all states can agree or commit
themselves to — although they may disagree on exactly what it means and on the measures
needed to achieve it;
2. Many lessons could be derived from the GSE-CTBT. Above all, it demonstrated that it is
possible and useful to conduct preparatory scientific and technical analysis and develop
capabilities that could facilitate agreement on difficult technical issues for the monitoring or
verification of compliance with a treaty;
3. The establishment of a GSE-NDV as an apolitical body would constitute an important means
to conduct joint research into verification technologies and data-analysis methodologies, while
the political environment is not conducive and while political processes are maturing;
4. One would, however, need to define 'nuclear disarmament verification'. In particular what
stage of the disarmament process it refers to - such as dismantlement, material disposition or
accounting.
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5. A GSE-NDV’s mandate should be set by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), as
this would give ownership to all stakeholders, irrespective of geographical location or legal
status under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It would
also give the group credibility and legitimacy. Finally, it could potentially provide a source of
long-term funding (possibly supplemented by a mechanism such as a Voluntary Trust Fund).
6. A GSE-NDV’s scope of work, even if broad and open-ended, would have to have clear
scientific and technical parameters;
7. Further to that, a GSE-NDV’s scope of work could be derived from UNGA/RES/71/67. In
particular, participants highlighted the third operative paragraph, which calls for all States to
work together to ‘identify and develop practical and effective disarmament verification
measures' through developing 'tools, solutions and methods and capacity-building.'
Participants also noted the fourth operative paragraph, that calls for the 'development and
strengthening of practical and effective nuclear disarmament verification measures.'
8. Scientists and technical experts should form the core of a GSE-NDV. However, provision
should be made for policy-makers and legal experts to interact with it periodically;
9. Scientific and technical experts forming a GSE-NDV should be drawn from both nuclear- and
non-nuclear armed states;
10. An important aspect of the work of a GSE-NDV should involve medium to long-term capacity-
building processes and programmes on verification techniques and mechanisms;
11. States would need room to interpret the mandate to suit their foreign policy goals - NPT
member states should be able to justify their work under Article VI. Non-NPT states should be
able to justify their participation by their UN membership.
12. The mandate should also be broad enough to accommodate the policy positions of both
'immediate abolitionists' and 'step-by-step advocates’.
13. The GSE-NDV would need to strike a balance between what is politically desirable to achieve
and what is practically feasible given the national security constraints of the work;
14. The GSE should aim to overcome issues relating to duplication, overlap and 'reinventing the
wheel,' but should not necessarily be the sole vessel of international co-operation on
disarmament verification.
15. In that sense, a GSE-NDV would need to develop a mandate and working methodology that
a) takes into account existing initiatives; b) makes use of their work in this area; and c)
benefits from the technical expertise in these groupings.
16. Following on from the GGE’s work in 2018 and 2019, such a GSE-NDV could feasibly
commence its work in the early 2020s and with a mandated but open agenda.
6. Conclusion
The complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere is in the long-term security interest of all 
states. However, both government representatives and various non-governmental experts point out 
that obstacles to nuclear disarmament include both the lack of favourable political and security 
conditions, and the challenges associated with verifying the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. 
As part of efforts to implement Resolution 71/67, it may be prudent therefore for states to co-operate 
in establishing a group of scientific experts that would address technical challenges to, and advance 
the development of solutions for, nuclear disarmament verification in the longer term. The inspiration 
is the example of the group of scientific experts (GSE) that was created in 1976 to study monitoring 
and verification approaches for a nuclear test ban.v 
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The creation a multilateral Group of Scientific Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, to 
complement existing initiatives and partnerships can only increase the international knowledge-base 
of verification options, enable all states to actively collaborate in developing practical methods that 
could contribute to the verification of irreversible dismantlement of nuclear weapons and provide a 
platform for long-term sustainability, capacity-building and consolidation. 
It was scientists that brought nuclear weapons into being and it will be scientists and technical experts 
who will have as much a role in their abolition as they had in their creation. 
i This paper is an edited version of ‘Defining a Group of Scientific Experts for Disarmament 
Verification’, VERTIC Brief 27, May 2017.  
ii W.H. Dunlop, ‘The role of Group of Scientific Experts in facilitating better international relations, 
particularly in arms control’, Report: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2012. <https://e-
reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/629112.pdf> 
iii Arian L. Pregenzer, 'Enhancing Regional Security Agreements Through Cooperative Monitoring', 
Report: Sandia National Laboratories, May 1995. 
<http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/26/074/26074525.pdf> 
iv See: Ola Dahlman, ‘How Can Science Support a Process Towards a World Free of Nuclear 
Weapons?’, Science & Global Security, 21: 95–105, 2013. 
v	See “1993-1995: Prelude and Formal Negotiations,” Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/1993-1996-treaty-
negotiations/1993-95-prelude-and-formal-negotiations/.  
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Abstract: 
A series of exercises and targeted meetings held by the European Safeguards Research and 
Development Association (ESARDA) Verification Technologies and Methodologies Working Group and 
the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technical 
Division have provided valuable insight into how a systems approach could help identify non-proliferation 
and arms control verification requirements. International experts from nuclear weapons states and non-
nuclear weapons states, with a wide-range of expertise in nuclear safeguards, arms control verification, 
radiation detection, political science, and defense studies, participated in the discussions. It 
demonstrated that it is possible to design a transparent state-level systems framework to define 
verification objectives, processes, and timescales for an effective verification regime based on the 
strategic goals of a treaty, while taking into account restrictions from different security environments. It 
was also an effective mechanisms for international and technical engagement on these complicated 
issues. Possible future research activities could include: (1) increased efforts to link the material and 
weapons sectors of the nuclear weapons complex; (2) further attention on how to satisfy the competing 
needs for effective verification and protection of national security; (3) greater consideration on how to 
define the treaty-controlled items so that declarations can be verified effectively; (4) continued testing of 
a systems approach to analyze the pros and cons of possible verification regimes to conduct a form of 
sensitivity analysis and provide feedback and a better understanding of confidence levels that could be 
achieved; and (5) possible ideas of how to engage in substantive dialogue in a broad international 
environment, such as the on-going International Partnership for Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), 
while taking into account the range of weapons and verification experience and the need to uphold NPT 
Article VI.  
Keywords: verification, arms control, systems approach 
1. Introduction
Establishing a method to systematically identify verification options for nuclear weapons control 
agreements could significantly contribute to future development of an effectively verifiable treaty [1]. 
The presentation of a nation’s nuclear defense complex would help define potential cheating pathways 
and facilitate the development of requirements for declarations/data exchanges and an inspection 
regime needed for verification. The increased transparency could foster confidence and improve 
communication between potential stakeholders.  
The application of a systems approach, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency’s State Level 
Concept (SLC) [2] to arms control agreements could help build a framework or verification architecture 
to be used to structure analysis. A series of technical meetings were organized in 2014 and 2015 to 
investigate the utility of a systems framework in the nuclear arms control context. International experts 
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from nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states, with a wide-range of expertise in, inter 
alia, nuclear safeguards, arms control verification, radiation detection, political science, and defence 
studies, participated in exercises and discussions to test the feasibility and identify knowledge gaps. To 
make the effort less abstract, two fictitious countries and a hypothetical treaty were devised for two 
exercises. An effort was made to represent some real-world complexity, without making it too difficult, 
so relatively simple physical models of national nuclear weapons enterprises were created. By 
formulating a scenario that incorporated more than the technical aspects of verification, it was possible 
to look at the state-as-a-whole and consider the additional factors that influence national security 
decision-making.  
Unrealistically, two constraints were NOT applied during the exercises: (1) the declaration of security-
sensitive information was allowed because a country could make the decision that it was in its interest 
to declassify information or share it under conditions deemed advantageous; and (2) the verification 
requirements focused only on the country to be verified without consideration of the acceptability of the 
same requirements being imposed on the verifier.  
2. Workshops and Exercises
The initial exercise set out to analyze potential diversion (cheating) pathways and potential treaty 
verification measures that could be applied in a nuclear weapons state. It was hosted by the European 
Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) Verification Technologies and 
Methodologies Working Group Meeting at the Joint Research Centre, Ispra, Italy, in autumn of 2014 [3]. 
The model bilateral treaty between the two nuclear weapons states limited the total number of warheads 
deployed and stockpiled. During this exercise, the meeting participants considered the existence of 
undeclared warheads above the initially declared total of 1,970 for the fictitious state. It maintained six 
types of nuclear warheads that were deployed across three types of delivery platforms, and any 
warheads deployed above the maximum of 500 would constitute a form of cheating.  
The nuclear weapons enterprise comprised a complete nuclear fuel cycle and weaponization facilities, 
which included a stockpile of military fissile material; warhead components production facilities; warhead 
production, maintenance, and dismantlement facilities; different types of storage depots; military bases; 
and delivery vehicles.  A simple physical model of the enterprise was considered and potential cheating 
pathways debated.  The group quickly learned that national security concerns and the country’s defense 
posture greatly influenced the type of cheating and likelihood of cheating along particular pathways, so 
a second short exercise was held by the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory during the summer of 2015 [4]. At this meeting, a simpler scenario was 
developed for the two fictitious neighbouring countries and the exercise was structured so that national 
security objectives would be taken into account, while considering the verification regime each country 
would require. A formal exercise framework (Figure 1) was suggested to focus the participants on 
national objectives and priorities. 
Figure 1. Framework used to explore the usefulness of a systems approach 
to development of a treaty verification regime. 
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For this exercise, the model treaty limited the total nuclear forces at existing levels for a period of 10 
years, including strategic and tactical and deployed and non-deployed. Each type of delivery system 
and the deployed and total number of warheads (including deployed and non-deployed) were capped, 
and the development, testing, and deployment of new types of warheads and delivery systems was 
prohibited.  
The neighboring countries were configured to represent different levels of development, capabilities, 
and populations. The larger power with a population of 200 million, was designed as a moderately 
advanced industrialized state with regional military and economic dominance with ambitions for broader 
global influence. It had a sophisticated nuclear weapons enterprise consisting of civilian and military 
nuclear fuel cycles and a total of 322 nuclear warheads. The smaller ascending power (population of 
100 million) was newly industrialized with a modest conventional force, recently developed its nuclear 
capability and relied on a primitive nuclear deterrent.  Its nuclear enterprise consisted of both civilian 
and military nuclear fuel cycles, and has possession of a total of 110 warheads.  
The final discussion, held at the 8th INMM–ESARDA Joint Workshop at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in 
October 2015 [5], was not directed towards any specific scenario, but instead focused more on 
application of systems engineering approaches and the complications that protection of sensitive 
national security information introduces into the process. 
3. Key insights
The use of exercises, with fictitious states and model treaties, effectively focused the discussion on the 
application of a systems approach beyond International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. It 
was interesting to invite both safeguards and arms control experts, some with expertise in international 
relations or political science, with the intent to challenge them to adapt their usual focus and methods 
to a different domain.  Another unusual aspect of these meetings was the range of viewpoints that 
nuclear weapons state and non-nuclear weapons state experts brought to the development of a nuclear 
arms control verification regime. Overall, it was demonstrated that it is possible (albeit complicated) to 
design a state-level systems framework to define verification objectives, processes, and timescales for 
an effective verification regime based on the strategic goals of a treaty, while considering restrictions 
from different security environments. More work is needed but the authors believe that it is an effective 
mechanism for international and technical engagement on these complicated issues. 
During the first exercise, most the participants came with vast experience in international safeguards 
and the group dove into acquisition pathway analysis with attempts to define attractive pathways and 
timeliness goals. As the effort bogged down, it was clear that the SLC would need to be modified to fit 
into this different context. Within the safeguards context, the goal is to prevent and detect the diversion 
of specifically defined nuclear materials. At the state-level, safeguards are applied in non-nuclear 
weapons states. The Nuclear Weapons States that implement a Voluntary Offer, apply safeguards in 
only volunteered facilities in the complex. In an arms control context, depending on the definition of the 
treaty accountable items, the cheating pathways would be found across the whole military and civilian 
complex. To conduct an integrated assessment, it will be necessary to link the material and weapons 
sectors of a nation’s nuclear weapons complex. When planning for the verification of items, such as 
weapons or weapons components, the State’s security and defense objectives will come into play.   
Defining clear metrics to evaluate pathway “attractiveness” and “timeliness of detection” for possible 
cheating must also be modified for an arms control context. The metrics used by the IAEA will provide 
a good basis for further work. New or revised metrics would likely be dependent on the objectives of the 
treaty and the security situation of the countries involved. For example, the technical difficulty of cheating 
might not be the issue for an existing functioning facility but whether “stealth” or “denial and deception” 
could be implemented would be a key factor. When considering whether maintenance and operational 
costs are an obstacle to cheating using a particular pathway, it would be important to consider if those 
costs were already included in the national budget. If so, the cost would not likely have a great influence 
on the level of attractiveness to exploit the pathway.   
The participants considered that the detection goals for diversion or production of significant quantities 
of treaty accountable items would be greatly influenced by the perceived stability in a region. Increased 
transparency but lower confidence verification of exact numbers might be acceptable between countries 
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with a trusted stable relationship. However, if each state has only a low number of weapons, accurate 
verification of numbers and locations might be a very strong requirement for treaty ratification.  
An effort was made during the second exercise to simulate an environment where the security of the 
State was an integral part of the scenario. By better defining two states, and splitting the participants 
into two groups, each side could go through the process outlined in Figure 1 and determine its own 
national security and verification objectives. With this additional information, the analysis of the different 
cheating pathways could be considered in the context of strategic and/or defense advantage.  
For example, if deterrence were the objective, having an undeclared (and undetected) cache of 
undeclared weapons would not provide much benefit. However, if the objective was to gain a strategic 
advantage for a certain area of a disputed border, it would be important to detect and cheating with 
respect to the number and locations of weapons.  
The imbalance between the two-hypothetical nuclear capable states during the exercise illustrated how 
the security objectives would drive the focus of a verification regime. The more capable state was 
interested in maintaining its advantage and therefore required that no new capability could be achieved 
in the smaller state without detection. So, the pathway analysis focused on the material and weapons 
production sectors of the complex. The less capable state was less concerned about improvements in 
the neighbor’s already powerful nuclear weapons capability than it was about the numbers and location 
of weapons near its borders.  
Ultimately, finding the balance between the degree of intrusiveness and allowable transparency must 
be achieved to provide confidence in treaty compliance. A nation’s national security requirements and 
the protection of sensitive information and facilities will constrain the final verification regime.  Protection 
of nuclear weapons knowledge (including materials, facilities and processes) are crucial to national 
security and are governed by the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) if nuclear and non-nuclear 
weapons states are involved. All these factors will influence the requirements for verification technology 
and acceptable uncertainty in the data that can be collected. Using an iterative process, verification 
measures could be developed to provide sufficient confidence in compliance in a way that would couple 
existing technical capabilities with operational and security requirements.  It could also help point the 
way for future technology R&D programs.  
Greater details on the scenarios and results of the technical discussions can be found in an upcoming 
book [6]. 
4. Future Research
Continued research can be done to advance implementation of an acquisition pathway analysis 
methodology in nuclear weapons states.  Increased efforts to link the material and weapons sectors of 
the nuclear weapons complex are needed. More consideration should be given on how to define the 
treaty-controlled items. Specifically, further work to refine metrics for pathway attractiveness, detection 
probabilities and detection goals will depend on the items to be verified, related pathways and the 
security objectives of a state.  
Continued testing of a systems approach to analyze the pros and cons of possible verification regimes 
should be carried out. This approach can also be used to conduct sensitivity analysis and provide 
feedback to better understand high priority pathways and how various confidence levels could be 
achieved. These results could impact the design of future declarations and provide more objective 
methods for evaluating effective verification.   
A clear benefit from the series of ESARDA/INMM expert meetings was the development of a cadre of 
national technical experts that is becoming more familiar with these issues. Based on the positive 
experience of working across a diverse community, substantive dialogue in an international 
environment, such as the on-going International Partnership for Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), 
should be encouraged. A structured framework to guide complicated and sensitive discussion could 
facilitate engagement across a broad range of weapons and verification expertise and support Article 
VI of the NPT.  
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Abstract: 
Military dimensions associated with nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation 
verification of a state's commitments are key for any significant and solid progress to be made. 
Verification of compliance and assurances of the absence of cheating are very sensitive issues, in 
particular with respect to the military capabilities that form the foundation of strategic and political 
posture at a national, regional and global level. This article sets the scene through a brief historical 
review of the influence that verification has on the credibility of arms control measures, the 
effectiveness of nuclear non-proliferation efforts and the importance of the nuclear disarmament 
process. In the framework of nuclear disarmament verification the main features of the military nuclear 
system are the doctrines, research & development, production, deployment and elimination of nuclear 
weapons, and the verification measures associated with disarmament commitments.  Finally, a brief 
description of the complexity of regional, multinational and international instruments is provided. Using 
a systems concept to establish a verification mechanism,, taking into account the specificity and the 
issues impacting individual states, could overcome the global complexity and national antagonisms 
and provide the confidence needed to enhance world global security.  
Keywords: nuclear_disarmament, verification, military_dimensions, national_security, 
1. Introduction1
Since the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Japan to end World War II, the possibility of use 
and the deterrence of use of nuclear weapons have been at the heart of military strategic doctrine. 
This is true for countries that possess nuclear weapons or rely on an ally’s nuclear umbrella, those that
do not currently possess nuclear weapons but may consider doing so in the future, and those that wish 
for global elimination.  
In the fifties and sixties, the rapid growth of the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) 
nuclear arsenals, was followed by United Kingdom (UK), France, and China as they achieved nuclear 
status.  This formed the club of five NPT nuclear weapon states. Later India (1974 and 1998) and 
Pakistan (1998), non-NPT parties, conducted nuclear weapons tests, more recently joined by North 
Korea’s (2006, 2009, 2013, 2016)  tests which withdrew from the NPT (2003). The threat of continued 
nuclear proliferation in Iraq, Libya, Iran and the increasing pressure for reduction and dismantlement of 
nuclear capacities, remain very sensitive issues and major factors in the political and strategic 
standing of states. 
Nonetheless, significant progress has been made since the Cuban missile crisis (1962) and especially 
since the end of the Cold War in the early nineties. More than seventy years after Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki and 25 after the end of the Cold War, the world’s nuclear arsenals are still estimated to total 
more than 15,300 warheads, nearly 93% of which are in the hands of the US and Russia.2  This still 
remains a major concern but a real improvement compared to the 70,300 weapons active in 19863. 
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In the aftermath of the disintegration of the USSR, the end of the Cold War and the new strategic 
context, which began with the perspective of a more peaceful world, brought new hopes and gave a 
new momentum to the nuclear disarmament process. Alas, at the turn of the century, the resumption 
of antagonism between the western bloc, young Russia, and emerging China plus regional disputes 
(i.e. India and Pakistan) have soon slowed down the pace of nuclear disarmament process. 
Nuclear weapons remain a major component of the security posture and backbone of military political 
and alliance strategy for those who wish to possess them.  This includes the countries that rely on the 
umbrella of US deterrence. Some states see nuclear weapons as a global strategic stability factor and 
others view them as a regional power vector. If strategic, regional and national conditions are met, 
progress on nuclear disarmament would be an important enhancement of global and regional security. 
This progress is not possible without the confidence that security it not undermined. The key challenge 
is to set the right balance between efficiency of disarmament instrument's verification systems and the 
legitimate rights of states to protect sensitive national security information. Transparency and effective 
verification will be essential to build confidence between states or group of states and allow progress 
towards that goal. Confidence building measures, such as:  
• verifiable declarations,
• voluntary actions,
• changes in state doctrines,
• irreversible destruction of equipment,
• facilities or testing sites,
• disposition of fissile material stocks no longer needed for defense purpose, and
• removal of nuclear warheads, with ad hoc visits
could all efficiently contribute to the establishment of a climate conducive to progress, as stated by 
UNSCR 1887 Preamble, unanimously adopted by heads of state.4 
Over the last thirty years, a renewed nuclear landscape has emerged in uncertain strategic 
environment, with new actors and new threats and a higher risk of nuclear use. Global Strategic 
Stability is more and more elusive and fragile.5  Any progress expected in nuclear disarmament should 
proceed stepwise carefully taking into account the strategy, policy, doctrines, regional or international 
context, culture, military capacity, compliance with existing instruments, and nuclear capacities, both 
military and civilian, of the states involved. This does not mean that ultimately, everything should or 
could be verified but the whole system should be considered. 
If these conditions are met, nuclear disarmament will proceed steadily, slowly and stepwise. 
Unfortunately, these conditions are not met currently and there is little hope they will be in foreseeable 
future, as relations with Russia are worsening. China continues to build up its military nuclear 
capacities and to manifest tendencies to regional hegemony. Tensions between India and Pakistan 
did not subside. In the Middle East, the nuclear deal with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) 
and its verification protocol bring some hope of removing the risk of a nuclear capable Iran 
(temporarily?). But tensions are still very high and Israel does not appear to be ready to make any 
move to drop its nuclear guard. 
This pessimistic picture of the international context prevents progress in nuclear disarmament and 
related verification. Progress will only occur if policy-makers feel it's in their country's national interest. 
It will only happen when political and security conditions enable it to happen6. Transparent, verifiable 
and irreversible nuclear disarmament complemented with credible disarmament measures in all other 
fields, such as conventional forces, missile defense and space and backed up by a fair and efficient 
verification regime taking into account all aspects of state's security, complemented by confidence 
building measures, is the key to movement towards disarmament.  
Today the landscape is a mix of hope and pessimism. On one hand, no new progress advancing 
international instruments has been seen.  We are still waiting for some major steps towards a future 
global nuclear disarmament, such as entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) and the continuation of negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, the multinational fora for disarmament negotiations, has 
produced no major progress for almost two decades. The fact that some nuclear powers keep 
modernizing their strategic forces and some continue to increase their nuclear arsenal (India7, 
Pakistan8, China?9) shows more is still needed to achieve the common goal of a global nuclear 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
219
disarmament. CTBT cannot enter-into-force until major nuclear players as USA, China, India, Pakistan 
Iran, Israel and North Korea (DPRK) ratify the treaty10. Although important work was conducted in 
2014-2015, negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapon 
(FMCT or cut-off treaty) have not yet re-started at the CD.  
On the other hand, there has been significant progress in recent years. France and UK announced 
reductions of their nuclear arsenals and put forward transparency measures11.  France closed the 
South Pacific test site and begun dismantling its nuclear weapons fissile material production facilities. 
New START, the Treaty between the US and Russian on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms has entered into force. No further reduction of fissile material 
available for nuclear weapons has been announced, after the significant reductions undertaken by US 
and Russia. 
2. Setting the Scene
The linkage between nuclear disarmament verification and strategic postures, nuclear deterrence 
doctrines and military capabilities is evolving so the strategic context becomes more elusive and 
complex. Since the end of World War II we have seen that military dimensions, verification processes, 
improvement in the security context and confidence between states are closely interlinked and can 
only proceed together.  
Growth of nuclear arsenals12: In the aftermath of the Second World War, the direct confrontation of 
both Western and Communist blocs triggered and fueled considerable growth in the US and former 
Soviet Union's nuclear arsenals. This was seen during Cuba missile crisis which brought the world to 
the edge of a nuclear war.  During this period, United Kingdom, France and China acquired nuclear 
status and began to develop their own nuclear military capabilities, albeit much smaller than those of 
the US and USSR. After several setbacks (e.g. Vietnam, Suez, etc.) these states chose not be 
completely dependent on the two superpowers.  The possession of nuclear weapons gave them the 
political and strategic stature needed, in particular to become members of the UN Security Council.  
At the same time, several other states, some very close to the nuclear threshold, concluded that their 
security would be better without nuclear weapons and renounced them.13 Others renounced 
possession of nuclear weapons and campaigned for nuclear disarmament while choosing to be 
sheltered under the nuclear umbrella of one or other of the superpowers (e.g. NATO members, Japan, 
Korea under the American umbrella, members of the Warsaw Pact under the Soviet Union).  This 
complicates the military dimensions of nuclear arms reduction talks.  
• Fissile Materials & Technology control: Very soon after the end of World War II, the US
became aware of the risk the diffusion of nuclear material and the uncontrolled spread of nuclear
technology. As the USSR developed their nuclear capability, they gradually came to share this
view. The fear of the huge destructive power of nuclear weapons raised the vital need to block
their dissemination. This required the control of the spread of sensitive materials and
technologies without hindering peaceful applications of nuclear energy. This "fearful dilemma"
inspired the speech of President Eisenhower "Atoms for Peace" (December 1953)14 and gave
birth to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)15.  The treaty establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC, 1957), known as "EURATOM treaty." require, inter alia, the
application of nuclear safeguards to all members of EU whatever their nuclear status16 (contrary
to IAEA safeguards which were applied only to non-nuclear weapons states, unless volunteered
by a nuclear weapons state)
• De-escalation: After the Cuban missile crisis (1962), the world, and in particular the two
superpowers became concerned with the risk of a a global nuclear war being triggered by a local
crisis. US and USSR began talks on mutual reduction of their arsenals and limiting nuclear testing
in the atmosphere. The first agreement was a treaty banning all nuclear weapons test detonations
in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater environments, allowing continued underground
testing (PTBT, 1963 see, section 4). Abolition of underground testing was addressed by the
CTBT 30 years later. By then, the establishment of a verification system of controls and mutual
inspections for underground explosions had been negotiated between the USSR and Western
countries. The competing requirements of security and confidentiality were already clear when
considering the means to detect and evaluate suspicious events.
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• Proliferation awareness: After the accession of UK, France and China to nuclear status, it
appeared that other countries were seeking to acquire nuclear weapons increasing the risk of
regional nuclear conflict. "There are indications because of new inventions, that 10, 15, or 20
nations could have a nuclear capacity, including Red China, by the end of the Presidential office
in 1964. This is extremely serious. I think the fate not only of our own civilization, but I think the
fate of world and the future of the human race is involved in preventing a nuclear war."17
Discussions in Conference on Disarmament, established under UN auspices in Geneva to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, resulted in the adoption of the Treaty of the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT, 1970). This is the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament
and nonproliferation and intended to close the door to the “nuclear club” while allowing the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Only the five members having already detonated a nuclear
weapon would have the legal right to possess them (US, USSR (later Russia), UK, France and
China). Any other nation that tested a nuclear weapon after entry into force of the NPT has been
accepted as a Nuclear Weapons State.
• Post-NPT era (1970-1990): During the Cold War, the main concerns were that the arms race
between the US and USSR increased nuclear arsenals, improved nuclear weapons (yield,
penetration, hardening of nuclear warheads, development of multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicle (MIRV), decoys, maneuverable warhead, stealth warhead) and improved the
ability to deliver the weapons (precision, range, discretion of strategic bombers, Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) systems). The risk of mutual annihilation was so high that the two super powers concluded
agreements for limitation of and reduction of strategic arms (SALTs and START treaties,
respectively - see section 4). The number of nuclear weapons in the world had peaked at
approximately 70,300 in 1986 but began to decline significantly, in particular after the end of the
Cold War. The number decreased to an estimated 15,350 by early-2016. An overwhelming
portion of the reduction happened in the 1990s as show in Fig. 1. Since then, the pace
of reduction has slowed significantly18.
In the two decades between the entry into force of the NPT and the collapse of the USSR, some
important events regarding disarmament and non-proliferation occurred.  In 1972 SALT I entered
into force19. In 1974, with a nuclear test, India demonstrated its possession of nuclear weapons.
In response, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created to limit the export of nuclear
equipment, materials or technology. The 70'S and 80's saw the strengthening of the non-
proliferation regime.
Fig.1 The number of nuclear weapons in the world has declined significantly 
since the Cold War (credit FAS/CSIS) 20 
• Post-cold war era (1990-2010): Progress during the first years following the collapse of USSR
stalled during the late 1990’s and the international context worsened. Some positive progresses
were recorded but they were counterbalanced at the same time by negative steps as serious
nuclear crisis just started, inter alia:
• Important progress in nuclear disarmament with START II (1992) and several
agreements between USA and Russia.
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• Start of the discussion for an FMCT (1992)
• Adoption of the CTBT (1996)
• Indian and Pakistan test nuclear weapons (1998)
• Proliferation crisis with the discovery of nuclear weapons program of North Korea,
Iraq, Libya and Iran
• Adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol which from the disclosure of Iraq
clandestine nuclear weapons program
• Iran non-proliferation crisis (2002) and disclosure of its nuclear weapons program
• Reinforcement of export control: NSG issues the double-use items list and
strengthened if after the unveiling of A.Q. Khan Proliferation's network (2004).
• North Korea nuclear tests (2006, 2009, 2013, 2016 (2 tests)
• Current context: since the 2000's there has not been much progress on nuclear disarmament
agreements. The only significant advance was the conclusion of the New START treaty which
entered into force in February 2011.  It replaced the expired START and included a modified
inspection and verification regime. In 2002, the Moscow Treaty (SORT) was agreed but it did not
provide for any verification measures.  It was terminated21 when New START entered-into-force
in 2011. New START limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550, and the
number of deployed and non-deployed inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers,
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments to 800. The CTBT has not yet entered-into-force because a requisite number of
required countries have not yet ratified. However the International Monitoring System (IMS), built
to verify the treaty, is over 80% completed and operational.
Possible negotiations to ban fissile material production for nuclear weapon (Fissile Material Cut-
off treaty) were attempted several times but quickly extinguished in the blocked Conference on
Disarmament. Treaty text proposals of have been tabled, in particular by France, but to-date the
Conference did not moved forward.22 Nevertheless, important work, undertaken in the framework
of the Governmental Group of Experts (GGE: 2014-2015, see section 4),23 prepares the ground
for future negotiations of a cut-off treaty.
A key accomplishment was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreed between
Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US) and the European
Union, in July 2015.24. This ended the crisis triggered by the discovery of an Iranian nuclear
weapons program in 2002 and the inability of the IAEA to inspect Iranian suspected facilities.
IAEA is committed to making a contribution to nuclear disarmament. The IAEA Department of
Safeguards Strategic Plan commits to:  "Contribute to nuclear arms control and disarmament, by
responding to requests for verification and other technical assistance associated with related
agreements and arrangements" and by preparing to play an active role in the verification of a
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty when and if it enters into force.
3. Military dimensions of nuclear disarmament
The military dimension in the nuclear disarmament negotiation process involves all features of the 
military nuclear complex: doctrines, research & development, production capacity, military nuclear fuel 
cycle, fissile materials and equipment, testing facilities and sites, means of delivery, nuclear strategic 
and non-strategic forces, conventional forces, and deployment of nuclear weapons. It must also take 
into account the existing nuclear disarmament commitments and the associated verification regimes, 
which are a very complex pattern of commitments.25  
Existing Commitments: A state’s membership in regional and/or international agreements influences 
its military stance with respect to nuclear disarmament verification. It adds a regional, multinational 
and international complexity that must be addressed.
Nuclear weapons control agreements can be organized into four interlinked categories. These non 
comprehensive reviews of regional, multinational and international agreements, that relate to nuclear 
weapons, include those in-force, expected to enter-in-force soon, and pending negotiation. 
• Treaties limiting nuclear weapons testing: Historically nuclear weapon testing treaties
were the first to be negotiated. The CTBT (1996) was preceded by several treaties limiting 
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nuclear testing capacity. Partial Test Ban Treaty between USA, USSR and UK (PTBT, 1963) 
allowed only underground testing. Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon 
Tests, between USA and USSR also known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT, 1974) 
capped the yield to 150kt. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, 1996) which forbids 
all nuclear weapon test explosion is not yet into force as the ratification of several annex II 
countries required for entry into force are still missing.26 The CTBT is equipped with a very 
comprehensive and efficient monitoring and verification system which is almost completed.  
• Treaties preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The keystone of the
nonproliferation regime is the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1970) which limits the number of
countries which have legally the right to possess nuclear weapon to the five countries which
carried out a nuclear weapon test before the 1st January 1967. Countries which tested
nuclear weapons after this date as India Pakistan and the Democratic People Republic of
Korea (DPRK) could not accede to the NPT without renoucing their nuclear weapons. Israel
is presumed to have nuclear weapons but never officially acknowledge it. Some other
countries host foreign nuclear weapons and some other had in the past nuclear weapons but
have renounced to them. Figure 2 presented a comprehensive overview of countries status
regarding nuclear weapons.
In coherence with the NPT countries of a same region gathered to ban nuclear weapon 
through Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties and negotiated Security Assurances to 
prevent the use of nuclear weapons against them27. For the implementation of article IV of 
the NPT regarding peaceful uses of nuclear technology Export Control regimes (e.g. Zangger 
Committee, NSG (Dual use items 1992),Wassenaar) have been set by concerned group of 
nuclear countries 
Map of nuclear-armed states of the world. 
 NPT-designated nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States) 
 Other states with nuclear weapons (India, North Korea, Pakistan) 
 Other states presumed to have nuclear weapons (Israel)  
 NATO nuclear weapons sharing states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey) 
 States formerly possessing nuclear weapons (Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Ukraine) 
Fig. 2 List of states with nuclear weapons (From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_with_nuclear_weapons) 
In accordance with Article VI of the NPT, any instrument, whether a treaty, a convention or an agreement 
contributing to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament should be "in principle" universal, non-discriminatory, 
multilateral, internationally and effectively verifiable. Such an instrument would have considerable impact on the 
international and regional strategic context. A verification protocol, along with transparency and confidence 
building measures, will be a key element. It must maintain a delicate balance of upholding Article I of the NPT to 
prevent proliferation of confidential data and technologies to non-nuclear weapon states (inter alia the limitation of 
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access to knowledge, know-how and technologies through managed access) and allowing for the necessary 
transparency provide assurances of compliance and confidence in the implementation of the instrument to all 
parties. 
• Treaties reducing strategic forces and nuclear weapons arsenals28,29: Strategic offensive
arms agreements between, USA and USSR (and then Russia) provide a great deal of
negotiation and implementation experiences on mutual verification systems, technologies,
inspections, managed access, and data exchange which may be useful for any future
disarmament agreement negotiations  Agreements related to strategic weapons systems are:
 SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1969),  
 SALT II (1972) START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 1991),  
 START II (1992 not entered-into-force), START III Framework (1997), SORT 
(Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty or Moscow Treaty, 2002),  
 New START between the United States and Russia (2011).   
 Nonstrategic Nuclear Arms Control: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF 
Treaty; 1987). 
Treaties to control production of fissile material for nuclear weapons: Since the end of the 
cold war, important efforts to reduce available fissile material stocks for use in nuclear 
weapons have been completed through voluntary measures. Most of nuclear countries have 
declared a moratorium on production and some have irreversibly dismantled their production 
facilities. As of January 2015, the global stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is 
estimated to be about 1370 ± 125 tons. The global stockpile of separated plutonium is about 
500 tons (270 in civilian custody). Most of this material (>93%) is hold by USA and Russia30 
(Fig 3). Fissile material disposition instruments includes (inter alia): 
 Fissile materials declared no longer needed for defense purpose31 
 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and update 
 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT negotiation not started yet. Nevertheless, 
some work has been done in the framework of the Group of Governmental Experts 
(GGE32) 
Fig 3: Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium Inventories, 2015 
(Credit: Institute for Science and international Security (ISIS))33 
4. A brief review of the components of the military dimension:
• Doctrines, posture and deterrence: a nuclear country’s policy on the use of nuclear
weapons and conventional forces is very important. It indicates the role that weapons play in
maintaining the status and the global image of a state34 and reflects the state’s perception of
the role that nuclear weapons play in ensuring national security and defense capacity, in the
context of its international policy. Most of the nuclear countries publish their nuclear doctrine.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an alliance relying on the nuclear capacity of
three of its members, has also published its doctrine. It covers a large array of complex
positions from "no first use" of China) to the deterrence (France, India) and the preemptive
strike against a major conventional attack or a non-conventional aggression (chemical, bio,
cyber, etc.). Nuclear and military doctrines are major elements to take into account when
considering disarmament verification.
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• Military nuclear fuel cycle: the extend (i.e. from mine to weapon) and the development (i.e.
advanced enrichment methods) of the military nuclear fuel cycle determines the capacity of a
state to resume or cover clandestine activities.
• Fissile materials: production and/or acquisition of weapon grade fissile materials (highly
enriched uranium or plutonium) are a mandatory step in nuclear weapon development
process. Putting an end to this stage of weapons manufacturing is the keystone of nuclear
arms control and ultimately elimination. It would encompass the control of fissile materials
production for nuclear weapons: enrichment, reprocessing, and other processes. A future cut-
off treaty, equipped with an efficient verification process, would be the tool to master that
stage. Absent a treaty, another way to manage the stocks of fissile material, would be to
irreversibly place the disposition of fissile material no longer needed for defense purposes
(fissile materials in excess of defines needs) under safeguards.
• Testing: testing is the ultimate stage in the nuclear weapons research and development
process before militarization, therefore prohibiting nuclear testing is important when moving
towards nuclear disarmament. Except for DPRK, all NPT and non-NPT nuclear weapon
states have declared or applied a de facto moratorium of testing.  In the continuity of previous
nuclear testing agreements (Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Threshold Test Ban Treaty) a
CTBT banning any nuclear testing has been adopted and is pending ratification of the US,
China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Israel.  It includes a monitoring and verification system (IMS
& OSI). Definite closure of nuclear test sites and associated facilities are also important
signals that countries are moving towards nuclear disarmament. To-date, only France and the
UK have completed this step.
• Nuclear weapons arsenals: transparency of nuclear arsenal composition is also a key
element of progress towards nuclear disarmament. The arsenals of the US and Russia have
been declared and considerably downsized within the implementation of bilateral arms control
reduction treaties (see section 4). France and the UK have also completed significant
downsizing and declared the size and the composition of their arsenals. Published
evaluations of India35, Pakistan36 and China3738 indicate they are increasing their arsenal.
• Nuclear strategic and non-strategic forces/Means of delivery versus conventional
forces: the size, composition and technological advance of strategic, non-strategic (tactical or
theater nuclear weapons) and conventional forces, means of delivery, ground and submarine
missiles and cruise missiles, military satellites, radar networks, etc. will influence the
disarmament process. Some less advanced countries may maintain a small nuclear capability
(i.e . Pakistan vs India or in the past NATO vs USSR) for national security purposes.
• Former verification experiences: Previous nuclear weapon dismantlement verification
exercises provide a great deal of experience in verification processs, development and
implementation of ad hoc technologies, military aspects, confidentiality issues, managed
access, confidence building measures and mutual verification. Some former experiences are:
- Early days field test 34 (1967) 
- Threshold Test Ban Treaty US-USSR mutual verification (1974) 
- Black Sea US-USSR joint experiment (1989) 
- DoE studies (1996-1997) 
- Trilateral initiative (US-Russia, IAEA 1996-2002) 
- Bilateral arm reduction treaties between USA and Russia START (1991) and 
New START (2010) 
- UK-Norway initiative 
- Other experiences as INF treaty (Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range 
Missiles, 1987) or Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty (CFE 1972) has 
also to be taken into account…
The role of the IAEA in the verification process: The IAEA is the multinational organization 
that carries out verification of compliance assessment for NPT commitments Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zone agreements and other related agreements, through a complex and efficient system of 
safeguards.  Based on its statutes, the IAEA had not invested in the disarmament verification until 
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proliferation crises (listed below) and nuclear weapons fissile material disposition initiatives drove 
the Agency to focus on these issues: 
 DPRK (North Korea ; agreed framework) 
 Iraq (IAEA): Action Team then INVO  
 Iran – P5 +1 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action JCPOA), 
 Libya and A. Q. Khan nuclear black market network 
Since the United Nations Security Council entrusted the Director General of the IAEA verification 
of the nuclear part of the disarmament of Iraq, the position of the Agency evolved. . Building on 
the skills acquired on these issues and the implementation of the Additional Protocol, the IAEA is 
positioned to play an important role in the verification of future disarmament agreements such as 
the verification of a cut-off treaty39. The Agency is staffed by international civil servants 
representing the Member State from both NPT Nuclear and Non-nuclear Weapons States. This 
introduces both proliferation and security concerns with designing a verification regime run by the 
IAEA. It has not been universally agreed that the IAEA has the resources or mandate to continue 
to support the world community in this way but it is likely to play a pivotal role  
5. Conclusion/ future prospects
Reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons is not likely to occur in a foreseeable future. The 
international, regional and national security context is deteriorating and confidence is lacking.  So 
there is no incentive for countries possessing nuclear weapons to disarm. After a long period 
comprising of a mix of fruitful dialog and chaotic confrontations resulting in a large decrease of 
arsenals, strategic forces and fissile material stocks, the relationship between the US and Russia is 
getting more and more difficult. Russia does not appear to be interested in the results achieved during 
1990-2010 and is modernizing its strategic forces. An increasingly aggressive strategy to rebuild its 
lost empire is being implemented.  US-China relations are also deteriorating, as China continues to 
develop its nuclear arsenal and rapidly modernizing its strategic forces to support its expansionist 
policies.  Antagonism between India and Pakistan continues at a high level. Both countries continue to 
produce fissile materials for weapons, increasing the number of nuclear warhead and improving their 
means of delivery. The security situation in the South Asia remains very tense as India, Pakistan, 
USA, China and Russia confront instable alliances and antagonism. 
In the last decades, the UK and France40 have made very important and unprecedented efforts 
towards nuclear disarmament by downsizing their arsenal and decommissioning and closing critical 
facilities as nuclear test sites, plutonium production reactors, reprocessing and enrichment facilities. 
Even though negotiations with Iran on the verification of its nuclear complex's verification resulted in 
the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to monitor the absence of cover nuclear 
program, the current situation in the Middle East does not provide an incentive for Israel to lower its 
nuclear posture.  
There is still a perception that maintaining or developing nuclear weapons arsenals is needed to 
support national security.41 Any voluntary downsizing of countries nuclear posture in the legal 
framework must be balanced by the assurance that its national security interests will not be 
jeopardized but strengthened.  Nevertheless, one should be reasonably optimistic. The road to a world 
without nuclear weapons will be long, tortuous, with setbacks, but unavoidable. One of the great 
challenges to overcome will be to achieve the needed transparency, verifiability and irreversibility of 
disarmament measures.  A systematic approach that creates a climate of confidence, while taking into 
account the security interests and military dimension of all stakeholders, will greatly ease the process. 
Achieving such confidence on a national-level followed by a regional level (European, Middle East, 
South Asia and Eastern Asia) to ultimately on the international level is pivotal. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
226
6. References
1  For a discussion on how to advance in nuclear disarmament, see Marc Finaud " Cooperative Security: A new 
paradigm for a world without nuclear weapons?" Cadmus, November 2013. 
2  http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ 
3  Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2010”, Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, vol. 66, no. 4, 2010, pp. 77–83. 
4  "Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in 
accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that 
promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all". UNSCR 1887, 
24 September 2009) 
5  For a comprehensive  discussion on the future of doctrines and deterrence, see the monograph "Nuclear 
Deterrence in the 21st century, Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy" by Ms. 
Therese Delpech edited by Rand Corporation (http://www.rand.org, 2012) and the Fondation pour la 
Recherche Strategique (http://www.frstrategie.org/, 2013) published by Odile Jacob for the French version 
6  See Remarks at the Global Zero Conference, Paris February 2nd 2010, Pierre Sellal Secretary General of the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
7  http://thebulletin.org/2015/september/indian-nuclear-forces-20158728 
8  http://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Nov-Dec-Pakistan-FINAL.pdf 
9  Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces 2015,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 01 
July 2015 
10  For any information on CTBT see the CTBTO Preparatory Commission web site:  https://www.ctbto.org/ 
11 Discours sur la dissuasion nucléaire - Déplacement auprès des forces aériennes stratégiques. Istres 
http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-sur-la-dissuasion-nucleaire-deplacement-aupres-des-forces-
aeriennes-strategiques-istres-3/ 
12  See section 5 
13  Sweden, Switzerland Brazil, South Africa and many other countries started to develop a nuclear weapons 
programs in the sixties. Most ended by the time NPT started and some others much later. See Institute for 
Science and International Security (ISIS): Nuclear Weapons Programs Worldwide:  An Historical Overview 
(http://isis-online.org/nuclear-weapons-programs) 
14  United States of America President Eisenhower (1953): "Atom for Peace" speech to the United Nations 
General Assembly on the 8th December 1953 
15  Birth of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) see https://www.iaea.org/about/history. 
16 Eur-lex.europa.eu › EUROPA › EU law and publications › EUR-Lex 
17  Third Nixon-Kennedy Presidential Debate, October 13, 1960 from JFK on Nuclear Weapons and Non-
Proliferation, Proliferation Analysis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 17, 2003 
18  Chart and comment from FAS Status of World Nuclear Forces By Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris 
http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ 
19  U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ US 
RussiaNuclearAgreementsMarch2010, David Kimball 
20  Reproduction with the kind permission of FAS: .Status of World Nuclear Forces, by Hans M. Kristensen and 
Robert S. Norris, Federation of American Scientist (FAS) 
21  New START replaced the Treaty of Moscow (SORT), which ended in December 2012. It is a follow-up to 
the START I treaty, which expired in December 2009. START II treaty never entered into force and the 
negotiations of START III treaty were never concluded. 
22  Draft Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, http://www.delegfrance-cd-geneve.org/Projet-francais-de-Traite (April 
10, 2015) and CD /2020 (13 April 2015) 
23  UNGA in its resolution 67/53 (2012) requested the Secretary General to establish a Group of Governmental 
Experts. The Group was mandated to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to, but 
not negotiate, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices,1 on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. The GGE met 
over four two-week sessions in Geneva during 2014-2015 (CD /2023,24June 2015) 
24 The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United 
Kingdom, United States—plus Germany) and the European Union. 
25  For a comprehensive review of non proliferation and disarmament  instruments see the "NPT Briefing Book 
(2015 Edition and previous ones) edited by King College and Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/csss/pubs/NPT-Briefing-Book-
2015/New-sections-April-2015/NPT-BB-2015-Final-April.pdf  
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
227
26 There are eight Annex 2 States that have yet to ratify the Treaty - China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United 
States of America, which have signed the Treaty, and North Korea, India, and Pakistan, which have not 
signed. 
27 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/critical-issues/5442-negative-security-assurances 
and [29] 
28  Ibid [18] 
29  Ibid [24] Section O: Bilateral Measures – Russia-United States 
30  For the actual status of fissile material disposition see "Global Fissile Material Report 2015" International 
Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM). 
31  Verified and irreversible elimination of weapon usable nuclear material is one of the essential elements of the 
nuclear disarmament effort. The Action  Plan adopted at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
Review Conference calls on nuclear-weapon states "to declare fissile material designated as no longer 
required for military purposes, and to place this material under safeguards to ensure that  it remains 
permanently outside military programmes" 2010 NPT Action Plan, action 16. 
32 Ibid 22 
33 Reproduction with the kind permission of D. Albright, Director of ISIS. 
34  For a discussion on doctrines and their roles vis-a vis nuclear disbarment see the Foreword by Academician 
Alexander A. Dynkin at the Conference “Contemporary Nuclear Doctrines” Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations/Russian Academy of Sciences and Nuclear Threat Initiative. Moscow 2010 and ibid 9 
chapter 3. 
35  Indian nuclear forces, 2015/Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris/ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
2015, Vol. 71(5) 77–83 
36  Pakistani nuclear forces, 2015/ Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris/Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
0(0) 1–8 
37  Chinese nuclear forces, 2016/ Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris/Nuclear Note Book/ 3 July 2016 
38  China's Strategic Forces in the 21st Century: The PLA's Changing Nuclear Doctrine and Force Posture/ Dan 
Blumenthal and Michael Mazza/NonProliferation Policy Education Center/April 06, 2011 
39 See IAEA Department of Safeguards Long‐Term Strategic Plan (2012 ‐2023) "Contribute to nuclear arms 
control and disarmament, by responding to requests for verification and other technical assistance". 
https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/symposium/2014/. 
40  http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/fr... 
41  Ibid [9] Rand issue pages 36 and 38 "Ninth, short of pretending that lions and sheep should be able to lie 
together before contemplating nuclear disarmament, the political conditions for a secure nonnuclear—or at 
least less nuclear—world are considerable. Serious political efforts should therefore accompany nuclear 
weapon reductions". 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
228
We shouldn’t focus on confirming the characteristics of nuclear 
materials when looking to verify nuclear weapons 
Keir Allen 
King’s College, London 
Abstract: 
Since the early 1990s, when it was thought that negotiations for START III might take place, there has 
been an interest in verifying nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons directly, rather than verifying the 
delivery systems that had been the focus of earlier agreements. In the decades since, the technical 
arms control community has expended much effort in developing systems that might help to positively 
confirm that an item declared to be a nuclear warhead truly is one. But focusing on verifying the 
correctness of a declaration in this way conflates the scientific objective of uncovering the truth with a 
strategic objective of nuclear arms control: to maintain stable relations between treaty partners. This 
paper argues that the approach taken in focusing on correctness contributes marginally to ensuring 
overall numbers are reduced whilst threatening to complicate and delay future negotiations. 
Keywords: Arms control; verification; systems; strategy 
1. Introduction
Since the early 1990s, when it was thought that negotiations for START III might take place, there has 
been an interest in verifying nuclear warheads directly, rather than verifying the delivery systems that 
had been the focus of previous iterations of the strategic arms reduction treaties.  
In handing over the requirement to verify warhead stockpiles and warhead destruction to the technical 
community, a lot of technical effort has been directed at the perceived problem of verifying that items 
declared to be warheads truly are warheads. But the approach taken by the technical community does 
not align well with the strategic aims of arms control and could be an inadvertent complication to the 
establishment verification mechanisms for future arms control agreements. 
This paper will review the use of positive confirmation and the technologies developed to achieve it. It 
will then discuss the strategic impetus behind the development and evolution of nuclear weapons 
arsenals and will argue that the assumptions underpinning the positive contribution approach to 
warhead verification may not be suitable when directed at weapons stockpiles that evolved under the 
influence of competitive and expensive deterrence relationships. Finally it will outline how more 
systematic approaches to nuclear stockpile verification could maintain stability whilst progress is made 
towards lower numbers of weapons. Because of this, a systematic approach could provide a better 
means for identifying strategic technical verification requirements.  
2. Positive confirmation
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For treaties involving the verification of nuclear warheads, suggested solutions often include the need 
to verify that an item declared to be a warhead truly is one. This seems to make sense: If a state is 
submitting nuclear weapons for monitoring under an agreement, then the other parties may wish to 
ensure that the state really does submit its nuclear arsenal and not something else. If the other party 
cannot confirm that that the items are nuclear weapons, then the concern may arise that the state is 
secretly withholding weapons in order to gain a later advantage.     
The act of verifying that a nuclear weapon truly is one is complicated by states’ national security 
priorities and nonproliferation obligations: nuclear weapons possessing states are extremely cautious 
about sharing any weapon design information either amongst themselves or with others. It is further 
complicated by the fact that a nuclear weapon is the product of advanced design and engineering and 
so there is no one design solution to which all weapons conform. Positive confirmation is complex 
because nuclear weapons characteristics vary and states are unwilling (and unable) to discuss the 
characteristics of their particular systems beyond.  
The technical solutions often proposed for overcoming these challenges broadly fall into one of two 
types of system: Attribute confirmation systems and template matching systems.  
2.1. Attribute systems 
Attribute confirmation systems are typically designed based on the assumption that certain design 
characteristics of a weapons system would be disclosed by a state entering into an arms control 
agreement. Such characteristics may include the type of fissile material contained in the weapons, the 
isotopic ‘grade’ of the material, and perhaps other details [1]. Attribute systems perform an analysis of 
the declared item based on detectable characteristic signatures to ensure that the item correctly meets 
expectations of what a nuclear weapon is.  
2.1. Template systems 
Template matching systems seek to confirm that one object matches another object declared to be of 
the same type. One object is chosen as the reference object and provides the template. Often the 
template is provided by radiation produced by the fissile material that is assumed to be in the weapon 
system, though this need not necessarily be the case. All other systems of the same type are 
expected to conform to the reference object and are subject to comparison with it [2]. Only systems of 
the same type should correctly match the template. Radiation detection statistics, changes in object 
configuration or changes in the measurement environment may all effect the results of the 
comparison.  
Either type of system, without further consideration, could facilitate the disclosure of sensitive 
information. In order to prevent this from happening the systems are commonly conceived of operating 
in conjunction with an information barrier. An information barrier acts as a filter, allowing only the 
agreed information about the item to be assessed.  
The reliance of both types of system on the assumption (and declaration) of the presence of fissile 
material with particular characteristics could create complications for the use of such systems in 
future. States might be very reluctant to provide even general declaration that covers design 
characteristics of their stockpiles because the secrecy over weapon design details extends to stockpile 
characteristics. The next sections explore why this might be the case. 
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3. Deterrence and stockpile evolution
The nuclear weapon stockpiles of the nuclear weapons possessing state have evolved in response to 
developments in the arsenals of other nuclear weapons possessing states, with each trying to ensure 
they can deter at least the state they each perceive to be their most significant threat.  
Deterrence is a political tool: To deter requires an aggressive adversary to believe that the possessor 
state has the means to retaliate to an extent that the costs of aggression would outweigh any gains 
made by being aggressive. The important factor in a deterrent relationship is credibility: each side 
must believe the other is capable of retaliation. Each of the nuclear weapon possessing states has 
established their own credibility via nuclear weapons tests and delivery vehicle development 
programs. 
A stable relationship of mutual deterrence requires the parties to continue to believe each possesses a 
credible stockpile that is invulnerable to a first strike. At least in part, the overall size of the stockpile 
may well contribute to credibility and invulnerability. Certainly parity in overall stockpile size has been 
an important aspect of the relationship between the US and Russia. Other states may also determine 
their own requirements for overall stockpile size at least in part by assessing the size of adversaries’ 
capabilities. Nevertheless, not mean that items professed to be weapons necessarily are. 
In a deterrent relationship there are potential benefits to be gained from inflating a capability, for 
instance, by maintaining an appearance of strength even if it is only a facade. If deterrence fails, the 
target of an attack suffers equally whether they retaliate with nuclear weapons or not. A cost effective 
means of deterring is therefore attractive. If the appearance of strength is enough to deter an 
aggressor then the facade fulfils its purpose and is more cost effective than investing in real systems. 
Since the Greeks used a wooden horse to defeat Troy, subterfuge and deception have been used for 
strategic advantage. During the early nuclear age, the Soviet Union used deception to inflate the 
apparent size of its strategic bomber fleet [3] Later, Soviet leader, Khrushchev also encouraged the 
perception of Soviet superiority in numbers of intercontinental ballistic missile systems by boasting that 
Soviet factories “were turning out missiles like sausages”[4]. He explained his reasons for doing so, 
saying “the number of missiles we had wasn’t important… The important thing was that Americans 
believed in our power” [4]. Deception by capability inflation has therefore been present in nuclear 
dynamics and the concept of strategic deception could be extended to stockpiles of nuclear weapons. 
States might have taken a decision to inflate the size of their nuclear weapons stockpiles in order to 
maintain the perception of strength in a cost effective manner. Objects that did not in reality meet the 
design criteria of the items they were professed to be, could nonetheless help create the appearance 
of strength so long as they looked similar enough to fully developed systems. 
3.1. Strategic stability and arms control 
To date, nuclear weapons arms control agreements have been designed to maintain stability even as 
numbers of deployed strategic systems have been reduced. This has been achieved by focusing on 
the completeness of states’ declarations rather than the correctness, i.e. the focus has been on 
ensuring the agreed limit of weapons is not exceeded, not that items that fall within the limit truly are 
nuclear weapons. A focus on completeness makes sense since the worst case scenario for which 
each state needs to plan for its own deterrence purposes is the scenario in which all items within their 
adversaries’ stockpile truly are nuclear weapons. 
This description is a simplified model of the dynamic nuclear relationship between states, but is 
sufficient for the purposes of this paper. Arms control agreements and their associated verification 
methods should maintain the stability of the relationship between adversaries whilst that relationship 
remains one based upon deterrence. Anything that revealed that a state was less strong that it 
professed to be could be destabilizing. 
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4. Positive confirmation and instability
A potential challenge to the inclusion of positive confirmation measurements in future nuclear 
weapons treaties is that they could undermine stability. By positively testing the design details of 
individual systems, overall stockpile characteristics could be revealed which could undermine the 
credibility of the state’s stockpile or make the option of a preemptive strike more attractive to an 
aggressor.  
For instance, one could imagine a state having inflated its stockpile with deceptive non-weapons 
objects in order to look strong. Deceptive objects might contain no fissile material of the assumed or 
expected grade. The use of attribute measurements systems designed to test for the presence of such 
attributes would therefore reveal the fact that the state maintains some number of fake objects. 
Positive measurement in this case could therfore undermine the overall credibility of that states’ 
stockpile, or make it appear more vulnerable to first strike. The stability of the relationship between the 
state and its adversary could be adversely effected. Where the perception of parity is important in the 
relationship, this dynamic would be effected negatively.  
Clearly the situation described would be unacceptable to a state negatively affected by the proposal to 
disclose any such design information and so any proposal to use positive confirmation measurements 
would no doubt be vetoed.  
Furthermore, though such a revelation may not prove disconcertingly destabilizing, the state may 
consider any such admission to be humiliating and so may find any such verification methods 
unacceptable for this reason.  
Similarly, the use of template based confirmation systems could require states to first declare 
distinctions between stockpile items that had previously been deployed under a single identity or 
designation. Such a distinction could again reveal stockpile characteristics that could undermine the 
stability of the relationship between adversaries. Additionally, if a template measurement is proposed 
in order to increase confidence in the nuclear nature of a declared weapon, then the positive presence 
of some nuclear attributes must first be confirmed before a template is generated. This is because a 
template on its own will be generated whether those attributes are present or not. In such a situation, 
the same conditions would be present as when attribute confirmation systems are proposed. 
A state could choose not to make any such declarations about its stockpile, but each time a result did 
not meet the expectations of the other side the relationship between the states involved could suffer 
and deteriorate.  
The use of either attribute or template systems to positively confirm items as nuclear weapons could 
therefore prove to be destabilizing and unacceptable to states whilst they still rely on nuclear weapons 
for deterrence purposes.  
Of course, it might be the case that all nuclear weapon states have been transparent throughout the 
evolution of their stockpiles and have only ever deployed genuine weapons. In this case, there should 
be fewer concerns about revealing stockpile characteristics and the theoretical challenge outlined 
above will be insignificant. But if it is acknowledged that positive confirmation approaches could tend 
towards being destabilizing, then it might be better to develop other means of verifying future nuclear 
arms control agreements.  
5. A strategic-stability focused, systems assessment approach
Positive confirmation approaches to nuclear arms control verification potentially face a significant 
challenge to being accepted in future nuclear arms control negotiations because they could destabilize 
relationships by revealing characteristics of states’ overall stockpiles that could undermine their 
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deterrent effects whilst they were still relied upon to deter. However, such measurements may not be 
necessary and other means of verifying nuclear arms control agreements whilst maintaining stability 
can be extrapolated from the past.  
In order to systematically reduce stockpiles a valuable approach is to continue along the lines laid out 
by previous nuclear arms control agreements, where completeness of a declaration is prioritized over 
correctness. Under such arrangements items declared to be nuclear weapons (or fissile components 
of nuclear weapons) could be treated as such and placed under controls or monitoring tailored to a 
specific agreement; until such time as the agreement ends or states no longer require nuclear 
weapons. The approach engenders stability because it maintains the ambiguity regarding stockpile 
and design characteristics that contribute to the maintenance of credibility whilst allowing states to be 
prepared against the worst case scenario.  
By default, all items declared to be nuclear weapons are treated as nuclear weapons. Over time the 
absence of any undeclared stockpiles that could meaningfully effect the stability of the deterrent 
relationship between adversaries would be assured, and so this approach would provide the 
transparency and predictability necessary for states to incrementally reduce overall stockpile sizes.  
The reality of the configuration of each individual system is of less importance. Eventually all 
stockpiles reduce in size whilst aggressors are deterred from using force by the possibility that the 
others stockpile consists solely of nuclear weapons.    
This approach certainly has logistical challenges, but the challenges would all exist whether the 
‘correctness’ of a declaration was tested or not – since completeness will need to be assured no 
matter what. At the same time, a focus on completeness would reduce the perceived acuteness of 
challenges such as initiating objects declared weapons into a verification process since any item 
declared would count towards the agreed limit. Nonetheless it may be technically easier to verify that 
an item declared not to be a warhead is not one, than trying to prove the a warhead is a warhead 
6. Conclusion
There is a popular desire to confirm that items declared to be nuclear weapons contain fissile 
materials with certain characteristics. However, such an approach could reveal more about overall 
weapons stockpiles than proponents of the method would advocate. Such revelations could 
destabilize relationships based upon nuclear deterrence and thus could well be voted if proposed 
during future nuclear arms control discussions. At the same time, such methods are neither sufficient 
nor necessary for controlling any fissile materials contained within nuclear weapons stockpiles and 
thus contribute marginally to verifying that overall stockpiles of weapons are reduced. Instead, the 
technical nuclear arms control community should move beyond a focus on the nuclear part of nuclear 
weapons verification and consider strategically and systematically what it is verification systems will 
need to achieve in future. One day, it will be important to verify that all fissile material that was once 
used in nuclear weapons is placed under monitored conditions. But verifying military stockpiles of 
fissile material is not the same as using fissile material as a proxy for verifying nuclear weapons. 
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Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement: Joining Dots 
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Abstract: 
The sensitivity around nuclear weapons and weapons materials means that measurement by inspectors 
providing strong confirmation that a declared item is in fact a nuclear explosive device may be impossibly 
intrusive.  Analysis of this challenge is one focus for the International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament 
Verification (IPNDV) which is now in its second year of substantive work to outline the objectives, methods 
and technology for verifying future steps toward nuclear disarmament. 
A consequence of this problem is that an effective regime to verify the dismantlement of nuclear warheads 
cannot rely only on inspectors monitoring a dismantlement procedure.  Verification of a future treaty 
commitment to dismantle warheads as a step toward nuclear disarmament will need to build assurance of 
compliance by tying together a series of observations, both within and beyond the dismantlement process, 
many of which could be quite disparate and disconnected.  It may be that only by monitoring multiple steps 
towards nuclear disarmament, potentially over many years, will it be possible for a verification regime to 
offer fully adequate assurance.   
Keywords: nuclear; weapons; disarmament; verification  
1. Introduction
The verification of the dismantlement of a nuclear warhead under any international system comprises two 
seemingly intractable challenges: the inspector must have high confidence that the inspected item is in fact 
a nuclear warhead; and, the host (i.e. the holder of the nuclear warhead) must have high confidence that 
the inspector has not accidentally or deliberately acquired some knowledge of the classified attributes of the 
warhead – a confidence-secrecy trade-off. The challenge to achieving this trade-off is to develop 
measurement technologies (combinations of hardware and software) that can measure or confirm key 
attributes of warheads, and can be authenticated and certified to ensure that there are no accidental or 
deliberate backdoors through which classified information can leak1 or through which the information can 
be tampered with. And as has been recognised for a long time in other disarmament initiatives, national 
technical means (NTM) also has a role, in bridging the technical and political2.  
A future disarmament verification inspectorate should approach the task with a mindset of “trust but verify”; 
the maxim that the IAEA applies to its verification mission. What this means is that the interactions between 
the inspectorate and inspected states should be respectful and non-adversarial while still maintaining 
credible verification mechanisms to preserve international confidence in the compliance of states. With this 
in mind, the working hypothesis for the verification system would need to be that attempts to spoof or tamper 
with the inspection process, while unlikely, cannot be discounted absolutely, so a risk-based system would 
be put in place to test against this working hypothesis. This will no doubt go the other way as well. Potential 
inspected states would apply a working hypothesis that attempts by an inspector to discover classified 
information cannot be ruled out absolutely either; so the measurement system would need to minimise this 
risk as well. 
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So, what level of confidence is sufficient for both sides of this confidence-secrecy trade-off? This has both 
a technical element and an element of political judgement. The technical element comes down to what 
verification technologies can confirm attributes of a warhead (such as nuclear material isotopics, density, 
mass), how these can be used without revealing classified details of the attributes, and then what statistical 
level of confidence can be assigned to the measurement.  
The political element is the judgement of the level of confidence (for the inspectorate and host) sufficient to 
persuade decision makers to sign up to commitments. History has shown that arms control treaties can 
sometimes be contentious in national legislatures, where concerns about cheating or shortcomings (justified 
or not) can lead to a failure to ratify agreements. There is a lot at stake therefore in designing a verification 
regime that engenders as much confidence as possible in its effectiveness and robustness.  
There may be a need for different approaches to apply to different countries to take into account different 
risk profiles and circumstances. And no detection system or technical solution will be perfect, so the process 
of verifying the dismantlement of warheads cannot rest on one technology or a single inspection process 
alone. This paper will consider what is needed for the inspections, verification technology/approaches, and 
political judgement to fit together – i.e. joining the dots.  
2. History and background
The challenges with disarmament verification have been recognised for a very long time, for example going 
right back to the Charter of the League of Nations following World War 1. The negotiating parties to the 
Charter decided that the Commission in charge of advising on States’ adherence to the Charter’s 
commitments to hold armaments to a minimum, should not have inspection powers. The view at that time 
was that inspections would not be consistent with the assumption of mutual good faith on which the League 
was founded, and that it was not practical to design inspections to discover undeclared research into new 
explosive. The view was that any large-scale preparations for war could not be concealed from national 
intelligence services 3 .  Moving forward some seventy years, to earlier work on nuclear warhead 
disarmament verification, a report commissioned by the US Department of Defense in 1993 in relation to 
US-Russia disarmament work, Verification of Dismantlement of Nuclear Warheads and Controls on Nuclear 
Materials4, summarised the situation as: “In any conceivable dismantlement/disarmament/cut-off regime, 
verification will of necessity be less than perfect. Therefore, a decision as to whether a particular informal 
agreement, or formal treaty is in the United States national interest must rely on difficult political/strategic 
judgments, as well as technical ones, as to its risks and benefits”. The report went on to make 
recommendations that an effective monitoring system be developed that integrates both cooperative 
verification procedures between the parties and national technical means. 
The summation of the challenge outlined in that 1993 report still holds true today, but since that time some 
“real life” experience in disarmament verification has been built, and good progress has been made in some 
promising technologies and techniques. Some examples of disarmament experience include: 
 South Africa disarmament: IAEA verification in 1993 that all nuclear material inventory from South
Africa’s terminated and dismantled weapons program had been accounted for5.
 Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus disarmament: The repatriation and dismantlement to Russia in the
1990s of nuclear weapons stationed in former Soviet states of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus6.
 START I and START II: Under these treaties, the USA and Russia limited the number of deployed
nuclear weapon delivery systems and the number of warheads per system, verified under very
detailed arrangements7 for confirming the number of warheads systems are armed with.
 US-Russia HEU purchase agreement: Under this agreement concluded in 1993, Russia down-
blended 500 metric tonnes of HEU over several years for use in US commercial nuclear power
generation. This agreement included transparency measures allowing for US monitoring8.
 Fissile Material Transparency Technology Demonstration: A Los Alamos National Laboratories
demonstration to Russian officials in August 2000 of a technology for monitoring nuclear materials
removed from military programs. The demonstration measured six attributes, plutonium isotopics,
plutonium mass, absence of oxide, presence of plutonium, symmetry of plutonium package, and,
age of plutonium, using information barriers displaying a simple yes/no for each attribute8.
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 Trilateral Initiative: A joint project between the US, Russia and the IAEA from 1996-2001 that
investigated the technical, legal and financial issues associated with IAEA verification of nuclear
disarmament 9 , focussing particularly on approaches that would permit the IAEA to conduct
inspections without coming into conflict with Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)10.
 UK-Norway Initiative: A first of a kind initiative between a nuclear-weapon State and non-nuclear-
weapon State, which began in 2007, exploring issues related to nuclear disarmament such as
information barriers and managed access11.
As well as building experience in disarmament verification approaches, there have also been some 
promising developments in technologies and techniques. 
3. Disarmament verification technologies and approaches
3.1 Templates vs attributes 
There are two quite fundamentally different measurement approaches that have been explored for verifying 
nuclear warhead dismantlement without revealing sensitive, classified information. The attribute approach, 
as the name suggests, directly measures attributes of the device to assess whether it appears to be a 
warhead, but with the measurement results obscured to only reveal to the inspector that each attribute is 
within a range, or less than or more than a threshold. Essentially, the attribute approach measures some 
“soft” minimum standard agreed between the host and inspectorate as providing enough information to give 
sufficient confidence that the item measured is a warhead.  Template measurements, on the other hand, 
assess whether two items are the same by confirming there are no differences in attributes, within 
measurement tolerances. In the template approach, one item is a pre-confirmed warhead template, and the 
other a warhead candidate. In both of these measurement approaches the warhead being measured is 
obscured, for example in a sealed container, to prevent the inspector from viewing the device. This provides 
an information barrier to prevent the inspecting party from learning details of the classified attributes 
through the measurement process12.  
The attribute approach verifies intrinsic characteristics of nuclear warheads, such as: ratios of plutonium 
isotopes 240Pu to 239Pu; plutonium mass; and, symmetry of the plutonium. These can be measured either 
using passive measurement techniques (e.g. measuring characteristic gamma spectra of plutonium or 
uranium using high purity germanium detectors), or active measurement techniques (e.g. x-ray or neutron 
transmission measurements, or neutron activation analysis). Active techniques can also be used to verify 
attributes associated with components of warheads such as the presence of explosives13, or to confirm that 
the plutonium is not in the form of plutonium oxide14. The specific attributes measured are classified, so the 
system must be designed such that the inspector does not see the measurements directly. The parties 
instead must agree on unclassified threshold values that are displayed to the inspector, e.g. plutonium mass 
 2kg; and 240Pu / 239Pu ratio  0.1. Attribute measurements also require a way to authenticate the 
measurement system using a standard that isn’t itself classified. 
The template approach does not measure attributes, but rather compares the physical signature (e.g. 
radiation from the transmission of neutrons or x-rays) of an inspected item against a known standard. This 
approach can be thought of as measuring attribute deltas between two presumed identical items, rather 
than measuring the attributes themselves. For the template approach to work there needs to be multiple 
warheads of the same type, and of course the inspector must have high confidence that the item used as 
the template warhead is in fact a real warhead.  
3.2 Promising developments in template approaches 
One type of template approach proposed recently15 by researchers at the MIT Laboratory for Nuclear 
Security and Policy would radiograph a candidate warhead using transmission nuclear resonance 
fluorescence to resolve geometric and isotopic attributes, in combination with a scattering foil for the 
transmitted x-rays that serves as an encryption key. The high-energy x-ray beam used to probe the warhead 
would resolve classified details if the measurement were recorded. However, before the radiograph is 
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recorded, and therefore seen by the inspector, the x-rays scatter off an encryption foil obscuring the 
information contained. The host manufactures and supplies the encryption foil and then in coordination with 
the inspector selects a warhead from which the template measurement would be taken. The remaining 
candidate warheads would then be measured against this template measurement.      
A variation on this technique that has been developed recently by a team of researchers at Princeton 
University and Microsoft Research, is something known as a zero-knowledge proof protocol16 . Zero-
knowledge proofs were invented in the 1980s and are used in cryptographic applications such as data 
mining where privacy must be preserved17. Under this technique, a radiographic image of each candidate 
warhead is compared against the template warhead. The detector system or array of detectors used to 
construct the image would be pre-loaded with what is essentially a “negative” image (conceptually similar 
to the negatives of photographs) of the template warhead. The measurement of a candidate warhead using 
the pre-loaded detector system would therefore produce a saturated image that contains no information 
whatsoever, provided the candidate is identical to the template. The image would only contain information 
of the measured warhead if some attribute of the candidate did not match the template, in which case there 
would be information leakage on an attribute of the warhead. The risk of this is also a disincentive to trying 
to cheat the measurement.  
This approach has been developed further by the authors to use superheated emulsion bubble detectors18, 
rather than electronic detector systems, for taking a neutron radiographic profile of the inspected item. The 
“image” taken by an array of emulsion detectors, would be a count per detector of the number of 
transmission neutrons detected represented by the number of bubbles in each detector – each detector 
representing a pixel in the image array. Using a measurement technique that essentially involves counting 
bubbles, means the system is far less prone to electronic tampering by an inspector to try and reveal 
classified attributes. 
3.3 Continuity of knowledge, chain of custody 
Continuity of knowledge is a well-established concept in verification activities where the inspectorate must 
maintain confidence that an item has not been tampered with, disassembled, moved or swapped after it has 
been verified. When applied in the implementation of IAEA safeguards it refers to a combination of 
containment (e.g. using tamper-indicating seals) and surveillance (e.g. remote monitoring of an area using 
event-triggered cameras) applied to verified nuclear material. The process of maintaining continuity of 
knowledge while bringing a verified item under containment and/or surveillance would be more challenging 
than most IAEA safeguards scenarios, given the inspector cannot would have tightly constrained access to 
the item. However, once the item is in its containment vessel or box, the standard containment and 
surveillance technologies could in principle still be used.  
3.4 Initialisation problem, authentication and validation 
The difference, strengths and weaknesses between the attribute approach and template approach are being 
examined carefully in academic circles (see for example, the review article by Yan and Glaser19), The 
template approaches is generally considered to be most appropriate in a scenario where numerous 
warheads of the same type are measured; with the attribute approach more appropriate for warheads not 
of the same type but similar features. The template approach is generally considered to be the more robust 
against cheating, but is likely to be more technically challenging to implement. For example, a template-
based measurement might require very careful physical alignment whereas an attribute measurement would 
likely be less constrained.   
One issue both approaches must contend with, though to different degrees, is the “initialisation problem”: 
how can the inspector be sure that the warhead template, or set of warhead attributes are in fact 
characteristic of the candidate warheads that are to be verified? As noted above, the working hypothesis 
the inspectorate should apply is that spoofing of measurements cannot be ruled out absolutely, so the 
initialisation problem needs to be addressed in any measurement system.  
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There are some approaches that can be taken to increase the confidence of the inspector that the template 
is legitimate. To be confident that a template warhead is in fact a warhead, the inspector could randomly 
select a few warheads from the full population. To spoof this by adding some fake or incomplete warheads 
to the population, would require the gamble by the inspected party that the inspector would not choose a 
fake warhead; a likelihood that could be designed to be very small. Alternatively, the host could in principle 
spoof this with a full population of entirely fake warheads, but this is where the notion of context and use of 
NTM become invaluable (discussed further below). To be confident that no “backdoors” or modifications 
have been made to equipment used in the inspection, techniques such as “blind buying”, random selection 
and purchasing off-the-shelf hardware can be used.   This principle was incorporated in design of the next 
generation attribute measurement system (NG-AMS) by Los Alamos National Laboratories20. 
3.5 Situational context 
A potentially important concept to build confidence about the initialisation problem, is context – which could 
be formalised as a specified confidence-building measure in the treaty instrument, or could arise through 
the inspectorate building situational awareness of the environment over time. An accumulation of situational 
observations or proximate facts on the ground could build situational context collateral. This situational 
context collateral combined with the measurements themselves could be used to increase confidence.  
For example, the approach described above of randomly selecting warheads from a full population would 
be enhanced by the situational context of knowing that the warhead was chosen while present in a fleet of 
missiles. If the inspectors could not witness the removal of a warhead from a randomly selected missile, 
then some sort of tagging system could be used instead on the selected missile/warhead combination. The 
argument would be that a nuclear deterrent relies on the presence of real warheads in missiles, so a properly 
designed process of randomly selecting one or more template warheads known to have been present on a 
missile is very likely to be a real warhead. Another example is scrutinising a credible record of custody of 
the chosen template warheads. 
Baseline declarations of a nuclear weapons program and its history would also provide situational context 
which would help with verification of disarmament actions.  Information of the full lifecycle of an individual 
type of nuclear weapon and on the ways in which it was deployed would provide collateral support for the 
assertion that an item is a nuclear warhead, as well as for checking that all (or a designated fraction) of 
warheads of a certain type are being verifiably dismantled.  The history of production of fissile material by a 
state may also be useful information. In this regard, the NTI publication, “Cultivating Confidence”21 has 
proposed that: “all states with nuclear weapons could be investing in extensive research into the history of 
their nuclear programs and developing information to support initial declarations of nuclear materials 
production; warhead production, deployment, retirement, and disposition; nuclear materials production 
capabilities; and delivery systems inventories.” 
This sort of technique was used in the IAEA’s verification of the dismantlement of South Africa’s nuclear 
weapons program in 19935. Considerable effort by the inspection team was put into determining the mutual 
consistency of the inventory of nuclear installations and material, including reviewing historical operating 
records, to ensure the completeness of material being verified. The declared inventory was evaluated from 
production, import and usage records, and then compared against a calculation of the isotopic balance. This 
comparison did at first indicate a discrepancy in the quantity of high enriched uranium produced. This was 
resolved by what the inspectors described as an exhaustive examination of the performance of one of the 
enrichment plants, using thousands of operating records to model the plant on a daily basis from the 
beginning of its operation to estimate the total quantity of HEU produced from first principles. 
Another piece of context that could build confidence is the relationship between the numbers and types of 
dismantled warheads and the fissile material removed.  While this material remains in sensitive forms it 
could not easily be quantified by inspectors. However, direct measurement would be possible for nuclear 
material once brought under safeguards.  Examining the quantitative relationship between a number of 
dismantled warheads and the quantity of nuclear material resulting may raise sensitivities for an inspected 
state, but could offer useful additional assurance if an approach that respects these sensitivities can be 
found. For example, different measurement approaches that complement one another could be considered.  
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Situational context can build as the inspection and inspected party work together on developing the 
verification approaches, involving access to locations holding inspected items, and building experience over 
time through inspections. This has been the case with the work between the US and Russia on verification 
under the original and new START treaties. Another aspect of context is the use of NTM, as this also builds 
situational awareness of the environment from where the warheads have been withdrawn. Incorporating 
NTM into a multi-lateral verification regime would present challenges, particularly in promoting a level 
playing field. The Open Skies Treaty which allows Parties to overfly other each other’s territory and take 
images in specified optical, infra-red and radar is a potentially useful model for supporting a multilateral 
disarmament verification treaty, especially for states that don’t have access to satellite imagery22. The 
examples of challenge inspections under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) could also provide a starting point for considering how NTM could 
be incorporated. These are examples of where NTM may be incorporated into multilateral verification, but 
differ from the case of multilateral disarmament verification in that they deal with specific non-compliance 
concerns, rather than supporting routine verification. 
And finally, there is the situational context of why a state is subjecting itself willingly to disarmament 
verification and its transparency and cooperation with the inspectorate. Using again the example of South 
Africa, the circumstances that led to it subjecting its dismantled warheads to verification were considered 
plausible, the South African Government had a policy of transparency, and the South African authorities 
were cooperative. Trying to quantify such factors when drawing conclusions is fraught, but these are 
contextual factors that can support confidence nonetheless. A paper by von Baeckmann, Dillon and Perricos 
(IAEA inspectors involved in the South African disarmament verification) summed it up as: “These general 
conclusions [about the correctness and completeness of the declared nuclear inventory] had strong 
technical bases and were significantly supported by the transparency and openness of the South African 
authorities with respect to access to information and locations, in particular the stated and demonstrated 
willingness of the authorities to facilitate access to any location that the IAEA may identify.”5 
4. How can the dots be joined?
The various kinds of observations and information that can help build confidence in declarations and actions 
of States subjecting warhead dismantlement to verification are potentially disparate.  Some would require 
the access that only inspectors can gain.  Others may draw on open source information, or information from 
NTM.  A substantial challenge for the design of disarmament verification will be to craft mechanisms through 
which stakeholder states are presented with a picture that joins the dots and provides adequate confidence, 
and/or with information that enables them to themselves join the dots.  And the circumstance could vary 
widely from one state to another, given differences in: warhead design and incorporation in delivery systems; 
accessibility of sites holding warheads; numbers of warheads and locations; security and safety protocols 
for providing access; completeness of historical production records; etc. Any disarmament verification 
arrangements will likely need to incorporate acceptance that adaptability will be required for the different 
circumstances. Developing an inspection protocol in detail would be a very big task, but that should not stop 
efforts to map out the general principles and basic framework, which is one of the tasks of the IPNDV.   
5. International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV)23
Analysis of the range of challenges that face nuclear warhead disarmament verification is the focus of the 
International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). IPNDV is a public-private 
partnership between the US Department of State and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) that began work in 
2015. It comprises representatives from around 25 countries, including all five NPT nuclear weapons states, 
and is broken up into three working groups:  
 Working Group 1: Monitoring and verification objectives – co-chairs, The Netherlands, Italy
 Working Group 2: On-site inspections (OSI) – co-chairs, Australia, Poland
 Working Group 3: Technical challenges and solutions – co-chairs, Sweden, USA
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Description Key questions and assessments 
Working 
Group 1 
Assess potential monitoring and 
verification objectives, methods and 
activities for key phases of the 
nuclear weapons lifecycle: 
deployment and storage of 
warheads; disassembly and 
dismantlement process: and, 
disposition of nuclear materials 
arising from dismantlement.  
 Key terms and definitions
 Framework for analysing monitoring and
verification activities
 Monitoring and verification objectives for key
aspects of the warhead dismantlement process,
including information needed to meet objectives
 Evaluation criteria for assessing monitoring and
verification regimes, including potential trade-offs
 Skills, areas of expertise and resources needed to
support future work
Working 
Group 2 
Explore the lessons learned from 
various on-site inspection regimes 
and identify fundamental OSI 
principles common to those 
regimes, assess the applicability 
and utility of these principles to 
potential future nuclear arms control 
agreements, and identify potential 
new inspection activities and 
techniques that could effectively 
verify compliance with future 
agreements. 
 Roles and objectives of OSI in verifying nuclear
disarmament undertakings, including identifying
parts of the lifecycle where OSI will be of value;
 Lessons learned from existing regimes related to
conventional and nonconventional weapons and
their non-proliferation, wherever OSI is used as a
verification mechanism.
 Ways in which verification objectives can be
achieved notwithstanding limitations related to
safety, security, national interests and non-
proliferation, including through the application of
managed access.
 Desirable knowledge and skills for inspectors,
escorts, and support staff at locations where
inspection and/or monitoring activities occur, as
well as considerations relevant to the capability
and composition of inspection teams.
Working 
Group 3 
Develop solutions for key technical 
challenges related to nuclear 
disarmament verification, 
particularly issues with warhead 
authentication, chain of custody, 
and data and equipment 
authentication.  
 Confirming the presence or absence of nuclear
warheads and relevant nuclear materials without
revealing proliferation sensitive information
 Effective methods and procedures for establishing
and maintaining chain of custody for items at
different stages in lifecycle
 Strategies and tools for software and hardware
certification and authentication.
Table 1: IPNDV Working Groups 
Drawing on the considerable expertise across many States (both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-
weapon States) in areas such as on-site inspections, technology development, disarmament verification, 
treaty evaluation processes and criteria, etc, the IPNDV is advancing understanding of this complex, multi-
disciplinary challenge. In the area of on-site inspections, IPNDV includes specialists with experience in 
inspections under the IAEA, OPCW, CTBT and bilateral disarmament agreements such as the START 
treaties. Drawing on the theme of this paper, once the present work of the IPNDV is complete, an aspect of 
the disarmament verification that would be worthwhile examining would be the “joining the dots” challenge. 
6. Closing remarks
A point of discussion that arose in an IPNDV Working Group 2 meeting was “what does confidence look 
like?” for nuclear disarmament. It was observed that there are already a few examples of nuclear 
disarmament: South Africa’s complete disarmament of its nuclear arsenal in the early 1990s; Kazakhstan, 
Belarus, and Ukraine’s repatriation of nuclear warheads to Russia in the early 1990s; USA and Russian 
disarmament of delivery systems under the START treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). The 
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international community has confidence that these countries fully disarmed, and that the USA and Russia 
have made large reductions in warheads and delivery systems under START 1 and 2. And this confidence 
was reached in completely different ways with different approaches to verification. Some were multilateral 
verification approaches (the IAEA’s verification of South Africa’s disarmament), some were unilateral 
(Russia’s retrieval of warheads from Ukraine and Kazakhstan), and some where bilateral (US and Russian 
START arrangements). And it is to be hoped that a time will come when DPRK disarms, which will build 
more international experience in disarmament verification. 
The circumstances in each of these cases is obviously quite different to the considerable challenge of a 
multi-lateral verification regime, particularly in the situation where the number of remaining warheads is 
approaching zero, but nonetheless this does reinforce that there are many different pathways to building 
confidence in the disarmament space, that it is possible to adapt verification arrangements to the 
circumstances, and that confidence builds over time with the understanding of the situational context. 
In the meantime, maintaining efforts in developing technologies, approaches, techniques, evaluation 
methods, etc, such as being spearheaded by the IPNDV partnership is very important, so that when the 
geo-political circumstances present an opportunity for further disarmament (partial or full) in one, some or 
many States, the body of expertise and experience in this field can provide verification solutions. 
This was neatly summed up by the Nobel Prize winning economist, Milton Friedman, although for a different 
purpose, but quite apt for the challenge of disarmament verification:  
“There is enormous inertia—a tyranny of the status quo—in private and especially governmental 
arrangements. Only a crisis—actual or perceived— produces real change. When that crisis occurs, 
the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic 
function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the 
politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.”24 
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Abstract: 
This paper presents an outline of the Swedish encapsulation and deposition processes, possible 
national measures in support of international safeguards, and possible national measures 
implemented for domestic purposes. All these measures are only in support of nuclear material 
accountancy and are not in any way aimed at other scenarios that would be in violation of Swedish 
law, e.g., theft, falsification, sabotage, etc. Only the operational phase of the geological repository is 
considered in this paper. 
The IAEA has developed safeguards approaches under integrated safeguards for encapsulation 
plants and geological repositories. The approaches are very generic for these two facility types and 
cannot be used for devising detailed safeguards approaches. In this context, a compatibility evaluation 
of the generic IAEA approaches vis-à-vis the Swedish system has been conducted. This evaluation 
also takes into account the conclusion drawn under the Additional Protocol, i.e., the confirmed State-
wide absence of undeclared nuclear activities. 
Two elements of the Swedish system that will need careful consideration are: (1) the high throughput 
encapsulation process–which may limit the time available for safeguards measurements; and (2) the 
unavailability of the copper canisters for measurement and evaluation of C/S once they have been 
loaded into transport casks. While also taking into consideration that ongoing daily operations over a 
period of several decades is expected at both facilities, there is apparent justification to develop very 
robust techniques for unattended verification and monitoring involving remote data transition 
capabilities. 
For the Swedish concept, it appears imperative that the transport casks containing the canisters are 
covered by robust C/S measures from the time of canister loading at the encapsulation plant up to the 
time of entering the underground areas of the geological repository. It is considered undesirable to 
have routine inspection activities (including C/S activities) conducted underground. 
Lastly, due to safety requirements, the operator is expected to perform comprehensive measurements 
on all individual fuel elements. These measurement results, in addition to equipment, may also be 
used by the IAEA and Euratom. Consequently, authentication and sharing issues may need to be 
addressed. 
Keywords: Final disposal; spent nuclear fuel; safeguards. 
1. Introduction
Spent nuclear fuel from Swedish reactors must be managed and disposed of in a safe manner, 
including safeguards. The Swedish concept for handling spent nuclear fuel has been developed by the 
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) [1]. In brief, the concept is based on 
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encapsulating the spent fuel in copper canisters and depositing them in granite bedrock about 500 m 
below ground. In 2011 SKB formally submitted an application for an encapsulation plant and a final 
repository.  
Spent fuel from Swedish reactors is shipped to Clab, an interim storage facility located in Oskarshamn. 
Here, the spent fuel is placed in storage pools in the bedrock about 30 m underground. Clab has been 
in operation since 1985 and is used to store spent fuel from all the nuclear power plants in Sweden [2]. 
Today there are about 32,000 spent fuel assemblies, at Clab corresponding to 6,300 tonnes of 
uranium and 59 tonnes of plutonium. The spent fuel stored at Clab consists primarily of BWR and 
PWR fuel with a few additions of older experimental fuel and spent fuel debris [3]. The flow of spent 
nuclear fuel in Sweden is illustrated schematically by Figure 1. A proposed encapsulation plant and a 
geological repository are also included in the figure. 
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the flow of spent fuel in Sweden, from nuclear power plants to final 
deposition. Source: SKB. 
2. The encapsulation plant
SKB has applied for permission to build the encapsulation plant, which is to be co-located with the 
existing facility, Clab the interim storage as an extension above ground. Thus there will be no need for 
transports between interim storage and the encapsulation plant. The combined facility will be named 
‘Clink’ [4]. Cooling times of the spent fuel that will be encapsulated will typically be 40 years, but it may 
vary from 10 to 60 years. Burn-up will range from a few GWH/tU up to 60 GWh/tU..  
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Fuel to be encapsulated will be moved to a measuring position. Here, the operator will verify important 
parameters of the fuel, such as thermal residual power and burn-up. After the operator’s verification, 
the fuel will be moved to a transfer canister, which will be moved to the handling cell where the 
assemblies will be dried and placed in a copper canister. In a series of steps, a copper lid will be put 
on and stir welded to the copper canister. The weld will be quality checked by the operator and the 
surface of the canister will be polished and decontaminated. Lastly, the canister will be placed in a 
transport cask and temporarily stored at the facility before being shipped to the geological repository 
site.  
Each copper canister will have an insert of cast iron with positions for 12 BWR fuel or four PWR fuel 
assemblies. Fuel will be encapsulated during campaigns arranged separately for BWR and PWR fuel. 
It is envisaged that 150 canisters will be treated per year. During routine operation, this means loading 
one canister per workday, corresponding to a flow of 12 BWR assemblies, or four PWR assemblies, 
per day. 
3. The geological repository
The plan is to build the geological repository at Forsmark, about 360 km north of the encapsulation 
plant. The repository will be close to, though separated from, the Forsmark NPP and the final storage 
facility for low and intermediate level radioactive waste, SFR, located there.  
The geological repository will consist of a surface area and an underground deposition part, about 500 
m below ground. The surface area will encompass a terminal and buildings for elevators, ventilation 
and backfill materials. There will be a transport ramp for vehicles connecting the above ground area 
with the underground repository; this will include the vehicle for transporting the transport casks 
containing the copper canisters. Copper canisters from the transport vehicle will be reloaded to a 
deposition machine in the underground Central Area. Transport tunnels will lead from the Central Area 
to the deposition tunnels, each having about 30 drilled vertical holes for one copper canister each. 
When all positions in a deposition tunnel have been filled, the tunnel will be backfilled and sealed with 
a concrete plug. A schematic illustration of the geological repository site is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. A schematic illustration of the geological repository’s proposed layout. 
Deposition tunnels will be excavated in a rock excavation zone, separated from the deposition and 
backfilling zone by a protection zone (with no blasting) and a separation wall. Excavation, deposition 
and backfilling can thus take place simultaneously, although physically separated. When the 
deposition tunnels have been backfilled, the separation wall will be moved, and the next step of 
excavation, deposition and backfilling can begin. One such step will take at least one year. 
A specially designed ship will deliver transport casks containing filled copper canisters from the 
encapsulation plant to the geological repository. The transport casks will be temporarily stored at 
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surface level in a terminal building before being transported by a ramp vehicle underground to the 
Central Area. The copper canisters will then be transferred from the transport cask into a radiation 
shield of the deposition vehicle. The deposition vehicle will bring the copper canister from the Central 
Area to its final deposition position. Lastly, the ramp vehicle will return to the surface with the empty 
transport cask. The facility will deposit 150 canisters per year during normal operation. This means an 
average of one transport cask with copper canisters will be transported each day from the surface 
terminal building to the subsurface Central Area and deposited.  
If approved, construction of the encapsulation plant can start in 2022 at the earliest and the plant 
would be in operation in 2030 at the earliest. Excavation works for the geological repository can start 
in 2020 at the earliest, with the first spent nuclear fuel being received starting in 2030. Both facilities 
will be in operation for about 45 years. After this period of operations, the surface buildings will be 
removed and the repository sealed [5].  
4. Legal requirements and national policy
One basic national legal requirement is that operators of nuclear facilities are responsible for ensuring 
that all the necessary measures are taken for safe management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. 
This includes fulfilling all obligations as prescribed by Sweden’s agreements aimed at preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons [6]. 
According to national regulations [6], SKB must ensure that sufficient nuclear material accountancy 
information and knowledge are in place and available on the part of the spent fuel prior to its 
deposition. This can be carried out by verifying that the documentation accompanying the nuclear 
material is complete and correct, and in the event of uncertainty, performing the necessary 
measurements or analyses. SKB is also required to have a system in place guaranteeing that 
necessary and correct information about the nuclear material is documented and retained following the 
material’s disposal.  
As a consequence of Sweden’s international obligations, all requirements must be met as effectively 
and efficiently as possible. This should involve the inclusion of design features that further facilitate the 
implementation of international safeguards. In order to achieve this, early discussions between the 
parties involved will be necessary. Therefore, early provision of the required documentation is of 
importance for fostering efficient and cost-effective safeguards. 
One of the main legal requirements is the operators maintaining records on locations to where all their 
spent fuel has been transported. As the licensees have assigned management and disposal of spent 
fuel to the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, SKB, the responsibility rests with 
SKB. Insofar as a geological repository is concerned, the main national policy in Sweden with regard 
to nuclear material accountancy is to provide assurance domestically and internationally that all 
deposited nuclear fuel is as declared. Information on the item identification and quantities of nuclear 
material must be correct. This should be assured by using a specially designed “paper trail” (e.g., 
source and operating documents) verification procedure covering the entire fuel history. SKB should 
be able to provide sufficient information for this verification. SKB also intends to conduct its own 
measurements of the spent fuel for safety purposes. 
5. Compatibility with IAEA safeguards models
The IAEA model integrated safeguards approach for an encapsulation plant [6] assumes that the 
encapsulation plant is a separate facility and that the spent fuel will be transferred from an interim 
storage facility in a transportation cask to an assembly handling cell of the encapsulation facility. The 
Swedish encapsulation plant will, however, be co-located with the spent fuel interim storage facility 
and form a combined facility. The encapsulation part of the facility will not have an area for receiving 
and storing spent fuel transport casks. The spent fuel from the NPPs will be stored in the interim 
storage area and stored in pools for several years before being moved internally to the encapsulation 
plant.  
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
248
The IAEA model integrated safeguards approach for a geological repository [7] assumes a separate 
facility similar to the Swedish concept. However, there are a few differences. The IAEA model 
assumes that the copper canister can be identified upon receipt at the geological repository and that 
canister identification can be performed when a canister is transferred between the above ground area 
and the geological repository at the entrance of the repository. In the Swedish model, however, the 
copper canisters will be shielded by a transport cask until they reach the underground central area.  
The model assumes that a redundant C/S system is to be applied to the disposal canister during 
transport from the encapsulation plant to the repository. During temporary canister storage above 
ground, dual C/S systems should be applied. In this context, we want to stress the importance of 
having robust C/S systems on the transport cask, i.e., systems that can be fully operated by facility 
employees while also providing credible assurance for the international community. 
6. Safeguards considerations
6.1. General 
On the basis of, inter alia, IAEA GOV/2002/8 [7], IAEA Model Integrated Safeguards Approaches for 
Spent Fuel Encapsulation Plants [8] and Geological Repositories [9] and the IAEA Safeguards 
Glossary (2001) [10], it is our understanding that the basic international verification requirements are: 
 Yearly verification for “gross defects” (yes/no test whether or not all declared fissile
material is missing) with “low detection probability” (20%) for spent fuel elements
which are available for measurement and which are “difficult to dismantle”;
 Verification for “partial defects” (at least a yes/no test whether or not 50% of the
declared fissile material is missing) for each spent fuel element which is being placed
in a copper canister and for yearly verification of spent fuel elements which are
available for measurement and which are not “difficult to dismantle”;
 Maintaining “dual C/S” or an equivalent system for spent fuel elements which are not
available for measurement.
There is no completely clear definition of the concept “difficult to dismantle”.  Rod exchange has been 
performed earlier on both BWR and PWR fuel in the ponds of Swedish nuclear power plants. 
However, with the absence of the required equipment for dismantlement at the Clab and Clink sites, it 
is reasonable to assume that all fuel that will be deposited can be classified as “difficult to dismantle”.   
With the above requirements and assumption, it is expected that the nuclear material at Clink will be 
verified with low detection probability for gross defects on an annual basis. Spent fuel will be verified 
for partial defects immediately prior to encapsulation.  
Thereafter a robust C/S system should be applied to the transport cask. This C/S should be 
evaluated upon entry into the underground area at SFK. 
The activities under the Additional Protocol are not fully credited for the two IAEA approaches 
mentioned above. The confirmed state-wide absence of undeclared activities should render 
unnecessary certain proposed monitoring and verification activities. In this context, we would refer to 
an excerpt from the Minutes of the Experts’ Group on Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in 
Geological Repositories [11] and also the statement from DG to the IAEA Board of Governors in 
February 2002 [12]. 
“The important difference is that under Integrated Safeguards, geophysical methods may not be 
needed to detect excavations or excavation activities. For this purpose, geophysical tools could be 
replaced with Complementary Access and information analysis. Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) may 
still be required for DIV purposes (i.e. detection of undeclared tunnels, rooms and boreholes, such as 
any permanent underground equipment and installations).” [11] 
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“The measures of the Model Additional Protocol were never intended to be simply superimposed as a 
new ‘layer’ of activity on top of safeguards as implemented under INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) and earlier 
strengthening measures. Given the additional assurances provided under an additional protocol, the 
need to avoid undue burden on States and facility operators, and the need for maximum efficiency in 
the light of the prevailing resource constraints, the new measures were to be ‘integrated’ with existing 
ones.” [12] 
Periodic DIVs and CAs under and above ground will provide sufficient assurance of the integrity of the 
site declarations and the absence of undeclared activities for both areas. The implementation of AP 
measures in the State will add more information on the nuclear capabilities.  
As mentioned earlier, the last verification opportunities for the individual fuel elements exist at the 
encapsulation plant. The operator is expected to perform comprehensive measurements on all 
individual fuel elements for safety purposes. The optimal position for the operator’s performance of 
these measurements is as early as possible in the material flow into the encapsulation process. This 
enables the operator to more easily reject assemblies that for safety or other reasons do not fit into the 
planned canister.  
The IAEA and the European Commission, on the other hand, presumably prefer to have the 
verification measurement performed immediately prior to the canister lid being put on and welding 
being started. This verification is expected to be performed according to established IAEA criteria and 
practice, namely, a verification for “partial defects” for the spent fuel element.  
Routine inspection activities underground at the final repository are not foreseen; underground 
activities will be limited to DIV only. Also, see the following recommendation from SAGOR: 
“The recommended safeguards approach is to use item accounting supported by a reliable and 
comprehensive C/S system above-ground to verify, inter alia, the flow of full casks and 
overpacks. DIV is recommended as the primary safeguards measure underground. DIV would 
include geophysical methods.”[13] 
6.2 Measurements and possible use of operators’ results 
It is not desirable to have two completely different pieces of measurement equipment and perhaps 
also two different measurement positions for the required final verification of the spent fuel. This takes 
up space and will take more time. Also, it must be kept in mind that up to 12 assemblies will be 
encapsulated on a daily basis. It should be investigated to what extent the operators’ measurement 
results and equipment can be shared with the IAEA and Euratom. It has to be assured that the 
operator’s measurement results in principle are sufficient for the IAEA and Euratom. Therefore, the 
authentication issues must also be addressed to provide the international safeguards with the required 
opportunities for drawing independent conclusions. 
Considering the fact that daily operations are expected to take place over the course of several 
decades, there appears to be a need to develop unattended verification techniques by means of 
remote data transition capabilities. The measurement position needs to be arranged at Clink in 
coordination with the IAEA and EU. 
After measurement at the Clink site, proper C/S measures must be applied to assure Continuity of 
Knowledge (CoK) from the final measurements until the closure of the copper canister. If needed, as a 
backup to the C/S measures, a simple unattended quality control immediately prior to the assemblies 
being placed in the copper canister may also be considered. Such verification could involve reading 
the fuel identification number, measuring the weight of the assembly, and using a gross gamma 
detector. After the spent fuel has been placed in the copper canister, additional C/S measures have to 
be applied until the canister is placed in its final position in the geological repository. 
If a method is developed and approved, verification of the copper canister may also be conducted at 
the encapsulation plant. However, for practical reasons, there are limitations to conducting similar 
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verification on the transport cask or on the copper canister underground at the final repository during 
normal operations. In exceptional cases, such verification underground could be performed in order to 
resolve anomalies. 
6.3 Continuity of Knowledge 
In the Swedish concept, it seems imperative that the transport casks containing the canisters are 
covered by robust C/S measures from canister loading at the encapsulation plant to entering the 
underground part of the geological repository.  
The operational activities are expected to be run continuously for approximately 40-50 years with daily 
production of one copper canister and shipments on at least a bi-weekly basis, a sealing system that 
can be attached, also that the same seal can be detached by the operator, would be cost-efficient and 
enhance an efficient use of resources.  
The inner walls of the underground tunnels and shafts define the primary containment of the 
geological repository. During construction and operation of the repository, there will be an access 
ramp, ventilation shaft, etc. These should be covered by C/S methods that are able to detect 
movements of spent fuel down to the deposition location and to detect any removal of nuclear material 
from the underground part. It is important to verify that a canister enters the underground part of the 
repository. This enables us to treat the underground part of the geological repository as a black box 
and there is thus no need for C/S and verification methods underground.  
Also, as already discussed earlier, it is not considered desirable to have routine inspections of nuclear 
material accountancy activities, or verification of seals, etc. performed underground. 
In the case of anomalies, a unique identifier for each copper canister resolution may contribute to its 
resolution, but not for routine use. Gamma and neutron measurements on the transport container may 
also be considered as a measure to resolve inconsistencies. 
Verification of empty transport containers leaving the underground area is to be performed, e.g., 
weighing, gamma and neutron measurement. 
6.4. Design Information Verification 
The integrity of the geological repository can be verified during DIV, which may be conducted 
periodically. The main objectives are to confirm the following: that the excavations are performed as 
declared, there are no other undeclared nuclear activities, and that there are no clandestine removal 
routes or excavations. In this context, Complementary Access both above and below ground, 
information from satellite imagery and other open sources’ information provide assurance for 
confirming the absence of clandestine activities at the area of the site. Hence, there is no need to 
continuously monitor the excavation by using geo-seismic monitoring.     
7. Conclusions
The conclusions drawn under the Additional Protocol are not properly credited for in the IAEA 
approaches mentioned above. The confirmed state-wide absence of undeclared activities should 
render unnecessary certain monitoring and verification activities that have been proposed. Therefore, 
in this context, some of the facility-specific considerations in the IAEA model may not apply. 
The last verification opportunities for individual fuel elements and also for routine verification of the 
canisters will exist at the encapsulation plant. The final spent fuel verification prior to canister welding 
at the encapsulation plant is expected to be performed according to established IAEA criteria and 
practice. 
The maximum time available for verification will depend on the material flow. In the Swedish system, 
up to 12 assemblies will be encapsulated in one day, so the measurement times will probably be in the 
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order of minutes. Considering the fact that daily operations over the course of several decades are 
expected, there is a need to develop unattended verification techniques by means of remote data 
transition capabilities.  
Due to safety requirements the operator is expected to perform comprehensive measurements on all 
individual fuel elements. It should be investigated if these measurement results can be shared with the 
IAEA. Therefore, authentication and sharing issues have to be addressed. 
Inspections for DIV purposes are essential to confirm that the repository is constructed as declared 
and to confirm the absence of any undeclared activities. It is considered undesirable to have other 
routine and verification activities, including C/S, performed underground. 
In the Swedish concept, it seems imperative that the transport casks containing the canisters are 
covered by robust C/S measures from the time of canister loading at the encapsulation plant up to the 
time of entering the underground part of the geological repository. It is considered undesirable to have 
routine inspection activities (including C/S activities) performed underground. 
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Abstract: 
The licensed construction of the disposal facility in Finland begun in autumn 2016 as the foundation 
works for the encapsulation plant and the excavations of the access tunnels to the canister shaft and 
canister storages in the geological repository were initiated. The disposal of spent nuclear fuel is 
scheduled to start in Finland in mid 2020’s after the operational licence is granted. To ascertain that 
necessary technical safeguards tools are available at that time, STUK, the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority of Finland has set up a national R&D project GOSSER (Geological Disposal 
Safeguards and Security R&D). GOSSER’s main objective is the finalisation of the national Finnish 
concept for safeguarding the final disposal of the spent nuclear fuel. This concept and related R&D 
efforts are coordinated with the Finnish facilities, European Commission and the IAEA. Activities in 
GOSSER include so far: 1) Participation in R&D of robust, reliable, and accurate methods to verify 
spent nuclear fuel prior to final disposal. The work has been done in cooperation with Helsinki Institute 
of Physics, the IAEA and other international partners. 2) Participation in the Safeguards-by-Design 
process of the Finnish encapsulation plant and final repository and, when necessary, development of 
safeguards methodologies for attaining knowledge of the verified nuclear material and to maintain it for 
future generations. 
Keywords: Spent Nuclear Fuel; Safeguards; IAEA; Geological Disposal; Final Disposal; Safeguards-
by-Design 
1. Introduction
In November 2015 the Finnish Government granted the licence to construct the disposal facility 
consisting of the encapsulation plant (EP) and the geological repository  (GR). The operator (Posiva), 
Finnish State Regulatory Authority (STUK), IAEA and the European Commission are cooperating on 
developing safeguards measures and on designing the necessary safeguards infrastructure for these 
facilities. The spent fuel disposed of will not be accessible for verification using traditional safeguards 
measures. The international and national safeguards measures have to create confidence that no 
nuclear material is diverted before, during or after the disposal process and that no undeclared nuclear 
activities take place at the disposal facilities. Moreover, the operational phase of the facilities will last 
over a century, thus the safeguards-related technological infrastructure should be flexible and 
upgradable. Safeguards by design (SbD) e.g. planning the safeguards measures and designing the 
necessary safeguards infrastructure during the design phase of the facilities has many benefits. Cost-
efficiency is assured by including safeguards equipment such as cameras, radiation detectors, cables 
and conduits, into the facility design. 
A plan for the operators safeguards activities during the construction and operation of the disposal 
facility was included by the operator in the application for the construction licence. This included the 
main steps in nuclear material accountancy and control during the facility development and preliminary 
plans for the control and accountancy during spent fuel transfers through the encapsulation and 
disposal process. The plan was approved by STUK during the licensing process and an assessment 
was included in the STUK Statement [1]. However, in order to ascertain that necessary technical 
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safeguards tools are available at the time needed, STUK launched the national R&D project GOSSER 
(Geological Disposal Safeguards and Security R&D). The main objective of GOSSER is the 
finalisation of the national Finnish concept for safeguarding the final disposal of the spent nuclear fuel. 
This concept and related R&D efforts are coordinated with the Finnish operators, the European 
Commission and the IAEA.  
The key task of GOSSER (named LOVE) is to develop a robust, reliable, and accurate method to 
verify spent nuclear fuel prior to final disposal. The IAEA requires that spent fuel is verified at a partial 
defect level before transfer to “difficult to access” locations; however, there is no current method 
available that can reliably detect a diversion of less than 50% of the pins in a fuel element. The Finnish 
Support Programme to the IAEA Safeguards has researched the applicability of Passive Gamma 
Emission Tomography (PGET), and it will be the main candidate for further investigation. Combined 
with other methods, like gamma spectrometry and neutron measurements, it can be used to verify the 
correctness and completeness of the declared fuel at pin level. Another task of GOSSER (named 
JOY) is to evaluate and, when necessary, develop safeguards methodologies for attaining knowledge 
of the verified nuclear material and to maintain it for future generations. This task may require different 
techniques from traditional C/S, including geophysics and novel technologies, as well as methods from 
societal verification and long term data management. GOSSER will recognise the interfaces between 
safeguards, security and safety [2]. Security and safeguards both share a common objective: spent 
nuclear fuel is secured from unlawful actions. 
2. Verification of spent fuel prior to disposal
STUK has a regular NDA verification programme. The goal of this programme is to verify that 
information provided by the operator is correct and complete, maintain and develop NDA expertise, 
prepare for final disposal and support IAEA safeguards conclusions. STUK performs 1 – 2 
measurement campaigns annually at each Finnish NPP site Olkiluoto and Loviisa. The traditionally 
used verification tools are SFAT, eFORK and GBUV [3]. Since early 2017 year also the PGET device 
is used for verification as well as testing. 
The Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA Safeguards has studied the applicability of Passive 
Gamma Emission Tomography (PGET) [4]. Under the GOSSER project, a research group was 
established in 2015 to study and develop the PGET method further. The Finnish Funding Agency for 
Innovation (TEKES) provides funding for the Finland Distinguished Professor Programme (FiDiPro) at 
the Helsinki Institute of Physics (HIP) for the years 2015 – 2018. STUK has a guiding role in the work 
and also actively participates in  method development. The aim is to develop a combination of robust, 
reliable, and accurate methods to verify spent nuclear fuel prior to final disposal, down to detecting 
diversion of single fuel pins. Because the IAEA and GOSSER project share the same main goal, to 
develop functional apparatus for partial defect level spent fuel verification, the LOVE project can 
provide in-kind support to the work conducted under IAEA MSSP tasks. This will include, for instance, 
arranging test campaigns with the NPPs.  
The latest tests with the prototype have shown the applicability of the method. Combined with other 
methods, like gamma spectroscopy and neutron measurements, it can provide precise and accurate 
verification results. The first campaigns with the upgraded PGET took place in February 2017 in 
Loviisa and in April in Olkiluoto. The campaigns went very well. The deployment of the system was 
easy and the PGET demonstrated its ability to reconstruct and analyse images of various fuel types 
with relatively short acquisition times (about 5 min). Missing pins were detected with good confidence. 
Although the technology has been developed and demonstrated, some research is still needed to 
support system development.  
3. Safeguards-by-Design process
In addition to the NDA measurements several other safeguards practices and measures are to be 
developed and implemented with the facility design, construction and commissioning. An equipment 
infrastructure to be installed in the Olkiluoto encapsulation plant is already developed in cooperation 
between the stakeholders, IAEA, European Commission, STUK and the operator [5]. However, the 
design of the facility is still being optimised by the operator. Continuous communication between the 
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stakeholders is essential, to assure that the operator maintains safeguardability of the facility and that 
the inspectorates are able to modify their equipment infrastructure according to changes in plant 
design. A similar process is foreseen to be conducted for geological repository during the initial 
planning and construction phase. Geological investigations and construction of the geological 
repository will continue in parallel through its operational period. Due to unforeseen elements in the 
geology and rock mechanics, the repository layout at Olkiluoto cannot be rigidly planned in advance, 
so any safeguards measures in the repository needs to have enough flexibility to adapt to design 
changes.   
The operator presented its plan to control the integrity of the fuel canisters and to demonstrate and to 
document their safe transfer to the emplacement hole with their construction licence application. This 
plan was approved by STUK in 2015 with the remark that the operator has to facilitate safeguards 
measures by STUK, the EC and the IAEA in further plans and development. Currently, the material 
accountancy for fuel canisters are a part of the negotiations of the Facility Attachment. In the disposal 
process, the Continuity-of-Knowledge and supporting Containment and Surveillance measures will be 
essential; whereas the annual DIV/PIV cannot be carried out in a traditional manner. The Safeguards-
by-Design concept will cover also these aspects.  
STUK has direct access to the repository; and, in cooperation with safety, also de facto full time 
institutional presence at the active final disposal facility site. In the national concept development this 
asset will be utilised. STUK follows the daily research and work plans, and the continuous monitoring 
of the site. STUK has also contacts to other authorities in Finland that are e.g. licensing construction 
activities and therefore can report about any undeclared safeguards-relevant activities. However, 
international inspectorates lacks these capabilities and in order to detect undeclared activities, they 
are more or less obliged to employ technological solutions, which STUK has less need for that. 
However, STUK must be aware of the capabilities and properties of these techniques. In it’s project 
STUK does not need to perform its own research. It is sufficient to follow what other institutions are 
developing in Finland and abroad for the safety assessment and security precautions and to 
demonstrate this to the inspectorates. However, this work also needs resourcing.  
4. Summary
The GOSSER project was launched because safeguards for spent fuel disposal is a new challenge 
and new concepts need to be developed and implemented already during the early design and 
construction of the final disposal facility licensed in 2015. The time span of the overall disposal project 
is more than100 years so process optimisation has high pay off opportunities. As the disposal facility 
is of a new kind to be safeguarded, the methods developed and applied in Finland have to gain 
international acceptance.  
The disposal of spent fuel requires that safety, information security and other security arrangements 
and the safeguards required to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons are properly implemented. 
This requires the reconciliation of all areas resulting in the implementation of 3S in an appropriate 
manner. This, in turn, requires action from the operators producing, encapsulating or disposing of 
spent nuclear fuel as well as from the national authorities.  
The novelty of the disposal concept calls for adequate research and provides the reasoning for 
establishment of GOSSER R&D project. If GOSSER is not successful, in the worst case there is a risk 
that the credibility of the disposal concept is questioned and; moreover, the future generations may not 
have adequate information to satisfy themselves that the spent fuel is fully and reliably disposed of in 
the repository. As the European Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have 
strong roles in the safeguarding of nuclear materials, their objectives are considered within this 
project. However, the main objective of GOSSER is the finalisation of the Finnish concept for 
safeguarding the disposal of the spent nuclear fuel by 2018. 
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Abstract: 
The Swedish system for taking care of the spent nuclear fuel include long term geological disposal of 
the fuel encapsulated into copper canisters. For such Safeguards applications, it is of upmost 
importance to be able to trace canisters once closed in order to keep the Continuity of Knowledge 
from the Encapsulation Plant to the Geological Repository. One possibility is to use a tagging of the 
canister. This work introduces an innovative system for tagging copper canisters based on the 
ultrasonic reading of cavities machined on copper lids. For corrosion reasons it is better to not engrave 
any code on the external parts of copper canisters. According to the copper lid geometry, the 
proposed solution envisages the machining from the inside of several inclined Flat Bottom Holes or 
chamfers around the circumference of the lid, while still keeping the required thickness of the copper 
for safety reasons. They represent a unique identification code for each canister, easily readable by an 
ultrasonic immersion probe on a 360° scan. A laboratory prototype for the identification system has 
been manufactured and successfully tested. 
The copper lid is reproduced on a scaled version and a series of chamfers 50° inclined are drilled 
around the bottom of the lid. The reading system hosted a probe placed 14° inclined according to the 
Snell’s law. The received ultrasonic signal represents the binary code realized by the chamfers. 
The paper will describe the optimization studies made on the transducers, the angle and width of 
chamfers, the binary identification codes, preliminary design and testing of a reading system. 
Keywords: ultrasound; identification; copper canister, geological repository. 
1. Introduction
The spent fuel coming from operations of Swedish nuclear power plants will be stored in deep 
geological repositories inserted into copper canisters. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste 
Management Company’s (SKB) developed the method for final disposal of fuel in copper canisters 
surrounded by bentonite clay about 500 metres underground in Swedish bedrock. This solution will 
keep the fuel isolated from human beings and the environment for many years.  
The new SKB’s method for final disposal of fuel comprises a number of facilities that together provide 
a safe chain (Figure 1). The fuel coming from Swedish reactors is stored for one year minimum in the 
spent fuel ponds at the reactors before it is shipped to the interim storage facility. There the fuel is 
placed in storage baskets which are stored in ponds. Later storage canisters with spent fuel will be 
lifted from the pools and moved to the encapsulation plant where the fuel is inserted in copper 
canisters with iron inserts. After encapsulation, the canisters are transported to the final repository and 
then located in the deposition hole. About 6000 copper canisters will be deposited, with an average of 
one canister per day. 
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Figure 1: The Swedish system 
Repositories present several new challenges for international Safeguards. One of them is maintaining 
the Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) from the encapsulation plant to the final repository. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency and EURATOM safeguards approaches propose to use 
canisters identification during transport and deposition from the encapsulation plant to the final 
repository. SKB has to date not presented any method for labelling the copper canisters. An engraving 
or marking of the canister may impede the long term safety and integrity of the canister since it may 
reduce the corrosion barrier [1]. Therefore alternative solutions should be developed. Next paragraphs 
illustrate a possible identification method based on ultrasounds developed by the SILab, Seals and 
Identification Laboratory, of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission in Ispra (VA). The 
first part of the research deals with studies oriented to identify the best positioning of holes or 
chamfers to be read by a specific transducer. Afterwards a series of simulations and experimental 
tests have been implemented on copper samples and slices of the copper canister (copper flanges) 
with the aim to demonstrate the possibility of identification of canisters by ultrasounds. In the end, the 
identification method is validated on a small scaled copper lid with chamfers investigated by an 
ultrasonic reading system prototype.  
2. The identification method
Since many years, SILab develops ultrasonic identification techniques on bolt seals with artificial 
cavities made on stainless steel washers, giving a fingerprint from the reflection of unique patterns. In 
the case of copper canisters, the geometry and dimension of the lid are much bigger than seals, 
therefore an adaption of the ultrasonic method is required. In particular, the solution proposed in this 
paper deals with the identification of copper canisters by the ultrasonic investigation of a series of Flat 
Bottom Holes (FBHs) or chamfers milled on the inner surface of the lid where the copper thickness is 
higher than 50 mm, as shown in Figure 2. Because of corrosion reasons, in fact, the minimum copper 
thickness must be not less than 50 mm and the machining of holes or chamfers must not affect the 
integrity and the stability of canisters. 
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Figure 2: Area (circled in yellow) where the thickness of the lid is higher than 50 mm 
The study of the best dimension and position of holes is realized by 3D simulations and experimental 
measurements carried out on copper samples. The first idea was to drill configurations of FBHs with 
different positions and dimensions on the bottom surface of copper lids as shown in Figure 2, on the 
left. The ultrasonic reading of these cavities was designed to be accomplished by a single probe 
located on the top of the lid, rotating 360˚ along with the lid circumference. Before machining FBHs in 
copper flanges, ultrasonic tests were carried out on cylindrical copper samples with different FBHs. 
The analysis of results revealed the possibility to acquire echoes, however, depending on the 
inspection frequency, the attenuation of ultrasound in copper could affect measurements negatively 
and then a different configuration of holes was studied [2]. In order to decrease the distance between 
cavities and probe, FBHs are replaced by inclined flat holes or chamfers arranged as illustrated in 
Figure 3, on the right.  
Figure 3: Two possible types of identification cavities: FBHs (left), inclined flat holes (right) 
This new disposition of holes involves the repositioning of the transducer as shown in Figure 4. In fact 
the probe must be inclined according to the Snell’s Law in order to guarantee the perpendicularity 
between the ultrasonic beam and reflectors. Considering the velocities of sound in water (V1=1500 
m/s) and in copper (V2=4651 m/s), the probe angle should be around 14° assuming that the inclination 
of the chamfer is 50°. 
sin(α1)/V1=sin(α2)/V2  α1=sin-1(1500/4651)ˑsin(50)=14.3°  (1) 
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Figure 4: Position of the transducer according to the Snell’s law 
Depending on the configuration of chamfers around the lid circumference, different ultrasonic 
amplitude responses will be received by the transducer. Therefore, each canister can be identified by 
a unique code of chamfers readable by ultrasounds.  
The implementation of this identification method will contribute to keep the CoK of copper canisters 
with nuclear spent fuel. However identification might not be sufficient to prevent attempts of 
falsification or duplication of canisters then another approach is necessary to ensure the originality of 
each container. For this purpose, authors developed an authentication method based on ultrasounds 
but the content will be not discussed in this paper.   
3. Simulations and experimental tests
Several experimental tests were carried out on copper flanges with the aim to verify the possibility of 
detection of flat bottom holes 50˚ inclined [3]. The inclination of holes has been chosen at 50˚ by 
authors for tests but it could be changed in case of necessity. The following Figure 5 shows the set-up 
of measurement for the investigation of an inclined hole (on the left) and the corresponding A-scan 
signal (on the right).  
Figure 5: Set-up of the ultrasonic investigation and corresponding A-scan acquisition 
Considering that the Time of Flight (TOF) of the echo received is 31.3 µs, the corresponding 
measured distance is 65.88 mm, value in accordance with the geometrical distance dh.   
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As shown from the analysis of measurements, ultrasonic echoes reflected by inclined holes can be 
detected with a good signal to noise ratio,    
Before validating the method on a laboratory prototype, simulations on the CIVA software were 
implemented to study the best dimensions and positions of chamfers to be machined on the copper lid 
circumference. The CIVA Ultrasonic Testing (UT) module is specific for ultrasonic NDT and offers two 
different types of evaluations: the beam computation and the inspection simulation, both useful for our 
purpose. The set-up simulated (Figure 6) is a 2D profile of the copper lid with a 50° inclined chamfer. 
Figure 6: Simulated set-up 
The setting of transducer parameters and position is made in accordance with the testing piece 
geometry. Before simulating the ultrasonic response of the chamfer, the beam computation is realized 
to appreciate how ultrasounds propagate in the test piece. As illustrated in Figure 7 the probe is not 
exactly focused in correspondence of the chamfer but the focal spot is located at a depth of about 25 
mm from the impact point. However the beam divergence angle is approximately 7° and the focal spot 
diameter at the chamfer depth is 13.2 mm. As a result, if the chamfer width is too small compared to 
the focal spot diameter, the echo reflected back will be not revealed by the probe.  
Figure 7: Beam computations for the first simulation set-up. On the left the default beam with 
0dB of dynamic, on the right the post processed beam with 15dB of dynamic. Sky blue stands 
for the highest intensity, yellow for the lowest. 
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The simulation of the interactions between ultrasonic field and chamfers is implemented by the 
inspection simulation module. The aim of this study is identifying the best chamfers dimensions in 
order to do not engrave too much copper. Figure 8 illustrates four chamfers with different widths: 5, 
10, 15 and 20 mm respectively. The yellow arc represents the minimum copper thickness of 50 mm to 
be always kept. As shown, the dimensions of all the chamfers agree with the thickness requirements 
but smaller they are better it is from the canister integrity point of view. 
Figure 8: Study of best chamfer dimensions 
The results of simulations pointed out the chance to receive good ultrasonic echoes from each one of 
the chamfers. However the larger the chamfer is, the better signal quality is received. By 
consequence, a good compromise could be a chamfer around 10 mm wide.  
4. Validation on a laboratory prototype
Following the ultrasonic tests on copper samples and CIVA simulations, an identification reading 
system prototype has been developed. In particular, the validation of the identification method is 
carried out on a scaled version (¼) of the copper lid where a barcode of cavities and chamfers is 
realized (Figure 9).  The scale is reduced but the geometry of the ultrasonic reading zone is scale 1 
compared to the real one meter diameter copper lid.  
Figure 9: Picture of the small scaled copper lid (¼) 
The chamfers, 50˚ inclined and 12 mm wide, are arranged around the small lid circumference 22.5˚ 
angle spaced (Figure 10). The binary code is created by an alternation of chamfers and cavities, which 
reflect the ultrasonic beam in different ways. The transducer, rotating around the circumference of the 
lid, will receive an echo in correspondence of chamfers only. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
263
Figure 10: Chamfers arranged around the circumference of the prototype lid 
The reading system prototype that hosts the probe is realized by a modified version of reading head 
used for seals verification (Figure 11). The transducer is installed 14° inclined in order to receive the 
signal reflected by chamfers according to the Snell’s law. The ultrasonic reading of chamfers is 
realized by an immersion testing and then a bit of water is poured inside the lid. The signal acquired 
by a 360˚ rotation of the transducer represents the code realized by chamfers and cavities. As shown 
in Figure 10, on the right, the ultrasonic amplitude response reproduces a binary code depending on 
the chamfers position around the lid. 
Figure 11: Reading system prototype and binary code acquired by a 360˚ rotation of the 
transducer around the small scaled copper lid 
Afterwards the result of the experimental testing is compared to a CIVA simulation, reproducing the 
same set-up of measurement (Figure 12). The simulated echo is clearly evident in both A-scan and B-
scan modes and the simulated amplitude ultrasonic response agrees with the experiments. As a 
result, we can state that the identification method is validated on this small scaled copper lid, which 
means that each future copper canister could have a different binary code made of chamfers.  
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Figure 12: CIVA simulation of the ultrasonic investigation of the small scaled copper lid with 
chamfers and cavities 
As a result from simulations and measurements on scaled copper lid, we can state that the 
identification method proposed is validated. This positive result paves the way for a future 
identification of all copper canisters which will be easy, cheap and reliable. When manufacturing the 
lid, it will be enough to mill or turn a few additional chamfers to deliver on each lid a different binary 
code, This code could be read at the Encapsulation Plant when the canisters is welded and then on 
arrival in the Geological Repository.    
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Abstract: 
During the operation of German nuclear power plants there are damaged fuel rods (DFR) that had 
been removed from spent fuel assemblies due to their special condition. DFR can consist of various 
types, such as leak-tight e. g. deformed fuel rods and leaking fuel rods, from pin hole defects and 
hairline cracks up to exposed nuclear fuel, e.g. fragments, loose pellets or broken fuel rods and fuel 
rods in capsules or cartridges.  These DFR can not be readily packed into the CASTOR® V-casks 
deployed for dry interim storage of spent fuel. Therefore, the DFR have to be supplied via a separate 
path to interim storage in order to achieve the defueled state of shut-down reactors. 
This concerns both DFR from boiling and pressurized water reactors (BWR, PWR). A special quiver 
has been developed by GNS as a technical solution to accommodate DFR in CASTOR® V casks for 
interim dry storage. After gas-tight sealing by welding, the quiver can be stored in CASTOR® V-casks 
like spent fuel assemblies. The DFR with uranium or MOX fuel can be combined as desired within the 
quiver. Likewise, loading configurations with DFR from PWR and BWR are possible. The outer 
dimensions of the quiver are similar to those of fuel assemblies. Its major components include an inner 
basket with storing positions for the DFR and an outer base body in order to protect the inner basket 
especially from external mechanical stresses.     
This paper will describe the major components of the quiver, the loading procedure and the further 
processing that lead to a permanently gas-proof packaging of DFR suitable to be loaded into 
CASTOR® V-casks. The focus is led on the continuity of knowledge during loading and processing of 
the quiver. Furthermore, the paper will present the first quiver loading with the aim of achieving a 
defueled reactor block A of Biblis NPP ahead of time. The quiver system has obtained its transport 
license.    
Keywords: damaged spent fuel; quiver; dry interim storage; continuity of knowledge; Germany 
1. Introduction
According to the Atomic Energy Act, nuclear power plants (NPP) in Germany will be operated until 
2022 at the latest. At the end about 10.000 Mg heavy metal, representing about 13.000 spent fuel 
assemblies (SFA) from pressurized water reactors (PWR) and about 17.000 SFA from boiling water 
reactors (BWR), will have accumulated for dry interim storage in about 1.000 big-sized casks of the 
CASTOR® V type. The technical design of CASTOR® V-casks must fulfil the following four protection 
goals: 
 Safe enclosure of the radioactive substances  
 Safe removal of the decay heat 
 Avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure by shielding of gamma and neutron radiation 
 Maintaining the sub-criticality  
Designed for transport and storage, CASTOR® V casks have to guarantee these safety requirements 
not only under normal operating conditions but also under extreme mechanic and thermal accident 
conditions during storage and transport. Therefore, casks of the CASTOR® V type are suitable to 
transfer spent fuel assemblies from the NPP to the dry interim storage and to accommodate spent fuel 
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assemblies safely for several decades. The storage license of the 12 existing on site dry spent fuel 
storage facilities near the reactor has been granted for 40 years.   
During the operation of German NPPs, damages of the cladding of single fuel rods may occur. These 
damaged fuel rods (DFR) cannot be used for a further cycle in a reactor. They have to be removed 
from the fuel assemblies and are stored in the spent fuel pools of the reactors. Depending on the 
extent of the damage, DFR can consist of various types, such as leak-tight e. g. deformed fuel rods 
and leaking fuel rods. Due to their special conditions, these DFR can not be readily packed into the 
CASTOR® V-casks. The fuel and the water that may be released by leaking fuel rods into the internal 
of the cask during the long period of storage may lead to a situation that the protection goals cannot 
be met any more. 
The German phase-out policy has triggered a strong demand for a disposal option for DFRs because 
this is essential to achieve the defueled state of shut-down reactors as quickly as possible. Therefore 
the objective was to develop a technical solution that can be realized with CASTOR® V-casks and 
covers the individual needs of the German NPP operators. These include in particular the 
 Disposal option of a broad range of fuel rods such as 
• Irradiated or unirradiated nuclear fuel in the form of fuel rods or fuel rod sections
• Leak-tight and dry fuel rods with potential damages, e.g. reduced cladding thickness
or deformed fuel rods,
• Leaking fuel rods, with minor pin hole defects and hairline cracks up to exposed
nuclear fuel, e.g. fragments, loose pellets, broken fuel rods or debris (cf. Fig. 1),
• Fuel rods in capsules or cartridges,
• Test rods from irradiation experiments
• Fuel in capsules or cartridges
 Disposal of DFR by means of the already approved and licensed transport and storage casks 
of CASTOR® V/19  and  CASTOR® V/52 type (96er-type) 
As a technical solution, a quiver for damaged fuel rods suitable to be loaded into CASTOR® V-casks 
has been developed thus enabling to include the damaged fuel rods in the ordinary disposal route for 
SFAs. This paper presents the major components of the quiver, the loading procedure and the further 
processing under the aspect of the continuity of knowledge. Furthermore, the paper shows the first 
quiver loading with the aim of achieving a defueled reactor block A of Biblis NPP ahead of time.   
2. Design of the Quiver for DFR
The design of the quiver for DFR is based on the requirement that the quiver has to fit into the 
standard fuel basket of CASTOR® V-casks. This requires a quiver with similar dimensions to those of 
a fuel assembly and an excellent mechanical robustness suitable to cope with mechanical loads 
during accident conditions of transport. Therefore the quiver for DFR consists of a forged monolithic 
base body in order to make the quiver resistant against mechanical loads. The base body is equipped 
with a head and a foot piece whereby the appearance of the quiver becomes more similar to that of a 
fuel assembly. The function of the basket inside the base body is to be loadable with a broad range of 
fuel rods, to enclose them safely and to hold them at a clearly defined distance. Differences in the 
diameter of the tubes have been defined according to the geometry and number of individual fuel rods 
that have to be disposed of. In particular, the tubes with the larger diameter allow to include deformed 
fuel rods. With respect to the achievement of the protections goals, the leaktightness of the quiver is 
crucial. For this purpose the quiver is equipped with a lid that can be bolted and welded as well. As a 
result the residual water and fuel inside the quiver is prevented from being released into the internal of 
the cask. Welding the lid has the advantage that the monitoring of the leaktightness can be omitted. 
Bolting the lid enables the filling of the quiver with further fuel rods. Regarding the aspect of 
Safeguards, it is to be noted that the inventory of the quiver is more resistant to manipulation than a 
fuel assembly as soon as the quiver has been welded, since it is more difficult to break open a welding 
seam than to screw off the head of fuel assemblies. From the view of the operator, the quiver should 
be regarded as an item as is the case for SFAs. 
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Fig. 1: Design of the quiver for damaged fuel rods 
. 
3. Handling of the Quiver for DFR
The handling of the quiver takes place on two levels, the spent fuel pool, where the quiver is loaded 
with individual fuel rods, and the reactor floor, where the further handling process of the quiver takes 
place (Fig. 2). The quiver has to be shielded when being transferred between the two levels and 
passing through the handling steps on the reactor floor in order to reduce the dose rate and to avoid 
unnecessary radiation exposure of the staff. At the beginning of the loading process, the quiver is 
placed into a primary shielding basket, which is in the loading station in the spent fuel pool. After 
completion of the loading, the shielding basket is closed by means of a head shielding and transferred 
from the spent fuel pool to the secondary shielding block of the dry handling station. Here the quiver 
passes through three processing steps: dewatering, drying and welding. After dewatering by means of 
a dewatering lance through the head shielding, a gas box is mounted on top of the secondary 
shielding block for the two further steps. The vacuum drying is necessary in order to limit the residual 
water in the quiver.  Therefore, a substantial evaporation of water from the leaking fuel rods has to be 
ensured. For this purpose the quiver for DFR possesses a central tube that allows the water vapour to 
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escape from the leaking fuel rods to the exhaust system of the building. Then the quiver is filled with 
inert gas and closed with a lid that is bolted and then welded.  
Fig. 2: Handling equipment for the quiver for damaged fuel rods on two levels 
Afterwards the handled quiver inside the primary shielding basket is returned to the loading station, 
taken out of the shielding basket and placed in the fuel assembly storage rack, where it is stored until 
loading into a CASTOR® V-cask.  
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Regarding the Safeguards-aspect, it is to be noted that all process steps in the gas box are remotely 
handled and carried out under video surveillance. After welding the unloading of the quiver is no 
longer possible with simple means. Therefore, the inventory of welded quivers is also safely enclosed 
in terms of continuity of knowledge; from the operator’s point of view the welded quiver can be 
regarded as an item to be verified by means of its unique identification number.   
3.1 Traceability of the Quiver for DFR during the Handling Process 
Base bodies, head pieces, internal baskets and the bolt-on and weldable lids are equipped with a 
unique identification number. The identity numbers are positioned in a way that they are clearly visible 
from above and from the side. Due to the side positioning of the identification number at the base 
body, a clear traceability of the loaded quiver is ensured throughout the entire handling process in the 
NPP.  
4. Experience from the first Loading of the Quiver for DFR
The first hot loading of three quivers was executed in the NPP Biblis reactor block A in July 2016. The 
three quivers were loaded together with the latest three fuel assemblies into a CASTOR® V- cask. 
With the transport of this cask in November 2016 from reactor block A to reactor block B, the defueled 
status of block A was achieved.  In block B the CASTOR® V- cask was unloaded. The quivers had not 
been filled completely and had only been bolted (not welded) so that further damaged fuel rods were 
added. Since the quivers then contained their intended inventory, they were ready for verification by 
the two inspectorates.   
Fig. 3: Site of the nuclear power plant Biblis 
The verification approach that was chosen by the inspectorates was the Digital Cherenkov Viewing 
Device (DCVD) method. The applicability of this method to quivers for individual fuel rods was tested 
for the first time on 5th April 2017. The application of the DCVD-method to a quiver turned out to be 
more difficult compared to a fuel assembly because the measurement of the Cherenkov radiation was 
limited to the water inside the central tube of the quiver. Altogether, the results were evaluated as 
satisfactory by the two inspectorates on-site: It could be clearly proven that fuel is inside the quiver. 
Furthermore, individual fuel rods were clearly visible. However, it remains to be seen whether results 
obtained with the DCVD method will correspond to the information value EURATOM and IAEA expect. 
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Abstract: 
The U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control sponsored different 
groups to design and simulate an instrument to measure fresh low enriched uranium fuel assemblies. 
The goal is to be less sensitive to the presence of burnable poisons relative to the current instrument 
in use – the Uranium Neutron Collar for LWR fuel (UNCL). Each group’s chosen sensor is Commercial 
Off the Shelf but has been under development in recent years. The candidate technologies are: pulse 
shape discrimination plastic scintillators, corrugated boron straw detectors, high pressure helium-4 
scintillators, boron-10 neutron plate detectors, stilbene scintillators, and liquid scintillators. Each group 
was provided a set of fresh fuel definitions in MCNP to calculate their detector’s performance. In 
addition, they were judged on other criteria such as size, portability, safety, robustness, and cost. This 
paper will discuss the details of each design and its performance relative to the standard UNCL in use 
today. 
Keywords:  fast neutron, fresh fuel assay, burnable poisons, UNCL, MCNP simulation 
1. Introduction
The objective of the Advanced Neutron Detection Technology Rodeo, henceforth simply referred to as 
the Rodeo, was to explore newly developed neutron detection materials to understand if they provide a 
benefit over existing technology in the area of nondestructive assay (NDA) of fresh fuel. The current 
methodology in use by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for quantifying fresh fuel 
assemblies is active coincidence counting utilizing the Uranium Neutron Collar for Light water reactor 
fuel (UNCL) [1]. The UNCL is a thermal neutron detector based on Helium-3 (3He) gas proportional
counters embedded in polyethylene. The UNCL consists of 18 3He tubes at 4 atmospheres which
amounts to ~6 liters of 3He gas. Three neutron detection slabs surround a central cavity that will 
contain a fuel assembly during the measurement. The fourth side of the cavity is a polyethylene slab 
with a cavity to accommodate a removable americium-lithium (AmLi) neutron interrogation source. In 
addition to a measurement of the ambient background that gets subtracted from every measurement, 
the typical assay sequence consists of two measurements with a fuel assembly in place: a passive 
measurement without the AmLi source present to measure the neutron count rates from the 
spontaneous fission of 238U, and an active measurement with the AmLi source in place to measure the
count rates from the induced fission of 235U plus the spontaneous fission of 238U. The difference 
between the active and passive count rates is proportional to the 235U linear density (g/cm). The use of
a shift-register to analyze the neutron pulse stream from all the 3He tubes allows for the determination
of the real coincidence rate – the number of time-correlated neutrons that emanate from the fuel 
assembly per unit time. The only measureable source of time correlated neutrons in such a system is 
fission, thus the net coincidence rate (Doubles rate) is a function of the induced fission rate which is, 
in-turn, related to the 235U linear density in the fuel.
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The UNCL, shown in Figure 1, has two operational modes – thermal and fast. In the Thermal Mode, 
neutrons that are moderated in the polyethylene body of the UNCL are free to interact with the fuel 
assembly. Since 235U has a much higher fission cross section for thermal neutrons relative to epi-
thermal or fast neutrons, as seen in Figure 2, the count rates are dominated by fission induced by 
thermal neutrons. In the Fast Mode, the user places sheets of Cadmium (Cd) around the central 
cavity. The effect is that most of the neutrons that are below ~0.5 eV in energy are not able to pass 
into the fuel cavity and so the fuel assembly is interrogated with predominantly epi-thermal and fast 
neutrons. Due to the reduced interrogation neutron population and the lower 235U fission cross section
for higher-energy neutrons, the induced fission rate is reduced in the Fast Mode compared to the 
Thermal Mode. However, the count rate is dominated by uncorrelated neutrons from the AmLi source, 
therefore, to achieve the same Doubles precision the inspector is required to measure longer in the 
Fast Mode relative to the Thermal Mode. In practice, a Thermal Mode assay total measurement time is 
around 15 minutes whereas a Fast Mode assay will require a few hours or more to reach the same 
measurement precision. There are two commercially available designs for the UNCL – Type I and 
Type II. For the Type I UNCL (Figure 1) the fuel cavity size is adjustable by moving the two side slabs. 
In the configuration shown in Figure 1 PWR fuel is depicted, but can be changed to measure smaller 
fuel assembly types like BWR and VVER440. The Type II models have fixed geometries so can only 
accommodate either PWR or BWR/VVER440 fuel depending on which configuration is purchased. The 
Type II models have higher efficiency because of the addition of two 3He tubes in the PWR case and
closer coupling of the fuel to the detectors in the BWR case. 
Figure 1: Cut-away view of the UNCL with a 17x17 PWR fuel assembly. 
Some modern fuel designs with higher 235U enrichments (> ~2.5%) require the addition of a neutron
poison in order to keep the assembly reactivity below acceptable limits. The typical poison utilized is 
Gadolinium (Gd). The blue fuel pins in Figure 1 represent poisoned fuel. As the fuel assembly is 
“burned” in the reactor the Gd inventory is continuously reduced because of its very high thermal 
neutron cross section as seen in Figure 2 in green. This is roughly two orders of magnitude larger than 
the 235U fission cross section (Figure 2 in red). The presence of the burnable poisons negatively 
impacts the assay of fresh fuel by removing neutrons that could otherwise induce fission or be 
detected. Thus, two fuel assemblies with the same 235U loading but one containing burnable poison
pins will return different count rates and would therefore be interpreted as having two different 235U
inventories. One of the approaches to reduce the influence of burnable poisons on the measured 
count rates is interrogating the fuel with neutrons that are minimally affected by the presence of the Gd 
– fast neutrons. There are many poisoned fuel designs that range in the concentration of Gd per pin
but also in the number of poisoned pins in an assembly, anywhere from 4 to 24. 
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Figure 2:  Neutron cross sections for Gadolinium capture, Cadmium capture, and 235U fission.
By placing the Cadmium sheets, as indicated in Figure 1, and due to the existence of the large capture 
resonance for Cadmium at ~0.2 eV, as seen in Figure 2 in blue, most neutrons with energies < 0.5 eV 
are effectively prevented from passing through and interacting with the fuel. In this way the effect of 
the neutron poison is reduced but not entirely mitigated since Gd isotopes have many large 
resonances at energies above the Cadmium cut off. Creating a separate calibration for poisoned fuel 
is not an option since the Gd concentration per pin as well as the number and positions of poisoned 
pins in an assembly vary widely throughout the industry. The effect is a reduction in the Doubles rates 
that range from a few percent (Fast Mode, 4 poisoned pins with 6% Gd) to upwards of 35% (Thermal 
Mode, 24 poisoned pins with 10% Gd) for poisoned fuel compared to unpoisoned fuel with the same 
235U loading. 
The current method most often utilized for assay of poisoned fuel is to use a multiplicative correction to 
the measured Doubles rate to compensate for the reduction due to burnable poisons. This correction 
factor requires knowledge of the concentration (in %) of Gd per fuel pin and the number of poison pins 
in the assembly. Since poisoned pins are identical in appearance to unpoisoned pins there is no way 
for the inspector to differentiate by visual inspection and must rely on the operator’s declaration. The 
assay result is then no longer fully independent. The inspector could opt to perform the assay in the 
Fast Mode configuration but time constraints usually dictate that this is rarely done. In addition, there is 
still an effect of the poison even in the Fast Mode, and although it is smaller in magnitude it still needs 
to be corrected using the operator’s declared information. There is a technique that utilizes the ratio of 
the Doubles rates from both a Fast Mode and Thermal Mode measurement [1] of a poisoned fuel 
assembly that can verify the operator’s declaration of burnable poisons or directly estimate the 
multiplicative correction to the Doubles rate – this is, of course, typically not done because of time 
constraints.  
Given these limitations of the current technology, the Rodeo sought to investigate detector 
technologies that could improve on the UNCL performance for poisoned fuel. The physics of the 
technique limits where improvements can be realized, such as control of the interrogating neutron flux 
and/or improved measurement time in the Fast Mode. Examination of the neutron cross sections 
plotted in Figure 2 shows that the Gd capture probability falls off rapidly at energies above the 
resonance region but the 235U fission cross section is roughly constant. Therefore, a significant 
reduction in the sensitivity to burnable poisons can be realized if the moderation of neutrons in the 
area of the fuel is minimized. Improvements in neutron detection efficiency and/or coupling of 
unmoderated or slightly moderated interrogation source neutrons to the fuel can lower the 
measurement time in Fast Mode. Improvements to the precision of the Doubles rate such as being 
insensitive to neutrons from the AmLi interrogation source and/or being able to shorten the 
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coincidence gate width, which reduces the accidental coincidence rate, will also lower the needed 
count time in Fast Mode. 
1.1. Rodeo Methodology 
One of the challenges when evaluating disparate technologies is devising a testing plan that is fair and 
unbiased to all participants. For this Rodeo it was decided that the testing and comparison of the 
technologies would be done via Monte Carlo simulation of fresh fuel assemblies. Furthermore, that the 
fuel assembly definitions and models would be developed by someone not participating in the Rodeo.  
The basic ground rules of the Rodeo were: each group design a UNCL-like instrument with their 
detector material with roughly the same form-factor and concept of use; the Monte Carlo simulation 
tool would be MCNP [2]; the interrogation source simulated was a 50,000 n/s AmLi source with a given 
(Obninsk) energy spectrum [3]; other neutron interrogation sources were allowed but a full set of 
simulations were required with the AmLi; the simulation of the detector response was done in both 
Fast and Thermal Mode. 
Each group were given several sets of Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel assembly definitions to 
evaluate their detector model.  
1. A set of 17x17 assemblies with 264 fuel pins and 25 guide tubes with 235U linear densities (LD)
of 15, 20, 25, 35, 45, 55, 60, and 65 g/cm. These were used to generate calibrations (Doubles
rate vs. 235U g/cm) in both the Fast and Thermal Mode.
a. Fuel dimensions:
i. Assembly width = 21.4 cm
ii. Fuel pin pitch = 1.278 cm
iii. Pellet density = 10.41 g/cm3
iv. Pellet diameter = 0.8255 cm
v. Zircalloy cladding
2. A set of unpoisoned 14x14, 15x15, 16x16, and 17x17 fuel assemblies with various differences
in fuel parameters such as: fuel pin pitch, numbers and locations of guide tubes, cladding
thickness, fuel pellet diameter and density, and overall enrichment.
3. A set of 17x17 fuel assemblies with partial defects – where some normal Low Enriched
Uranium (LEU) fuel pins have been substituted with Depleted Uranium (DU) fuel pins. The
number of substituted pins simulated were: 8, 16, 24, 32, and 40
4. A set of 17x17 fuel assemblies containing burnable poisons in the form of Gd-oxide.
Concentrations of Gd per pin were 6%, 8%, and 10% and the number of poisoned pins per
assembly were 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, and 24.
The groups were asked to use the calibration assemblies (set #1 above) to determine coefficients for 
both Fast and Thermal Mode calibrations. These calibrations would then be used to calculate the 
“assayed” linear density of the fuel assemblies in sets 2, 3, and 4. The assayed linear densities for the 
fuel would then be compared to the known linear densities to calculate the mass difference, or mass 
defect. This comparison would highlight the sensitivity of the modeled detector to the given 
perturbation. It is these mass defects that will be compared across all of the different detector 
materials. 
An estimate of the counting statistics on net count rates was also requested by simulating both passive 
and active assays. The passive assay counting statistics were determined assuming a 300 second 
measurement while the active statistics were calculated at 600 and 1800 seconds. These were done 
using the 55 g/cm 17x17 calibration assembly. 
Finally, in order to have a baseline to compare the various detector designs to, the standard 3He 
based UNCL was also simulated using the same sets of PWR fuel assemblies. The following teams 
and a short description of the materials tested are shown in Table 1. Each of these materials on its 
own is interesting enough to report on, however, that is not the purpose of this paper. Therefore, only 
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introductory information on each detector will be given and the reader is encouraged to find more in-
depth information in the references provided in Table 1. 
Group Detector material 
ORNL1 EJ-299 – Pulse Shape Discrimination (PSD) plastic is a bulk scintillator that has 
excellent discrimination properties between gamma rays and neutrons; fast-neutron 
detection mechanism via proton-recoil and scintillation coupled to photomultiplier tubes; 
crosstalk correction based on particle velocity [4][5] 
ORNL2 Boron-coated straws – 10B-lined cylindrical proportional counters that are cost effective,
simple to make, and offer higher efficiency per tube compared to 3He; low gamma ray
sensitivity; thermal neutron detection, no detector-to-detector crosstalk [6][7][8] 
LANL Boron parallel-plates –  10B lined plate layout with high detection efficiency per unit 
surface area; polyethylene sheets between plate detectors allow for neutron energy 
information; thermal neutron detection, no detector-to-detector crosstalk [9][10][11] 
INL 4He scintillators – high pressure 4He has a high intrinsic fast neutron efficiency; low
gamma sensitivity; low sensitivity to AmLi neutrons; least moderating design of those 
tested; fast-neutron detection mechanism via 4He-recoil and scintillation coupled to 
photomultiplier tubes or SiPMs [12][13][14] 
LLNL Stilbene scintillators – solid organic scintillators with high sensitivity to fast neutrons; 
excellent neutron and gamma ray Pulse Shape Discrimination; can operate at low PSD 
threshold (~60 keVee); innovative model for correcting crosstalk [15][16][17] 
UM EJ309 – liquid scintillator; high flash point; non-toxic; excellent PSD properties, can 
operate at low PSD threshold (~50 keVee) [18][19][20] 
Table 1. Summary of the groups and the detector materials simulated. 
As seen in Table 1 there are a mix of thermal neutron detectors and fast neutron detectors. There are 
advantages and disadvantages of each type. For example, thermal neutron detectors typically have a 
higher intrinsic efficiency, are insensitive to gamma radiation from fresh fuel, and do not suffer from 
crosstalk since the neutron is absorbed as a result of the detection process. However, the process of 
thermalizing the neutrons for detection leaves the technique vulnerable to biases from burnable 
poisons. Additionally, thermal neutron detectors are also sensitive to neutrons from the interrogating 
AmLi neutron source which greatly impacts the precision of the measured Doubles rate. Fast neutron 
detectors are typically threshold detectors that are largely, but not completely, insensitive to the lower 
average neutron energy of AmLi. Due to the fact that neutrons from events of interest (fission) are born 
fast there is no need for moderation which greatly reduces the sensitivity to burnable poisons. The 
time window needed to observe truly coincident neutrons is orders of magnitude shorter for fast 
detectors relative to thermal detectors so that accidental coincidences are rare at the count rates 
observed with this type of measurement and improves Doubles rate precision and assay time. 
However, because the fast detection mechanism is neutron scattering there is some crosstalk between 
detector cells that must be corrected for. Finally, since most fast neutron detectors are bulk scintillators 
they are sensitive to gamma ray radiation and require either shielding and/or a robust method for 
discriminating between gammas and neutrons. 
Because of the volume of data generated in the Rodeo project and the perceived need in the area of 
poisoned fresh fuel assay this report will focus only on the results in the Fast Mode. All of the 
simulated detectors performed at least as well as, and certainly a few of them better than, the standard 
UNCL in the Thermal Mode. However, in terms of performance, the standard UNCL is perfectly 
adequate in the Thermal Mode and exceeds the published international safeguards targets for 
accuracy and precision [21], therefore no performance enhancement need is envisioned at this time in 
Thermal Mode. 
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2. Detector materials
2.1. Pulse Shape Discrimination (PSD) plastic (EJ-299) 
Recently, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) evaluated a set of segmented detectors constructed 
from commercially available PSD plastic for the purpose of fast-neutron coincidence counting. These 
detectors were originally built to instrument the focal plane of a fast-neutron imager, but the position 
and time resolution permitted by segmented detectors enabled separation of fission coincidences from 
inter-detector scattering using the kinematics of neutron scattering. A photo of one of the PSD plastic 
cells is shown in Fig 3. 
Figure 3. Photograph of a segmented PSD plastic detector module with 4 PMTs. 
For the purposes of this simulation study, the philosophy of the notional design for the PSD plastic 
collar was to echo the present design of the UNCL while using detectors that were representative of 
the present ORNL segmented PSD plastic detectors. In this way, the study was intended to primarily 
provide information regarding the safeguards utility of fast proton-recoil scintillator, segmented 
detectors, and the ability to identify and compensate for inter-detector scattering. For instance, no 
significant effort was spent adjusting the geometry or constituents of the moderator to modify the 
interrogating neutron flux or spectrum. As a result, the instrument was modeled as a four-sided system 
similar to the UNCL with three sides of detectors and one side consisting of a moderated AmLi source 
identical to that used in the UNCL. In the Fast Mode, the fuel was surrounded by a 1 mm layer of 
cadmium extending 340 mm along the length of the fuel. Vertically centered about the cadmium liner 
were 12 PSD plastic volumes, each 12 × 12 cm on a face with a depth of 5 cm arranged in a 2 × 2 
array on each of three sides. In each corner, a block of plastic was used as passive shielding to limit 
multiple scattering of neutrons between adjacent sides. A cross-sectional view of the (right) PSD-
plastic collar and the (left) UNCL are shown in Figure 4. Additional inactive volumes, such as light 
guides, light readout [photomultiplier tubes or silicon photomultipliers (PMTs or SiPMs)], detector 
housings, and electronics were not included in the simulation. 
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Figure 4. Comparison of the standard UNCL to the collar design with PSD Plastic modules. 
Simulations were performed using Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) 6.1.1b coupled with a locally 
authored detector response and coincidence analysis that used the MCNP6 “ptrac” stream. In the 
simulations, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory fission model was specified using the 
FMULT card via (e.g.) FMULT 92235 METHOD=5. Further details of this methodology can be found in 
[22]. 
2.2. Corrugated Boron Straw Detectors 
The second ORNL entry consisted of a thermal neutron detector in the form of 10B-lined cylindrical
proportional counters (PCs) from Proportional Technologies Inc. (PTI). These are among the oldest 
and most highly developed neutron detection technologies, as described by Rossi and Staub back in 
1949. However, when 3He gas became widely available, 3He-filled PCs quickly became the dominant
approach to neutron detection because they were cost-effective, simple to make, and offered higher 
efficiency per tube. Recently the demand for 3He has challenged the supply, costs have risen sharply,
and there is a concern over the long-term supply. This has refocused attention on boron-lined PC 
approaches to providing general purpose safeguards solutions to neutron counting needs. Several 
important points can be made about this technology. First, gas-filled PCs are inherently reliable and 
stable. These characteristics are especially important in nuclear safeguards applications. Second, they 
can be operated with high gamma-to-neutron discrimination, comparable to or better that 3He, which
most credible alternatives cannot match. This is evidenced by the use of commercial detectors in 
reactor applications. Third the neutron capture process may be confidently simulated using standard 
transport code options. This is important because in NDA safeguards there is usually the need to 
extend existing calibrations and to calculate correction factors using computational methods. Multiple 
scattering, cross talk, and complicated pulse shape analysis do not need to be considered. In contrast 
to 3He-gas-filled PCs, 10B-lined counters have a continuous energy deposition spectrum, and the 
threshold needed to discriminate gamma-rays results in lost efficiency. A compromise between the 
boron layer thickness and detection threshold must be struck. Deposit thicknesses are normally limited 
to about 2 µm, and traditionally, this limited achievable detection efficiency. Recently, however, several 
changes in thinking and practice have taken place so that the measurement penalty is not as great as 
it was once assumed to be. Advances in coating technology and manufacturing capability mean that 
large, robust areas of boron carbide can now be laid down in an automated and reproducible way. 
To overcome some of the disadvantages of the older 10B counters noted above, boron-coated straws
(BCSs) have recently been developed. As the name implies, using a small diameter straw with internal 
structure (corrugation), the boron concentration per unit volume of the moderator has been increased 
considerably. An additional and crucial benefit is that the boron is distributed throughout the moderator 
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Polyethylene (CH
2
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more uniformly so that thermal neutrons can be absorbed at the point of thermalization, which reduces 
the system die-away time. For coincidence counting applications both efficiency and die-away time are 
important in governing system performance, and so a BCS design does not have to match a standard 
3He-based design on efficiency if it has a shorter die-away time. The realization that commercially 
available BCS detectors, the straw aspects of which are proven in the high energy physics community 
for image reconstruction, has provided viable and scalable 3He-free solutions for a wide range of 
safeguards and other applications.  
The basic design (round tube) and three advanced BCS designs are shown in Figure 5: six-point star 
(a-right), pie-6 (b), and pie-12 (c). The purpose of these advanced designs was to increase the internal 
wall areas for B4C coating in order to increase overall neutron detection efficiency, while maintaining 
the same coating thickness. As a result, the total coating area has been increased by a factor of 1.4, 
2.0, and 3.0 for the six-point star, pie-6, and pie-12 designs, respectively, compared with that of the 
basic design. 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 5. The basic straw design (round) and three advanced straw designs: the basic straw design (a-left) and 
the advanced six-point star (a-right); pie-6 (b); and pie-12 (c).  
The model of the UNCL using the BCS detectors was optimized in terms of both efficiency and 
tailoring the neutron spectrum from the interrogation source. Figure 6 shows the optimized version of 
the BCS collar, referred to as the “BCS plus collar,” which is bigger than the base model and 
incorporates several novel design features. The width, length, and height of this model are 52, 49, and 
50 cm, respectively, compared with the 43, 43, and 52 cm of UNCL. The number of straws was 
increased from the 1,076 of the base model to 1,802 to increase the overall neutron detection 
efficiency. This BCS plus collar has been optimized to reduce the sensitivity to the Gd rods in the fuel. 
The cadmium liners of the base model were replaced with gadolinium liners around the cavity in the 
plus model. A half cylindrical shell with top and bottom of stainless steel is added and placed behind 
the AmLi source to reflect the neutrons back to the interrogation target—the fuel assembly. Borated 
polyethylene was used for the source block to reduce the number of source neutrons traveling through 
those regions and then being detected by the straws. The coating thickness of the B4C in the straws 
was 1.5 µm. In the analysis of both the base collar and the plus collar, it was assumed that the total 
B4C coating area was doubled using the advanced straw designs, although only round straws are 
shown in corresponding figures. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 6. BCS plus collar: the XY cross-sectional view of the BCS plus collar (a); the XZ cross-sectional view of 
the plus collar with the Y plane cutting through the AmLi source (b). 
2.3. 4He Scintillator 
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) submitted a UNCL design based on high-pressure 4He scintillators. As
a scintillator, 4He is a fairly good one, with scintillation light emitted in the vacuum ultraviolet (VUV)
region at a wavelength around 80 nm, requiring the use of a wavelength shifter in order to be detected 
in a meaningful way. Photon production is on the order of 18,000 VUV photons produced per MeV 
deposited by neutrons. The detectors simulated in this study utilize wavelength shifting paint on the 
interior of a 60-cm long detection cylinder, with silicon photomultipliers (SiPMs) placed axially along 
the cylinder to detect the light emitted from the scintillation events. For the present study, detection of 
a neutron event was based on the amount of energy transmitted from an incident neutron to the 4He
gas, so the method of light collection was not of primary concern, but may be important for further 
implementation or for other applications, particularly in high radiation dose situations. The 4He elastic
scattering cross section has a peak at around 1 MeV for neutrons, which makes it ideally suited for 
active interrogation applications. Figure 7 presents the scattering cross section of 4He, AmLi neutron
emission energy, and 235U fission neutron emission energy.
Figure 7. Elastic cross section for 4He (blue, left axis), AmLi neutron emission (green, right axis) and U-235
fission neutron emission (red, right axis). 
Monte Carlo models of 4He scintillator detectors including inelastic scatter, light transmission and 
detection in PMTs or SiPMs have been developed and published using GEANT4 and MCNP-PoliMi 
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models. In order to have a benchmarked simulation basis upon which to compare results to other 
detectors being investigated under the current study, a model was developed in MCNP6.1b to simulate 
the 4He detector response based on the energy transferred to 4He gas from incident neutrons. The
development and decay of excimer states was not modelled, nor was wavelength shifting or light 
collection. The model utilized pulse height and energy deposition tallies with the ptrac coinc option to 
provide information on coincident events both within a single detector, and between multiple detectors. 
This model was compared to simulated and experimentally measured detector responses published 
for 4He detectors of different pressures and lengths, shown in Figure 8. Excellent agreement is 
observed between the developed MCNP model, the detector response from both GEANT4/MCNP-
Pollimi simulations and experimental measurements. 
Figure 8. Single detector modelling and experimental comparison. Experimental data for 20cm, 150bar tubes 
shown in black [13]; GEANT4 data from [14] 
For the present effort, commercially available Arktis Radiation Detectors Ltd. model S670 detectors 
were simulated. These detectors are 60 cm in active length and 4.4 cm in active diameter, with up to 
200 bar 4He fill gas. The tubes are comprised of three 20-cm sections, each with 8 SiPMs. Output from
each section is analyzed utilizing a time-over-threshold (TOT) algorithm using integrated electronics, 
and a TTL output is provided from each tube. Figure 9 shows a cutaway view of the Arktis detectors. 
Figure 9. Cutaway view of the Arktis Radiation Detectors S670 tube [courtesy of Arktis Radiation Detectors, Ltd.] 
One of the primary challenges of using fast neutron scintillation detectors for coincident or multiplicity 
measurements is scatter between detectors, possibly leading to false coincident neutron events. For 
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the developed detector model, events where an incident neutron was scattered and detected in 
multiple neighboring detectors were recorded in the ptrac coinc output and subtracted from the total 
coincident rate. As each detected event contains spatial and energy information, more sophisticated 
treatment of scattering events was investigated, but offered limited improvement for the present 
application. A plan view of the 31 detector model used in this study is shown in Figure10. 
Figure 10. Plan view of the 4He models with double rows of tubes completely surrounding FA, 60 cm in length.
2.3. Boron Plate Detectors 
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) utilized a COTS technology based on sealed-cell boron-
coated plate detectors developed by Precision Data Technology (PDT). The newer version of the plate 
design that this work is based on utilizes a new boron coating material mixture and procedure that 
results in large increases (~ 50%) in the detection efficiency per unit of surface area. This proprietary 
method provides a 3-D surface area increase over the prior PDT coating method, and the boron 
surface area is considerably larger than the metal surface that supports it. A photograph of one of the 
slab units and a cutaway drawing showing the internal structure is shown in Figure 11. 
Figure 11. The PDT parallel plate detector pod with 6 internal 10B lined cells. 
The first UNCL design consisted of 4 PDT pods arranged to create detectors on three sides. The 
fourth side is a polyethylene slab with a hole for the AmLi source. This design creates a form factor 
which closely resembles the 3He based UNCL system. To optimize the detector, there are several
characteristics which were studied. These are the polyethylene thickness between the cells, the 
polyethylene thickness between the sample cavity and the first cell, the Cd layer thickness, and the 
AmLi source position. 
All of the optimization runs were done with a 17x17 fuel assembly with a mass loading of 45 g/cm – 
one of the fuel assemblies that was provided by NNSA/NA-241 for creation of the calibration curve. 
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Both the Fast and Thermal modes in active and passive configuration were modeled. To find the best 
design, the error of the doubles rate was minimized for the Fast Mode configuration. Some of the 
detector characteristics were fixed during the optimization runs. This includes the sample cavity which 
was fixed at 23.4 cm by 23.4 cm. Each individual 10B cell thickness is 0.6 cm with a 0.1 cm thick wall
and a 2.1 μm thick boron layer. The total height of the UNCL is 51 cm that is approximately the same 
as the current UNCL. The electronics and cable connections are mounted at the top of the pod and are 
included in the 51 cm height. 
MCNP version 6.1.1b was used for the Monte Carlo modeling. In active mode, AmLi neutrons were 
started with the Obninsk source spectrum definition provided by NNSA/NA-241. The coincidence count 
rate per source particle was obtained using a F8 capture tally. Multiplying this tally by the AmLi source 
strength resulted in the singles and doubles count rates. In an effort to make the MCNP model as 
close to reality as possible, the corrugation of the cells, shown in Figure 12, was incorporated into the 
model. The corrugated design allows for better charge collection and also makes the individual cell 
more ridged. All modeling includes dead spaces where the edges of the individual pods meet. 
Figure 12. Diagram of the corregated geometry. 
To achieve a better coupling between the AmLi source and the fuel assembly for Fast Mode operation, 
a notch was added to the slab that holds the AmLi source. This notch also would allow for a WWER 
fuel assembly to fit into the sample cavity as shown in Figure 13. 
Figure 13. On the left is an MCNP model of the boron plate UNCL design with the corregated cell design shownig 
the 4 pods, AmLi slab, and fresh fuel assembly. On the right is a drawing representing how a WWER fuel 
assembly would fit into the boron plate UNCL design. 
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2.3. Stilbene 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) designed their UNCL counter using stilbene 
scintillator crystals that are commercially available from Inrad Optics. The company uses a rapid, safe 
growth technique that was developed at LLNL which allows for large (4” x 2”) crystals at lower cost 
than previously available. Like the other scintillators in this study stilbene is a fast neutron detector that 
relies on neutron scattering to produce energetic charged recoil ions that generate scintillation light. It 
has a fast response time on the order of a nano-seconds which allows for the resolution of individual 
fission chains (bursts) and permits a detailed analysis of the underlying neutron multiplication, as well 
as a much shorter coincidence gate for counting neutrons and their correlations with very few 
Accidentals. This leads to a precise and rapid assay in significantly lower measurement times. Since a 
fast 1 MeV neutron travels at 1.5 cm/ns, with nano-second time resolution it is possible to resolve the 
spatial distribution of SNM (special nuclear material) at centimeter scales using neutron and gamma 
correlations. While this is not a requirement for the Rodeo it is an important capability of fast neutron 
counting that can potentially be used to great advantage. 
With scintillator based detection what is actually being measured is the scintillator light output 
spectrum. From this light output spectrum one can unfold the neutron energy spectrum of the neutrons 
being detected. Finally, stilbene is an optimal scintillator detector because it has the highest organic 
scintillation efficiency with much higher light yield than plastics or liquids. It has an excellent PSD 
(pulse shape discrimination) which allows for excellent gamma rejection which in turn implies high 
neutron detection efficiency. This high efficiency and short coincidence gating is critical to it being 
competitive with 3He based neutron detectors.
The prototype stilbene neutron collar design described here uses 30 of these 4”x2” crystals that can fit 
into the form factor of standard 3He based collar, as shown in Figure 14. The LLNL group used the
Hansen-Richter quench function [23] to generate the stilbene light output spectrum by post-processing 
their custom LLNL MCNPX27e simulations of the neutron collar. 
Figure 14. LLNL prototype stilbene neutron collar with 30 stilbene cells and a form factor similar to commercially 
available 3He based UNCL. Also shown is a MCNP model of the stilbene collar with a fuel assembly and an AmLi
interrogating neutron source (shown without the poly bank in which it is embedded). 
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Simulations with the custom MCNPX27e code use the LLNL fission library by setting fism=5 in the 6th 
entry of the PHYS:N card. This setting samples a full measured distribution for the number of fission 
neutrons emitted in a fission event. The timestamps recorded by the custom LLNL MCNPX27e are in 
double precision, in contrast to the default MCNP PTRAC which uses single precision. This double 
precision is especially important when simulating fast neutron detector counting with sub nano-second 
time resolution to avoid false correlations. 
The LLNL analysis methodology uses an inverse modeling approach to estimate and correct for 
multiple scatter neutron crosstalk. A detailed MCNPX27e model of the stilbene collar is used to 
generate a library of scintillator light output spectrum for a set of random point or extended source of 
mono-energetic neutrons with energies ranging from 1 to 10 MeV. A measured scintillator light output 
spectrum from a general unknown object is then fitted with the library of responses to simultaneously 
determine the neutron energy spectrum and the crosstalk correction. 
2.4. Liquid Scintillator EJ309 
The University of Michigan designed the UNCL with EJ309 (3”Ø x 3”) liquid scintillators which are 
scatter-based fast neutron detectors that directly detect the unmoderated fast fission neutrons. The 
primary mechanism for neutron detection in organic scintillators is through neutrons undergoing elastic 
scattering on protons within the active volume of the detector; the recoil protons generate scintillation 
light that is collected and read through a photomultiplier tube (PMT), or more recently through silicon 
photomultipliers (SiPM). These scintillators have relatively fast response times with waveforms on the 
order of tens of nanoseconds and coincident timing resolution of less than two nanoseconds at full-
width half maximum. The EJ309 system is also able to count pairs of neutrons in much shorter time 
gates relative to thermal neutron detector systems as there is no need for moderation of the emitted 
fast neutrons; this allows for much lower rates of accidental correlations relative to true correlations. 
The fast response and shorter time gates of an EJ309 system results in the ability to assay the fuel 
assembly (to a degree of uncertainty) in shorter acquisition times relative to the traditional 3He based
systems. Figure 15 shows a typical waveform in an EJ309 and the timing resolution between pairs of 
EJ309 modules obtained experimentally from coincident measurement of 22Na annihilation photons.
Figure 15. A typical pulse in an EJ309 (left) and the timing resolution between pairs of EJ309 measured with a 
22Na source (right). 
The EJ309 system also exhibits additional capabilities that are not feasible in traditional 3He based
systems mainly due to the absence of moderating material. Without moderating material between the 
fuel assembly and the detectors, additional information characteristic to the impinging neutron can be 
retained. One measured quantity is the energy deposited within each detector cell (proportional to the 
collected light in the PMT and/or SiPM); this allows for neutron spectrum unfolding capabilities. 
Additionally, spatial and/or angular distributions of the fission neutrons can also be extracted which 
can potentially provide characteristic signatures pertinent to the assembly. 
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EJ309 cells are sensitive to both fast neutrons (> ~0.5 MeV at 50 keVee light threshold) and gamma 
rays. The two types of particles are distinguished from one another through pulse shape discrimination 
(PSD) techniques. Neutron pulses will exhibit a slower decay in the tail-region of the waveform relative 
to photon pulses of the same pulse height. The ratio of the charge in the tail-region to the total charge 
of the waveform provides a suitable discrimination parameter which allows for particle identification. 
The chance for particle misclassification increases for pulses of lower pulse heights; the detection 
threshold was set such that the gamma-ray misclassification rate (gamma rays that are classified as 
neutrons) was lower than 10-6 per detection. Figure 16 shows two distinct regions that correspond to
neutron and gamma ray pulses. 
Figure 16. Scatter plot of the charge-ratio versus the pulse height showing two distinct regions for neutrons and 
gamma rays from a 252Cf source; the black line is the optimized discrimination line for particle identification.
The prototype system design is comprised of an array of 23 EJ309 detectors arranged in to fit in the 
form factor of the standard 3He based UNCL. MCNPXTM v2.7e with the -PoliMi extension [24] was
used to simulate fission events and its subsequent events. The MPPost detector response emulator 
code [25] was used to extract neutron multiplicity counting distribution, which was used to obtain the 
neutron doubles count rate (second-order factorial moment). The time gate was set to correlated 
neutrons within a 200 nanosecond window. Figure 17 shows the simulated model geometry of the 
prototype EJ309 system.  
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Figure 17. The simulated model geometry for the prototype EJ309 system consisting of 23 EJ309 detectors. 
3. Results and Comparisons
In the sections that follow the simulation results will be presented for all the detector materials in this 
study. For comparison, the simulation results for the current standard Type I UNCL with 3He tubes are
also included. It should be noted that the Doubles rate from the active simulations is the quantity of 
interest for this Rodeo. In simulation space, the active Doubles is equivalent to the coincidence rate of 
interest, the Net Doubles rate. In an actual measurement, the Net Doubles is normally obtained by 
subtracting the passive Doubles from the active Doubles. This makes the simulation study more 
convenient in that it is not necessary to run passive simulations to obtain the net Doubles rate. Thus, 
going forward, the Doubles rate refers to the Net Doubles rate which is the quantity used to determine 
the LD of 235U in the fuel assembly in a real world measurement.
3.1. Fast Mode Calibration 
To achieve the Fast Mode most groups utilized either a 1.0 or 0.5 mm thick Cadmium liner around the 
fuel cavity to effectively prevent neutrons with energies < 0.5 eV from interacting with the fuel. The 
ORNL – 10B Straws group used liners made of Gadolinium. Table 2 presents the simulated Singles (S)
and Doubles (D) rates as a function of the linear density of 235U in the calibration fuel assemblies 
provided. 
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LD 235U
(g/cm)
S
(1/s)
D
(1/s)
σD 
(1/s)
S
(1/s)
D
(1/s)
σD 
(1/s)
S
(1/s)
D
(1/s)
σD 
(1/s)
S
(1/s)
D
(1/s)
σD 
(1/s)
15 821 5.6 0.06 196 7.7 0.12 918 6.1 0.16 1946 17.0 0.53
20 834 7.5 0.06 215 10.2 0.14 926 7.8 0.17 1964 21.5 0.53
25 846 9.3 0.07 234 12.3 0.15 933 9.4 0.17 1982 26.0 0.54
35 867 11.8 0.08 268 16.2 0.17 948 12.2 0.18 2014 34.2 0.55
45 887 14.5 0.09 299 19.2 0.19 959 15.0 0.18 2042 41.8 0.57
55 903 16.7 0.10 329 23.2 0.21 973 17.6 0.19 2068 49.3 0.58
60 911 18.0 0.10 342 24.2 0.21 978 18.8 0.19 2082 53.1 0.58
65 918 18.7 0.10 354 25.9 0.22 983 20.0 0.19 2094 56.7 0.59
LD 235U
(g/cm)
S
(1/s)
D
(1/s)
σD 
(1/s)
S
(1/s)
D 
(1/s)
σD 
(1/s)
S
(1/s)
D
(1/s)
σD 
(1/s)
15 843 15.3 0.09 150 7.6 0.06 257 11.4 0.15
20 856 16.0 0.09 163 9.2 0.07 279 14.0 0.17
25 870 17.0 0.10 176 11.2 0.08 299 16.9 0.18
35 897 19.2 0.10 198 14.1 0.09 336 21.5 0.21
45 921 21.1 0.11 220 16.7 0.10 371 24.9 0.22
55 945 22.6 0.11 238 19.5 0.10 402 28.2 0.24
60 956 23.3 0.11 248 21.4 0.11 415 30.9 0.25
65 965 24.1 0.12 256 22.2 0.11 430 32.9 0.26
UNCL ORNL - PSD plastic ORNL - 10B straws LANL - 10B Plates
INL - 4He LLNL - Stilbene UM - EJ309
Table 2. Fast calibration data for all technologies based on a 50,000 n/s AmLi interrogation source.
The error in the Doubles rate are determined assuming an 1800 second assay and a shift-register 
analysis of the pulse stream from the detector. The methodology for the Doubles uncertainty is 
described in [26] and is dependent on the Singles and Doubles rates and the Gate Width. All 
calibrations are shown in Figure 18 on a lin-log scale. The error bars are too small to see in the plot. 
Figure 18. Plot of the Fast Mode calibrations for all the technologies. 
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The rates shown are calculated assuming a 5.0x104 n/s interrogation source. The different
technologies provide a range of detector responses over the calibration LD range. Most of the detector 
calibrations can be fit with the typical fit of the form: 𝐷 =  𝑎∗𝑚
1+𝑏∗𝑚
, where a and b are fitting constants and 
m is the 235U linear density. The exception is the INL – 4He detector that obtains a better fit with a
linear or second order polynomial. The likely reason the 4He detector material has a flatter response
relative to the other materials is that there is no hydrogen associated with the detector material itself. 
In the case of the UNCL and the 10B Straws or Plates, there is polyethylene that provides moderation
to increase the detection efficiency. For EJ309, Stilbene, and PSD Plastic these detector materials are 
hydrocarbons which will also moderate the neutrons very well. Even though there are cadmium or 
gadolinium curtains between the detectors and the fuel, a good fraction of epi-thermal neutrons are 
able to interact with the fuel and thus, boost the fission rate as the linear density increases. However, 
for the 4He material, since it is not as good as hydrogen at moderation, the neutron spectrum 
interrogating the fuel is much faster and so the multiplication in the fuel is relatively lower at the higher 
235U linear densities compared to the other detector types. 
3.2. Fast Mode Unpoisoned In-tact Fuel 
In order to test the calibrations determined from the fittings above the groups were tasked with 
simulating a variety of unpoisoned fuel found in the nuclear fuel industry. The fuel ranged from 14x14 
up to 17x17 and have different design characteristics than the fuel used for calibration. The significant 
parameters of each fuel assembly are given in Table 3 and examples of two of the modeled fuel 
designs are shown in Figure 19. The results for each detector technology are shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
The data in the tables show the analyzed linear densities for each technology that were derived from 
their specific Fast Mode calibrations in addition to the difference between the actual LD and the 
analyzed LD (mass defect) as well its 3σ total uncertainty for comparison. The total uncertainty 
assumes an 1800 second active measurement and an assumed 2% systematic uncertainty. 
Width 
(cm) 
Pin 
Pitch 
(cm) 
# 
Fuel 
Pins 
Clad 
OD 
(cm) 
Clad 
thickness 
(cm) 
Pellet ρ 
(g/cm3)
Pellet 
OD 
(cm) 
Enrich. 
(%) 
235U 
LD 
(g/cm) 
Fuel 
Design 
19.70 1.437 179 1.016 0.0617 10.42 0.875 3.80 37.6 14x14A 
20.60 1.499 176 1.118 0.0660 10.44 0.968 3.13 37.3 14x14B 
19.70 1.437 179 1.016 0.0617 10.42 0.875 2.00 19.8 14x14C 
21.40 1.452 204 1.072 0.0620 10.64 0.929 4.50 58.4 15x15A 
21.50 1.459 205 1.075 0.0725 10.45 0.911 5.00 61.5 15x15B 
21.70 1.472 208 1.090 0.0635 10.52 0.940 4.55 60.9 15x15C 
19.70 1.252 235 0.914 0.0572 10.42 0.784 4.50 46.9 16x16A 
20.70 1.317 184 0.950 0.0572 10.42 0.819 4.50 40.1 
20.70 1.317 52 0.950 0.0572 10.42 0.819 4.00 10.1 
20.70 1.317 236 0.950 0.0572 10.42 0.819 4.39 50.2 16x16B 
20.70 1.317 136 0.950 0.0572 10.42 0.819 2.92 19.2 
20.70 1.317 100 0.950 0.0572 10.42 0.819 2.42 11.7 
20.70 1.317 236 0.950 0.0572 10.42 0.819 2.71 30.9 16x16C 
22.96 1.459 236 1.075 0.0725 10.50 0.911 4.50 64.1 16x16D 
21.40 1.278 264 0.950 0.0570 10.52 0.819 3.20 41.3 17x17A 
21.40 1.278 264 0.950 0.0570 10.64 0.819 4.20 54.8 17x17B 
Table 3. Details of the fuel designs for the in-tact unpoisoned fuel used to test the calibration. The design names 
are only of significance for this study. 
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Figure 19. MCNP model representations of un-poisoned in-tact fuel: 16x16C (left) and 14x14A (right). The 
different color pins in the fuel indicate different enrichment. 
Fuel 
Design
Declared 
LD 235U
(g/cm)
Analyzed 
LD 235U 
(g/cm)
LD mass 
defect (%)
1800 sec 
Total 
Uncert (%) 
3σ
Analyzed 
LD 235U 
(g/cm)
LD mass 
defect (%)
1800 sec 
Total 
Uncert (%) 
3σ
14x14A 37.6 35.0 -6.9% 9.2% 35.1 -6.7% 8.5%
14x14B 37.3 36.0 -3.5% 9.0% 36.0 -3.6% 8.3%
14x14C 19.8 17.9 -9.4% 12.1% 19.1 -3.5% 10.8%
15x15A 58.4 58.7 0.6% 8.5% 58.1 -0.5% 7.6%
15x15B 61.5 59.4 -3.5% 8.5% 61.7 0.2% 7.6%
15x15C 60.9 61.8 1.4% 8.5% 61.5 0.9% 7.6%
16x16A 46.9 44.4 -5.3% 8.6% 44.9 -4.3% 8.0%
16x16B 50.2 49.0 -2.4% 8.5% 48.3 -3.7% 7.8%
16x16C 31.0 29.4 -4.9% 9.6% 29.5 -4.7% 8.9%
16x16D 64.1 66.6 4.0% 8.6% 65.1 1.6% 7.6%
17x17A 41.3 41.7 1.0% 8.6% 40.4 -2.0% 8.0%
17x17B 54.8 52.6 -4.0% 8.4% 53.8 -1.9% 7.6%
Fuel 
Design
Declared 
LD 235U
(g/cm)
Analyzed 
LD 235U 
(g/cm)
LD mass 
defect (%)
1800 sec 
Total 
Uncert (%) 
3σ
14x14A 37.6 34.5 -8.3% 9.0%
14x14B 37.3 35.4 -5.1% 8.7%
14x14C 19.8 18.4 -7.1% 11.5%
15x15A 58.4 57.9 -0.8% 8.2%
15x15B 61.5 60.9 -1.0% 8.3%
15x15C 60.9 61.6 1.1% 8.3%
16x16A 46.9 44.0 -6.3% 8.5%
16x16B 50.2 47.7 -5.0% 8.3%
16x16C 31.0 28.9 -6.6% 9.2%
16x16D 64.1 65.4 2.0% 8.2%
17x17A 41.3 40.2 -2.7% 8.4%
17x17B 54.8 53.9 -1.7% 8.2%
UNCL ORNL - 10B Straws
LANL - 10B Plates
Table 4. Results for the in-tact unpoisoned fuel virtual assay for the thermal neutron detector materials. 
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Fuel 
Design
Declared 
LD 235U
(g/cm)
Analyzed 
LD 235U 
(g/cm)
LD mass 
defect (%)
1800 sec 
Total 
Uncert (%) 
3σ
Analyzed 
LD 235U 
(g/cm)
LD mass 
defect (%)
1800 sec 
Total 
Uncert (%) 
3σ
14x14A 37.6 40.3 7.3% 8.4% 37.7 0.3% 7.5%
14x14B 37.3 33.0 -11.5% 8.8% 36.2 -2.9% 7.6%
14x14C 19.8 22.6 14.4% 9.8% 21.1 6.6% 9.4%
15x15A 58.4 55.5 -5.0% 7.4% 59.5 2.0% 7.4%
15x15B 61.5 58.3 -5.3% 7.4% 64.0 3.9% 7.8%
15x15C 60.9 53.8 -11.7% 7.5% 63.0 3.5% 7.7%
16x16A 46.9 48.3 3.0% 7.8% 47.3 0.8% 7.1%
16x16B 50.2 43.9 -12.5% 8.1% 51.0 1.7% 7.1%
16x16C 31.0 33.5 8.2% 8.8% 31.4 1.6% 8.1%
16x16D 64.1 59.0 -7.9% 7.5% 63.8 -0.5% 7.8%
17x17A 41.3 43.0 4.2% 8.2% 39.7 -3.8% 7.4%
17x17B 54.8 53.1 -3.2% 7.5% 54.3 -1.0% 7.2%
Fuel 
Design
Declared 
LD 235U
(g/cm)
Analyzed 
LD 235U 
(g/cm)
LD mass 
defect (%)
1800 sec 
Total 
Uncert (%) 
3σ
Analyzed 
LD 235U 
(g/cm)
LD mass 
defect (%)
1800 sec 
Total 
Uncert (%) 
3σ
14x14A 37.6 37.5 -0.3% 7.9% 41.1 9.4% 6.7%
14x14B 37.3 36.4 -2.6% 8.0% 38.3 2.7% 6.7%
14x14C 19.8 20.4 3.3% 10.2% 22.3 12.6% 7.1%
15x15A 58.4 60.0 2.8% 8.3% 60.4 3.5% 6.8%
15x15B 61.5 63.1 2.6% 8.6% 63.2 2.7% 6.9%
15x15C 60.9 58.2 -4.5% 8.1% 59.8 -1.8% 6.8%
16x16A 46.9 45.3 -3.3% 7.6% 51.7 10.3% 6.7%
16x16B 50.2 49.2 -1.9% 7.6% 53.7 7.0% 6.7%
16x16C 31.0 30.2 -2.5% 8.7% 32.7 5.6% 6.8%
16x16D 64.1 62.6 -2.3% 8.6% 62.8 -1.9% 6.8%
17x17A 41.3 40.0 -3.2% 7.8% 42.0 1.6% 6.7%
17x17B 54.8 50.2 -8.5% 7.6% 54.1 -1.3% 6.7%
UM - EJ309
INL - 4He LLNL - Stilbene
ORNL - PSD plastic
Table 5. Results for the in-tact unpoisoned fuel virtual assay for the fast neutron detector materials. 
It is well known that there are differences in fast neutron scattering and multiplication in fuel 
assemblies with differences in the total Heavy Metal (HM) loading, i.e. the total Uranium LD. For 
example, if the calibration of an instrument is done with all 17x17 fuel assemblies, as was done in this 
project, there can be significant systematic biases when assaying fuel with much lower HM loading. 
For the Rodeo, the calibration fuel assemblies have a Uranium LD of 1297 g/cm. Table 6 shows the 
Uranium LDs of the 12 unpoisoned in-tact fuel assemblies and demonstrates that there are instances 
where the HM loading is quite different. This is typically remedied in a normal UNCL assay with a 
correction to the measured Doubles rate based on the total Uranium loading, as shown in the last 
column of Table 6 for the standard UNCL. This makes it somewhat difficult to draw conclusions about 
how accurate each modeled detector would be since the HM correction is highly dependent on the 
neutron energy spectrum that is interrogating the fuel. However, in general, most of the unpoisoned in-
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tact fuel assayed within 3σ total uncertainty for the given detector material. The ORNL PSD Plastic 
detector had four results where the difference in 235U LD was larger than 3σ. These assemblies: 
14x14A, 14x14C, 16x16A, and 16x16B all have the largest HM differences from the calibration fuel 
and thus, would need the largest correction factors in practice. The INL 4He Scintillator also had 
difficulties with four fuel assemblies (14x14B, 15x15C, 16x16B, and 16x16D) but they were generally 
not the assemblies with the largest HM differences relative to the calibration assemblies. 
 
Another result of interest from the data in Tables 4 & 5 is the magnitude of the total uncertainties when 
comparing the detectors that rely on thermal neutron detection (UNCL, 10B Straws, and 10B Plates) and 
those that detect fast neutrons (PSD Plastic, 4He Scintillator, Stilbene, and EJ309). In general, but not 
categorically, the fast neutron detectors have a lower overall uncertainty because of the very short 
coincidence gate that can be used with these fast detectors. The advantage being that it minimizes the 
number of accidental coincidences and improves the Doubles measurement precision. In the case of 
the ORNL 10B Straws, they were able to approach the counting statistics of the fast neutron detectors 
by reducing both the Pre-Delay and coincidence gate width in addition to designing their interrogation 
source slab so as to minimize the number of thermalized source neutrons that reach the detector 
active areas directly. This was achieved by adding borated polyethylene on the wings of the source 
slab as seen in Figure 6a. Finally, Figure 20 shows the assayed assembly results (LD of 235U) for all 
detectors and all unpoisoned in-tact fuel assemblies along with the actual declared LD values for 
comparison. The error bars shown are 3σ and show the generally acceptable results with a few 
exceptions. 
 
 
 
Table 6. The in-tact unpoisoned fuel designs’ total Uranium LDs and comparison to the 17x17 calibration 
assembly. Correction factors for each fuel design as determined for the UNCL. 
 
 
Fuel Design
U LD 
g/cm
% diff to 
Calibration
UNCL HM 
correction 
factor
14x14A 989 -24% 1.12
14x14B 1192 -8% 1.04
14x14C 989 -24% 1.12
15x15A 1297 0% 1.00
15x15B 1231 -5% 1.03
15x15C 1339 3% 0.98
16x16A 1042 -20% 1.10
16x16B 1143 -12% 1.06
16X16C 1143 -12% 1.06
16x16D 1424 10% 0.95
17x17A 1290 -1% 1.00
17x17B 1305 1% 1.00
17x17 calibration 1297 1.00
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Figure 20. Comparison of assayed and declared 235U linear densities of the in-tact unpoisoned fuel assemblies. 
 
 
3.3. Fast Mode Partial Defect 
 
The UNCL has been the workhorse instrument in international safeguards for detecting missing pins in 
fresh fuel assemblies for decades. For the Rodeo, teams were asked to determine the sensitivity of 
detecting substituted fuel pins for their detector material by using provided fuel definitions with different 
numbers of LEU pins substituted with DU pins as shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. Fuel assembly patterns for partial defect sensitivity estimation. 
 
 
The case with 0-pin substitutions has a 235U LD of 51.9 g/cm which corresponds to a 17x17 fuel 
assembly populated uniformly with 4% enriched LEU fuel pins. The partial defect (PD) cases under 
evaluation are for substitutions of 8, 16, 24, 32, and 40 pins containing DU, these substitutions 
correspond to mass defects of 2.9%, 5.8%, 8.7%, 11.6%, and 14.5% respectively. The results for each 
detector are evaluated relative to the analyzed mass of the 0-pin substitution case to remove any 
systematic bias and to ensure the mass defect is always negative. The results, the analyzed mass 
defect and 3σ uncertainty for an 1800 second active assay, for each technology are shown in Table 7. 
 
 
# of 
replaced 
pins
LD mass 
defect (%)
3σ 1800 
sec (%)
LD mass 
defect (%)
3σ 1800 
sec (%)
LD mass 
defect (%)
3σ 1800 
sec (%)
0 0.0% 9.3% 0.0% 7.7% 0.0% 7.1%
8 -1.7% 9.3% -2.6% 7.7% -2.1% 7.1%
16 -4.5% 9.3% -6.1% 7.9% -5.6% 7.1%
24 -7.4% 9.4% -9.1% 8.0% -8.7% 7.1%
32 -11.3% 9.4% -8.9% 8.0% -12.8% 7.1%
40 -13.6% 9.4% -13.1% 8.1% -15.9% 7.2%
LD mass 
defect (%)
3σ 1800 
sec (%)
LD mass 
defect (%)
3σ 1800 
sec (%)
LD mass 
defect (%)
3σ 1800 
sec (%)
LD mass 
defect (%)
3σ 1800 
sec (%)
0.0% 7.7% 0.0% 7.8% 0.0% 6.9% 0.0% 7.6%
-4.3% 7.7% -3.0% 7.8% -4.5% 6.9% -3.1% 7.6%
-6.9% 7.7% -6.4% 7.9% -4.5% 6.9% -6.1% 7.6%
-9.9% 7.8% -9.3% 7.9% -8.3% 6.9% -9.2% 7.6%
-12.3% 7.8% -12.7% 8.0% -12.8% 6.9% -12.3% 7.6%
-16.4% 7.9% -15.3% 8.1% -15.6% 6.9% -14.7% 7.6%
ORNL - 10B Straws LANL - 10B plates ORNL - PSD Plastic UM - EJ309
UNCL INL - 4He LLNL - Stilbene
 
 
Table 7. Analyzed mass defects for the partial defect cases and their uncertainties. 
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The slope of the linear fit forced through the origin when plotting the LD mass defect (%) vs. the 
number of substituted pins gives the % defect per pin and can be used to determine the number of 
pins that would need to be diverted before rising above the 3σ level. For each technology investigated 
the sensitivity to partial defects is shown in Table 8. 
 
 
Detector
Diverted Pin 
Sensitivity 
(# of pins)
Analyzed 
Mass Defect 
(%)
1800s 3σ 
Uncertainty 
(%)
UNCL 29 9.6% 9.4%
INL - 4He 25 8.1% 7.9%
LLNL - Stilbene 19 7.3% 7.1%
UM - EJ309 18 7.0% 7.0%
ORNL - 10B Straws 19 7.7% 7.7%
LANL - 10B Plates 21 8.5% 8.2%
ORNL - PSD Plastic 19 7.2% 6.9%  
 
Table 8. The partial defect sensitivies of each design based on the assay uncertainty. 
 
 
There is clear improvement in the PD sensitivity over the standard UNCL with any of the new detection 
technologies. While these results along with those from the un-poisoned in-tact fuel are encouraging 
and provide confidence that improvement to the standard UNCL can be achieved with these new 
materials, the more pressing challenge is to make significant improvement in the assay of poisoned 
fuel.  
 
3.4. Fast Mode Poisoned Fuel 
 
The problem of accurate and independent assay of fuel containing burnable poisons is quickly 
becoming a major issue in international safeguards as evidenced by resource investments by 
inspectorates to solve this problem [27][28]. Especially as commercial fuel designers are using higher 
concentrations of these burnable poisons. For the Rodeo examination of this capability, the teams 
were asked to simulate fuel poisoned with Gadolinium (Gd). There are, of course, other poisons in use 
but Gd is the most widely used today. Similar to what was done with the PD testing, six different fuel 
designs were provided as shown in Figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 22. Fuel assembly patterns for testing of burnable poisons. 
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As can be seen, the numbers of poisoned pins simulated were 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, and 24 and the 
concentration of Gd was varied at three different levels: 6%, 8%, and 10%. Each group simulated the 
Fast Mode by placing a thermal neutron absorber around the cavity of the detector. Most groups chose 
to use Cadmium curtains as is used in the standard UNCL in practice. One group (ORNL - 10B Straws) 
chose to use Gadolinium as the curtain material as it has a higher thermal neutron absorption cross 
section (see Figure 2) but also removes epi-thermal neutrons at the exact energies where the poison 
in the fuel is most reactive, thus, further lowering the sensitivity to the poison. The mass defects for the 
set of poisoned fuel assemblies for each technology is shown in Table 9. While the general trend is for 
the mass defect to rise with increasing Gd it is not true in all cases for all detectors. It is seen within the 
data that there are examples where added poisoned pins results in a decrease of the mass defect; 
such as for the UNCL with 6% Gd going from 12 poisoned pins to 16. The mass defect actually gets 
smaller, going from 4.6% to 4.2%. This is likely due to the pattern of pins having a larger effect than 
the number of pins, further emphasizing the fact that a single general absolute calibration for poisoned 
fuel is not possible. 
 
 
Gd 
Content 
(%)
# of 
Poisoned 
pins UNCL INL - 4He
LANL - 
10B 
Plates
LLNL - 
Stilbene
UM - 
EJ309
ORNL - 
10B 
Straws
ORNL - 
PSD 
Plastic
4 -1.9% -8.1% -1.9% -1.7% -4.7% -1.5% 1.0%
8 -2.9% -8.3% -3.6% -4.7% -5.0% -2.9% -2.1%
12 -4.6% -10.3% -5.5% -4.4% -2.9% -3.4% -3.0%
16 -4.2% -6.4% -6.3% -5.3% -3.6% -3.5% -2.9%
20 -7.8% -6.4% -6.6% -7.0% -8.9% -4.5% -4.7%
24 -8.2% -9.9% -8.0% -4.0% -8.5% -5.0% -4.8%
4 -1.7% -7.8% -2.3% -2.5% -5.0% -1.2% -1.0%
8 -3.1% -8.9% -4.8% -5.2% -5.4% -3.8% -2.0%
12 -5.2% -11.2% -6.3% -5.2% -5.4% -3.7% -7.1%
16 -4.9% -7.7% -6.7% -5.9% -6.6% -3.4% -5.4%
20 -10.5% -6.8% -8.0% -7.9% -9.8% -4.6% -7.9%
24 -10.1% -8.5% -9.7% -4.0% -10.4% -5.7% -9.0%
4 -2.4% -8.6% -2.8% -2.3% -5.8% -1.1% 1.5%
8 -4.4% -10.2% -5.2% -5.1% -6.6% -2.9% -5.3%
12 -6.1% -10.1% -6.9% -6.6% -6.9% -4.9% -4.0%
16 -6.6% -7.7% -7.6% -7.9% -7.1% -5.2% -5.4%
20 -10.9% -9.3% -9.2% -8.4% -12.3% -6.8% -5.3%
24 -11.9% -6.2% -11.5% -7.9% -11.7% -6.3% -8.0%
6
8
10
Mass Defects (%)
 
 
Table 9. Mass defects due to burnable poisons. 
 
 
The data in Table 9 shows the percentage of mass that is unaccounted for without correcting for the 
presence of the burnable poisons and that it can be large even in the Fast Mode. Though there are 
some obvious improvements relative to the UNCL especially at the higher poison loadings for the 
LLNL – Stilbene detector, the ORNL – 10B Straws, and the ORNL – PSD Plastic. A plot of all the data 
displayed in Table 9 is show in Figure 23. The smaller the mass defect for a given fuel design the less 
sensitive the detector design is to the presence of the burnable poison. 
 
For general comparison, the same mass defects for all technologies in the Thermal Mode range from 
~10% - 55% for these same fuel assembly definitions, obviously quite a bit larger. There was, 
however, one notable exception in the Thermal Mode and that was for the INL – 4He detector which 
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had mass defects in the 5% - 25% range. This further demonstrates the importance of moderation on 
the sensitivity to burnable poisons. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Burnable poison impacts of the mass defects in Fast Mode. 
 
 
Another way to look at the sensitivity of the detector design to burnable poisons is to determine if the 
assayed mass is within three standard deviations of the declared value. That will demonstrate if the 
measurement is sensitive to a mis-declaration of the fuel assembly as being unpoisoned. That is, 
without correcting for the burnable poison content, would the assay result pass the 3σ test? Table 10 
shows the results of that analysis for the 18 poisoned fuel assembly designs. In the “Random Error” 
column only the Doubles error and the calibration constant uncertainties are propagated into the mass 
uncertainty. In the “Random + 2% Systematic” column a 2% systematic error is also folded into the 
mass uncertainty. While it is clearly not known what the actual systematic uncertainty for a UNCL 
based on each detector material would be, this at least gives an idea of the impact. The data in Table 
10 shows that with only the counting and calibration uncertainties, there is clear improvement for 
several of the technologies relative to the UNCL, however with the addition of a 2% systematic 
uncertainty the alternate only a couple of the technologies maintain some slight advantage over the 
UNCL. 
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Detector Random Error
Random + 2% 
Systematic
UNCL 6 4
INL - 4He 0 0
ORNL - PSD Plastic 13 4
UM - EJ309 16 6
LLNL - Stilbene 15 4
ORNL - 10B Straws 6 0
LANL - 10B Plates 13 5
# of Poisoned FAs w/ Mass 
Defects > 3σ
 
 
Table 10. Sensitivity of each detector technology to mis-declared poisoned fuel. 
 
 
3.5. Net Doubles Uncertainty 
 
The last test for these technologies was the statistical uncertainty for a full assay, passive and active, 
with count times of 300 and 600 seconds respectively. The results are sensitive to the detection 
efficiency, as evidenced by the magnitude of the Net Doubles, as well as the interference of Accidental 
coincidences that impact the precision of the Doubles rate. The Net Doubles and uncertainties from a 
passive and active assay of the 55 g/cm calibration fuel assembly are shown in Table 11 for both the 
Fast and Thermal modes. For a given mode the technologies are ordered by the relative Doubles 
uncertainty from lowest to highest after the UNCL to show which detectors have the best precision. In 
general the fast neutron detector types typically have the better result though not always the highest 
efficiency as is seen in the Net Doubles column. 
 
 
Detector Net Doubles (1/s) σD (1/s) σD (%)
UNCL 16.7 0.5 2.9%
INL - 4He 22.6 0.2 0.9%
ORNL - PSD Plastic 23.2 0.3 1.4%
UM - EJ309 28.3 0.4 1.2%
LLNL - Stilbene 19.5 0.3 1.6%
LANL - 10B Plates 49.3 1.2 2.4%
ORNL - 10B Straws 17.6 0.5 2.6%
Detector Net Doubles (1/s) σD (1/s) σD (%)
UNCL 225 1.5 0.65%
ORNL - PSD Plastic 220 0.7 0.3%
LLNL - Stilbene 149 0.6 0.4%
ORNL - 10B Straws 236 1.3 0.5%
LANL - 10B Plates 426 2.4 0.6%
INL - 4He 35.3 0.2 0.7%
UM - EJ309 287 3.1 1.1%
Fast Mode
Thermal Mode
 
 
Table 11. The Net Doubles and uncertainties based on 300 second passive and 600 second active 
measurements. 
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Of interest in the context of the Net Doubles precision is the total measurement time required for a 
Fast Mode assay to achieve the same precision as the standard UNCL achieves in a 15 minute 
Thermal Mode assay (5 minutes passive and 10 minutes active). Assuming an active assay that is 
always twice the duration as a passive assay, the total measurement time to reach the 0.65% Net 
Doubles uncertainty of the UNCL Thermal Mode assay for all detector technologies is shown in Table 
12. 
 
 
Detector
Net 
Doubles 
(1/s) σD (1/s) σD (%)
Total Time (hours) 
to reach UNCL 
Thermal Mode 
precision of 0.65%
Optimized 
Active:Passive 
Count Times
UNCL 16.7 0.109 0.65% 4.48 4 : 1
INL - 4He 22.6 0.148 0.65% 0.46 4 : 1
ORNL - PSD Plastic 23.2 0.151 0.65% 1.10 2 : 1
UM - EJ309 28.3 0.185 0.65% 1.29 1.4 : 1
LLNL - Stilbene 19.5 0.127 0.65% 1.45 1.3 : 1
ORNL - 10B Straws 17.6 0.115 0.65% 1.93 2 : 1
LANL - 10B Plates 49.3 0.322 0.65% 3.21 4 : 1
Fast Mode
 
 
Table 12. Needed total assay times in Fast Mode to reach the Net Doubles precision attained by the UNCL in a 
15 minute Thermal Mode assay. 
 
 
In the Rodeo, the Passive and Active count times for determining the Net Doubles precision were set 
to 300 s and 600 s respectively. While these are the typical count times used in the field, this 2:1 ratio 
may not always be optimal. The last column in Table 11 illustrates how the ideal ratio between the 
Active and Passive count times can be different for each technology.  
 
3.6. Cost and Size 
 
Lastly the groups were asked to estimate the cost, dimensions, and weight of a potential fieldable 
instrument. Those estimates are provided in Table 13 and illustrate the competitiveness of the 
technologies to the current UNCL. It is anticipated that the cost of the Stilbene crystals will continue to 
come down in price as the market expands. 
 
 
Detector Material
Outside 
Dimensions (cm)
Weight 
(kg) Cost ($k)
UNCL 42 x 42 x 51 38 $150
ORNL - 10B Straws 52 x 49 x 50 70 $120
INL - 4He 50 x 50 x 70 200 $100
LLNL - Stilbene 66 x 53 x 40 78 $305
LANL - 10B Plates 50 x 56 x 51 72 $70
ORNL - PSD Plastic 68 x 54 x 40 48 $150
UM - EJ309 80 x 60 x 40 78 $145  
 
Table 13. Estimated cost and physical attributes of instruments and data acquisition electronics based on the 
detector materials considered in the Rodeo. 
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4. Conclusions
The Advanced Neutron Detection Technology Rodeo explored many of the new and newly 
commercially available technology in the context of an important challenging problem for international 
safeguards in the assay of fresh nuclear fuel containing burnable poisons. Teams that have been 
researching these materials were asked to create a Monte Carlo model of a UNCL-like instrument that 
could potentially replace the standard UNCL in both form and function. In order to compare the 
different technologies in a fair test, identical sets of fuel assembly definitions were provided to each 
team and they were asked to simulate their instrument response in MCNP. As a way to compare to the 
current industry standard for these types of measurements, a non-participating researcher performed 
the same set of calculations with a model of the standard UNCL. 
The ORNL 10B Straws group explored and exploited the idea of spectrum tailoring to boost the 
performance of their design. The use of Gadolinium to achieve a Fast Mode interrogation flux with 
depressions at the resonance energies where the poison in the fuel is most sensitive helps minimize 
the sensitivity to its presence. In addition, the borated polyethylene on the wings of the AmLi source 
slab reduces the contribution of the source neutrons to the Accidental coincident rate thereby 
improving the Doubles precision. These improvements could be implemented in other instrument 
designs. 
While the previous sections have shown that improvements over the standard UNCL can be seen with 
various detector technologies there was no single technology that demonstrated a consistent and 
substantial improvement. Though it is clear that the fast detection technologies offer promise towards 
improvement on Fast Mode assay of fresh fuel, the information gathered for this Rodeo effort fell short 
of providing a clear path forward with any single material. Further investigation and development of 
these fast neutron detector technologies is needed – keeping in mind the need for simplicity of 
implementation and data analysis. The reduction in the required count time to achieve Thermal Mode 
counting statistics in the Fast Mode is very encouraging. 
One of the constraints placed on the participants of the Rodeo was that each technology’s data 
analysis was required to produce information that could be used to conduct an assay the way they are 
currently conducted, i.e. the use of a Net Doubles rate to determine the 235U linear density. This would
allow a technology to be used by international safeguards inspectorates without much deviation from 
what is currently done. In practice, the methods used by the fast neutron technologies to determine a 
Doubles rate would necessarily be different from the neutron capture based technologies. In MCNP-
space, the determination of the coincidence rate for the thermal neutron capture based technologies is 
more straightforward relative to the fast neutron scattering technologies. In these Rodeo results it is 
assumed that the interpretation of the MCNP based responses of the fast neutron detectors has 
provided accurate Doubles rates that have been corrected for cross-talk and have solid experimental 
benchmarks. Furthermore, what is also encouraging is the knowledge that some of these technologies 
reach into physics that are not possible with the standard UNCL. Thus, one can imagine that there are 
clever and, as of yet, unrealized ways to look at fresh fuel assay with burnable poisons that may be 
able to realize the goal of timely, accurate, and independent assay of such fuel. 
The logical next steps for this area of investigation would be to focus more effort towards spectrum 
tailoring to minimize, to the extent possible, the sensitivity to burnable poisons; primarily focusing on 
the fast neutron detector materials as they provide the best counting statistics when measuring in the 
Fast Mode. In addition, development of data reduction techniques that are robust, can be automated, 
and do not require frequent recalibration is essential. 
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Abstract 
The Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) has been used for national and international nuclear 
materials accountancy and safeguards inspections for more than 3 decades to measure the 235U mass in 
bulk uranium samples. The AWCC uses active neutron interrogation with an Americium-Lithium (AmLi) 
neutron source. The AmLi neutrons induce fission reactions in the sample, and the resulting  fission 
reaction neutrons are measured using 3He detectors in a well-type geometry. The purpose of this paper is 
to provide information on the modifications to the AWCC for the use of 252Cf interrogation sources instead 
of AmLi sources. The AmLi neutron sources that have been used for the AWCC and other active neutron 
interrogation instruments are no longer commercially available, and alternative neutron sources are 
needed. The 252Cf sources provide the benefit that the interrogation source emits multiple neutrons per 
spontaneous fission that are time-correlated with the induced fission (IF) reactions in the sample. This 
increases the doubles signal and reduces the statistical uncertainty. This time correlated induced fission 
(TCIF) method makes use of the 252Cf  sources that are readily commercially available with the advantage 
of lower cost, and a radioactive level in the tens of micro-curie range compared with the AmLi neutron 
source in the curie range.       This paper details the AWCC detector modifications for using 252Cf in lieu of 
AmLi, including detector parameters such as dead-time, die-away time, efficiency, and calibration 
coefficients. Also, included in the paper is a direct measured comparison of  252Cf with a standard AmLi 
source for a range of uranium samples to illustrate the improvement in the statistical uncertainty.  
Key Words: neutron interrogation, active well coincidence counter, uranium assay 
1. Introduction
The Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) [1] has been used for national and international nuclear 
material accountancy and safeguards inspections for more than 35 years to measure the 235U mass in 
bulk uranium samples [2]. Modifications to the AWCC have also been used for the verification of fresh 
research reactor fuel [3]. The AWCC uses active neutron interrogation with an Americium-Lithium (AmLi) 
neutron source. The neutrons that are emitted randomly in time induce fission reactions in the sample, 
and the resulting  fission reactions are measured using 3He detectors in a well-type geometry. The 
purpose of this paper is to detail the modifications to the AWCC for the use of 252Cf interrogation sources 
instead of AmLi sources. The AmLi neutron sources that have been used for the AWCC and other active 
neutron interrogation instruments are no longer readily available commercially, and alternative neutron 
sources are needed. The 252Cf sources provide the benefit that the interrogation source emits multiple 
neutrons per spontaneous fission that are time-correlated with the induced fission (IF) neutrons in the 
sample.  This increases the doubles signal and reduces the statistical uncertainty. The time correlated 
induced fission (TCIF) method [4] makes use of the 252Cf  sources that are readily commercially available 
with the advantage of lower cost, and a radioactive level in the tens of micro-curie range compared with 
the AmLi neutron source in the curie range. However, the relatively short half-life of the 252Cf source (2.64 
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years) requires source replacement after about ten years and which will lessen the cost advantage. Prior 
AWCC systems used two AmLi sources of ~ 1.1 Ci each to provide a neutron yield of ~ 4.5x104 n/s each; 
whereas, a 10 µCi 252Cf source yields 4.4x104 n/s. For the measurements presented in this paper, the 
252Cf source strength was ~ 400µCi (on 10/1/2015), so the source will have an adequate neutron yield for 
AWCC applications for more than 15 years. Three AWCCs have been fabricated by commercial vendors 
for the future use at the China Safeguards Center of Excellence for Nuclear Security (COE) [5]. 
This paper provides the AWCC detector modifications for using 252Cf in lieu of AmLi including detector 
parameters such as dead-time, die-away time, efficiency, and calibration coefficients. Also, included in 
the paper is a direct measured comparison with the standard AmLi source (MRC-95) to compare the 
statistical precision of the two methods. 
2. Time correlated interrogation concept
In the  TCIF method, the sample is interrogated with neutrons from the 252Cf source; however, the 
measured doubles rates are enhanced because the IF neutrons  are also time correlated with the 252Cf 
spontaneous fission (SF) interrogation source. Thus, the trigger events that initiate the coincidence gates 
can originate from either the SF and/or the IF neutrons. This higher effective average  is the basis of the 
improved precision for the TCIF method. The measured multiplicity rates (doubles and triples) increase 
rapidly with the effective (average neutrons per fission in the time gate).  The average   of the 252Cf 
source is 3.76 and the induced fission   for 235U is 2.44, so the combined effective   is higher than for 
random neutron interrogation; however, only a fraction of the time  correlated neutrons are measured. 
This higher effective  significantly increases the multiplicity counting rates and improves the statistical 
precision.  
There are three probabilities that come into play in the TCIF method: 
1. The probability of a 252Cf SF neutron inducing a fission reaction, primarily related to the physical
coupling between the 252Cf and the sample
2. The probability of counting at least one of the IF neutrons in the detector
3. The probability of counting at least one of the 252Cf  background neutrons in the detector.
The first coupling probability is a function of the separation distance between the 252Cf source and the 
sample, the high density polyethylene (HDPE) moderator, the sample size and fissile mass, and any 
potential absorbers of the thermal neutrons in the sample such as 238U. The probability for a least one 
252Cf source neutron causing an IF we can define as PIF. It is a variable that can be determined from 
physical standards or MCNP calculations. 
The second probability for measuring at least one of the IF neutrons depends on the detector efficiency 
for neutrons born at the sample location. For the modified AWCC used in these experiments, the 
measured efficiency was 38.2% for the sample position. Thus, each of the IF neutrons have a 38.2% 
chance of being detected, so the combined probability for the 2.44 neutrons that at least one of the 
neutrons is detected is equal to [6] 
Pd  = 1- (1 - e)2.44 = 1- (1- 0.382)2.44 = 0.691, 
where e is the detection efficiency.   
The third probability, of measuring the  252Cf neutrons is a function of the coupling of 252Cf source relative 
to the detectors. Because this is measured without a sample, we call it the background efficiency. For the 
modified AWCC, the efficiency for the 252Cf source in the bottom HDPE end plug was 26.3% and  is 
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3.76. Thus, the probability  of measuring at least one neutron from a single spontaneous fission event 
would be  
Pcf  = 1- (1- e)3.76 = 1- (1- 0.263)3.76 = 0.683. 
Note that the 252Cf spontaneous fission emits an average of 3.76 neutrons, and when more than one of 
these SF neutrons cause an IF, the correlated measured doubles increase significantly regardless of the 
other two probabilities (items 2 and 3 above).       
The three probabilities all combine in determining the doubles rate boost from the TCIF method. For the 
AWCC, the limiting factor in the combined probabilities is the coupling probability because the relatively 
small sample only reacts with a minor fraction of the 252Cf spontaneous neutrons because of the small 
sample size.  
The TCIF method has a longer die-away time than for the random neutron AmLi source interrogation. 
This longer die-away time is a combination of the detector specific die-away (~ 70 µs for the AWCC) and 
the die-away time (~ 80 µs) of the thermal-neutrons that cause the IF reactions. Thus, to have our gate 
interval  include both SF and correlated IF, we need to open the  gate to more than 100 µs. However, the 
statistical error is a function of the accidental counts (A) pileup, and a longer gate will make the A related 
error larger.  An analysis of the data indicated that a gate length of 128 µs was near optimum. 
3. Background Subtraction
There are neutron backgrounds that need to be subtracted from the active neutron measurement as 
follows: 
1. Neutrons from the 252Cf source (doubles and singles) (for no 235U)
2. Neutrons from the room background (negligible for doubles but not singles)
3. Passive neutrons from the uranium  sample (negligible)
Only the first of these backgrounds is significant for the high yield 252Cf sources that are used in the COE 
AWCCs.   
During the initial design of the AWCC [1], 252Cf was discounted because of concerns about the doubles 
background from the 252Cf source. The TCIF benefit in increasing the IF doubles above the SF 
background was not identified at the time.   
The 252Cf interrogation source  background is impacted by the sample inside the detector because of 
neutron scattering from the sample and fast neutron fission in the 238U. Thus, a dummy sample that 
contains no fissile mass was used for the background measurement. The background from fast-neutron 
fission in the 238U component of the sample was determined by extrapolating the doubles response curve 
to zero fissile mass. The 252Cf  background was measured overnight so that its statistical error was 
negligible. For the present sample range    (1-190 g 235U) the 252Cf source background is larger than the 
IF signal so care must be taken in measuring this background. 
4. System description and optimization
The AWCC shown in Fig.1 consists of a well-type HDPE moderator containing 42  3He tubes at 4 atm. 
pressure.[1]   Measurements were made with both the ANTECH [7] and Canberra [8] AWCC systems  
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with no significant differences in their performance. However, the ANTECH AWCC has an attachment to 
the electronics junction box that contained a pulse de-randomizer to reduce the dead-time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Photo of one of the COE AWCC systems (left) with the 3He tubes removed (right) to show the HDPE 
moderator design. 
To obtain optimum performance of the AWCC for low mass samples, thermal-neutron interrogation was 
used. The modifications to the AWCC included removing all Cd and the Ni annulus. The HDPE rings on 
both the top and bottom plugs were also removed to obtain a higher counting efficiency at the sample 
position. Figure 2 (left) shows the AWCC sample cavity with the Cd and HDPE rings removed from the 
bottom and top lid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Photo of the AWCC system with a sample can in the cavity (left) and the 252Cf source holder that is inserted in 
the end plug (right).  
Measurements were made to determine the optimum position for the 252Cf source inside the holder (Fig. 2 
right).  The statistical precision in the doubles rate is a function of the neutron source coupling to the 
sample as well as the  neutron background. To determine the optimum position for the source, the 
statistical uncertainty was measured at different depth positions for the 252Cf inside the holder. The error 
was determined by the “sample mode” error evaluation in the INCC data collection software [9]. Each of 
the source configurations were measured for at least 30x20 s cycles and the spread in the doubles data 
252
Cf source 
and holder 
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was compared for the different positions. Figure 4 shows the doubles rate and error versus the 252Cf 
source position in the bottom end plug, and we see that the error reduces as the source gets closer 
to the sample. We operated the system with the source at the minimum separations distance (1cm) with 
the 252Cf source at the top end of the holder.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The net doubles rate and statistical error  as a function of the 252Cf source depth into the HDPE end plug   for a 
600s measurement using a can of U3O8 powder (left) and statistical error  as a function of the height above the 
bottom (right). 
The doubles error for a 600s measurement was less than 1% for all of the  measured positions. The 
sample  measurements described above were used to optimize the configuration of the AWCC that were 
as follows: 
1.  No Cd liners or Ni annulus  
2. Both HDPE  rings on the end plugs removed 
3. The maximum sample cavity height was the standard 20cm 
4. Only one 252Cf source positioned in the bottom plug (i.e. no source in the lid) 
5. The 252Cf source holder was set flush with the bottom end plug.  
To evaluate the change in the doubles rate and error as a function of the height of the can above the 
cavity bottom, measurements were performed for different can heights.  Figure 3 (right) shows the change 
in the doubles rate as a function of the sample height as well as the error in 600s for the different 
positions. The can used for the position optimization contained 186g of 235U and had a diameter of 7.6cm 
and a height of 8.6cm containing a powder mass of 230g. The optimal sample position was determined to 
be sitting on the bottom of the sample cavity. 
4.1 Detector Parameters Electronics Set Up 
The neutron data was collected using a JSR-15 shift register [10] and a laptop computer. The INCC 
software was used with the HV at 1680V, pre-delay of 2.5 µs, gate of 128 µs. The dead time was 
measured using the 2 source method [3] with the combined rates of ~500,000 cps. Note that we used b = 
a2/4 and multiplicity dead time = a/4. The results gave an a value of  0.757 µs for the Canberra units and 
0.28 µs for the Antech detector.  
 
5.  Measurement Procedures and sample description   
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
0 1 2 3 4 5
net doubles rate % error for doubles
  Ne
t D
ou
bl
es
 R
at
e 
 
252Cf depth into Poly  Plug  [cm] Sample Above Bottom [cm] 
  
Er
ro
r [
%
] 
Er
ro
r [
%
] 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
307
The samples that were used for the optimization study  included the U3O8 powder mixtures of the 
type being supplied to the COE.  All the samples contained 230g of powder  with enrichments 
varying from 0.31% to 93%.  The sample cans were 7.6cm diameter and 8.6cm tall. The 
enrichments ranged from 0.31% to 93% 235U, and the 235U mass varied from 0.0g to 181.1g. 
The measurement procedure was to place the sample can on the HDPE bottom end plug and take a 
minimum of 30 cycles of 20s each for 600s total time. In some case much longer measurements were 
performed to better determine the statistical error. All errors in the tables have been normalized to 600s 
for comparison purposes. The singles and doubles backgrounds were measured with the blank (dummy) 
sample in the detector. The dummy sample had the same total  mass as the calibration samples, but 
contained no fissile material. The room backgrounds were negligible because of the high source yield 
from the source FTC-CF-2494 (1.422E+06 n/s on 10/1/2015). 
6.  Measurement Results 
 
Table 1 presents the calibration data and the statistical errors for a 600s measurement for the ANTECH 
AWCC. The doubles background was determined to be 81700cps and the singles was 378600cps by a 
long overnight measurement using a dummy sample that contained no 235U.  The doubles background 
was also measured for the empty sample cavity and the ratio of the sample dummy to the empty case 
was 1.029. The statistical error in the singles and doubles background was negligible because of the long 
measurement time. The first 3 samples in Table 1were measured twice on separate days to test the 
repeatability that was 1.6% in 600s. 
U3O8 235U Cf gross Cf Cf 600s Cf 600s Cf 
ID [g] D [cps] net D sigma cps sigma % net S  
NBL-0075 181.09 119253 37553 425.6 1.13 38954 
NBL-0074 105.22 114304 32604 359 1.1 34037 
NBL-0073 38.98 103677 21977 474.4 2.16 23770 
NBL-0075 181.09 118550 36850 501 1.36 38900 
NBL-0074 105.22 113838 32138 416.7 1.3 34159 
NBL-0073 38.98 104030 22330 416.7 1.87 23687 
0005-20.06 39.1 103526 21826 326 1.49 23742 
0006-52 102.4 112867 31167 425.1 1.36 33941 
446-071 8.69 89114 7414 440.7 5.94 7858 
295-072 5.75 86966 5266 416.8 7.92 5962 
194-071 3.78 85640 3940 340.5 8.64 3235 
En-0.71 1.38 83709 2009 352.5 17.55 1167 
En-0.31 0.6 82500 800 389.5 48.69 500 
 
Table 1.  The ANTECH AWCC measured results for the U3O8 samples 
We observe in the Table 1 that the doubles statistical error for a 600s measurement is ~ 1.1-1.8%  for the 
mass range from 40-180 g 235U. For mass values below ~ 10g, the error increases because of the low 
signal/background ratio. Note that the net doubles rate is almost the same magnitude as the net singles 
rate. The increase in the net doubles for the sample is a result of the time correlation between the 252Cf  
counts and the IF reactions. 
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Figure 4  shows the doubles rate versus the 235U mass both before and after subtracting the constant 
doubles background that was measured using the dummy sample. Fitting a 4th power polynomial through 
the data gives a zero mass intercept of 82461cps before the 252Cf doubles background subtraction and 
761cps after the background subtraction. This indicates that there is a fast-neutron IF component in the 
238U of about 761cps from the fast neutron fission in the sample that has no 235U. This component is only 
~ 2-3% of the doubles rate for the higher mass samples, and it is built into the calibration function 
displayed on the graph. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4  The doubles rate as a function of 235U mass before (top) and after (bottom) the subtraction of the 252Cf 
background. 
7. Comparison of AmLi  neutron source with 252Cf  source interrogation 
 
For each of the calibration sample measurements using 252Cf, a similar  measurement was made using 
the standard AmLi source MRC-95 for comparison purposes. The AmLi source was placed in the same 
position as the 252Cf source with the same thermal-neutron configuration of the AWCC.  The same HV, 
gate, and pre-delay were used for the AmLi interrogation. It has been shown in the past that for neutron 
doubles counting, the doubles error is independent of the interrogation source strength for the case where 
the accidental rate dominates the statistical error [3]. Thus, the only changes were the lower neutron 
energy spectrum and the random source interrogation.  
Table 2 presents the comparison of the 252Cf results with the AmLi results after normalizing the 252Cf 
source strength to the MRC-95 neutron yield (32620 n/s) at the time of the measurements (10/1/2015). 
The key observation is that the doubles rate from the normalized 252Cf source is ~ 2.6 times higher per 
source neutron than for the AmLi source. The reason for the high net doubles rates for 252Cf  is that the IF 
reactions are time correlated with the background counts so the doubles tally in the coincidence gate gets 
the TCIF boost where more than half of the net doubles originate from time correlated 252Cf events. 
Note that a singles background count that is time correlated with a singles neutron count from the IF in 
the 128us gate, results in a net doubles count for the signal. Figure 5 shows the net doubles rates after 
the normalization to the same source yield.  
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Fig. 5  Net doubles rate comparison for 252Cf and AmLi after normalization to the same neutron interrogation strength. 
        
 
235U g AmLi AmLi AmLi 600s Cf norm D  Cf 600s D Ratio 
g Net S net D D sigma % 36250n/s D  sigma % Cf/AmLi 
181.09 747 331.31 1.59 857.8 1.13 2.59 
105.22 655 281.81 1.64 744.7 1.1 2.64 
  38.98 434 197.97 2.11 502 2.16 2.54 
181.09 750 337.12 1.55 841.7 1.36 2.5 
105.22 655 284.38 1.8 734.1 1.3 2.58 
38.98 438 194.26 2.11 510 1.87 2.63 
39.1 405 201.06 2.55 498.5 1.49 2.48 
102.4 609 276.04 1.73 711.9 1.36 2.58 
8.69 120 81.41 5.66 169.3 5.94 2.08 
5.75 84 62.68 6.38 120.3 7.92 1.92 
3.78 31 47.16 7.18 90 8.64 1.91 
1.36 0 14.8 24.3 45.9 17.55 na 
0.6 0 6.39 58.5 18.3 48.69 na 
    
Table 2. Comparison of 252Cf  interrogation with AmLi random source interrogation 
Another interesting result from Table 2 is that the statistical errors for the 252Cf interrogation were about 
30% lower than for the AmLi source interrogation in  spite  of the high 252Cf doubles background where 
the signal/background ratio was ~ 1/2 for the 252Cf source for the high mass sample (37553 cps versus 
87700 cps in Table 1).  
The theoretical statistical uncertainty for the time correlated doubles would be very complex, because the 
measured counts do not follow simple counting statistical theory. Thus, we have used the repeat sample 
based method to actually measure the spread in the data for the doubles errors in Table 2.  
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Table 2 shows that the Cf/AmLi doubles ratio is increasing from 1.91 to 2.6 in going from LEU samples to 
HEU (> 20% enrichment). This is caused by the change in the correlated coupling coefficient between the 
252Cf source and the sample. When the 238U fraction is much larger than the 235U fraction (0.31 to 4.45% ) 
for the 5 lowest enrichment samples in Table 3, some of the thermal neutrons that provide the IF in the 
sample are lost to parasitic absorption in the 238U. For the HEU, the fractional loss to 238U becomes 
negligible, and the ratio of the Cf/AmLi doubles is rather constant at ~ 2.6 for the AWCC. 
8.  Summary 
The conversion of the AWCC from the typical AmLi neutron interrogation source to a 252Cf  source was 
necessitated by the lack of commercially available AmLi sources. This paper presented the detector 
configuration for optimizing the AWCC for using 252Cf, and also the improvement in the statistical 
performance. After the optimization of the AWCC for the 252Cf source use, the doubles statistical error 
was about 1.2% for a 600s measurement of a 100g 235U sample. This was about 30% lower  than for the 
AmLi source interrogation with both sources in the thermal-neutron mode. The sensitivity limit of the 
AWCC using 252Cf was ~ 1g 235U. We note that the statistical uncertainty in the doubles rate tends to 
increase for the calculated 235U mass because of the slope of the doubles calibration curve for the higher 
mass samples.  For 235U mass values above ~ 500g, the AWCC can be used in the Cd liner mode to 
obtain better penetration of the samples. 
The primary reason for the improved statistical performance for the modified AWCC is that the neutron 
emission from the 252Cf source is time correlated to the IF reactions in the samples. The time correlated 
counts fall in the coincidence gate that is selected for the doubles counts. The time gate was extended 
from 64µs to 128 µs to account for the two thermalization intervals (one for the IF and one for the 3He 
tube count). 
        The optimization and calibration of the AWCC was performed for the ANTECH AWCC detector. The 
other two AWCCs (from Canberra), that are included in the COE project, were cross calibrated for 
efficiency and performance with the ANTECH detector. All 3 AWCC units have the same HDPE design 
and matched 3He tubes (4 atm), and their operating parameters are the same except for the dead-time. 
The dead-time difference was a result of the de-randomizing buffer in the ANTECH junction box. The high 
neutron emission from the COE 252Cf sources require a significant dead-time correction.  
This paper shows that the 252Cf sources are viable replacements for the AmLi sources that are no longer 
commercially available. The calibration function is a polynomial that is only valid within the calibration 
range 1-190 g of 235U. When the unknown samples are measured with the same calibration function, any 
error related to the doubles background subtraction cancels in the measured 235U mass result. The 
modification to the INCC software to support the use of the 252Cf sources for the AWCCs is currently in 
progress [11].  
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Field test of a full scale 3He-alternative HLNC-type counter: High Level 
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Abstract: 
Thermal neutron counters developed for deployment as non-destructive assay (NDA) instruments in 
the field of nuclear safeguards traditionally rely on 3He-based proportional counting systems. 3He-
based proportional counters have provided core NDA detection capabilities for several decades and 
have proven to be extremely reliable with range of features highly desirable for nuclear facility 
deployment. Facing the depletion of 3He gas supply and the continuing uncertainty of options for future 
resupply, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) designed and built a 3He-free full scale thermal 
neutron coincidence counter based on boron-lined parallel-plate proportional technology. The counter 
was designed as a direct alternative to High Level Neutron Coincidence counter (HLNC-II).  
This paper provides a summary of performance evaluation of HLNB under realistic field conditions at 
Plutonium Conversion Development Facility (PCDF) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The field 
test included a range of low to high mass MOX materials that represent realistic process samples and 
provided key insight on and validation of the feasibility of HLNB as a safeguards instrument in realistic 
facility environment. In particular, the results of verification measurements demonstrate that HLNB is 
capable to satisfy ITV expected for HLNC-II-type counter of 2.1% in 300 s measurement time. 
Keywords: coincidence counting; 3He alternatives; boron-lined proportional counters 
1. Introduction
3He gas-filled proportional counters have long been the cornerstone of safeguards detection system 
designs due to their reliability, robustness and high neutron detection efficiency. The latter is a key 
requirement of correlated neutron counting utilized in non-destructive assay of special nuclear 
materials (SNM). Over the past decade, a reduction of 3He gas supply has been increasingly apparent 
[1,2] and prompted a widespread effort in development of various 3He-free neutron detection 
technologies including plastic (typically 6Li-coated) or liquid scintillators, and variety of designs of gas-
filled boron-lined proportional counters [3-5]. Any such technology proposed for use in nuclear 
safeguards is presented with series of challenges that are specific to this type of application and 
include high neutron detection efficiency and optimum neutron thermalization characteristics while 
maintaining compact footprint. Other important aspects of nuclear safeguards technology development 
include reliability, low maintenance requirements, reproducibility and low sensitivity to gamma-ray 
backgrounds that can be significant especially when measuring high mass Pu-bearing materials [5,6]. 
All these aspects are driven by stringent requirements on technology deployment at nuclear facilities. 
In order for a detection technology to be viable for safeguards use, its design features must provide 
performance characteristics essential for SNM assay. To address this need, LANL has developed a 
full scale thermal neutron coincidence counter (High Level Neutron Counter – Boron: HLNB) based on 
boron-lined parallel plate technology. The underlying boron-lined technology represents a well-
established proportional technology that offers similar level of maturity as 3He-based proportional 
counters making it a suitable candidate for development of a robust detection system [7]. The HLNB 
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was developed with design parameters similar to 3He-based High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter 
(HLNC-II). The HLNB was first evaluated at LANL using available neutron and gamma-ray sources [8] 
and subsequently evaluated for operating parameters necessary for field deployment. This paper 
describes the key features of HLNB and its performance under realistic field conditions at Plutonium 
Conversion Development Facility (PCDF) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The field test was 
performed using range of low to high mass MOX items (5 g Pu – 1.2 kg Pu) prepared specifically for 
this purpose in order to assess full HLNB functionality in Pu mass assay. Details of the activities 
performed and performance results are described in the following sections. 
2. Physics design of HLNB
Detailed description of HLNB design can be found in [8]. Here we only summarize the key features. 
The HLNB counter is composed of six individual boron-lined detector modules manufactured by 
Precision Data Technology, Inc. (PDT) [7]. Each detector contains six boron-lined detection cells filled 
with Ar+CO2 gas. The individual detection cells are interleaved with high density polyethylene (HDPE) 
plates for optimum neutron moderation. The entire system of cells and HDPE is hermetically sealed 
within an Al enclosure. The detectors tightly surround the sample cavity of 17.00 cm (6.69”) in 
diameter and height of 41.00 cm (16.14”). The top and bottom end plugs consist of aluminium core 
surrounded by HDPE. In addition, 1.27 cm (0.5”) thick HDPE slabs are added along the external sides 
of the detectors to boost the detection efficiency through neutron reflection. A view of the HLNB 
internal layout is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: (left) Top view of the boron-lined detectors layout inside the HLNB along with associated wiring; (right) 
MCNP visualization of the HLNB internal structure. 
The HLNB was designed as a direct replacement of a High-Level Neutron Coincidence Counter 
(HLNC-II) [9], which represents a safeguards standard, fielded in numerous nuclear facilities and used 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The HLNB was developed to mimic the external 
dimensions of HLNC-II with identical size sample cavity. The key requirement was achieving 
performance (count rate capability and Pu assay uncertainty) similar to HLNC-II. A photograph of 
HLNB and HLNC-II side-by-side is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: HLNB (right) next to its 3He-based reference HLNC-II. The HLNB LED display reflects the internal 
detector layout and allows for easy state-of-health assessment. The multi-pin connector is added for list mode 
acquisition. 
The initial development of the HLNB dates back to 2012 and since its initial implementation, the 
detector has undergone series of dedicated tests at LANL to evaluate its key parameters relevant for 
nuclear safeguards applications. This rigorous testing also helped identify potential weaknesses of the 
initial design and allowed for further technical improvements and modifications that were performed on 
the system to improve its safeguards applicability. The current HLNB boron-lined detectors feature a 
sealed-cell concept with each individual detection cell hermetically sealed. The sealed-cell design 
allows for high degree of internal gas purification in order to prevent any potential contamination and 
to maintain its characteristics for extended periods of time. Such an approach is necessary to assure 
long term stability performance required in routine safeguards deployment. The individual sealed-cells 
are filled with C10 gas (Ar+CO2 mixture) at sub atmospheric pressure. Therefore, good structural 
integrity of the cells is necessary to sustain pressure differential during handling and full system 
assembly at an atmospheric pressure. Once assembled, the detector module (with 6 sealed cells) 
itself is sealed in an external Al enclosure and filled with gas. This assures overall system robustness 
under variations in external atmospheric pressure. To provide the needed structural integrity of 
individual cells, a concept of corrugated surface was developed. In this concept the cell is 
manufactured in two identical halves and both boron-coated internal surfaces are corrugated. The two 
halves of the cell are then welded together and the internal corrugation provides an additional support 
through the contact of the individual ridges. Photographs of the internal corrugated layout for a single 
sealed-cell are shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Photographs of corrugated sealed-cell concept; (left) view of the corrugated boron-coated surfaces 
inside the cell; (right) finished sealed-cell. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
315
The HLNB signal processing electronics is housed in a very compact junction box that is only 3.5 cm 
(1.5”) tall. Each of the HLNB detectors is equipped with 3 amplifiers (each servicing two adjacent 
detection cells) making a total of 18 amplifiers in the entire system. The HLNB features a standard 
shift register compatible signal output with all the amplifiers OR’ed together. In addition, the HLNB is 
equipped with list mode data acquisition, which allows a direct read out of all the 18 amplifiers. The 
technique allows the recording of all of the HLNB channels, which can be analyzed for deadtime and 
dieaway information as well as provide monitoring of the state-of-health of the wholde system. HLNB 
list mode data is collected in PTR32-HV pulse train recorder unit [10]. The unit records time intervals 
between the consecutive neutron pulses in 10 ns increments and is capable to handle rates of up to 3 
MHz of periodic pulses. 
2.1. HLNB operating parameters 
In order to prepare for the field trial measurements of Pu-bearing materials and to operate the HLNB 
as a coincidence counter, several operating parameters must be determined. The HLNB 
characterization and evaluation of operating parameters was performed at LANL using available 
neutron sources. The key operating parameters include operating HV setting, neutron detection 
efficiency (ε), die-away time (τ), pre-delay and gate width, dead-time correction parameters (A, B) and 
known-alpha calibration parameter (ρ0). The listed parameters represent standard characteristics of a 
neutron coincidence counter used by INCC software [11] in SNM assay. The values of the individual 
parameters for HLNB are summarized and compared to HLNC-II in Table 1.  
Detector HV [V] 
Pre-delay 
[μs] 
Gate 
[μs] ε τ [μs] ρ0 A [μs] B [μs
2] 
HLNB 860 3 180 0.183 89.5 0.105 0.665 0.1105 
HLNC-II 1680 4.5 64 0.175 43.0 0.103 0.768 0.2480 
Table 1: Overview of HLNB and HLNC-II operating parameters 
From Table 1, it can be seen that HLNB exceeds the detection efficiency of HLNC-II by 0.8% (a 4.6% 
increase), however, the die-away time of HLNB is about a factor of 2 longer than in case of the HLNC-
II. It should be pointed out that the die-away time can be further improved by additional optimization of 
boron deposit thickness. In [12] it was demonstrated, using another PDT boron-lined detector, that 
recent improvement in boron coating technique leads to a ~40% improvement in neutron detection 
efficiency, and approximately a factor of two reduction in the die-away time. 
3. Field trial of HLNB at PCDF
The field trial of HLNB was performed at Plutonium Conversion Development Facility (PCDF) of JAEA 
over a period of May –February 2016. The field trial represented a key milestone in the evaluation of 
HLNB performance and provided a unique opportunity to evaluate the overall performance of the 
newly developed system in conditions beyond well controlled laboratory environment with materials 
that were representative of realistic deployment conditions. Of key interest was the evaluation of 
transportability, ease of set-up and functionality in an operational facility with realistic backgrounds, 
noise interference and temperature and humidity conditions. The field trial measurements focused on 
range of items of operational interest that included medium to high mass MOX items. An overview of 
the available materials is provided in Table 2. 
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Pu mass 
[g] 
238Pu 
[%] 
239Pu 
[ %] 
240Pu 
[ %] 
241Pu 
[ %] 
242Pu 
[ %] 
241Am 
[%/Pu] date U [wt%] Pu [wt%] 
5-10 0.886 67.538 24.420 3.377 3.779 1.95 6.3.2015 43.75 41.72 
50-1223 0.984 62.570 28.383 3.530 4.533 2.58 27.4.2015 43.61 41.50 
Table 2: Overview of MOX items available for HLNB field trial measurements. 
The measurements were performed in one of PCDF test process rooms with HLNB and HLNC-II 
detectors positioned side-by-side and separated by ~ 2 m distance. Each detector was connected to 
its own JSR-15 shift register. INCC was used for data acquisition and analysis in connection with JSR-
15 to reflect realistic field assay conditions. HLNB data was also collected in list mode using PTR32-
HV unit. List mode data was recorded for offline analysis with dedicated, LANL developed, software. 
Photograph of an experimental configuration is shown in Figure 4. Each MOX item was handled and 
inserted into the detectors by dedicated PCDF personnel. A reference swipe was taken and tested for 
every measured item to check for contamination. 
Figure 4: HLNB and HLNC-II during field trial measurements. Photograph shows a PCDF operator taking swipe 
sample of a bagged small MOX container before measurement in HLNB. 
MOX items that were prepared for the field trial measurements were enclosed in small stainless steel 
cans for the larger items and plastic containers for the low mass items and double sealed in a pair of 
plastic bags to prevent contamination of the detector surface. To assure reproducibility of field trial 
measurements, the items were placed on a fixed height lab jack located at the bottom of each 
detector. The height of the lab jack was set to 11.7 cm (4.6”) to assure the item positioning within the 
flat portion of the HLNB and HLNC-II counting efficiency. A photograph of pair of MOX items used in 
verification measurement (5 g Pu and 10 g Pu items were combined to obtain mass of 15 g Pu) is 
shown in Figure 5. 
Additional MOX material was present in the process equipment in the room during the field trial 
campaign, however, no handling and processing was performed. To account for any variations in the 
material distribution, background measurements were repeated daily. 
The performed measurements included initial post transportation state-of-health evaluation with a 252Cf 
neutron source, high voltage plateau measurements, calibration using low to high mass MOX items 
(up to 100 g Pu), verification measurements and measurements with high mass MOX items (200 g 
and 1.2 kg Pu).  
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Figure 5: Photograph of two small MOX containers placed side-by-side on a lab jack inside the HLNB counter 
well. 
3.1. Initial set-up and performance test 
A JAEA provided 252Cf source with neutron emission rate of 8.52x104 n/s (on 1.5.2015) was used for 
post-transportation state-of-health assessment. The measurements focused on HV plateau curve and 
neutron detection efficiency for HLNB as well as HLNC-II and comparison of results with LANL 
reference measurements. The HLNB HV plateau data were recorded in list mode to obtain HV curve 
for each amplifier and evaluate any differences with respect to LANL reference measurements. 
Comparison of HV plateau curve measurements for individual HLNB amplifiers is summarized in 
Figure 6. The difference in the total counts between LANL and JAEA measurements is due to the 
different activity 252Cf sources available at each location. The step decrease in the height of the 
plateau curves from individual HLNB outputs is a result of the increasing distance of the internal 
detector cells from the sample. Figure 6 illustrates that no significant deviation from reference 
measurements performed at LANL was identified in post-transportation evaluation performed at PCDF 
demonstrating robustness of the HLNB design. The count rate measured at operating HV was used to 
confirm unchanged detection efficiency. 
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Figure 6: Comparison of HV plateau curves for individual HLNB amplifiers for detectors 1-4 (top) and detectors 5 
and 6 (bottom); (left) measured at LANL; (right) post-transportation performance at PCDF. 
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3.2. MOX measurements 
Measured MOX materials included small MOX items with mass corresponding to 5 g Pu - 10 g Pu, 
medium mass MOX items of 50 g Pu and 100 g Pu and high mass MOX items of 200 g Pu and 1.2 kg 
Pu with characteristics summarized in Table 2. The medium mass MOX items included two very 
similar 50 g Pu items, one was used for calibration and the other for verification measurements. A thin 
(1 mm) Sn foil was used inside the HLNB during the measurements of the high mass MOX items to 
remove low energy (60 keV from 241Am) gamma-ray interference. It should be pointed out that similar 
effect is achieved in HLNC-II by its Cd liner. Note that the introduction of Sn foil does not affect the 
neutron detection efficiency due to its negligible thermal neutron capture cross section. 
Calibration measurements were performed using passive calibration curve as well as known-alpha 
calibration methods in INCC. Two sets of calibration parameters were established for HLNB as well as 
HLNC-II, respectively; one for small MOX items with mass range < 20 g Pu and one for medium and 
high mass MOX items corresponding to mass range of > 20 g Pu. The division of calibration curves 
into two distinct mass ranges was motivated by the different encapsulation of the small MOX items 
(plastic container) and larger MOX items (stainless steel cans). 
The MOX materials available for the calibration measurements included 5 g Pu and 10 g Pu for the 
small MOX items; and 50 g, 100 g, 200 g and 1223 g Pu for the medium and high mass MOX 
materials. The measurement times were kept the same in both detectors and corresponded to 1200 s. 
The measurements were performed in series of 20-30 s cycles that were used for statistical error 
estimation from the standard deviation in the repeat runs. The passive and known-alpha calibration 
parameters for HLNB and HLNC-II are summarized Table 3 and were used as input into INCC for 
verification measurements.  
Calibration method 
and parameters 
HLNB HLNC-II 
Small MOX Medium /large MOX Small MOX 
Medium
/large MOX 
Known-
alpha 
parameters 
ρ0 0.105 0.103 
b 20.67 19.55 19.22 18.65 
Passive 
calibration  
parameters 
a 0.3639 0.0968 0.0171 0.0560 
b 22.6176 23.5515 20.3199 19.6920 
Table 3: Overview of passive and known-alpha calibration parameters. 
Figure 7 shows the multiplication corrected doubles rate measured for the medium and high mass 
MOX compared to the known-alpha calibration line. The observation that results of all items are well 
represented by the calibration fit confirms that the measurements were not affected by gamma-ray 
interference and that the operating HV of 860 V as well as Sn foil used with the high mass MOX items 
in HLNB provided adequate operating conditions for gamma-ray backgrounds from the full range of 
assayed materials.  
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Figure 7: Multiplication corrected doubles versus declared 240Pu effective mass for medium to high mass MOX 
items measured in HLNB (red diamonds) and HLNC-II (black open squares) compared to the known-alpha 
calibration for each detector.   
Verification measurements were performed with materials that were not used for calibration. These 
materials included combination of 5 g Pu and 10 g Pu MOX items (equivalent of 15 g of Pu) and the 
second of the two 50 g Pu MOX items. The results of the verification measurements are summarized 
in Table 4 for 1200 s measurement time. 
Analysis 
Method 
Declared Pu 
mass 
[g] 
HLNB HLNC-II 
Assay 
Pu mass 
[g] 
σ 
Declared-
assay 
mass [%] 
σ Assay Pu mass [g] σ
Declared-
assay 
mass [%] 
σ 
Known 
alpha 
15.0 15.06 0.04 -0.58 0.29 14.99 0.02 -0.08 0.15 
50.0 49.79 0.07 0.41 0.13 49.98 0.05 0.03 0.11 
Passive 
calibration 
15.0 15.24 0.11 -1.76 0.72 14.93 0.08 0.27 0.50 
50.0 49.85 0.25 0.29 0.49 50.44 0.21 -0.90 0.41 
Table 4: Results of verification measurements in HLNB and HLNC-II. 
The verification measurements indicate good performance of HLNB over the low-to-medium mass 
MOX range that is comparable to HLNC-II. Overall, the known-alpha calibration results in better 
accuracy in declared mass than passive calibration, because of the better statistical precision for 
known-alpha and the variability of the multiplication. The uncertainties of HLNB results for the mass 
range of the available MOX items reported in Table 4 are comparable to HLNC-II despite the longer 
die-away time of HLNB. The impact of longer die-away time is typically emphasized with increasing 
count rate due to increased contribution of accidental coincidences in the longer HLNB gate and 
therefore its effect on uncertainty is expected to affect predominantly higher mass items.  
To provide further validation of the HLNB results a comparison with International Target Value (ITV) 
for HLNC-type counters is of interest. The HLNC-II ITV corresponds to 2.1% for 300 s long 
measurement of MOX with Pu content greater than 10% [13]. The measurements reported here 
correspond to 1200 s and although reduction of measurement time to 300 s would increase 
measurement uncertainties by approximately a factor of 2, the assay accuracy in Table 4 is largely 
determined by the overall calibration fit quality and therefore will be less affected by the measurement 
time reduction, especially if there is sufficient number of calibration points. Therefore, the HLNB (and 
HLNC-II used in the field trial) measurement results are projected to satisfy the ITV expectation for 
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equivalent 300 s measurement time. The HLNB performance thus confirms the expected performance 
of an HLNC-II equivalent system based on broad range of practical safeguards data. 
4. Feasibility of HLNB as deployed safeguards system
The field trial of HLNB concluded development of a full scale prototype 3He-free coincidence counter 
for nuclear safeguards applications. The development involved series of engineering challenges in 
manufacturing and mechanical and structural design that were driven by stringent requirements for 
routine deployment at nuclear facilities. In addition to key performance parameters that were 
evaluated during initial phases of the project, the full system build brought the attention to the key 
design parameters such as overall system robustness, reliability, ease-of-use and operation as well as 
ease of maintenance, that can only be addressed once the development moves into a full-scale 
system build. The latter represented an essential step in moving the technology into facility 
environment. 
HLNB was developed and designed with these standards in mind and series of decisions and process 
modifications adopted along the way represented key shifts to satisfy these requirements. The field 
trial provided an essential insight on the performance of the system under facility conditions and 
helped answer questions on its transportability, ease-of-use and set-up. The extended time of the trial 
campaign required the JAEA personnel to acquire skills needed to operate the detector and provided 
insight on the operator training requirements. It is important to note that the PCDF facility staff has 
been able to fully operate the system after the initial joint measurements with LANL staff and less than 
half-day of training. The compatibility of the HLNB with the standard INCC software that is used by the 
IAEA, has made the system very user friendly for the inspectorates and facility staff.  
The first activity of the field trial was dedicated to initial set-up and post-transportation state-of-health 
evaluation. This initial set-up required similar activities and efforts as HLNC-II, but with the addition of 
list mode data acquisition in the HLNB, which did not represent a significant added complexity. One of 
the differences between the HLNB and HLNC-II is the requirement of 12V supply for the HLNB 
operation, which, however, is typically incorporated into one of the standard shift register modules 
(AMSR, JSR-15 that provides the necessary 12V supply in a LANL-designed stand). The post-
transportation state-of-health assessment revealed consistent performance of the HLNB in agreement 
with the reference LANL measurements. The post deployment efficiency was within ~ 1% of the 
efficiency prior to the field test. This provided a key demonstration of robustness of the HLNB 
structural and mechanical design. 
Another key aspect of the field trial was an assessment of measurement times and the overall material 
handling and detector operation experience. The material handling and measurement times were 
maintained the same for HLNB and HLNC-II. The HLNB was equipped with list mode acquisition for 
additional level of detail that was essential for performance assessment of the system, however, is not 
strictly required for routine operation. Although measurement times during field trial corresponded to 
1200 s, for routine operation a 300-600 s measurement would be adequate for the design basis 
materials used with the HLNC-II. Assuming the core application would utilize standard shift register 
electronics, the operation of HLNB fully mimics the operation of HLNC-II. A slight additional training is 
needed for the list mode operation. Nevertheless, since list mode (specifically PTR32 utilized with 
HLNB) was recently approved for use by IAEA, it can be anticipated that additional training on the 
operation of the device will become a part of regular inspector training exercises in the future. The 
JAEA personnel were trained to operate the HLNB using both, the shift register as well as the list 
mode data acquisition. The capability of JAEA personnel to perform the field trial measurements 
demonstrates the ease-of-use of the instrument under routine conditions.  
In addition to the robustness and overall performance of HLNB, the reliability and ease of maintenance 
represent additional essential design aspects. The reliability and long term stability of HLNB was 
demonstrated throughout the 9 month long period that the instrument spent at PCDF with continuously 
consistent performance comparable to HLNC-II and without requiring any renormalization or 
modification of calibration parameters as can be confirmed in the presented results. The modularity of 
HLNB allows for ease of maintenance and repairs of potential faulty parts via a direct replacement of a 
full detector module. This feature represents an important consideration in the overall system 
maintenance requirements that is often overlooked in 3He-alternative system designs. 
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The above observations along with the field trial measurement results discussed in previous sections 
indicate that HLNB is well positioned to provide a robust and reliable nuclear safeguards technology 
with characteristics similar to HLNC-II. 
5. Conclusions
This paper provides a summary of performance evaluation of HLNB under realistic field conditions. 
The field trial measurements were performed at PCDF of JAEA and included range of low to high 
mass MOX materials that were prepared specifically for the purpose of the field trial and represent 
realistic process samples.  
The field trial provided key insight on feasibility of HLNB deployment as a safeguards instrument in 
realistic facility environment. The HLNB proved to be a robust technology with no identified post-
transportation issues and ease of set-up similar to HLNC-II. The dedicated state-of-health 
measurements with a 252Cf source performed upon arrival of the detector to PCDF showed stable 
performance, in agreement with reference measurements performed at LANL prior to instrument 
shipment. The reliability and long term stability of HLNB was demonstrated throughout the 9 month 
that the instrument spent at PCDF performing consistently without the need of any renormalization or 
modification of calibration parameters. Agreement of HLNB assay results with HLNC-II for 
measurements acquired over this period of time provides further evidence of its long term reliability.  
The field trial results indicate good performance of HLNB over the broad MOX mass range 
investigated (5 g Pu to 1.2 kg Pu) with uncertainties and accuracy that is comparable to HLNC-II. In 
particular, the results of verification measurements demonstrate that HLNB is capable to satisfy ITV 
expected for HLNC-II-type counter of 2.1% in 300 s measurement time. The known-alpha calibration 
results in better accuracy in declared mass than passive calibration for both instruments. Overall, the 
verification results serve as a first indication that HLNB is capable of similar performance in the same 
amount of measurement time as HLNC-II for the range of evaluated MOX items. Additionally, the 
agreement between HLNB and HLNC-II for the 200 g Pu and 1.2 kg Pu MOX items demonstrates 
feasibility of HLNB in assay of high mass items. 
Improvements in the boron coating technology at PDT during the past year have demonstrated a ~ 
40% increase in efficiency and a significant decrease in the die-away time compared with the sealed-
cells in the HLNB [12]. Future units that incorporate the improvements could be expected to 
outperform the current unit as well as the HLNC-II. 
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Abstract: 
When characterizing a neutron coincidence counter for use in international safeguards, it is important 
to understand the dead time of the system. With current data acquisition in the form of shift register 
logic, there are several options to determine effective dead time model parameters. A customary 
approach consists of incrementally overwhelming the detection system with various sources to generate 
different count rates for analysis. An empirical fit to these data can then produce a dead time parameter. 
This method makes use of the expectation that the doubles to singles count rate ratio, after dead time 
correction, should remain fixed. In our measurements, we begin with a single 252Cf source and 
successively combine it with 1, 2, 3, and 4 AmLi (α,n) sources. The time-correlated fission neutrons from 
the 252Cf are detected by the neutron coincidence counter, and the random-in-time neutrons produced 
from the multiple AmLi sources provide excess counts to trigger on. Another recently reported approach 
[12] consists of utilizing the neutron-count number distribution, for a number of counting cycles, to permit 
a statistical analysis and subsequent determination the dead time along with a robust estimate of the 
statistical uncertainty. Moments of several orders can be used; therefore, several estimates of the 
effective dead time parameter are obtained. In the results reported here, two AmLi sources are 
measured simultaneously within the well of the counter for a number of cycles. We have selected 24 
cycles of 300 s each, with predetermined timing gates, where detected neutron multiplicities can range 
up to approximately 10 neutrons per cycle. These two methods were tested at Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory using a Boron-Coated-Straw High-Level Neutron Coincidence Counter, but the methods are 
also applicable to 3He counters. In this paper, we compare the results of these approaches and discuss 
the relevance of both. 
Keywords: Dead time correction; boron-coated straws; high-level neutron coincidence counter; neutron 
coincidence counting; shift register 
1. Introduction
Neutron coincidence counting is widely used in international safeguards applications for the 
nondestructive assay of nuclear material. Common thermal neutron coincidence and multiplicity 
counters take the form of an annular body filled with a moderator and populated with 3He tubes, which 
surround a central well used for sample loading. When a sample undergoes fission, each event 
produces a simultaneous release of neutrons, the average number of which are characteristic of the 
sample’s isotopics, which travel through the well of the detector and into the moderating body. These 
time-correlated neutrons are slowed in the moderator, spreading out this distribution over a longer period 
of time; this time is related to the neutron die-away time. The die-away time is characteristic of the 
geometry of the detector and not of the fissioning source, and it cannot be altered. These thermalized 
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neutrons are then captured in the 3He tubes and can be detected, by software, in coincidence and higher 
order multiplicities using appropriate timing gates. The total number of neutron events measured is 
recorded as the singles count rate. The doubles count rate corresponds to two neutron events measured 
within a specified time gate, and the triples count rate corresponds to three neutron events within that 
gate. However, in addition to these fission neutrons, background and (α, n) neutrons can also be 
detected within these timing gates, generating artificial multiplicities.  
Each neutron interaction produces a pulse in the electronics connected to the 3He tube, and the 
tube system is then dead for some amount of time. This means that any neutrons captured during this 
dead period are not counted and do not contribute to the total neutron pulse train. The dead period is 
related to the processing and recovery time of the electronics used and applies to each of the tube and 
electronic systems and, because the signals from each are summed together in a total output, a total 
detector system dead time can be determined. For systems with several detector bank channel outputs, 
dead times for the individual channels can also be determined.  
Neutron coincidence and multiplicity counting relies on the accurate measurement of these 
fission neutrons as a function of time to determine the quantity of nuclear material within the measured 
sample [1, 2]. These distributions of neutrons are perturbed due to this dead time, thereby influencing 
assay values. Because detection systems cannot be 100% efficient, nor will every emitted neutron travel 
towards the moderated detector body, corrections are applied for neutron losses. In addition, another 
correction for the dead time related losses in the system is required. This value must be well-known to 
accurately adjust the measured neutron multiplicity rates for the true multiplicity rates. 
Previous work has been done to determine the dead time of neutron coincidence counting 
systems and to characterize how this affects the incoming neutron pulse trains. The long-standing and 
widely used approach is extended to higher order multiplicities by Dytlewski [3] and is applied to 
safeguards systems, including High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter designs [4, 5], assuming a 
paralyzable (or updating) dead time model. The paralyzable model assumes that not only will a neutron 
captured during the dead period of the tube not be counted towards the total neutron pulse train, but 
that neutron event will extend the dead period. Although this model has been assumed for neutron 
coincidence counting, it has not been fully verified. The common experimental approach to measure the 
dead time uses multiple 252Cf sources of increasing strength to determine two dead time parameters, 
which will be explained in detail later. Another approach utilizes random-in-time neutrons produced by 
AmLi (α, n) sources— in conjunction with a single 252Cf spontaneous fission neutron source— to 
increase the uncorrelated single neutron events while maintaining the doubles neutron rate; this method 
was employed for this paper.  Many others have built upon these methods by deriving alternative 
approaches to singles dead time corrections [6, 7] and investigating the effect of correlation in the 
neutron pulse train due to varying sources [8, 9], while also trying to simplify the theory and expressions 
for easy adaptation. However, the final expressions and implementation of the theory to experiment are 
complex, and as a result have not been adopted in favor of older simplifications.  
Using the approach laid out by Menaa [10], based on the theory outlined by Foglio Para and 
Bettoni [11], random-in-time neutrons produced by AmLi sources are used to obtain a neutron-count 
distribution. Then, using the methodology outlined in [12], a statistical analysis is performed on this 
distribution over many cycles. With this analysis, the dead time parameters for second, third, and fourth 
order factorial moments can be determined, enabling an inter-comparison of values from a single data 
acquisition. These multiple samplings also allow for a robust estimate of the statistical uncertainty.  
The importance of this method from a safeguards inspection perspective relates to the 
availability of sources for in-field measurements; AmLi sources are present for active interrogation in 
neutron coincidence counters.  Meanwhile, it is not uncommon for a facility under inspection to not have 
252Cf at that location. Compared to the traditional method, the AmLi sources allow for shorter acquisition 
times with similar precision, and they do not have to be replaced as frequently due to the long half-life 
of Am isotopes. This work summarizes both the traditional approach and the new statistical approach 
and compares the two using data obtained using a boron-coated-straw (BCS) High-Level Neutron 
Coincidence Counter (HLNCC) as a comparison between them.  
2. Experimental Setup
The BCS HLNCC was built by Proportional Technologies, Inc. (PTI) as a prototype 3He  
alternative neutron coincidence counter. This prototype was designed to meet the specifications and 
performance objectives set for evaluation against other systems at an international workshop searching 
for a drop-in 3He replacement [13]. Because of this, the BCS HLNCC was built as an aluminum-encased 
cylindrical high density polyethylene (HDPE) body measuring 34 cm in diameter and 68.2 cm in height 
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(Figure 1a), preserving the dimensions of the 3He-based HLNCC-II. The sample well is 17 cm in 
diameter and 41 cm in height and is sealed with top and bottom end plugs made of HDPE and aluminum. 
The main differences between the standard system and BCS system are a 6 kg increase in mass and 
the use of 10B rather than 3He for the neutron capture reaction. 
The 18 3He tubes from the standard HLNCC-II were substituted for 804 10B straws, each 
measuring 4.4 mm in diameter, evenly dispersed throughout the HDPE body.  The 96% enriched 10B4C 
coats a 2 μm thickness on the inside of aluminum or copper tubes, which are filled with a mixture of CO2 
(10%) and Ar (90%) at 1 atm [14-16]. The incident neutrons interact with the 10B, releasing an alpha 
particle and 7Li ion, which ionize the gas as they travel. Because this method of charge collection is 
similar to the method exploited in 3He tubes, similar electronics and software can be used for both 
technologies. There are six detector banks, of 134 tubes each, connected and processed by six 
amplifiers. A conversion box consisting of inputs (Figure 1b), outputs (Figure 1c), and a field-
programmable gate array (FPGA) module shapes the incoming pulses and amplifies them to produce 
the correct form for an output signal trigger to be used with shift register or list mode acquisition software 
(Figure 1d). An external power supply provides the +5 V needed for the detector. 
Figure 1a-1d. Left to right: The BCS HLNCC showing (a) the six detector bank outputs; (b) the BCS 
HLNCC-specific conversion box containing electronics to shape and amplify the output signals, 
resting on the external power supply used for the +5 V; (c) the output signal cables of the 
conversion box; and (d) PTR-32.  See text for details. 
A list mode data acquisition system, Pulse Train Recorder-32 (PTR-32) [18], was used with the 
BCS HLNCC to bias, record, and analyze the neutron pulse train for each of the detector bank channels 
(Figure 1d). Because previous data taken with the PTR-32 have shown to be in agreement [19] with 
data taken with a JSR-15 shift register [20], the two were used interchangeably. PTR-32 can produce 
output files in a form similar to those output by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Neutron 
Coincidence Counting (INCC) Program, including a neutron count distribution per every cycle recorded, 
in addition to neutron multiplicity analysis.  PTR-32 can perform analysis using shift register logic when 
the user specifies predelay, gate width, and long delay time windows. As an added benefit, PTR-32 can 
perform this analysis for each individual detector channel connected to 1 of the 32 inputs on the board 
from a single measurement. The BCS HLNCC was biased to the standard setting of  +850 V, and PTR-
32 was set to analyze using the previously-determined optimal timing gates of 2 μs for the predelay, 48
μs for the gate width, and 4096 μs for the long delay for these measurements. 
3. Traditional Dead Time Approach
As previously mentioned, the traditional and most commonly used approach for determining 
detector dead time was established decades ago, and extended to greater multiplicities by Dytlewski 
in 1990 [3], assuming a paralyzable dead time model.  This methodology was then applied for use in 
neutron coincidence counters such as the 3He- based HLNCC models [4, 5]. The combination of these 
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works derived the following equations for the doubles (D) and singles (S) dead time correction factors 
(CF):  
𝐶𝐹𝐷 = 𝑒
𝛿𝑅 ∙ 𝑆𝑚 = 𝑒(𝑎+𝑏 ∙ 𝑆𝑚) ∙ 𝑆𝑚  (1)
𝐶𝐹𝑆 = 𝑒
𝛿𝑇 ∙ 𝑆𝑚 = 𝑒
1
4
(𝑎+𝑏 ∙ 𝑆𝑚) ∙ 𝑆𝑚 = 𝐶𝐹𝐷
1/4  (2)
Where 𝛿𝑅 is the dead time for the doubles, 𝛿𝑇 is the dead time for the singles, 𝑆𝑚 is the measured 
singles rate, and 𝑎 and 𝑏 are the dead time parameters which are empirically determined for a specific 
detection system. Equation 1 represents the dead time correction factor for the doubles rate, and 
Equation 2 represents the dead time correction factor for the singles rate. The free parameters 𝑎 and 𝑏 
are determined by a quadratic fit to doubles count rate data as a function of increasing singles rate. It 
is common for detectors of the same model to keep the ratio of a/b constant across all production, 
aiding in this analysis. 
Data can be obtained using multiple 252Cf sources of increasing strength, or with a single 252Cf 
source in combination with random-in-time neutrons produced by AmLi sources to provide a range of 
count rates. The number and/or strength of the sources chosen should correlate with the full count 
range expected to be measured. Because the first method uses only 252Cf point-like sources, there is 
no significant multiplication nor (α, n) contribution, and so the multiplicity ratios of triples to doubles 
(T/D), triples to singles (T/S), and doubles to singles (D/S) should all be constant and independent of 
the source strength once dead time corrected. This allows the dead time parameters to be determined 
and adjusted by minimizing the chi-squared value from each of these ratios.  
For an uncorrelated neutron source, where the emitted neutrons have no time-dependent 
pattern (as a fissionable source would have), the (Reals + Accidentals) count rate should be 
approximately equal to the (Accidentals) count rate illustrated in the Rossi-Alpha distribution below 
(Figure 2). This means that there is a very low probability that emitted neutrons will be counted as 
false doubles or triples. The second experimental approach to the traditional method uses a number of 
AmLi sources with a single 252Cf source to incrementally overwhelm the detection system to generate 
different singles count rates for a similar analysis. This method benefits from the convenience and 
availability of using one 252Cf source, while still having the ability to determine the dead time 
corrections for both the singles rate and the doubles rate. This is the method used in this section for 
analysis. 
Figure 2. A Rossi-Alpha distribution illustrating the various gates used in shift register analysis and 
their chronological positions on the neutron pulse train. 
A NIST-traceable 252Cf source, with a detected neutron rate around 94,000 cps and 1.10% 
relative standard error, was placed in the center of the BCS HLNCC. Two different metal cans were 
used to hold the 252Cf and the AmLi sources: the 252Cf was placed just below the middle plane of the 
BCS for optimal efficiency, and a second, slightly taller, metal can was placed over this and served as 
a stand for the AmLi sources. The 252Cf source and the metal cans remained stationary throughout the 
entire experiment to ensure that no associated systematic errors were introduced. Using the 
experimental setup described here, a 120 minute acquisition, using only the 252Cf source, was 
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obtained to ensure good counting statistics on the doubles count rate. The total detector signal was 
collected along with the six individual channel neutron pulse trains, as a result of using the PTR-32. In 
this work, we only analyze the total detector signal, but the same procedure would apply when 
analyzing each of the channels. It was assumed that little difference would be registered between a 
measurement of the strong 252Cf source and a measurement of the strong 252Cf source with the 
addition of a single AmLi source; therefore, the next measurement taken was of 252Cf with two AmLi 
sources. These two AmLi sources had measured strengths around 7300 cps with an uncertainty of 
0.11%. Because of the greater count rate, the acquisition time for this data collection was reduced to 
30 minutes. A third AmLi, with a measured strength around 10200 cps and an uncertainty of 0.11%, 
was then added. Data were taken again for 30 minutes. A fourth, and final, AmLi source, with similar 
strength to the third one was then added. For this run, the acquisition time was increased to 45 
minutes to give a greater certainty of the count rate, as this is crucial for producing an accurate fit.  
These files were then analyzed in PTR-32 with the standard 2 μs predelay, 48 μs gate width,
and 4096 μs long delay in order to find the singles and doubles count rates for each of these runs. 
This method is the same as the analysis performed using a shift register. Figure 3 shows a plot of the 
ratio of doubles to singles count rates as a function of singles count rate with the empirical fit applied. 
Figure 3. A plot of the measured Doubles to Singles count rate ratio as a function of the measured 
singles count rate. An empirical fit used to determine the dead time parameters is shown in red. The 
error bars are smaller than the markers.  
The method described above is not robust under our experimental conditions, as it relies on 
the user to manipulate the terms by hand to produce the best fit. This method is also sensitive to the 
number of data points acquired, thereby increasing the total experimental time and number of sources 
needed for a more accurate result. Because of this, there can be several values which minimize the 
sum of squared errors of the deviation between the dead time corrected doubles to singles ratio to the 
uncorrected ratio with respect to 𝑎 and 𝑏. For a set of standard counters, the ratio of 𝑏/𝑎 has typically 
been determined previously using a large number of 252Cf sources; but for this new BCS HLNCC, 
there is no predetermined ratio. Instead, assuming that 𝑏 = 𝑎
2
4
 , the fitting parameters were found to be 
𝑎 = 6.53 ∙ 10−8 and 𝑏 = 1.066 ∙ 10−15, resulting in an average dead time of (0.0653 ± 0.0054) μs. The
uncertainty in this value was determined through chi squared analysis and is relatively large due to the 
reasons discussed previously. Next, 𝑏 was constrained to 0 and 𝑎 was found to be 6.199 ∙ 10−8 
producing a dead time of (0.0620 ± 0.0077) μs. The dead time values found are within error using the 
different empirical approaches, due to the insensitivity of the equations to 𝑏 over a wide range of 
values.  
A note to the reader: in the first work characterizing the BCS HLNCC [17], it was stated that 
the dead time parameters were 𝑎 = 0.55 ∙ 10−6 and 𝑏 = 0 using 252Cf sources. For the sources 
measured at PTI, these values were selected as the best fit for the D/S ratio allowing a constant value, 
independent of the source strength, once dead time corrected. However, only three sources of a 
limited count rate range were used, therefore influencing the accuracy of the fit. Also, these values 
applied to a measurement using only a single detector bank rather than the total six banks combined 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
328
for the total detector output. As expected, when the whole system was measured for this paper, the 
total detector dead time decreased. 
4. Neutron Count Distribution Dead Time Approach
Menaa et al [10] outlined and experimentally justified an alternative method to the traditional 
approach. It was proposed that dead time could also be experimentally estimated using random-in-
time neutrons produced by a source such as AmLi, to generate an uncorrelated neutron count 
distribution. The equations presented in [11], under the assumption of a paralyzable not-free (the 
system starts counting the initial neutron pulse while it is dead) detector, represent the mean value of 
the count distribution and the variance of that distribution. They are then used by Menaa et al. to 
derive expressions for the dead time, 𝛿, in terms of the gate width, 𝑇𝑔, and the statistics of the neutron 
count distribution:  
𝜑 = 1 − √1 − [
〈𝑖〉 − 𝜎𝑖
2
〈𝑖〉2
] ;  𝜑 =
𝛿
𝑇𝑔
 (3) 
with 〈𝑖〉 representing the mean value of the neutron count distribution as 
〈𝑖〉 =
∑ 𝑖 ∙ 𝐴𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑖
 (4) 
and 𝜎𝑖2 representing the variance of the distribution as 
𝜎𝑖
2 =
∑ [𝑖 − 〈𝑖〉]2 ∙ 𝐴𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑖
.  (5) 
Through simple measurement of an AmLi source, all necessary variables can be obtained in a short 
period of time.  
Croft et al. [12] reviewed this method in detail, and built upon this work to extend the same 
methodology to higher order moments of the neutron count distribution. The expressions derived for 
the third and fourth reduced factorial moments, 
𝜑 =
1
2
[1 − √
〈𝑖(𝑖 − 1)(𝑖 − 2)〉
〈𝑖〉3
3
]  (6) 
and 
𝜑 =
1
3
[1 − √
〈𝑖(𝑖 − 1)(𝑖 − 2)(𝑖 − 3)〉
〈𝑖〉4
4
]  (7) 
respectively, can all be determined from a single measurement. It was proven that the dead times 
determined from each of these expressions were consistent within counting precision. All three values 
are reported below. 
Because the bias, 
𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 = 100 [
〈𝑖〉𝑅+𝐴
〈𝑖〉𝐴
− 1] , %,  (8) 
should be approximately zero for an uncorrelated neutron source, the neutron count distributions 
should be roughly equal between the (Reals + Accidentals), or (R + A), and the (Accidentals), or (A), 
gates (as illustrated in Figure 2).  To test this theory, the (R+A) and (A) neutron count distributions 
were analyzed separately to produce individual dead time values, checked for bias, and then 
combined into a single 48 cycle data set for an additional dead time determination. 
Twenty-four cycles of 300 s data acquisition runs were taken to randomly sample the neutron 
count distribution, produced by the AmLi sources previously listed, a large number of times. The AmLi 
sources were centered vertically and radially within the well to load an approximately even count rate 
on each of the six detector banks. Two separate acquisition runs were taken, one using two AmLi 
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sources for a combined measured singles count rate of approximately 14000 cps, and the other using 
all four AmLi sources for a combined measured singles count rate of 33500 cps. The optimal detector 
parameters were set at 2 μs for the predelay, 48 μs for the gate width, and 4096 μs for the long delay.
The total neutron pulse train recorded in PTR-32 was exported to INCC format to produce the count 
distributions. As is customary with shift register electronics and INCC software, the neutron 
distributions in each of the cycles are reported as a function of multiplicity for both the (R+A) and (A) 
gates. These count distributions were analyzed using the second, third, and fourth order moment 
expressions to determine the dead time and the bias. The results are reported below in Tables I-III. 
Number of 
Sources 
δ(R+A)
(μs)
± δ(A)
(μs)
± δ(Combined)
(μs)
± Bias 
(%) 
± 
2 0.0669 0.0050 0.0657 0.0054 0.0663 0.0036 0.0008 0.0197 
4 0.0641 0.0015 0.0652 0.0018 0.0646 0.0012 0.0060 0.0069 
Average 0.0655 0.0052 0.0654 0.0057 0.0654 0.0038 0.0034 0.0209 
Table I. Total detector dead time values calculated using the second order factorial moment
As expected, there is less uncertainty in the dead time calculated for the measurement using 
four AmLi sources rather than just two sources, due to better counting statistics. However, as is typical 
for in-field measurements, two AmLi sources may be more readily available and still provide accurate 
evaluations of the detector dead time. The bias is consistent with 0, the individually calculated dead 
time values are consistent within counting precision across sources, and therefore, the average dead 
time values between (R+A), (A), and combined gates are also in agreement.  
Number of 
Sources 
δ(R+A)
(μs)
± δ(A)
(μs)
± δ(Combined)
(μs)
± 
2 0.0639 0.0069 0.0723 0.0063 0.0681 0.0047 
4 0.0632 0.0019 0.0635 0.0018 0.0634 0.0013 
Average 0.0635 0.0071 0.0679 0.0065 0.0657 0.0049 
Table II. Total detector dead time values calculated using the third order factorial moment
Number of 
Sources 
δ(R+A)
(μs)
± δ(A)
(μs)
± δ(Combined)
(μs)
± 
2 0.0603 0.0111 0.0711 0.0086 0.0657 0.0072 
4 0.0598 0.0029 0.0609 0.0026 0.0604 0.0020 
Average 0.0600 0.0115 0.0660 0.0090 0.0630 0.0075 
Table III. Total detector dead time values calculated using the fourth order factorial moment 
As the ordered factorial moments increase, the uncertainty in the dead time parameter 
increases due to the lower precision of higher neutron multiplicities. Because an uncorrelated source 
is used, higher order multiplicities are not emitted, and therefore the probability of detecting one is low. 
Despite this, all three expressions result in values that are in agreement within counting precision. This 
result verifies, using another detector model than was used by Croft et al. [12], that this approach is 
robust and appropriate for estimating the dead time of a system. 
5. Conclusion
The comparison of dead times determined from both the traditional and statistical methods are 
shown below in Table IV. The traditional approach values are reported for two different empirical fits 
where b was not free and when it was constrained to zero. The second order (R+A) and (A) combined 
gate average dead time value, obtained from both the two source and four source measurements, are 
reported for this comparison. The values are in agreement within uncertainties. It is evident that the 
uncertainty in the neutron count distribution analysis approach is much less than the uncertainty 
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associated with the traditional approach. This is due to the insensitivity of the equations to 𝑏 over a 
wide range of values and the number of experimental data points used to find the empirical fit.  
Method δ ± 
(μs)
Traditional- b=a2/4 0.0653 0.0054 
Traditional- b=0 0.0620 0.0077 
Statistical- 2 sources 0.0663 0.0036 
Statistical- 4 sources 0.0646 0.0012 
Statistical- Average 0.0654 0.0038 
Table IV. Comparison of total detector dead time values using the traditional method and the statistical approach
Both methods have been previously used with 3He-based neutron multiplicity counters, and 
are shown here to apply to BCS as well. The neutron count distribution approach allows for a quick, 
robust, and convenient way to determine the dead time of a system. The availability of AmLi sources 
in facilities also serves as another benefit to the traditional approach. Multiple dead time values can be 
calculated with a single data acquisition run using the higher order factorial moment expressions, 
allowing for a cross-verification.  
In this work, it has been shown that both approaches return similar dead time values. We have 
discussed the underlying theories of both methods, while acknowledging many other works over the 
last few decades. This list is certainly not exhaustive, and it illustrates the revived drive to accurately, 
precisely, and easily represent detector dead times based on true physical models. A comparison was 
performed to show the capabilities of both approaches, while justifying this newly proposed analysis 
with another detector system. This statistical approach provides an experimentally determined 
approximation to the neutron multiplicity counter’s dead time which may be more simple to grasp and
implement, returning values with greater confidence due to the robust uncertainty calculations. Future 
work will include extending this analysis to each of the detector channels, in addition to quantifying the 
impact these dead time determinations have on the uncertainty in the final calculated mass values of 
an assay. 
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Abstract: 
LiF:ZnS technology, previously used in the nuclear security field has been successfully adapted by 
Symetrica Security (UK) to produce an effective neutron coincidence counter.  A proof-of-concept 
system was tested alongside other US and European technologies during the “3He Alternatives for 
International Safeguards Workshop and Inter-comparison Campaign” held in October 2014 at JRC 
Ispra.The system performed well as was reported to the 37th ESARDA symposium in Manchester and 
published in the ESARDA bulletin issue 53 (2015).  
Subsequently, within an administrative arrangement with DG-ENER (Euratom) and JRC in Ispra, an 
upgraded Neutron Coincidence Counter based on this 6LiF:ZnS technology was built.  It comprised 
thirty-two low-profile thermal neutron detectors arranged in four banks of eight around a square 
sample cavity, with neutron reflectors included to improve the sensitivity profile and a cadmium lining 
to suppress background neutrons.   
This paper describes the system and the results of measurements carried out at the JRC in Ispra to 
validate the Monte Carlo models, and to characterize the performance of the counter by measuring a 
number of important parameters such as absolute efficiency, die-away time, gamma-ray rejection 
efficiency and profile.  The performance of the counter is compared to that of the commonly-deployed 
HLNCC-II which uses rare and expensive 3He gas. 
It was found that the 6LiF:ZnS system had a superior absolute efficiency of 22.5% and a die-away time 
of 31.2µs.    Gamma-ray rejection efficiency  was measured to be better than 1:107 for a Cs137 source 
at a dose-rate of 1.7mSv/hr at the surface of the sample cavity. 
Keywords: NDA, Nuclear Safeguards, Neutron Coincidence Counting, LiF;ZnS 
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1. Introduction
Neutron coincidence counters (NCC) are essential tools in the non-destructive assay the material 
used in Nuclear Safeguards efforts.  For the last few decades these systems have relied on 3He 
proportional counters for thermal neutron detection However the future supply of 3He has been 
recognised as a potential problem [1].  To address this a number of groups have conducted research 
into 6Li and 10B or organic scintillators as alternative detectors, whilst also exploring their potential to 
provide some additional capability.  To facilitate this work, a number of benchmark tests have been 
carried out in the US and in Europe [2] and it has been found that useful systems have been 
developed using both isotopes.  JRC Ispra and Symetrica Security Ltd have collaborated on 
development of a 6LiF:ZnS based system by adapting technology originally developed by Symetrica 
for nuclear and Homeland Security purposes [3].  The new Neutron Coincidence Counter was 
designed utilising MCNP and a reduced-capability proof-of-concept  detector was built and tested at 
the 2014 benchmark [4], and found to perform well.  Whilst this instrument  did not meet the specified 
performance targets, this was not expected and it did successfully prove the concept and provide 
essential information for the next stage of its development.  The results of the 2014 benchmark tests 
are shown in Table 1. 
HLNCC-II PTI Symetrica GE Reuter Stokes 
Technology 3He tubes Multiple10B lined 
straws 
6Li loaded 
blades 
Combined 10B and 3He 
proportional counter 
Abs. Eff (%) 16.5 13.6 9.6 10.2 
Die away 
time (s) 
43.3 26 56.9 65.4 
FoM 2.51 2.66 1.28 1.26 
Table 1: Results of the 3He-free benchmark tests carried out in Ispra in 2014. 
This paper presents the characterisation of the fully-instrumented NCC and the second stage of the 
development effort first presented by the authors in ESARDA Bulletin 39 in December 2015 [5] and 
presented at the ESARDA conference of that year. 
2. System Description
The instrument being tested here is the first practical 6LiF:ZnS based coincidence counter able to meet 
the required performance specification.  It comprises thirty-two thermal neutron detectors (dubbed 
“blades” for their low profile) in a moderator matrix with readout electronics. 
2.1. Thermal Neutron Detectors 
The detection of thermal neutrons is achieved using a unique detector “blade” design utilising a pair of 
6LiF:ZnS screens sandwiching a wavelength-shifting PVT plate to create an active element having 
dimensions of 50 x 6 x 0.4cm.  The scintillation light is collected by silicon photomultipliers and on-
board electronics provide pulse-shape discrimination (PSD)  to minimise the blades sensitivity to 
gamma-radiation. This circuit provides output neutron detections as TTL pulses.  Each blade is self-
contained and its calibration and PSD parameters may be set using a software interface.  More detail 
can be found in Tagziria et al (2015) [5]. 
The application of a neutron/gamma discrimination threshold means that a fraction of  those neutrons 
captured in the 6Li will be missed, and the measurement of this “readout efficiency” is essential when 
designing the coincidence counter using Monte Carlo tools.  Such a measurement was taken during 
the proof-of-concept development [5] and gave a value of 85.1 ± 2.9% (1σ). 
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• Mass = 430g
• Dimensions = 560 x 68 x 12 mm
• Power requirement = 9mA at 12V
• Temperature range = 10 to 30°C
• Neutron detection signal = +5V,
120ns TTL pulse
Figure 1: A photograph of a blade and some of their specifications. 
For instruments that employ a large number of blades,  the uniformity of efficiency is important. this 
was measured for the thirty-two blades produced for this development.  A measurement jig was 
designed and the count rate when exposed to a moderated 252Cf source was recorded for the same 
PSD parameters.  The measurements are shown in Figure 2 and show good consistency over the set. 
The variation in sensitivity is due to small variations in the 6LiF:ZnS screen thickness. 
Figure 2: A plot of sensitivity for each of the thirty-two blades.  Sensitivity is expressed in cps/ng of 252Cf in the 
measurement jig.  Error bars are shown at the 1σ level. 
The mean of this distribution is 17.33 cps/ng and the standard deviation is 5.3%, which was deemed 
good enough for this development since the sensitivity of the blades is distributed randomly.  If 
required, the neutron/gamma discrimination threshold could be used to further tighten the distribution 
by setting calibrating the blades to a specified sensitivity. 
2.2. Instrument Design 
Monte Carlo simulations were carried out to aid the design of an instrument suitable for neutron 
coincidence counting [5].  Thirty-two blades are arranged in four slabs of eight, surrounding a square 
sample cavity of 21x21x40cm.  Each slab is made up of a HDPE moderator matrix lined on five faces 
by a 1mm-thick cadmium sheet which suppresses thermal neutron albedo from outside the instrument 
and prevents thermal neutrons from passing across the sample cavity thus  leading to a longer die-
away time.  The top face is open to allow connectors and cables to pass whilst an aluminium cladding 
of 1mm  avoids the need to handle cadmium.  Neutron reflectors are included, in the form of four 
HDPE blocks to minimise loss of efficiency in the corners of the cavity.  Similarly, HDPE and 
aluminium plugs play a similar role at the top and bottom of the cavity.  Whilst this design is not 
expected to be offer optimised performance, it was selected for ease of manufacture. 
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Figure 3: Left: A photograph of the instrument with one slab removed showing its moderator and reflector design.  
Right: A photograph of the completed system including aggregator electronics and cabling. 
Readout of the blades is achieved through four aggregator units (seen in the right panel of Figure 3) 
which power the blades, buffer their TTL outputs and then OR them into a single output.  This allows 
the user to read each blade individually with coincidence-counting electronics such as the PTR-32 (EK 
Hungary) or to reduce the number of signals into a single output with the JSR-12 or JSR-14 
(Canberra).  Finally, a software interface is provided that allows the PSD parameters of the blades to 
be varied to trade off gamma-ray rejection with absolute efficiency. 
3. Characterisation of the System
3.1. Performance Figure of Merit and Bias 
The performance of the NCC has been quantified by measuring the absolute efficiency (ε) and  die-
away time (τ), and by calculating a figure-of-merit using the commonly used formula: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝜀
√𝜏
    (1) 
Measurements were taken using a 252Cf source of 1.81ng (4197n/s) placed at the centre of the sample 
cavity.  Data was read out for each blade using a PTR-32 and analysed using its accompanying 
software on a Windows PC.  Results are shown in Table 2 compared to an HNLCC-II owned by JRC 
and the 8-blade proof-of-concept 6LiF:ZnS instrument.  Also given are the values as simulated in 
MCNP using the readout efficiency previously measured. 
HLNCC-II 8-Blade PoC 32-Blade 
Measurement 
32-Blade 
MCNP Simulation 
Abs. Eff (%) 16.5 9.6 22.5% 25.8% 
Die away 
time (µs) 
43.3 56.9 31.2 30.5 
FoM 2.51 1.28 4.03 4.67 
Table 2: Performance parameters of the instrument compared with an HLNCC-II benchmark and MCNP 
simulation. 
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The measured performance  parameters of the instrument are encouraging and show a significant 
advantage over the HLNCC-II. They are also very close to the simulated values.  The FoM is however 
a naïve measurement and other factors must be taken into consideration such as bias and gate  
fraction when optimal values for gate-width and pre-delay have been selected.  These parameters 
have been investigated using an Americium-lithium source, the Rossi-alpha distribution for which is 
shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: A Rossi-alpha distribution for an AmLi source taken with the completed NCC.  Values have been 
normalised. 
As in the proof-of-concept tests we can see a step in the distribution from 0 to 15µs which is caused 
by the dead-time of the blade that detected the first neutron.  This represents a drop in efficiency 
during that time to 96.88% (31/32) of the maximum. 
3.2. Selection of Operating Parameters 
The doubles counting precision of the instrument depends on the acquisition gate structure.  The goal 
of this analysis was to determine the optimal combination of pre-delay and gate-width settings which: 
a. Minimizes the measurement bias of uncorrelated sources, such as AmLi or the uncorrelated
component of PuO2 sources.
b. Minimizes the relative statistical standard deviation in the measured doubles rate, σDoubles (%),
for correlated neutron sources.
The PTR-32 list mode acquisition data files were post-processed using the PTR-32 Pulse Train 
Recorder software [6] for varying combinations of pre-delay and gate-width settings in order to select 
the optimal gate structure.  The determined pre-delay and gate-width settings are then used to 
determine the doubles gate fraction, fd, for correlated neutron sources, and investigate its effect on 
the overall system performance. 
3.2.1. Doubles Rate and Bias 
The measured doubles rate from uncorrelated sources should ideally be zero in a non-biased counter.  
However, Figure 5 shows the negative doubles rate recorded in the counter during the measurement 
of an AmLi source as a function of pre-delay.  Doubles rates are negative regardless of pre-delay 
choice, but as the pre-delay is increased beyond ~15 us, the magnitude of the negative doubles rate 
diminishes and plateaus to a constant negative offset, where the effect of the diminished efficiency 
due to same-channel coincidences is less prevalent, as seen in Figure 4.  The negative doubles rate 
represents a negative bias which was calculated as 100 R/A [7].  Table 3 shows this bias as a function 
of pre-delay for various used gate-width settings for the same AmLi measurement.  It is important to 
note that, for any tested gate-width, the negative bias appears to stabilize beyond 13us, making this 
value a logical choice for pre-delay. For a fixed 13-us pre-delay, the bias fluctuates with gate-width.  
Although the 39.6us gate-width demonstrates the lowest bias (-0.08%), the gate-width must be 
selected to reduce the doubles rate uncertainty, discussed in the following section. Later we discuss 
the effect of this untraditionally long pre-delay on the gate fraction.      
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Figure 5: Negative Bias in Doubles rate as a function of 
pre-delay for various gate-widths for AmLi (singles rate of 
31,923 cps, 1200s measurement) 
GW 
(µs) PD=12 PD=13 PD=14 PD=15
32 -0.20 -0.20 -0.2 -0.2 
39.6 -0.16 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
48 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
56 -0.17 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 
64 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 
80 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 
Table 3: Negative bias (%) as a function of pre-
delay for various gate-width settings 
3.2.2. Doubles Rate Uncertainty 
Figure 6 shows the relative uncertainty in the doubles rate from a 252Cf source vs. gate-width for pre-
delay settings of 13µs and longer . The minimum uncertainty consistently occurs between gate-width 
settings of 30µs and 40µs.  The optimal value of gate-width to minimize the relative error can be 
approximated by 𝐺𝐺 = 𝜏(𝑒𝐺𝐺𝜏 − 1)/2 ≈ 1.257𝜏  [7] ,so the 39.6µs rule-of-thumb gate-width does fall 
within this minimum uncertainty range.  The choice of 13µs for the pre-delay reduces the bias effect, 
while a 39.6µs gate-width reduces the relative uncertainty in doubles counting.  Next we consider the 
effect of the gate structure on the doubles gate fraction. 
Figure 6: Doubles rate relative uncertainty as a function of gate-width for various pre-delays during 7200s 
measurement of 252Cf (singles rate of 21,944 cps) 
3.2.1. Gate Fraction and its Effect on Figure-of-Merit 
The doubles gate fraction, or gate utilization factor, estimates the fraction of the coincidence signal 
that is measured by the counter.  A typical HLNCC-II has a typical gate fraction of 0.696 [8].  The gate 
fraction increases with shorter pre-delay settings and longer gate-width values.  The gate fraction is 
calculated using Equation 2. 
 𝑓𝑑 = e −𝑃𝑃𝜏 (1 − e −𝐺𝐺𝜏  )              (2)    [7] 
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Table 4 shows the doubles gate fractions for varying gate settings for a 252Cf source.  For the 
prescribed pre-delay of 13µs and gate-width of 39.6µs, the gate fraction is 0.451 for this system, lower 
than that of the HLNCC-II, due to the longer pre-delay (13µs vs 4.5µs, respectively), and shorter gate-
width (39.6µs vs 64µs, respectively) compared to HLNCC-II.  The effect of this lower gate fraction on 
the overall system performance was factored into the FoM to give a more comprehensive performance 
comparison.  Previous work suggests two alternative FoMs which include the gate fraction [9, 10], 
shown in Equations 4 and 5. The latter two are qualitatively similar as FoM3=(FoM2)2.  The results are 
summarized in Table 5.  Even with the inclusion of the system’s reduced gate fraction compared to the 
HLNCC-II, the Li-based NCC still shows a ~12% increase in performance over the traditional system.   
𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝜀
√𝜏
(3),  𝐹𝐹𝐹2 = 𝜀∙𝑓𝑑√𝐺𝐺 (4),   𝐹𝐹𝐹3 = 𝜀2∙𝑓𝑑2𝐺𝐺    (5) 
GW (µs) PD=12 PD=13 PD=14 PD=15 
32 0.437 0.423 0.41 0.397 
39.6 0.489 0.451 0.459 0.445 
48 0.535 0.518 0.501 0.486 
56 0.568 0.55 0.532 0.516 
64 0.593 0.574 0.556 0.539 
80 0.628 0.608 0.589 0.571 
Table 4: Doubles gate fraction as a function of gate 
structure 
Parameter HLNCC-II LiF:ZnS NCC 
ε (%) 16.5 22.5 
GW (%) 64 39.6 
fd 0.696 0.451 
τ (µs) 43.3 31.2 
FOM 2.51 4.03 
FOM2 1.44 1.61 
FOM3 2.06 2.60 
Table 5: Overall system comparison 
3.3. Axial and Horizontal Profile Measurements 
An important characteristic of an effective neutron coincidence counter is a flat efficiency profile, with a 
large volume having the same absolute efficiency.  This is a function of the whole counter design, 
especially the placement of neutron reflectors and moderators.  To characterise this, two sets of 
measurements were taken: the first  was to measure the axial profile with the source moving up along 
the centreline of the system, and the second to measure the horizontal profile by moving the source 
over a plane at the mid-height of the cavity.  In both cases, the 1.81ng 252Cf source was used.  For the 
doubles measurement, a pre-delay and gate width of 15µs and 39.6µs were used. 
3.3.1. Axial Profile 
The axial profile (Figure 7) shows a considerable drop in absolute efficiency at each end of the sample 
cavity.  If a limit of 5%  were  set on deviation in the doubles rate, then a small flat region of 10cm at 
the centre meets that requirement  This compares unfavourably with the HLNCC-II.  Future iterations 
of the design should include a change to the neutron reflector design to improve this. 
Figure 7: The axial profile of the system.  Error bars are at the 1σ level. 
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3.3.2. Horizontal Profile 
The horizontal profile was measured at a height of 20cm, supported on an aluminium stand.  Figure 8 
shows the variation of singles and doubles rates for a line going across the X-axis of the instrument, 
from the centre of one face to the centre of the other. 
Figure 8: A plot of the singles and doubles rates, across the width of the sample cavity.  Error bars are at the 1σ 
level. 
This plot shows a large variation in both efficiency (represented by the singles rate) and doubles rate 
across the width of the sample cavity.  If a limit of 5% were set on variation in doubles rate, then a flat 
area can be defined that is 10cm across, or ±5cm from the centre point. 
A better response can be seen in Figure 9 as the source moves into the corners of the cavity with the 
largest deviation in doubles rate being 6.7 ± 0.57%.  We can also see that the doubles rate starts to 
fall again in the corner whilst singles rate continues to rise.  This is because a greater fraction of the 
detected neutrons have been partially moderated in the corner reflector before migrating into the 
slabs, leading to an increased die-away time.  Die-away time at (8,8) was 31.8µs vs 30.9µs at (0,0), so 
the gate fraction there is slightly worse. 
Figure 9: Singles and double rate as the source moves towards the +X,+Y corner (left) and the -X,+Y corner 
(right) 
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3.4. Gamma-Ray Rejection Measurement 
Gamma-ray rejection (GRR) was measured by placing a 137Cs source at the centre of the sample 
cavity and measuring the increase in counts above background.  The activity of the source was 2.49 x 
108 Bq and the dose at the surface of the sample cavity was calculated to be 1.73 mSv/hr.  Gamma-
ray rejection was calculated using the formula below and is expressed as the probability of a single 
gamma-ray causing a false neutron count. 
𝐺𝐺𝐺 =  𝐺−𝐵
𝐴∙𝑅𝐵∙Ω
     (6) 
Where A is the activity of the source in Bq, 𝐺𝐵 is the branching ratio of the 662keV gamma ray (0.85), 
and Ω is the solid angle subtended by the detector as a fraction of 4π.  In this case, only the solid 
angle of the slabs containing blades was used, giving Ω = 0.93. G and B are the count rates during a 
137Cs exposure and background, respectively. G was measured to be 32.49 ± 0.23 cps and B was measured to be 18.04 ± 0.18 cps.  This gave a 
measurement of GRR = 7.33 x 10-8 ± 0.17 x 10-8 (1σ). 
Another measurement was made of how the doubles signature for a fission source is affected by the 
presence of gamma-ray flux.  To measure this, the same 137Cs source and the 1.81ng 252Cf were 
used, with the doubles rate measured with and without the gamma-ray flux being present.  Using a 
pre-delay and gate width of 15µs and 39.6µs the following results were obtained: 
Doubles rate 
252Cf = 149.20 ± 0.59 cps
137Cs + 252Cf = 156.83 ± 0.86 cps
Ratio = 1.05 ± 0.01 
Table 6: The measured doubles rate with and without a gamma-ray dose of 1.73mSv/hr. 
This indicates that the introduction of the gamma-ray flux creates a significant positive bias.  In 
practice, this can be reduced by raising the neutron/gamma discrimination threshold or by including a 
steel liner to reduce the surface dose. 
3.5. Measurement with Plutonium Samples 
Finally, the plutonium mass calibration function was measured, using a set of PuGa sources having 
the following isotopic composition: 
Isotope Iso.Compo.wt 
% 
rsd % Specific Power 
mW/g (error) 
Half Life (y) 
Pu-238 0.1336 0.04 567.57  (0.26) 87.74 
Pu-239 75.6606 0.03 1.9288  (0.0003) 24119 
Pu-240 21.4898 0.07 7.0824  (0.002 6564 
Pu-241 1.9510 0.93 3.412    (0.002) 14.348 
Pu-242 0.7651 0.38 0.1159  (0.0003) 376300 
Am-241 1.86 0.02 114.2    (0.42) 433.6 
Table 7: Isotopic composition of the PuGa samples used in this measurement. 
The same measurement was performed with an HLNCC-II owned by JRC for comparison purposes.  
Figure 10 shows this data as well as data taken with the eight-blade proof-of-concept. 
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Figure 10: Plots of doubles rate as a function of 240Pu mass taken using PuGa samples.  Statistical errors have 
been included but cannot be seen on this scale. 
In the figure we see that the system has a linear relationship, as desired.  The gradient of the 32-blade 
system is only somewhat steeper than the HLNCC-II because although it has a much higher absolute 
efficiency, this is moderated by the poorer gate-fraction caused by the long pre-delay.  As in the 8-
blade proof-of-concept a negative intercept is seen due to the negative bias remaining in the system. 
4. Conclusions
This study relates to the first practical 6LiF:ZnS NCC and has demonstrated that a system has been 
built that can be used for non-destructive assay in the field of nuclear safeguards.  Good agreement 
was also observed between Monte Carlo models and measurements taken at JRC following validation 
of models during the first stage of this development [5]. 
It was found that the 6LiF:ZnS system had a superior absolute efficiency of 22.5% and a die-away time 
of 31.2µs compared to 16.5% and 43.3µs for the HLNCC respectively.  This achieved a figure-of-merit 
of 4.03 compared to the 2.51 of the HLNCC-II.  In practical terms, this difference will allow a given 
doubles rate uncertainty to be achieved in less time and so improve throughput of samples.  Gamma-
ray rejection was measured to be better than 1:107 for a 137Cs source at a dose of 1.7mSv/hr at the 
surface of the sample cavity. The vertical and horizontal profiles of the counter are not optimal but are 
acceptable and can be improved with redesigned top and bottom reflectors, and an annular 
configuration.  The validated Monte Carlo models will be used to make these improvements. Although 
a very small negative bias is observed even with the optimum pre-delay and gate-width, the plutonium 
mass calibration is rather linear. 
There is scope for further development and improvements (both on the design and electronics) on 
aspects such as the imposition of a relatively long pre-delay by dead time and pulse pile-up effects in 
the blades, which is the main limitation on the performance of the instrument. 
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Abstract 
The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) which was launched in 
March 2015 in Washington broadly aims to build international capacity amongst Nuclear Weapon States 
(NWS) and non-NWS, improve and broaden the understanding of the challenges faced with in nuclear 
disarmament verification and monitoring and finally provide international leadership by facilitating 
technical progress to meet these challenges.  Following a short introduction to IPNDV (see also the 
presentation by US Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) at this symposium), this paper shall focus on the 
technical challenges in disarmament verification which heavily depends on Non-Destructive Analysis 
Techniques (NDA) combined with containment and surveillance and chain of custody which have been 
effectively used in nuclear safeguards and nuclear security for many decades. However boundary 
conditions and the need for information barriers to protect sensitive information make their application in 
nuclear disarmament verification that much more challenging. 
Keywords: Disarmament Verification, NDA, Nuclear Safeguards, Chain of custody, information barriers
a
Contact: hamid.tagziria@ec.europa.eu
1. Introduction
The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) [1,2] principally uses for its 
building blocks a number of initiatives such as the US-Russia monitoring and verification experience, the 
US-UK program on non-proliferation and arms control technology and the UK-Norway initiative [3] on
nuclear warhead dismantlement verification.
IPNDV however differs from others in that it is focused on practical and technical activities and 
recognizes that 1) an effective verification underpins the all-important confidence, 2) that disarmament 
can only happen if verifiable and 3) that technologies (old and novel) are fundamentally needed for 
confidence in verification. The latter heavily depends on Non-Destructive Analysis Techniques (NDA) 
combined with containment and surveillance and chain of custody which have been effectively used in 
nuclear safeguards and nuclear security for many decades.
The IPNDV activities are organized around biannual plenaries (previously held in Washington, Oslo, 
Tokyo, Abu Dhabi and Berlin) and are principally focused on the work of the three working groups (WG): 
x WG1: Monitoring and verification objectives    x WG2: On-site inspections                                   x WG3: Technical challenges and solutions     
A number of much needed and useful joint group meetings were also organized. 
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The plenary sessions are generally attended by about 25 (invited) national delegations: the 5 UN 
Security Council's permanent members, about 11 or more EU Member states , about 11 non EU-NNWS 
and the EU/EEAS  in addition to  delegates from IAEA, VERTIC, CTBTO and OPCW.
While the IPNDV overall will be presented and described in the plenary of this ESARDA symposium and 
WG2 work described by Floyd et al. also in this event, this paper will focus on some aspects of WG3 
work. For further details the reader is directed to references 1 and 2.
2. The IPNDV simple scenario:
In order to ensure further focusing of work and good progress towards IPNDV objectives, a simple 
scenario was agreed in Geneva in February 2016, although revisited and expanded on in subsequent 
meetings whereby:
• One NWS will dismantle one Nuclear Explosive Device (NED) and put the resulting components 
(nuclear material, explosives, etc.) into a temporary monitored storage at the dismantlement site. 
• The inspecting party will consist of members from both NWS and non-NWS.  
• Confidence in the completion of these activities is required by both the inspectors and 
governments.
The starting points of the scenario would be:
a) To Confirm NED: X quantity of either Pu or U with Y % of either Pu-239 or U-235; X and Y will 
depend on the NED, on what the NWS is willing to reveal and the accuracy of the equipment
b) To confirm dismantlement of the NED: Separation of the nuclear material (physics pack) and 
the High Explosive
c) To Ensure Chain of custody: from when inspectors confirm the item declared as an NED
meets agreed characteristics until both HE and NM are in temporary monitored storage
d) To ensure NM and HE remain within temporary monitored storage until the next stage of 
the dismantlement process: arrangements must be made for how containers are moved and
how the temporary storage will be monitored. 
The diagram of Figure 1 drawn by the Japan delegation is to reflect the scenario. 
Figure 1: Schematic Diagram of a the dismantlement phase (by Japan delegation) based on the IPNDV 
simple scenario
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3. Working Group 3: Technical challenges and solutions       
In line with its terms of reference [1, 2] WG3 would examine and assess:
• How parties can confirm the presence or absence of nuclear warheads and relevant nuclear 
materials without revealing proliferation sensitive information; 
• Effective methods and procedures for establishing and maintaining chain of custody for items at 
different stages in the nuclear weapons lifecycle; and 
• Strategies and tools for software and hardware certification and authentication. 
WG 3 thus endeavoured to map any existing and potential technical capabilities for the monitoring and 
verification of a nuclear weapon dismantlement process at its different stages, the associated level of 
confidence each technology can bring and finally draw a list that identifies capability gaps and 
weaknesses.
Ultimately the aim is to develop solutions for key technical challenges for Nuclear Weapons States 
(NWS) and Non-NWS related to nuclear disarmament verification, particularly issues focusing on nuclear 
warhead authentication, methods for establishing and maintaining chain of custody, and data and 
equipment authentication. Specific technologies and methods will be needed to support future arms 
control and disarmament initiatives. Nuclear warhead verification and monitored dismantlement of 
nuclear weapons in particular will require extensive collaboration, technology development, and testing. 
While significant contributions have already been made, this work has largely been focused within a 
handful of states and many issues remain unresolved. The WGs and IPNDV in general acknowledged
the complete nuclear warhead lifecycle, but initial focus has been on the nuclear warhead dismantlement 
process and the monitored storage of nuclear materials resulting from dismantled nuclear warheads. 
3.1. WG3’s tool box of Potential Technologies 
About 21 potential technology papers (or data sheets) now nearing completion have been developed 
and written by WG3 delegations which cover 3 main pillars of a dismantlement verification process. As 
no single technology would fit all purposes and stages, it is suggested that the technologies proposed 
should be seen rather as a tool box able to be picked from and adapted as to adequately address 
various aspects and stages of an agreed scenario which its possible variations (and development) in 
scope and within changing boundary conditions beyond the initial simple scenario. 
1) Nuclear Materials 
a. High Resolution gamma spectrometry
b. Gamma-ray imaging
c. Passive neutron counting
d. Pulsed neutron interrogation
e. Active neutron interrogation 
f. Fast neutron imaging
g. Muon Tomography 
h. Radiation templates
2) High Explosives (HE)
a. Computed Tomography (X-ray imaging)
b. Fast neutron interrogation (for HE identification)
c. Nuclear quadrupole resonance spectroscopy (NQR)
d. Raman spectroscopy  (fingerprinting)
e. X-ray backscattering imaging (for size and shape)
f. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) 
3) Chain of Custody:
a) Facility Verification and change detection 
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b) 3D identification and containment 
c) Surveillance
d) Accelerometers
e) Radiation detection
f) Tamper indicating seals and enclosures
More specifically for the Chain of Custody main pillars for surveillance, containment and identification:
Technology area Technology
Surveillance x Personalx Videox 3D Laserx Radiation portal monitorsx Accelerometersx Radiation Detectionx …
Containement x TIDs and Sealsx 3D Laser Change Detection Systemx Optical Change Detection Systemsx Tamper indicating enclosurex …
Identification x Radiation proof passive RFIDx 3D Container identificationx Taggingx ...
A number of the above technologies currently applied to nuclear safeguards and nuclear security (Non 
Destructive Analysis, 3D laser based, seals and tamper indicators..) were demonstrated by the Joint 
Research Centre in ISPRA to WG3 participants in May 2016.
3.2. Template of WG3 Technology Papers 
Each paper or technology data sheet has been written based on a common template that provides the 
following information:
a. Physical Principle/ Methodology of Technology
b. Potential Monitoring Use Cases (e.g., chain of custody, nuclear material detection, explosives 
detection, etc.)
c. Physical Description of Technology
d. Time Constraints for verification
e. Technology Complexity
f. Infrastructure requirements
g. Technology Limitations
h. Information Collected by the Technology 
i. Safety, Security, Deployment Concerns:
j. Technology Development Stage (or readiness level TRL)
k. Cost Estimate
l. Where/How the Technology Is Currently Used  
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
348
m. Additional System Functionality  
n. Examples of Equipment and References
4. Case study:  Neutron Passive Counting
In essence within the simple scenario described above and the boundary conditions to be safeguarded 
by strong information barriers, the verification of attributes in nuclear disarmament for a Pu based device 
would ultimately seek to: 
1) confirm the presence of Pu, 
2) measure the  
240
Pu  to 
2393XUDWLRW\SLFDOO\IRU1('V
3) measure the mass of 
240
Pu and 
4) consequently extract the mass of Pu from steps 2) and 3) in order to verify whether the mass 
exceeds the agreed threshold. 
4.1. Principles of neutron coincidence counting
Contemporary nuclear explosive devices (NED) or nuclear weapons primarily contain plutonium (Pu) 
ZLWKRI2393XDQGRU+LJKO\(QULFKHG8UDQLXP+(8ZLWKRI235U (for which active 
interrogation is more suitable).  In addition, the so called “primary” (or pit) may be made of Pu and/or 
HEU metal and as part of a  “secondary” may also include extra fissile materials (in general HEU).  It is 
expected that a nuclear weapon would contain about 8 kg of Pu (or 
233
U) or 25 kg of 
235
U in HEU. 
Passive Neutron Counting makes use of the neutrons emitted by spontaneous and induced fission 
processes in plutonium and uranium to measure the amount of nuclear material present. The very 
penetrating nature of neutrons facilitates this use by making it possible to measure neutrons from the 
entire item.
The neutrons from nuclear material are created by three processes:x Spontaneous fission where the nucleus randomly separates into two fragments which 
then emit a distribution of neutrons and gamma rays.x Induced fission where a fission event is driven by an incoming neutron interacting with 
the nucleus that then fissions.x ĮQUHDFWLRQVZKHUHOLJKWHUHOHPHQWV18O or 19)IRUH[DPSOHUHDFWZLWKDGHFD\Į.
For well characterized material, the total or gross neutron counting rate is proportional to the mass of 
nuclear material present. The characterization requirement is substantial, however, and this approach is 
rarely used to quantify the mass of nuclear material as variations in the material composition and shape 
strongly affect the neutron rate. Neutron coincidence counting systems (both passive and active) have 
over many decades been successfully designed, adapted and used in safeguards for the accurate Non 
Destructive Assay (NDA) of Pu and Uranium containing items [4-6].
In essence, by measuring the correlated spontaneous fission rates of the item of interest, a passive 
neutron coincidence counter (2 neutrons correlated are counted) or a multiplicity counter (more than 2 
neutrons in coincidence) once calibrated leads to the determination of the mass of plutonium provided 
the isotopic composition of the item is known (by e.g. gamma spectrometry) and that the other 
competing reactions and conditions are taken into account. For neutrons from either spontaneous fission 
(
238,240,242
Pu isotopes) or induced fission (
239
Pu and 
235
U) are emitted almost simultaneously (in 
coincidence) and detected within a gate width in the range of 40 to 80 µs. 
The train of electronic pulses produced by the neutron detector is recorded and their distribution in time 
LVGHWHUPLQHG1HXWURQVIURPEDFNJURXQGDQGIURPĮQUHDFWLRQVZKLFKPXVWEHDFFRXQWHGIRUDUH
fortunately either uncorrelated or arrive randomly in time.  Standard coincidence electronics such as the 
shift-registers or pulse train analyzers (or recorders) exploit this fact so that the detectors are insensitive 
to those unwanted neutrons. 
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In a traditional NCC the total neutron rates (Totals) and the time-correlated rates (called Reals or 
Doubles) are measured within a gate width of typically 64 µs (depending on counter) following a few µs 
pre-delay. By subtracting the accidental rates counted within the same gate width but 1000  µs later (i.e. 
once the fission neutron has died away) the pure correlated pulses are measured which leads to the 
determination of the plutonium mass and neutron multiplication (M) in the sample provided the ratio of 
UDQGRPWRFRLQFLGHQFHQHXWURQVĮLVNQRZQ7KHODWWHULVQRWDOZD\VHDVLO\NQRZQHVSHFLDOO\IRULPSXUH
samples or items for which information is restricted and/or whose chemical composition is unknown.  
This problem of more unknowns (
2403X0DVV1HXWURQPXOWLSOLFDWLRQ0DQGĮWKDQHTXDWLRQVLVVROYHG
by using multiplicity counters with high efficiency which allow to measure the third order terms of the 
multiplicity distribution i.e. the Triplets rates (3 correlated fission neutrons) and subsequently extract the 
mass of 
240
Pu equivalent (or effective).
Figure 2: Standard (HLNCC) neutron coincidence counter and coincidence electronics box
In summary, neutron coincidence counting is a well-established and powerful method used in nuclear 
safeguards to detect the presence of nuclear material and, provided the isotopic composition is known 
(by e.g. gamma spectrometry), is also used to determine the mass of Pu. It can be readily applied to 
nuclear disarmament verification, but only when agreed boundary conditions are respected and robust 
information barriers are installed. Monte Carlo simulation successfully also combined with 
measurements for the verification of nuclear material declarations [7-10] can also be envisaged within 
the disarmament verification regime.
5. Information barriers and boundary conditions
In applying one or more of the technologies from the toolbox above, the following attributes could be 
revealed:
1) Isotopic composition, the age and the mass  of the fissile material
2) Design features of both the NED including the HE: geometry, density, reflectors, seals and 
tamper indicators etc..
3) Etc..
All these and more are classified and secret information thus requiring an Information Barrier (IB) to 
translate it into a standard unclassified information agreeable to all parties such as a binary yes/no 
(green/red light and perhaps also yellow). 
IB systems thus principally aim to prevent the release of proliferative or other sensitive information. They 
provide the all-important confidence in:
1) the monitoring and verification of classified and sensitive items using measurements of high 
quality 
2) protection of highly sensitive design information and thus alleviate concerns about security and 
non-proliferation
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While the right definition of these attributes and by extension the definition and scope of the scenario the 
technologies are required to address is crucial, it is a political process as much as the declassification of 
the data allowed to be acquired. While disarmament is possible only if verifiable, the availability of 
verification technologies (including for chain of custody) combined with robust information barriers is 
fundamental in building confidence and advancing toward a process for disarmament. It is equally 
important that within this highly sensitive technical verification regime the role of “trust” and “confidence” 
is well understood by both the host and the inspecting parties. 
Figure 3:  The application of information barrier (IB) to measurement of sensitive items
An example of information barrier was demonstrated in Oslo to IPNDV participants by the UK-Norway 
initiative [3] which uses gamma ray spectrometry for isotopic composition analysis. Another was shown
in 2009 in VNIIF (Russia) to US observers for the Attribute Verification with Neutrons and Gamma rays 
(AVNG) system [11]. The latter combines an HPGe gamma spectrometer with a multiplicity neutron 
counter containing 164 
3
He tubes giving 30% neutron efficiency inside an AT-400R container (491 mm 
diameter and 503 mm in height).
Figure 3: An example of the IB box developed (in Phase III) by the UK-Norway initiative [3]
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6. Conclusions  
During the Abu Dhabi plenary of IPNDV, it was concluded that collective thinking on the broad goals, 
priorities and next steps have been advanced and several areas were identified as key for the next 
stages:
a) Further development and completion of technical and procedural papers to 
verify dismantlement (basic scenario)
b) One recurring theme was the need for practical activities such as technology 
demonstrations and exercises. 
c) These practical and technical activities differentiate IPNDV from other 
disarmament efforts.
The US under-secretary of state Frank Rose concluded and stated that:
x Agreements must seek to maintain stability and confidencex Effective verification underpins confidencex Disarmament can only happen if verifiablex Progress slow but no short cuts as of complex naturex Disarmament desirable and feasiblex Technology development very important and new technology can be applied to verificationx Technologies fundamentally needed for confidence in verification x Trust and Verify principle
In line with its terms of reference and planned activities, Working Group 3 has progressed well towards 
completing its deliverables. A toolbox of potential technologies applicable to all relevant stages of the
nuclear disarmament verification process has been evaluated and papers describing the technologies 
developed.  
As noted by various delegations, the need for practical activities such as technology demonstrations and 
exercises would be a natural and worthwhile next step for WG3 in particular and IPNDV in general. This 
was actually done within the trilateral initiative (IAEA, Russia, USA 1996-2002) in December 2001 at the 
JRC in Ispra (Italy). Eventually, when ready and adequate, an inter-comparison exercise could be 
organized such as the one performed for He-3 alternative neutron detection technologies for nuclear 
safeguards within DOE-EURATOM task sheet (47) at the JRC in Ispra in October 2014 combined with a 
workshop might be a format worth exploring.
As discussed in Nature by Rees et al [12], even at the pinnacle of the cold war US and Russian 
scientists constructively worked together on verification issues, technologies and approaches. 
Furthermore, scientists involved in disarmament and initiatives such as the IPNDV can draw inspiration
from the fact that scientific collaborations has in the past helped negotiations and that science could 
eventually help paving the way forward to disarmament. 
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Abstract: 
Approaches for the verification of dismantlement of nuclear weapons have historically focused on the 
separation of High Explosives and Fissile Material. Proposed methods to prove separation and 
authenticity require measurements of features or characteristics of the Fissile Material and High 
Explosives, both in assembled and disassembled configurations, producing information commonly 
considered design information. Protection of this sensitive design information requires a universally 
approvable information barrier that does not yet exist. 
While Fissile Material verification poses ongoing technical and policy challenges, non-nuclear 
disposition verification may provide a new approach to the challenge that is less encumbered by 
design sensitivity and operational security issues. Non-nuclear disposition verification focuses on the 
examination of dispositioned non-nuclear parts and pieces, integral to the assembly of the nuclear 
warhead. The approach utilizes forensic and spectroscopic techniques used commonly in 
environmental and safeguards applications, to look for evidence of material changes and activation 
products indicative of prolonged exposure to neutron fluence from Plutonium. As part of stockpile 
reduction, these parts would be expected to become excess and, as such, it is reasonable to expect 
that they will ultimately be dispositioned/destroyed. For the United States, a disposition processes 
already exist which effectively sanitizes the majority of these parts through physical destruction means 
(i.e. chopping, crushing shredding etc.), resulting in remnant products that can treated as general 
waste or recycled as raw materials. Because such processes are present, it would be reasonable to 
believe that a verification regime might take advantage of their existence to build confidence that 
dismantlement of a nuclear warhead has taken place. While the existence of these processes in the 
U.S. do not guarantee similar in treaty partner programs, there is a strong probability that something 
similar may exist. This paper will explore the feasibility of this novel approach to dismantlement 
verification. 
Keywords: warhead; verification; Dismantlement; Non-Nuclear, Disposition 
1. Introduction
Disposition verification as discussed in this paper draws upon foundational work in Safeguards [1], the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and Nuclear Forensics [2,3]. This study explores the 
utilization of technologies such as various NDA measurements, Mass Spectrometry and Ultratrace 
detection methods to identify neutron activation products in dispositioned parts, components and 
subassemblies and radiation induced material degradation associated with long term 
proximity to a source of weapons usable nuclear material. The techniques and capabilities that would 
be used to search for the presence of activation products or degradation in weapons materials are 
often used to assure longevity of parts in the stockpile, and have also been demonstrated successfully 
in emergency response, forensic and environmental applications, including looking at the impacts of 
radiation dose imparted as a result of the Fukushima disaster  
This paper discusses a conceptual approach to disposition verification using established techniques 
that could provide a less sensitive means for providing confidence and verification that weapons have
been dismantled. Because the disposition process is designed to destroy functions and features that 
would make the design of parts sensitive, disposition verification has the potential to serve as a 
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catalyst for verification activities that could include not only nuclear weapons states, but also non-
nuclear weapons states. 
2. Background
A weapon is comprised of many parts, components and subassemblies. Some of these components 
are nuclear; however the majority are simply mechanical or electronic (Figure 1). In addition to these 
components there is a significant amount of hardware, fixturing and casing material that is typically 
non-radioactive. The components that are part of the nuclear package have visual and physical 
(design) classification issues which can limit the options for verification. Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) 
measurements can provide detailed information on the mass, material composition and design 
configuration, but may provide too much information to make a host comfortable in the release of that 
information. To address this concern, such verification would probably require the addition of a trusted 
information barrier, a capability that does not currently exist for most NDA technologies.  
The verification of dismantlement is expected to be an important component of future arms reduction 
treaties. Traditionally, dismantlement has focused on the separation of fissile material and high 
explosives (HE); however, the disposition verification approach considers dismantlement more 
broadly, to include “the removal of all subassemblies, components, and individual parts for the 
purpose of physical elimination of the nuclear warhead [4].” While there have been many approaches
proposed for providing dismantlement verification, verification of physical dismantlement alone may 
not be sufficient.  The traditional emphasis of dismantlement has been on the separation of fissile 
material and high explosives; non-nuclear parts and components have always been considered to be 
of lesser concern. As a result, multiple approaches to fissile material verification have been posited 
over the last several decades, but to date those approaches still encounter complexities relating to 
design sensitivities. While such complications exist with fissile material verification for dismantlement, 
the disposition verification approach discussed in this paper does not assume to be applicable to 
fissile material at this time. Instead this approach focuses purely on the non-nuclear parts, 
components and subassemblies that are required to complete the assembled nuclear weapon, and 
seeks to fill a gap in confidence that dismantlement of a nuclear weapon has actually been completed. 
Verified disposition of non-nuclear weapons parts has never been considered as part of 
dismantlement verification.  
2.1. Components and their Significance 
The inclusion of non-nuclear components (high explosives, electronic and mechanical 
parts/components not part of the nuclear package) in the disposition verification process could 
represent an important alternative or supplemental dismantlement verification approach for several 
reasons. First, the information security requirements associated with many non-nuclear components 
are generally lower than for the weapons usable nuclear material (WUNM) in the nuclear package 
itself. While the detailed characteristics of the WUNM are exceptionally difficult to share, even with a 
NWS treaty partner, the sharing of information on non-nuclear components, especially post-
disposition, is likely to be more acceptable and less sensitive. Second, the disposition process for non-
nuclear parts is typically conducted on site but in lower level security areas. This may make access to 
the remnant disposition materials for verification much less complicated and difficult.  
Additionally, the proposed disposition verification approach could already take advantage of processes 
that currently exist instead of inserting invasive inspection processes that require changes in host 
operational behaviors, into the nuclear weapons production environment. The United States already 
has a disposition process for all nuclear weapons parts and the methodologies and pathways for 
disposition are well defined.  Because disposition is a very common industrial practice, it would be 
reasonable to expect that other NWS have some sort of disposition process as well. Witnessed 
disposition practices were deployed during the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF) 
between the United States and Russia to verify destruction of the empty missile body [5]. Similarly the 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty involved 22 states [6] with witnessed disposition of a 
variety of military armaments and equipment. Thus, there is some historic basis for witnessed 
disposition of military hardware and weapon components. Clearance and access of inspectors is 
considered a political decision and that will not be included in this paper, but access to disposition 
facilities for verification of non-nuclear component destruction could require less restricted access than 
that necessary for nuclear package SNM verification that may require access to the production facility 
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high security areas.The verified disposition of non-nuclear parts should provide increased confidence 
that a nuclear weapon was dismantled by helping verify reduction of parts and components required 
for the assembly of the weapon itself.  
Figure 1. Example: B61 Weapons Parts 
The dismantlement of a weapon can produce dozens of parts and up to hundreds of parts when 
hardware and support structure materials are included in the verification process. Depending upon the 
planned schedule and the parts/components or subassemblies that are included, a month-long 
dismantlement campaign could easily produce several hundred parts and components. While the 
disposition process for some parts and components may be simply to crush and submit for recycling, 
others components and subassemblies may require more time and steps prior to final disposition. If 
there is a quantity of parts that are all the same or follow the same disposition path, the host may 
prefer to disposition them en masse. However, as part of a regime, an inspector may prefer that 
disposition to be performed on an individual part by part basis within an agreed disposition regime. 
Because all of these items are routed to disposition in approved shipping containers, random selection 
for disposition verification may be a viable option. This could support the host’s need for expedient 
disposition, but could also support monitored disposition verification needs for an inspector and 
provide the material content characterization by which to compare against future dispositions of the 
same component. Without disposition verification of non-nuclear parts and components, a gap exists 
that could allow for the retention of those parts for reintroduced into the stockpile at another point. 
2.2. Disposition and its Pathways 
As mentioned above a completed weapon is a combination of a number of different types of parts, 
components and subassemblies (figure 1.). In U.S. facilities, these items are handled and packaged 
independently for individual disposition. That disposition process may include reacceptance, repair, 
reuse or destruction, depending on the needs of the production activity. Similar disposition processes 
may exist in treaty partner facilities, and could be leveraged in a disposition verification approach. 
While not all disposition actions currently result is destruction, if a weapon system is being removed 
from the stockpile, destruction is a likely option for parts, components and subassemblies that will no 
longer be needed for the remaining stockpile. When these disassociated parts, components and 
subassemblies are no longer needed because the weapon is being removed from the stockpile, they 
are then routed for disposition.  
Disposition is not an identical process for all items. Some components or subassemblies require 
further dismantlement before the resulting parts can be sent to final disposition. Nuclear components 
may be sent to other facilities for final disposition or disposal, while non-nuclear parts and components 
are typically dispositioned on site. The disposition process renders these unneeded items unusable, 
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and sanitizes them of all sensitive information. These parts, components or subassemblies are made 
up of a variety of different metals (both precious and non-precious), composite materials or plastics, 
and organic materials. The composition and characteristics of the item determine which method of 
disposition is applicable. Disposition approaches include but are not limited to methods such as 
shredding, chopping, melting, burning or detonation. These types of disposition processes produce 
remnant materials, the majority of which are then disposed of as either general waste or recycled. The 
disposition process of interest for this paper is circled in figure 2, below. 
Figure 2. U.S. Dismantlement/Disposition process flow 
3. Where and How Could Disposition Verification Happen
3.1. Disposition Verification Process 
Disposition verification has three primary areas of focus: first, to confirm consistency of dispositioned 
materials over time; second, to confirm that the dispositioned material had been in the presence of a 
significant radiation source for a defined duration of time (size of source and warhead age or period of 
component presence determined, or bounded, by the host’s declaration~ this may include deviation 
from overall age or presence of specific components due to maintenance); and third, to affirm that 
those items were recently removed from that source’s presence (declared recent time window).  
3.1.1. Confirming Consistency of Disposition Materials over Time
Confirming the consistency of dispositioned materials is a key element in ensuring that parts, 
components and/or subassemblies declared to have come from a specific category of treaty 
accountable items are consistent across each disassembled item type. In a broader treaty sense, this 
type of verification could confirm consistency in the type of weapon being dismantled as well. 
Confidence in this consistency would be expected to develop over time and with repeated verifications 
of the same dispositioned item(s). The over-time verifications could be performed in a variety of 
fashions including detailed visual inspections on every dispositioned item as it comes out of the 
disposition process and/or more detailed material inspections. Consistency may be achieved by 
witnessed disposition and detailed visual (and potentially physical in some cases) inspections of 
individual items shortly after dismantlement or verification of randomly selected pre-batched 
components, parts or hardware of the same types. While visual and physical inspection of 
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dispositioned materials are specifically applicable to this area of focus, there are additional techniques 
that could be deployed in support of the second and third areas of focus, which will also provide 
support for the development of confidence in the consistency of dispositioned products in addition to 
meeting the other two goals.  
3.1.2. Confirm that the Dispositioned Material had been in the Presence of a Significant 
Radiation Source for a Defined Duration of Time 
The proximity of most material to a radiation source for a long enough period of time will produce 
activation products within those elements as a result of exposure to neutron radiation. These neutron 
activation products are indicative of sustained exposure, but because of the way activation occurs, it 
does not support reconstitution of design information, and therefore is inherently protective of national 
security information. While these products may not be of sufficient quantity or strength to deter a host 
from disposing of the products in general waste (landfill) or sending their disposition products to 
recycling, their presence could prove invaluable for disposition verification. Rad hardening which 
prevents radiation damage to electronic components may prevent the generation activation products 
within the device itself, but external materials (brackets, housings etc.) may not have the same level of 
protection. 
The decay of specific activation products would be expected to be fairly consistent across the same 
materials in similar locations within a warhead. Techniques that can be used to see these neutron 
activation products are dependent upon the quantity of activated product, and energy, mechanism and 
strength of the decay pathway. Some products may be of significant enough quantity and longevity of 
decay pathway to be readily seen using standard Mass Spec or other Techniques. Other products will 
be much less prevalent and could be revealed through the use of Ultratrace methodologies, helping to 
discern a history of both presence and duration in the presence of a radiation source. Ultratrace 
methods are broadly used in support of International Safeguards and nuclear forensics work as well 
as environmental characterization and emergency response. Therefore, a fieldable Mass Spec or 
Ultratrace system (one that could be set up in a field facility or the system that is currently deployed on 
the Mars rover) could be easily deployed to support identification. Any field facility would also have to 
have the capability of supporting appropriate sample preparation. 
In addition to identifying the presence of the neutron activation products discussed in the paragraph 
above, there is also the potential for identifying degradation or chemical structural changes to organic 
materials including rubbers and plastics as a result of long term exposure to radiation fields within a 
sealed environment. Techniques such as physio chemical analysis, differential scanning calorimetry, 
infra-red spectroscopy and electron paramagnetic spectroscopy are some of the methods that can be 
used to discern characteristic changes to polymer materials that have been exposed to radiation over 
time in a sealed environment. While dose in open air may have a less significant effect on 
degradation, dose rates in a sealed environment can be 3 to 10 times higher for materials such as 
polyolefin, Polyether ether ketone (PEEK), Nylon and Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE), that are 
sensitive to oxidation [7]. A gas/air sample from the sealed environment could also contain outgassed 
chemical products indicative of radiation induced degradation, although the availability of such a 
gas/air sample may not be acceptable by the host. The ability of the inspector to witness a gas 
sampling process would have to be considered to support this type of verification. 
3.1.3. Affirm that the Dispositioned Items were Recently Removed from that Source’s
Presence
In addition to knowing that the component, part or hardware was in the presence of the specified 
source for an extended (declared) period of time, it would also be valuable to discern that the 
exposure of the items ceased within the declared dismantlement window. While aging of the exposure 
would look at long-lived neutron activation products, the need to affirm recent dismantlement would 
require looking for the presence of much more short-lived neutron activation products. The reason 
affirmation of presence of short-lived products would be valuable, is that their presence would help 
provide confidence that the dispositioned item was recently part of the declared dismantlement, and 
not a part that has been on a shelf for months or years; another possible method to help verify 
dismantlement. 
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The identification and measurement of specific short-lived neutron activation products would be 
dependent upon the style or approach that would be utilized for disposition verification (immediate 
one-to-one disposition of items, or randomly selected items from batched products). Some very short-
lived products will decay to the point that they can no longer be seen in minutes to hours, some in 
days, and others in weeks. In the case of random selection from batches, specific dates/times of 
dismantlement would be necessary for the randomly selected part, in order to determine expected 
level or presence of specific short-lived products. Batching processes which might include parts that 
had been stored for up to six months may provide limited value for this application, since many of the 
short-lived products may have decayed completely in the majority of parts. 
4. Conclusion
While this approach still requires exploration, disposition verification may offer a number of options 
which could lead to the development of confidence over time while also protecting the most sensitive 
elements of the host’s stockpile and lifecycle. Many U.S. non-nuclear components and parts are 
dispositioned by the host with a target of sanitization for release into a general waste or land fill. 
Because non-nuclear parts disposition may be conducted in lower security industrial areas, this option 
might provide more accommodating access for all treaty partners to engage in verification, and if the 
remnant materials are sufficiently insensitive for general release, their examination by even an NNWS 
partner, might be possible.  
While the host might typically perform unmonitored disposition en masse (batched dispositions) for 
convenience, disposition processes could be designed such that individual items can be dispositioned 
as well. If this type of condition exists, it could potentially support both the continuous disposition of 
numerous parts and the disposition of randomly selected representative parts either from randomly 
selected full disposition verifications or from a ready batch of staged parts. 
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Abstract: 
Independent estimates assume that the world-wide civilian and military fissile material stocks amount 
to 500 tons of plutonium and 1,400 tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU). To enable deep cuts in 
warhead arsenals, states will very likely need to verify declarations of fissile material stocks, as they 
could be used to build new nuclear weapons. One approach is nuclear archaeology, reconstructing 
the past production of those materials. Research has so far focused on specific measurements in 
reactors to assess past plutonium production, on deposits in gaseous diffusion plants and isotopics of 
depleted uranium tails to assess HEU production. For the large historical production of separated 
plutonium and HEU by Russia and the United States, uncertainties corresponding to large numbers of 
significant quantities remain with these techniques. A combination of measurements, fuel cycle 
simulations and reviews of records from past production activities could significantly reduce these 
uncertainties. This combination also would enable cross-checking information and measurement 
results for consistency. To demonstrate this approach, we conduct a case study. A declared 
production history is generated using the CYCLUS nuclear fuel cycle simulator. The simulation results 
are signatures resulting from the simulated history, some of which could in principle be measured. 
Assessing the isotopic compositions of waste streams, for example, can allow for cross-checking of 
declared fuel cycle histories. Based on this case study, the capabilities of the approach will be 
examined. 
Keywords: nuclear archaeology; disarmament; fuel cycle simulations 
1. Introduction
With the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union launched their fissile 
material production (plutonium and highly enriched uranium, HEU) for military purposes. By the mid-
1950s, both countries were already making ton-quantities of fissile material per year to supply their 
nuclear arsenals. They were soon joined by the United Kingdom (1951), France (1955), China (1964), 
and Israel (1965)—and later by India, Pakistan, and finally North Korea. According to independent 
estimates by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, there exist about 505 tons of plutonium and 
1370 tons of HEU world-wide today [1]. 
Most large-scale fissile-material production programs were driven by a sense of urgency and typically 
shrouded in secrecy. It is generally believed that accounting for these military operations was poor. 
The fissile material production uncertainty is very large, and even states themselves have had 
difficulty reconciling production records with physical inventories. In the United States, for example, 
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estimated plutonium acquisitions exceeded the actual inventory by 2.4 tons, but it is not clear if this 
material ever existed [2]. 
These uncertainties will have to be understood and reduced as further progress toward nuclear 
disarmament is made. In particular, a solid understanding of fissile-material holdings is needed to 
achieve a meaningful degree of predictability and irreversibility of future arms-control initiatives. 
Speculations about unaccounted fissile-material stockpiles, possibly equivalent to hundreds of nuclear 
weapons, could make progress in this area very difficult. To this end, states must be able to verify the 
past fissile material production [3]. 
2. An integrated nuclear archaeology approach
In order to understand and reduce the uncertainties in the amount of produced fissile materials, new 
methods and tools must be developed that help reconstruct the past fissile material production history 
and enable verification. This is called nuclear archaeology, a concept introduced already in 1990 [4]. 
The state of nuclear archaeology research is at a low level despite its importance. Some initial 
research has been conducted on measurement concepts for nuclear archaeology in uranium 
enrichment plants [5]. The isotopic composition of the depleted uranium tails can be assessed, to 
determine whether HEU had been produced [6, 7]. Other techniques under development include 
quantitative estimates of the plutonium production in graphite-moderated reactors (GIRM) [6, 8, 9] and 
heavy water reactors [10] by examining the graphite moderator or structural reactor elements. By 
examining isotopic ratios of trace elements, the neutron fluence can be determined, which yields the 
total amount of plutonium produced in the reactor, assuming the reactor design to be fully known. 
Some further unpublished and perhaps classified research appears to have been conducted by U.S. 
government scientists [11]. Of all published research, only GIRM has been experimentally validated to 
a larger extent. 
All past research results only deal with examining particular fuel cycle facilities in isolation. However, 
the nuclear archaeology toolbox could be much broader. Additional signatures could be sought. What 
is lacking is a systematic and integrated approach that ties together all available information – not only 
from measurements, but also from available records about the past fissile material production. Such 
an approach could be used to identify inconsistencies (for example between records and today’s 
measurements), help understand the underlying reasons for the current uncertainties, and reduce 
them.  
Some nuclear weapon states have a large number of nuclear facilities involved in the fissile material 
production. The operations of these facilities changed over time (e.g. changes in the power levels of 
the reactors), as did the complex material transfers between these facilities. For example, spent fuel 
has sometimes been reprocessed and used as feed in enrichment plants. Enrichment operations also 
had a level of complexity. For example, natural uranium has sometimes been enriched to low enriched 
uranium in one plant, which has subsequently been fed into another plant to produce HEU [12, p. 57]. 
To calculate the material flows in such complex fuel cycles, an integrated fuel cycle simulation tool 
would be very useful. Data on facility operations provided to the inspector or plausible assumptions 
could be used as input to simulate the nuclear materials as they pass through the fuel cycle. The 
simulation results of such forward-modelling would tell about the various signatures to expect from 
what is available today, for example the isotopic composition of different types of wastes (e.g. 
depleted uranium tails or radioactive reprocessing waste). It could then be checked whether 
information gathered today, such as waste measurements, are in agreement with the simulation 
results. In particular in more complex fuel cycles, various signatures are correlated, and examining 
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these correlations itself can provide information on the production history, e.g. to which extent 
reprocessed uranium was used for HEU production.  
The joint evaluation of measurements and simulations based on provided data can potentially reduce 
the uncertainties of the fissile material estimates beyond what is possible based on either approach 
alone. Some documented data may be inaccurate, or different recorded data maybe inconsistent in 
itself, for example because of past inventory measurements with large uncertainties. Measurements 
today can perhaps help resolve such issues. 
In the following, we first examine a tool that could be developed for the forward-modelling of complex 
fissile material production histories. Second, we use a case study to demonstrate the integrated 
nuclear archaeology approach. 
3. Forward-modelling simulation tool
The forward-modelling simulation tool must be able to handle all relevant types of nuclear facilities. It 
must be able to calculate the composition and masses of nuclear materials at the different fuel cycle 
stages. To manage the complex fuel cycle histories, the code must provide for options to change 
facility operations over time, introduce new facilities and shut down old ones at specified times, and 
change the material flows between facilities. To realize this, discrete fissile material flows must be 
calculated, as opposed to continuous material flows resulting from a fuel cycle in a steady state. 
The Cyclus fuel cycle tool [13] is an open source, agent based fuel cycle simulator. Fundamentally, 
the Cyclus simulator tracks the discrete flow of materials between facilities over time. It can also 
provide time series data such as material inventories, incorporating radioactive decay. Facilities are 
represented as agents. Each agent has its own unique and independent behaviour. The agents do not 
communicate directly with one another, but interact through the Dynamical Resource Exchange 
(DRE), which calculates the fissile material transfers between them. 
At the beginning of each time step, each facility sends its own material requests to the DRE. The DRE 
then collects the corresponding bids made by the different facilities that have material to offer. Finally, 
the DRE solves the market problem by finding a solution that matches requests with bids, allowing the 
materials to flow between the different facilities. Each facility can specify requested quantities or 
compositions of materials, and they can decline trade if the offered materials do not meet its own 
requirements (e.g. regarding isotopic composition). 
The Cyclus suite is offered as a pair of libraries: the Cyclus core contains the DRE as well as input and 
output interfacing, while the Cycamore library provides a basic set of nuclear facility agents. The 
separation between the simulation agents and the solver core provides flexibility and customizability. 
The Cyclus development team supports the development of the Cycamore plugins, which correspond 
to low fidelity archetypes that incorporate some physics [14]. If the Cycamore archetype suite does not 
capture a desired behavior, contributors can design their own specialized facilities as plugins.   
For example, a modified version of the Cycamore enrichment facility has been developed for this 
research [15]. The original Cycamore enrichment facility allows enriching the uranium-235 content of a 
feed stream. All minor isotopes (those apart from uranium-235 and uranium-238, for example uranium-
234 or uranium-236) are directly sent to the tails. This does not represent the physical reality, where 
also the minor isotopes are being enriched. To enable the tracking of additional isotopes, the new 
enrichment archetype allows for manually specifying the enrichment of isotopes other than uranium-
235 and uranium-238 as well, and calculates the correct isotopic composition of the product and tails 
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streams. To enable this, the ratios of each isotope’s product to feed enrichments must be specified 
manually. 
Given a desired product mass 𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡   and uranium-235 enrichment τp, as well as the specified 
uranium-235 content in the tails τt, the enrichment agent will first compute the required feed mass 
𝑀𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  , which also depends on the uranium-235 enrichment of the feed τf, using 
𝑀𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑  =  𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡  ∗  
τp –  τt
τf − τt
The tails mass results from mass conservation. The concentrations of the specified minor isotopes in 
the product are then calculated based on their content in the feed and the specified enrichment ratios. 
The remaining minor isotope masses from the feed that are not in the product are transferred to the 
tails.  
3. Demonstration of the integrated approach
In the following, we use a case study to provide an example of an integrated nuclear archaeology 
assessment, using more than one measurable signature, documentation provided to the inspector and 
forward-modelling to learn about the past fissile material production. For the purpose of clarity, we 
keep the case study simple. While complex fuel cycle computer simulations are not absolutely 
required in this simple case, a realistic nuclear weapons state case could be much more complex, in 
which case a complex simulation tool would be required to forward-model the fuel cycle based on the 
provided documentation.  
For the case study (see Fig. 1), we assume a state used natural uranium to produce plutonium in 
reactors and a reprocessing plant (Fig. 1, path A) and HEU in a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant 
(path B). Because the state assumed limited access to natural uranium and wanted to maximize use 
of its natural uranium resources, it decided to enrich some of the reprocessed uranium (which still 
contains 0.6% to 0.7% uranium-235) to produce HEU (path C).  
The principal goal is to determine how much HEU and plutonium the state produced, based on three 
pieces of information that were declared: the total amount of natural uranium used (208 tons), 
information on the reactors (full reactor designs known, specific power 4.45 W/gIHM and fuel burnup 
300 MWd/t), and knowing the HEU enrichment (94%). Notably, to quantify the plutonium and HEU 
production, the material transfers corresponding to the paths A, B and C must be quantified. 
While simplified, this case is relevant. For example, the United States released data on its history of 
natural uranium purchases, and further data on its nuclear program. [16]. This data has already been 
used to conduct a rough consistency test [17]. Also, at least the Soviet Union and the United States 
re-used their reprocessed uranium in reactors to produce more plutonium or in enrichment plants for 
the production of HEU [12, p. 57]. 
In the following, we propose an approach to solve this nuclear archaeology case study in three parts, 
combining measurements with forward-modelling. 
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Figure 1: The fuel cycle of the case study. Certain knowledge from declared information or measurements exists 
for the materials and facilities marked in green. The italic text refers to information declared to the inspectors. The 
case study focuses on how to use the available data to gain information on the plutonium and HEU production, by 
quantifying the material transfers indicated by the red arrows, marked A, B and C. 
i) The amount of produced plutonium and the required natural uranium (path A) can be determined by
taking samples from structural components of the reactor cores for forensic analysis of trace elements. 
ii) Confidence in the declared information can be increased by performing consistency-checks. As an
example relating to the plutonium production part, the declared fuel burnup can be checked by 
forensic analysis of the radioactive (high-level) reprocessing waste (for example liquid waste using 
inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry). Some plutonium remains in the waste – in particular 
from military reprocessing activities several decades ago [18]. The ratio of plutonium-239 to plutonium-
240 indicates the fuel burnup, if the reactor design is known (see for example graphs in [19, p. 159]). It 
would be obtained by depletion calculations (forward-modelling). Because of the long half-lives, this 
signature is very little dependent on the time passed since the fuel discharge from the reactor, which 
may be unknown. 
iii) To distinguish between HEU production from natural uranium feed (path B) and reprocessed
uranium feed (path C), forensic analysis by thermal ionization mass spectrometry of samples taken 
from a number of depleted uranium tails containers could be used. Uranium-236 is produced from 
uranium-235 when irradiated in reactors, by capturing a neutron [12, p. 58]. Therefore, both HEU as 
well as the corresponding depleted uranium tails contain uranium-236, if the uranium had previously 
been irradiated. Given a reprocessed uranium feed, the concentration of uranium-236 in the depleted 
uranium tails depends on the uranium-235 enrichment of the produced HEU and the tails. It can be 
computed by using the matched abundance ratio or M* (M-star) cascade theory [20, 21, 22]. 
Natural uranium, in contrast, contains no uranium-236. Hence, the extent to which natural and 
reprocessed uranium were used can be determined by measuring the uranium-236 content. 
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Burnup: 300 MWd/t 
Specific power: 4.45 W/gIHM 
Enrichment 
Plant 
Reprocessing 
plant 
Natural uranium 
208 tons as fuel and UF6 Highly 
enriched 
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5. Demonstration of the integrated approach: Results
i) Knowing the reactor design and the fuel burnup, infinite lattice depletion calculations using MCODE
[23] were performed. The lattice used here corresponds to a reactor design similar to the Savannah 
River Site (USA) reactor, containing natural uranium slugs and lithium-aluminum alloy control rods. 
The MCODE simulations yield the isotopic composition of the spent fuel. The uranium isotopics of the 
spent fuel are shown in Table 1. The MCODE simulations also show that the reactors produced 0.25 g 
of plutonium per kg of uranium fuel.1 In the future, a capability to perform such calculations could be
integrated into Cyclus. For now, we have manually included the MCODE results in our Cyclus 
simulation. 
Isotope wt-% 
Uranium-234 5.30 ∙ 10−3 
Uranium-235 0.678
Uranium-236 5.13 ∙ 10−3 
Uranium-238 99.312
Table 1: Uranium isotopics of the spent fuel 
For the purpose of this paper, we assume (without actually assessing the ratios of trace elements in 
the reactors’ structural elements) that it was successfully found that the reactors produced a total of 42 
kg of plutonium, using 168 tons of natural uranium (path A). Given that the inspectors know that 
overall 208 tons of natural uranium were used for both plutonium and HEU production, they now know 
that 40 tons of natural (un-irradiated) uranium were used for HEU production (path B). 
ii) The MCODE simulations show that, at 300 MWd/t, the plutonium isotopic ratio is
𝑃𝑢 − 239
𝑃𝑢 − 240⁄ = 62.81. If the forensic analysis of radioactive waste yielded this ratio, the
measurement results would independently confirm the declared information that was used for forward-
modelling. 
iii) For a uranium-235 product enrichment of 94 wt-%, a tails enrichment of 0.3 wt-%, and the uranium-
236 feed content from Table 1, we obtain a uranium-236 tails content of 3.85 ∙ 10−3 wt-% according to 
the M* cascade theory.2 These values are used in the Cyclus simulation.
If the uranium-235 tails enrichment is unknown, it would be obtained from the forensic analysis of the 
tails. In this case study, it is 0.3 wt-%. Let us assume that the average uranium-236 content of the tails 
the inspectors measured is 2.14 ∙ 10−3 wt-%. At these values, the relative measurement uncertainties 
using Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry can be smaller than 10−3 [24], so the measurements 
have sufficient precision at these low concentrations. It can be deduced that about 44% of the 
enrichment feed was natural uranium, and 56% were reprocessed uranium. Thus, 50 tons of 
reprocessed uranium were enriched (path C). Note that it is necessary to measure the tails, and to 
know the uranium-236 content of the feed, which was obtained from forward-modelling based on the 
burnup data. Results would have been wrong, if the declared burnup had been wrong. By using 
forensic analysis of reprocessing waste, however, this cheating scenario could be excluded. 
As the main purpose of the case study is only to demonstrate the nuclear archaeology concept in 
general, we have not conducted a comprehensive uncertainty analysis. The results are therefore 
preliminary. 
1
 The results of the MCODE simulations are presented in order to demonstrate the proposed nuclear archaeology 
concept. We have validated the reactor model used for MCODE only to a limited extent. 
2
 We have not compared the calculated uranium-236 concentrations against experimental values. Therefore, the 
computed concentration is used in this paper only to explain the described nuclear archaeology concept. 
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6. Conclusions
Using a case study, this paper has shown, how assessing several indicators of past fissile material 
production (here: isotopics of depleted uranium tails, isotopics of the reprocessing waste, and 
documentation provided to inspectors) can be used to study the consistency of data and deduce 
additional information that had not been provided. It has also shown the importance of combining 
computer simulations and measurements. 
Cyclus provides a good framework for a fuel cycle simulation tool, as it calculates discrete fissile 
material flows and allows for changes in the fuel cycle design and facility operations over time. For 
example, a more complicated version of the case study would be a fuel cycle history with a much 
larger number of facilities with different operational characteristics each, changing over time. 
The current facilities that exist as part of the Cycamore library have only very limited capabilities. To 
comprehensively use Cyclus in the nuclear archaeology context, such libraries must be significantly 
extended, for example allowing to use a wider range of operational parameters that might be part of 
provided documentation as simulation input. 
Once the integrated nuclear fuel cycle code for nuclear archaeology has been developed, it must be 
validated, preferably against historical data. The code structure of Cyclus is modular, which facilitates 
validation: Facility agents can be programmed and implemented without changing other facility agents 
or the kernel. Therefore, specific extensions or new agents may not require repeated validations of the 
overall code, if the other parts have been previously validated.  
With regard to the integrated nuclear archaeology approach, a robust uncertainty analysis of the 
gained information on the past fissile material production history will be central. For example, 
measurement uncertainties must be included. Uncertainties are also introduced by sampling 
strategies, e.g. from how many depleted uranium containers samples are taken, as isotopic ratios may 
vary between them. Information on past activities will be incomplete, which introduces uncertainties of 
the fuel cycle simulation results due to uncertainties of the input parameters. A study should be 
conducted comprehensively studying the various uncertainties and their propagation. 
Overall, this approach can be able to identify errors (for example in the provided documentation) that 
would not have been found without consistency-checks, thereby possibly increasing precision of fissile 
material estimates. Also, it may enhance the capability to detect deliberate attempts to declare false or 
incomplete production histories. Such a widened nuclear archaeology approach could significantly 
contribute to enable a solid understanding of fissile-material holdings, thereby increasing predictability 
and irreversibility of future arms-control initiatives. 
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Environmental effects on MCNP output and the consequences for 
arms control 
Jennifer Schofield AWE, 
Aldermaston, Reading, UK 
Abstract: 
The Monte Carlo N-Particle code, MCNP, is a well-known tool for investigating radiation transport and 
detector response. This work explores the capabilities and limitations of MCNP in the context of arms 
control. Future arms control disarmament verification activities may encounter a range of different 
environments and neutron backgrounds (for example inside a building at high altitude, as opposed to 
sea-level, dockside activities). Understanding the implications of these changes on the predicted 
response of detectors is important.   
Two simulated neutron detectors (a boron straw and 3He detector) are benchmarked against new 
experimental data taken in an average neutron background rate of 1.11 cps. The effect of differing 
background and consequences will be explored. The significance and effect of these results for arms 
control treaty verification will be discussed.   
Keywords: MCNP; non-destructive assay; arms control; neutron detectors 
1. Introduction
Arms control scenarios involving verification do 
not often explicitly consider the environment in 
which these measurements are taken [1]. 
There are many examples of existing treaties, 
such as New START, and exploratory 
initiatives, such as the AVNG (Attribute 
Verification by Neutron and Gamma ray assay 
using information barriers) system from the 
trilateral initiative, however few of these 
describe the verification environment in which 
measurements do/should take place. They 
instead tend to focus on the Detector:SNM 
dyad. It makes sense that arms control 
situations involving stored SNM might take 
place inside, although this doesn’t necessarily
tally for deployed systems. Equally test ban 
treaty nuclear forensics modelling considers a 
range of situations and environments. In brief a 
wide range of arms control environments 
should be considered. 
This paper will discuss an experimental set-up 
and MCNP modelling results of two detectors 
with a californium source. The MCNP version 
used in the work is MCNP6.1.1 [2]. The work 
then presents various scenarios using these 
benchmarked detectors and a BeRP ball to 
simulate SNM (special nuclear material) [3]. 
The paper concludes by exploring what we can 
draw from these modelling results in the wider 
context. 
The two detectors in this study are a helium 
detector and a boron coated straw detector. 
Helium-3 gas is a well-known and much 
utilised thermal neutron detector [4]. However, 
due to a global shortage and increased cost of 
helium, lithium and boron materials are also 
considered for detection purposes [5]. Boron is 
considered better than lithium as it has a larger 
cross section of 3840 barns (b) (although not 
as good as the 5330 b for 3He) compared to 
940 b for lithium [4]. Graph 1 shows the 
relative cross sections of importance for helium 
and boron from the ENDF nuclear cross 
section library. The close correlation means 
solid boron is therefore a good candidate 
substitute for helium gas, although this must 
be a thin layer in order to limit the stopping of 
particles in the boron. The following section 
describes the detectors and experimental and 
modelling set-up in more detail. 
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2. Experimental and modelling set-up
2.1. Experimental environment 
As mentioned, two detector types were used in 
this study. Both are well suited to studying 
thermal neutrons due to their light ion content. 
As shown in Graph 1, the neutron absorption 
cross section increases with decreasing 
neutron energy. In the case of a helium-3 
detector the reaction: 
3He + n  p + 3H + Q(764 keV) 
describes neutron absorption. In contrast, 
boron can capture a neutron using one of two 
possible reactions: 
10B + n  7Li + α + Q(2,792 keV) 
10B + n  7Li* + α + Q(2,310 keV) 
For boron, 94 % of thermal neutron captures 
go down the excited lithium route.  
The helium detector used was a Canberra 3He 
type and for the boron, the boron coated straw 
type detector was chosen as it shows promise 
as an alternative to helium detectors [5]. For 
the experiments section a californium-252 
source used, which had an activity of 163 kBq 
127 days before the measurement. 
Graph 1: The (n,p) cross section for 3He and the (n,alpha) cross section for 10B according 10B according to the 
ENDF/B-VII.1/Cross section library. 
2.2. MCNP set-up 
The MCNP version, MCNP6.1.1, was used in 
these simulations [2]. An F4 tally was used for 
the thermal neutron interactions with the 3He 
gas and the 10B solid. This flux tally was 
combined with an FM multiplier including the 
cross section for the (n,p) or (n,alpha) reaction 
to yield the correct number of interactions per 
source particle. Simulations were run at 1e6 or 
more source particles. Neutrons were run with 
NCIA (neutron capture ion algorithm) enabled, 
meaning light ion (He, Li and B) recoil physics 
and neutron capture is allowed. Analogue 
interactions of neutrons are also enabled. The 
LLNL fission model (enabled using the FMULT 
card) was used in both the initial experiment 
model and the arms control situations. 
When benchmarking to experimental data a 
californium-252 source was used for neutron 
measurements due to ease and speed of 
obtaining data. However, when modelling 
future arms control situations, it was decided to 
use a BeRP ball in a case for a more complex 
simulation rather than elemental californium. 
The MCNP model of the BeRP ball used in this 
experiment is shown in Figure 1. This is based 
on the BeRP ball used by LLNL, as in 
reference [3]. A BeRP (beryllium reflected 
plutonium) ball is a subcritical ball of plutonium 
which can be used to represent SNM (special 
nuclear material). Specific details of this bare 
BeRP ball can be found in reference [3].  
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Figure 1: MCNP model of the BeRP ball from [3], used in this paper to model SNM. 
3. Benchmark results
3.1. Helium detector results
The 3He detector used for experimental 
measurements was a Canberra 64NH30 type, 
with a 30 cm active length and pressure of 10 
bar [6]. This was used with an ORTEC ASPEC 
MCA, a Canberra HV supply and amplifier, a 
voltage of 1040 V was utilised. Counts were 
taken over 900 s for 2 different scenarios. Data 
was taken on Maestro software. The 
temperature, relative humidity and pressure 
were recorded using an Omega® detector 
during this experiment. They varied very little, 
between: 27.41 and 27.6 oC for the 
temperature, 33.26 and 35.47 % for the 
relative humidity, and 1020 and 1019 hPa for 
the pressure. These are all fairly uniform 
values and can be considered constant. 
Two scenarios were considered, one simply 
with a high density polyethylene (HDPE) 
sleeve to moderate neutrons down to thermal 
energies, and one using an extra moderator 
block covering the whole of the active area of 
the detector. 
Intrinsic neutron efficiency in this case is 
calculated as the number of charge pulses 
emitted by the detector as a ratio to the 
number of neutrons incident on detector 
calculated according to MCNP. There are 
some drawbacks to this approach as this 
doesn’t fully take into account the geometry of 
the simulation however, as long as simulations 
maintain the same solid angle that the detector 
takes up, then the efficiency calculated here 
should be a good approximation. 
Scenario Experimental counts 
MCNP Model 
counts Efficiency 
Source on top of the PE moderator 200,599 ± 2,074 1,522,890 ± 8,833 13 %  ±  0.5 % 
Source, placed next to detector with 3.5 
cm thick PE shield moderator 190,134 ± 2,172 1,978,066 ± 10,484 10 % ± 0.5 % 
Table 1: Experimental and detector results for helium tube with the californium-252 source. Correction factor for 
MCNP/efficiency of detector is shown. 
The results shown in Table 1 illustrate the 
attenuating factor which should be applied to 
MCNP results when considering arms control 
situations in order to emulate the helium 
detector response. We can consider the 
efficiency to be 11.5 %. This agrees with 
previous descriptions of this detector as having 
11% efficiency.  The modelled neutron 
detector is shown in Figure 2.  
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
371
Figure 2: MCNP model of the helium detector. The inner helium (pressure 10 bar) is shown in dark blue, the 
moderator in light blue. 
3.2. Boron detector results 
The detector used is a boron coated straw 
detector from Proportional Technologies, Inc. 
(PTI) [7]. The detector is based on long, thin 
copper ‘straws’ with a 1.45 μm thick inner
coating of boron carbide. The straw detectors 
are filled with a proportional gas mixture of 
carbon dioxide (10 %) & argon (90 %) with a 
tungsten anode wire through the centre, as 
with the helium detector, this detector operates 
at 1040 V. The detector was used in 
conjunction with ‘NDMS’ software provided by 
Proportional Technologies, Inc. (PTI). 
The boron detector results were taken over a 
period of 180 – 360 seconds for several 
different runs, varying distance of the source to 
the detector and amount of moderation. 
Background counts were taken prior to the 
experimental run and were determined to be 
on average 1.11 cps (from a 960 second 
measurement). These are automatically 
subtracted from the detector measurement. 
As shown in Table 2, the same attenuating 
factor can be derived for the boron straw 
detector as for the helium detector. It can be 
noted solely from number of counts that there 
is a difference in efficiency from a helium 
detector, even taking the time for 
measurement into account. The temperature, 
relative humidity and pressure were recorded 
during this experiment. Again there was little 
variation with measurements between: 25.3 - 
25.2 oC for the temperature, 37.4 - 34.5 % for 
the relative humidity and 978 - 974 hPa for the 
pressure. 
Scenario Experimental counts MCNP model counts Efficiency 
Source 100 cm from detector 18,199 ± 135 401,158 ± 1,845 6.24 % ± 0.5 % 
Source 100 cm from detector with 4 cm 
PE shielding 20,270 ± 142 325,161 ± 1,756 4.54 % ± 0.5 % 
Source 50 cm from detector 46,484 ± 216 791,907 ± 2,854 5.86 % ± 0.5 % 
Source 50 cm from detector with 4 cm PE 
shielding 41,911 ± 205 473,964 ± 2,133 8.83 % ± 0.5 % 
Table 2: Experimental and detector results for boron coated straw with californium-252 source. Efficiency of 
detector is shown. 
From this (albeit shortened) benchmarking 
effort we are able to now situate our detectors 
in possible arms control environments and 
perceive the changes that are/aren’t caused by 
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these situation variations.  The boron detector 
is shown in Figure 3. The average efficiency is 
6.4 %, this is expectedly lower than the 
efficiency found for helium. In fact, it fits 
relatively well with the expected efficiency of 
around 5 - 8 % for single layers of boron 
coated straws [8]. 
Figure 3: MCNP model of the boron coated straw detector used in this work. A series of straws are combined and 
encased in (orange) PE moderator. 
4. Environmental changes
4.1. Background and height 
Background radiation is a signal detected in a 
detector which does not pertain to the 
SNM/measurement object of interest in that 
experiment. Background radiation can come 
from a couple of areas: cosmic ray induced, 
NORM (naturally occurring radioactive 
material) and other sources which are not the 
source of interest at that time [9].  
One of the main factors affecting background 
neutron flux is the height of the ground above 
sea level [10]. Background neutron flux has 
been shown to be proportional to ~exp(αZ) 
where Z is the altitude in metres above sea 
level. Alpha is a constant ranging from 0.7-
1.01 [10,11]. Goldhagen also states that 
neutron rate at 3,000 metres is 11 times the 
rate at sea level [9]. 
It is obvious that background can have a 
significant effect, therefore, on the counts 
seen. In the case of the boron straw detector 
this can be overcome, as a background is 
acquired prior to the measurements being 
taken. However, in the case of the helium 
detector used here this is not the case – we 
can assume background counts are the same 
in both cases.  
MCNP6.1.1 possesses a background source 
term which can be implemented when defining 
source particles [12]. This can be used to, for 
example, simulate the effect of cosmic muons 
on a detector to simulate a real world scenario. 
Background data is taken from several sources 
(the source of choice can be determined by the 
user) in order to make this assumption. In our 
case this was used – with solely neutrons 
simulated from a ‘skymap’ [12]. In future, 
deviations of this choice on results can be 
explored.  It is possible that changes to the 
source background could affect the results of 
this background study. 
As discussed, arms control situations could be 
wide ranging. We might expect activities to be 
confined to military bases – however this 
doesn’t limit the height at which verification 
activities might take place, the world’s highest 
military base is at a height of 6,000 m. This 
study will consider SNM at a height of 6,000 m 
and at sea level. Detectors will be modelled 
with no background, and solely background. 
The percentage difference will show how the 
different detectors are affected by differing 
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backgrounds. All responses are combined with 
the experimental efficiency found.  
The result in Table 3 shows that the boron 
detector appears to be slightly less affected by 
the differing background. This result is 
expected to be 10 times higher for the higher 
background counts, closer to 10 % for high 
altitudes. A possible reason for this 
discrepancy could be an error in reproducing 
background rates (either from skymap or 
otherwise). 
Detector No background flux % difference with high background counts 
% difference with low 
background counts 
Helium 7.36E-05 0.9028 0.8072 
Boron 1.19E-03 0.4247 0.3978 
Table 3: Effect of height on background counts. 
4.2. Air composition – water environments 
As described by Rosolem, the moderation of 
neutrons from background radiation can have 
a big effect [13]. This stems from the hydrogen 
in water vapour present in the atmosphere. 
The back scatter of neutrons can also be 
considered from SNM when there is sufficient 
water vapour/other sources of water in the 
area. Rosolem shows a 12 % change in 
neutron intensity according to humidity. This is 
not something often discussed by those who 
study the height effect of background neutron 
flux [10, 11] although it is mentioned by 
Goldhagen [9]. 
As previously, arms control can be expected to 
take place in several environments including 
bases with very different water environments. 
A naval submarine base could in the future 
have dockside verification activities taking 
place, whereas, there are realistic desert 
situations for arms control which will be 
significantly drier. An average precipitation 
could be something like 0.3 inches a month in 
these dry areas as opposed to a coastal base 
where we might expect considerably more 
rainfall. In this study two scenarios will be 
modelled: the BeRP ball on a dock with a layer 
of moisture on its case from high relative 
humidity, contrasted with the model in a 
completely dry environment. 
In order to evaluate the amount of water that 
should be put into the system a global 
maximum measured by Dai [14] of p=23 g m-3 
can be used.  This can be combined with the 
equation: 
IWV = pH [ 1 - exp(-z/H) ] 
Where H is the water vapour scales height, 2.3 
km according to Reitan [15] and z is the height 
in km. The IWV obtained is the equivalent mm 
of water if all the water vapour in the air were 
allowed to condense at a surface. This amount 
equals 229 g m-2 in the maximum case (and 
zero in the minimum case). This is put on both 
the BeRP ball case and the detector surface in 
the simulations. 
Detector Dry environment flux Nearby ‘lake’ (% difference) 
Absolute humidity (% 
difference) 
Boron 0.0018 0% 3% 
Helium 0.0001 0.41% 14.98% 
Table 4: Results from different water vapour environments. 
Table 4 shows the results from these different 
water vapour environments. The change for 
helium is much more noticeable. This is 
probably because of the small amounts of 
moderation in place. The additional water layer 
represents a significant addition in this case. 
Whereas there is already a large amount of 
polyethylene surrounding the boron. 
4.3. PV=nRT – pressure and temperature changes 
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The pressure of the gas used, along with the 
active length, is known to have an effect on the 
efficiency of counts in the case of a helium 
tube [6]. This can be shown by a simple MCNP 
model, varying the pressure in the tube, shown 
in Graph 2. Higher pressures lead to a better 
efficiency. This can be followed through when 
discussing the temperature of the 
surroundings. The volume of the helium tube is 
fixed and therefore when the temperature 
increases, according to the ideal gas law, the 
pressure will also increase. Likewise, in colder 
climes, the pressure will be under that at 
normal operating temperatures.  
As can be seen from the graph a logarithmic 
relationship is shown which has been 
portrayed elsewhere [6, 16]. We can define a 
relative correction which will apply to the 
detector efficiency at different pressures, 
shown in Table 5. 
Graph 2: Increase in efficiency for helium tubes at greater pressures is shown clearly here for the black circles. 
The boron straw flux (open squares) doesn’t change as a function of pressure.
Pressure 
(atm) Correction 
1 0.3231 
2 0.5048 
3 0.6273 
4 0.7179 
5 0.7885 
6 0.8434 
7 0.8903 
8 0.9312 
9 0.9677 
10 1.0000 
11 1.0300 
12 1.0548 
Table 5: Correction values for different atmospheres of pressure inside a helium detector tube. 
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In the case of the boron coated straw, we do 
not see a large difference in sensitivity due to 
pressure. This is because the method of signal 
production is not dependent on a gas for its 
functioning. This is also illustrated in Graph 2, 
which shows no change in the efficiency of our 
detector to changing air pressure. 
Following the methodology of previous 
sections we can posit some extremes of 
temperature which these detectors might be 
used in. One of the coldest military bases have 
an average low of -24 oC and an extreme low 
of -53 oC. Hot areas will be in desert regions, it 
would not be impossible to imagine 43 oC for a 
verification activity in hot desert conditions.     
When these extremes are taken into account 
we expect the boron straw to not be affected 
by this change in pressure (from 1 atm to 2 
atm at the hotter end, falling to 0.4 atm at the 
lower end). In the case of helium, at 10 atm, a 
rise to a maximum of 12 atm can be expected, 
which we would predict to have a small 
positive effect on the efficiency of a detector of 
5.5 %. The atmospheric pressure would fall to 
7 atm within the tube for the very cold 
situations. This would lower the efficiency of 
the detector by almost 11 %, meaning 
measurements would have to be taken for 
significantly longer times in order to achieve 
the same precision.   This implies a boron 
coated straw would be more robust in a range 
of pressure situations. 
5. Conclusions
This study has shown that in a range of 
scenarios we would expect our two detectors 
to behave differently. The output from MCNP 
illustrates its ability to model useful 
comparisons for arms control situations. The 
results found in this study are limited for each 
effect (water, altitude etc.) and further work on 
atmospheric effects on likely detector 
responses should be undertaken. It is not 
considered in this study how other 
uncertainties in measurements would relate to 
these environmental effects. For example, the 
distance from source to detector. 
The ideal verification scenario in terms of short 
measurement time and lowest background 
would be a measurement taken at a low 
altitude and high temperature for example at 
sea level during a hot summer’s day. However 
even with this optimal scenario we do not 
expect this to have a large effect on 
measurements and therefore on arms control 
scenarios. 
Further work should include taking more 
situationally accurate measurements with the 
SNM of interest. This will remove some of the 
uncertainty in the measurements modelled by 
MCNP. Measurements of a BeRP or other 
object in a variety of different scenarios would 
provide the required experimental data.  
High gamma counts and how this might affect 
the detectors are not investigated in this work, 
but should be considered in future research. 
In addition, the timing responses of certain 
detectors using MCNP should be studied. This 
would be advantageous as it would allow 
investigatory experiments, such as the AVNG 
experiments, to be more closely related to the 
output. 
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Abstract: 
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was put into force in 1975 and bans the 
development, production, and stockpiling of bioweapons. The BTWC is thought to be a successful 
arms control treaty, because it paved the way for the complete world-wide disarmament of 
bioweapons. But there is one major shortcoming: the BTWC lacks a verification mechanism. Thus, 
biological arms control has a rather preventive, observational character without any inspection 
measures at hand. Confidence building within the BTWC regime relies on other instruments such as 
voluntary annual declarations, which proofed to be rather inefficient over time. It appears, that 
transparency regarding relevant member states activities has to be increased by alternative means. 
One solution is the development of a publicly applicable method to collect and analyze open source 
information with relevance to the BTWC in a structured, non-biased way. The Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) was put into force in 1997 and complete disarmament of weapons stocks will not 
be finished before 2022. In the near future, the CWC regime is expected to see a shift towards a more 
preventive, observational role, too. Therefore, the use of open source information for compliance 
monitoring could be also beneficial for work under the CWC, ultimately creating synergies between 
biological and chemical arms control. 
Keywords: biological; chemical; WMD; verification; monitoring 
1. Ban and disarmament of biological and chemical weapons
The development and large-scale deployment of chemical weapons in the course of World War 1 was 
a critical moment in the (mis-)use of otherwise ground-breaking scientific and industrial achievements 
[1]. After the war, which is believed to have seen little military impact of chemical weapons on its 
outcome, disarmament of chemical (and the upcoming category of “bacteriological” weapons) has 
been discussed on the international level, but the leading nations could not find agreement on this. As 
minimal consensus, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited the use of these weapons against other 
treaty members. But a number of States Parties like France or the United Kingdom declared the right 
of retaliation in kind once they would be attacked with weapons prohibited by the Protocol. The United 
States of America as late major combatant nation of World War 1 and important promotor of pst-war 
disarmament negotiations changed the political attitude completely and postponed the ratification of 
the Geneva Protocol until 1975. Therefore, any country still had to face the prospects of chemical and 
biological warfare in future armed conflicts during the following decades. 
It is important to note, that although there were concerns among military and political decision makers 
about the practicability of chemical and biological warfare – not to speak about the ethical implications 
– many nations kept their chemical weapons arsenal. Research & development was continued as well
as testing activities and preparation of troops and the civilian population for large-scale biological and 
chemical weapons attacks. 
During World War 2 chemical and biological weapons were not used on the European battlefields, but 
at varying degree by Japanese troops against Chinese troops and civilians; the latter being also 
victims of inhumane experiments with biological warfare agents [2]. At the beginning of the Cold War 
chemical and biological weapons were intensively studied in Western and Soviet labs. But in 1969 the 
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USA unilaterally declared the suspension of all offensive biological warfare preparations, a political 
movement which opened the ground for negotiating an international treaty aiming at the complete ban 
of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction: the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(BWC). The BWC was put into force in 1975 and shows currently 178 States Parties. The Convention 
prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of any biological material intended to 
be used for hostile purposes. Furthermore, it calls all members to fully cooperate in the peaceful 
application of biotechnology. There is one major limitation of the BWC: the lack of any verification 
regime. Even nowadays there is no legally-binding mechanism implemented for continuous 
compliance monitoring, which is a rather odd phenomenon in the light of rapidly developing field such 
as biotechnology, biomedicine and the life sciences. 
Chemical weapons were kept in the military arsenals during the whole Cold War. Their use in the case 
of sub-nuclear warfare activities or in combination with nuclear attacks, e.g. on the European 
battlefield in a potential armed conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, was always perceived 
as a real threat. Therefore, it was a major step forward when with the USA and the former Soviet 
Union the two major possessing countries agreed on the disarmament and complete ban of chemical 
weapons at the end of the 1980ies. In 1997, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was put into 
force. Currently, 192 countries are States Parties to the Convention, which is tremendous in numbers 
for an international arms control treaty. The importance of a mechanism for the verification of the 
treaty member’s compliance with the provisions of the Convention, especially concerning certain 
production capacities for selected chemical compounds within the chemical industries, has been 
recognized early. Therefore, the CWC was from the beginning on equipped with an elaborated 
verification and inspection regime as well as an international body, the Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was mandated to support the implementation of the CWC and 
to collect required data for compliance assessments by all States Parties. 
2. Challenges of biological and chemical arms control
2.1. Special prerequisites of biological arms control 
What do we know about potentially existing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons? The 
complete destruction of biological weapons arsenals and the dismantling or conversion of associated 
testing and production facilities is mandatory in the course of the accession to the BWC. From a legal 
point of view one should now assume that all documented and declared bioweapons stockpiles have 
been successfully destroyed world-wide. But without any verification mechanism it remains difficult to 
assess the current situation. This is can be best understood when we look at the historical case of the 
Soviet Union’s large-scale biological warfare programme, which has been continued and extended 
after (!) the ratification of the BWC [3]. National technical means used by Western intelligence services 
partially contributed to the disclosure of these illicit activities. But it required the reports by 
eyewitnesses (émigrés, whistle-blowers) to produce sound evidence that the Soviet Union was indeed 
in violation of the provisions of the BWC. With specifically designed verification and inspection 
measures (VIM) at hand, it might had been possible to penetrate the veil surrounding the many, many 
research, testing and production facilities of the Soviet BW programme. Of course, VIM will not 
necessarily provide in any case a detailed, forensically sound picture about an efficiently concealed 
state-driven biological or chemical weapons programme. But VIM could at least provide data and 
observational findings which could be used to promote political and scientific discussions about 
ambiguous activities of a BWC member state. Furthermore, VIM might also provide valuable hints for 
the intelligence community and (if made public) also for non-governmental observers allowing a 
deeper analysis of a given special situation. With the BWC lacking an agreed VIM, confidence building 
among States Parties (and towards a growing “global civil society”) has to rely in part on surrogates 
such as Confidence Building Measures (CBM): annual, form-based declarations about selected 
facilities and activities, which submissions are just politically but not legally binding. In practice, they 
even proofed to be a rather weak source of information. Therefore, new approaches for confidence 
building such as a peer review mechanism (“transparent visits”) are currently tested by some States 
Parties within the BWC regime [4]. 
Biological arms control is crucial to confidence building, because it provide facts required for 
compliance assessments. But arms control should not stick to conventional ideas and models about 
biological warfare programmes. To the opposite, it should be continuously developed further in order 
to be able to figure out what would be basic elements of a clandestine biological warfare programme 
and how to detected them - independently of the currently perceived demands by the BWC member 
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states. Of course, this mechanism should include also the continuous monitoring of BWC non-member 
states by the use of open source information (in addition to national technical means). In this respect, 
a non-discriminatory, unbiased and transparent analytical approach for accessing treaty compliance 
would be very beneficial. Such activities could even trigger the willingness of some countries to 
deliberately provide information in the open source information universe on the internet in order to 
foster public compliance monitoring.  
2.2. Future perspectives of chemical arms control 
Full disarmament of the last remaining large chemical weapons stockpiles in the USA and the Russian 
Federation is expected around 2023 and 2020, respectively. Once this goal has been achieved work 
of the OPCW is believed to be focused more on monitoring activities due to the then preventive 
character of the CWC. 
But will this ever happen? Currently, toxic chemical substances are again frequently used in armed 
conflicts like the Syrian civil war, although at a much lower level than in full-scale chemical warfare 
scenarios of the past. But even these limited attacks already caused a number of dead and injured 
victims. For example, up to 1,400 people (mostly unprotected civilians) were found dead, when in 
August 2013 apparently Syrian governmental forces deployed the nerve agent sarin in Ghouta, East of 
Damascus. Furthermore, after Syria’s (more or less enforced) accession to the CWC in October 2013 
a number of doubts showed up about the completeness and accuracy of the mandatory declaration of 
the country’s CW programme. By the work of the OPCW data assessment team Syria was coerced to 
submit additional information about previously undeclared research and production facilities. And still, 
there are a number of open questions concerning the types and total amounts of chemical weapons 
Syria might have had in possession [5]. 
In Iraq and in Syria militants of the so-called Islamic State (IS) allegedly used chemical agents such as 
mustard gas-like substances for a number of single attacks. It cannot be excluded, that some of these 
substances are not left-over from old Iraqi or Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles but chemical agents 
newly produced by IS specialists at seized research and production facilities [6]. After tedious 
international negotiations, UN-OPCW joint teams are investigating the aforementioned incidents in 
order to identify the chemical agents used and provide data which shall allow to determine who was 
responsible for these attacks. Therefore, the role of the OPCW in providing crucial scientific, technical 
and logistical support for inspection and fact finding missions cannot be underestimated. 
Future chemical threats could stem from completely different classes of chemical compounds not 
covered by former chemical weapons programmes. Here, experts are already carefully looking at 
upcoming trends in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, but also in biotechnology which could 
become more and more important in the production of chemical compounds formerly synthesized by 
classical procedures. Scientific and engineering expertise must be kept at hand for the analytical 
assessment of such novel trends. Therefore, it is a very likely scenario that the OPCW will keep its 
central role as supporting international body. But it should be (and hopefully will be) equipped with an 
extended mandate allowing OPCW experts to directly access open source information, process the 
raw data (e.g. results from a very focused scientific literature research, satellite imagery, business 
reports, patents etc.) and make it available for political decision making within the CWC regime. 
Analytical workflows for preventive chemical arms control will then be required which would share 
many similarities with those workflows already used in preventive biological arms control. 
3. Novel approaches and synergies in biological and chemical arms control
Other than with nuclear weapons, the development of biological and chemical weapons will most 
probably go along with a reasonable number of wet lab-based cultivation/synthesis and pilot-
production steps. This would include the repeated biochemical and biophysical testing of the obtain 
chemical compounds/biological agents. Lab-scale efficiency test will make use of with animals (or 
nowadays in some cases even cell culture material) might follow this first initial phase. These illegal 
activities are most difficult to detect, because the nature of the material (biological, chemical) used, the 
required equipment as well as the layout of the experiments might be quite similar if not identical to 
fully legitimate research and development activities. Therefore, preventive biological and chemical 
arms control must aim at shading some light on the intention behind certain types of experiments in 
selected research environments. This can be done most efficiently by the combination of many 
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different types of information and a cross-correlation between individual findings, but will in many if not 
all cases end up in an estimation of the intention, but no final proof.  
The general structure of databases usable both for biological and chemical arms control could be the 
same: main fields of relevant activities (e.g., industrial activities; governmental activities (including 
public health measures as well as animal, plant and food security); civilian research and development 
activities; (defensive) military B/CW activities; civil protection activities). In this context, the term 
“activities” refers also to the type of work (one indicator) done at a specialised facility (part of the 
organisational model), which is provided for certain task (part of the system processes within the 
physical model). A summary of additional key elements of such a database is shown in table 1. 
Database entries Comments 
Main Categories Civilian research & development 
activities, military chemical and 
biological activities;  
Sub-categories Research on pathogenic 
microorganisms/toxins; production of 
selected vaccines; military biological 
and chemical weapons defensive 
research facilities;  
Primary indicator Self-explaining, no further knowledge 
required to understand its fundamental 
role within a putative B/C warfare 
programme (e.g., a biological threat 
agent) 
Secondary indicator Context-dependent meaning, further 
knowledge required to understand its 
role within a putative B/C warfare 
programme (e.g., biological research 
facility) 
Descriptor Allocates indicators to certain elements 
of the physical model 
Physical model(s) An assumption, how a B/C warfare 
programme would look like in a given 
context (country-based, time-
dependent, conflict-dependent etc.) 
Sub-model(s) E.g., organisational pathways, system 
process flows etc. 
Table 1: Key elements of a database usable for open source information gathering. 
From table 1 it is getting evident, that the creation of groups of indicators representing certain 
materials, agents, installations etc. is forming the basis for the other elements mentioned (Note: An 
indicator is not a proof for illicit activities in the context of the treaties discussed here!). The associated 
value associated with an indicator just represent the findings of open source data collection. Indictors 
help to simplify the database structure, but there is still the need to integrate a huge variety of different 
types of information (names, addresses, geotags, imagery, tweeds, patent information, trade data, 
excerpts from news reports, measurement values etc.). The required integration and subsequent 
assessment can be done by a conventional analytical workflow, supplemented with additional working 
steps, as shown in the following: 
Working steps Comments 
Selection of field of investigation Main categories within the databse, 
e.g. biomedical research and 
development activities 
Perform Search for relevant information 
by combination and permutation of 
appropriate search terms 
Requires scientific, technical and 
military knowledge 
Review of search results and removal of 
unreliable information 
E.g. well-known conspiracy theories, 
prominent cases of false accusations, 
propaganda already detected and 
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reported by others 
Classification of obtained results in the 
course of database storage 
Categories/classes have to be defined 
following a target-centric approach 
Re-examination of database entries in the 
context of their corresponding category 
Allows correction of the classification 
of database entries and the 
identification of missing research 
results (refers analyst back to step 
two) 
Determination of (maybe even previously 
unknown) cross-connections between 
data sets by specialised database queries 
Central part of the work with the 
aggregated data sets; try to remove 
any bias by using rival work hypothesis 
when performing analytical work 
Generate topic-specific reports E.g., tabular outputs; graphical outputs 
(country maps, network diagrams),  
Table 2: Analytical workflow using open source information for biological and chemical arms control. 
Repeated cycles of data collection, selection, and pre-analysis will result in reasonable amounts of 
aggregated information which might tend to become “invisible” due to the huge amount of data stored. 
Graphical outputs of results of database queries could make them visible again. Combined with 
several layers of cross-correlative analyses, this could highlight previously unknown 
interdependencies between individual indictors or groups of indicators. Especially in biological and 
chemical arms control this feature would be crucial due to potentially quite fragmented physical 
layouts of weapons programmes. 
Ultimately, such analytical tools could become standard for the traceable, transparent data analysis 
required in preventive biological and chemical arms control. They would enable international arms 
control experts, but ideally also non-governmental actors sharing and discussing the obtained results.  
Ideally, the results are subsequently be handed over to or grabbed by treaty member states in order to 
find a common understanding about certain compliance-relevant activities. In this respect, one first 
working example is the BioWeapons Monitor 2.0, which allows collecting and processing relevant data 
and provide analytical results usable for BWC compliance monitoring and transparency building [8]. 
4. Conclusions
Although biological and chemical arms control will look in the first instance on different threat agents 
and production principles, they share in common the (i) fragmented nature of illicit warfare 
programmes, (ii) similar or even identical sources of information, and (iii) comparable system process 
flows which all must be considered by a combined analytical workflow usable for compliance 
monitoring tasks. The CWC will most probably see in the mid-term future the increasing application of 
preventive chemical arms control measures. This treaty regime has already technical and political 
instruments implemented which could directly make use out of the data generated by open source 
information compliance monitoring approaches. With the BWC the situation is different. Biological 
arms control has currently a predominantly preventive function, but without any VIM capabilities. 
Frequently, a number of BWC States Parties, academic experts and non-governmental organizations 
urge the member states to address this shortcoming. But unfortunately, there is no indication that the 
political situation will change in the near future. Transparency building and compliance monitoring still 
has to be done outside the BWC. The use of open source information will be a practicable way to do 
so. But it could become part of a BWC “regime” in a broader context, because this work corresponds 
to analytical approaches anyways applied by intelligence services in those countries able to do so 
(“OSINT”; example: USA) and therefore will be recognized either as complementary, politically already 
usable information or simply as another source of open source information. And with no compliance 
monitoring mechanism within the treaty this work has to be done by other stakeholders. In one 
scenario, this could result in transformation of the treaty governance from the conventional, member 
states-centric approach towards a kind of public governmental partnership, where at least some BWC 
member states are in support of these monitoring activities by non-governmental actors and actively 
seeking for the information provided. Another scenario would of course be, that all information 
aggregated by public compliance monitoring activities has to be used solely outside the BWC regime. 
For example, in the case of grave concerns about compliance of selected BWC member states will 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
382
come up alarming news have to be published in social and mass media in order to get recognised. 
Experience frequently shows that this could make political decision making even more difficult. 
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Abstract 
The goal of a collaborative effort between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 
Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH (FZJ) is to produce monodisperse microparticles for nuclear 
safeguards applications in order to strengthen the IAEA's analytical capabilities to detect illicit nuclear 
activities. 
These particles are intended to serve for quality control purposes and eventually as certified reference 
materials for mass spectrometry. Therefore, the principal requirement is the consistency concerning 
the number of uranium atoms per particle, but also a homogenous size distribution, a consistent 
isotopic composition and uniform particle morphology. This work focuses on different aspects of the 
particle production process, including (1) development and implementation of the particle generation 
process and (2) particle collection techniques as well as (3) substrate and sample preparation 
techniques for further analysis and (4) particle size distribution using scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM) and large geometry secondary ionization mass spectrometry (LG-SIMS) for determination of 
the isotopic ratios. 
A working microparticle setup was developed and implemented at FZJ. The entire setup is designed 
as a closed system to mitigate the risk of contaminations. Monodisperse uranium oxide particles are 
generated by spray pyrolysis and particles are collected by inertial impaction on vitreous carbon 
substrates. Furthermore, substrates can be prepared in advance with reference marks to facilitate 
particle identification and relocation of single particles with high precision in different analytical 
instruments. Customizable reference marks were engraved using a laser micro dissection instrument 
(LMD). Collection efficiency assessment of two different inertial impactor designs, a one-stage inertial 
impactor and a modified cyclone impactor, are in agreement with the theoretical predictions. A 
consistent particle size distribution, a homogeneous morphology and the presence of uranium were 
confirmed using SEM-EDX. LG-SIMS analysis performed on single uranium microparticles confirmed 
consistency of the uranium isotopic ratios in comparison to the initial precursor solutions. 
Keywords:  Particle Production, LG-SIMS, Nuclear Forensics, Destructive Assay, Environmental 
Sampling 
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1. Introduction
Safeguarding nuclear facilities is the
main objective of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). Its purpose is to verify 
compliance with existing legal multilateral 
safeguards agreements such as the non-
proliferation treaty of nuclear weapons 1, the 
Additional Protocol 2 and others i. In order to 
ensure compliance the IAEA has implemented 
the concept of environmental sampling. Since 
its approval by the IAEA Board of Governors in 
1995 it has proven to be the cornerstone of 
technical verification. Mass spectrometry is 
used to measure the isotopic composition with 
high accuracy. In nuclear safeguards and 
forensics high resolution mass spectrometers, 
e.g. Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass 
Spectrometry ICP-MS), Thermal Ionization 
Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) or Secondary 
Ionization Mass Spectrometry (SIMS) are 
commonly used to determine uranium isotope 
ratios 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. SIMS analysis offers the 
advantage of screening and isotope detection 
capabilities 9 and has a proven record in 
nuclear safeguards and forensics 10, 11, 12. The
implementation of a new generation of SIMS 
instruments offers higher resolution and higher 
transmission compared to conventional SIMS 
instruments 13. The so-called large geometry 
SIMS (LG-SIMS) models, CAMECA IMS 1270, 
1280 and 1280HR, are based on the basic 
principle such as the CAMECA IMS 3F-7F 
models but are equipped with a considerable 
larger magnetic sector field and improved ion 
optics 9, 14. In nuclear safeguards and forensics
samples are commonly taken as so-called 
swipe-samples on cotton. These cotton swipes 
contain minute quantities of material which 
carry an inherent signature of their production 
and release scenario. Generally, disposable 
one stage inertial impactors are used to transfer 
the particles from the swipes onto a vitreous 
carbon substrate 15, 16, 17, 18, 19. SEM-energy 
dispersive X-ray spectroscopy (SEM-EDX) and 
LG-SIMS analysis are routinely used to assess 
the morphology, elemental and isotopic 
composition of these micro-particulates. QC-
materials and (certified) reference materials 
(CRM) are indispensable for instrument 
calibration and method validation to ensure 
precise and reliable results. Currently, the 
availability of commercial U and/or Pu 
i  Treaty of Rarotonga, Treaty of Tlatelolco, Treaty on a 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia 
(CANWFZ), Bangkok Treaty, Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty, etc. 
containing CRMs is limited to metals, powders 
and solutions. Monodisperse particles with a 
well-defined characteristics are needed to 
ensure and improve reliable data output. Single 
U and/or Pu containing particles with various 
isotopic compositions and sizes are needed. 
Homogeneous and monodisperse particles with 
a known number of atoms per particle are most 
suitable for instrument calibration and method 
validation; in particular for SIMS, TIMS or Laser 
Ablation ICP-MS (LA-ICP-MS) analysis. On the 
other hand, mixed particles sizes with different 
elemental and isotopic compositions are more 
suitable as a quality control material since they 
reflect actual field samples more accurately. In 
the end, that is why different monodisperse 
particle populations are intended to be blended 
and embedded into a more realistic dirt and 
dust matrix to imitate real swipe samples. This 
demand of a new generation of reference 
materials was already recognizes in the late 
1990s. Since that time several particle 
production programs were initiated which 
yielded in mixed results: ranging from uranium 
micro-particulates to mimic real-life samples 
such as uranium doped glasses 20 or uranium-
oxyfluoride particles 21 to polydisperse 
uranium/plutonium containing microparticles 22, 
23, 24, 25, 26. Erdmann et al. 27 and Stetzer 28
proved that monodisperse particles can be 
produced using a vibrating orifice aerosol 
generator (VOAG). Further studies on the 
correlation of the uranium mass content to the 
size distribution and particle density 29, 30
proved the potential of this approach, see 
Ranebo et al. 12. Since the project was 
discontinued it was decided to take up this 
approach. In 2012 the Environmental Sample 
Laboratory at the Department of Safeguards 
(SGAS-ESL) at the IAEA decided to start a 
particle production program as part of a joint 
R&D project with the Institute of Nuclear Waste 
Management and Reactor Safety (IEK-6) at the 
Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH (FZJ) in order 
to improve its analytical capabilities. This work 
is premised upon previous publications where 
the basics of particle production were already 
discussed 31. A more detailed analysis will be 
given on how the particle size distribution and 
the final morphology dictate the overall scheme 
of the particle production setup. Therefore a 
more detailed insight will be given on the 
droplet-to-particle conversion process and the 
chronological succession of the setup. Finally a 
short assessment on the size distribution and 
morphology will be given as well as mass 
spectrometric analysis confirming the stability of 
the isotopic abundancy of the initial isotopic 
content. 
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1.1 Droplet-to-Particle Conversion 
The goal of this project is to produce 
solid, homogenous micro particles: uranium 
oxides are therefore preferred over uranium 
salts such as nitrates or chlorides. Particles 
discussed in this paper are derived from dilute 
uranyl nitrate solution. Therefore it is necessary 
to convert the uranium nitrate particles to its 
subsequent oxides by thermal treatment. 
Additionally, calcinated particles offer a better 
chemical and mechanical stability than dried 
uranyl particles. Microparticle production via 
spray pyrolysis is a delicate matter: the final 
size, morphology and density are depended on 
many variables such as temperature profiles, 
dwell times, instrument configuration and 
precursor solution composition and 
concentration. These parameters dictate the 
setup configuration significantly. 
The conditions during evaporation and 
decomposition of the uranyl nitrate solution play 
a key role in the formation of the final size and 
morphology 32. This is particularly true for spray
pyrolysis 33 34 were the complex conversion 
from droplets-to-particles takes place in 
seconds. 
Figure 1: Schematics of droplet-to-particle 
conversion during thermolysis 35, 36.
This implies the following seven steps: 
(1) aerosol production, (2) evaporation, (3) 
dehydration, (5) nucleation, (4) thermal 
decomposition, (5) crystallization and oxidation, 
(6) cooling and (7) sampling. The nucleation 
process is the pivotal step in the production 
process. It is dictated strongly by the 
temperature profile and dwell time in order to 
yield solid and monodisperse particles. 
Reuge et al. 35 and Messing et al. 36 describe a
basic conversion schematic for spray pyrolysis 
process. The formation of homogenous and 
solid particles is described as a competitive 
precipitation reaction. In order to yield in solid 
particles a homogeneous precipitation is 
needed. On the other hand a surface controlled 
precipitation leads to the formation of hollow or 
cracked-up species, see Figure 1. Depending 
on the permeability of the outer layer the 
evaporation pressure inflates the particles 
which can eventually cause them to 
disintegrate. Reuge et al. 35 and Gurav et al. 36
also mention that temperature profiles, dwell 
time, solvent composition and concentration are 
also contributing to some extend to the final 
size and morphology. SEM measurement, see 
Chapter 2.4, highlight the complexity associated 
with the nucleation process discussed in this 
paragraph. 
1.2 Particle Collection – One Stage 
Inertial Impactor 
Inertial impaction is a well-established 
and effective method to collect microparticles 
from an air flow. For this work a one-stage 
inertial impactor was used 15. A sufficient 
number of particles can be collected directly 
onto a suitable substrate within a few minutes. 
Particles are impacted depending on their 
aerodynamic diameter, respectively by their 
inertia. The collection efficiency of a round one-
stage impactor is dependent on factors such as 
the airflow, the length and distance of the 
entrance nozzle to the impaction plate and from 
interstage losses 37, 38. An important component
in the assessment of the impactor efficiency is 
the Reynolds number “Re”, the Stokes number 
"Stk" and the so-called cut-off diameter. "Re" 
describes the dynamic properties of the flow. 
"Stk" is a dimensionless number and it 
represents the ratio of the particle stopping 
distance, in a given flow to the characteristic 
dimension of an object in that flow. The most 
important parameter for an inertial impactor is 
the so-called cut-off diameter “d50”. The cut-off 
diameter is defined as the threshold for the 
particle size where the collection efficiency is 
50 %. There are physical limitation for the cut 
off diameter to a size range of about 0.2 -
0.3 µm 39.
𝒅𝟓𝟎 = √
𝟗𝝅𝜼𝑫𝑺𝒕𝒌
𝟒𝑽𝝆𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒙𝑪
(1) 
The cut off diameter of a round one 
stage impactor can be calculated using 
equation (1). “D” is the nozzle diameter of the 
impactor, “η” represents the dynamic viscosity 
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of air, “v” is the volume flow rate, “xC” is the 
Cunningham slip correction factor to account for 
non-continuum effects, “ρParticle” is the particle 
density and “Stk” is the Stokes number. 
1.3 Localization and Identification of 
Single Particles 
In nuclear safeguards and forensics the 
identification and pinpointing of single particles 
of interest which are embedded into a large 
matrix is vitally important. A particle of interest 
can be defined as an entity which does not 
disintegrate while being observed 40. The notion
of a single particle however is an arbitrary 
definition because a particle may be 
homogenous for a specific property but 
heterogeneous by another. In our case, 
homogeneity of the morphology and the size 
distribution are the main criterions thus making 
particles identification simple. In this work 
particles were identified and pinpointed using 
microscopy (SEM or optical microscopy) with 
the help of references marks. Triangulation is a 
well-established method for single particle 
identification and relocation applied in nuclear 
safeguards and forensics related work, see 
Admon et al. 40.
Figure 2: Top: vector diagram representing the 
triangulation method, see Admon, et al. 2005. 
Bottom: tailor-made reference marks engraved using 
a LMD system. 
Figure 2 depicts a general schematic 
vector diagram of the triangulation method: with 
“P” the particle of interest, “A, B, C” are three 
non-collinear reference marks on the substrate, 
"O and O`" are the stage Cartesian coordinates 
system. This identification grid helped to 
relocate single particles of interest with 
appropriate precision in different instruments. 
The target coordinates of any given point can 
be calculated if the source coordinates are 
known. Commonly there are several ways of 
applying reference marks, (1) either by gluing 
some sort of a mesh or (2) by carving. This 
approach describes a new method to use a 
laser micro dissection (LMD) system to create 
precise tailor-made reference marks. Reference 
marks were defined in a custom excel sheet 
and then converted with Notepad++ and 
imported into the proprietary MMI software. The 
precision of this modified triangulation 
methodology is < 10.0 µm. 
2. Experimental
2.1 Particle Production 
Monodisperse uranium particles are 
produced by spray-pyrolysis (which is a four-
step process) in a closed and sealed system, 
see Figure 3: (1) certified uranium solutions are 
diluted to hydro-alcoholic precursor solutions, 
(2) monodisperse aerosols are produced by a 
dedicated aerosol generator. All particles are 
carried throughout the system by carefully 
adjusted airstreams, (3) aerosol droplets are 
dried and calcinated in-stream to the 
subsequent uranium oxides and (4) collected 
from the system by inertial impaction. 
Figure 3: Schematic overview of the four step 
particle production process. 
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A vibrating orifice aerosol generator 
(VOAG, model 3450 TSI Inc.) was used to 
produce monodisperse aerosol droplets with a 
standard operating liquid feed rate "Q" of 
Q = 1.392.10-1 cm3min-1, a 20 μm diameter
orifice and a frequency "ν" of ν ≈ 70 kHz. 
Particles are thermally converted in a furnace 
(Pressurized Air Heater, Dekati Ltd.) from 
uranyl nitrate to a corresponding uranium oxide. 
Uranium particles were produced from certified 
uranyl nitrate solution (IRMM-183) which was 
purchased from JRC-Geel ii, see Table 1.
Dilutions were prepared gravimetrically and 
volumetrically with ultrapure water (18.2 mΩ). 
Isotope Amount Ratio 
n(234U)/n(238U) 1.9755(22) . 10-5
n(235U)/n(238U) 0.0031257(16) . 10-5
n(236U)/n(238U) 1.48358(54) . 10-5
Table 1: Isotope amount ratios of IRMM-183, re-
certified values by Richter et al. (2005). 
After adjusting the uranium 
concentration to about 200 μgg-1 an equivalent
volume of ultrapure ethanol (analytical grade, 
Merck Germany) was added. The uranium 
concentration of these solutions was 
determined by ICP-MS (Perkin Elmer, Sciex 
Elan 6100 DRC). 
2.2 Setup Development 
Particle production started in late 2012 
with a preliminary setup. The system was 
operated with a uranium substitute, neodymium 
nitrate, to test the functionality of all 
components. The setup was comprised of an 
aerosol generator, a small furnace and a 
sampling unit. Over a period of three years the 
setup changed incrementally to adopt new 
features and to improve the particle generation 
process. The configuration of each component 
influences the particle size distribution, the 
morphology, the density and the crystal 
structure of the final particulates – some to a 
bigger extend than others. The following 
paragraph will depict these crucial components 
and the setup evolution until December 2014. 
The aerosol generator was initially 
mounted upwards so that the aerosol particles 
ii JRC-Geel: Joint Research Centre Geel formerly 
known as IRMM (Institute for Reference Materials and 
Measurements) 
had to travel against the force of gravity. 
Experiments performed at IEK-6 showed that 
the air flow is susceptible to turbulences caused 
by the shape of the tubing and the adjacent 
volumes. This resulted in a significant loss of 
particles inside the setup. Additionally, in the 
beginning the system was intended to be 
operated with two independent furnaces: (a) a 
small tubular furnace (Dekati Furnace) to 
preheat and dry the precursor droplets to 
mitigate stress induced cracks and then to 
transfer them directly to a (b) longer and hotter 
furnace (ThermConcept 4 zone furnace, max. 
temperature of 1100 °C) for the final calcination 
at temperatures between 600 - 900 °C. Both 
heating systems were installed in series. Initially 
it was considered that the second furnace was 
necessary to fully calcinated the aerosol 
particles. Depending on the temperature profile 
we expect to see mixed oxidation states of +V 
and +VI 41, 42. Experiments showed that for 
uranyl nitrate hexahydrate solutions combined 
temperature profiles, including a preheating at 
around 600 °C and a calcination temperature 
well above 800 °C, tend to form hollow, inflated 
particles. During that time, it was difficult to 
produce monodisperse particles. Instead of 
generating only solid particles in the size range 
of ~ 1 µm, inflated and hollow particles as well 
as debris of these populations was generated 
simultaneously. SEM investigations showed 
that the intact and hollow particles would reach 
up to > 6 µm in diameter. These findings lead to 
the conclusion to focus on the adjustment of the 
temperature profile to yield solid particles. 
Experiments indicated that the small tubular 
furnace was sufficient. Micro Raman 
investigations showed that the small particles 
were predominantly made from U3O8 and to 
some lesser degree to UO3, see Knott 43. 
Initially, track etched polycarbonate filters 
(Whatman, Track Etched Nuclepore Filters) 
were used to collect particles. Further 
experiments revealed some major impairments 
compared to inertial impaction: (a) cumbersome 
sample preparation and post-processing 
procedures caused by curling of the filter, (b) 
low particle retention, (c) limited imaging 
capabilities inside SEM due to non-conductive 
surface and (d) charging effects which caused 
the particles to jump or move. A smooth, even 
and conductive surface was preferred. Hence it 
was decided to use inertial impaction to collect 
particles on vitreous carbon substrates (1" dia., 
Ted Pella Inc.). 
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Figure 4: Schematic overview of the four-step 
particle production process. 
This method is already well established 
in nuclear safeguards analytic and is applied to 
transfer a statistically significant number of 
particles from the swipes to a carbon substrate 
15 which can be used almost directly for LG-
SIMS analysis 9, 10. It can be concluded that 
shorter dwell time and a more moderate 
temperature profile, with temperatures up 
to 600 °C, are sufficient to form solid uranium 
oxide particles. Additionally, it was decided to 
turn the VOAG upside down to use gravity and 
reduce the tubing to a minimum. Secondly it 
was decided to discard the four-zone oven to 
improve the particle collection process and to 
minimize the risk of unfavored particle species. 
These changes increased the particle yield 
significantly and made the overall process less 
prone to external influences. Between 2012 -
 2015 various incremental steps were applied to 
modify and adopt the system to operate 
reliably. The size distribution is controlled online 
by an external optical sizer (Optical Particle 
Sizer 3330, TSI Inc.). In pursuance to reduce 
the combined air currents to a sufficient degree 
a component which is called a virtual impactor 
is used to generate two separate air streams. 
Each air stream is controlled separately by a 
pump. All air streams are directed into a 
ceramic Swagelok particle filter and discarded 
into the fume hood. 
2.3 Particle Collection 
2.3.1 One Stage Inertial Impactor 
The inertial impactor used in this work 
was initially developed by Esaka et al. (2004) 15
to collect particles off swipe samples. But the 
design used in this work was changed and the 
cut-off diameter was never determined. 
Particles are generally collected at air flows in 
the range of 6 - 10 lmin-1. The particle collection
system at IEK-6 operates with combined 
airflows up to 32 lmin-1.
Air Flow, 
[lmin-1] Substrate 
Particle, 
[#] 
Yield, 
[%] 
Target Si-Wafer 17211 - 
4 Carbon 1354 8.27 
10 Carbon 1174 6.98 
15 Carbon 889 5.22 
20 Carbon 759 4.41 
25 Carbon 657 3.85 
35 Carbon 519 3.01 
Table 2: Overview of each airflow its corresponding 
substrate, number of particles collected and the 
yield. 
Therefore, an airflow range of 4 -
35 lmin-1 was chosen for the assessment. The
aim of this assessment is to determine the cut 
off diameter, the radial distribution and the 
collection efficiency. For these experiments, 
certified soil matrix (Sigma Aldrich, Channel 
sediment, BCR-320R) was used. The soil 
matrix material is composed of finely ground 
polydisperse particles which have an irregular 
shape and geometry. Hence, the feret diameter 
was used to assess the particle size. 0.5 g of 
soil matrix was carefully grinded and transferred 
onto a cotton swipe. Particles were collected via 
inertial impaction directly onto a target 
substrate: Si wafer disk (Ted Pella Inc., 
25.4 mm diameter). The number of particles on 
the target substrate was calculated with image 
acquisition software (FIJI) based on a 
composed large areal image; taken from 
multiple single optical microscopy images 
(Zeiss Axio Vision). 
In total 17211 particles were counted 
on an area of about 4.0 . 105 µm2. Image
processing showed a consistent particle size 
distribution for each air flow throughout the 
whole investigated area ranging. For each air 
flow a theoretical cut off diameter "d50(theor)" was 
calculated and compared against the measured 
cut off diameter "d50(meas)" and their deviation 
"Δ" was recorded, see Table 2. As expected the 
cut off diameter decreases with increasing air 
flows. 
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Figure 5: Radial distribution for all six air flows. 
Figure 6: Normalized collection efficiency curves.
The number of particles collected 
decreases with increasing air flows due to blow-
off effects and interstage losses. A higher air 
flow increases the number of particles 
impinging on the surface, but simultaneously a 
higher air flows also increases the probability of 
particles being detachment due to blow off- and 
re-entrainment effects 37, 38 as well as shear-, lift
and drag forces caused by turbulences and 
pressure differences 44. These effects 
substantiate in significant deviations between 
the measured and calculated cut-off diameters 
at low and high air flows, see Table 3. This 
investigation substantiated the prediction that 
the cut-off diameter decreases with increasing 
air flow and that the optimal working range is 
between 15 – 20 lmin-1. The radial distribution
of particles over an angle of 360° shows a 
distinct deposition pattern with one strong 
alleviation underneath the nozzle and a second 
slightly smaller deposition ring further away. 
Air Flow, 
[lmin-1] 
d50(theor) 
[µm] 
d50(meas) 
[µm] Δ, [%] 
4 1.17 1.49 27.5% 
10 0.71 0.78 9.86% 
15 0.57 0.60 6.01% 
20 0.48 0.45 6.05% 
25 0.42 0.51 21.14% 
35 0.34 0.39 13.70% 
Table 3: Theoretical and measured cut-off 
diameters. 
This deposition pattern is unique to this 
impactor design but it is also apparent that the 
radial distribution is linked to the air flow. The 
higher the airflow the more the second ring-like 
deposition moves further away from the center: 
for 4 lmin-1 it is about 5800 µm, for 10 lmin-1 it is
6150 µm, for 15 lmin-1 it is 7200 µm, for 20 lmin-
1 it is 7750 µm, for 25 lmin-1 it is 7900 µm and
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
391
for 35 lmin-1 it is 9950 µm away from the center,
see Figure 5. The collection efficiency was 
derived from the size dependent distribution 
and the data acquired from the radial profile 
distribution using FIJI. Figure 6 shows the 
normalized collection efficiency plotted against 
the particle size. Values for the measured cut-
off diameters "d50(meas)" were derived from this 
plot. An air flow of 15 lmin-1 shows the most
promising result. 
2.3.2 Cyclone Impactor 
Alternatively, to inertial impaction a 
cyclone impactor was designed at SGAS-ESL 
to ensure a sufficient particle collection yield. At 
the time the cyclone impactor was designed the 
inertial impactor could not deliver a sufficient 
collection yield because the combined air flows 
were too high due to the application of the four-
zone furnace. Additionally, a cyclone impactor 
offers the advantage to collect particles directly 
into suspensions. Yet, this approach can 
facilitate and simplify the distribution of particles 
to various substrates. The first prototypes of the 
cyclone impactor were developed using 3D 
printing technology to test the basic 
functionality. Eventually a modified cyclone 
impactor with a conical body and a venture inlet 
was derived. The entire cyclone impactor 
consists of three components: (1) a venture 
nozzle with PTFE tubing, (2) cyclone body and 
(3) collection vessel. The venture nozzle is the 
inlet for the particle jet and is radially connected 
to the cyclone body. The collection vessel is 
threaded to the bottom of the cyclone body, see 
Figure 7. The venture nozzle is connected to 
the collection vessel with a PTFE tube to 
ensure water circulation. The collection vessel 
contains 5 ml MilliQ for circulation and 
dispersion. This inlet produces a fine aerosol 
water spray at air flows ranging from 20 - 
135 lmin-1. A jet of particles enters the venture
nozzle is mixed with a spray of water. This 
mixture impinges tangentially on a conically 
shaped inner surface of a cyclone impactor. 
The Venturi nozzle serves the purpose to 
disperse a steady stream of water droplets to 
entrap the incoming particles and to increase 
the collection efficiency. The collection vessels 
are commercially available PTFE vessels with a 
thread and variable volume.  
Figure 7: Left: Schematics of Cyclone Sampler. 
Right: Image of the Cyclone Sampler. 
Figure 8: Collection efficiency of the cyclone sampler at various air flows. 
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For this assessment, PTFE vials 
purchased from VWR, Germany (V = 20 ml) 
where used. After impaction, the particles 
collected in the PTFE vessel and the air is 
diverted through the exit aspiration port. Finely 
ground certified soil matrix (Sigma Aldrich) was 
used to assess the collection efficiency. The 
collection efficiency, see Figure 8, was 
assessed by gravimetrical means at air flows 
between 0 – 130 lmin-1.
Experiments also revealed that this 
cyclone design did not work above > 130 lmin-1
due to turbulences: liquid is uncontrollably 
released through the exit aspiration port. A 
recommended operating range of 20 –
120 lmin-1 can be derived, see Figure 8.
2.4 Particle Size 
All six particle batches discussed in this 
work are produced from one CRNM (IRMM-
183) by dilution with water and ethanol and are 
listed in Table 4 and Table 5. The focus of this 
chapter will be put on two distinct particle 
species that were observed during SEM 
analysis: (A) inflated and (B) solid particles. 
These solid particles are significantly denser 
than particle species (A). All particles were 
intended for a final particle diameter of around 
1 µm. Initially a monodisperse size distribution 
could not be produced due to the formation of 
unfavored inflated species: batch (1) 
SG140521_02. After modifications to the setup, 
see Chapter 2.2, solid particles could be 
produced consistently on the following five 
batches: (2) SG141027_12A, (3) 
SG150312_05, (4) SG150401_14, (5) 
SG150413_03A and (6) SG150429_02. The 
particle size distribution and the aspect ratio 
were derived by using image acquisition 
software (FIJI) from stitched secondary electron 
(SE) images. This procedure was applied to 
obtain a statistical significant number of 
representative particles. All particles discussed 
in this chapter were identified as uranium 
containing entities with a Jeol JSM 6610 SEM 
which was equipped with an EDX detector by 
Oxford Instruments. 
2.4.1 Inflated Particles 
The inflated species on batch 
SG140521_02 were produced alongside a 
smaller number of solid particles. In total five 
distinct populations (solid, inflated and 
collapsed) in the size range from 0.67 to 
≥ 9.3 µm were observed; on SG140521_02 - 
see Table 4. SEM investigations showed two 
distinct solid species with a mean diameter of 
0.67 ± 0.50 µm and 1.35 ± 0.53 µm. These 
particles have cavities, pores and notches on 
the surface and are not perfectly spherically 
shaped, see Figure 11 (first and second from 
the left). To assess their geometry, the aspect 
ratio was determined using FIJI. It can be 
derived that the size and geometry of the solid 
species is not homogenous: Species (1) are 
small particles with a mean size of 
0.67 ± 0.5 µm and an aspect ratio of 
0.95 ± 0.05 and species (2) are solid particles 
with a mean size of 1.35 ± 0.53 µm and an 
aspect ratio of 0.77 ± 0.19 was derived. 
Figure 9: Typical hollow fragments and particles 
before (left) and after (right) destruction. 
SEM investigations also showed that 
most of the particles were much bigger and 
hollow. Above 1.35 µm in diameter only hollow 
particles or debris of them was found. Species 
(3) and (4) are intact, hollow particles with a 
mean diameter of 4.61 ± 0.27 µm and 
6.50 ± 0.53 µm respectively. These particles 
are spherically shaped which represented in a 
mean aspect ratio of 0.98 ± 0.02. Above 6.7 µm 
only collapsed shells, debris and 
aagglomerations were found. 
SG140521_02 Ø [µm] 
ΔØ 
[µm] 
(1) solid species #1 0.67 0.50 
(2) solid species #2 1.35 0.53 
(3) inflated species #1 4.61 0.27 
(4) inflated species #2 6.50 0.50 
(5) debris + agglomerations > 6.7 – 9.3 / 
Table 4: Particle species of SG140521_02 and their 
corresponding mean particle size. 
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Due to the large amount of debris the 
mean diameter could not be determined 
satisfactory. For species (4) and (5) the highest 
number of particles was counted. SEM 
investigations on SG140521_02 confirmed that 
the clear majority of particles are hollow. In 
order to assess the inner structure a selected 
number of particles were cracked open with a 
motorized tungsten needle inside a Jeol SEM, 
see Figure 9. A more thorough and 
comprehensive study on the inner structure and 
the shell thickness is described by Knott 43. Due
to the formation of an outer shell the 
evaporation pressure inside the sphere causes 
the particle to inflate. If the evaporation 
pressure becomes too pronounced the spheres 
will collapse and form shells and debris, such 
as observed. The inflated species neither met 
the criteria of monodispersity defined by NIST 45
nor had a consistent morphology but they offer 
a helpful insight on the droplet-to-particle 
mechanics and demonstrate that higher 
temperature gradients tend to favor surface 
controlled precipitations, see Gurav et al. 33,
Reuge et al. 35 and Messing et al. 36. This
observation only applies to dilute hydro 
alcoholic uranyl nitrate solutions. It can be 
concluded that the main parameters which 
govern the precipitation process during 
solidification are the temperature profile and the 
dwell time. Moreover, parameters such as air 
flow, uranium concentration and setup design 
have a less pronounced influence. 
Figure 10: Size distribution of SG150312_05 (blue), SG150401_14A (red), SG150413_03A (green) and 
SG150429_02A (orange). 
Figure 11: Overview of the particle evolution since May 2014 to April 2015. From left to right: inflated species and 
solid particle species. 
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2.4.2 Solid Particles 
The presence of inflated species was a 
clear indication that the setup had to be 
modified and that the temperature profile had to 
be adjusted. The setup was changed 
subsequently to a configuration that is depicted 
in Figure 4. These modifications had a 
significant impact on the consistency of the 
particle characteristics. Five different batches 
were analyzed. Four different batches were 
intended for a mean final particle size of 1 µm 
and one for 0.85 µm. All particle batches show 
a consistent particle size distribution and are in 
good accordance with the calculated values, 
see Table 5. Particle analysis was performed 
using FIJI. All particle batches discussed in this 
paper are not yet monodisperse by NIST 45
definition. 
Ø 
[µm] 
ΔØ 
[µm] 
(1) SG141027_12A 1.37 0.19 
(2) SG150312_05A 0.99 0.15 
(3) SG150401_14A 0.85 0.15 
(4) SG150413_03A 1.05 0.11 
(5) SG150429_02A 1.02 0.10 
Table 5: Mean particle size of solid particles from 
SG141027_12A to SG150429_02A. 
SG141027_12A was the first particle 
batch towards consistent particle characteristics 
and was therefore investigated separately. A 
mean particle size of 1.37 ± 0.19 µm was 
derived. In total 2689 particles were measured 
on an area totaling 1430 x 1072 µm2. A small
doublet peak at 1.73 µm was detected with 1/6 
of the intensity of the main peak. To a small 
degree inflated particles appear on 
SG141027_12A as well at 4.25 µm. For rest of 
the batches an area of ~ 4700 x 3500 µm2 was
investigated and no inflated species were 
detected. For SG150312_05 4497 particles 
were detected with a mean particle size 
distribution of 0.99 ± 0.15 µm. A small doublet 
tailing was measured at 1.25 ± 0.13 µm with 
about 1/5 of the intensity of the main peak. For 
SG150401_14A 5043 particles were analyzed 
with a mean size distribution of 0.85 ± 0.15 µm. 
Particles were intended to be around 0.8 µm in 
diameter. A small doublet tailing at 
1.07 ± 0.11 µm with a signal of about 1/6 of the 
main peak was detected. SG150413_03A has 
mean diameter of 1.05 ± 0.11 µm for 7142 
detected particles. No doublet peak could be 
identified. For SG150429_02A a similar picture 
can be drawn: 7505 particles were detected 
with a mean size distribution of 1.02 ± 0.10 µm, 
see Figure 10. These results highlight how the 
uranium concentration is vital for the adjustment 
of the final diameter. But it also shows that 
every parameter in the production process 
needs to be monitored carefully to ensure a 
reproducible outcome. Due to technical issues 
the liquid feed rate "Q" could not be established 
consistently which also lead to the formation of 
unwanted particle species, see batches 
SG140521_02 and SG141027_12A. It can be 
concluded that the particle size can be adjusted 
accurately by the precursor solution 
concentration if every step in the droplet 
formation process is controlled correctly. SEM 
investigations on the geometry revealed that 
these particles are not perfectly spherical. The 
outer surface of all investigated particles shows 
dents and cavities and an overview of the 
particle geometry and size is depicted in Figure 
11. Since SG141027_12A was the first particle
batch towards a more consistent quality it was 
investigated more thoroughly. Therefore, it was 
used in the following Chapter 2.5 to assess the 
isotopic composition of the final microparticles. 
2.5 Isotopic Analysis 
Isotopic amount ratios of 
n(234U)/n(238U), n(235U)/n(238U), n(236U)/n(238U)
were measured on a CAMECA 1280 large 
geometry SIMS (LG-SIMS) at SGAS-ESL. In 
this investigation one representative batch 
(SG141027_12A) of solid particles will be 
discussed. All particles were measured with an 
ion probe current (IP) of IP = 50 pA and a beam 
raster size of 10 µm. Particles were directly 
measured from the C-substrate. Particles 
measured in this campaign all derived from one 
CRM: IRMM-183. Hence the isotopic 
composition of these particles was compared 
against the original composition to detect any 
anomalies. The isotopic ratios of n(234U)/n(238U),
n(235U)/n(238U), n(236U)/n(238U) were compared
against the re-certified values by Richter et 
al. 46.
Isotope Amount Ratio 
n(234U)/n(238U) 1.9755(22) . 10-5
n(235U)/n(238U) 3.2157(16) . 10-3
n(236U)/U(238U) 1.48358(54) . 10-4
Table 6: Re-Certified Isotopic Amount Ratios of 
IRMM-183, according to Richter et al. 46. 
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According to Richter et al. IRMM-183 
was produced in 1987 along with a series of 
other uranium CRM's with various enrichment 
levels. Due to the progress in the development 
of mass spectrometers and procedures the 
certified values were to be updated. It is worth 
mentioning that Richter's data was derived from 
TIMS measurements on bulk quantities. 
Therefore, a better counting statistic can be 
derived which means a higher degree of 
accuracy and smaller corresponding 
uncertainties than for LG-SIMS measurements 
on minute quantities. These re-certified values 
were used a direct comparison. The scope of 
these measurements was to verify that no 
changes in the isotopic composition occur and 
to draw conclusions about the homogeneity of 
the particle morphology. For n(234U)/n(238U) a
mean isotope ratio of n(234U)/n(238U) = 1.999.10-
5 ± 1.333.10-6 was measured which corresponds
to a relative standard deviation (RSD) of 
6.67 %. Richter measured an isotope ratio of 
n(234U)/n(238U) = 1.976.10-5 ± 2.2.10-7 with an
RSD of 1.22%. For 235U a much more precise
result is expected due to better counting 
statistics and the results are in good agreement 
with this hypothesis: 
n(235U)/n(238U) = 3.2189.10-3 ± 1.2991.10-5 and a
RSD of 0.40 %. 
Figure 12: SG141027_12ª, n(234U)/n(238U).
Figure 13: SG141027_12A, n(235U)/n(238U).
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Figure 14: SG141027_12A, n(236U)/n(238U). 
n(234U)/n(238U) SG141027_12A
Certified Value for 234U/238U (1.9755.10-5 ± 2.2.10-7), k = 2
Average 234U/238U (1.9999.10-5 ± 1.3332.10-6), k = 2 (STD, n = 21)
Rel. Std. Dev.: 6.67 %, Rel. Bias: 1.22 % 
n(235U)/n(238U) SG141027_12A
Certified Value for 235U/238U (3.2157.10-3 ± 1.6.10-5), k = 2
Average 234U/238U (3.2189.10-5 ± 1.2991.10-5), k = 2 (STD, n = 21)
Rel. Std. Dev.: 0.40 %, Rel. Bias: 0.10 % 
n(236U)/n(238U) SG141027_12A
Certified Value for 236U/238U (1.48358.10-4 ± 5.4.10-7), k = 2
Average 234U/238U (1.4852.10-4 ± 3.6512.10-6), k = 2 (STD, n = 21)
Rel. Std. Dev.: 2.44 %, Rel. Bias: 0.78 % 
Table 7: Isotope Amount ratios on solid particles in comparison to Richter's data 
This result is underlined by a small 
deviation to Richter's value, of only 0.10 %, and 
by the low standard deviation of the mean, see 
Table 7. For 236U a mean intensity of 
n(236U)/n(238U) = 1.49521.10-4 ± 3.65118.10-6
was measured with a RSD of 2.44% and a 
standard deviation of the mean of 7.96754.10-7.
The deviation to Richter's value is about 
0.78 %. It can be concluded that no deviation 
from the initial isotopic composition was 
detected. LG-SIMS measurements demonstrate 
that all solid particles show consistent and 
homogenous signals for all isotopes (234U, 235U,
236U and 238U), in particular for the minor 
isotopes 234U and 236U. The low variance of the
measured data points indicates a consistent 
and homogenous morphology for all measured 
particles. This trend is in agreement with a 
significantly low deviation to Richter's data, 
ranging from only 0.10 - 1.22 % - see Table 7. 
Furthermore, it can be derived that the isotopic 
composition is independent from the particle 
size and morphology 
3. Discussion and Conclusion
This work demonstrates the complexity
associated with the production of monodisperse 
uranium microparticles made by spray 
pyrolysis. The final size and morphology is 
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governed by the setup itself, the production 
characteristics (i.e. liquid feed rate, temperature 
profile and dwell time) but more over by the 
uranium concentration. That is why the focus of 
this work is put on (a) the evolution of a working 
microparticle production setup and its vital 
components in the time period between 2012 
and 2015 and (b) on a comprehensive 
analytical assessment to derive the size, 
morphology and isotopic composition. It can be 
concluded that the final particle size can be 
adjusted accurately by the uranium 
concentration of the aerosol solution. All 
parameters during the aerosol generation and 
the solidification and nucleation process must 
be monitored carefully to yield in solid uranium 
microparticles. The morphology control is not as 
straight forward. Depending on the conditions 
during the droplet-to-aerosol conversion the 
final particle size, morphology and density can 
significantly differ. Hence a smaller and more 
compact setup is favoured: a smaller dwell time 
in combination with temperatures up to 600 °C 
lead to the formation of solid uranium oxide 
particles. 
Particle collection is an important issue. 
The collection system of choice needs to fulfil 
three basic requirements: (1) easy access, (2) 
mitigating the risk of cross contamination and 
(3) possibility to transfer single particles or bulk 
quantities easily to different substrates. And it 
needs to operate inside the existing air flow 
limitations. It could be demonstrated that inertial 
impaction fulfilled these requirements the best. 
A proprietary one stage inertial impactor was 
commonly used to collect particles. And its 
performance and cut-off diameter were 
characterized. It can be derived that theoretical 
collection efficiency and cut-off diameters are in 
good agreement with the measured values. 
Particles in the size range of a few micrometres 
can be collected efficiently. Only for very low 
and very high air flows a significant deviation for 
the cut off diameters was derived. Alternatively, 
particles can be collected directly into 
suspensions. A modified cyclone impactor was 
developed at SGAS-ESL to collect particles at 
high air flows. It can be concluded that this 
methodology is in good agreement with the 
theoretical values and it works for air flows in 
the range of 20 - 120 lmin-1.
Particle identification and relocation is a 
vital step in nuclear safeguards and forensics. 
Single particles are to be measured and 
assessed in different instruments. Triangulation 
is commonly used in nuclear forensics to 
facilitate particles identification. The method 
depicted in this work describes a novel 
technique using a laser micro dissection system 
to engrave custom-made triangulation patterns 
as reference marks. With this method the 
precision of the relocation can be less than 
10 µm, depending on the optical capabilities. 
Six different particle batches were 
analysed in order to assess their size 
distribution, morphology and geometric 
characteristics. All particles discussed in this 
paragraph were identified as uranium bearing 
particulates with SEM-EDX. Chronologically, 
the first batch (SG140521_02) described in this 
work contained two specific particle species: (a) 
solid particles and (b) hollow, inflated particles. 
The existence of species (b) was not 
anticipated but it was used to highlight the 
complexity of the droplet-to-particle conversion. 
This specie consists of a wide range of different 
particulates: from inflated, intact species, to 
inflated broken particles, to debris and finally to 
agglomerations. That is why a broad size 
distribution of > 4.5 µm up to 9.2 µm could be 
observed. It can be derived that with increasing 
temperature profile (gradient and dwell time 
alike) particles tend to inflate. To demonstrate 
that the intact and inflated particles are hollow a 
selected number of particles were broken with a 
tungsten needle inside the SEM. Solid particle, 
from five different batches, were also 
investigated and showed a more coherent 
picture: (a) particles are not perfectly spherically 
shaped and (b) particle surface shows cavities 
and notches but (c) the particle size distribution 
is almost monodisperse. Over the time the size 
distribution became more consistent due to 
changes and monitoring devices in the setup. 
Solid particles are generated through a 
homogenous precipitation process which is in 
direct competition to a surface controlled 
precipitation. It can be concluded that the 
anticipated size distribution can be reproduced 
sufficiently, but a monodisperse size distribution 
could not be accomplished so far. Experiments 
also show that the final particle size is primarily 
controlled by the uranium concentration of the 
aerosol solution and the liquid feed rate (which 
is the volume/time unit that is pushed through 
the orifice [ml/s], see Berglund and Liu (1974)47;
under normal working conditions. 
Since these microparticles are intended 
to be used as a future CRM for SIMS analysis 
one exemplary batch (SG141027_12A) was 
used to confirm consistent isotopic composition. 
The measured isotopic ratios were compared 
against the re-certified values from IRMM-183 
by Richter et al. 46. For 234U an isotope amount
ratio of n(234U)/n(238U) = 1.9755.10-5 ± 2.2.10-7
with just a deviation of about 6.7 % to Richter's 
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value is measured. For the more abundant 235U
an n(235U)/n(238U) = 3.2189.10-3 ± 1.2991.10-5
with deviation of only 0.4 % is measured and for 
n(236U)/n(238U) = 1.49521.10-4 ± 3.65118.10-6 the
deviation to Richter's value accounts to about 
2.4 %. Furthermore, the variability of the 
measured isotopic amount ratios and its 
corresponding RSD's are a strong indication 
that the particle morphology is consistent 
throughout the entire particle batch. 
It is worth noting that the particle 
production project is continued at IEK-6. Since 
December 2015 more improvements were 
implemented and new results are published, 
see Middendorp et al. 48.
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Abstract: 
In order to produce micro particle reference materials for nuclear safeguards particle analysis, a 
dedicated facility has been established at Forschungszentrum Jülich. This includes an aerosol-based 
particle production setup which is capable of producing uranium micro particles with consistent 
isotopic compositions and uranium contents. While the produced particles could be used as reference 
materials as obtained after production, further options for packaging the particles are being considered 
to simplify handling of the particles and to open new possibilities, such as the preparation of particle 
mixtures.  
The transfer of the collected particles into a suspension bears several advantages. For example, 
particles in suspension stored in a bottle would be amenable to extraction of an aliquot, which could 
be dried on a substrate of interest, such as silicon wafers, glass-like carbon disks or cotton-swipes, to 
obtain test samples. Also, various suspensions could be mixed in different ratios followed by drying on 
the desired substrates to obtained particle mixtures of two or more different particle types. However, 
while the particles are dispersed in suspension, various reactions could have an influence on the 
stability of the micro particle property values. In order to assess the stability of uranium micro particles 
in a suspension, experiments have been conducted using synthetic powders and uranium micro 
particles. Our results from dissolution and uranium isotope exchange studies show that ethanol is a 
suitable medium for the storage of particles over a period of a few months. Using particles produced 
with the particle production setup at Forschungszentrum Jülich, particle suspensions have been 
produced by transfer of collected particles into ethanol and distribution on silicon wafers and cotton-
swipes produced consistent results. It was demonstrated that the production of particle mixtures is 
feasible. It was also shown that particles in suspension could represent a suitable packaging for a 
particle reference material which permits a quick and flexible preparation of various types of test 
samples. 
Keywords: Particle Analysis; Environmental Sampling; Reference Material; NWAL; Suspensions 
1 Introduction 
The destructive analysis of samples collected during inspections of nuclear facilities is one of the 
verification measures applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to derive safeguards 
conclusions. One of the employed methods is particle analysis, which is based on the release of small 
amounts of microparticulate matter during all material handling processes. Such particles are collected 
via swipe samples taken during inspections of the nuclear facilities. The collected samples are sent to 
dedicated laboratories for analysis, which is typically performed using high accuracy micro-analytical 
tools, such as LG-SIMS. These methods are capable of measuring the isotopic composition of fissile 
elements within single microparticles. The capability to reveal the material handling history of 
inspected facilities has therefore become an important tool to detect undeclared activities in the 
inspected facilities.  
Over recent years, great progress was achieved in the improvement of the measurement accuracy of 
isotopic composition of fissile elements within micrometer sized particles [1]. The analysis of individual 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
401
particles has progressed beyond the analysis of the major isotopes (e.g. 235U and 238U) towards the
minor isotopes (e.g. 234U and 236U) which provide additional information, e.g. on the facility operations
history. 
Due to the improved measurement accuracy, quality assurance (QA) has become more stringent. 
Generally, the QA require various quality control (QC) measurements to be performed for the 
analytical method [2]: 
1) Calibration;
2) Validation;
3) Quality control;
4) Proficiency testing.
Each of these measures requires a dedicated test material of high homogeneity and stability, which 
are generally described as reference materials (RMs) [3]. For calibration, validation and also 
proficiency testing, not only the stability and homogeneity of the material is of importance, the material 
is also characterized with respect to one or more property values to quantify the true value; i.e. the 
absolute value of the property with given uncertainty and traceability. Such materials are classified as 
certified reference materials (CRMs) and have strict requirements, as described in ISO Guide 34 [4].  
Over the recent years, a setup has been established at Forschungszentrum Jülich [5-7] to produce 
micrometer sized uranium oxide microspheres, which are intended to be used for the various quality 
control measurements and are to be certified as CRM with respect to the uranium isotopic composition 
and uranium elemental content. The setup consists of an aerosol generator, after which the aerosol 
droplets are carried through an aerosol heater in which spherical particles are formed with a 
homogeneous size and shape. The obtained particles have been investigated in detail [7] and were 
shown to consist of triuranium octoxide (U3O8).  
At present, the produced microparticles are collected using single-stage inertial impactors, which allow 
for the production of ca. 50 samples within a single run. The usage of such impactors does, however, 
have a number of limitations; the number of particles collected may differ between various production 
runs, the particles are deposited heterogeneously over the substrate and the production of particles 
mixtures under controlled conditions is not easily possible. Also, some applications require the 
production of more than 50 samples, which would require production of particles over multiple 
batches/days, which could lead to an expanded between-sample inhomogeneity. 
This paper describes a method to transfer collected particles into particle suspensions. Such particle 
suspensions could then be mixed with similar suspensions containing different types of particles, for 
example different isotopic composition, which could then be distributed and dried over various 
substrates to prepare the final test samples. However, while in suspension, interaction of the particles 
with the solution could alter the properties of the particles. Therefore, a number of investigations were 
performed to determine whether and to what extend such interactions occur. 
2 Particle Production at Forschungszentrum Jülich 
The production of monodisperse uranium oxide microspheres with a nominal diameter around 1 μm at 
Forschungszentrum Jülich has been described elsewhere in detail [7]. The production is based on the 
formation of an aerosol from a dilute uranyl nitrate solution with the desired isotopic composition. The 
usage of uranyl nitrate was found to yield proper particles with a minimal amount of preparation [7], 
which would minimize the risk of cross-contaminations. The diluted solution is fed using a syringe 
pump through a vibrating orifice aerosol generator, where a monodisperse aerosol is formed. The 
volume of a single droplet can be calculated by dividing the volume flow rate Q by the oscillating 
frequency f applied to the generator. When the uranium content w and the density ρ of the feed 
solution are known, the amount of uranium contained in a single droplet m can be calculated 
according to equation 1. 
m = Q / f × w × ρ (1) 
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The formed droplets are then guided with an air flow through an aerosol heater set to 500 °C; at 
500 °C particles were found to be fully decomposed into uranium oxide whereas a further increase of 
the temperature causes the particles to deform, and a lower degree of monodispersity was obtained 
[7]. After cooling, the particles are collected using single-stage inertial impactors [8] onto glass-like 
carbon substrates. The collected particles were investigated by μ-XRD, μ-XANES and μ-Raman 
spectroscopy to identify the obtained chemical phase, all of these techniques resulted in an 
orthorhombic triuranium octoxide (U3O8) phase [7]. 
By using the single-stage inertial impactor, the produced particles can be collected on glass-like 
carbon substrates which, in turn, can be analyzed by SIMS without further handling, minimizing the 
risk of introducing any cross-contaminations. The usage of the inertial impactor does, however, cause 
an inhomogeneous deposition pattern of the particles on the substrate. An area with a diameter of 
12 mm is deposited with particles where the particle loading density increases towards the outer rim of 
this deposition area and only few particles can be found at the center of the substrate (Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Spatial particle distribution of microparticles collected on a glass-like carbon disk using a single-stage 
inertial impactor, obtained from low-magnification SEM scans. 
The number of particles collected can be controlled in a limited manner by varying the particle 
collection time; with an increasing collection time, the total number of particles increases. However, 
due to the intricacies of aerosol transport, the particle concentration of the air flow through the 
impactors may vary between different production runs and even between collections within a single 
production run.  
3 Particle Suspensions 
The previously described problems by using a single-stage inertial impactor can be overcome by using 
a suspension. When particles are dispersed in a solution, the particles are homogenized and aliquots 
of this suspension can be distributed for analysis, where each aliquot contains approximately the 
same number of particles. Such suspensions also increase the maximum number of samples which 
can be produced during a single batch. During normal operation, the number of samples which can be 
collected is limited by the liquid feed input reservoir, and lays around 50 samples. Once the reservoir 
is empty, the system needs to be interrupted to refill the reservoir before continuing. The particles 
properties between two such runs could therefore be different. Although similar limitations would be 
present when using suspensions, particles collected during multiple production runs could be 
homogenized, eliminating the between-sample inhomogeneity.  
Particle suspensions could be produced by two methods; either the particles can be collected in a 
suspension directly or particles are collected using an inertial impactor and are subsequently 
transferred into a suspension. The former method has proven to be unsuccessful as the air flow 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
403
  
causes evaporation of the solvent during longer operation. Therefore, particles are collected using the 
single-stage impactors, typically onto silicon wafers due to the high degree of cleanliness and 
affordability. The silicon wafers can then be placed into a vessel filled with the selected medium and 
placed in an ultrasonic bath for a few minutes. The ultrasonic bath causes the detachment of particles 
from the surface into the medium, after which the silicon wafer can be removed.  
 
The selection of the liquid medium has proven to be a critical step towards the production of particle 
suspensions due to the strong restrictions, as the medium should 
 
1. Be of high purity to prevent significant cross-contaminations,  
2. Not cause dissolution of particles within the required processing time,  
3. Be suitable to detach the particles from the substrate and, 
4. Not cause agglomeration of particles.  
 
Previous investigations [9] have shown that ethanol is most suitable as liquid medium, as water and 
dimethyl formamide causes dissolution of the particles, n-hexane and n-decane prevent the 
detachment of particles from the substrate and 2-propanol causes increased agglomeration of 
particles. 
 
In order to demonstrate the suitability of particle suspensions using ethanol as liquid medium, particles 
produced during the same run as the particles shown in Figure 1 were transferred into ethanol and 
were subsequently dried onto a glass-like carbon substrate. The temperature at which the samples 
were dried proofed to be a critical parameter, as with an increasing temperature agglomeration of 
particles was observed. The prepared samples were therefore placed in a glass Petri dish onto a 
heating plate set to 50 °C, the actual temperature at the surface of the substrate is, however, 
unknown. The prepared substrate was investigated by SEM, the obtained particle distribution is shown 
in Figure 2. The figure shows a much higher homogeneity compared to Figure 1 and shows the value 
of homogenizing the particles using a suspension. Although not yet quantified, the homogeneity 
between samples is also expected to be much higher compared to the direct collection. 
 
 
Figure 2: Spatial particle distribution of microparticles deposited on a glass-like carbon disk using an ethanol 
suspension, obtained from low-magnification SEM micrographs. 
 
The prepared suspension also opens a number of new possibilities, such as the production of 
mixtures containing various types of particles. In order to demonstrate the possibility to produce 
particle mixtures, cerium particles were produced, which were subsequently transferred into an 
ethanol suspension. The cerium particle suspension was mixed with a uranium suspension, where the 
produced mixture was dried on a silicon wafer. The obtained wafer was then investigated by 
SEM/EDX where EDX spot measurements were performed on each identified particle to distinguish 
between uranium and cerium. Figure 3 shows collected EDX spectra of 12 randomly selected 
particles. The spectra show clear lines for either cerium (between 4.5 and 6 keV) or uranium (between 
3.0 and 3.5 keV), no spectra containing both uranium and cerium were found. Of the 533 particles, 21 
were identified as uranium particles and 509 were identified as cerium particles. 
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Figure 3: Measured EDX spectra of 12 randomly selected particles in a uranium/cerium mixture. 
 
The prepared suspensions also expand the possibilities to prepare different substrates. When using 
the inertial impactor, only solid, flat substrates can be used, whereas the suspensions could be 
distributed over any type of substrate as long as the medium (ethanol) does not interact with the 
substrate. One such substrate would be cotton swipes, which are normally used to collect particles 
during inspections. To demonstrate the suitability of particle suspensions to prepare particle samples 
on such cotton swipes, an aliquot of the uranium/cerium mixture was dried on a small piece of cotton 
swipe. SEM/EDX analysis was complicated by the degradation of the swipe by the electron beam, 
even though both uranium and cerium particles could be identified. One of the collected SEM 
micrographs is shown in Figure 4, in which uranium are marked by a yellow circle and cerium particles 
with a red circle. The SEM/EDX studies show the possibility to deposit microparticles onto substrates 
which could not be used with the inertial impactors and open new possibilities for method optimization 
and quality control measurements in the nuclear safeguards particle analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: SEM micrographs of uranium (red) and cerium (yellow) particles transferred onto a cotton swipe from 
an ethanol particle suspension. 
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4 Stability of Particles in Suspensions 
 
Although the previous section has shown the suitability of using particle suspensions as processing 
step and has shown some new possibilities with such suspensions, the suspensions could also have a 
negative impact on the particle property values. The produced particles are intended to be certified as 
a certified reference material with both the uranium isotopic composition and the uranium content as 
property values. Such certification does, however, not only require the property values to be 
quantified, but also required the determination of the expanded uncertainty, including contributions 
due to inhomogeneity and instability. During the storage of particles in a suspension, a number of 
effects could have an influence on the property values and/or the uncertainty of these values. For 
example, dissolution would decrease the uranium content, and exchange of uranium isotopes 
between particles and traces of natural uranium in the liquid medium would alter the composition. In 
order to assess these effects, various studies were undertaken. 
 
The dissolution of particles was studied by storage of particles in an ethanol suspension for 365 days. 
After storage, an aliquot of the suspension was dried on a silicon wafer which was investigated by 
SEM. Figure 5 shows a collected micrograph of a particle compared with a micrograph collected of the 
sample before transfer into the suspension. Although the brightness/contrast differs slightly due to 
different SEM settings, no alteration of the particle could be observed. In contrast, strong signs of 
dissolution were observed for particles stored in water for only 16 days [9].  
 
  
(a) t = 0 d (b) t = 365 d 
Figure 5: Microparticles (a) before and (b) after storage in ethanol for 365 days. 
 
A second effect which might be of significance to the produced particle property values is isotope 
exchange. When a particle suspension is prepared consisting of two or more particle populations with 
different isotopic compositions, exchange of uranium between particles could alter the isotopic 
composition of the particles. Although no information on such exchange is currently available, 
Johnston et al. [10] measured the exchange of oxygen between water and various uranium oxides, 
including U3O8. In order to assess whether such exchange occurs between particles, particles 
consisting of depleted uranium (DU) and low-enriched uranium (LEU) were produced and 
subsequently transferred into suspensions. The suspensions were distributed over a number of clean 
silicon wafers. One wafer containing DU particles and a wafer containing LEU particles were 
transferred into a vial to which ethanol was added. The sample was stored for a given time, after 
which both wafers were removed and separately dissolved in HNO3 for Q-ICP-MS analysis. A 
schematic overview of the experimental setup is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Schematic procedure to investigate the exchange of uranium  
between particles stored in an ethanol suspension. 
 
The experiment aims to investigate the stability of the isotopic composition of particle mixtures stored 
in ethanol. Two distinct effects could occur; exchange between particles and traces of NU in the 
medium or exchange of uranium between particles. Figure 7 shows the measured isotope ratio of both 
the DU and LEU particles after storage for up to 202 days, although both particles do not show any 
significant change of the isotopic composition. Therefore, it can be concluded that no exchange occurs 
within the investigated timeframe. 
 
 
Figure 7: Measured change of the m(235U)/m(238U) isotope ratio after storage in ethanol. 
 
 
5 Summary and Outlook 
 
This paper proposes a method to transfer produced uranium microparticles into an ethanol 
suspension, which could then be divided into multiple samples. The proposed method strongly 
increases the homogeneity of the particle distribution over the substrate. Also, the method reduces the 
spread of the total number of particles on different samples and allows the preparation of a larger 
number of samples, either from a single batch or combining multiple production runs. The particle 
suspensions also open new possibilities towards quality control materials for nuclear safeguards 
particle analysis. Mixtures of different particles could be prepared, as demonstrated with uranium and 
cerium particles, although mixtures of particles with different uranium isotopic compositions would also 
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be feasible. The suspensions also allow for a wider choice of substrates, such as cotton swipes, or a 
multitude of substrates with a single batch of particles.  
 
In order to verify the stability of particles in ethanol, particles were stored for 365 days in a suspension, 
during which no alteration of the particle morphology was observed. Also, no exchange of uranium 
isotopes between different particles was measured after a period of 202 days. These studies show 
that even over multiple months’ storage in suspension, the particles remain unaltered. As the transfer 
of particles into suspensions, possible mixing of different suspensions and distribution over a large 
number of substrates can be performed within a few days, particle suspensions offer a wide range of 
new possibilities to enhance the quality control measurements without affecting the property values. 
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Abstract: 
The Joint Research Centre (EC-JRC, Geel, Belgium) and the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et 
aux Energies Alternatives (CEA/DEN, Marcoule, France) jointly prepared and certified a 243Am spike 
reference material in compliance with ISO 17034. This reference material is needed for accurate mass 
spectrometry measurements of 241Am in nuclear forensics, security and safeguards applications but 
also for the characterisation of radioactive waste. Nearly 600 units of this material were produced, 
each containing about 3.5 mL of dilute nitric acid solution with an Am mass fraction of 1.5 µg·g-1. The 
reference material is certified for the 243Am amount content by Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry 
(IDMS) using an in-house 241Am spike, produced by beta-decay from highly enriched 241Pu (99.3 %) 
material. The americium isotope amount ratios were certified by Thermal Ionisation Mass spectrometry 
(TIMS). Independent verification measurements were performed by alpha-particle spectrometry, high-
resolution gamma-ray spectrometry for activity ratios, and alpha counting for the total massic activity of 
241,243Am. 
Keywords: Americium; Certified Reference Material; Nuclear Safeguards; Nuclear Forensics; IDMS; 
TIMS; ISO 17034; ISO Guide 35 
1. Introduction
In nuclear safeguards and security, accurate isotopic measurements are required in order to draw 
correct conclusions. The accuracy, reliability and traceability of such measurements depend heavily 
on suitable isotopic reference materials. There is a wide range of uranium and plutonium Certified 
Reference Materials (CRMs) for quality control, method validation and instrument calibration in mass 
spectrometry. On the contrary, the availability of americium reference materials is limited. Currently, 
there is no 243Am spike reference material commercially available, although a CRM is indispensable 
for accurate mass spectrometry measurements of 241Am in nuclear materials. Such material can be 
used in nuclear forensics to determine the 'model age' of a (seized) plutonium material, i.e. the time 
elapsed since its last chemical purification [1, 2, 3, 4]. Accurate measurements of elemental americium 
and isotopic composition are also needed for the management of nuclear waste, where 241Am 
contributes via its daughter 237Np to the long-lived radioactive waste [5].  
The provision of nuclear reference materials is regularly addressed among reference materials 
providers and users, e.g. in the frame of the Working Group on Techniques and Standards for 
Destructive Analysis (WGDA) of the European Safeguards and Research Association (ESARDA), the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Nuclear Forensics International Technical 
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Working Group (ITWG). The need for an americium spike CRM was expressed at the 2014 IAEA 
Technical Meeting on Reference Materials for Destructive Analysis in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and at 
the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit: Certified Reference Material Fact Sheet [6]. In order to fulfil this 
urgent need, a novel 243Am spike material was jointly produced and certified by the Joint Research 
Centre of the European Commission (EC-JRC) in Geel (Belgium) and the Commissariat à l’Energie 
Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives (CEA/DEN) in Marcoule (France). The reference material was 
produced in compliance with ISO 17034 [7] and characterised for the 243Am, 241Am and total Am 
amount contents by Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry (IDMS) [8] and for the n(241Am)/n(243Am) and 
n(242mAm)/n(243Am) amount ratios by Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometry (TIMS). Furthermore, 
confirmation measurements of the certified values were performed by independent alpha-particle and 
gamma-ray spectrometry, as well as alpha-particle counting at a defined solid angle (DSA). Prior to 
release of this CRM, an inter-laboratory comparison (ILC) exercise using that same material has been 
organised by CEA/CETAMA.  
The preparation and the characterisation of this 243Am spike CRM will be presented in this paper. As 
the ILC exercise is still on-going, the certified values cannot be disclosed at this time. Therefore only 
the normalised results will be presented.  
2. Preparation of the 243Am reference material
Four mg of americium source material (88 % 243Am and 12 % 241Am) was made available by the 
CEA/L2AT (ATalante Analysis Laboratory). The solution was purified by TRU-Spec resin (Triskem 
International, Bruz, France) to remove the impurities and shipped to JRC-Geel for processing. The 
purified americium solution was diluted with 2400 mL nitric acid solution ([HNO3] = 1 M) to achieve an 
Am mass fraction of 1.5 µg·g-1. This Am concentration was considered suitable for various mass 
spectrometry measurements (e.g. TIMS, ICP-MS). The solution was allowed enough time to 
homogenise before being dispensed into pre-cleaned screw-cap ampoules. In total, 587 units were 
prepared, each unit containing approximately 5 µg of americium in nitric acid solution. Dilution of the 
original material and dispensing into ampoules were carried out in a dedicated glove box. The 
ampoules were packed in PVC bags and labelled. The major processing steps are depicted in Figure 
1. 
Figure 1: Preparation of 243Am reference material: dilution and dispensing (A), packing and labelling 
(B and C) 
3. Certification methodology
The 243Am amount content was measured by Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry (IDMS). In IDMS, 
the amount of an element in the sample is determined on the basis of additions of known amounts of 
spike material of the same element, but with a significantly different isotopic composition from that of 
the unknown sample. By measuring the change in isotopic composition of the blend (sample-spike 
mixture), the unknown amount of the element in the sample can be determined [8].  
C A B 
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The amount content of 243Am (c243Am) can be calculated using the following equation: 
Equation 1 
where c241Am is the 241Am amount content (mol·g-1) of the spike; mx and my are the mass (g) of the 
sample and the spike, respectively; Ri is the isotope amount ratio n(243Am)/n(241Am) in which index i 
takes the values x, y and b to represent the un-spiked sample, the spike and the blend, respectively. 
The n(241Am)/n(243Am) and n(242mAm)/n(243Am) amount ratios were determined by Thermal Ionisation 
Mass Spectrometry (TIMS). The material was certified in compliance with ISO 17034 [7] and ISO 
Guide 35 [9]. Homogeneity assessment and characterisation (value assignment) measurements were 
combined and carried out on 18 randomly selected units representing the whole batch. 
3.1 241Am in-house spike 
In absence of a suitable 241Am spike material for IDMS measurements of the 243Am, an alternative 
approach was applied. The 241Am spike material was produced from highly enriched 241Pu (99.3 %) 
material available at JRC-Geel. The ingrown 241Am, produced by the beta-decay of 241Pu since the 
initial purification of the 241Pu material, was used as spike for the measurement of the 243Am by IDMS.  
About 2 mg of 241Pu material was purified to remove the daughter decay products growing in since the 
production of this material in 1991. This was accomplished by anion exchange separation (Biorad AG 
1-X4 resin, 100-200 mesh) [10]. The purification procedure was performed three times; the final 
purification was carried out on 10 June 2014 at 15:10 CET (Central European Time), which marked 
the start of the Am in-growth (time zero). The completeness of the purification was confirmed by high 
resolution gamma-ray spectrometry. The purified plutonium material was diluted with 100 mL nitric 
acid solution ([HNO3] = 1 M) and characterised for the 241Pu amount content and its isotopic 
composition by IDMS using a 242Pu spike CRM (IRMM-049d) and by Triton TIMS, respectively. 
The ingrown amount of the 241Am in 241Pu is calculated using the following equation: 
Equation 2 
where c0241Pu is the amount content (mol·g-1) of 241Pu in the spike solution at time zero, t (a) is the 
ingrowth time of 241Am (time elapsed since time zero) and λ241Am and λ241Pu are the decay constants (a-
1) for 241Am and 241Pu, respectively. The half-lives and associated uncertainties used in the 
calculations were (14.325 ± 0.012) a (k = 1) [11] for 241Pu and (432.6 ± 0.6) a (k = 1) [12] for 241Am. 
3.2 Spiking and chemical treatment 
Spiking, chemical treatment and subsequent measurements were carried out about one and a half 
year after the purification of the 241Pu material. During this period a sufficient amount of 241Am had 
been produced for IDMS analysis. From each of the 18 selected units, an aliquot was taken for 
determination of the 243Am content by IDMS and another aliquot for the determination of the isotopic 
composition by TIMS. The chemical treatment and subsequent measurements were spread over a 
period of 7 months. This approach was used in order to have different amounts of ingrown 241Am in 
the blends for IDMS and to be able to assess the stability of the 243Am solution during the certification 
campaign. Prior to the measurements, two purification steps were carried out to remove the 241Pu from 
the in-grown 241Am in the spike solution by means of UTEVA-spec (Triskem International, Bruz, 
France) and DGA extraction resins (Triskem International, Bruz, France), respectively [13, 14]. The 
chemical procedure is shown in Figure 2.  
243 = 	 −  −  ∙  ∙
	 · 241
241 = 241  241241 −241 (
−241  − −241 )
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Figure 2: Purification of Am prior to isotope ratio measurement. 
3.3 Isotope ratio measurement 
Isotope ratio measurements were carried out using the total evaporation method on a multi-collector 
Triton Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometer (Thermo Fisher Scientific, Bremen, Germany), in a 
similar manner as routinely performed for uranium and plutonium samples of similar size. In the total 
evaporation method, the evaporation filament is heated up to maintain a steady intensity and 
measured until the whole sample is consumed. In this way, the fractionation effects in the ion source 
are minimized [15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Degassed zone refined rhenium filaments (Thermo Fisher 
Scientific, Bremen, Germany) were used as ionization and evaporation filaments (double filament 
configuration). About 20 ng of americium as nitrate solution was deposited on an evaporation filament, 
dried down and mounted on a sample turret. All ion currents were measured simultaneously on 
Faraday cups. 
For U and Pu a mass fractionation correction using measurements of a CRM on the same magazine is 
recommended following ASTM C1672-17 [20], but not mandatory. According to ASTM C1672-17, the 
relative bias for uncorrected n(235U)/n(238U) and n(242Pu)/n(239Pu) ratios is less than 0.05 % within 2 
standard deviations (2σ) for ratios spanning 3 mass units. In the absence of a suitable Am isotopic 
standard, it was not possible to perform a mass fractionation correction for this project. Due to 
similarities in the chemical behaviour and similar ionization energies, it can be assumed that 
americium behaves similar to uranium or plutonium during the total evaporation measurement and that 
the bias statements for uranium and plutonium can equally be applied for americium. For the 
n(243Am)/n(241Am) ratio the uncertainty component was calculated as 0.033 % (2 σ, for ratios spanning 
2 mass units) and for the n(242mAm)/n(243Am) ratio to 0.017 % (2 σ, for ratios spanning 1 mass unit).   
3.4 Verification measurements 
Independent verification measurements for the 243Am and 241Am amount contents and for the 
n(241Am)/n(243Am) amount ratios were performed using radioactivity measurement methods. 
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High-resolution alpha particle spectrometry [21, 22, 23] was used to determine the A(243Am)/A(241Am) 
activity ratio. The alpha source was prepared from the Am CRM solution by electrodeposition on a 
polished stainless disk with an active diameter of 18.6 mm and measured using a passivated ion-
implanted planar silicon detector (PIPS®, 150 mm2 active area, Mirion Technologies (MGPI) SA, 
France). The total Am activity per unit mass was determined by means of alpha-particle counting at a 
defined solid angle (DSA) [21, 24]. Gravimetrically quantified drops of americium solution were 
deposited on 34 mm glass plates and covered with 20 µg·cm-2 VYNS foils (polyvinylchloride-
polyvinylacetate copolymer) to prevent material loss. 
Two independent gamma-ray measurement campaigns were carried out, one in the underground 
laboratory 'HADES' [25] and one above ground in the radionuclide metrology laboratory at JRC-Geel. 
Point-like sources for gamma measurements were prepared gravimetrically by drop deposition on 
laminated plastic foils with a diameter of 34 mm. They were measured above ground using two coaxial 
HPGe gamma-ray spectrometers one of 35 % and the other of 90 % relative efficiency (Mirion 
Technologies (MGPI) SA, France). One gamma source was selected for ultra-low-level gamma-ray 
spectrometry measurements (ULGS) in HADES using the Ge-8 detector. The Ge-8 is a HPGe detector 
of type Broad Energy Germanium Detector (BEGe) with a relative efficiency of 20 % (Canberra). The 
activities of 241Am and 243Am were calculated based on the main gamma-ray peaks of the nuclides, i.e. 
the 59.54 keV line for 241Am and the 74.66 keV line for 243Am, respectively [26, 27, 28].  
4. Results and discussion
4.1 Results of the characterisation of 241Pu spike solution  
The results of the characterisation of the purified 241Pu solution are summarised in Table 1. 
Value Uncertainty (k = 2) 
Amount content 241Pu [mol·g-1] 8.1394·10-8 0.0053·10-8 
Isotope amount 
fractions 
n(238Pu)/n(Pu)·100 0.00097 0.00034 
n(239Pu)/n(Pu)·100 0.00053 0.00018 
n(240Pu)/n(Pu)·100 0.25741 0.00029 
n(241Pu)/n(Pu)·100 99.29993 0.00052 
n(242Pu)/n(Pu)·100 0.44116 0.00025 
Table 1: Results of the characterisation of the purified 241Pu solution 
The values of the plutonium isotope amount fractions were found to be in agreement with the values
from the certificate of the 241Pu material from 1991. The value for the 241Pu amount content was 
calculated from the mean of the 10 blends measured by IDMS. Each blend was measured in 
replicates on the Triton TIMS using the total evaporation method. The mass fractionation correction 
was based on the measurement of the IRMM-290/A3 Pu isotopic standard. The results of the IDMS 
measurements of the 241Pu amount in the spike solution are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: 241Pu amount content in the purified 241Pu solution established by IDMS of 10 blend 
solutions. The solid line represents the mean of the ten values, the dotted lines represent the 
expanded uncertainty (coverage factor, k = 2) of the mean. 
4.2 Results of the verification measurements 
Due to the on-going ILC exercise, only the normalised certified values are presented in this paper. The 
results of the verification measurements obtained by gamma-ray and alpha-particle spectrometry are 
shown in Figure 4. They are in agreement with the certified values within measurement uncertainty. 
Measurement uncertainties were estimated according to GUM [29] and mean values calculated by 
means of the power-moderated mean formalism [30]. 
Figure 4: Results of the independent alpha-particle (triangles) and gamma-ray (diamonds and 
squares) measurements for the 241Am and 243Am amount contents and n(241Am)/n(243Am) amount 
ratios expressed as relative differences from the certified value. All the measurement results are 
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shown with a relative expanded uncertainty (k = 2). Red dotted lines show the relative expanded 
uncertainty (k = 2) of the respective certified value. 
The relative expanded uncertainty (k = 2) for the 243Am amount content from the characterisation 
assessment was 0.20 %. The major sources of uncertainty come from the half-life of 241Pu, the time of 
the 241Am ingrowth and the amount content of the 241Pu solution. The relative expanded uncertainties 
(k = 2) of the n(241Am)/n(243Am) and n(242mAm)/n(243Am) isotope ratios are 0.04 % and 1.0 % 
respectively.  
5. Results and discussion
A novel 243Am spike RM was prepared and certified for the amount content and isotope amount ratios. 
The material was produced in compliance with international guidelines. Certified values for the amount 
content and isotope amount ratios were established by IDMS and TIMS and confirmed by independent 
radioactivity measurements. The uncertainties associated with the certified values are fit for the 
purpose for this reference material. This material is available in dilute nitric acid solution with an 
americium mass fraction of about 1.5 ppm. 
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Abstract: 
Sample preparation methods for mass spectrometry are being automated using commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) equipment to shorten lengthy and costly manual chemical purification procedures. This 
addresses a serious need in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Network of Analytical 
Laboratories (IAEA NWAL) to increase efficiency in the Bulk Analysis of Environmental Samples for 
Safeguards program with a method that allows unattended, overnight operation.  In collaboration with 
Elemental Scientific Inc., the prepFAST-MC2 was designed based on COTS equipment.  It was 
modified for U/Pu separations utilizing renewable columns packed with Eichrom™ TEVA and UTEVA 
resins, with a chemical separation method based on the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) 
NWAL chemical procedure. The original preFAST-MC2 system is currently installed in the Ultra-Trace 
Forensics Science Center at ORNL. 
Initial verification experiments yielded small elution volumes, consistent elution profiles, ample 
separation, and good recovery without cross-contamination of the eluent. Separation of mixed U and 
Pu samples containing certified reference materials were analyzed by multi-collector inductively 
coupled plasma mass spectrometry (MCICPMS), and the isotope ratio results were well within data 
quality limits for the IAEA NWAL. The low blank levels allow the option of performing the chemical 
separations without the necessity of cleanroom infrastructure. Comparison of the amount of personnel 
time necessary for successful manual vs. automated chemical separations showed a significant 
decrease in hands-on time from 9.8 h to 35 min for 7 samples, respectively. Overall, the system will 
enable faster sample reporting times with reduced costs by limiting personnel hours dedicated to the 
chemical separation, and will ensure continued efficient and effective operation of the NWAL. 
Keywords: automation, destructive assay, environmental sampling, safeguards 
1. Introduction
Environmental swipes are one type of sample that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
may collect during inspections of facilities under safeguards to verify compliance with declared nuclear 
activities [1]. Bulk analysis is a particular form of destructive analysis that is performed on an entire 
swipe sample.  It utilizes high precision mass spectrometry on purified samples to measure isotopic 
composition and concentration of actinide elements, particularly U and Pu that were collected on the 
swipe. Bulk analysis produces very accurate and precise data, but the chemical separations required 
to produce the purified samples are labor intensive and require significant laboratory infrastructure. 
The IAEA depends heavily on its Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) to support the Bulk 
Analysis of Environmental Samples for Safeguards program. Timeliness and efficient sample 
processing are important for the NWAL laboratories. Typical characteristics of collected field samples 
are 1 ng to 10 mg U/swipe and <1 ng Pu/swipe. The Measurement Quality Goals set forth by the IAEA 
for the bulk analysis program are a ≤ 2% relative expanded uncertainty for 235U/238U and ≤ 20% for 
234U/238U and 236U/238U at >10ng U and ≤ 20% for all Pu isotope ratios at >1pg at a 95% confidence 
level [2]. Multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (MCICPMS) or multi-collector 
thermal ionization mass spectrometry (MCTIMS) are often employed for this analysis.  However, these 
high precision instruments require highly purified actinide fractions, free from interferences such as 
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organics and heavy metals, to ensure the quality of the measurements. Current purification protocols 
include ashing samples individually in furnaces (or occasionally chemical leaching with acid), and then 
manually loading gravity-driven separation columns – a process that is both costly and time 
consuming.  From start to finish, the manual purification chemistry takes between two and four weeks, 
and represents the longest single step in the analysis process for bulk environmental samples. The 
separation procedures are also typically carried out in certified International Standards Organization 
(ISO) cleanroom laboratories with heavily filtered air and high purity reagents to limit the contribution 
of background contamination to the measurement of nanograms or picograms of material that may be 
present in environmental samples.  The installation and maintenance of cleanroom facilities 
represents a significant upfront financial investment and ongoing maintenance commitments that 
some laboratories may be unable to sustain.  
Streamlining NWAL sample preparation methods for subsequent analysis by mass spectrometry using 
fully automated, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment would address a serious need in the 
safeguards community by shortening lengthy and costly manual chemical digestion and purification 
procedures.  Automating digestion and chemical separation, while still producing highly purified 
sample fraction, will offer significant time and cost savings to the IAEA without sacrificing data quality. 
Additional benefits may include lower and more consistent blank levels for U and Pu and the ability to 
achieve cleanroom level blanks without the infrastructure needs of ISO cleanrooms.  Finally, the use 
of COTS equipment will allow an automated method to be quickly and economically transferred to and 
implemented by any NWAL laboratory (or prospective NWAL member), helping the IAEA globally 
execute standard operating procedures for isotopic purification while addressing the ongoing 
challenge of increasing efficiency and preventing sample backlogs.  
These goals directly address high-priority Milestones 10.2 and 10.3 in the IAEA Long-Term R&D Plan 
(STR-375) [3] by developing new technologies and techniques that will improve the NWAL’s ability to 
provide analytical services to IAEA. By supporting STR-375, this work also addresses the short-term 
needs described in the Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification 
2016–2017 (STR-382) [4]. Specifically, transfer of automated COTS technology to NWAL member 
laboratories supports SGAS-003, Analysis Support and NWAL Coordination, and especially the top 
priority to “Ensure efficient and effective operation of the NWAL” [4]. 
To this end, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has worked with Elemental Scientific Inc. (ESI) to 
customize their COTS sample preparation platform prepFAST-MC [5]. The prototype, dubbed 
prepFAST-MC2, has been installed at ORNL and closely mirrors the manual ORNL NWAL chemistry, 
but uses automation to perform chemical separations in unattended, overnight operation.  The initial 
work has been described in more detail previously, [6], with those results summarized here and new 
data added where available. Specifically, ORNL has documented significant labor savings through use 
of this equipment without any associated impact to final data quality. As hoped, the blank levels 
achieved with the system point to the potential to operate as a portable cleanroom in laboratories 
lacking that infrastructure.  Finally, ORNL is evaluating additional COTS technologies to enable 
efficiencies in other parts of the chemical processing of environmental swipe samples, which are also 
briefly described here.   
2. Experimental
The prepFAST-MC2 prototype from ESI, installed in the Ultra-Trace Forensic Science Center at 
ORNL, is pictured in Figure 1 below.  The heart of the system is a proprietary assembly of switching 
valves and syringe pumps that can perform precise and accurate column chemistry.  The entire 
sample flow path is closed and is constructed from fluoropolymers, both of which serve to minimize the 
actinide blank levels from the system and ensure samples are handled as cleanly as possible. The 
system duplicates the ORNL NWAL procedure, which utilizes single-use prepacked Eichrom TEVA 
and UTEVA chromatographic resins to separate Pu and U, respectively, from the rest of the sample 
matrix. To automate this procedure, the prepFAST-MC2 is designed to use bulk TEVA and UTEVA 
resin that is packed and unpacked into two fluoropolymer columns (C1 - TEVA and C2 - UTEVA in 
expanded picture in Fig. 1).  Packing and unpacking both columns before and after every separation 
ensures that each sample is exposed only to fresh, cleaned resin, and eliminates quality assurance 
concerns about the reuse of resin on environmental level samples. 
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Figure 1. Installed prepFAST-MC2 at ORNL with TEVA (C1) and UTEVA (C2) columns in expanded picture. 
The prepFAST-MC2 is housed in a plastic and powered coated metal frame, which makes it suitable 
for installation in a cleanroom (although a cleanroom is not required).  The laboratory infrastructure 
requirements are minimal and are listed below. 
· Space: 826 mm L × 430 mm W × 1625 mm H (from the floor)
· Power outlet within 3 m of instrument (120V/60Hz)
· Chemical exhaust with 69 mm ID to fit the back panel and a flow rate of 40 cubic feet per minute
· 5 bar of gas pressure (Ar or N2)
Ultrapure reagents, including acids and American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Type I 
(18.2 MΩ) water are recommended and were used in all studies at ORNL. The specifications for the 
resin used is listed below. 
· UTEVA Resin: Eichrom; 50–100 µm; Part No. UT-B100-S
· TEVA Resin: Eichrom; 50–100 µm; Part No. TE-B100-S
Certified reference materials (CRMs), with known isotopic values, were used for the uranium and 
plutonium separation experiments.  Specifically, New Brunswick Laboratory NBL-137 was used as the 
plutonium source and the Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (now the Joint 
Research Center of the European Commission) IRMM-183 was used as the uranium source. 
Additionally, IRMM-57 (233U) and an in house ORNL standard RAL-22 (244Pu) were used as isotope 
dilution spikes to determine system blank levels and sample recoveries.  
All mass spectrometric data presented here was collected on either a high-resolution inductively 
coupled plasma mass spectrometer (HRICPMS) or an MCICPMS. A ThermoScientific Element II 
(Bremen, Germany) was the HRICPMS used during the column calibration step to quickly scan 
column elution fractions for both U and Pu to verify separation and approximate recovery. It was also 
used for experiments evaluating the capacity of the automated system to remove contaminating 
elements such as Pb and Th, which might interfere with U and Pu measurements. A ThermoScientific 
Neptune Plus (Bremen, Germany) was used for all MCICPMS measurements. This instrument is 
typically utilized by ORNL for NWAL analysis of both U and Pu isotope ratios, and was used here to 
characterize the mixed CRM aliquots of U and Pu that were separated on the prepFAST-MC2.  
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3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Reproducibility of Resin Packing and Unpacking 
The reproducibility of the prepFAST-MC2 in packing and unpacking resin into the columns for each 
separation proved a critical parameter in determining the reproducibility of the system to preform U 
and Pu separations.  To quantify this, after a packing and unpacking run, the unpacked resin was 
collected, filtered, dried, and weighed. Repeated experiments gave a measurement of the 
reproducibility of the system within one day and over the course of three consecutive days.  After 
optimization of the method, the daily average for the packing of the TEVA resin in column C1 was 
0.556 ± 0.030 g and 0.601 ± 0.019 g for the UTEVA resin in column C2. This corresponds to daily 
variations of approximately 3 - 5%, which meets or exceeds the specifications that Eichrom quotes for 
its pre-packaged columns. The variation from one day to the next was slightly higher, on the order of 6 
- 8%, but the performance of the system was still demonstrated to be suitable for highly reproducible 
actinide separations. 
3.2. prepFAST-MC2 Column Calibration 
The initial column calibration experiments were conducted using 5 ng of IRMM-183 and 2 pg of NBL-
137, with the goal of verifying the elution profiles of the U and Pu respectively off the columns. The 
prepFAST-MC2 was run in a mode where the entire elution profile was collected in 1 mL fractions. 
These were then analyzed by HRICPMS to determine both the separation between the U and Pu 
elution and the recovery of the analytes. U and Pu were first run independently (and in replicate) to 
check the performance of each individual column, and then the full system performance was verified 
by the separation of mixed U and Pu samples.   
Figure 2 is the elution profiles, as determined by HRICPMS analysis, for the U fraction (red downward 
triangles) and Pu (blue upward triangles) of a combined U/Pu sample.  The figure shows narrow 
elution profiles for both elements, and demonstrates good separation between the U and Pu, with 
almost 20 mL of column wash volume separating the two. There is essentially no U present in the Pu 
fraction and vice versa.  This calibration data allowed for the setting of the software parameters in the 
final method, notably the size of the fractions to collect to ensure complete recovery of the eluted 
analytes.  The final collection volumes were 4 mL fractions for U and 8 mL fractions for Pu, compared 
to 5 mL and 12 mL respectively for the ORNL manual chemistry.  The decreased aliquot size 
represents time savings for the acid dry down step that occurs before MCICPMS analysis. 
Figure 2. Combined UTEVA (red) and TEVA (blue) column calibration runs for U/Pu separations. 
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3.3. prepFAST-MC2 Blank Levels 
Process blanks, or reagent blanks, are an important figure of merit for the prepFAST-MC2 as they 
represent the inherent actinide content background of system, in the absence of any intentionally 
added U or Pu, and thus contribute to the ultimate detection limits of the automated method.  Because 
uranium is ubiquitous in the environment it is expected to be present in some small amount 
everywhere, even in cleanroom processes using ultrapure reagents. Additionally, the cotton swipes 
that make up the matrix for the environmental samples contains a small amount of uranium (~1-5 ng of 
U per swipe) that gets included in the bulk analysis measurement.  The amount of Pu naturally 
occurring in the environment, however, is essentially nothing.  For both U and Pu analysis, 
characterizing and minimizing the laboratory blank contribution to the final determination of both the 
isotope ratios and the total actinide content of a sample is extremely important.   
Figures 3 and 4 below show the amount of U and Pu, respectively, measured by isotope dilution mass 
spectrometry in process blanks.  The blue squares in both figures are the actual replicate data points, 
while the blue line is the average value and the black line is the average value for 2015-2016 from the 
manual separation chemistry in the ORNL cleanroom.  The average amount of U in the process 
blanks from the automated chemistry is 15.03 ± 0.42 pg, compared to the cleanroom value of ~30 pg. 
The higher blank content of the cleanroom blanks also includes U acquired during the ashing process, 
a parameter not incorporated thus far in the budget of background contributors. The total amount of 
Pu, on average, is 0.00065 ± 0.00266 pg, compared to ~ 0.003 pg on average from the cleanroom. 
Figure 3. Average and total [U] in process 
blanks (blue squares) compared to the average 
value for ORNL manual chemistry for 2015-2016 
(black line). 
Figure 4. Average and total [Pu] in process 
blanks (blue squares) compared to the average 
value for ORNL manual chemistry for 2015-2016 
(black line)
The goal of the automated system is to achieve blank levels approaching that obtained by the manual 
chemistry in a cleanroom, without the requirement of cleanroom infrastructure.  The results shown 
here demonstrate that the goal is achievable.  Additionally, the automation, with its completely closed 
sample lines, may prove to have a more consistent blank level than is achievable from the manual 
chemistry.  Certainly, the data seen here indicated a high degree of reproducibility in the blank levels 
for both U and Pu. It is important to note that this data represents the initial condition of the unit, before 
appreciable amounts of U or Pu have been passed through it.  However, the result is an important 
benchmark to document what a clean system is ultimately capable of.   
3.4. Separation of Mixed Uranium and Plutonium Samples 
Samples of mixed CRMs IRMM-183 and NBL-137 were separated by the prepFAST-MC2 in an 
automated, unattended mode. Initial experiments used ~45 ng of IRMM-183 and ~15 pg of NBL-137, 
interspersed with unspiked reagent blanks to verify the absence of sample carryover.  Figures 5 and 6 
show results for the major isotope ratios for U (235U/238U) and Pu (240Pu/239Pu), respectively, plotted 
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against the certificate values for these materials. The results show good agreement with certificate 
values, well within the targets set out by the IAEA [2], and they display a high degree of precision 
among replicate measurements.  Good recovery is also observed, typically >85% for U and ~60% for 
Pu, on the order of that observed in the manual chemistry.  
Figure 5. 235U/238U isotope ratios of U in 
separated samples compared to the IRMM-183 
certificate value (black line). 
Figure 6.  240Pu/239Pu isotope ratio of Pu in 
separated samples compared to the NBL-137 
certificate value (black line). 
The blanks interspersed with the samples were also very clean, with a U content on average of 22 pg 
U/sample, and a Pu content on average of 0.0005 pg Pu/sample.  Additionally, the isotopic content of 
the U in the blanks is natural abundance, while the samples, IRMM-183, are depleted in the 235U/238U 
ratio.  Combined, the low total actinide content in the blanks, as well as the lack of depleted U present, 
both demonstrate the cleanliness of the system and confirm no carryover of sample from one 
separation into the next. 
Recent experiments have been conducted to test the capability of the prepFAST-MC2 to successfully 
separate higher loadings of U and Pu, and especially to test samples with high U and low Pu (and vice 
versa).  The same 2 CRMs were used, but in concentrations ranging from ~165 - 2 ng of U and ~150 - 
3 pg of Pu.  The results, even at these higher levels, showed ~99.8% removal of U from the Pu 
fraction and likewise a 99.9% removal of Pu from the U fraction, both of which are critical for a high-
quality measurement by MCICPMS.  At the highest Pu loading of 150 pg (extremely high for a typical 
environmental sample), when three samples were run consecutively, a very small amount of Pu (~13 
fg) was present in the reagent blank immediately following the third sample.   A second blank run after 
the first restored the Pu background to <1 fg. The finding suggests that the upper limit for Pu loading 
should be set at less than 150 pg to keep a low Pu background on the system. This will still 
encompass the vast majority of samples expected in the NWAL Bulk Analysis Program, and should be 
achievable with judicious aliquot sizing based on preliminary sample screening information. It also 
shows, however, that an occasional higher sample inadvertently loaded will not leave a permanent Pu 
background; it may simply require additional washing.  Experiments to quantify recovery of extremely 
low Pu loadings (<1 pg Pu) are currently underway. 
3.5. Separation of Heavy Metal Contaminates 
Significant amounts of heavy metals such as W, Pt, Pb, and Th are known to create interferences in 
an ICP-MS plasma that can affect the measurement of U and Pu.  Additionally, significant quantities of 
any metals may occupy binding sites in the resin columns and impact the successful purification of the 
U and Pu aliquots. To test this, elements either expected to be present in swipe samples in high 
abundance (Pb, Th) or elements, however rare, that are known to cause interferences in the ICPMS 
(Pt, Au, Bi) were spiked into samples and were separated on the prepFAST-MC2. The performance 
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was initially verified with blanks, and then the same contaminates were spiked into samples containing 
U and Pu CRMs.  A fraction of each purified aliquot was measured by HRICPMS to quantify the 
removal of the contaminates, while the remainder was submitted for MCICPMS analysis to ensure no 
negative impact on the actinide isotope ratio determinations.  The list of contaminates examined and 
their starting and final concentration in the CRM spiked samples is shown in Table 1.  The results 
confirm that removal of all species in, even at significant quantities, is accomplished by the system for 
both the U and Pu containing fractions.   
Element 
U Fraction Pu Fraction 
Starting 
Concentration 
(ng/mL) 
Final Concentration 
(ng/mL) 
%Reduction Final 
Concentration 
(ng/mL) 
%Reduction 
Zr 1000 17.0 98 0.4 100 
Mo 1000 0.2 100 0.4 100 
Ru 10 0.1 99 0.1 100 
W 1000 0.2 100 0.2 100 
Os 10 -0.3 103 -0.1 101 
Pt 10 0.1 100 0.1 99 
Au 10 0.2 98 0.1 100 
Hg 10 0.2 100 0.2 100 
Tl 10 -0.2 101 0.0 100 
Pb 10000 0.8 100 0.6 100 
Bi 1000 0.2 100 0.1 100 
Th 5000 5.1 100 0.6 100 
Table 1. Percent reduction of contaminant elements in U and Pu fractions by the prepFAST-MC2 
3.6 Cleanroom Conditions 
An important point to note with the results above is that all experiments were conducted with the 
prepFAST-MC2 located outside of a cleanroom.  It was installed in standard laboratory, with 
ventilation for acid fumes but without the HEPA filtered air that constitutes an ISO certified cleanroom. 
The ability of the system to produce consistent reagent blanks on the order of (or even lower) than 
what results from the manual chemistry performed in a cleanroom is critical.  It shows that the unit may 
be installed in a laboratory without the expensive infrastructure and personnel required to maintain an 
ISO certified cleanroom and still achieve comparable results. 
The entirely closed fluoropolymer sample path, as well as the limited sample handling required and 
the smaller reagent volumes all contribute to the low blanks achievable with the automated system. 
Additionally, based on recommendations from ORNL staff, the second generation prepFAST-MC2 will 
have an attached ultra-low particulate air (ULPA) filter, which will ensure even cleaner air flows over 
the samples that sit open on the tray prior to being loaded onto the resin columns for separation, or 
when the final aliquots have been dispensed after separation. 
A caveat to this, however, is that all the acid dry down steps still occur in specially designed boxes in 
the ORNL cleanrooms.  The acid dry downs, alternatively called matrix conversions, are necessary 
and time-consuming steps occurring at several places in the sample preparation process.  They serve 
to convert the analyte from one chemical form to another (as needed to change plutonium eluent from 
a chloride to a nitrate form in preparation for injection into the ICP-MS), to adjust analyte 
concentration, or to ensure complete mixing of a spike with the sample. 
ORNL is currently evaluating COTS equipment that may serve to replace the dry down boxes and that 
can operate outside of a cleanroom.  The EvapoClean® from Analab®, a sub-boiling distillation 
apparatus, is pictured in Figure 7 below.  It is a 6 or 12 port vertical hotplate with programmable timer 
that can evaporate acids off from individual samples, each in a completely sealed fluoropolymer 
environment. The acid matrix of the sample is evaporated and then condensed into a separate vial, 
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Figure 7.  The Analab® EvapoClean® installed in a chemical hood at ORNL 
while the analytes of interest (i.e. actinides in a sample) remain in the original vial.  The sealed 
environment limits the exposure of the samples to lab air, which would enable the dry down step to 
move out of a cleanroom and into a traditional chemical laboratory. An additional benefit of the 
equipment is that it can simultaneously be used to reflux acid into labware (via the ports on top of the 
unit), either to clean new vials or to acid leach previously used vials for reuse.  The dual use of the 
EvapoClean® enables both labware cleaning and sample dry downs to occur outside a cleanroom. 
To measure the efficiency of analyte recovery, a 40-element cocktail with a concentration of 0.5 ng/g 
per element in 2% HNO3 was evaporated in the system, and 37 out of 40 elements were recovered at 
greater than 85%. Separate experiments were also conducted to specifically measure U and Pu 
recovery using CRM ~5 ng of IRMM-183 and ~3 pg of NBL-137.  The results showed greater than 
95% recovery for both U and Pu for 4 replicate samples. Testing continues at ORNL to document any 
time savings that may be gained by use of the EvapoClean® in place of the dry down boxes. 
3.7 Documented Time Savings from Automation 
Table 2 documents the time savings for the ORNL NWAL chemistry enabled using automation from 
the prepFAST-MC2 for a batch of 7 samples. This number was chosen because a typical set of swipe 
samples from the IAEA would include 5 samples, with the remaining two places occupied by 
laboratory blanks (a reagent blank and a swipe blank, for instance).  The total time to manually 
process this set of samples, including multiple acid dry downs, is ~28 hours.  Almost 10 hours of that 
requires hands-on labor from a chemist, the majority of which is the actual chemical separations (8 
hours).  The total time utilizing the automated system is approximately the same, ~27 hours. However, 
the total hands-on time for the entire sample set is ~35 minutes.  A small amount of setup time is  
Sub-Steps 
Manual Chemistry Automated System 
Total Time (h) Hands-on Time (h) Total Time (h) Hands-on Time (h) 
Resin Cleaning 1.4 1.4 0.33 0.33 
Misc. Setup  0.2 0.2 0.05 0.05 
Chemistry 8 8 16.3 0 
Dry Downs 18 0.2 10 0.2 
Total 27.6 9.8 26.68 0.58 
Table 2. Time comparison of ORNL NWAL manual chemistry and ESI prepFAST-MC2 automated system 
for a batch of 7 samples 
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required at the start of each run, and then the system will operate unattended, even overnight. The 
>90% reduction in manual labor required for the automated separations creates significant efficiency 
gains that can be realized without the addition of extra staff.  Both the cost and the relatively small 
laboratory footprint make operation of multiple systems feasible, which would produce even greater 
gains.  Two units in the same laboratory could operate simultaneously, doubling the throughput with a 
relatively modest increase in personnel effort.  Additionally, the use of multiple systems would allow 
segregation by sample content, as is currently common in NWAL laboratories.  A lab may utilize one 
unit for hot swipes and another for cold, minimizing the chance of cross-contamination between 
samples and eliminating concerns of carryover from one separation to the next. 
4. Conclusions
The prepFAST-MC2 from ESI is a COTS automated sample preparation system that has been 
customized by ORNL to perform U and Pu separations on digested swipe samples in support of the 
IAEA’s Bulk Analysis of Environmental Samples for Safeguards program.  It packs and unpacks bulk 
Eichrom TEVA and UTEVA resins into columns for each individual sample purification.  ORNL has 
characterized the reproducibility of the resin packing and the low blank levels achievable through 
automation without requiring housing in cleanroom space.  The separation was verified by use of 
mixed U and Pu CRM samples and various concentration ranges.  Heavy metal contaminates were 
also spiked into samples to ensure purification of the final U and Pu aliquots.  The use of the 
prepFAST-MC2, along with other COTS equipment like the EvapoClean® from Analab®, create the 
opportunity to conduct cleanroom level separations without the expensive infrastructure.  Documented 
time savings enabled by the automation reduce the hands-on time required for processing of a set of 7 
samples from 9.8 hours to ~0.6 hours.  The prepFAST-MC2 may be run in unattended, overnight 
operation, and the simultaneous use of multiple units would create even greater gains in efficiency. 
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Abstract: 
Uranium isotope ratio determination for nuclear forensic, nuclear safeguards and for environmental 
applications is challenging due to the large isotopic differences between different material types and 
because of the extreme differences in isotopic abundances. For some applications the total uranium 
quantities can be limited, or it is desirable to run at lower concentrations for radiological protection. 
Recent developments in inlet systems and detector technologies allow small samples to be analysed 
at higher precisions using MC-ICP-MS and TIMS. 
Here we evaluate the combination of Elemental Scientific apex omega desolvation system with the 
Thermo Scientific NEPTUNE Plus MC-ICP-MS. The new inlet system is exceptionally stable and 
efficient with respect to sample transport to the ICP, and with respect to minimizing the 235U1H 
interference on 236U. The highest ICP sampling efficiency is realized using the Thermo Scientific Jet 
Interface. The 235U/238U mass bias is typically stable to better than 0.01% RSD within an analytical 
session.  
Thermo Scientific 1013 ohm amplifier technology allows small ion beams to be measured at higher 
precision on Faraday cups, offering an enhanced signal/noise ratio with a linear and stable response 
that covers a wide dynamic range (ca. 2 kcps – 30 Mcps). The baseline uncertainty on a 10-minute 
measurement is ca. 20-25 cps. 1013 ohm amplifiers are readily cross-calibrated at the 0.01% precision 
level. Thermo Scientific 1013 ohm amplifier technology can be applied to isotope ratio measurements 
for systems from Li to Pu using the Thermo Scientific NEPTUNE Plus MC-ICP-MS and TRITON Plus 
TIMS instruments.  
For sub-nanogram quantities of LEU the 235U can be measured with 1013 ohm amplifier technology 
instead of an ion counter. For nanogram sample amounts the minor isotopes 234U and 236U can be 
transferred from ion counters onto 1013 ohm amplifiers. Using 1013 ohm amplifier technology we were 
able to quantify 234U/238U ratios at the 0.1 % level with 25 ng sample amounts of natural isotopic 
composition. 
Keywords: MC-ICP-MS; TIMS; uranium; plutonium; isotopic 
1. Introduction
The use of Thermo Scientific 1013 Ω amplifier technology (Thermo Fisher Scientific (Bremen) GmbH,
Germany) for multicollector mass spectrometry measurements was first described by Koornneef et al. 
[1]. 1013 Ω current amplifiers offer significant improvements over standard 1011 Ω amplifiers, especially
with respect to signal/noise ratio, and allows low intensity ion beams to be measured more precisely 
than has previously been possible. 1013 Ω amplifier technology has been used for a variety of 
applications on the Thermo Scientific NEPTUNE Plus MC-ICP-MS and Thermo Scientific TRITON 
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Plus TIMS instruments [2]–[6], including uranium isotopic determination by modified total evaporation 
(MTE) [7]. For nuclear safeguards applications, 1013 Ω amplifier technology allows precise isotopic
signatures to be obtained from smaller sample amounts. Here we illustrate the utility of the 1013 Ω
amplifier technology for the determination of isotopic compositions of uranium and plutonium involving 
pg quantities of isotopes without the need for ion counters. 
Figure 1 show a comparison of the dynamic range for the different detectors that are used for 
multicollector mass spectrometry measurements. The minor isotopes of uranium (234U and 236U), and 
the isotopes of plutonium are typically measured at ion beam intensities that are lower than the 
optimal dynamic range of the standard 1011 ohm amplifier. Ion counters are traditionally used for these 
measurements, however 1013 Ω amplifier technology offers advantages in terms of ease of use,
detector lifetime, flexibility, dynamic range, linearity, stability and cross-calibration precision. 
Uncertainties approaching 0.01 % are achievable with 1013 Ω amplifier technology [5]. 
Figure 1: Dynamic range of different detector types (F = Faraday cup). The recommended detector(s) 
available for a given signal intensity are indicated by the intensity of shading. The counting statistic limit 
on precision for a 10 minute acquisition is indicated at the top, with typical limits for detector type on the 
right. 
2. Uranium Isotopic Measurements Using MC-ICP-MS
A range of uranium isotopic reference materials were measured using a NEPTUNE Plus MC-ICP-MS 
equipped with Jet Interface option. An Elemental Scientific Apex Ω High Sensitivity Sample
Introduction System (Elemental Scientific Inc., Omaha, USA) was used. This desolvating nebulizer 
offers sensitivity and stability with low oxide and low hydrides, and can be tuned remotely from the 
instrument PC. Uranium sensitivity was 1600 V/ppm at 119 µl/min uptake rate, and the hydride on m/z 
239 was < 1 x10-6.
The 1013 Ω amplifier were cross calibrated in a similar way to that described by Kimura et al. [4], 
comparing Nd isotope ratios measured using electronically cross-calibrated 1011 Ω amplifiers with
those measured by 1013 Ω amplifiers. The precision of the cross-calibration measurements are within 
0.01% (95% C.I.) and the cross-calibration measurements are recommended to be on a weekly basis. 
In contrast, ion counters require daily optimisation and within-run cross-calibration. 
Each measurement included a half-mass off-peak baseline (100 seconds), followed by 7-minutes on-
peak acquisition. Approximately 1.2 ml of sample solution was consumed per analysis, with 15 – 25 ng 
uranium required for an analysis. 
The collector configuration used is shown in Table 1. The 1013 Ω amplifiers can be electronically
switched between any of the Faraday cups as required for different applications. 
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Detector L1 L2 C H1 H2 H3 
Amplifier 1013 Ω 1011 Ω 1013 Ω 1011 Ω 
Isotope 234U 235U 236U 238U 
Table 1: Collector configuration for uranium isotopic measurements. Detector C can be switched to 
an SEM with RPQ for the lowest quantification limits of 236U. Comprehensive multi-ion-
counting arrays are available for nuclear forensic applications, enabling precise 
measurements of sub-ng uranium sample quantities [8], [9]. 
Uranium isotopic determination was made by comparison to measurements of the uranium isotopic 
standard NBS U-010 (New Brunswick Laboratory, Argonne, USA). For every 4 ‘sample’
measurements a blank and a standard measurement was made. The blank was < 0.01 %after a 10-
minute wash. Ratios were corrected using the Richter & Goldberg [10] reference values, and their 
uncertainties are propagated through to the reported data. 
2.1. Repeatability of uranium isotopic measurements. 
Figure 2 shows the repeatability of 234U/238U and 236U/238U measurements of a 20 ng/g solution of NBS 
U-010. The mass bias stability of the measured 235U/238U ratio was 0.008 % RSD, with the 
measurements spanning 3-hours. Typical mass bias stability within an analytical session is within 0.01 
% RSD.  The 234U/238U and 236U/238U data were corrected using an exponential mass bias correction 
and the certified 235U/238U ratio. The values are within uncertainty of certified ratios, and within 
uncertainty of those obtained by Richter & Goldberg [10]. 
Figure 2: Repeatability of back-to-back measurements of a 20 ng/g solution of NBS U-010, with 
mass bias correction from 235U/238U. 234U and 236U were measured using 1013 Ω amplifier
technology.  The RSD for 234U/238U and 236U/238U are 0.03 and 0.02 % respectively, with no 
detector drift apparent in the datasets. Error bars on the data points are 2x standard error of 
the mean. 
2.2. Reproducibility of uranium isotopic determinations. 
Table 2 reports the data from n=8 repeat measurements for each of 4 certified reference materials. 
The data for 234U/238U are plotted in Figure 3, expressed as deviation from certified reference value, 
and shows a good level of agreement for a range of isotopic compositions. NBS U-0002 is omitted for 
clarity, since the scatter is larger for the very lowest intensity ion beam (3.9 kcps). 
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 n=8 234U/238U 235U/238U 236U/238U 
NBS U-005 Mean 0.000021889 0.00491913 0.000047459 
SD 0.000000032 0.00000024 0.000000038 
RSD 0.15% 0.005% 0.08% 
NBS U-0002 Mean 0.000001653 0.00017724 
SD 0.000000042 0.00000016 
RSD 2.5% 0.09% 
IRMM-184 Mean 0.000053230 0.00726026 <3.5E-7 
SD 0.000000049 0.00000016 
RSD 0.09% 0.002% 
IRMM-183 Mean 0.000019824 0.00321731 0.000148529 
SD 0.000000050 0.00000019 0.000000037 
RSD 0.25% 0.006% 0.02% 
Table 2:  Reproducibility of uranium isotope ratio measurements for 4 certified reference materials. The 
ion beam intensity for 234U ranges from 3.9 kcps for NBS U-0002 to 128 kcps for IRMM-184. The 
3.5 x 10-7 quantification limit for 236U was estimated from NBS U-0002. 
Figure 3:  Accuracy and reproducibility of uranium isotope ratio measurements for 3 certified reference 
materials. The dotted lines indicate the 95 % C.I. intervals of the certified reference value. There is a 
good level of agreement with certified reference values. 
2.3. Application 
Solutions from individual uranium-oxide grains were re-measured using this setup and compared to 
data previously reported [11]. Sample amounts from 12.5 – 25 ng were available (equivalent to 15 – 
20 µm diameter grains). Standards run at 12.5 and 25 ng/g concentration were within agreement of 
each other. The data are presented in Figures 4 & 5, and are significantly more precise than the 
previous analyses made using older instrumentation with an ion counter for the minor isotopes. 
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Figure 4:  Solutions from individual uranium-oxide grains were re-measured using Faraday cups and the 
data are significantly more precise than previous data obtained using older instrumentation. The grains 
were isolated from dust and soil samples collected for an environmental case-study [12]. 
Figure 5:  3D plot of uranium isotopic signatures for the individual grains (blue dots) compared to a sub-
set of PDGP tails assay data (red dots). The isotopic signatures of the individual grains can be explained 
through the mixing of batches of depleted uranium feedstock during processing and subsequent waste 
disposal at a site in Colonie, NY, USA [13]. 
3. Plutonium Isotopic Measurements Using MC-ICP-MS
The instrument setup for the plutonium isotopic measurements was similar to that used for uranium. 
Table 3 shows the collector configuration used for the plutonium measurements. An SEM ion counter 
was used for the 241Pu measurements. Each measurement comprised 7.5 minutes on Line 1, followed 
by 100 seconds on Line 2. Approximately 1 ml of 6 pg/g plutonium solution was consumed for each 
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analysis. CRM 137 (New Brunswick Laboratory, Argonne, USA) was measured against IRMM-086 
(Standards for Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Unit, Geel, Belgium).  
Detector L2 L1 C H1 H2 
Amplifier 1013 Ω 1013 Ω SEM 1013 Ω 1012 Ω 
Line 1 239Pu 240Pu 241Pu 242Pu 244Pu 
Line 2 239Pu 240Pu 
Table 3: Collector configuration for plutonium isotopic measurements. A second line is included for 
the cross-calibration of the SEM ion counter used to measure 241Pu. Multi-ion-counting arrays 
are available for nuclear forensic applications, enabling measurements of fg quantities of 
isotopes [8]. 
3.1. Reproducibility of plutonium isotopic determinations. 
The data for the plutonium measurements is plotted in Figure 6. The data are within uncertainty of age 
corrected reference values. The repeatability (RSD) for 240Pu/239Pu and 241Pu/239Pu are 0.17 and 0.12 
% respectively (from ca. 6 pg Pu). Ion beam intensity ranges on the 1013 Ω amplifier were from 22 
kcps to 982 kcps (240Pu and 239Pu respectively from IRMM-086). The lower intensity 241Pu beam was 
measured using an SEM (ca. 0.6 kcps for IRMM-086). 
Figure 6:  Reproducibility of plutonium isotope ratio measurements CRM 137 (6 pg Pu). There is a good 
level of agreement with age-corrected reference values. The RSD for 240Pu/239Pu and 241Pu/239Pu are 
0.17 and 0.12 % respectively. 239Pu and 240Pu were measured using 1013 Ω amplifier technology, whilst 
241Pu was measured on an SEM ion counter. Prior to standardisation the RSD for 240Pu/239Pu from CRM 
137 was 0.03 %; the low 240Pu signal from the IRMM-086 standard limits precision. 
4. Conclusions
Thermo Scientific 1013 Ω amplifier technology is shown to have utility for nuclear safeguards 
measurements of uranium and plutonium isotopic compositions. The combination of the Thermo 
Scientific NEPTUNE Plus MC-ICP-MS with Jet Interface option and the Elemental Scientific Apex Ω
High Sensitivity Sample Introduction System delivers the sensitivity and stability required for obtaining 
precise and accurate isotope ratios from small sample amounts. The combination of new technologies 
enables precise isotope ratios to be measured from pg quantities of isotopes without the need for ion 
counters. 
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Abstract: 
The Digital Cherenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) is one of the tools available to a safeguards inspector 
performing verifications of irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies in wet storage. One of the main 
advantages of safeguards verification using Cherenkov light is that it can be performed without moving 
the fuel assemblies to an isolated measurement position, allowing for quick measurements. One 
disadvantage of this procedure is that irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies are often stored close to each 
other, and consequently gamma radiation from one assembly can enter a neighbouring assembly, and 
produce Cherenkov light in the neighbour. As a result, the measured Cherenkov light intensity of one 
assembly will include contributions from its neighbours, which may affect the safeguards conclusions 
drawn. 
In this paper, this so-called near-neighbour effect, is investigated and quantified through simulation. 
The simulations show that for two fuel assemblies with similar properties stored closely, the near-
neighbour effect can cause a Cherenkov light intensity increase of up to 3% in a measurement. For 
one fuel assembly surrounded by identical neighbour assemblies, a total of up to 14% of the 
measured intensity may emanate from the neighbours. The relative contribution from the near-
neighbour effect also depends on the fuel properties; for a long-cooled, low-burnup assembly, with low 
gamma and Cherenkov light emission, surrounded by short-cooled, high-burnup assemblies with high 
emission, the measured Cherenkov light intensity may be dominated by the contributions from its 
neighbours. 
When the DCVD is used for partial-defect verification, a 50% defect must be confidently detected. 
Previous studies have shown that a 50% defect will reduce the measured Cherenkov light intensity by 
30% or more, and thus a threshold has been defined, where a ≥30% decrease in Cherenkov light 
indicates a partial defect. However, this work shows that the near-neighbour effect may also influence 
the measured intensity, calling either for a lowering of this threshold or for the intensity contributions 
from neighbouring assemblies to be corrected for. In this work, a method is proposed for assessing the 
near-neighbour effect based on declared fuel parameters, enabling the latter type of corrections. 
Keywords: DCVD; partial defect verification; Cherenkov light; Geant4; Cross-talk 
Introduction1.
Irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies are commonly stored in water for radiation protection, as well as for 
decay heat removal. As a result of the interactions of the radiation emanating from the fuel assemblies 
with the surrounding water, Cherenkov light is produced. This Cherenkov light has frequently been 
assessed by safeguards inspectors, using the presence, characteristics and intensity of the Cherenkov 
light to verify that the object under study is an irradiated nuclear fuel assembly, and not some other 
non-fuel item. 
The Digital Cherenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) is one of the tools available to safeguards inspectors 
to measure the Cherenkov light emissions from irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies in wet storage. The 
DCVD can be used for gross- as well as partial-defect verification [1]. The type of partial defect 
analysis under study in this paper relies on comparisons of the measured intensities to predicted 
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intensities, where removal or replacement of a fraction of the fuel rods will result in a lowered 
Cherenkov light intensity. 
One of the main advantages of the DCVD is that the fuel assemblies do not have to be moved to an 
isolated area for measurement. A downside of measuring the assemblies where they are stored is that 
gamma radiation from closely stored assemblies can enter neighbouring assemblies and cause 
Cherenkov light emission there. This cross-talk, referred to as the near-neighbour effect, introduces a 
measurement error that is not compensated for in the currently deployed inspection procedure. The 
aims of this paper are: (i) to characterize and quantify the near-neighbour effect under selected fuel 
storage conditions, (ii) to identify how the near-neighbour effect affects the partial-defect verification 
procedure currently used, and (iii) suggest a method for its compensation. 
1.1. Partial defect verification of used nuclear fuel using the DCVD 
There are two methods used to detect partial defects in nuclear fuel assemblies with the DCVD. The 
first method uses image analysis to detect empty rod positions, and can be used to detect any 
removed rods in visible positions, as seen from the measurement position above the fuel. The second 
method is used to detect possible substitution of 50% of the fuel rods in an assembly. This method 
relies on the comparison of the measured intensity to a predicted intensity, based on operator-
provided fuel declarations. In this analysis, the measured fuel assemblies are grouped by fuel type, so 
that each group contains fuels with the same physical design. For calibration within each group, the 
measured and predicted intensities are related by a linear fitting, as illustrated in Figure 1. As a result 
of this calibration, the predicted intensity values do not correspond to absolute measured intensity, but 
to a relative intensity of all fuel assemblies of the same type, and deviations from the group’s linear fit 
call for further investigations of possible reasons. It is known from simulations that if 50% of the rods in 
an assembly are substituted with non-radioactive rods, the Cherenkov light intensity will be reduced by 
at least 30% [2]. Thus, if any measured intensity of an assembly is more than 30% lower than 
expected, a partial defect may be suspected. 
Figure 1 Illustration of the calibration procedure and partial defect verification method using the DCVD. For each 
fuel type, a linear fit is made between the predicted and measured intensity, where the fitted slope relates the 
predicted and measured intensity values. If any measured value deviates by more than 30% from the predicted 
(red square), a partial defect may be suspected. 
Up until recently, the prediction method used was based on a parameterization of the Cherenkov light 
intensity as a function of burnup and cooling time in a BWR 8x8 configuration [3]. This method is 
currently being replaced by a new method [4], which more accurately considers the fuel irradiation 
history by calculating the inventory of fission products using ORIGEN [5], by considering the geometry 
of the fuel assemblies, and by including Cherenkov light intensity contributions from both gamma and 
beta decays [6]. 
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1.2. DCVD measurements and the near-neighbour effect 
During a measurement, the DCVD is typically mounted on the railing of a moveable bridge, looking 
down on the fuel storage pond. The fuel assemblies are typically stored densely enough that radiation 
from one fuel assembly may enter neighbouring assemblies and create Cherenkov light there. Due to 
the relatively long distance that the radiation must travel to reach a neighbour, only gamma-ray 
emissions are expected to contribute to the near-neighbour effect. The intensity of neutron emissions 
is too low in comparison to gamma emissions to contribute significantly, and the ranges of alpha and 
beta particles are too short to contribute. This work hence considers only Cherenkov light produced 
due to gamma-decays of fission products. The magnitude of the near-neighbour effect is a function of 
the distance between the fuels, the amount of storage rack material present in between the 
assemblies and the energy spectrum of the gamma-ray emissions, which depend on the fuel cooling 
time.  
Figure 2 Left: DCVD image of 25 BWR fuels stored at the Swedish Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent 
Nuclear Fuel (Clab). Image courtesy of Dennis Parcey, Clab, and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 
(CNSC). Right: For an active assembly emitting gamma radiation, called main, this paper analyses the Cherenkov 
light produced in the neighbouring assemblies, labelled N1 to N5, by gamma radiation originating from the main 
assembly. For symmetry reasons, all surrounding assemblies in a 5x5 grid may be defined using labels N1 to N5. 
In Figure 2, an example is shown of the storage situation at the Swedish Central Interim Storage 
Facility for Spent Nuclear fuel (Clab), where 25 BWR fuels are stored in one fuel basket. The fuels are 
stored very close to each other, being separated by 4 mm of borated steel. At a reactor fuel pond, 
there is typically more distance in between the fuels for criticality safety reasons, and it is also more 
likely that fresh or low-burnup fuel is stored close to high-burnup fuel, which in turn may cause a 
significant near-neighbour intensity in the low-burnup neighbours. Low-burnup fuel will give rise to 
relatively low levels of gamma emission and consequently low levels of Cherenkov light, in comparison 
to high-burnup, short-cooled fuel. Accordingly, a large fraction of the gamma radiation in a low burnup 
fuel may have its origin in neighbouring high-burnup fuel, thus a significant fraction of the Cherenkov-
light emission in the low-burnup fuel may be attributed to the near-neighbour effect. To be able to refer 
to the different neighbouring position in a storage rack, Figure 2 also labels the five neighbour 
positions considered in this work, where position N1 shares one side with the main assembly causing 
the near-neighbour effect in the studies, N2 shares a corner with the main assembly, and N3-N5 are 
one row/column further away. Other positions in a 5x5 grid may be referred to using these labels due 
to the symmetry of the storage situation. 
Main  N1  N3 
 N2  N4 
 N5 
Gamma radiation causing 
Cherenkov light emission in 
neighbouring assemblies 
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 Definition and characterization of the near-neighbour effect 2.
In this work, the near-neighbour effect is studied in terms of the effect of one assembly emitting 
gamma radiation (“Main” in Figure 2) to its neighbours (N1-N5). The results will be presented as the 
ratio, NNR, of the Cherenkov light intensity in a neighbour (𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟) produced by gamma radiation 
from the main assembly, as compared to the intensity in the main assembly itself (𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛), or 
𝑁𝑁𝑅 =
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟
𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛
(1) 
Note that by this definition, the intensity 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛 is caused only by fission product decays in the main 
assembly. For real measurements, this value is not accessible due to the near-neighbour effect, 
though 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛 can be predicted using one of the available prediction models [3] [6]. Furthermore, this 
study is limited to gamma-ray and bremsstrahlung emission, whereas it has been shown that beta 
particles may increase  𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛  by 1-10%, depending on fuel assembly type, irradiation history and 
cooling time [4]. There are negligible beta particle contributions to 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟  because of their short 
travel range in water. 
2.1. Simulations 
To characterize the near-neighbour effect, simulations were run for two different fuel assembly 
configurations, BWR 8x8 and PWR 17x17, and for two different fuel storage situations. The 
simulations were performed using a toolkit based on Geant4 [7], which is a further development of a 
previously used toolkit for simulating the Cherenkov light production in irradiated nuclear fuel [8].  
The fuel assemblies were modelled including fuel rods and control-rod guide tubes for PWR, 
respectively a water channel and a fuel channel surrounding the rod configuration for BWR. The 
dimensions of the simulated fuel assemblies are given in Table 1. In addition, walls of a square steel 
storage rack were also included in the simulations. Vertically directed Cherenkov light was analysed in 
the simulations, since the DCVD will measure the vertical light component given the measurement 
situation with the DCVD situated above the fuel. Cherenkov light at an angle smaller than 3 degrees to 
the vertical axis was considered representative of the vertical light component in the simulations, and 
this value also allows for comparisons with earlier simulation results [8]. This angle is wide enough that 
sufficient statistics can be obtained in the simulations in reasonable time, while being narrow enough 
to represent the vertical component.  
BWR 8x8 PWR 17x17 
Number of fuel rods: 63 264 
Fuel pellet diameter [mm]: 10.44 8.18 
Cladding thickness [mm]: 0.91 0.57 
Rod centre to centre distance [mm]: 16.3 12.6 
Table 1 Dimensions of the simulated fuel assemblies. 
The fuel depletion code ORIGEN [5] was used to assess the gamma spectrum for fuel assemblies with 
burnups of 10, 20, 30 and 40 MWd/kgU, and cooling times ranging from 0.25 to 60 years. The initial 
enrichment was set to 2% in all cases. These fuel parameter sets were chosen to be comparable to 
earlier studies [3] [8] . Fuels with 10, 20 and 30 MWd/kgU burnup were simulated as irradiated for four 
cycles, where each cycle consisted of 312.5 days of irradiation and 46 days of cooling, for a total of 
1250 irradiation days. The power levels for the three lower burnups were 8, 16 and 24 kW/kgU, 
respectively. For the 40 MWd/kgU case, the power level remained at 24 kW/kgU, and the fuel was 
irradiated for 5 cycles. Note also that the gamma spectrum provided by ORIGEN includes both 
gamma-rays from fission product decays as well as bremsstrahlung produced when beta-particles are 
stopped in the fuel material. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
439
2.2. Effects of burnup and cooling time for BWR assemblies 
Figure 3 shows results of the simulations of the near-neighbour effect for BWR 8x8 fuels with a burnup 
of 40 MWd/kgU, for the fuel storage situation shown in Figure 2, with a 4 mm steel wall separating the 
assemblies. As can be seen, the N1 position is most strongly affected by the near-neighbour effect, 
with an NNR up to 2.9% of the main assembly intensity. For the N2 position, the near-neighbour effect 
is weaker, however; the NNR value is affected by attenuation in the assembly at N1, and will differ if 
the N1 position is occupied or vacant (called “N2” respectively ”N2 only” in Figure 3). Accordingly, it is 
not only important to consider the properties of the emitting fuel assembly when estimating the near-
neighbour effect; it is also important to consider which nearby positions that do not contain fuel to 
estimate the effect correctly. With N1 occupied, the intensity in N2 is up to 0.4% of the main assembly 
intensity, and with the N1 absent, it is up to 0.9% For the N3 position, if N1 and N2 are occupied the 
near-neighbour effect is at most 0.05%, and could be neglected. However, if N1 and N2 are absent, 
the near-neighbour intensity in N3 can be up to 0.5% (called “N3 only” in Figure 3), comparable to the 
intensity found at N2. The intensities in the N4 and N5 positions were found to be negligible in all 
cases simulated. 
Figure 3 The magnitude of the near-neighbour effect as a function of cooling time, for BWR 8x8 assemblies. The 
N2 and N3 positions were simulated both for the situation that all neighbouring positions contained fuel (denoted 
N2 and N3, respectively), and for the situation that only two fuel assemblies were present, one at “main” and one 
at one neighbour position, (denoted “N2 only” and “N3 only”, respectively). Error bars denote 1 𝝈 uncertainty. 
As can also be seen in Figure 2, the near-neighbour intensity ratios NNR, (Eq. (1)), reach maxima at a 
cooling time of around 1 year. As an example, the N1 position has a maximum NNR value at 1 year of 
2.9%, which decreases to 1.9% after 40 years cooling. This is due to the changing gamma spectrum 
of the fuel assembly with cooling time. For short-cooled fuel, several high-energy gamma-emitting 
isotopes are still present, which have relatively long range and thus contribute more to the near-
neighbour intensity. As the fuel cools, the gamma emissions become dominated by the 662 keV 
emissions of Cs-137, which are of lower energy and has a relatively shorter range. As a consequence 
of the changing gamma spectrum with time, compensating for the near-neighbour effect will require 
assessing the gamma spectrum of all assemblies contributing to the measurable intensity at the event 
of measurement. 
While the near-neighbour effect is noticeably affected by the cooling time, dependence on burnup is 
small, although a slight decrease with burnup is seen in the relative near-neighbour intensity at short 
cooling times. Note that while the near-neighbour intensity ratio changes little with burnup, the 
dependence of absolute Cherenkov light intensity on burnup is strong; high burnup implies high 
Cherenkov light intensity in both the fuel assembly emitting the radiation as well as in its neighbours. 
0,0001
0,001
0,01
0,1
0,1 1 10 100
R
at
io
 n
e
ig
h
b
o
u
r 
as
se
m
b
ly
 /
 m
ai
n
 
as
se
m
b
ly
 (
N
N
R
) 
Cooling time [years] 
N1
N2
N2 only
N3
N3 only
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
440
2.3. Differences in the near-neighbour effect for BWR and PWR fuels 
To investigate the differences in the near-neighbour effect for different fuel assembly configurations, 
the simulations in section 2.2 were complemented by simulations for a PWR case, where each PWR 
fuel was separated by a 5 mm steel wall, corresponding to closely stored fuel assemblies. In Figure 4, 
the ratios of NNR (see Eq. (1)) between BWR and PWR for the N1 and N2 positions are plotted, as a 
function of cooling time. The ratios are fairly flat at short cooling times, whereas for cooling times 
longer than 5 years, the near-neighbour intensity ratio, NNR, decreases more rapidly with cooling time 
for BWR as compared to PWR. Accordingly, the near-neighbour effect depends on the fuel assembly 
configuration, and thus a compensation procedure may have to take the fuel type into account. 
Furthermore, one may note that NNR is higher for BWR fuel than for PWR fuel (the ratios between the 
fuel types is >1), given that both assembly types are stored closely. 
Figure 4 Ratio of NNR (see Eq. (1)) between BWR and PWR fuels as a function of cooling time, for the N1 and 
N2 neighbour storage positions. In the N2 case, all the N1 positions were occupied. Error bars denote 1 
𝝈 uncertainty, due to the Monte-Carlo nature of the simulations. 
2.4. Effects of fuel assembly spacing 
To investigate the dependence of the near-neighbour effect on the storage distance between fuel 
assemblies, the simulations in sections 2.2 and 2.3 were complemented with an additional more 
spacious storage geometry, which corresponds to the storage situation for BWR fuels at the Forsmark 
Nuclear Power plant, for comparison with the experimental results reported in [9]. In these simulations, 
each fuel assembly was surrounded by a 2.5 mm-walled square steel channel, similar to the storage 
rack found at Forsmark. For the PWR simulation, the same relative fuel distance, as compared to fuel 
size, was simulated as in the BWR case, and the same wall thickness (2.5 mm steel) was used. The 
results for each simulated configuration are presented in Table 2 for 1-year cooled 40 MWd/kgU 
burnup fuel.  
Storage 
configuration 
Fuel size 
[mm] 
Wall 
thickness 
[mm] 
Fuel assembly 
centre-to-centre 
distance, [mm] 
N1 intensity 
ratio (NNR) 
N2 intensity 
ratio (NNR) 
BWR close 130 4.0 135 2.84 ± 0.03% 0.39 ± 0.02% 
PWR close 215 5.0 220 2.60 ± 0.01% 0.26 ± 0.01% 
BWR spacious 130 2.5 + 2.5 195 1.43 ± 0.02% 0.54 ± 0.02% 
PWR spacious 215 2.5 + 2.5 322 0.63 ± 0.01% 0.18 ± 0.01% 
Table 2 The near-neighbour intensity ratio (NNR in Eq. (1)) for two fuel types and two different fuel centre-to-
centre distances. In the spacious simulations, each fuel was surrounded by a separate steel wall. In the 
simulations for the N2 intensities, the N1 positions were occupied. The uncertainties are due to statistics in the 
Monte-Carlo simulations, and are presented for the 1 𝜎 level. The simulated fuel assemblies had a cooling time of 
1 year and a burnup of 40 MWd/kgU. 
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As can be seen in Table 2, the near-neighobur intensity in N1 is smaller for the more spacious storage 
geometry. For position N2 in the BWR case, the intensity becomes higher. The reason is that the 
assemblies in N1 positions strongly attenuate radiation travelling between the Main and N2 position in 
the close storage configuration. In the more spacious storage configuration, the N1 fuels interfere less 
with the radiation from the Main assembly, leading to a net increase in the N2 intensity ratio, despite 
the increased distance between them. For the PWR case, the result in larger absolute distances in the 
spacious storage geometry lower the N2 intensity ratio. Had the simulated distance been smaller, it 
may have been possible to observe the same effects as for the BWR case.  
 Comparison of simulations with experimental results 3.
In 2012, a series of measurements were conducted at the Forsmark nuclear power plant, where the 
near-neighbour effect was quantified for the N1, N2 and N3 fuel positions [9], when all other positions 
were vacant. This was done by; (i) moving one active fuel assembly (defined as “Main” in Figure 2) to 
an isolated location and measure it to record the 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛 intensity of Eq. (1), and; (ii) place it relative to a 
fresh fuel assembly in the N1, N2 and N3 positions and measure the subsequent intensity increase in 
the fresh fuel assembly, corresponding to 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 in Eq. (1). For details on these measurements, we 
refer to [9]. Here, the measured configurations have been simulated to provide an experimental 
benchmark of the simulation procedure, as further described below. 
3.1.  Measured and simulated geometries 
In the measurements, the active assembly was of one BWR 10x10 type, while the fresh fuel was a 
different BWR 10x10 design. The properties of the storage racks at the Forsmark plant are accounted 
for in Table 2, denoted “BWR spacious”. The irradiation histories of the fuel assemblies were made 
available to the authors, courtesy of the operator, Vattenfall. 
In the simulations, the fuel irradiation histories were used to calculate the assemblies’ gamma 
emission spectra by means of the ORIGEN code [5]. Using these spectra, simulations were run for the 
Forsmark storage configuration. However, the fuels simulated were BWR 8x8, while the irradiated 
fuels measured at Forsmark were all 10x10, including several part-length rods. The reason for not 
simulating the 10x10 fuel type was that exact geometry data for that fuel type were unavailable. Still, 
because the outer dimensions are similar for BWR 8x8 and 10x10 fuels, the BWR 8x8 simulations 
may be considered to be representable also for 10x10 fuels. 
3.2. Results 
In Table 3, the simulated near-neighbour intensities are compared to the intensities measured at 
Forsmark [9]. The overall agreement is good, especially for the N1 position where the near-neighbour 
effect is the strongest. One may note that the N1 position is slightly underestimated, while the N2 and 
N3 positions are overestimated. The deviations may be explained by differences between the 
simulated and measured fuel assembly configurations, or by measurement uncertainties. Further 
investigations would be required to draw more solid conclusions on the deviations. 
Another result of these simulations is that for fuel assemblies in this storage geometry, the N2 intensity 
is not much affected by the presence or absence of a fuel in the N1 positions. In the case of both N1 
positions occupied, the simulated N2 NNR is 0.41 ± 0.01 %, and with the N1 positions vacant it 
increases to 0.43 ± 0.01 %.  
Neighbour position Measured neighbour intensity Simulated neighbour intensity 
N1 1.25% 1.16 ± 0.02% 
N2 0.36% 0.43 ± 0.01% 
N3 0.12% 0.18 ± 0.01% 
Table 3 Comparison of the measured near-neighbour effect (data from [9]), to a simulated near-neighbour 
intensity for a similar configuration, which was obtained using a gamma spectrum calculated with ORIGEN, taking 
into account the operator-declared fuel irradiation history. Simulation uncertainties are due to the Monte-Carlo 
nature of the simulations. Uncertainties in the measurements were not provided in [9]. 
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 Detection limits in presence of the near-neighbour effect 4.
As mentioned in section 1.1, partial defect verification using the DCVD relies on the fact that a 50% 
substitution of rods with non-radioactive content will reduce the Cherenkov light intensity by at least 
30%, which, accordingly, is taken as the limit for partial defect. Fuel assemblies where measured 
intensities are more than 30% lower than predicted are detected as being subject to partial defect, 
whereas other assemblies pass the inspection. This situation becomes slightly more complicated in 
presence of the near-neighbour effect, since the light being measured is partly caused by the fuel 
under study, and partly by the neighbouring fuels. As a consequence, the limit of 30% will be reduced 
when near-neighbour intensities influence the analysed data. This is shown in Figure 5, where the 
30% intensity reduction is adjusted to also take into account the near-neighbour effect.  
Figure 5 Calculated reduction of the 30% light intensity limit as a function of the near-neighbour intensity. 
As a consequence of the data in Figure 5, the detection limit for partial defect at 30% lower intensity 
than expected would have to be lowered, unless the near-neighbour effect is corrected for. Lowering 
the detection limit would bring more stringent requirements on the accuracy of the models used for 
predicting the Cherenkov intensities as well as on the experimental precision that govern the accuracy 
of measured data in order to maintain the partial-defect detection capability. If the methods cannot 
meet these higher requirements, one must either allow a larger number of false alarms (using a lower 
threshold for partial defect according to Figure 5), or endanger the partial-defect detection rate 
(keeping the 30% intensity reduction threshold). 
One situation where the near-neighbour effect would be particularly strong is when measuring a 
storage site with a population of neighbouring fuels with highly varying Cherenkov light intensities, due 
to largely varying burnups and cooling times. In such a situation, low-intensity fuel assemblies will be 
more strongly affected by the near-neighbour effect as compared to high-intensity ones. If the effect is 
not corrected for, the fuel intensity predictions will systematically underestimate the intensity of low-
intensity fuels, while over-estimating the measured intensity of high-intensity fuels. Referring to Figure 
5, considering a low-intensity assembly where as much as 50% of the intensity comes from 
neighbouring fuels, a diversion of 50% of its fuel rods may only cause a 15% decrease in measured 
intensity. It is doubtful that the current experimental and predictive methods may be further developed 
to offer the precision required for confident detection in such extreme cases, unless the near-
neighbour effect is included in the analysis. 
In conclusion, to avoid changing the detection threshold while maintaining the partial-defect detection 
capability, methods for correcting for the near-neighbour effect should be considered. Such correction 
methods are further discussed below. 
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 Methods for correcting for the near-neighbour effect 5.
In this section, two methods for correcting for the near-neighbour effect are presented. The basics of 
both methods are that each measured intensity can be expressed as a sum of the intensity from the 
assembly under study, 𝐼0, and the intensities from its nearest neighbours: 
𝐼𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 = 𝐼0 + ∑ (𝐼𝑖 ∙ 𝜀𝑖)𝑖 (2) 
Here, 𝜀𝑖 denotes the ratio of the intensity that neighbouring assembly 𝑖 emits in the studied assembly 
to the intensity it emits in its own position, (𝐼𝑖). One may note that 𝜀𝑖 goes in the opposite direction 
compared to NNR defined in Eq. (1), but for symmetry reasons their values should be identical. The 
two methods presented below differ in how the 𝜀𝑖  are determined, where section 5.1 describes a 
method based on experimental data and section 5.2 describes a simulation-based method. 
5.1. Least-squares fitting of experimental data 
In [9], an experimental method to assess the near-neighbour effect was tested on a set of BWR fuel 
assemblies measured at Clab, under the conditions shown in Figure 2. The proposed method uses 
Eq. (2), limited to neighbours in relative positions N1 and N2 (referring to Figure 2). The method 
suggests collecting experimental intensities for the complete set of fuels in one storage rack and 
determining the 𝜀𝑁1 and 𝜀𝑁2factors by performing a least squares fit of Eq. (2) for the experimental 
data set, based on predicted intensities. These fitted 𝜀𝑁1  and 𝜀𝑁2  can then be used to predict the 
measured intensity of an assembly, given a prediction of the intensity of the assembly and its 
neighbours, or alternatively to subtract the intensity caused by the near-neighbour effect from the 
measurements. 
Ref. [9] presents values of 𝜀𝑁1 and 𝜀𝑁2 obtained from fitting of the experimental data set. In this work, 
simulations of the storage conditions at Clab for the assemblies under study have been performed to 
provide an independent evaluation of the deduced values. A comparison of the simulated and the 
experimentally fitted intensities from [9] is shown in Table 4. 
Neighbour Simulated 𝜀𝑖 Fitted 𝜀𝑖 
N1 1.82 ± 0.05% 16% 
N2 0.17 ± 0.02% 9.5% 
Table 4 Comparison of the simulated near-neighbour intensity for closely-stored BWR fuels (as shown in Figure 
2) and the fitted values reported in [9].
Table 4 shows poor agreement between simulated and fitted values, and the simulations suggest that 
the fitted values overestimate the near-neighbour effect by almost an order of magnitude. Considering 
the relatively good agreement between simulations and measurements shown in Table 3, there is 
reason to suspect that the fitting procedure may not be adequate to accurately quantify the near-
neighbour effect. Probable reasons for this deficit are that the fit is based upon a rather small set of 
fuels, and that the equation system may be ill-conditioned, making it sensitive to stochastic noise. One 
may assume better results if larger data sets are used or if constraints are introduced on the near-
neighbour intensities, based on expected ratios.  
5.2. Simulation-based corrections 
As shown in section 3, simulations can provide relatively accurate estimates of the relative intensities 
from neighbouring fuel. However, since the near-neighbour simulations are time-consuming, a method 
is needed to take the near-neighbour effect into account in a quicker way, which can be used by 
inspectors in the field. Here, a solution is suggested, where the near-neighbour effect is parameterised 
as a function of fuel geometry, fuel centre-to-centre distance, and gamma-ray energy. The 
parameterisation would be based on large simulations done in advance, allowing for fast deployment 
for in-field inspections. 
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Based on the results presented here, primarily the N1 and N2 positions would need to be considered 
when assessing the near-neighbour intensity, and only rarely will the N3 position be significant. Given 
the irradiation history, or at minimum the burnup and cooling time, of an assembly and all its 
neighbours, ORIGEN can be used to assess the gamma-ray energy spectrum of each fuel assembly. 
By binning the spectrum, it is possible to run simulations with initial gamma rays from each bin, to 
assess the near-neighbour intensity of gamma-rays of each energy. These simulations will have to be 
done for a large number of energy bins, for each fuel assembly configuration, and for several fuel 
centre-to-centre distances. The results will be the magnitude of the near-neighbour effect 𝜖𝑖,𝑗for a fuel 
at neighbour position 𝑖 and for gamma rays with energy in bin 𝑗. These simulations can be done in 
advance, and only have to be done once for each case.  
To calculate the near-neighbour intensity at the event of measurement, the user selects the pre-
calculated 𝜖𝑖,𝑗 values applicable for the fuel type and storage situation applicable to the measurement 
situation. These values are combined with the calculated, binned gamma-ray emission spectra of the 
neighbouring fuels, based on the operator declared fuel declarations. If the binned spectrum of a fuel 
is given by 𝑆𝑗 for bin 𝑗, the intensity caused by one neighbour at position 𝑖 (𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟,𝑖) can then be 
calculated as: 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑜𝑏𝑢𝑟,𝑖 =  ∑ 𝜖𝑖,𝑗 ⋅ 𝑆𝑗  
# 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑠
𝑗=1
 (3) 
The total near-neighbour intensity contribution in an assembly is then the sum of the intensity of all 
present neighbours, each calculated using Eq.3. This value can either be added to a predicted 
assembly intensity 𝐼0 to give a prediction of the measured intensity; alternatively it can be subtracted 
from the measurement to obtain an experimental value of assembly intensity 𝐼0 without neighbours.  
Conclusions and outlook6.
Fuel assemblies in wet storage are often verified using the Digital Cherenkov Viewing Device, which 
enables inspection without requiring the fuel to be moved to an isolated measurement location. Since 
the fuel assemblies are stored closely, gamma rays from one assembly may enter a neighbouring 
assembly and create Cherenkov light, the so-called near neighbour effect. This paper describes how 
simulations can be used to estimate the magnitude of the Cherenkov light intensity that occurs in a 
neighbouring position due to the near-neighbour effect. The simulations have been validated using 
experimental data. The near-neighbour effect will be particularly influential in cases where long-cooled, 
low-burnup fuels containing relatively low activity levels are stored next to short-cooled, high-burnup 
fuels containing relatively high activity levels. 
It has been shown that the partial-defect detection limits may need adjustment unless the near-
neighbour effect is corrected for. Two possible methods for such corrections have been described; one 
method based on experimental data and one simulation-based method. Building on the fact that 
simulations have proven capable reproducing experimentally recorded near-neighbour intensities, the 
latter method is recommended, and a methodology allowing for quick in-field use has been presented. 
The methodology is based on extensive, time-consuming simulations, which are done in advance to 
create parameterisations specific for storage configurations, assembly types and gamma-ray energies. 
These parameterisations may then be used for fast assessment during inspection. 
While some experimental data is available regarding the near-neighbour effect, more is required to 
verify the simulations performed, and to assess the performance of the suggested method for 
predicting the near-neighbour effect. Knowing the accuracy of the near-neighbour prediction model will 
allow for higher limits to be set regarding what magnitude of near-neighbour effect can be tolerated in 
the measurements, which increases the partial-defect detection performance of the DCVD. Additional 
experimental data will also be useful for further refining the near-neighbour prediction model, which 
can further enhance the DCVD partial defect detection capabilities.  
The studies presented in section 3 suggest that it may be possible to e.g. treat all BWR fuel 
assemblies as being identical with respect to the near-neighbour effect. Thus, it may be possible to 
simulate only a few selected fuel geometries of widely varying configuration, and use those 
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simulations to assess the near-neighbour effect for all fuel types. This would greatly reduce the 
amount of simulations necessary to perform to parameterize the near-neighbour effect, but further 
studies are required to assess what uncertainties are introduced by this simplification.  
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Abstract: 
In the last years, the safeguards verification of spent fuel assemblies by NDA has received increased 
interest also due to upcoming programmes for the geological disposal. During safeguards inspections 
one aims at verifying the completeness and correctness of operator declared data. One should then be 
able to draw conclusions on the fuel integrity and diversion of pins, as well as checking the consistency 
of operator declarations on initial enrichment, fuel type, burnup and cooling time. The verification of 
spent fuel is also important for safety aspects related to the storage of spent fuel. 
The experimental observables associated to NDA of spent fuel assemblies are often a complex function 
of the characteristics of the fuel, its irradiation history and other variables related to the used 
measurement setup and devices; nowadays one often assumes that some of the variables are known 
to interpret the data and draw conclusions. To facilitate the interpretation of the data and draw more 
robust safeguards conclusions, an R&D effort is on-going at SCK•CEN and its results are given in this 
paper.  
This work reports first about the efforts done at SCK•CEN on simulating detector response functions for 
different types of NDA instruments such as the Fork detector, the ForkBall detector and SINRD 
detectors. These responses are obtained from Monte Carlo model of the fuel and measurement setup. 
The spent fuel composition and radiation characteristics are taken from a spent fuel reference library 
developed in recent years. 
A database of detector responses corresponding to 8400 cases with different fuel characteristics and 
irradiation parameters was then obtained. We explore the use of these simulated observables as input 
for data analysis algorithms aimed at uniquely characterizing the spent fuel and drawing safeguards 
conclusions. More specifically, we focus on the application of artificial neural networks due to their ability 
to generalize non-linear relationships. As a first step, cooling times smaller than 100 years were selected 
from the database, and several network configurations and training schemes were investigated. 
Keywords: Spent fuel verification; Simulated observables; Data mining; Artificial neural network 
1. Introduction
Spent fuel assemblies (SFA) are subject to verification of safeguards authorities due to their residual 
fissile material content. A direct measurement of the residual fissile mass is not possible with available 
technologies [1,2,3] and can only be estimated. The workhorses used during the verification of SFA are 
instruments such as the DCVD and the Fork detectors; these instruments allow to draw conclusions on 
the absence of gross defect in the fuel assemblies and verify the consistency of the operator declaration 
about fuel characteristics (e.g. fuel type, initial enrichment) and irradiation history (e.g. burnup and 
cooling time). 
Considering the large amount of spent fuel in interim storage and the incipient opening of spent fuel 
repositories [4], there is an interest in developing NDA methodologies that could allow a more 
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quantitative assessment of the spent fuel assembly before its disposal. This interest is also shared by 
the regulatory authorities and fuel management bodies to comply with requirements related to the safe 
fuel disposal; the implementation-oriented R&D activities on deep geological disposal of spent fuel and 
long-lived radioactive waste has been emphasised in [5,6]. 
The traditional nuclear signatures of spent fuel in a Non-Destructive Assay, i.e. passive neutron, gamma 
emission and Cherenkov glow, are mainly due to minor actinides (e.g. Cm isotopes) and fission products 
(e.g. Cs isotopes). Their associated observables (i.e. measured counts or light) do not provide a direct 
measure of the residual fissile mass and are a complex function of several variables, such as irradiation 
history parameters. At the moment, none of the available methods allow a unambiguous determination 
of all the variables. Therefore, one typically supposes that one or more of such variables are actually 
known, so that the number of unknowns is reduced. An example of such case is the determination of 
the residual fissile content which can be estimated after the burnup of the fuel has been determined 
from the observables for example with a calibration procedure [7].  
New NDA methods are being studied and developed in the last decade[3,8]. In an ideal scenario each 
method could generate one or more observables where each would allow the unique determination of 
the quantities of interest. However, this does not seem to be the case [9]. This situation therefore calls 
for a methodology to disentangle the quantities of interest from the observables. 
In this framework, we carried out R&D work first to simulate observables associated to NDA equipment 
such as the ForkBall detector and SINRD. This work is described in Section 2, where the methodology 
developed at SCK•CEN to simulate observables is explained. Then, in Section 3 we focus on the 
interpretation of the data and the extraction of the quantities of interest from the simulated observables; 
we describe an approach based in neutral network analysis. The obtained results are presented and 
discussed; outlook and recommendation for future work are given. 
2. Detector response function simulations
2.1. Methodology 
Due to the limited accessibility of spent fuel [10], the development and optimization of measurements 
methods are carried out by means of numerical calculations, often based on Monte Carlo methods [11]. 
Studies with Monte Carlo methods are based on models including the geometry and composition of the 
measurements equipment, the measurement environment and the characteristics of the radiation 
source.  
The determination of the spent fuel composition and the characteristics of the emitted radiation can be 
achieved by means of evolution and depletion codes such as Origen-ARP [12,13,14] and ALEPH2 [15]. 
In the last years, SCK•CEN developed a spent fuel library (SFL) and investigated the impact of different 
factors on spent fuel composition and emitted radiation. The characteristics of spent fuel depend on 
quantities such as fuel type, irradiation history and initial composition of the fuel. We focussed on 17x17 
PWR fuel elements and studied the change of the neutron emission by varying parameters such as 
initial uranium enrichment (IE), average power level (AP), duration of the irradiation cycle (DIC) and 
cooling time between two complete irradiation cycles (CTIC), burnup (BU and cooling time (CT) after 
discharge [16,17]. The current version of the SFL contains information for Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) 
fuel with an initial enrichment between 2% and 5% and cases with Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel with up to 
10% of Pu. 
The spent fuel library consists of entries, each corresponding to a specific irradiation case. In one entry 
the total neutron emission, total gamma emission, and the corresponding energy spectra are given. In 
addition, the abundances of 50 selected nuclides are present [10]. The data are generated in a format 
which is compatible with the one of an MCNP [18] input file.  
The overview of the methodology developed for this study is presented in Figure 1. The used 
methodology relies on the development of an MCNP input file template of the measurement setup, 
including the fuel. The composition of the fuel and the description of the source term is then taken from 
the library for the desired cases, substituted in the template and the simulation is run. More information 
on the specific tallies is given in the next section where the considered detection system and associated 
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observables are described. The output file of the simulation is combined with the radionuclide 
abundancies and source term intensity obtained from the SFL to generate the database with signatures 
of the different fuel assemblies. 
Figure 1: Overview of the methodology to generate simulated observables. 
2.2. Considered detection systems 
Two different types of equipment were considered. The first one is the so-called ForkBall detector [19]. 
This detector is designed for underwater measurements of SFA and includes features found in the Fork 
detector such as total neutron counts with fission chambers, total current obtained with ionization 
chambers and gamma-ray spectra obtained with a Cadmium Zinc Telluride (CZT) detector. The fission 
and ionization chamber are installed into cavities inside a polyethylene cylindrical arms wrapped with 
Cd. A variant without Cd was also considered. 
The second detection systems implements the Self-Interrogation neutron resonance densitometry 
(SINRD) technique by carrying out measurements in dry conditions; this system features miniaturized 
fission chambers in the instrumentation channel of the SFA. The fission chambers are either bare or 
wrapped by neutron absorbing foils of Cd or Gd; additional details on the technique can be found in [8]. 
2.2.1. ForkBall detector 
Separate simulations were carried out for neutrons and photons. In the neutron simulations for each 
entry of the SFL we determined the detection efficiency and the net multiplication factor both for the 
configuration with and without Cd around the polyethylene arms of the detector. The detection efficiency 
was estimated by multiplying to F4 tally by the (n,f) cross section of 235U and amount of fissile material 
in the fission chambers (FM treatment). 
While the neutrons simulations are straightforward and do not require a variance reduction technique, 
the gamma simulations associated to the CZT detectors require an ad-hoc procedure. Due to the 
presence of a shield and collimator used in the ForkBall, standard MCNP simulations are highly 
inefficient. A special procedure, described in [20], was therefore developed. The procedure splits the 
photon transport into two simulations. In a first simulation for a photon of given energy, the probability 
to reach CZT crystal is determined. A second set of simulations is done to determine the intrinsic 
detector efficiency that is the probability that an incoming photon deposits all its energy in the CZT 
crystal. These two quantities are then multiplied to obtain the overall full-energy detection efficiency, that 
is the probability that a photon of a given energy emitted by the fuel results in a full-energy peak in the 
crystal. 
In first approximation, the overall full-energy detection efficiency does not depend on the fuel 
composition which still largely made up of Uranium and Oxygen. The obtained results are given in Fig.  2. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
449
Figure 2: Normalised full-energy detection efficiency for the CZT detector in the Forkball detector. 
The net peak count rate c due to a gamma ray of energy E emitted by the radionuclide i is then given 
by  
𝑐(𝑖, 𝐸𝛾) =  𝜀(𝐸𝛾) × 𝑀𝑖 × 𝐴𝑖 × 𝑃(𝑖, 𝐸𝛾)  (1) 
Where 
 (E) is the overall full-energy detection efficiency
 Mi is the mass of the radionuclide in the SFA
 Ai is its specific activity
 P(i,E) is the number of emitted gamma rays of energy E per decay
2.2.2. Self-Interrogation neutron resonance densitometry 
For the SINRD technique the response of different types of fission chambers in the instrumentation 
channel of the SFA was simulated by multiplying the F4 tally by the (n,f) cross section of the active 
material and amount of fissile material in the fission chambers (FM treatment). The presence of shielding 
material was also accounted for by the FM treatment. Table 1 gives the details of the modelled detectors; 
more details on the choice of detectors and filters thickness are given in [8]. 
Active material Filter Energy cutoff 
238U --- --- 
235U --- --- 
235U 1 mm Cd ~ 1 eV 
239Pu 0.1 mm Gd ~ 0.1 eV 
239Pu 1 mm Cd ~ 1 eV 
Table 1: Active materials and filters for SINRD. 
As indicated in [8], the chosen signatures are sensitive both to 239Pu and 235U in the fuel. 
2.3. Data processing and results 
The MCNP calculations provide observables (tallies) that are usually expressed per simulated source 
particles. To express the observables in absolute terms one has to take into account the source strength 
associated to the considered spent fuel element. This information is retrieved from the SFL and the 
value of the observable is determined for the considered case. Overall a database of observables and 
spent fuel characteristics is generated. Within the database other calculated information on the spent 
fuel is also included such as the content of fissile material and the multiplication factor. An excerpt of 
the database content is shown in Table 2. 
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Neutron Counts   CZT 
BU IE CT with Cd without Cd SINRD FAST/TH 134Cs1 137Cs 134Cs2 154Eu 
GWd/tHM % y cps cps   cps cps cps cps 
5 2 5 1.0 1.2 0.026 0.009 22.2 425.2 38.4 3.2 
10 2 5 6.3 6.9 0.031 0.010 88.3 847.3 153.2 12.9 
15 2 5 31.3 34.4 0.037 0.009 187.3 1263.6 324.9 28.9 
20 2 5 109.8 123.6 0.038 0.009 324.4 1677.7 562.7 51.2 
25 2 5 284.2 317.0 0.041 0.009 485.4 2088.6 841.8 76.2 
30 2 5 600.9 652.3 0.044 0.010 647.8 2490.3 1123.5 102.4 
35 2 5 1088.2 1159.4 0.046 0.010 841.1 2893.2 1458.7 130.5 
40 2 5 1711.4 1877.6 0.046 0.010 1041.0 3292.0 1805.4 157.4 
45 2 5 2568.7 2793.7 0.047 0.010 1213.6 3679.9 2104.7 182.9 
50 2 5 3559.5 3912.6 0.049 0.010 1420.1 4071.4 2462.8 208.8 
55 2 5 4813.7 5240.8 0.049 0.010 1621.7 4459.6 2812.4 232.2 
Table 2: Excerpt of the database. The signatures 134Cs1 and 134Cs2 denote the net peak areas at 605 keV and 
796 keV respectively. 
3. Neural network analysis
3.1. The use of Artificial Neural Networks as function approximators 
Artificial neural networks (ANN) denote a class of computational models that emulate the functioning of 
the biological brain, by using a number of interconnected neural units (shortly, neurons or nodes). They 
have been widely used in machine learning and data mining, in particular owing to their capacity to work 
as universal function approximators, provided certain conditions are met by the network architecture 
[21].  
An ANN can be described as a network in which each node i processes the n input units it is connected 
to through an activation function fi : 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(∑ (𝑤𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑥𝑗 − 𝜃𝑖)
𝑛
𝑗=1 ) (2) 
where 𝑦𝑖 is the output of neuron i, 𝑥𝑗 is the j-th input to node i, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the weight of the connection between 
input j and node i,  and 𝜃𝑖 is the threshold (or bias) of the node.  
Neural networks have a layer for input neurons, a layer for output neurons, and one or more inner layers 
of neurons, also called hidden layers. Leshno et al. [21] proved that a standard multilayer feedforward 
(i.e. without feedback loops) ANN with a locally bounded piecewise continuous and non-polynomial 
activation function can approximate any continuous function with any degree of accuracy. Feedforward 
networks used for function approximation problems have one or more hidden layers of nodes with non-
linear activation functions (e.g. sigmoid) followed by an output layer of nodes with linear activation 
functions. This multilayer architecture allows the network to learn nonlinear relationships between input 
and output vectors. 
Standard numerical optimisation algorithms can be used to optimise the network’s performance function, 
often taken as the mean square error between the network’s output and the network’s target (real or
simulated values of the function to be approximated). Various, gradient based or Jacobian based, 
learning algorithms [22] can be applied to adjust the weights and the biases of an ANN in a direction 
that optimises the performance function of the network. The most simple is the gradient descent 
algorithm, where the current vector 𝑧(𝑘) of weights and biases is updated at each iteration k+1 based on 
the current gradient 𝑔𝑘 and the learning rate  𝛼𝑘, until the network converges: 
𝑧(𝑘+1) = 𝑧(𝑘) − 𝛼𝑘 ∙ 𝑔𝑘 (3) 
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One of the fastest training algorithms for neural networks is the Levenberg-Marquardt optimization 
method [23], which was used for our application. 
3.2 Spent fuel characterisation based on Artificial Neural Networks 
In this work, we employ ANN’s to explore the use of detector response values to characterize spent fuel 
in terms of initial uranium enrichment, burnup and cooling time. Simulated data are used to train and 
test different ANN architectures and learning algorithms. The MATLAB R2016b Neural Network Toolbox 
[24] was used for all data processing and analysis. 
Figure 3: Artificial neural networks architecture implemented in this work. 
The implemented ANN architecture is illustrated in Fig. 3. As observables, we considered total neutron 
counts for a Cd wrapped fission chamber and gamma rays spectroscopy data from 137Cs, 134Cs and 
154Eu. These data represent the variables in the input layer of the ANN. The BU, IE and CT represent 
the variables in the output layer of the ANN. While the BU and IE data were linearly spaced over their 
range, the CT data spanned several decades and had a logarithmical spacing. The natural logarithm 
was then taken to ensure that the resulting variable is uniformly distributed over its range. Both the 
values in the input layer (observable) and the one in the output layer (quantity to be predicted) were 
scaled between -1 and +1 before being fed to the network optimization algorithm.  
The algorithm was tested on a subset of the database described in section 2.3. We considered data 
with fourteen burnup (BU) values (from 5 to 70 GWd/tU in steps of 5 GWd/tU), initial enrichment (IE) of 
between 2.0% and 5.0% in steps of 0.5%, eleven values of cooling time (CT) from 1 day to 100 years. 
A total of 1078 cases were considered. 
For the neurons in the hidden layers we used hyperbolic tangent sigmoid transfer functions whereas for 
the activation functions for the output neurons were linear. The quantity mean square error (mse) was 
used as target for minimisation. In the used mse each squared error contributes with the same 
importance as follows: 
𝑚𝑠𝑒 =  
1
3𝑁
∑ ∑ (𝐴𝑘,𝑗,𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐 − 𝐴𝑘,𝑗)
2𝑁
𝑘=1
3
𝑗=1  (4) 
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Where Ak,j,calc is the value of the parameter as determined by the ANN in the output layer (Fig. 3), Ak,j is 
the nominal value of the parameter. The index j runs over the IE, BU and CT output while k runs over 
the part of the database used for training. The calculation of the mse is done before the final scaling. 
In the future we will define the performance in such a way that the percentage deviation enters in the 
definition of the quantity to be minimized rather than the absolute deviation. Note that the absolute 
variation in the logarithm of CT results already in a relative deviation on the CT. 
The database of simulated observables and spent fuel characteristics is divided in two sets, 
corresponding to training and validation. The data in the training set are used to stop training if the 
network performance on these data fails to improve or remains the same for a predefined number of 
iterations. The Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm was used for training the network. The neural networks 
tested used up to three hidden layers. 
3.3 Results 
First we studied the impact of the number of neurons on the performance, assuming that all data set 
was used to train the network. The performance was then calculated on the whole database of N=1078 
cases. We considered from 2 to 20 neurons per hidden layer, while the number of hidden layers went 
from one to three. The obtained results indicate that the performance increases in general with the 
number of neurons per layer and with the number of hidden layers. However, the improvement is 
marginal above 15 neurons, as shown in Fig. 4.  
Figure 4: mse for ANN with one, two and three hidden layers as a function of the number of neurons. The mse in 
the right figure is limited to a maximum value of 0.01. 
Figure 5: mse for ANN with two hidden layers as a function of the training set size. For both hidden layers the 
number of neurons was set to 15. 
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Figure 6: Deviations in the predicted values of BU, IE and CT for the considered cases. The results refer to 
an ANN with 3 hidden layers and 20 neurons per layer. See the text for explanation. 
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In addition, we carried out calculations by changing the fraction of data used for training from 10% to 
100% in step of 10%. The rest of the data was used for validation. The number of neurons was 5, 10, 
15 and 20 and we considered up to three hidden layers; both the performance on the training and the 
validation set were computed. The assignment of individual data to the training or validation set was 
done randomly by MATLAB.  
In general, we found that the value of the performance changes if the calculation is repeated; this is due 
to the fact that in the current implementation the initial values of the weights and biases of the ANN are 
randomly assigned [25] and this is affecting the results. For each network configuration the calculations 
were repeated 20 times and the average performance was calculated with its standard deviation. For 
the case in which 100% of the data are used for training, we observed a standard deviation in the mse 
between 12 % and 25%. By reducing the share of the training set, the standard deviations are higher; 
this is due to the fact that choice of the data used for training is random and changes every time; 
consequently, the value of the performance is affected. In addition, it was found that also the share of 
the training and validation data sets is not a fixed number but fluctuates around its nominal values. The 
resulting spread on the performance should be kept in mind when comparing different performance 
values. 
The performance on the training set was in general better than the performance on the validation set. 
The difference between them was increasing by reducing the size of the training set, as shown in Fig. 5., 
and by increasing the number of neurons in the last hidden layer. 
In general the performance improves with the size of the training set and there is a clear difference 
between the performance obtained with 90% and 100% training; however, the improvement is marginal 
in the range 50% to 90%. 
While it is of interest to identify which parameters affect the performance, it is also important to 
understand how performance values translate into deviation between calculated values and “real”
values of BU, IE and CT. In Fig. 6, the % deviation on the value of BU, CT and IE are shown for the 
ANN with 3 hidden layers and 20 neurons per hidden layer with 100% training. In the plots on the left, 
the deviations are shown as a function of BU (X-axis) and IE and CT (Y-axis). The Y-axis is an 
identification number ID that is given by the formula 7xIDCT+IDIE, where IDCT and IDIE range from 1 to 
11 and 1 to 7 respectively and uniquely identify the case of CT and IE to which they refer. For the plots 
on the right the deviations are given as a function of an arbitrary case identified number (ID) that is used 
for a more straightforward representation; for each variable (BU, CT, IE) the ID is chosen such that the 
corresponding declared variable is monotonically increasing.  
The results indicate that if 20 neurons and 100% of the data are used for training the ANN is capable of 
reproducing the value of BU within 3% for 96% of the cases, the value of IE within 2% for 98% of the 
cases and the value of CT within 10% for 87% of the cases. In a more realistic case, where only 50% 
of the data are used for training, the ANN is capable of reproducing the value of BU within 3% for 85% 
of the cases, the value of IE within 2% for 80% of the cases and the value of CT within 10% for 58% of 
the cases.  
The reason why we obtain larger deviation on the CT when compared to BU and IE is not clear. The 
larger deviations at low value of CT can be related to the choice of observables which are less sensitive 
to CT smaller than 1 y. 
4. Conclusions and outlook
In this work we first reported about a methodology developed to simulate detector response functions 
for different types of NDA instruments. A database of detector responses for 8400 cases with different 
fuel characteristics and irradiation parameters was then obtained. The use of the simulated observables  
as input for data analysis algorithms aims at uniquely characterizing the spent fuel and drawing 
safeguards conclusions. We explored the application of artificial neural networks due to their ability to 
generalize non-linear relationships on a subset of data corresponding to cooling times smaller than 100 
years. 
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We studied the network performances in terms of mean square error as a function of the number of 
hidden layers, number of neurons in each hidden layer and share of the training data set. We could 
conclude that, within the range considered, the performances increase with the number of neurons, 
number of hidden layers and share of the training data set. The results show that, when all the data set 
is used for training, the ANN is able to predict the BU and IE within a few percent for most of the analysed 
cases, whereas CT is predicted with a larger deviation especially for values lower than 1y. The 
performance is significantly worse when a fraction lower than 50 % of the data set is used for training 
the ANN. 
Future research will focus on improving the performance of the network with respect to the CT. In 
particular, we will investigate the possibility to selectively use data for training rather than randomly 
choose the data. We will investigate the impact of the initial weight values. We will also try to identify 
which additional observables (for instance the SINRD signatures) would result in an improvement of the 
performance. The impact of the range values of burnup, initial enrichment and cooling time on the 
performance will also be studied. The use of different performance functions will also be considered.  
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Abstract 
The verification of spent fuel assemblies is among the activities conducted during the safeguards 
inspections, and several non-destructive assay techniques are being developed to improve the accuracy 
of existing methods. Among other techniques, the self-indication neutron resonance densitometry (SINRD) 
relies on the passive neutron emission from the spent fuel assemblies. Previous research conducted at 
SCK•CEN found that the optimal configuration was obtained with the fuel kept in air and surrounded by a 
polyethylene slab. 
The SINRD technique was proposed mainly for the direct quantification of the 239Pu mass in spent fuel, 
whereas this contribution is focused on the potential to detect the diversion of fuel pins from a spent fuel 
assembly. First, the detector responses of several fission chambers placed in the guide tubes of a PWR 
17x17 fuel assembly were calculated with the Monte Carlo code MCNPX. Different fissile material 
coatings (e.g. 239Pu, 238U) were taken into account to consider detectors mostly sensitive to thermal and 
fast neutrons. In addition, the response to ionization chambers was modelled for the detection of gamma-
rays. Fuel assemblies with material compositions corresponding to different initial enrichment, burnup, and 
cooling time were modelled to evaluate the sensitivity of the detector responses to the fuel irradiation 
history. 
The detector responses were calculated also for several diversion scenarios where fuel pins from a 
complete fuel assembly were replaced with dummies made of stainless steel. The diversions ranged from 
15% to 50% of the total pins. The detector responses obtained from the diversion cases were compared to 
the values for the complete fuel assemblies to determine the capability of SINRD to detect the diversion of 
fuel pins. Promising results were obtained by combining the responses of the different detector types. 
Keywords: SINRD, spent fuel, NDA, partial defect, Monte Carlo 
1 Introduction 
The technical objective of nuclear safeguards is to ensure the detection of the diversion of nuclear 
material from peaceful applications to the manufacture of nuclear weapons (IAEA, 1972). 
Safeguards inspections are carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the countries 
signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (IAEA, 1970). Since most of nuclear material placed 
under safeguards is in the form of spent fuel, the verification of this material is of major interest for the 
IAEA (IAEA, 2013). 
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However, the measurement of spent fuel presents many challenges due to its very high radiation emission 
and decay heat. Currently the spent fuel verification is performed with non-destructive assay (NDA) 
techniques such as the digital Cherenkov viewing device (DCVD) (Chen et al., 2003), (Chen et al., 2009), 
(Branger et al., 2014), the spent fuel attribute tester (SFAT) (Arit et al., 1995), (Honkamaa et al., 2003), 
and the Fork detector (Rinard et al., 1988), (Borella et al., 2011). In addition, many other NDA techniques 
are under development to improve the accuracy of the verification (Tobin et al., 2011). 
This contribution is focused on the capabilities of the self-indication neutron resonance densitometry 
(SINRD) (Menlove et al., 1969) for the detection of diversion from a spent fuel assembly. The basic 
principle of SINRD is described with the Monte Carlo models used in the study. Then the overview of the 
simulations is given, considering both complete fuel assemblies and diversion scenarios, and the 
capabilities of SINRD for this application are discussed. Finally the conclusion are presented with an 
outlook on future research. 
2 Description of the SINRD technique 
The self-indication neutron resonance densitometry is a non-destructive assay technique that relies on the 
passive neutron emission of spent nuclear fuel (LaFleur, 2011), (LaFleur et al., 2015), (Rossa et al., 
2015), (Rossa, 2016). 
The basic principle of SINRD is described in Figure 1. The total cross-section for neutron-induced reaction 
of 239Pu is plotted with the transmission of a neutron flux through samples containing different percentages 
of 239Pu. The transmission values were calculated with Monte Carlo simulations considering a sample of 
239Pu with density and dimensions equal to a PWR fuel pin. It is evident from the figure that the 
attenuation of the neutron flux is related to the amount of 239Pu in the sample. The SINRD technique aims 
at measuring the attenuation of the neutron flux around the 0.3 eV region due to the presence of 239Pu in 
the fuel assembly. The neutron detection in the 0.3 eV region is enhanced by using a fission chamber with 
239Pu as fissile material, according to the self-indication principle (Fröhner et al., 1966). 
 
Figure 1: Total cross-section of 239Pu and transmission of a neutron flux through samples containing 239Pu. The 
cross-section values were obtained from the ENDF/B-VII.0 data library, whereas the transmission was calculated with 
Monte Carlo simulations. 
0.1 1
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
10
4
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 
T
o
ta
l 
c
ro
s
s
-s
e
c
ti
o
n
 (
b
)
Neutron energy (eV)
 
239
Pu
1% 
239
Pu
4% 
239
Pu
 T
ra
n
s
m
is
s
io
n
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
459
3 
 
The neutron flux in the 0.3 eV energy region is estimated with SINRD by taking the difference between the 
neutron counts of two 239Pu fission chambers. One detector is covered by a thin Gd filter, whereas the 
other detector is covered by a Cd filter. These materials were chosen because they have a cutoff in the 
neutron absorption below and above 0.3 eV, respectively. 
In addition, the thermal neutron flux and fast neutron flux were estimated in this work by calculating the 
response of a bare 239Pu fission chamber and 238U fission chamber, respectively. 
The approach for the study of the SINRD technique was extended in this paper by calculating the 
response of ionization chambers for the detection of gamma-rays. The multiple insertion of neutron and 
gamma-ray detectors in a fuel assembly was proposed for the PDET detector (Ham et al., 2009), (Ham et 
al., 2015), and can be beneficial also for the SINRD technique. 
3 Model developed for the study 
3.1 Monte Carlo model 
The capability of SINRD for the detection of partial defects was investigated in this article with Monte Carlo 
simulations. The Monte Carlo code MCNPX v.2.7.0 (Pelowitz, 2011) was used to simulate a PWR 17x17 
fuel assembly stored in air and surrounded by a 12-cm slab of polyethylene to ensure neutron moderation. 
The model of the fuel assembly is shown in Figure 1. The fuel geometry chosen for the simulation 
contains 264 fuel pins and 25 guide tubes. These are used for the insertion of control rods during the 
reactor operation and provide enough room for neutron or gamma-ray detectors once the fuel is 
discharged. 
 
Figure 2: MCNPX model of the fuel assembly used for the study. The fuel pins are depicted in black, the peripheral 
guide tubes in yellow, and the central guide tubes in red. 
3.2 Calculation of the neutron detectors counts 
The total counts of the neutron detectors (Nbare) were calculated with Formula (1) as the product between 
the coefficient CN, the incoming neutron flux (jN) and the microscopic cross-section (sDET) of the active 
material in the detector itself. The coefficient CN was calculated with Formula (2) as the product between 
the amount of fissile material in the detector (nfiss), the total neutron emission from the spent fuel assembly 
(NE), and the measurement time (t). The Photonis CFUE43 fission chamber (Photonis, 2017) was taken 
as reference design, but the active length was increased to 2 m to obtain a fissile material mass of 263.89 
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mg (Rossa, 2016). The total neutron emission was taken from the reference spent fuel library (Rossa et 
al., 2013), whereas the measurement time was set to one hour. 
The neutron flux (jN) and the microscopic cross-section (sDET) included in Formula (1) are a function of 
the incoming neutron energy EN. The neutron flux was obtained from the MCNPX simulations and 
accounts also for the multiplication effect. The cross-section values were taken from the ENDF/B-VII.0 
nuclear data library (Chadwick, 2006) and averaged over 600 logarithmically-interpolated energy bins 
between 10−9 and 20 MeV. The fission cross-sections of 239Pu and 238U were used to model detectors 
sensitive mainly to thermal and fast neutrons, respectively. 
௕ܰ௔௥௘ ൌ ܥேන ߮ேሺܧேሻߪ஽ா்ሺܧேሻ݀ܧோಿ ሺͳሻ ܥே ൌ ݊௙௜௦௦ ாܰ ݐሺʹሻ 
The presence of a thin Gd or Cd filter around the 239Pu fission chamber was accounted for with Formula 
(3), where nfil and sfil are the atom density and cross-section of the filter. 
௙ܰ௜௟ ൌ ܥேන ߮ேሺܧேሻߪ஽ா்ሺܧேሻ݁ି௡೑೔೗ఙ೑೔೗ሺாಿሻ݀ܧோಿ ሺ͵ሻ 
The neutron counts in the energy region close to 0.3 eV were calculated as the difference between the 
counts of two fission chambers, one covered by a Gd filter and one covered by a Cd filter. 
The uncertainty of the neutron counts for the different detectors was estimated as the square root of the 
corresponding neutron count. 
3.3 Calculation of the gamma-ray detectors response 
The gamma-ray detector response (P) was calculated with Formula (4) as the product between the 
coefficient CP, the gamma-ray flux (jP) and the response function of the detector (fDET). The coefficient CP 
is the product between the total photon emission from the spent fuel assembly and the measurement time. 
The total photon emission was taken from (Rossa et al., 2013) and the measurement time was set to one 
hour as for the neutron measurements. 
The photon flux (jP) and response function (fDET) were obtained from MCNPX simulations and are function 
of the incoming gamma-ray energy Eg. The photon flux was calculated in the guide tubes with the model of 
the spent fuel described in Section 3.1, whereas the response function was obtained by modelling the 
detector alone as an aluminum cylinder filled with nitrogen. The transport of both photons and electrons 
was simulated to obtain the response function (fDET), which was calculated as the energy deposition tally 
(F6 type) in the gas-filled cavity. The energy range of the source term was divided into 23 bins from 50 
keV to 5 MeV, and separate simulations were performed defining the source with a uniform histogram 
distribution over a single energy bin. ܲ ൌ ܥ௉න ߮௉൫ܧఊ൯ ஽݂ா்൫ܧఊ൯݀ܧఊாം ሺͶሻ 
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The statistical uncertainty of the gamma-ray detector response was neglected since ionization chambers 
are normally operated in current mode and reach a stable signal well within the considered measurement 
time. 
4 Overview of the performed simulations 
4.1 Complete fuel assemblies 
The simulations performed for this study considered both complete fuel assemblies and assemblies with 
diverted pins. In the case of a complete fuel assembly the fuel pins are identical in material composition 
and source strength, and these characteristics were taken from the reference spent fuel library (Rossa et 
al., 2013), (Borella et al., 2015). The sensitivity of the detector responses to the fuel irradiation history was 
evaluated by considering fuel assemblies with material composition and source strength corresponding to: 
· initial enrichments: 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0, 4.5, and 5.0%; 
· burnup: 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, and 60 GWd/tHM. 
4.2 Diversion scenarios 
In the diversion cases the fuel pins were replaced by dummies made of stainless steel with the same 
dimensions of a fuel pin. The diversion scenarios are shown in Figure 3 and the replaced pins were 
between 50% and 15% of the fuel pins in a fuel assembly. The diversion scenarios were symmetrical 
since it resulted from previous work as the most challenging pattern to detect (Sitaraman et al., 2009), 
(Rossa, 2016). 
 
Figure 3: Overview of the diversion scenarios. The fuel pins are depicted in white, the dummy pins in grey, and the 
guide tubes with crosses. 
Diversion 9: 20% Diversion 10: 20% Diversion 11: 15% Diversion 12: 15%
Diversion 1: 50% Diversion 2: 50% Diversion 3: 50% Diversion 4: 50%
Diversion 5: 30% Diversion 6: 30% Diversion 7: 25% Diversion 8: 25%
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For the simulations with the diversion scenarios the fuel pins had a material composition and source 
strength corresponding to fuel with: 
· 2% initial enrichment and 30 GWd/tHM burnup; 
· 3.5% initial enrichment and 10, 30, or 60 GWd/tHM burnup; 
· 5% initial enrichment and 30 GWd/tHM burnup. 
In all simulations included in this contribution the fuel pins had a cooling time of 5 years. 
5 Results 
5.1 Complete fuel assemblies 
For each simulations in this study the detectors responses calculated according to the approach described 
in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 were normalized to the value obtained in the central guide tube. In addition, the 
guide tubes were divided for this study into 16 peripheral and 9 central guide tubes depending on the 
geometrical location in the fuel assembly. The two groups are identified in Figure 1 by different colors. The 
average detector responses were calculated in the two guide tubes groups. 
The average detector responses obtained in the cases with complete fuel assemblies were used to 
establish a reference band associated to each type of detector response (i.e. thermal neutrons, resonance 
region neutrons, fast neutrons, gamma-rays). The low and high boundaries are reported in Table 1 for the 
nine central guide tubes and for the sixteen peripheral guide tubes. In order to obtain the low boundaries 
for the neutron detectors in Table 1, the minimum detector responses obtained in the whole set of 
complete fuel assemblies were further decreased by the 1-s value to account for uncertainty. Similarly the 
high boundaries were obtained by increasing by 1-s the maximum values obtained for each detector type. 
The boundaries for the gamma-ray detector were taken as the minimum and maximum detector 
responses obtained in the whole set of complete fuel assemblies. 
Both boundaries for thermal and resonance region neutrons are lower for the central guide tubes 
compared to the peripheral guide tubes, whereas the opposite occurs for fast neutrons and gamma-rays. 
In general the width of the reference band is larger for peripheral guide tubes compared to central guide 
tubes, and it is significantly larger for neutron than for gamma-ray detectors. 
Table 1: Normalized detector responses calculated for the complete fuel assemblies for thermal neutrons, neutrons 
around the 0.3 eV region, fast neutrons, and gamma-rays. The low and high boundaries are given for the nine central 
guide tubes and the sixteen peripheral guide tubes. 
 Central guide tubes Peripheral guide tubes 
 Low 
boundary 
High 
boundary 
Low 
boundary 
High 
boundary 
Thermal neutrons 1.153 1.263 1.695 2.298 
Resonance region neutrons 1.122 1.271 1.576 2.290 
Fast neutrons 0.862 1.090 0.802 0.977 
Gamma-rays 0.985 0.987 0.904 0.912 
 
5.2 Diversion scenarios 
The average detector responses obtained for the diversion scenarios were compared to the reference 
bands shown in Table 1, and the values that fell outside these bands signaled possible diversion cases. 
Figures 4-7 show the normalized detector responses calculated for the diversion scenarios for the different 
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detector types. The results are the average values for the nine central guide tubes and for the sixteen 
peripheral guide tubes. 
The results for the thermal neutron detectors show that most of the diversion cases fall within the 
reference band of the complete fuel assemblies. Only for diversion with fuel with 5% initial enrichment the 
detector responses are above the high boundaries both for central and peripheral guide tubes. 
Considering the detectors measuring neutrons around the 0.3 eV resonance region (Figure 5), most of the 
diversions with fuel assemblies with initial enrichment of 5% fall outside the reference band. In addition, 
also some scenarios with 50% of replaced pins from fuel with 3.5% initial enrichment and burnup larger 
than 30 GWd/t have values above the reference band. 
The results for the fast neutron detectors show that for all diversion scenarios the average values for the 
central guide tubes are within the reference band. The average detector responses for the peripheral 
guide tubes are lower than the reference band for some scenarios with 50% and 30% of replaced pins. In 
all cases there is not a significant difference due to the fuel irradiation history. 
Figure 7 shows that for all diversion scenarios the average responses of the gamma-ray detectors are 
outside the reference band of the complete fuel assemblies. The peripheral guide tubes are the most 
affected by the replacement of fuel pins. As in the case of fast neutron detectors, the irradiation history of 
the fuel assembly does not influence significantly the results. By comparing the different detector types, 
the gamma-ray detectors show a larger variation due to the fuel pins diversion compared to the neutron 
detectors. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Central guide tubes
Thermal neutrons
 2.0%; 30 GWd/t
 3.5%; 10 GWd/t
 3.5%; 30 GWd/t
 3.5%; 60 GWd/t
 5.0%; 30 GWd/t
N
o
rm
a
liz
e
d
 d
e
te
c
to
r 
re
s
p
o
n
s
e
Scenario
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Peripheral guide tubes
Thermal neutrons
Scenario  
Figure 4: Normalized detector responses for thermal neutrons in the different diversion scenarios. The average value 
for central guide tubes (left), and peripheral guide tubes (right) are shown. The lower and upper boundaries for the 
cases with complete fuel assemblies are also reported. 
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Figure 5: Normalized detector responses for neutrons around the 0.3 eV resonance region in the different diversion 
scenarios. The average value for central guide tubes (left), and peripheral guide tubes (right) are shown. The lower 
and upper boundaries for the cases with complete fuel assemblies are also reported. 
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Figure 6: Normalized detector responses for fast neutrons in the different diversion scenarios. The average value for 
central guide tubes (left), and peripheral guide tubes (right) are shown. The lower and upper boundaries for the cases 
with complete fuel assemblies are also reported. 
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Figure 7: Normalized detector responses for gamma-rays in the different diversion scenarios. The average value for 
central guide tubes (left), and peripheral guide tubes (right) are shown. The lower and upper boundaries for the cases 
with complete fuel assemblies are also reported. 
6 Conclusions 
The capabilities of SINRD to detect the diversion of fuel pins from a complete assembly were investigated 
in this paper. The neutron and gamma-ray fluxes were estimated in the guide tubes of a PWR fuel 
assembly to mimic the use of multiple detectors during the measurements. The response of detectors 
sensitive mainly to thermal neutrons, neutrons with energy around 0.3 eV, fast neutrons, and gamma-rays 
were considered. 
A first series of simulations concerned complete fuel assemblies with different irradiation histories to 
estimate the influence of initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time on the detector responses. The 
results from the complete fuel assemblies were used to identify a reference band of values obtained for 
complete fuel assemblies. The values calculated for the diversion scenarios were then compared with the 
reference bands of each detector type, and the values that fell outside the reference bands were an 
indication of diversion. 
The peripheral guide tubes in almost all scenarios were the most affected by the fuel pins diversion and 
were outside the reference bands for multiple detector types. For all diversion scenarios the average 
gamma-ray detector response for the guide tubes was outside the reference band, whereas for some 
diversion cases with 50% and 30% of replaced pins also the values for neutron detectors were outside the 
reference bands. Overall the gamma-ray detectors showed a larger change due to the diversion of pins 
compared to the neutron detectors. 
Future work will continue the assessment of the SINRD technique for the detection of fuel pins diversion 
by considering additional diversion scenarios and other approaches to the data analysis. The comparison 
among different NDA techniques for the same diversion scenarios is also foreseen. 
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7.2. Copyright 
The authors agree that submission of an article automatically authorises ESARDA to publish the 
work/article in whole or in part in all ESARDA publications – the bulletin, meeting proceedings, and on the 
website. The authors declare that their work/article is original and not a violation or infringement of any 
existing copyright. 
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Abstract: 
The international transport of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) provides a novel challenge to the safeguards 
community considering the expected significant frequency in such shipments and increasing 
complexity of multimodal routing.  We have developed a notional transportation case study, grounded 
in real case data, capturing the complex, socio-technical security, safety and safeguards (3S) factors 
influencing an SNF shipment that traverses several international boundaries while using various 
transportation modalities (e.g., roads, rail, and water).  Our research focuses on using system-level 
analysis techniques (e.g., dynamic probabilistic risk assessment, DPRA) to analyze these complex risk 
factors influencing SNF transportation from an integrated 3S perspective in an attempt to identify 
possible advantages and efficiencies.  
As it fits within the integrated 3S approach, this paper focuses specifically on the modelling and 
analysis of safeguards for the international transportation of SNF.  Using our notional transportation 
case study, we modelled the various stages of SNF transport as states within a Markov Chain using 
the Brookhaven National Laboratory-developed PR-CALC software.  The resultant model identifies 
distinct safeguards approaches and intrinsic barriers at each state of the SNF shipment, which then 
determines the probability of the SNF moving to one of several proliferation states: a ‘state’ of 
diversion detected, a ‘state’ of diversion failure, or a ‘state’ of proliferation success.  Initial results from 
the Markov Chain model are encouraging in that they provide a clear description of how safeguards 
can be applied to an international SNF shipment—suggesting improvements over current best 
practices.  We then situate this new safeguards model in an integrated 3S perspective by exploring 
the interplay with models for security and safety of the international SNF transportation (using DPRA 
as the integrating framework).  Ultimately, our work aims to help identify where safeguards concepts, 
approaches, and technologies could be improved to bolster the international safeguards regime 
among an expected (and significant) increase in international SNF transports.   
Keywords: 3S, transportation, spent nuclear fuel, risk complexity, Markov models 
1. Introduction
The growing global interest in nuclear energy programs and high costs associated with the storage of 
spent nuclear fuel (SNF) has increased the demand for transport to offsite locations.  In the U.S. alone, 
shipments are expected to reach over 12,000 by the year 2055 [1].  Shipments to reprocessing facilities 
or storage sites may employ different transport modalities (e.g., train, boat, rail) and travel long 
distances, perhaps crossing international borders.  As the shipment progresses, the SNF may face a 
variety of socio-technical influences (e.g., protesters, terrorists, national policies, economic constraints, 
or geopolitical pressures) that challenge traditional approaches to managing risk.  From a nuclear 
safeguards perspective, managing these risks is guided by a State’s export obligations via its
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA for the international shipment of SNF.  
Prior to a shipment, the State will send identifying information about the shipment cask and its origin, 
material composition, expected shipment dates, and the destination [2].  The increased demand to ship 
SNF internationally may present opportunities for proliferators to divert nuclear materials—especially 
considering how casks are transferred between various transportation modalities and across multiple 
geopolitical and maritime borders.  How these characteristics of international SNF transportation 
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challenge safeguards effectiveness is compounded when the influence(s) of safety and security 
concerns along international transportation routes are also considered. 
As such, the international transport of SNF presents unique challenges in the areas of security, safety, 
and safeguards (3S).  Traditionally these challenges are assessed and analyzed independent of one 
another, which can lead to compartmentalized descriptions (and a segmented understanding) of the 
international SNF transportation risk space.   Recent work by Williams, et. al. [3] suggests that applying 
an integrated 3S-based complex risk perspective may improve the overall design and analysis of SNF 
transportation.  
In this paper, we model applied safeguards (e.g., containment seals) and intrinsic barriers (e.g., heat 
and radiation characteristics of the SNF) of a hypothetical SNF transportation case study using an 
analytical technique based on Markov chains.  Our model is evaluated with software named PRCALC 
(created at the Brookhaven National Laboratory [4]) which computes the probabilities of proliferation 
success, diversion detection, and diversion failure at a given stage in the model.  Some PRCALC inputs 
and results are subsequently used in a novel analysis called Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(DPRA) to assess the complex risk perspective of the integrated 3S.   
2.Transportation Case Description & Scenario
A regional map of our hypothetical SNF transport case study is shown in Figure 1 below (NOTE: A more 
complete description of this case study is provided in [5]), and includes the following fictitious nations: 
 Zamau, a non-weapons state signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) with a fairly robust nuclear enterprise that provides 12% of national electrical
power [SNF origin];
 Famunda, a non-weapons state signatory to the NPT with rampant governmental corruption
and no developed safeguards system [SNF transit country]; and,
 Kaznirra, a non-weapons state signatory to the NPT & Additional Protocol with a well-developed
nuclear enterprise interested in making Site B a regional SNF repository [SNF end destination].
The SNF shipment route spans these three hypothetical countries and travels first via rail (the grey 
path), then barge (the dark blue path), and finally road (the orange path).   
We included a variety of SNF characteristics to represent a wide range of realistic SNF factors—
including the need to understand how SNF from the variety of reactor types currently used in existing 
nuclear power plants (and fuel usage strategies) affect safeguards.  In addition, these SNF 
configurations influence the attractiveness of the SNF to state actors (e.g., quantity of Plutonium, Pu) 
and the ease of handling the SNF cask (e.g., radioactivity and thermal heat).  Within our hypothetical 
case description of international SNF transportation, we consider different SNF characteristics, 
including: 
 PWR and BWR reactor types with 24 and 52 fuel rods per assembly, respectively
 Three burnup values of 40, 50, and 60 GWD/MTU
 Four fuel ages after discharge of 5, 10, 20, and 50 years
The SNF cask has generic characteristics and its construction is consistent with International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA)-certified AREVA TN-Series dual purpose casks used for storage and 
transportation.  In this hypothetical case, the SNF cask has a passive metal containment seal applied 
by the Site A facility operator under video surveillance by the IAEA.  Prior to shipment, the country of 
Zamau sends the IAEA the SNF and cask attributes as part of its CSA.  Further, Zamau has 
responsibility for the SNF shipment until the recipient state Kaznirra assumes custody [2]. 
This train is dedicated to SNF transport and includes an onboard security force that protects the SNF 
(per international best security practice).  The rail car itself has a protective canopy and buffer/escort 
cars, meeting the US AAR S-2043 standard for trains to carry high-level radioactive waste, including 
SNF [5].  Given the relatively low track class (i.e., standards dictating railroad track quality) of Zamau’s 
expansive railway network [6] and the fact that train derailments are the most common type of rail 
incident [7], for this paper we include this event in our scenario to explore the safeguards repercussions 
within a complex risk context.   
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Figure 1: Regional (and route) Map of Spent Nuclear Fuel Transport
More specifically, a 40-foot section of track is removed, causing the train to derail (Figure 1).  The 
derailed train is then (opportunistically) attacked by a state actor posing as a terrorist organization.  
During the attack, the train’s security force engages the attackers in a short firefight.  In this scenario, if 
the attack is thwarted, the SNF shipment continues to its destination.  However, if the attackers are 
successful, they quickly divert one significant quantity (SQ) of Pu from the fuel assembly, replace any 
missing material with dummy fuel rods, re-apply the containment seal and create a radiological release 
by detonating TNT attached to a fuel rod to make the diversion appear to be an act of terrorism.  Lastly, 
the remains of the SNF assembly in the cask will eventually be shipped back to Site A and Zamau will 
send a special report to the IAEA detailing the incident.  An IAEA inspector will subsequently inspect 
and examine the SNF shipment cask at Site A.   
3. Markov Model in PRCALC
The complexity facing safeguards in this scenario suggest the importance of maintaining continuity and 
the quality of knowledge (beyond current best practices) along international SNF transportation routes.  
In a manner similarly aimed at maintaining continuity and quality of nuclear material knowledge, Denning 
suggested Markov chain models as a method to assess scenarios for proliferation resistance [7].  A 
Markov model breaks a time-variant scenario into discrete stages (or states) using a directed graph with 
transition parameters defining the probability of advancing to the next stage.  Future and past states of 
the Markov process are considered independent of the present state.  In addition, this method can 
compute probabilistic measures that account for a wide range of uncertainties found in the complexity 
inherent in maintaining safeguards obligations in the international transportation of SNF.   
The train derailment/attack scenario, described in the previous section, is shown as a Markov model in 
Figure 2.  The model starts where the SNF cask is loaded onto the train in the country of Zamau—the 
‘Loaded on train at Site A’ stage.  Next, the train travels (under anticipated normal conditions) to a 
seaport (the ‘Travel on Train’ stage).  (NOTE: A more complete Markov Chain Model would also have a 
branch illustrating the state descriptions associated with SNF traveling along the desired path to its 
destination.  We truncated the model in this paper for clarity.)  However, the train derails and is 
subsequently attacked by the Zamau state actors posing as terrorists (the ‘Derail/Attack Train’ stage).  
At this point in the scenario, the model offers two possibilities: the attack on the derailed train can be 
either successful or thwarted.  For this paper, we do not consider the ‘Attack Thwarted’ stage from a 
safeguards point of view because there is no unique opportunity for proliferation.  In the ‘Attack 
Successful’ stage, the adversaries divert enough SNF to contain one SQ of Pu and subsequently cause 
a radiological release to create the appearance of a terrorist act.  From here, the Markov model accounts 
for three safeguards outcomes:  
Train derailment / 
attack 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
471
 the diversion may eventually be detected by safeguards inspectors under current safeguards
best practices due to the applied safeguards measures —the ‘Diversion Confirmed’ stage;
 the diversion could fail, because of the SNF intrinsic barriers—the ‘Diversion Failure’ stage;
or,
 the adversaries overcame both the applied safeguards measures and intrinsic barriers to gain
the SNF without detection—the ‘Diversion Success’ stage.
Loaded on 
train at 
Site A
Derail/
Attack 
Train
Travel on 
Train
Attack 
Successful
tt  
f l
Attack 
Thwarted
Diversion 
Success
Diversion 
Failure
Diversion 
Confirmed
Figure 2: Markov Model for Train Derailment / Attack 
Our model applies safeguards measures which help safeguards inspectors more quickly detect a 
diversion of SNF.  The scenario narrative after the attack is that the cask will return to Site A.  During 
the next safeguards inspection, our model assumes the inspector will check the seal applied to the cask 
and send it to a laboratory for analysis.  Another modeling assumption is that the inspector will also 
perform a visual inspection of the fuel assembly.  In this scenario, the State actor takes measures to 
conceal their diversion by tampering with the seal to access the SNF and the use of dummy fuel rods. 
Given the (assumed) sophistication and maturity of Zamau’s state-level safeguards system, we assume 
their concealment activities are effective 80% of the time.  The average inspection period TI, inspection 
time to discover an anomaly TDA, and time to confirm the anomaly TVA are all used to compute the time 
to detect a diversion TD.  Table 1, below, gives the average times, as defined by Yue [4], for our scenario 
safeguards measures.  Per the logic of PRCALC (and international best practices in safeguards), 
increasing the number and effectiveness of applied safeguards, increases the likelihood that inspectors 
will detect a diversion (ideally in a timely manner). 
Table 1: Applied Safeguards and Factors to Compute the Time to Detect Diversion 
Safeguards 
Approach 
TI TDA TVA TD = TI + TDA + TVA 
Visual Inspection 52 weeks Days Quickly 53 weeks 
Passive Seal 3 months Days 2 weeks 13 weeks 
Intrinsic barriers related to international SNF transportation are natural fuel and/or transportation 
mechanism (e.g., cask) characteristics that work to delay a successful proliferation and increase the 
likelihood of failure.  IN PRCALC, the delay time associated with these intrinsic barriers, along with the 
rate of diversion, directly affects the amount of time it takes to divert the SNF, which affects the 
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probabilities of proliferation success and failure.  We added a fixed intrinsic barrier delay to the model 
to represent the detrimental qualities of the SNF (e.g., SNF heat, toxicity, and radiation) as well as the 
physical barriers associated with the cask and train design.  Before material can be successfully 
diverted, the proliferators will need to overcome these barriers.  As with applied safeguards, increasing 
the number and effectiveness of intrinsic barriers, prolongs the proliferation time and increases the 
likelihood of proliferation failure. 
We input the Markov model into the PRCALC software along with information from this scenario 
describing the applied safeguards measures, the intrinsic barriers, and SNF/cask characteristics.  We 
consider 24 SNF cask configurations, including SNF from PWR and BWR reactors as well as different 
fuel age and burnup values as shown in Table 2.  Note that these parameters affect the mass of Pu in 
the SNF shipment, a key parameter in PRCALC.  As represented in our model, the software outputs 
three time-variant probabilities: 1) the diversion detection, 2) the diversion failure, and 3) the proliferation 
success. 
Table 2: Spent Fuel Characteristics for reactor type, age, and burnup values 
4. Results
We ran the 24 configurations for the SNF shipment derailment/attack scenario for the ‘Attack Successful’ 
stage of our Markov model.  The peak output probabilities of diversion detection, diversion failure, and 
proliferation success are given in Table 3.  These probabilities all start at zero at time t=0, but grow over 
time based on the SNF characteristics, diversion rate, safeguards, and intrinsic barriers.  The PRCALC 
simulation terminates when these probabilities no longer significantly change.  For our scenario and 
configurations, PRCALC stopped simulation after 50 – 60 weeks of time.  We found that the probability 
of diversion detection remained constant across all configurations because the value TD (time to detect 
a diversion) is computed solely on the selected safeguards measures, which remained static across the 
24 configurations for the SNF.   
However, the calculations for the probabilities of diversion failure and proliferation success are 
dependent upon the amount of Pu contained in, and the rate of diversion from, a fuel assembly (and 
therefore the cask) as well as the time delay caused by the intrinsic barrier.  Note that the selection of a 
fixed intrinsic barrier value for all configurations is a simplifying assumption.  As the SNF ages it becomes 
easier to handle because the SNF becomes less radioactive and thermally hot.  Overall, despite the 
differences in reactor type, age, and burnup values, there were only small differences in the probabilities 
of diversion failure and proliferation success (Table 3).  Both of these probabilities are computed based 
on the total amount of Pu, compared to one SQ, in the transport cask, and the goal of the proliferators 
in our scenario is to divert one SQ.  As such, shipments that contain more Pu are more likely to 
experience a higher diversion failure probability but also more likely for proliferation to succeed.  This is 
because the amount of time needed to divert the material decreases as the amount of Pu in the cask 
Age 
(years) 5 10 25 50 5 10 25 50 5 10 25 50 
Burnup, 
GWD 60 60 60 60 50 50 50 50 40 40 40 40 
PWR 
Pu per 
assembly 
(kg) 3.95 3.85 3.67 3.53 3.66 3.56 3.37 3.24 3.31 3.22 3.05 2.93 
Pu in 
cask (kg) 94.8 92.5 88.1 84.8 87.8 85.5 81.0 77.8 79.5 77.4 73.4 70.5 
BWR 
Pu per 
assembly 
(kg) 1.85 1.81 1.73 1.67 1.72 1.68 1.60 1.54 1.55 1.51 1.45 1.40 
Pu in 
cask (kg) 96.6 94.3 90.0 86.8 89.6 87.5 83.4 80.4 80.7 78.9 75.4 72.9 
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increases.  Yue showed that diversion time is used to compute both diversion failure and proliferation 
success, and a decrease in this time drives an increase in these probabilities [4].   
Table 3: Probabilities of Diversion Detection, Diversion Failure, and Proliferation Success for the 24 configurations 
Reactor Type / Burnup 
(GWD)  / Age (years) 
P(Diversion Detection) P(Diversion Failure) P(Proliferation Success) 
PWR / 60 / 5 0.496 0.00282 0.00470 
PWR / 60 / 10 0.496 0.00275 0.00459 
PWR / 60 / 25 0.496 0.00262 0.00437 
PWR / 60 / 50 0.496 0.00252 0.00421 
PWR / 50 / 5 0.496 0.00261 0.00436 
PWR / 50 /10 0.496 0.00254 0.00424 
PWR / 50 / 25 0.496 0.00241 0.00402 
PWR / 50 / 50 0.496 0.00232 0.00386 
PWR / 40/ 5 0.496 0.00237 0.00395 
PWR / 40 /10 0.496 0.00230 0.00384 
PWR / 40 / 25 0.496 0.00218 0.00364 
PWR / 40 / 50 0.496 0.00210 0.00350 
BWR / 60 / 5 0.496 0.00287 0.00479 
BWR / 60 / 10 0.496 0.00281 0.00468 
BWR / 60 / 25 0.496 0.00268 0.00446 
BWR / 60 / 50 0.496 0.00258 0.00431 
BWR / 50 / 5 0.496 0.00266 0.00444 
BWR / 50 /10 0.496 0.00260 0.00434 
BWR / 50 / 25 0.496 0.00248 0.00414 
BWR / 50 / 50 0.496 0.00239 0.00399 
BWR / 40/ 5 0.496 0.00240 0.00401 
BWR / 40 /10 0.496 0.00235 0.00392 
BWR / 40 / 25 0.496 0.00224 0.00374 
BWR / 40 / 50 0.496 0.00217 0.00362 
Figure 3 illustrates how the probability of detection of the ‘Attack Successful’ stage varies with time for 
a given configuration.  The more time that passes after the diversion, the greater the likelihood the 
safeguards inspectors will discover the diversion.  After 10 weeks have passed, the diversion detection 
and confirmation probability reaches about 25%, and after 50 weeks the probability stabilizes at roughly 
50%.  It takes almost one year to reach its highest probability of detection because of the average 
detection times of 13 weeks for the seal and 53 weeks for a visual inspection.  Also, our assumed 
concealment effectiveness factor of 80% serves to further delay the discovery of diversion. 
Figure 3: Probability of Diversion Detection versus Time for the ‘Attack Successful’ stage 
Figure 4 illustrates the time varying probabilities of diversion failure and proliferation success for a 
PWR configuration with 25 year age 60 GWD/MTU burnup.  For all of the configurations, these 
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probabilities stabilize after one to three weeks of time, which is a much shorter time period than for the 
probability of detection.  This shorter time period is attributable to the large amount of Pu in the 
transport cask, a quick diversion rate, and the model selection of a fixed intrinsic barrier that does not 
cause significant delay to proliferation.  However, selecting intrinsic barriers that cause more time 
delay will correspondingly increase the probability of diversion failure.   
Figure 4: Probability of diversion failure and proliferation success for PWR with 60 GWD Burnup and 25 year age 
for the ‘Attack Successful’ stage 
5. 3S Integration using DPRA
Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) is an extension of traditional PRA methods that 
investigates both the aleatory (e.g., arising from stochasticity in the process) and epistemic (e.g., 
arising from the model) uncertainties in complex systems by varying key parameters during 
simulations [3].  We use a software program called ADAPT, which is designed to investigate the 
uncertainty space of complex systems through the use of dynamic event trees (DETs) [6]. In ADAPT, 
DET analysis begins at time t = 0 in the system and continues until a set of pre-determined conditions 
(known as branching rules and relating to either time-dependent or system physics-dependent 
phenomena) are met.  At this point, the computer model stops and reports the condition that ended 
the run, and, based on the reason given, generates multiple modified models in order to reflect the 
possible system evolutions based on system parameters (e.g., edit rules).  This process continues 
until all of the possible system evolutions have been investigated with a variety of PRA-related values 
(e.g., probability of occurrence) being reported for each branch/modified DET model. 
For our scenario, ADAPT evaluated how three independent safety (RADTRAN), security (STAGE) and 
safeguards (PRCALC) analysis techniques interact to more fully address the uncertainty (and 
complexity) within our SNF transportation scenario.  In order to investigate all three models together, 
ADAPT modifies all of the models jointly using the output(s) of some as the input(s) of others. This is 
done through edit rules which describe how the system changes based on scenario parameters (e.g., 
the state of the casks before vs. after the derailment)—and results in various new branches that 
compose the DET.  In ADAPT, when a predetermined state has been reported, the edit rules then 
alter the input file by replacing selected variables with different parameters reflecting the changed 
status of the system (e.g., integrity of the mechanical safeguards seal before vs. after the derailment).  
DPRA is designed to look at the behaviors of specific scenarios—hence our hypothetical scenario that 
involves the interactions between safety, security and safeguards considerations.  For example, in the 
scenario there is a branch point based on whether the railcar is still on the track.  A traditional 
safeguards scenario would not cause the train to go off-track, but the ability of both applied safeguards 
and intrinsic barriers to meet safeguards obligations would certainly be affected.  If Zamau were to 
sign the Additional Protocol, a safeguards-related branch point could determine whether or not Zamau 
is in ‘good standing’ with the IAEA regarding its obligations—where ‘good standing’ may result in 
reduced scrutiny over the initial application of the mechanical safeguards seal on the cask at the point 
of origin.  DPRA—via ADAPT—provides a mechanism for exploring higher fidelity models of these 
classes of interactions.   To further evaluate the sensitivity of safeguards in this scenario, ADAPT will 
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be used to simulate various orders of the integration between the three previously mentioned codes 
(e.g., RADTRAN to STAGE to PRCALC, STAGE to RADTRAN to PRCALC).  [NOTE: At the time of 
this publication, the ADAPT-related PRCALC results were not complete, and thus could not be 
reported.] 
6. Conclusion
Traditional safeguards approaches struggle to handle the complexities introduced in the international 
transportation of SNF and mitigate the risk of diversion of nuclear material.  Integrated 3S, complex risk 
approaches offer a new analytical framework to address this gap.  Our focus in this paper is on the 
safeguards ‘S’ using a Markov chain model, which supports the reorientation of safeguards towards a 
focus on the continuity and quality of nuclear material knowledge, which can improve current best 
practice (e.g., ‘check-in/check-out’ system). 
Results from analyzing 24 SNF configurations of our hypothetical scenario showed that the transport 
SNF characteristics, applied safeguards, and intrinsic barriers are all important factors in calculating 
proliferation measures.  PRCALC computed quantitative values for probabilities of detection, diversion 
failure, and proliferation success.  In this scenario (and across all modeling assumptions), the probability 
of diversion success is approximately twice as high as the probability of diversion of failure.  Combined 
with a 50% (at best!) probability of detection after 53 weeks, the challenges of current safeguards 
approaches to the international transportation of SNF are evident.  For example, these results could 
lead to more conscientious physical barrier design for the transport cask and rail car.  Since the 24 SNF 
configurations do not change appreciably in the amount of Pu being transported, the attractiveness and 
challenges to proliferators do not vary significantly.  Given the similarity in trends across these 
configurations—and in the context of the expected significant increase in international transportation of 
SNF—emphasis on Pu context for adversarial attractiveness may need to be reconsidered.  Lastly, we 
demonstrated the following with this complex systems approach to safeguards: 
 how meeting well-established reporting requirements may be insufficient to meet international
safeguards obligations (and needs!) for international SNF transportation;
 how accounting for a ‘per system state’ safeguards approach may improve the continuity and
quality of knowledge of the nuclear material over the current international best practice (where
the safeguards responsibility is on the country of origin until the SNF is delivered and ‘checked
in’ to the destination country’s inventory); and,
 the importance of accounting for the relationships between safeguards and security (e.g., what
‘intrinsic barriers’ can the physical security design provide), as well as between safeguards and
safety (e.g., how can safety inspections of SNF be leveraged as applied safeguards).
Our future research will focus on the integration of all 3S, using the results of this paper as well as safety 
and security results published elsewhere [1].  We will further develop and refine other SNF transport 
scenarios.  The defined model inputs and outputs will lend better understanding to the interdependences 
between the 3S, and help to better define complex risk.  An integrated 3S, complex risk approach 
(grounded in systems theory) provides a new concept for framing—and new approaches for applying—
more efficient and effective safeguards in rapidly changing, dynamic implementation environments. 
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Training and Qualification Plan for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission’s International Safeguards Analysts 
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Bruce W. Moran, Peter Habighorst and David H. Hanks 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Washington, D.C. 
ABSTRACT 
Training and qualification plans are developed for the primary skills required of U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to ensure that they can effectively and correctly perform their job 
responsibilities. To ensure that NRC’s International Safeguards Analysts, Import and Export Analysts, 
and Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS – U.S. nuclear materials 
database) Analysts have the necessary knowledge and skills to perform their job responsibilities a 
training and qualification plan was developed for these areas of expertise. Such a plan is especially 
important during periods when changes in staffing occur.  Brainstorming was performed to determine 
what information is necessary for performing the international analyst job responsibilities.  From this 
list, two general objectives for the training and qualification were identified: (1) Effectively represent 
NRC and U.S. interests in domestic and international meetings on nonproliferation issues, and (2) 
Ensure NRC and its licensees comply with international treaties and agreements.  Each of these 
general objectives was further characterized through the development of sub-objectives.  Each of the 
sub-objectives was assessed to determine performance metrics that would need to be met at the 
basic, intermediate, or comprehensive level.  The importance of the sub-objectives was then 
prioritized based on the staff member’s primary area of responsibility – international safeguards 
analysis, import and export analysis, or NMMSS analysis.  Assessment questions were developed to 
assist the qualification panel in assessing a candidate. The training and qualification plan was linked 
to locations in the public internet and NRC-intranet where training resources could be found.  
Information on training courses, seminars, and meetings that could assist the candidate in developing 
their skills, as well as on-the-job training opportunities, were also linked to the plan.  Where training 
materials were not already available, they are to be developed. 
BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), like many other organizations in the nuclear field, is 
placing increasing importance on ensuring that knowledge is transferred to newer staff who are 
replacing those who are retiring or otherwise leaving the organization.  One aspect of the NRC’s 
program is the establishment of training and qualification plans that identify what information must be 
transferred to newer staff for them to become qualified to perform assigned activities. 
NRC’s international safeguards staff require some knowledge of a variety of technical disciplines and 
government policy. For example, international safeguards implementation requires accountants, 
auditors, information management specialists, statisticians, information and trade analysts, 
mathematicians, chemists, physicists, chemical engineers, nuclear engineers, international policy 
analysts, and lawyers, among others. While it is typically necessary for persons to be experts within a 
given discipline, some knowledge of all of the disciplines is useful to have a full understanding of how 
the discipline relates to the global nonproliferation policies and practices. The Training and 
Qualification Program for NRC’s staff assigned to international safeguards related activities – 
International Safeguards Analysts, and Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System 
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(NMMSS) Analysts – addresses each of the primary knowledge areas and prioritizes them for the 
different disciplines. 
PLAN DEVELOPMENT: 
Brainstorming:  The beginning activity for developing the International Safeguards Training and 
Qualification Plan began with a “brainstorming” to identify the primary topics and information that an 
NRC international safeguards staff person would need to know.  This information was then organized 
into a hierarchical outline structure and reviewed to identify apparent gaps in the information. 
Objectives:  After conducting the “brainstorming” exercise, an objectives-based analysis was 
performed to determine the knowledge and skills that the new international safeguards analyst would 
need to have to be qualified to independently represent the NRC in U.S. Government and 
international meetings and in meetings with NRC and Agreement State licensees.  The learning 
objectives are listed in Table 1. 
Performance metrics:  For each of the objectives, performance metrics were determined that 
defined abilities and knowledge that the new international safeguards analyst should possess to be 
qualified. The performance metrics were prioritized for each of the technical specialties to establish 
the level of knowledge needed by that specialty to be qualified – basic, intermediate, or 
comprehensive knowledge. In addition, for each performance metric, example questions were 
developed to assist the qualifications review panel in assessing whether the new staff person has the 
necessary ability or knowledge. The performance metrics are listed in Table 1. 
Training activities:   For each training objective and its associated performance metrics, training 
activities were identified in three categories: suggested reading, training courses and conferences, 
and on-the-job training.  We identified that there already exists a large body of training materials and 
courses that have been established in the United States, most by the U.S. Department of Energy, its 
national laboratories, and its contractors.  Some have also been established by universities and other 
non-government organizations. The assembled list of training resources provides options that can be 
used by the new international safeguards analyst in developing a training plan. On-the-job training, 
where experienced and new international safeguards staff work together to address the international 
safeguards and nonproliferation tasks of the NRC, remains a critical component of the knowledge 
transfer. 
Identifying Available Resources: Links were provided in the qualification card to public internet 
and NRC-intranet locations for information used to establish newer staff knowledge baseline. In 
particular, the IAEA guidance for State compliance with safeguards obligations (IAEA Service Series 
21 and associated Safeguards Implementation Practice guides). Mentor assignments for newer staff 
also serves to improve assimilation of large amounts of information and practicality of analysis being 
performed.  
SUMMARY: 
To ensure that it has qualified International Safeguards Analysts, Import and Export Analysts, and 
NMMSS Analysts for the future, NRC has developed a training and qualification plan to assist new 
international safeguards staff in determining the knowledge and abilities that they need to know, and 
what the resources are to assist them in gaining that knowledge and abilities. The training and 
qualification plan also assists NRC managers in their assessment as to whether the new staff meets 
the levels of performance necessary to be considered qualified.  NRC began to implement the training 
and qualification plan in 2016 to guide the development of new staff selected for the international 
safeguards team. 
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Table 1. International safeguards staff training objectives and performance metrics 
Objective Performance metric 
A. Effectively represent 
NRC and U.S. interests 
in domestic and 
international meetings 
on nonproliferation 
issues 
1. Ability to develop, present, and defend NRC positions (both
verbally and in writing)
2. Ability to provide acknowledged technical expertise to
discussions
3. Ability to understand other Federal agency interests and
motivations
4. Ability to understand International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and IAEA Department of Safeguards interests and motivations
5. Ability to understand other countries or groups of countries
interests and motivations
6. Ability to differentiate policy and technical perspectives in
discussions and provide options to meet both needs
A.1. Understand U.S. 
and international 
nuclear 
nonproliferation policy 
and objectives and the 
history of their 
implementation 
1. Knowledge of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and
international perspectives on its content
2. Knowledge of the IAEA’s Statute, structure and operations,
including the structure and practices of the Department of
Safeguards
3. Knowledge of the US-IAEA safeguards agreements and
protocols to those agreements (e.g., additional protocol and
small quantities protocol)
4. Knowledge of other agreements that establish safeguards
obligations, such as project supply agreements, and nuclear
weapon free zones
5. Knowledge of the routine bilateral, multilateral, and international
(e.g., IAEA Board of Governors and IAEA General Conference)
coordination meetings
6. Knowledge of differences in nonproliferation objectives among
IAEA, U.S., and other countries
7. Knowledge of IAEA safeguards implementation at NRC-licensed
facilities
8. Knowledge of IAEA safeguards implementation at U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) facilities
9. Knowledge of IAEA safeguards implementation during the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission
A.2. Understand 
interagency roles and 
responsibilities 
1. Knowledge of the roles of Federal agencies in meeting those
objectives (e.g., U.S. National Security Council, U.S.
Department of State, DOE, U.S. Department pf Defense, U.S.
Department of Commerce, NRC)
2. Knowledge of the roles of the interagency coordination
committees – Subgroup on IAEA Safeguards in the U.S.
(SISUS), Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS),
Subcommittee on International Safeguards and Monitoring
(SISM), IAEA Steering Committee (ISC), Interagency Policy
Sub-committee (Sub-IPC)
3. Knowledge of the DOE national laboratories, and other major
DOE facilities and their roles in supporting nonproliferation and
international safeguards activities
A.3. Understand 
international 
nonproliferation 
obligations 
1. Knowledge of the model safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/66,
153, 540)
2. Knowledge of international export control guidance
(INFCIRC/207 and 254)
3. Knowledge of IAEA guidance for State compliance with
safeguards obligations (IAEA Service Series 21 and associated
Safeguards Implementation Practice guides)
4. Knowledge of the Hexapartite Agreement and bilateral
agreements for the import of enrichment technology to the U.S.
(URENCO States and Australia)
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Objective Performance metric 
B. Ensure NRC-licensees 
comply with 
international 
safeguards treaties and 
agreements 
1. Knowledge of U.S.-specific safeguards agreements
(INFCIRC/288, INFCIRC/288/Add. 1, INFCIRC/366), protocols to
the agreements, subsidiary arrangements, and facility
attachments
2. Knowledge of the resulting obligations that affect NRC licensees
3. Knowledge of regulations impacting international safeguards
implementation (e.g., 10 CFR 75 and 810)
4. Knowledge of licensee facilities and operations to determine
effective, efficient, and practical means to meet the international
obligations
B.1. Understand the 
design and operations 
of reactors and other 
nuclear fuel cycle 
facilities 
1. Knowledge of how all types of nuclear facilities operate
2. Knowledge of classified, sensitive and proprietary aspects of
fuel cycle processes
3. Knowledge of how fuel cycle processes could be misused for
proliferation purposes
4. Knowledge of the global nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear trade
B.2. Understand NRC’s 
safety, physical 
security, and 
information security 
requirements for 
licensing nuclear 
facilities 
1. Knowledge of Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended) and
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (as amended)
2. Knowledge of NRC licensing requirements for reactors (50), fuel
cycle facilities (10 CFR Part 35, 40, 70, 72, and 76),  Agreement
States (10 CFR Part 150), and physical security (10 CFR Part
73)
3. Knowledge of classified and sensitive technology protection (10
CFR Part 95 and 810)
B.3. Understand 
nuclear material control 
and accounting 
1. Knowledge of nuclear materials control and accounting
2. Knowledge of NRC regulations for material control and
accounting (10 CFR Part 74)
3. Knowledge of the content and structure of a fundamental
nuclear material control plan
4. Knowledge of nuclear material measurements and statistical
evaluations
5. Able to develop a conceptual nuclear materials accounting
system for a facility
B.4. Understand 
concepts of IAEA 
safeguards 
implementation 
1. Knowledge of State-level concept for IAEA safeguards
implementation
2. Knowledge of additional protocol content and related guidance
3. Knowledge of IAEA model safeguards approaches for each type
of fuel cycle facility
4. Knowledge of safeguards verification procedures, techniques
and equipment
5. Knowledge of the safeguards by design concept
B.5. Understand and be 
able to implement 
actions that must be 
undertaken by NRC and 
licensee facilities to 
ensure compliance with 
IAEA safeguards 
obligations 
1. Able to add or remove a licensee facility from the Eligible
Facilities List
2. Able to compile and submit annual and quarterly additional
protocol declarations on licensee sites and locations
3. Able to review and advise licensees on completion of design
information questionnaire and additional protocol declarations
4. Able to facilitate access to licensee installations under both
safeguards agreement and additional protocol (e.g., design
information verification, scheduled inspection, random
inspection, or complementary access)
5. Ability to coordinate interagency actions associated with a
design information verification, inspection or complementary
access at a licensee installation
6. Able to perform acquisition/diversion path analysis for a nuclear
facility
7. Able to determine safeguards objectives at facility and State
levels
8. Able to develop safeguards verification options for a facility
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Objective Performance metric 
9. Able to assess effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards
approach and the associated safeguards measures
B.6. Understand NRC’s 
requirements for 
licensing exports of 
nuclear equipment and 
material 
1. Knowledge of export and import  licensing requirements and
review processes
2. Ability to perform export license review, including using
Congressional Research Service Reports
3. Knowledge of the requirements of foreign regulatory agencies
(e.g., European Commission, Australia, Canada, etc.)
B.7. Understand foreign 
obligations and 
obligation tracking 
1. Knowledge of the foreign obligation reporting requirements
(transaction and inventory) applicable to licensees and DOE
sites.
2. Knowledge of the U.S. Nuclear Materials Management and
Safeguards System (NMMSS) actions to track foreign
obligations
3. Knowledge of current agreements for cooperation and
associated administrative arrangements.
4. Knowledge of the Government-to-Government exchange
process for establishing foreign obligations
5. Knowledge of the NMMSS actions that go into the preparation
of the annual inventory of foreign obligated nuclear materials in
the USA
B.8. Understand and be 
able to manage NMMSS 
database to ensure 
completeness and 
correctness of U.S. 
nuclear material 
accounting reports for 
NRC licensees 
1. Knowledge of the domestic and international reporting
requirements in 10 CFR Parts 40, 50, 62, 70, 72, 74, 75, 76, and
150) 
2. Knowledge of Code 10 of the U.S. Subsidiary Arrangements
3. Knowledge of NMMSS processes for receiving and reviewing
material accounting reports
4. Trained and certified as Contracting Officer Representative
5. Able to review correctness and completeness of U.S. accounting
declarations to the IAEA
6. Ability to lead reconciliation of differences between IAEA and
U.S. data
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EUSECTRA training centre - Practice and experience 
János Bagi, Jean Galy, Indra Krevica 
European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Karlsruhe, Germany
Abstract: 
The European Commission has dedicated large efforts to address the fight against illicit trafficking of 
nuclear and other radioactive materials by supporting its States and partner countries to strengthen 
Nuclear Security by enhancing their capabilities in prevention, detection and response. The Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) supports EU policy strengthening nuclear security in providing a broad range 
of trainings on radiation detection and response to front line officers, trainers and experts. The courses 
include border detection, train-the-trainers, equipment maintenance, national response plans, nuclear 
forensics core and advanced capabilities, radiological crime scene management and nuclear security 
awareness.  
One of the main focuses of the Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) of the JRC is the 
training of front line officers from Member States. Dedicated training consists of theoretical lectures, 
demonstrations, hands-on and table-top exercises. The training curriculum was developed by the 
Border Monitoring Working Group, (BMWG) and based on "The Systematic Approach to Training" 
(SAT) methodology. Practical exercises under realistic conditions are considered as the most 
important and most effective part of the courses. Thus, in our facility training areas simulate realistic 
environment and professional scenarios, namely airport conditions and border crossing point. The 
training program offers a unique opportunity for trainees to see and experience actual materials and 
commodities, as EUSECTRA is one of the few places in the world where a wide range of samples of 
plutonium and uranium of different isotopic compositions can be used for training in detection, 
categorization and characterization together with a large portfolio of dedicated instrumentation.
Since the inauguration of the training centre, a number of courses were carried out, hundreds of front 
line officers were trained and a lot of experience was gained by the EUSACTRA staff. We use this 
experience and also the feedbacks of the trainees to enhance the training methodology. In this paper 
we would like to share our experience and practices in implementing radiation detection trainings. 
Keywords: Nuclear security; Detection; Identification; Nuclear materials 
1. Introduction
Nuclear and other radioactive materials have many benefits in nuclear industry and many other areas.
At the same time, such materials represent a notable threat to people and environment if they are out
of control or get into inadequate hands. Radioactive sources of high activity have the potential to
cause a serious radiological incident. Nuclear materials also can be used for malicious acts. Nuclear
smuggling events and radiological incidents happened in the last decades have established that the
threat is real and that the illicit trafficking, inadvertent movement and unauthorized use of such
material persists [1]. Therefore, within the framework of nuclear security architecture, certain
measures have been implemented to prevent, detect and response to such incidents.
- Prevention involves physical protection of nuclear and radioactive facilities, accountancy,
administrative control and inspection on such materials.
- Detection of materials out of control requires radiation detection infrastructure at airports,
seaports and border crossing point, and can be achieved through an instrument alarm or
information alert.
- Response involves confirmation, identification, assessment of the situation and health risk,
measures to protect the health of the personal and the population and secure the material. Such
response measures are typically defined in the national response plan and based on or
harmonised to the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The grade of
response depends on the severity of the individual situation [2].
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For law enforcement organizations, the term detection has a much broader meaning than detecting 
radiation from radioactive material by a portal monitor -or by any other instrument- or by information 
alert. Before the national response protocol is initiated, it must be confirmed that the alarm is real and 
generated by radioactive material out of control. Front line officers (FLOs) also have to determine, or 
at least, to estimate the radiological hazard and carry out measures for their own personal safety. 
These steps can be considered as initial response to instrument alarm or information alert. It is slightly 
overlapping with the response measures, but carried out at lower level [3].  
 
Identification of radioactive materials and radiological hazard assessment require dedicated expertise. 
Only experts with scientific background and experience can carry out an adequate assessment. 
Detailed and accurate analysis of such materials shall require accordingly laboratory conditions and 
proper experimental set up. Time is another important factor. The preparation of the measurement, the 
acquisition and the evaluation of the results can last for hours or days. On the contrary, at border 
check points laboratory conditions cannot be provided, there is a time pressure and the 
measurements have to be carried out by front line officers such as customs, police, border guards or 
security officers, who are in principle not in position to do such work. Therefore, investigation of an 
instrument alarm requires special equipment, straightforward but well-defined response protocol and 
trained front line officers.  
 
The European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) to address these concerns provides, 
among others, such dedicated training for front line officers. Over the past few years, many courses 
were provided and, consequently, experience is accumulated that we continuously use to enhance the 
quality and effectivity of the training courses. This paper focuses on mainstreaming to share 
experiences and good practices among international and national organisations active in the field of 
nuclear security training.  
 
 
2. The role of front line officers in nuclear security 
 
Detection and interdiction of radioactive and nuclear material emerges as a crucial duty of the customs 
and other border management to perform a vital community protection role in terms of preventing 
international terrorism, in addition to their "traditional" fiscal role in terms of tax collection, and their 
environmental and social role in terms of protecting public health and cultural heritage. In that respect, 
FLOs play an essential role in detection of material out of control as they are the first facing the case 
and they have to initiate the national response. They have to be able to operate radiation detectors, to 
understand the information provided by the equipment, to conduct secondary inspection with hand-
held devices, to maintain their personal radiation safety and to make "detain or release" decision. They 
also have to understand the principles of radioactivity, radiation detection and the general context of 
nuclear threat and security, even if very deep knowledge is not required. 
 
 
3. The European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) 
 
The European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) was specifically established by the 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission to complement the national training efforts 
and to support the member states of the European Union other countries in nuclear security. Based on 
the unique combination of scientific expertise, specific technical infrastructure and special nuclear 
materials available at the premises of the JRC in Karlsruhe, Germany and Ispra, Italy, EUSECTRA 
provides nuclear security training courses, such as radiation detection at border, train-the-trainers, 
mobile emergency response (i.e., MEST), reach-back, creation of national response plans, nuclear 
forensics, radiological crime scene management, nuclear security awareness and sustainability of a 
national nuclear security posture. The Centre serves also as platform for knowledge transfer and for 
networking experts.  
EUSECTRA is one of the few places in the world that can provide realistic scenarios including special 
nuclear material. The training program offers a unique opportunity for trainees to get experience in 
detection and identification of plutonium and uranium of different isotopic compositions. 
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4. Objectives of FLOs training 
 
The main goal of the training is to get FLOs able to adjudicate and response to radiation alarm and to 
determine whether it is caused by material out of control.  
To accomplish this goal the following main learning objectives are identified: 
- FLOs will understand  
- the threat of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material, 
- the role of their role in countering this threat,  
- the steps of response process to radiation alarm. 
- They will be able to  
- review instrument alarms,  
- use radiation detection equipment, 
- carry out secondary inspection, 
- maintain their personal radiation safety, 
- distinguish innocent and threat material, 
- initiate national response. 
 
The training is performance-oriented with the focus on hands-on exercises supported by lectures, 
case studies and table-top exercises. The curriculum was developed in an international coordination 
effort of the Border Monitoring Working Group using the Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) 
methodology. 
 
 
5. Practice and Experience  
 
5.1. Preparation  
 
Preparation for a course has to start with the logistic in weeks or even months before the training 
occurs. Although the general training material is ready and the practical scenarios are worked out, the 
presenters, who are typically not the developers of the lectures, need time to prepare themselves. The 
trainers also have to check the training facilities and the equipment, revise the training materials and 
prepare the training aids. It is also worth to studying the nuclear profile, the radiation detection 
infrastructure and the operational protocol of the country. 
The typical training course consists of 5 days. Lectures are generally given in the morning and hands-
on exercises carried out in the afternoon. According to our observations the most effective period for 
lectures is the first 2 days. The trainees are bright and alert, motivated and pay huge attention to the 
lectures. Thus, these 2 days are the best to provide the audience with the most important information. 
On the other side, on the first day they are typically the less proactive. On the last day the situation is 
actually just the opposite. They are very proactive but after 4 days can pay less attention to the 
lectures. This is important aspect to be taken into account when making the agenda. 
 
5.2. Lectures and exercises 
 
There is a logical sequence of lectures and exercises, that has to be kept. The first lecture is an 
overview on the general context of and the FLOs role in nuclear security. 
It is particularly important that the trainees receive all necessary information prior to the exercises. 
Before they take the equipment in their hand on the first afternoon, they have to receive an matching 
introduction, which is accordingly given on the first morning. 
The operational response protocol to an instrument alarm is the most essential part of the training. It 
describes step by step what the front line officers have to do in the case of an instrument alarm. They 
receive the lecture on Monday or Tuesday, and then they have to carry out hands-on exercises. Even 
if there is a general recommendation from the IAEA, the protocol is country and situation dependent. 
Thus, before the course it is worth to studding the protocol of the given country, to consult with its 
national atomic authority and, if possible, to invite and involve a national expert in the course.  
Some lectures are interactive involving a multiply-questionnaire about the key points. Each trainee is 
equipped with a clicker and can provide her answer anonymously. The benefit of such practise is that 
it keeps the trainees attention, makes them thinking and the trainer gets a feedback immediately if the 
audience understood the discussed point.  
In the second half of the course there are also many case studies presented and discussed step by 
step. The main objective of these studies is to learn and share good practices from previous cases. 
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Some of them are also interactive and the trainees have to decide what they would do in a given 
situation. It not just keeps the audience attention but also generates a discussion. The participants are 
also encouraged to present their cases during the discussion. 
 
The hands-on exercises have to be as realistic as possible involving entire detection equipment, real 
radioactive and nuclear materials and real-life scenarios and professional situations. The practical 
section is divided into four modules: (a) introduction to detection equipment, (b) pedestrian portal 
monitor exercises, (c) vehicle portal monitor scenarios, and (d) computer-based alarm evaluation 
activity. The practical exercises are complemented with a table top exercise (TTX) where nuclear 
security detection infrastructure and tactic can be challenged. Typically the trainees are split into 3 
working groups and 3 exercises are running simultaneously at 3 different locations. This pattern is, 
obviously, dependent of the number of participants. This specific set up requires lot of resources, 
preparation and manpower, but it is still the most effective way of training. The group size has a huge 
influence on the effectiveness. The working groups should not be larger than 8 persons since it would 
be difficult to keep everyone active. There are always very active trainees who would like to play the 
main role and others who would like simply to stay in the background. The trainers have to pay 
attention to that. The smaller the group the higher the effectivity, but it would require more main 
manpower and, as the groups have to work separated, more training rooms and equipment. 5-7 
people in a group is a good compromise. Each trainee can get a dedicated task, they can rotate the 
roles, and the trainer can follow their personal activities.  
There is a wide range of radiation detection equipment from different producers. In our training centre 
we have a number of different devices. In most cases we can provide the trainees with that they use at 
their duty station with few exceptions. Anyway, the international standards on nuclear security 
equipment ensure that the principals of operation are the same for all devices. If custom officers learn 
how to operate one device, they are able to use any other.  
 
 
5.3. Language barriers 
 
Language barrier is a real challenge for the trainers and has a strong effect on the effectivity. In an 
international training centre as EUSECTRA that provides training not just within the European Union 
but worldwide, this is an essential aspect to take into account. In many cases, the English practice of 
the front line officers is good enough to receive the training in English. However, they may need strong 
support to understand the lectures. The most important tool remains the actual presentations and 
consequently the individual slides. Preparing and giving lectures has its own science and practice, 
here we would like point out that we find especially important for our training: First of all, the bullet 
points of the lecture should particularly simple and clear. Either using just keywords or too complex 
messages degrades the comprehension. The speaker has to follow the bullet points more strictly than 
for native speakers and to use more common words that convey the message in simpler terms. 
Otherwise the audience might lose the line. It is especially important for the lectures involving 
instructions. In practical exercises it is easier to overcome the language barrier. The instructor can tell 
and demonstrate what the trainees have to do and see immediately if the message has arrived to the 
trainees.  
Many lectures may include scientific and technical explanations and typically given by trainers with 
scientific background. Scientists have their own specific terms and phrases that the front line officers 
might fail to understand. Even the most qualified technical experts and well-crafted course materials 
can fail to have impact if they do not communicate to the participants in terms that they can 
understand. This is another language barrier to be considered. 
In many instances, interpretation is than needed. In this case all lectures and training materials are 
translated to native language. The speaker may use English but the audience can see the translated 
lecture and listen to the interpretation. The disadvantage of using interpretation is that the trainer loses 
direct contact to the trainees. Interpretation is particularly difficult for practical exercises. Involving a 
national expert is very beneficial in such a situation, as they know the legal, scientific and technical 
background and can support the trainer. 
 
5.4. Course evaluation 
 
After the course is completed the effectiveness of the training has to be evaluated. The evaluation is 
based on the observation of the trainers and the feedback of the trainees. During the exercises the 
instructor can observe directly the FLOs performance development and identify difficulties and 
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possible improvements immediately. Directly after the course trainers identify what is needed to
improve performance and determine how the course could be better done.
Additionally, the facilitators may use breaks and other opportunities to poll participants informally
about their response to the activity as well as to give feedback to facilitators/trainers on techniques
that might improve effectiveness.
The trainees also have the opportunity to evaluate and rate the course anonymously using a multiply
choose questionnaire. This feedback is very valuable in helping us to refine the training program.
6. Summary
A large series of nuclear security courses for front-line officers, trainers and experts have already been
provided involving participants from many countries within and out of the European Union. The basic
radiation detection training to front line officers is the most demanded within the EUSECTRA training
portfolio. Since its official launch, EUSECTRA has hosted trainees in Karlsruhe and Ispra from over 70
different countries, including more than 1000 front line officers from all around the world, which have
benefited from the training provided.
Based on the feedback provided by the trainees and their respective national authorities it can be
concluded that the course fulfils its objectives. EUSECTRA trainings are indeed repeatedly
acknowledged by trained countries to be beneficial in terms of enhancing preparedness, detection of
and response to nuclear security events. EUSECTRA's unparalleled training opportunities lead to a
steadily increasing demand for training sessions. Yet, the EUSECTRA team is very committed to
improve efficiency, and gives effort to continuously enhance quality of the trainings at all levels.
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Abstract: 
Nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation are generally absent from academia curricula in nuclear science 
and technology. To fill this gap, the Working Group on Training and Knowledge Management of ESARDA 
developed a dedicated specialized course, which is organized on yearly basis by EC JRC in Ispra (Italy). 
Since the first course in 2005, 16 editions of the course with 40 to 60 students have been successfully 
organized. This compact course is open to master degree students, in particular nuclear engineering 
students, but also to young professionals and International Relations/Law students. It aims at 
complementing nuclear engineering studies by including nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation in the 
academic curriculum. The course addresses aspects of efforts to create a global nuclear non-proliferation 
system and how this system works in practice: The Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
safeguards technology, and export control. Also regional settings, such as EURATOM Treaty, are 
presented and discussed. The course deals in particular with technical aspects and application of 
safeguards: i.e. how to implement the safeguards principles and methodology within the different nuclear 
facilities. Therefore, the course presents an overview on inspections techniques, ranging from neutron/ 
gamma detectors, to design information verification, to environmental sampling, etc. Students attending the 
course and passing an examination, consisting on a multi-choice questionnaire and a written assay, are 
awarded three credits according to the ECTS (European Credit Transfer System) in their university 
curriculum. 
The paper presents the experience of 16 years’ experience of ESARDA course by also pointing out on it 
evolution during these years. Moreover, due the success of the course and the need of such initiative to be 
implemented out of Europe, DG DEVCO has funded, the program of this last development will be also 
presented. 
Keywords: Safeguards, Non-Proliferation, Education, Training, ESARDA 
1. Introduction
The knowledge retention issue in the nuclear field was acknowledged by the OECD in 2000. The United 
Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (2002) made detailed recommendations for 
urgently required improvements. In fact, nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation are generally absent from 
academia curricula in nuclear science and technology. Moreover, teaching in the Nuclear Safeguards field 
is indeed strongly influenced by national history so the objective of the ESARDA course is to provide 
homogeneous material in Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation matters at the European and 
international level. 
ESARDA, the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (Ref. 1), which is nowadays 
considered more and more as European forum/think tank in safeguards, non-proliferation and related fields 
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reacted to these shortcomings with a strategy to tackle the problem and created a Working Group on 
Training and Knowledge Management (ESARDA TKM WG) to setup academic course modules to an 
internationally recognised reference standard. The objectives of the ESARDA TKM WG are to promote 
nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation education and training in general and to setup and yearly 
organise the so-called ESARDA Course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. 
Since 2005 the Nuclear Security Unit, Nuclear Security and Safeguards Department, Nuclear Safety and 
Security Directorate, Joint Research Centre Directorate General of the European Commission in 
collaboration with ESARDA TKM WG collaboration has yearly organised the ESARDA Course. The last 
edition was organised in April 2017. In the following chapters an overview of the course is given including 
duplications of the course out of Europa. In fact, due to its success and the need of such initiative to be 
implemented worldwise, EC DG DEVCO funds the organisation of the course in several regions to enhance 
awareness of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. 
2. Organisation of ESARDA Course
The course is organised yearly in Ispra by JRC Nuclear Security Unit and features a full five-days program 
with lectures and practical exercises by international experts in the field of nuclear safeguards and non-
proliferations. The course includes visits to JRC Ispra safeguards laboratories. The session preceding the 
closing ceremony of the week course is dedicated to the evaluation of course in which a multi-choice exam 
is performed by the students and then discussed in a plenary. This exam contains questions on each of the 
topics dealt in the week. After that, a feedback on the course is asked to the students not only on the on the 
content of each of the lectures but also on the lecturers. In addition to examination performed during the 
ESARDA course, the students attending the course have a possibility, on their voluntary basis, to make an 
exam consisting on an online multi-choice questionnaire and a written assay. Then, if they pass they are 
awarded three credits according to the ECTS (European Credit Transfer System) in their university 
curriculum. Up to 2 best essays can be selected for being published in the ESARDA Bulletin or for being 
presented in the poster session at the ESARDA Symposium. 
The closing ceremony of ESARDA Course is dedicated to the delivery of participation certificates and 
closing addresses by the organisers and the participants. No course fee is requested to the registries. 
This compact course is open to master degree students, in particular nuclear engineering students, but 
also to young professionals and International Relations / law students. It aims at complementing nuclear 
engineering studies by including nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation in the academic curriculum. The 
basic aim of the course is to stimulate students’ interests in safeguards and non-proliferation. The course 
addresses aspects of the efforts to create a global nuclear non-proliferation system and how this system 
works in practice: The Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), safeguards technology, and 
export control. Also regional settings, such as EURATOM Treaty, are presented and discussed. The course 
deals in particular with technical aspects and application of safeguards; i.e. how to implement the 
safeguards principles and methodology within the different nuclear facilities. Therefore, it creates an 
overview on inspections techniques, ranging from neutron/gamma detectors, to design information 
verification, to environmental sampling, etc. 
The course material, consisting of a complete set of presentations and literature is provided to the 
participants which is also posted on the webpage of ESARDA. It also contains a link to the portal of 
NuSaSET (Nuclear Safeguards & Security Education and Training) (Ref 2) being an international initiative 
of the INMM (Institute for Nuclear Material Management), ESARDA and IAEA. This portal provides support 
to professionals in the field of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, specifically to promote the provision of 
training and education of students. 
As course material, the syllabus book of ESARDA Course (Figure 1) is also distributed to the participants. 
A new edition of the book is being under elaboration that will contain news chapters such as nuclear trade 
regulation, the utility of open-sources, monitoring and verification applications, nuclear security in context of 
international law and concepts. Additionally, few chapters will be updated such as those on DA and NDA 
techniques sued for safeguards and history of the evolution of safeguards and its international regulations. 
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Figure 1: ESRDA Syllabus edition 2008, a new edition is being prepared 
3. ESARDA Course Content and Participation
The major topics covered in the course are presented below. 
Introduction: evolution of the Non Proliferation Treaty - regime, safeguards, international control regimes 
in theory and practice. and present trends in the nuclear non-proliferation efforts. 
What is safeguarded: nuclear material that is subject to nuclear safeguards and related safeguards goals 
(significant quantity, timeliness and detection probabilities). 
Where: nuclear fuel cycle from mining to final repository, focussing on enrichment in the front-end and 
reprocessing in the back-end. 
Legal framework: overview on international and regional Non-Proliferation Treaties and established 
Institutions and Organisations. 
Verification methodology: nuclear material accountancy principles and statistics of auditing. 
Inspection tools: overview on inspector tools and their use to verify the nuclear activities (Destructive and 
Non-Destructive Assay, Containment/Surveillance); additional safeguards measures under the Additional 
Protocol (complementary access, satellite imagery, environmental sampling) and how they are applied in 
field (storage facility, process facility, enrichment facility, research institute, spent fuel transfer). 
Nuclear security: physical protection, import/export control of dual-use items, combating illicit trafficking, 
nuclear forensics. 
Non-proliferation: collection/analysis of open source data and case studies. Collection of open source 
data and demonstration of some case studies (Iraq, 1993). 
Approximately 60 students participate in each course with a majority from Europe. Figure 2 presents some 
information of the last ESARDA course (16th edition) held from 3rd to 7th April 2017 with a comparison on 
the participation with respect to the 15th edition. Lecturers are offered by JRC, EURATOM, IAEA, JAEA, 
DoE and many other organisations of EU Members States including other ESARDA members. 
Apart from students, the course is typically attended by professionals from: 
- Nuclear inspectorates (IAEA and EURATOM) 
- National authorities 
- Research centres 
- International organisations  
- Operators of nuclear facilities 
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Figure 2: Participation to the 16th edition of ESARDA Course held in Ispra on April 3rd-7th 2017 
Figure 3: Results of the exam of the 15th edition of ESARDA Course: Four over the five students that have 
made the exam have successfully passed. 
4. Towards the implementation of ESARDA course worldwide
An Administrative Arrangement was signed between JRC and DEVCO in 2016 (Figure 4) in view of 
provision by JRC of educational courses of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation, world-wide, based on 
the ESARDA course experience at JRC Ispra in the last 15+ years. Those course participants shall be 
adequately selected by the country beneficiaries in the perspective that some of the participants shall be 
future organisers of safeguards courses in their respective countries. The latter will enhance the suitability 
of the EU outreach effort in this field. Similarly, the planned creation of an “Educational Network” (i.e. 
bringing together future organisers for such safeguards courses across countries and regions) should 
support sustainability. 
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The project aims in a first instance at providing an academic basis for an educational course in a limited 
time of a week of classroom teaching. The academic recognition will be a duty of the partner country. In 
Europe this was achieved in the past by adding to the course itself the duty for the students to write an 
essay and take an exam (for a total of 3 ECTS points). It will depend on the specific universities and 
countries on how this can be translated outside Europe. In case academic recognition cannot be achieved 
under this project, the integration of the course in existing training packages and training centres will be 
aimed at. The course is so structured to ensure to the participants a good basis for performing safeguards 
activities and also for ensuring transfer of acquired knowledge in their countries which contributes to the 
sustainability of the project achievements. 
In agreement with DEVCO, the first contacts are already taken with two countries namely Algeria for north 
Africa Region and South Africa for south Africa region. The organizational work for the course in north 
Africa has started and it is planned for the end 2017 or beginning 2018. Other targeted regions will follow 
such as Iran, Vietnam, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Philippines, … The choice of countries is 
discussed/agreed with DEVCO in line with updated country or region priorities. 
Figure 4: Administrative Arrangement for Provision of Safeguards Education worldwide 
5. Conclusion
ESARDA as a whole is playing an important role as an European forum/think tank in safeguards, non-
proliferation and related fields. Additionally, its symposiums and meetings of its WGs make support 
successfully the mission of the association. ESARDA Course is well established and successfully 
organised over 16 years. Due to its success and the need promote safeguards and non–proliferation 
Training & Education networking, sustaining competences, ESARDA Course is presently under way being 
implemented worldwide. 
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ABSTRACT 
The innovative aspect of the Advanced Safeguards Measurement, Monitoring and Modelling 
Laboratory, AS3ML, subject of this paper, is that it aims to complement the classical approach of 
implementing nuclear safeguards by providing an innovative method to monitor the process of 
sensitive facilities such as Gas Centrifuge Enrichment and Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing plants and/or 
deploy innovative / smart sensors and technologies.  
AS3ML endeavors to enhance the “traditional safeguards measures” by the focus on and analysis of 
(other) process parameters, that may be used to understand & monitor better the whole plant.  
Some of new technologies investigated include: Indoor localization (RFID, UWB, Laser positioning), 
2D/3D Camera, ID (OCR) of cans, Investigative Inspector, pulse shape generator  to simulate 
Gamma and Neutron detectors 
The AS3ML is conceived as an R&D location, test bed, demo facility and training centre for innovative 
safeguards approaches where researchers, inspectors (and operators) can conceive and analyse 
different approaches (including competing technologies) for safeguarding nuclear facilities. 
The paper will describe techniques and approaches, not currently used in routine safeguards 
applications, including some recent return of experience on deploying AS3ML based approaches for a 
new way of safeguarding a plutonium storage location and an enrichment facility. 
Keywords : safeguards, modeling, process monitoring, innovative sensors, mass/volume 
1. Introduction
JRC started the development, a couple of years ago, of a new laboratory, baptized Advanced 
Safeguards Measurement Monitoring and Modelling laboratory (AS3ML), with the main scope to both 
modernize safeguards implementation and provide a test-bed, demo-site and training facility to look at 
new approaches, use of operator data, advanced sensors and innovative process monitoring 
technologies. 
This paper describes the current state of the laboratory, provides some examples of recent 
achievements and developments and an outlook on the future projects planned in AS3ML. 
The AS3ML is conceived as an interconnection of a number of distinct areas, each representative for 
a specific type of fuel cycle facility, but at the same time offering the opportunity to test out the use of 
certain techniques typically deployed in other areas. Another major emphasis lies on the tools used to 
enhance the inspector's analysis and interpretation skills to deal with multiple sensors, comparison 
between process modelling and measurement and diagnosis of anomalies in general. 
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2. The Mini-process/TAME/Mass-volume area
Reprocessing plants (RP) are among the most sensitive ones in the nuclear fuel cycle and safeguards 
inspectorates have always invested large effort to control them. JRC has an historical competence in 
supporting Euratom and IAEA inspections in reprocessing plants like La Hague, Sellafield and 
Rokkasho.  
In particular the TAME laboratory is especially dedicated to the development and validation of 
techniques used to monitor and account solutions of nuclear material in RPs and to train inspectors. 
The TAME facility is equipped with full-scale vessels similar to those installed in RPs and is located in 
the same hall of AS3ML. 
A demo and training area for simulation of processes in RPs is included in the AS3ML and has been 
equipped with reduced-scale vessels of different shapes (cylindrical, conical, slab, annular, harp,…) 
connectable with a choice of transfer systems (pumps, gravity, syphon,…). This allows reproducing 
and playing a broader variety of scenarios in management of solutions and associated monitoring 
techniques and to test the software used to monitor the process and train the inspectors in the review 
of data. 
Some R&D components associated to this is the development and validation of software for 
automated calibration of mass/volume measurement devices and for the tank calibration verification 
by continuous flow mode (upgrade of to VOLCAM.NET program). 
The signals to be monitored in such processes are pressure and temperature, from the pressure 
values the level and density values are then derived (trough calibration curves). New measurement 
devices are developed using the latest technologies in term of industrial data acquisition (OPC, 
Ethercat) and data transmission (OPC UA, data authentication and encryption). 
This new hardware makes largely use of Ethernet as a communication channel. The use of “Power 
over Ethernet” (PoE) will be tested in order to determine the advantages and disadvantages. It could 
help to simplify the design of future installation and so reducing also the wiring cost. 
The use of industrial standard for performing data acquisition using PLC is also one of the objectives 
of the facility. PLC code for acquiring the data could be written using the IEC 61131-3 standard then 
exposed them using the IEC 62541 (OPC UA also known as IIoT) standard and using IEC 61508 
(EtherCAT) standard to collect data from other real time devices. Some of those norms have been 
investigated to evaluate their advantage or disadvantage for a deployment for safeguard purpose and 
deployed in real facilities such as THORP, La Hague UP2 and UP3. The IEC 61131-3 standard is 
used to perform the data acquisition making use of IEC 61508 (EtherCAT). Further investigations are 
needed for IEC 62541 (OPC UA). 
Figure 1: Picture of the facility performing multiple solution transfer processes with different  types  of  
tanks  (cylindrical,  annular,  slab,  conical  and  others)  and  transfer systems (pumps) 
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3. Test and validation of software for data acquisition and analysis
The monitoring software tool, called DAI (Data Analysis and Interpretation) has been developed by 
JRC upon request of the EURATOM inspectorate and was initially specifically designed for process 
monitoring in RPs, even though its modularity and flexibility allows nowadays its use for monitoring 
most of the safeguards-relevant processes in all the nuclear facilities. This monitoring tool does more 
than just supervision: it interprets the signals and verifies the consistency and coherency with 
predefined criteria and without intervening in the process. These criteria are based on the design 
characteristics of the recipients and transfer mechanism. 
In the case of the solution process in a reprocessing plant, the signals are visualizing the solution 
properties (temperature, density) and tank levels. The change in tank level of the feeding tank is 
cross-checked against the corresponding change in tank level of the communicating process tank and 
the software verifies the coherency in total mass transferred. In particular the start of a transfer has to 
be recognized appropriately and that with the appropriate signal profile, that differs for siphon transfer 
and mechanical pumping. DAI is continuously monitoring/tracking nuclear material flow through a 
reprocessing plant, while verifying by cross-correlation if the total mass transferred is arrived at its 
destination in the tank downstream. 
The JRC’s software package for Process monitoring consist several modules: 
1. The data acquisition: to collect the data for the data historian (local buffering).
2. The data historian: allow real-time registering of data with timestamp (dead band and
compression). 
3. The data analysis kernel (DAI): to analyse and interpret the data collected from the process
control sensors and actuators. The central task of the DAI kernel is the recognition of 
exploited process cycles with the objectives to survey in real time the correct operation of 
the production process, to diagnose abnormal situations and to evaluate the process 
performance indicators and inventory balances of the batch cycles in real time. 
4. The relational database with results.
The numerical simulation of Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants presents many important challenges: 
1) Fluid properties: uranium hexafluoride is a heavy gas, having a density about 10 times larger
than air;
2) Flow conditions: the system works at low pressure (around 500 Pa) and with extremely small
flow rates, in the order of micrograms per seconds;
3) System complexity: plants contains hundreds or thousands of centrifuges;
4) Physical complexity: the isotope separation process takes place into centrifuges spinning at
hypersonic velocities.
A system level fluid-dynamic approach was designed and implemented using the advanced CFD 
software tool FloMASTER®. In order to model the complexity of the system, a bunch of custom 
components were implemented into the library. The most important one is the component capable to 
model a single centrifuge or a single stage of the cascade by providing the separative power of the 
centrifuge as a function of gas flow rate and the number of centrifuges in the stage (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2: System Level 1D FloMASTER Computation Fluid Dynamics model of Centrifuge/Stage 
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The numerical simulations performed with a complete  network cascade model  show that a system 
level approach is capable to model the main features of an uranium enrichment cascade plant on 
workstations in times ranging from few seconds to few hours depending on the length of the simulated 
times. In addition the simulations supply a reliable estimation of the cascade separation performances 
under normal and off - normal conditions. In particular it is possible to analyze the transient behavior 
of the centrifuges cascade physical parameters in case of material diversion and/or misuse activities. 
An example is illustrated in Figure 3 where are showed the transient curves corresponding to the 
stages product assays in case of a small addition of undeclared feed for an 11 stage cascade 
composed of “Rome” type centrifuges. 
Figure 3: Stages product assays transient effects in case of undeclared addition of UF6 feed ( Off – 
Normal condition) and successive restoration of UF6 normal feed ( Normal condition) at the input 
stage. 
4. Local and remote inspector offices
Future safeguards will make use more and more of unattended monitoring systems coupled with 
remote data transmission, provided that secure data transmission is granted. 
In order to test the data communication tools and protocols and to demonstrate the functionalities of 
the remote monitoring software, AS3ML will host two offices that will act respectively as the Local 
Inspector Office at the facility and the Inspectorate Headquarter. 
The equipment of the office areas will basically consist on high-end servers for collection and storage 
of data from the different other areas of the AS3ML, workstations for data retrieval and analysis from 
the inspectors, large screens to project synoptic of the facilities (with HD and 3D capabilities) and, 
when applicable, replicas of facility control rooms. 
Figure 4: Layout of the inspector offices area 
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The main requirements for the data transmission systems include: 
• The devices in the process should be able to communicate state-of-health and data to clients 
in the local office 
• Flexibility in adding/removing devices to/from the data transmission system 
• Monitors with Graphical User Interfaces (GUI) should allow displaying the facility layout and 
verifying the status of devices at the local office 
• The Headquarter Office should allow viewing the status of the process and access to a 
(limited) set of operator approved data 
• Communication between facility and local office and between local and HQ offices should 
include authentication features 
• Data communication between local and HQ offices shall have integrity strength to be 
managed by public internet (encryption) 
• Communication protocols should be compatible with international standards and make use 
as much as possible of proven industrial tools 
OPC-UA (IIoT), MQTT, AMQP) (MQTT = Message Queuing Telemetry Transport, AMQP  Advanced 
Message Queuing Protocol, OPC-UA = OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) is an industrial M2M 
communication protocol for interoperability developed by the OPC Foundation. It is the successor to 
Open Platform Communications (OPC). 
Figure 5 shows a generic scheme of a data transmission system including the main protocols used 
for data exchange (OPC-UA, MQTT and AMQP) 
Figure 5: From sensor to headquarter Data transmission system 
Figure 6 shows the use of data agent to provide Data to public or Private Cloud making use of any of 
the transmission protocol OPC-UA, MQTT or AMQP 
Figure 6: From sensor to CLOUD 
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5. The spent fuel pond area
Spent fuel ponds are the most sensitive part of nuclear power plants from a safeguards perspective 
and pose very specific needs in terms of safeguards. The fuel, once it has been used in the nuclear 
reactor, has to be kept in water to cool down before it can be removed and put in dry storage casks. 
Spent fuel is kept under strict control to avoid diversion, and the spent fuel ponds are constantly under 
video surveillance to detect undeclared activities. 
In some cases, for example in CANDU reactors, the small size of the spent fuel element and the 
plutonium contained in it require an even more strict control.  In the AS3ML is a small pond filled with 
water containing various mock-ups of the spent fuel racks with a platform, which is used to simulate a 
spent fuel pond and a bridge moving above where operators and inspectors can go to install and read 
seals. 
This facility gives a great opportunity to train inspectors from Euratom and/or IAEA and facility 
operators, on a one-to-one scale mock-up of an underwater storage, on the use of the ultrasonic 
sealing systems developed by JRC. This is particularly relevant for the JRC CANDU (in use in 
Romania – Cernavoda and Pakistan – Karachi) or the JRC La Hague (France) Sealing Systems, 
underwater ultrasonic sealing systems that require the handling of long tools to deploy the seal over 
the stacks containing the spent fuel (see figure 7). It is used as well to test new prototypes, as the one 
developed for ABACC to be deployed in Argentina, at Atucha nuclear plant.  The facility can be used 
also to train people over the use of other instruments, with the aid of a Cherenkov Effect simulator, 
that produce a light emission similar to spent fuels.  
On the side of the pool two mock-ups of dry storage casks have been installed and reproduce how 
the casks are sealed. These mock- ups are used to train inspectors on the use of Ultrasonic Optical 
Sealing Bolts, a new dual technology seal expressly designed by JRC for dry storage sealing. UOSB 
combines wire sealing (passive, like COBRA or active, like EOSS, RMSA or AOLS) with ultrasonic 
seals (see figure 8) 
A recent achievement, in addition to all training sessions done on underwater and dry storage 
ultrasonic sealing system is the validation of the prototypes used for ABACC.  The first prototype 
designed for the sealing of Atucha spent fuel pond, has been tested in the pond area. A mockup of 
the hangers was designed and validated the correct fitting of the locking mechanisms first in air and 
then in water (figure 9). It later happened that the prototype brought to Argentina fit perfectly well with 
the real hangers. The final design which will be tested in second half of2017 has been fine tuned in 
the same pond as well. For training purposes, even a copy of the pond and a mock up of the hangers 
was build to train inspectors and operators in Buenos Aires. 
Real spent fuel pond in Karachi, with racks 
sealed by JRC ultrasonic sealing bolts 
Mock–up of the Kanupp sealing racks (on the 
right) with associated handling tools 
Figure 7: Spent fuel pond in reactor and mock-up in AS3ML 
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Real CONSTOR dry storage cask in Ignalina 
(Lithuania) with Ultrasonic Optical Seal Bolts 
Mock–up of the CONSTOR cask used for training 
of inspectors 
Figure 8: Sealing of casks for dry storage of spent nuclear fuel 
Test of a ABACC sealing system prototype in the 
pond 
Mock–up of the hangers and test in air of ABACC 
prototype 
Figure 9: Specific tool development for use by ABACC 
6. The interim/final storage area
The storage area is conceived to test technologies and methodologies applicable to any kind of 
itemised facility, such as fabrication plants, nuclear material storages, reactors, interim and final 
storage of spent fuel, etc. The storage area is equipped with different types of technologies that can 
be used to identify, authenticate, localize and follow movements of items containing nuclear material 
in a plant, including radiation detectors, surveillance equipment, weighing scales and identification 
and localization devices.  
The storage area aims to support the development of integrated containment and surveillance 
systems, such as the ‘Unattended Combined Measurement System’ (UCMS) that was developed for 
monitoring the plutonium storage at the Magnox plant. It is also used to investigate concepts for the 
integrated analysis of data coming from different sensors and systems.   
Some of the technologies that are being developed, evaluated and demonstrated in the AS3ML 
storage area are the following: 
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Identification And Authentication 
RFID: Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has been used in various industrial and commercial 
applications for many years. The tags, which are attached to the objects of interest, modulate an 
electro-magnetic field that is emitted by a reader and generate a unique response. The latest 
generation of tags allows authentication and encryption with passive tags.   
3D laser for container identification. 
JRC develops systems for the identification and authentication of nuclear material containers using 
accurate 3D measurements of the container surface. For example, LMCV (laser surface mapping for 
containment verification) has been developed for the identification and authentication of dry storage 
containers. It uses triangulation-based laser scanning to acquire surface profiles of the container 
welds with micrometer accuracy which are used as a unique signature of the container, figure 10.  
Figure 10: LMCV mounted on dry storage casks in Canada during a field trial. 
Localization and Tracking. 
Localization of nuclear items and handling equipment is fundamental for the detection and tracking of 
safeguards relevant events in nuclear (storage) facilities. Commercial Indoor Position Systems use 
either radio- frequency (RF) and/or ultrasonic signals and require the installation of an infrastructure 
(beacons) in the facility. AS3ML will be used to demonstrate the use of the techniques in different 
application scenarios and investigate the suitability and limitations of the available products. 
Laser Positioning systems can be used for precise localization of items of interest and could be used 
for monitoring the declared movement of UF6 cylinders in an enrichment plant. The feed, product and 
tail material are contained in large and heavy containers that are moved using a special dedicated 
loading machine. Monitoring the movements of the loading machine can be a way to double check the 
declared movements of cylinders and therefore the transfers of nuclear material.  
7. Surveillance
 AS3ML has been used during the development and testing of various safeguards surveillance 
devices, in particular related to 2D and 3D laser systems: Laser curtains use laser scanners 
measuring the position of objects within a 2D plane. They allow detecting movements of pre-defined 
objects (i.e. according to size and shape) within a specified area of interest, see figure 11. Event 
detection based on laser scanners is more robust than change detection based only on optical 
imagery and is typically used to trigger optical surveillance cameras. Laser curtains are used for 
example in the UCMS in Sellafield and for monitoring movements over a fuel pond in La Hague. 
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Figure 11: detection principle by the laser curtain. Profile and reconstructed profile of a forklift truck 
as used in the UCMS. 
Considering the long development cycles in nuclear safeguards, the design of the future surveillance 
system will be starting soon. Optical surveillance cameras will remain the core of safeguards 
surveillance system. However, many other relevant sensor types are becoming available and a future 
system should be able to support multiple sensors and be flexible enough to integrate new sensors 
types as they become available. The following design principles should guide the developments of the 
future surveillance system (see figure 12): i) It uses a modular approach where the common 
requirements are separated from the sensor itself. ii) The hardware design is based on OEM 
components and is owned by the inspectorates. iii) The surveillance device is compatible with the 
existing infrastructure for remote data transmission and, for example, supports remote configuration 
and health checks. iv) The surveillance device supports different deployment scenarios (i.e. stand-
alone with local data storage, networked with and without remote data transfer.  JRC will support the 
development through the design, prototype development and evaluation phase as presented in a 
dedicated paper “Containment and Surveillance Systems – reflections on future technologies” in this 
2017 ESARDA meeting.  
Figure 12: Proposed structured of data gathering, transfer and storage. 
8. Simulation
Since the use of real nuclear material is not foreseen within AS3ML, the signal of radiation detectors 
will have to be simulated. Neutron counter and gamma spectrometer surrogates are under 
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development that will be able to reproduce the signal of a real instrument as a function of position and 
type of the item containing the nuclear material. 
9. Outlook
The AS3ML laboratory continues to be equipped and expanded, both based on innovative R&D 
results and on return of in-field implementation of new safeguards approaches. AS3ML offers itself as 
a testbed for new methodologies to be validated and thus is open for both safeguards inspectors, 
national authorities and nuclear fuel cycle facility operators.  
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Certification of Ultra-High Purity Pu-244 for Safeguards Applications 
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Anagha Iyengar3, Kerri Treinen2 
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Abstract: 
Following nearly 25 years of negotiation, preparation, and collaborative efforts between the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE), the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Department of 
Safeguards, and the Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), the U.S. 
National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Safeguards is finalizing 
production and certification of ultra-high purity plutonium-244 (Pu-244).  This newly fabricated Pu-244 
material will support the IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories’ (NWAL) need for a better Pu spike 
material for low-level analyses to address international nuclear safeguards challenges.  Before the end of 
2017, this joint effort will have produced and certified the highly-enriched Pu-244 (99.98% purity), thereby 
enabling accurate measurements of Pu in environmental samples and providing more than a century’s 
supply of Pu-244 certified reference material (CRM) for nuclear safeguards, nuclear forensics, and other 
scientific purposes.  This paper seeks to provide an overview of the historical origins of the cooperation, a 
timeline of the Pu-244 production, and its applications in support of IAEA safeguards. 
Keywords: Plutonium, Pu-244, Safeguards, Certified Reference Material, Network of Analytical 
Laboratories 
1. Background
Currently, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is fabricating ultra-high purity plutonium-244 
(Pu-244) reference material for use in bulk environmental sample analyses for safeguards. Pu-244 is 
used by many members of IAEA’s Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) as a spike isotope for 
quantification of Pu content, but stocks of this essential spike are nearly exhausted. Although discussions 
on fabrication of new sources of ultra-high purity Pu-244 began in 1991, technical preparations did not 
begin between the U.S., Russia, France, and the IAEA until more than a decade later. Following nearly 
13 years of work, the Pu-244 fabrication project is expected to be completed in 2018, with a new Pu-244 
reference material expected to supply the needs of the IAEA NWAL for many decades. 
In 2005, NNSA/DOE agreed to supply a small quantity of plutonium dioxide containing about 17.5 atom % 
Pu-244 to the IAEA, who subsequently negotiated an agreement with the Russian Federal Nuclear 
Center — Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF) to perform a two-phase electromagnetic separation 
to increase isotopic purity of the supplied material for the fabrication of a high-purity Pu-244 certified 
reference material (CRM). As it stands, 60% of the CRMs that will be produced in the US will be sent to 
the IAEA and 40% will be retained by the United States for domestic use. The feed material containing 
0.5 g Pu was delivered to VNIIEF in 2012, initiating the fabrication process.  
The first pass through the mass separator produced approximately 10 milligram (mg) of intermediate 
product. This product was sampled by the IAEA and a small quantity was shipped to LLNL in April 2013 
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for measurement of the isotopic composition. Both the U.S. and Russian measurements of the Pu-
isotopic composition were in agreement – the Pu-244 content had increased to 98.86%. This product 
material was used to feed the second round of separation, and test samples were received and analyzed 
at LLNL in January 2015.  
Results were reported to the IAEA in early 2015 that the Pu-244 content was > 99.98 atom%. The entire 
sample of the final product, denoted FP-33-2, was received at LLNL in May 2015 along with all residue 
and waste from VNIIEF. Approximately 800 micrograms (µg) of final product were recovered. As of 2017, 
190 reference material units have been prepared from this material. This high-purity Pu-244 will be 
extremely valuable to the safeguards analytical community for the analysis of environmental Pu and will 
improve analyses of very low-level Pu in safeguards environmental samples.  
1.1 Historical Context 
In April 1991, the needs of nuclear reference materials in the international safeguards community were 
assessed and discussed at the IAEA. The IAEA’s Safeguards Information Management division noted 
requirements for rare CRMs, especially those which would enhance measurement of plutonium 
concentration and isotopic composition. The meeting resulted in an agreement to fabricate ultra-high 
purity Pu-244 spikes, and VNIIEF offered its capability to perform the required separation for a low cost 
using an S-2 electromagnetic mass separator that can provide highly enriched isotopes,1,2  Following this, 
VNIIEF made improvements to the performance of the separator through modification of the ion source 
and isotope collector design and optimization of the material recovery procedures, all of which increased 
the feed utilization efficiency and the product yield [1]. The main stated goals of the project were to obtain 
100 mg of 99.5% Pu-244 for production of reference materials for nuclear material accountancy 
measurements and 1 mg of 99.99% Pu-244 for production of the isotopic spike required for environmental 
sampling (ES) analysis. 
The US, IAEA, and Russia agreed to and implemented the processing of 0.5 g of the source ‘FP-33’ 
material to the IAEA for transfer to and separation at VNIIEF on the conditions that the performance of the 
VNIIEF installation, and that the IAEA would oversee sampling and verification of the separation products. 
DOE also undertook the responsibility, upon return of the separation products, to produce certified 
reference materials and provide 60% portion of the finished product to the IAEA for use in nuclear 
safeguards and forensics applications [2]. Based on the agreed upon conditions and goals between all 
parties, the IAEA and VNIIEF negotiated a contract for separation of the FP-33 sample and production of 
highly-enriched Pu-244. In February 2012, the 0.5 g test portion of the source material was delivered to 
VNIIEF, and the work began after nearly 20 years of negotiations and arrangements. 
In early 2012, VNIIEF converted the provided FP-33 plutonium dioxide into trichloride, a working 
substance for electromagnetic separation, and used the feed in several batches. After separation of each 
batch, individual isotope fractions were extracted from the ion collectors, and dispersed material inside 
the separator was recovered and returned to feed. By October 2012, VNIIEF completed separation of the 
FP-33 test portion, and claimed that the primary product contained over 98.86 % Pu-244. In November 
2012, the IAEA arranged for sampling of the initial separated product and applied seals to the containers 
with aliquots intended for verification measurements. The IAEA tasked two members of NWAL to perform 
these analyses: V. G. Khlopin Radium Institute (KRI) in St. Petersburg, Russia, and LLNL. By April 2013, 
the results of the verification were found to be consistent and confirmed successful completion of the 
initial test separation. 
Following this, the parties involved proceeded with further purification of the test separation product, 
aiming to obtain 500 µg of 99.99% Pu-244 that would suffice for production of isotopic spikes for ES 
analysis. To maximize the amount of product, VNIIEF agreed to recover additional residues of the 
material derived from FP-33 and perform an extra cycle of separation; this work generated an additional 
0.7 mg of ~97.8% Pu-244, which later was combined with the test separation product to feed the second 
phase of separation. 
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In February 2014, VNIIEF was authorized to proceed with the second phase of separation using the 
combined first phase product: approximately 10 mg of Pu. In August 2014, VNIIEF reported that the 
separation work was completed. In October 2014, the IAEA collected samples of the final product and 
supervised the plutonium nitrate solution being evaporated to dry salt to facilitate its safe transportation. 
The results of the verification analysis performed by LLNL on this final product sample became available 
in January 2015 and confirmed the values reported by VNIIEF. The isotopic purity of the final product was 
> 99.98% Pu-244, falling slightly below the target for isotopic enrichment, however the yield (880 µg) far 
surpassed the expected value given that only 0.5 grams of starting material was used.   
The shipment of all the final product and waste materials associated with the mass separation at VNIIEF 
arrived at LLNL in May 2015. The bulk of the high purity material was contained in two 25 milliliter glass 
volumetric flasks: 1) Flask FP-33-2-A, containing 792 micrograms, and 2) flask FP-33-2-B, containing 7.5 
micrograms. During 2014, a dedicated laboratory was constructed for the preparation of CRMs in a new 
mass spectrometry facility at LLNL. The laboratory was outfitted with a class 100 laminar flow fume hood, 
a balance table and analytical balances, a high-purity water system, and a high-precision liquid 
dispensing system. A study of plutonium background in this laboratory was conducted through sampling 
and analysis of environmental swipes. The analytical detection limit was approximately 1 femtogram, and 
no environmental Pu was detected.  
During 2015 and 2016, the Pu-244 was prepared for the CRM. These steps included: transfer of the 
material from the two glass flasks and verification that the isotopic composition of each was identical; 
combination of the two and purification of the plutonium; verification that the post-purification isotopic 
composition had not changed; preparation of a master solution and dispensing of 190-5 milliliter aliquots 
of that solution into pre-weighed 30 milliliter fluorinated ethylene propylene (FEP) bottles. The mass of the 
master solution that was dispensed into these units was measured individually and each is expected to 
contain approximately 110 nanogram of Pu-244.   
In 2015, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) prepared a gravimetric Pu-239 standard from CRM 
126A Pu metal standard for use as one of the spikes for isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS) 
measurements of the Pu-244. This material was received by LLNL in September 2015. The other IDMS 
spike used was a unit of IRMM-086 Pu standard already available at LLNL, and a dilution of this was 
prepared in 2016. The Pu-239 content of these two standards has been certified by national metrology 
institutes (United States and European Union, respectively), and will be used in the certification of the 
molar content of Pu-244 in the CRM units. To achieve this, a random sample of 12 units were selected for 
spiking with the Pu-239 standards. Six were spiked with CRM 129A and six with IRMM-086. In addition, 
two special aliquots of the master solution (each 3 x 5 milliliter) were prepared at the mid-point of the unit 
dispensing process. Each of these is expected to contain approximately 330 ng of Pu-244. These special 
units were also spiked with the Pu-239 standards and were equilibrated, dried, re-dissolved, and each 
was split into three samples.   
Per an action sheet signed between DOE and Commisariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA, Île de France) in 
2015, three laboratories will oversee mass spectrometric analyses of the IDMS mixtures: LLNL, LANL, 
and CEA. Each lab will analyze two units spiked with CRM 126A, two units spiked with IRMM-086, two of 
the special units described above, and one un-spiked unit to determine the isotopic composition [3]. 
1.1.1 Pu-244 as a CRM 
Performance of the IDMS method strongly depends on the quality of the isotopic reference materials used 
– both purity of isotopic tracers and as well as precision of their certified values. The isotope which is the
least abundant in the sample analyzed is preferable for use as an isotopic tracer (spike). The most 
common isotope dilution tracers for plutonium mass spectrometry are based on the Pu-242 isotope 
generated in small quantities in commercial nuclear reactors. However, for ES application it is often 
required to reliably quantify Pu-242 itself; this is near-impossible when such a spike is used. 
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Pu-244 was recognized as the most suitable spike for low-level mass-spectrometric measurements of 
plutonium, allowing for accurate determination of all isotopes from Pu-239 to Pu-242 [4, 5]. However, the 
currently available reference materials based on Pu-244 are few and lack the isotopic purity required for 
ES analysis. These include New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) CRM-131 (former NBS SRM-996) and 
Central Bureau for Nuclear Measurements (CBNM) IRM-042/IRM-042a which were all certified in the 
1980s and have Pu-244 content just under 98%, and Pu-242 impurity slightly over 1.3%. 
Due to the need for an updated and more accurate CRM, the new high-purity Pu-244 is being prepared at 
LLNL for use in bulk environmental sample analyses for safeguards. When used as a spike, the low 
abundances of the other Pu isotopes in this new material will enable higher precision measurements of 
Pu-240/Pu-239 in the sample to be made at lower concentrations. There is a strong need for high-purity 
isotopic spikes at the IAEA, as typical analysis of environmental samples involves, among other 
techniques, bulk measurement of plutonium amount and isotopic composition by means of mass 
spectrometry with isotope dilution.  
1.2 Historical Technical Considerations 
During the early 1970s, 86 plutonium targets were irradiated in a high neutron flux reactor at the 
Savannah River Site (SRS) in the United States with the primary objective of producing gram quantities of 
Californium-252 (Cf-252). Until now, 65 of the original 86 irradiated targets remain unprocessed and are 
stored at SRS; their total inventory is several hundred grams of plutonium containing about 20 g of Pu-
244, which constitutes the majority of the existing global inventory of Pu-244 [6, 7, 8]. 
By the mid-1980s, a total of 21 irradiated targets were processed in several batches at the Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (ORNL) to recover Cf-252 along with curium, berkelium, and einsteinium byproducts. 
A plutonium fraction with ~17% Pu-244 was also recovered and partially electromagnetically separated in 
the ORNL calutrons to produce ~2 g of 98.5% Pu-244, designated for U.S. DOE research programs. A 
later reworking of another part of the plutonium fraction produced 1 g of ~97.8% Pu-244 for safeguards 
programs; this material ultimately was certified as Standard Reference Material (SRM)-996 [9]. 
When different options were considered for producing a new stock of material highly enriched in Pu-244, 
the remaining residues from the initial production campaigns, containing 14.2 g of plutonium (of which 
~17% was Pu-244), were judged to be the most suitable feed for an electromagnetic separation path, a 
route which would not involve reprocessing of additional irradiated targets. Even this least expensive 
option, however, would have only produced material with 94.3% Pu-244 and was estimated to have cost 
about $5M in 1986 dollars (more than double that amount if considered in 2017 dollars). With a lingering 
need for ultra-high purity Pu-244, various routes to fabricate the specialized Pu-244 material were 
explored, and talks with the IAEA and other international partners in the early 1990s led to work that 
began in the mid-2000s. 
1.2.1 Applications in Support of Safeguards 
Analyses of bulk environmental samples taken for safeguards purposes by the IAEA require 
measurement of femtogram to attogram levels of Pu isotopes. Pu-244 is used by the IAEA’s Network of 
Analytical Laboratories as the spike isotope for isotope dilution measurement of the Pu content of these 
samples. The present stocks of Pu-244 used by the NWAL contain relatively high levels of the other Pu 
isotopes, correction for which results in elevated detection limits for Pu and elevated uncertainty on the 
measurement of Pu isotopic ratios. Use of the new high purity Pu-244 reference material will increase 
confidence in the results supplied by the IAEA NWAL for safeguards evaluations and will supply the 
needs of the IAEA NWAL for decades to come. 
The isotopic purity of the newly fabricated Pu-244 material is greater than 99.98 % Pu-244, with 0.0040 % 
Pu-240 and 0.0012 % Pu-239. This purity is significantly greater than other Pu-244 spikes currently used 
by the NWAL. As is known, such high-purity Pu-244 would be extremely valuable to the safeguards 
analytical community for the analysis of environmental Pu. 
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1.2.2 How does Ultra High Purity Pu-244 Compare? 
NBL’s CRM 131 (NBS SRM 996), the current go-to standard, is only 97.87 % Pu-244, also containing 
0.68 % Pu-240 and 0.034 % Pu-239, respectively. However, this CRM is no longer available to the public. 
The figure below shows the error magnification that occurs using the new spike vs. CRM 131.  Detection 
limits of state-of-the-art analytical laboratories are in the femtogram range. For the parameters shown, the 
240Pu/239Pu ratio can be measured in one femtogram of Pu at about 10% uncertainty using the new ultra-
high purity spike, whereas it could not be measured at all using the CRM-131 spike (uncertainty > 100%). 
When used as a spike, the low abundances of the other Pu isotopes in the newly fabricated Pu-244 CRM 
will enable higher precision measurements of Pu-240 and Pu-239 in the sample to be made at lower 
concentrations, and will increase the confidence in the results for safeguards evaluations. Further, 
assuming that analysis of one swipe sample can require up to 10 pg of Pu isotopic spike, and with a 
tenfold margin introduced to account for various QC measurements, one CRM unit containing 0.1 µg Pu-
244 will be sufficient for analysis of 1000 samples, which covers the IAEA annual needs. 
Table 1: Error magnification that occurs using the new spike vs. CRM 131. 
2. Current Developments
In 2017, LLNL will send samples of Pu-244 and the IDMS mixtures described above that are needed for 
the certification measurements to CEA and LANL. The three labs (LLNL, LANL and CEA) will analyze the 
samples and report results with uncertainty budgets to LLNL and NIST, who will make independent 
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calculations of the mole content of the Pu-244 units. Upon completion of the measurement and reporting 
requirements, LLNL intends to compile the data and report these results to CEA and LANL. The final 
analysis report will be sent to NIST for review and evaluation relative to the certification criteria of the 
institute, and if acceptable, NIST will file the certification report for further review. 
2.1 Quality Assurance Protocols 
The limited supply of this irreplaceable material warranted an elevated level of care to produce a high-
quality Certified Reference Material while minimizing the potential for degrading or otherwise wasting the 
material. At LLNL, Quality Assurance Protocols were enacted to ensure the integrity of the Pu-244 
material in its preparation as a CRM, including but not limited to: 
• Balance and weight sets calibrated annually (ISO 17025) [10];
• Balance linearity checks;
• Detailed experimentation to demonstrate quality control (e.g., viability of using H3PO4 as a
fixative; evaporation potential from standard units);
• Laboratory environmental monitoring system measures temperature, humidity, and barometric
pressure (for buoyancy correction);
• Use of ultra-high purity acids
• Screening all prepared reagents for Pu and other interfering isotopes;
• Detailed notes and records management;
• Control charts for Quality Control samples maintained for Multicollector-Inductively Coupled
Plasma Mass Spectrometer (MC-ICP-MS) instruments;
• Analytical plans shared with NIST colleagues prior to execution;
• Staff training, good housekeeping, etc.
These protocols, among others, were used to ensure the safety, security, and integrity of the samples 
throughout their lifecycle.
To date, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) provided metrological oversight of this 
project, assisted in the development of the project plan and has observed or approved all work performed 
at LLNL. NIST will also evaluate the results provided by the analytical laboratories for the IDMS mixtures 
and will determine whether those results, along with the preparation and analysis plans and other 
documentation of the work done at LLNL and LANL, are suitable to allow the certification to proceed. 
Ultimately, it is expected that the units will bear NIST labels and certificates.
3. Upcoming Developments
It is expected that the analyses at LLNL, LANL and CEA will be completed before August 2017, and the 
reports will be sent to both NIST and LLNL for independent evaluation and comparison. Standard 
statistical methods will be used to evaluate any bias between laboratories, any bias between results from 
the two Pu-239 standards used, and to determine if there are any outliers. The results of this evaluation 
will determine whether any additional verification measurements will be needed.  Upon completion of this 
evaluation, the units will be labeled and prepared for shipping and storage in heat-sealed Mylar bags. In 
early 2018, these units could be distributed with “provisional” certificates of analysis as needed, and the 
final certificates would be sent when available later in the year. 
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4. Conclusion
Following decades of preparation and collaborative work across several continents, mass separation of 
several hundred micrograms of Pu-244 was completed recently under the direction of the IAEA at the 
VNIIEF. The U.S. Department of Energy had originally provided 0.5 grams of FP-33 plutonium material to 
the IAEA, which transferred the material to VNIIEF in Russia for isotopic separation under the terms of a 
2005 Memorandum of Understanding. The product of the first pass of the material through the isotope 
separator at VNIIEF was 98.86 atom % Pu-244. The second and final pass through the separator 
produced a high-purity product that was measured at LLNL to be greater than 99.98 atom % Pu-244, and 
is being fabricated at LLNL as a CRM. Upon completion of the fabrication, it is expected that 60% of the 
prepared units are intended to be returned to the IAEA. The CRM is expected to be a valuable asset to 
the IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories for use as an isotope dilution spike to measure 
environmental Pu for nuclear safeguards.  
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Innovative Developments in Destructive Analysis for Safeguards 
A. D. Dougan1, A. M. Krichinsky1, A. P. Belian1, M. N. Fisher1
1NNSA Office of International Nuclear Safeguards 
Abstract 
The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration’s (DOE/NNSA) Office of 
International Nuclear Safeguards is sponsoring the development of innovative technologies applicable to 
nuclear materials safeguards. In particular, one primary area of development applies to destructive 
analysis (DA) methods and technologies of uranium- and plutonium-bearing materials. This paper will 
discuss trends in sample acquisition, prioritization, pretreatment and analysis, some of which focus on 
mass spectrometry. For instance, ongoing work in the DOE/NNSA DA portfolio covers the testing of 
several improved ion sources for mass spectrometers and options to collect uranium hexafluoride in solid 
form for shipment, all in addition to overviews of several planned field tests. Stakeholders in destructive 
analysis should be encouraged by the improvements underway that can lead to more efficient processes 
in this traditionally costly and time-consuming aspect of safeguarding nuclear materials.  
Keywords: safeguards, development, destructive analysis, mass spectrometry, calibration 
standards. 
1. Introduction
The mission of the Safeguards Technology Development (SGTech) Program is the development and 
application of tools, technologies, and methods that improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
international nuclear safeguards in support of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at both the 
facility and state levels.  SGTech focuses its initiatives on refining, adapting and testing existing or 
emerging technologies and methods, to employ these techniques or tools in the near-term (within 3-to-5 
years) for IAEA safeguards applications or for manufacture by commercial vendors. 
Safeguards technologies can be categorized in various ways, but the SGTech Program portfolio 
breakdown is typically organized within the following profiles: 
· Destructive Analysis (DA);
· Nondestructive Analysis;
· Containment and Surveillance;
· Standards and Infrastructure;
· Data Management.
This paper focuses on SGTech efforts at improving the efficiencies in its first portfolio, Destructive 
Analysis, which encompasses measurement technologies and methods that alter samples in the process 
of characterizing them.  Several DA technologies under development across DOE laboratories are 
intended to improve efficiencies of analyzing environmental (or “swipe”) samples (ES), often conducted in 
the IAEA Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL), while other improvements are intended for 
application in the field (such as during sample acquisition).  This paper also will touch on standards being 
produced to maintain and improve current DA capabilities. 
2. Current DA development projects
For safeguards applications, DA techniques serve two general purposes: 
1. Analyze nuclear material to quantify declared inventory;
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
513
2. Analyze ES to detect undeclared nuclear activities. 
Most of the SGTech focus addresses the second of these purposes, developing technologies for 
analyzing ES, although some initiatives support analyzing declared nuclear material as well.  A correlated 
goal is to produce techniques that are field-ready or provide for portable solutions to aid inspectors in 
supporting DA.  
 
2.1 Improve efficiency and effectiveness of current methods  
 
Mass spectrometry (MS), a technique in support of DA, is a key analysis technique in the IAEA program 
for bulk analysis of ES.  The current method for analysis of swipe samples utilizes high-precision, multi-
collector, mass spectrometry to produce highly accurate and precise isotopic data.  Two SGTech-
supported projects, such as the cart-portable MS system and automated clean chemistry system, involve 
the application of MS in safeguards.  
 
2.1.1 Cart-portable mass spectrometry system – a downsized benchtop mass spectrometer for 
enrichment measurements 
 
In response to growing difficulties in transporting gaseous UF6 samples from inspection sites to analytical 
laboratories, there is interest in deploying an MS capability in enrichment facilities.  To address this need, 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is downsizing and modifying a benchtop MS system based on a 
Thermo Scientific Quadrupole-Ion Trap MS so that the system can be nearly self-contained (now 
requiring only hood ventilation and electric power) and be transported on a hand cart [1].  (See Figure 1.)  
Three improvements are particularly notable, and are discussed below. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Cart Portable Mass Spectrometer (left) and Sample Manifold (right) in a 6-foot-wide hood. 
 
Downsizing: Although it retains its benchtop cabinet, key internal parts (most notably, the vacuum 
chamber) have been downsized to about ¼ its original size. This not only reduces the device’s weight by 
almost half (from 68 kg to 36 kg), it also allows commensurate reductions in much of the infrastructure 
such that some external supporting components and added features could be included within the 
benchtop cabinet.  The added features include purges and gas-absorbers intended to protect internal 
components most vulnerable to fluoride corrosion.  An outcome of this downsizing effort is a major 
reduction of the vacuum pumping system which demands most of the electric power needs for MS. 
 
Combining CO2 with UF6: Originally, CO2 was added simply to UF6 to dilute the corrosive effects of the 
fluorides present; however, it was found that introducing the mixture of gases also improved the ionization 
efficiency which, typically, is the first step upon feeding a sample into an MS system. 
 
Automating gas sample mixing: Initial tests mixing CO2 and UF6 demonstrated a need to closely control 
the mixture to ensure reproducible results. To achieve this, a sample manifold (SM) was designed, 
fabricated and tested, with subsequent tests demonstrating the intended reproducibility.  The sample 
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manifold included P-10 bottles for upper- and lower-range calibration gases, mixing chambers for 
calibration gases and sample gases, exterior connections for sample bottles, and a programmable logic 
controller for single-touch operation of vacuum pump-down, gas mixing, introduction, purging and 
shutdown.  Interestingly, the SM can be a beneficial add-on to any MS system used for analyzing 
corrosive gases. 
 
So far, and without comprehensive optimization of feed-gas mixing ratios, the cart-portable MS system 
has demonstrated a precision of <1%, with a measured variation of 0.5% to 0.8%, over 1 hour of 
sampling (that is, it approaches international target values for isotope dilution mass spectrometry). 
 
2.1.2 Automated clean chemistry system – an automated sample preparation system for MS 
 
Samples are prepared for MS by extensive purification procedures to isolate actinide elements from 
commingled materials, thereby reducing interferences and minimizing matrix effects.  For ES – where 
entire sample contents are analyzed, not just portions thereof – preparations include ‘ashing’ [or a total 
destruction the sample substrate (typically, a cloth swipe)], dissolution of the contents, separation of 
actinides to avoid confounding results due to presence of isobars, matrix reduction and conversion (acid 
dry-downs), and sample spiking with well-known tracer isotopes (for concentration measurement).  These 
preparations are time-consuming, repetitive and require chemical experts to manipulate samples before 
introduction into a mass spectrometer.  By automating this process, ORNL will simplify, streamline, 
reduce the possibility of contamination, and reduce costs and errors [2].  (See Figure 2.)  
 
 
Figure 2.  
Commercially available, 
operational sample 
preparation system.   
Upper cabinet shows 
the clean sample 
manipulation enclosure.  
Open doors on lower 
cabinet reveal reagent 
storage (bottom shelf) 
and, on the upper shelf, 
resin reservoirs (left), 
syringe pumps (right) 
and columns and 
mixing valves (mounted 
on the wall behind the 
syringe pumps). 
 
 
Cleanroom-level enclosure: Analyses of ES – intended to identify and quantify only trace amounts of 
materials on swipe samples – require that analyses and their preparations be conducted in cleanrooms 
certified to International Standards Organization (ISO) criteria.  Commercially available, automated, 
sample-preparation systems allow incorporating enclosure options capable of emulating cleanroom 
processing environments without the infrastructure of a typical, ISO-certified cleanroom.  This option was 
included in the U-Pu separations system discussed below, and demonstrated to be an effective 
cleanroom alternative as evidenced by blank-sample results, obtained using the enclosed system located 
in a regular chemical laboratory, that equaled or surpassed blank-sample levels determined by manual 
chemistry performed in a Class 100 cleanroom.  [It is noted that this encouraging performance was 
achieved on a new system vented to a radiological hood; its ability to maintain that cleanliness is yet to be 
confirmed.] 
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U-Pu separations: The first achievement in this area involves separating low concentrations of uranium 
and plutonium from “ashed” swipes.  This separation uses a previously developed ion exchange column-
separations system, equipped with a proprietary assembly of valves and pumps that control sample flow 
throughout the process.  System testing demonstrated very good performance as evidenced by sample 
content determination (well within IAEA data quality limits) and no cross-contamination between samples 
(based on alternate blank-sample runs).  A significant decrease in hands-on chemists’ time from 9.8 
hours to 0.6 hours was demonstrated for a seven-sample run when the amount of personnel time 
necessary for successful manual was compared respectively to automated chemical separations.  This 
documented reduced labor commitment translates to a significant cost savings per sample.  Overall, the 
system will enable faster sample reporting times at reduced costs by limiting expert-personnel hours 
dedicated to the chemical separation.  
 
The commercial U-Pu separations system has other cost- and labor-saving options which are under 
current investigation; these include automated spiking of tracers used in isotope dilution mass 
spectrometry (IDMS), and an integrated barcode reader for high fidelity sample tracking. 
 
Automating other sample preparations: Other commercially-available off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment 
is being evaluated this year for potential time and cost savings for ES preparation include: 
· Rapid matrix reduction and conversion – multiple dilutions and evaporations intended to adjust 
concentration or to convert the acid form automatically, rather than occupying a chemist during 
several hours of processing; 
· Microwave ES swipe ashing – a microwave oven system equipped with an automatic sampler (for 
interfacing directly with the U-Pu separations system) to replace the protracted, labor-intensive 
furnace ashing or acid digestion. 
 
2.2 Adapt new techniques to DA applications 
 
In safeguards, DA encompasses sample acquisition, sample preparation, sample analysis, data 
evaluation, and results reporting.  Currently, the SGTech program is adapting technologies addressing 
the first three aspects of the DA process:  sample acquisition, preparation, and analysis described briefly 
below.  
 
2.2.1 NuGoo – a gel coating for environmental sampling of porous surfaces 
 
NuGoo is a UV-curable, peelable coatings being developed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL) to improve the efficiency of ES acquisition – especially where only trace amounts of material 
present [3].  These coatings also promise to enable sampling surfaces not amenable to current swipe-
sampling techniques – that is, porous surfaces such as meshes (e.g., fabrics) or cracked solids (such as 
wood grains, corroded metal, etc.).  Liquid gels are being combined with additives that chemically target 
and affix analytes, and allow for extraction from surfaces.  Rapid curing using a pocket ultraviolet LED 
lamp makes this an attractive option to swipe sampling.  
 
The NuGoo sampling process takes about two minutes, only slightly longer than swipe sampling – but is 
expected to be well worth the gains in efficiency.  (See Figure 3.)  It involves applying a stencil (to aid in 
peeling) and the gel coating; waiting for a short period to allow analytes to loosen from the surface and 
migrate into the uncured gel; curing the gel with a pocket UV LED lamp (~30 seconds); and peeling the 
stencil and cured gel.  Preliminary testing indicates sampling efficiencies >50%.  With increased 
efficiency, commensurately improved actinide detection sensitivity is anticipated. 
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Figure 3.  NuGoo in use. 
 
2.2.2 DNDG – Delayed-Neutron/Delayed-Gamma (DNDG) screening of ES  
 
The IAEA has expressed interest in using J-swipes for ES of hot cell interiors.  Because of the 
anticipated, high activity levels for these samples, they cannot be analyzed in NWAL laboratories (which 
specifically focus on ES analysis) due to their extreme sensitivity to elevated backgrounds. To address 
the need for analyzing J-swipes with isotopic specificity, ORNL is combining the results of delayed 
gamma (DG) counting with delayed neutron (DN) counting [4]. 
 
J-swipes are 1½-inch-diameter swipes currently used by inspectors as Pre-Inspection Check Samples 
(PICS) of their clothes.  Currently, PICS are analyzed by DN counting – a highly sensitive method 
(currently capable of picogram detection levels) which detects neutrons emitted upon decay of neutron-
rich fission products formed in the sample during irradiation.  DN counting infers the presence of fissile 
material which is quantified in terms of the equivalent mass of 235U.  However, it does not provide fissile 
isotope specificity.  This lack of specificity is sufficient for PICS, but is not adequate for ES intended to 
provide specific evidence of undeclared nuclear activity. 
 
DG counting provides insight into the presence of specific fissile isotopes based on the profile of fission 
products (FP) present and the photons emitted after irradiation.  Fission results in a bimodal distribution 
of lighter and heavier FP that depends on the parent fissile isotope.  This distribution is shifted somewhat 
– more notably for the lighter FPs than for the heavier ones – to an extent that the ratio of the yield of a 
light fission fragment to a heavy fission fragment is parent-isotope specific.  (See Figure 4.)  When 
combined with the equivalent mass of 235U, specific quantities can be determined for individual fissile 
isotopes present in a sample.  This combined method will provide a new technique for inspectors to 
determine undeclared activities in hot cells. 
 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
517
 Figure 4.  Graph showing linearity of photopeak ratios for 357keV and 974 keV photons 
from 104Tc and 132Sb, respectively, when plotted against 239Pu fraction in a U-Pu mixture. 
 
2.3 Improve data analysis methods 
 
The IAEA’s analysis of ES requires data interpretation and analysis using expertise in reactors and 
facilities. One of SGTech’s projects applies to DA and is aimed at improving the way data are analyzed.   
 
INDEPTH – an Inverse Depletion Theory (INDEPTH) code 
 
The current interpretation of ES analyses rely on expert knowledge to manually identify the best matches 
of predicted data to measured data.  The INDEPTH code – which was developed by ORNL and uses 
search routines that automatically pair irradiation history and fuel design parameters to measured data – 
is being adapted to interpret analytical results from ES [5].  Automatically matching the irradiation history 
and fuel design parameters to ES measurements will help analysts characterize irradiated nuclear 
material and verify its origin with greater speed and confidence.   
 
 
Figure 5.  ORIGEN isotope depletion and decay code generates scenarios which help interpret ES data. 
 
Adaptations for ES include a user-friendly graphical user interface, streamlined inputs and outputs 
tailored to IAEA’s ES mission, and a thorough validation of the results using a set of realistic scenarios 
and measured data.  The modified version of INDEPTH will help IAEA scientists to meet verification 
requirements using analytical results provided by the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL), and to 
identify undeclared nuclear activities. 
 
2.4 Provide calibration standards for maintaining or improving capability
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Standards are a crucial component for instrument calibration and benchmarking to aid in maintaining 
instrument performance thereby ensuring consistency from one analysis to the next, and for identifying 
and eliminating bias between laboratories performing similar analyses on samples.  SGTech is involved in 
the production of two types of standards, including 1) spike standards that are added to liquid samples as 
part of the protocol for IDMS, and 2) particle standards used to analyzing microscopic particulate material 
by secondary ion MS.  
 
2.4.1 Spike standards 
 
Two sets of spike standards are being produced at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 
to increase confidence in the results supplied by the IAEA NWAL for safeguards evaluations.  These 
standards are being produced using ultra-pure 244Pu and 233U materials to improve the precision of trace 
plutonium and uranium analyses in ES respectively [6]. (See Figure 6.)  In 2016, a dedicated laboratory 
was established at LLNL for preparing reference materials (RM). This year, approximately 200 µg of 
>99.98%-pure 244Pu were processed into 190 RM units, with each unit containing approximately 100 ng of 
pure 244Pu material.  Sample units were selected and prepared (by 239Pu spike addition) for independent 
evaluation at two other laboratories; these units will be analyzed later this year.  Standard statistical 
methods will be used in evaluating the results to identify any bias between laboratories or between results 
from the two 239Pu standards used, and to determine if there are any outliers.  In 2018, the analytical 
results and statistical analysis for the 244Pu RM units will be evaluated by the certifying authority – the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) – leading up to their issuing the 244Pu RM 
certification.  Also next year, a nearly identical process will begin for producing 233U RM for certification, 
although these units will likely contain close to 1 mg of this pure isotope.   
 
 
Figure 6.  Graph showing improvement in IDMS precision for trace (femtogram-level) plutonium in ES 
using the new UHP spike (blue line) when compared with the current spike (CRM-131; red line). 
 
2.4.2 Calibrated particles 
 
To meet the growing demand for a reliable and universal approach to generating U particle reference 
material, two techniques are being tested:  1) chemical formation, and 2) printing technology. The 
proposed chemical pathways allow the fabrication, purification and stabilization of colloidal dispersions of 
actinide material to within a fixed particle-size range.  Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and 
LANL are exploring different synthetic approaches for particle creation are being evaluated, tested and 
then optimized for producing particulate material of monodispersed size, singular composition and 
density, uniform morphology and tailored isotopic abundances [7].  (See Figure 7.) 
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 Figure 7.  Progressively enlarged images of monodispersed particles deposited on a carbon planchet. 
 
An inkjet printing technique is being developed at LANL to create depositions of particulates of known 
mass, in known locations with separations of 10-20 micrometers.  The basic technology involves a COTS 
piezoelectric MEMS (microelectromechanical systems) printer to deposit known concentrations of 
solutions on a silicon or carbon substrate with known volume, in the 1-10 picoliter range, and then in the 
sub-picoliter range.  Developing this technology requires precise volume and position control for 
deposited droplets, and the development of a basic methodology to control and optimize depositions. 
Depositions will be characterized in terms of physical properties such as diameter, thickness and 
uniformity. 
 
3. Upcoming Technology Competitions 
 
When different techniques promise to achieve the same or similar improvement in efficiency, then a side-
by-side challenge provides a convenient method for evaluating the relative merits of one technology over 
another, if they are at similar points in their maturity and if they can be tested under similar circumstances.  
SGTech has used this competitive approach in the past, and is preparing to do so in two areas of the DA 
cycle:  sample acquisition and MS feed ionization. 
 
3.1 Innovative UF6 Sampling Techniques 
 
Sampling, shipping, and analyzing UF6 gas poses many logistical and technological challenges.  
Investment in sampling technologies to mitigate said challenges has resulted in three similar pathways – 
all using the controlled hydrolysis of corrosive UF6 gas to a solid and relatively benign uranyl fluoride.  
(See Figure 8.)  Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is developing an alumina-pellet approach called 
HORUS, a Handheld Operation for Rapid Uranium Sampling, which is based on the Cristallini method of 
the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control’s (ABACC’s), while LANL’s PADDA (Planar 
Alumina-based Deposition for Destructive Analysis) uses a commercially available anodized alumina disc 
to collect and stabilize milligram quantities of UF6 [8].  PNNL’s Single-Use Destructive Assay (SUDA) 
sampler uses a thin film of zeolite on a disc substrate to collect and stabilize milligram quantities of UF6 
[9].  The three UF6 DA sampling technologies will be tested side-by-side in a competition taking place in 
two phases:  first using only depleted UF6 (DUF6) as a test run, and the second using uranium at a variety 
of enrichments. Each technology will be evaluated based on criteria such as compatibility with facility 
operations, ease of transport, suitability for analysis by various methods, and cost.  
 
Carbon 
Planchet 
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Figure 8.  Three UF6 gas sampling devices are being tested competitively:  LANL’s PADDA (left), 
ANL’s HORUS (upper right), and PNNL’s SUDA sampler (lower right). 
 
3.2 Innovative MS Ion Source Technologies
 
As part of the effort to create a more-portable mass spectrometer (MS), three ionization systems (also 
referred to as ion sources) were developed at LANL and PNNL over several years.  (See Figure 9.)  
Laser ablation/ionization (LAI; at LANL) uses a laser to desorb and ionize uranium samples from a planar 
sample surface (e.g., planchet) [10].  Atmospheric pressure glow discharge (APGD; at PNNL) ionizes a 
liquid sample in a plasma formed between two electrodes near the MS sampling cone [11].  Substrate-
enhanced laser desorption and ionization (SELDI; at PNNL) uses pretreated planchet to enhance laser 
energy utilization in ablating and ionizing the sample absorbed onto the surface [12].  Development of 
these systems is coming to a decision point for which competitive performance testing is warranted to 
facilitate down selection to the best-performing technology.   
 
 
  
Figure 9.  Three MS ion source technologies are being tested for UF6 analysis:  LANL’s LAI (left), LS- 
PNNL’s APGD; and PNNL’s SELDI.  
 
Field testing of each ion source is to be conducted on two different benchtop MS platforms for a 
comprehensive performance comparison that considers MS system differences.  Several performance 
measures will be used to compare the ionization techniques including:  efficiency of pure ions production; 
results accuracy, precision, bias and relative standard deviation; limits of detection; analysis time; and the 
amount of sample needed to achieve reported results.  The competition is scheduled to be conducted 
early in FY2018. 
 
4. Concluding Summary 
 
The SGTech mission focuses on achieving measureable improvements in international safeguards by 
adapting emerging or existing technologies to address a safeguards function within a relatively short 
period.  The main customer of these improvements is the IAEA with a particular focus on efforts to 
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improve efficiencies and effectiveness in all aspects of safeguards inspections, to ease the burden on 
inspectors in the field, and to improve confidence in drawing safeguards conclusions.  The projects 
mentioned above showcase technology development in the destructive analysis area.  Similar efforts are 
being pursued in nondestructive analysis technologies, containment and surveillance, and data 
management. 
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Abstract: 

Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) is the uranium compound typically involved in uranium enrichment 
processes. As the first line of defense against proliferation, accurate determinations of the uranium 
isotopic ratio (or enrichment) in UF6 are critical for materials verification, accounting and safeguards. 
Currently, mass spectrometry (MS) is the most sensitive measurement technique for analysis of stable 
and long-lived isotopes. However, current MS techniques require too much infrastructure and operator 
expertise for field deployment and operation. In-field isotopic analysis of UF6 has the potential to 
substantially reduce the time, logistics and expense of bulk sample handling by allowing for an 
‘informed’ choice of samples to be sent to a central laboratory for further definitive analysis by 
standard techniques. 
It is common that the next generation of analytical instruments is driven by technologies that are either 
currently available or just now emerging. Therefore, a comprehensive and in-depth review is conducted 
on state-of-the-art and emerging technologies for field enrichment analysis of UF6. These technologies 
are evaluated based on their competitive advantages and current limitations for in-field UF6 enrichment 
assay. The objective of the study is to identity the most promising technologies that can be used for 
development of the next-generation, field-deployable instrument for providing rapid, accurate, and 
precise UF6 enrichment assay. In this paper, we provide an overview of instrument options, discuss their 
limitations, and examine the main gaps between needs and capabilities for their field use. 
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8) HQULFKPHQWDVVD\KDVEHHQJURZLQJ$V WKH ILUVW OLQHRI GHIHQVHDJDLQVW SUROLIHUDWLRQ DFFXUDWHDQDO\WLFDO WHFKQLTXHV WR GHWHUPLQH WKH XUDQLXP LVRWRSLF GLVWULEXWLRQ LQ 8) DUH FULWLFDO IRU PDWHULDOVYHULILFDWLRQDFFRXQWLQJDQGVDIHJXDUGVDWHQULFKPHQWSODQWV

&XUUHQWO\ WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $WRPLF (QHUJ\ $JHQF\ ,$($ PRQLWRUV WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI HQULFKHG 8) DWGHFODUHG IDFLOLWLHV E\ FROOHFWLQJ EHWZHHQ ± J RI JDVHRXV 8) LQWR D VDPSOH ERWWOH ZKLFK LV WKHQWUDQVIHUUHGDQGWDPSHUVHDOHGLQDQDSSURYHGVKLSSLQJFRQWDLQHU7KHVDPSOHLVVKLSSHGXQGHUFKDLQRI
FXVWRG\WRDFHQWUDOODERUDWRU\>HJ,$($¶V1XFOHDU0DWHULDOV$QDO\VLV/DERUDWRU\10$/LQ6HLEHUVGRUI@
IRUKLJKSUHFLVLRQLVRWRSLFDVVD\E\PDVVVSHFWURPHWU\06>@7KHORJLVWLFVDUHFXPEHUVRPHDQGWKH
DQDO\VLV LV FRVWO\ DQG UHVXOWV DUH QRW DYDLODEOH IRU VRPH WLPH DIWHU VDPSOH FROOHFWLRQ ,Q DGGLWLRQ QHZ
VKLSSLQJ UHJXODWLRQVDUHPDNLQJ LWPRUHGLIILFXOW WR WUDQVSRUW8) >@7KH ,$($ LVFKDOOHQJHG WRGHYHORSHIIHFWLYHVDIHJXDUGVDSSURDFKHVDWHQULFKPHQWSODQWVZKLOHZRUNLQJZLWKLQEXGJHWDU\FRQVWUDLQWV>@

7KHUH LV RQH RQVLWH HQULFKPHQWDVVD\ WHFKQLTXH WHUPHG &20ELQHG 3URFHGXUH IRU 8UDQLXP
&RQFHQWUDWLRQDQG(QULFKPHQW$VVD\ &2038&($ZKLFK RIIHUVH[FHSWLRQDO DQDO\WLFDO FDSDELOLWLHV
ZLWKW\SLFDOFRPELQHGV\VWHPDWLFDQGUDQGRPPHDVXUHPHQWXQFHUWDLQW\DURXQGUHODWLYH>@
&2038&($ FRPELQHV HQHUJ\GLVSHUVLYH ;UD\ DEVRUSWLRQ HGJH VSHFWURPHWU\ DQG JDPPDUD\
VSHFWURPHWU\WRPHDVXUHXUDQLXPHOHPHQWDOFRQWHQWDQG8HQULFKPHQWUHVSHFWLYHO\7KHPHWKRGLV
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DOUHDG\ LQ XVH LQ LQYHQWRU\ YHULILFDWLRQ FDPSDLJQV DW (XURSHDQ /(8 IXHO IDEULFDWLRQ SODQWV >@
&XUUHQWO\WKHPHWKRGLVXWLOL]HGRQO\IRUVROLGVDPSOHVDQGLVQRW\HWDSSOLHGWR8)HQULFKPHQWDVVD\,$($ LV H[SORULQJ H[WHQGLQJ WKH &2038&($ V\VWHP WR LQILHOG 8) HQULFKPHQW GHWHUPLQDWLRQ >@0DMRU VKRUWFRPLQJV RI WKH PHWKRG DUH LWV FRPSDUDWLYHO\ FRPSOLFDWHG VDPSOH SUHSDUDWLRQV DQG LWV
KRXUVORQJPHDVXUHPHQWWLPHIRUHDFKVDPSOH

)RU RIIVLWH 8HQULFKPHQW PHDVXUHPHQWV 06 LV FXUUHQWO\ WKH PRVW VHQVLWLYH DQDO\WLFDO WHFKQLTXH
KRZHYHU FXUUHQW 06 WHFKQLTXHV UHTXLUH WRR PXFK LQIUDVWUXFWXUH DQG RSHUDWRU H[SHUWLVH IRU ILHOG
GHSOR\PHQWDQGRSHUDWLRQ,QILHOG8)HQULFKPHQWDVVD\KDVWKHSRWHQWLDOWRVXEVWDQWLDOO\UHGXFHWKHWLPHORJLVWLFVDQGH[SHQVHRIEXONVDPSOHKDQGOLQJE\DOORZLQJIRUDQµLQIRUPHG¶FKRLFHRIVDPSOHVWR
EHVHQWWRDFHQWUDOODERUDWRU\IRUGHILQLWLYHDQDO\VLVE\VWDQGDUGODERUDWRU\WHFKQLTXHV

7KH REMHFWLYH RI WKH SUHVHQW VWXG\ LV WR LGHQWLI\ WKH SRWHQWLDO YLDEOH WHFKQRORJLHV WKDW DUH OLNHO\ WR
FXOPLQDWHLQDQH[SHGLWHGGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHQH[WJHQHUDWLRQRI ILHOGGHSOR\DEOH LQVWUXPHQWDWLRQIRU
UDSLGO\GHWHUPLQLQJ8)HQULFKPHQW2QHFRPPRQDSSURDFKWRSURMHFWWKHQH[WJHQHUDWLRQRIFKHPLFDOLQVWUXPHQWDWLRQ LV WR WUDFN WKH FXUUHQW WUHQGV DQG WR H[WUDSRODWH WKHP >@ 7KLV DSSURDFK DOEHLW
VRPHZKDW FRQVHUYDWLYH KDV EHHQ GHPRQVWUDWHG ZLWK D IDLU GHJUHH RI UHOLDELOLW\ LQ WKH ILHOGV RI
DQDO\WLFDO VFLHQFH DQG FKHPLFDO LQVWUXPHQWDWLRQ >@ 7KHUHIRUH DQ H[WHQVLYH OLWHUDWXUH UHYLHZ RQ
H[LVWLQJ DQG HPHUJLQJ WHFKQRORJLHV IRU 8) HQULFKPHQW DVVD\ LV SHUIRUPHG DQG WKH FRPSHWLWLYHDGYDQWDJHV DQG FXUUHQW OLPLWDWLRQV RI GLIIHUHQW DQDO\WLFDO WHFKQLTXHV DUH FRPSDUHG %DVHG RQ WKH
UHVXOWV RI WKH UHYLHZ UHTXLUHPHQWV DQG UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV IRU GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH QH[WJHQHUDWLRQ
ILHOGGHSOR\DEOHLQVWUXPHQWIRU8)HQULFKPHQWDVVD\DUHDGGUHVVHG

0HWKRGRORJ\

&XUUHQWDQDO\WLFDOWHFKQLTXHVIRU8)HQULFKPHQWDVVD\DUHEDVHGRQRQHRIWKUHHVFLHQWLILFSULQFLSOHVUDGLRPHWU\PDVVVSHFWURPHWU\DQGRSWLFDOVSHFWURPHWU\ ,Q WKLVVWXG\DFRPSUHKHQVLYH OLVWRI8)HQULFKPHQWDVVD\PHWKRGVLVUHYLHZHGDQGHYDOXDWHG&2038&($>@ LVDUDGLRPHWULFWHFKQLTXH
DQGVHUYHVDVDEHQFKPDUNIRURQVLWH8HQULFKPHQWDVVD\(YDOXDWHGPDVVVSHFWURPHWULFWHFKQLTXHV
LQFOXGHJDVVRXUFHPDVVVSHFWURPHWU\*606>@WKHUPDOLRQL]DWLRQPDVVVSHFWURPHWU\7,06>@
LQGXFWLYHO\ FRXSOHG SODVPD PDVV VSHFWURPHWU\ ,&306 > @ PXOWLSKRWRQ LRQL]DWLRQ PDVV
VSHFWURPHWU\>@8)PROHFXODUPDVVVSHFWURPHWU\ZLWKSRUWDEOHPDVVVSHFWURPHWHU>@ODVHULRQL]DWLRQ PDVV VSHFWURPHWU\ >@ VXUIDFHHQKDQFHG ODVHU GHVRUSWLRQ DQG LRQL]DWLRQ 6(/', >@
OLTXLGVDPSOLQJDWPRVSKHULFSUHVVXUHJORZGLVFKDUJHPDVVVSHFWURPHWU\/6$3*'06>@DQG
DWPRVSKHULFSUHVVXUH VROXWLRQFDWKRGH JORZGLVFKDUJH PDVV VSHFWURPHWU\ $36&*'06>@
7HFKQLTXHV EDVHG RQ RSWLFDO VSHFWURPHWULF SULQFLSOHV LQFOXGH RSWLFDO DWRPLF HPLVVLRQ ZLWK DUJRQ
DIWHUJORZ GLVFKDUJH RU ,&3 >@ JORZ GLVFKDUJH RSWRJDOYDQLF VSHFWURVFRS\ >@ ODVHUDEODWLRQ
ODVHU LQGXFHG IOXRUHVFHQFH >@ ODVHU DEODWLRQ DEVRUEDQFH UDWLR VSHFWURPHWU\ /$$56 > @
DWRPLFEHDPWXQDEOHGLRGHODVHUDEVRUSWLRQ>@WXQDEOHODVHULQIUDUHG,5DEVRUSWLRQ>@DQGLWV
KLJKSHUIRUPDQFHYHUVLRQZLWKTXDQWXPFDVFDGHODVHU>@DQGODVHULQGXFHGVSHFWURFKHPLFDODVVD\
IRUXUDQLXPHQULFKPHQW/,6$8(

*6067,06DQG,&306DUHLQFOXGHGWRHQDEOHFRPSDULVRQZLWKODERUDWRU\WHFKQLTXHV2WKHUZLVH
DOORWKHU WHFKQLTXHVVKRXOGEHGLUHFWO\FRPSDUHGZLWK&2038&($IRU WKHLUSRWHQWLDO WRVHUYHDVDQ
DOWHUQDWLYH ILHOGEDVHG HQULFKPHQW DVVD\ WHFKQLTXH (DFK WHFKQLTXH LV FRPSDUHG DJDLQVW VHYHQ
FULWHULD%HFDXVHRISDJHOLPLWLWLVQRWIHDVLEOHWRGHVFULEHHYHQEULHIO\DOOWKHUHYLHZHGWHFKQLTXHVLQ
JUHDWGHWDLO7KHUHIRUHRQO\WKRVHDQDO\WLFDOWHFKQLTXHVDFFRUGLQJWRSXEOLVKHGOLWHUDWXUHUHVXOWVWKDW
VRIDUVKRZWKHKLJKHVWSRWHQWLDOVIRU8)HQULFKPHQWDVVD\DVDOWHUQDWLYHVIRU7,06RUPXOWLFROOHFWRU0&,&306ZLOOEHHPSKDVL]HG


$VVHVVPHQWFULWHULD

7KH VHYHQ DVVHVVPHQW FULWHULD DUHPHHWLQJ SUHGHILQHG WDUJHW RI DQDO\WLFDO DFFXUDF\ DQG SUHFLVLRQ
WZRVHSDUDWHFULWHULDPHHWLQJ UHOD[HG WDUJHWRIDFFXUDF\DQGSUHFLVLRQ WZRFULWHULDVLPXOWDQHRXV8DQG8PHDVXUHPHQWPHDVXUHPHQWWLPHDQGRYHUDOOHDVHRIRSHUDWLRQDQGV\VWHPFRPSOH[LW\
7KH ,$($ SXEOLVKHG LQWHUQDWLRQDO WDUJHW YDOXHV ,79V >@ IRU D ZLGH YDULHW\ RI PHDVXUHPHQW
WHFKQLTXHVIRUQXFOHDUPDWHULDODFFRXQWDQF\DQGVDIHJXDUGVYHULILFDWLRQ7KH,79VDUHFRQVLGHUHGWR
EHDFKLHYDEOHYDOXHVLQURXWLQHPHDVXUHPHQWVDQGDUHXQFHUWDLQWLHVWREHFRQVLGHUHGLQMXGJLQJWKH
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UHOLDELOLW\RIDQDO\WLFDOWHFKQLTXHVDSSOLHGWRWKHDQDO\VHVRIQXFOHDUPDWHULDOV>@*6067,06DQG
0&,&306 DUH WKH RQO\ WKUHH06 V\VWHPV OLVWHG XQGHU GHVWUXFWLYH DQDO\VLV '$ WHFKQLTXHV >@
$OWKRXJKPRUHWHFKQLTXHVILYHDUHOLVWHGXQGHUWKHFDWHJRU\RIQRQGHVWUXFWLYHDQDO\VLV1'$LW LV
QRWDEOH WKDWPHDVXUHPHQWXQFHUWDLQWLHV IURP1'$WHFKQLTXHVDUHPXFK ODUJHU± W\SLFDOO\PRUHWKDQ
DQRUGHURIPDJQLWXGHODUJHU±WKDQWKHWKUHH06EDVHG'$WHFKQLTXHV>@

7R HYDOXDWH WKH DQDO\WLFDO DFFXUDF\ DQG SUHFLVLRQ RI D FDQGLGDWH DQDO\WLFDO WHFKQLTXH UHSRUWHG
DQDO\WLFDO ILJXUHV RIPHULW DUH FRPSDUHG WR WKH ,79V RI 7,06DQG0&,&306>@ZKLFK VHUYH DV
FRPSDULVRQ UHIHUHQFHV )RU WKHVH 06 V\VWHPV WKH u(r) DQG u(s) LH UDQGRP DQG V\VWHPDWLF
XQFHUWDLQWLHV UHVSHFWLYHO\ ,79V DUH WKH VDPH DQG WKH\ DUH  UHODWLYH IRU GHSOHWHG8 8 
 DEXQGDQFH  UHODWLYH IRU XUDQLXP ZLWK 8 DEXQGDQFH EHWZHHQ  DQG  
UHODWLYHIRU/(88DQGUHODWLYHIRU+(88!>@7KH,$($,79V
GHILQH WKH VWULFW WDUJHW IRU DQDO\WLFDO DFFXUDF\ DQG SUHFLVLRQ IRU DOO DQDO\WLFDO WHFKQLTXHV XQGHU
HYDOXDWLRQ%HFDXVHWKH,$($,79VDUHLQWHQGHGIRUPRUHHVWDEOLVKHGWHFKQLTXHVWREHWWHUJDXJHWKH
SRWHQWLDO RI HPHUJLQJ WHFKQLTXHV WKDW DUH VWLOO XQGHU DFWLYH GHYHORSPHQW DQ DGGLWLRQDO VHW RI
SHUIRUPDQFHFULWHULD LVVHWE\ UHOD[LQJ WKH WDUJHWYDOXHVE\u LHUHODWLYH IRUGHSOHWHG8
UHODWLYHIRUVDPSOHVZLWK8EHWZHHQDQGDQGVRRQ,QFDVHWKHHPHUJLQJWHFKQLTXHLVVR
QHZ WKDW H[SHULPHQWDO GDWD DUH QRW \HW DYDLODEOH VSHFLILFDOO\ IRU XUDQLXP SURMHFWHG RU H[WUDSRODWHG
YDOXHVIURPYHU\VLPLODUWHFKQLTXHVVKDULQJWKHVDPHVFLHQWLILFSULQFLSOHDUHXVHG


 ,PSRUWDQFHRIVLPXOWDQHRXVPHDVXUHPHQWDQGVLJQDOFRUUHODWLRQ LQ LVRWRSHUDWLR
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ

6LJQDOFRUUHODWLRQ LVFUXFLDO LQGHILQLQJ WKHDFFXUDF\DQGSUHFLVLRQRI LVRWRSHUDWLRPHDVXUHPHQWVDQG
WKXVLWVLPSRUWDQFHQHHGVWREHVWUHVVHG6RIDUQRQHRIWKHDQDO\WLFDOWHFKQLTXHVdirectlyPHDVXUHWKH88 UDWLR ,QVWHDG DOO DYDLODEOH WHFKQLTXHV LQGLUHFWO\ JDXJH WKH 88 UDWLR WKURXJK VHSDUDWH
PHDVXUHPHQWV RI WKH VLJQDOV IURP 8 DQG 8 $OO PHDVXUHPHQWV XQDYRLGDEO\ FRQWDLQ QRLVH 7KH
UHODWLYHHUURU LQWKHUDWLRRIWZRVLJQDOVxDQGyFRXOGEHODUJHURUVPDOOHUWKDQWKRVHLQWKHLQGLYLGXDO
VLJQDOVLHDIXUWKHUGHJUDGDWLRQRUDQLPSURYHPHQWLQPHDVXUHPHQWSUHFLVLRQWKHRXWFRPHLVKHDYLO\
GHSHQGHQWRQWKHFRUUHODWLRQRIQRLVHLQWKHWZRVLJQDOV7RLOOXVWUDWHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIVLJQDOFRUUHODWLRQ
FRPSXWHU VLPXODWHG VLJQDOV ZLWK ERWK FRUUHODWHG DQG XQFRUUHODWHG QRLVH FRPSRQHQWV KDYH EHHQ
JHQHUDWHG DQG DUH VKRZQ LQ )LJXUH EHORZ ,QGLYLGXDOO\ WKH SUHFLVLRQV RI WKH WZR VLJQDOV x DQG y
>UHODWLYH VWDQGDUG GHYLDWLRQV 56' a @ DUH UDWKHU XQDFFHSWDEOH IRU PDQ\ VLWXDWLRQV +RZHYHU
EHFDXVHWKHWZRVLJQDOVDUHKLJKO\FRUUHODWHG±WKDWLVVLJQDOGLSVDQGSHDNVRFFXUDWWKHVDPHWLPHIRU
WKH WZR VLJQDOV WKH QRLVH LV JUHDWO\ UHGXFHG LQ WKH UDWLR xy 56'a 7KHVH KLJKO\ FRUUHODWHG
VLJQDOV DUH XVXDOO\ DFKLHYDEOH RQO\ZKHQ WKH WZR VLJQDOV DUH DFTXLUHG VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ DV UHSHDWHGO\
SURYHQLQWKHOLWHUDWXUH>@6LJQDOFRUUHODWLRQW\SLFDOO\JUHDWO\GHJUDGHVIRUVHTXHQWLDOPHDVXUHPHQWV
LHZKHQVLJQDOVxDQGyDUHPHDVXUHGRQHE\RQHVHTXHQWLDOO\LQWLPH

)LJXUH7ZRVLPXODWHGVLJQDOV[DQG\DQGWKHUHVXOWDQWVLJQDOUDWLRV[\
GHPRQVWUDWLQJWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIFRUUHODWHGQRLVHDQGVLPXOWDQHRXV
PHDVXUHPHQWLQLPSURYLQJWKHVLJQDOLVRWRSLFUDWLRV
       









5DWLRx/y
56'
6LJQDOy
56'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 6LJ
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,W VKRXOG EH QRWHG WKDW QRW DOO QRLVH VRXUFHV DUH FRUUHODWHG LQ QDWXUH 2QH ZHOONQRZQ VRXUFH RI
XQFRUUHODWHGQRLVHZKLFKLVSDUWLFXODUO\UHOHYDQWWRLVRWRSLFDQDO\VLVLVFRXQWLQJVWDWLVWLFVDOVRNQRZQ
DV 3RLVVRQ QRLVH ,Q DQ LGHDO FDVH LQ ZKLFK DOO RWKHU QRLVH VRXUFHV DUH HOLPLQDWHG SUHFLVLRQ RI
LVRWRSLFDQDO\VLV LV WKHQJRYHUQHGE\FRXQWLQJVWDWLVWLFV%HFDXVHUDGLRPHWULF WHFKQLTXHVXVXDOO\GR
QRW KDYH RWKHU QRLVH VRXUFHV WKHLU SUHFLVLRQV DUH ODUJHO\ OLPLWHG E\ FRXQWLQJ VWDWLVWLFV )RU D WUXO\
VLPXOWDQHRXV ,&3 PDVV VSHFWURPHWHU LW KDV EHHQ VKRZQ WKDW LVRWRSLFUDWLR SUHFLVLRQ FORVH WR
FRXQWLQJVWDWLVWLFV OLPLW LV DFKLHYDEOH >@ $FFRUGLQJO\ RQH FULWHULRQ RQ HYDOXDWLRQ RI D FDQGLGDWH
DQDO\WLFDOWHFKQLTXHLVRQLWVFDSDELOLW\WRSHUIRUPWUXO\VLPXOWDQHRXVPHDVXUHPHQWIRU8DQG8


5HVXOWVDQG'LVFXVVLRQ

5HVXOWVRISHUIRUPDQFHDVVHVVPHQW

7DEOHVXPPDUL]HV WKHSHUIRUPDQFHRI WKHEHQFKPDUN ODERUDWRU\EDVHG WHFKQLTXHV*6067,06
DQG0&,&306 WKH EHQFKPDUN ILHOG WHFKQLTXH &2038&($ DQG WKH IRXU HPHUJLQJ WHFKQLTXHV
WKDW VKRZ SURPLVLQJ SRWHQWLDO IRU LQILHOG 8) HQULFKPHQW DVVD\ 7KH DVVHVVPHQW UHVXOWV DUH FRORUFRGHG)RUDQDO\WLFDODFFXUDF\DQGSUHFLVLRQD³JUHHQ´UDWLQJLQGLFDWHVPHHWLQJWKHVWDWHGFULWHULDD
³\HOORZ´UDWLQJUHSUHVHQWVQRWPHHWLQJWKHFULWHULDEXWLVZLWKLQuWKHWDUJHWLHPDUJLQDOO\IDLODQGD
³UHG´UDWLQJGHQRWHVQRWPHHWLQJWKHFULWHULDHYHQLI WKHWDUJHW LVUHOD[HGE\DIDFWRURI7KHPHWULF
³VLPXOWDQHRXV 8 DQG 8 PHDVXUHPHQWV´ VXPPDUL]HV LI WKH 8 DQG 8 PHDVXUHPHQWV DUH
SHUIRUPHGLQWUXO\VLPXOWDQHRXVJUHHQTXDVLVLPXOWDQHRXV\HOORZRUVHTXHQWLDOUHGIDVKLRQV7KH
PHWULF ³PHDVXUHPHQW WLPH´ UHIHUV WR W\SLFDO PHDVXUHPHQW WLPH 7HFKQLTXHV UDWHG ³JUHHQ´ W\SLFDOO\
UHTXLUH OHVV WKDQ PLQXWHV IRU RQHPHDVXUHPHQW 7HFKQLTXHV WKDW W\SLFDOO\ UHTXLUHPRUH WKDQ 
PLQXWHVEXWOHVVWKDQRQHKRXUDUHUDWHG³\HOORZ´DQGWKRVHUHTXLULQJPRUHWKDQRQHKRXUDUHUDWHG
³UHG´)LQDOO\WKHPHWULF³RYHUDOOHDVHRIRSHUDWLRQ´UHIOHFWVWKHRYHUDOOFRPSOH[LW\RIWKHPHDVXUHPHQW
SURFHGXUHVLQFOXGLQJVDPSOHSUHSDUDWLRQSURFHGXUHVDQGLQVWUXPHQWRSHUDWLRQHJWXUQNH\versus
FRPSOLFDWHGV\VWHPVDVZHOODVJHQHUDOUREXVWQHVVRIWKHLQVWUXPHQWDQGWKHWHFKQLTXH


7DEOH$VVHVVPHQW VXPPDULHV RI EHQFKPDUN DQG SURPLVLQJ WHFKQLTXHV IRU8) HQULFKPHQW DVVD\ %R[ ZLWK
GLDJRQDOKDWFKLQGLFDWHVJXHVWLPDWHIURPVFLHQWLILFSULQFLSOH$TXHVWLRQPDUN LQGLFDWHVWKDW LQIRUPDWLRQHLWKHULV
QRW\HWDYDLODEOHRULVLQVXIILFLHQWIRUHVWLPDWLRQ

 $QDO\WLFDO3HUIRUPDQFH 2SHUDWLRQ
$FFXUDF\
PHHWVWDUJHW
3UHFLVLRQ
PHHWVWDUJHW
$FFXUDF\
ZLWKLQuWDUJHW
3UHFLVLRQ
ZLWKLQuWDUJHW
6LPXOWDQHRXV
8DQG 8
PHDVXUHPHQWV
0HDVXUHPHQW
WLPH
2YHUDOOHDVH
RIRSHUDWLRQ
*606       
7,06       
0&,&306       
&2038&($     1RWH  
/6$3*'06ZLWK2UELWUDS06 " "    
$36&*'06ZLWK2UELWUDS06 " " " "   
/$$56       
/,6$8(   " "   
1RWH6LJQDOFRUUHODWLRQIRUPHDVXUHPHQWQRLVHUHGXFWLRQWKURXJKVLPXOWDQHRXV8DQG8PHDVXUHPHQWGRHVQRW
DSSO\LQ&2038&($EHFDXVHWKHLVRWRSLFDVVD\LVSHUIRUPHGWKURXJKUDGLRPHWULFFRXQWLQJJDPPDUD\LQZKLFKWKH
GRPLQDWHGQRLVHVRXUFHLVFRXQWLQJVWDWLVWLFV

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%HQFKPDUNWHFKQLTXHV±*6067,060&,&306DQG&2038&($

7KH EHQFKPDUN WHFKQLTXHV ZLOO EH EULHIO\ GLVFXVVHG LQ WKLV VHFWLRQ ZKHUHDV WKH GHWDLOV RI HDFK
SURPLVLQJHPHUJLQJWHFKQLTXHZLOOEH LQGLYLGXDOO\GLVFXVVHGLQ WKHIROORZLQJVHFWLRQV2YHUDOODOO WKH
WKUHH EHQFKPDUN 06EDVHG WHFKQLTXHV RIIHU RXWVWDQGLQJ DQDO\WLFDO SHUIRUPDQFH EXW GHPDQGLQJ
RSHUDWLRQ LQ WHUPV RI PHDVXUHPHQW WLPH DV ZHOO DV H[SHUWLVH LQ LQVWUXPHQW RSHUDWLRQ $OO 06
WHFKQLTXHV FRPSULVH WZR HVVHQWLDO FRPSRQHQWV ± DQ LRQL]DWLRQ VRXUFH DQG D PDVV DQDO\]HU 7KH
PDVVDQDO\]HUUHVSRQGVRQO\WRLRQVFKDUJHGSDUWLFOHVEXWQRWQHXWUDOVWKXVDQLRQL]DWLRQVRXUFHLV
UHTXLUHGWRFRQYHUWWKHQHXWUDOXQFKDUJHGVDPSOHWRFKDUJHGLRQV7KHPDVVDQDO\]HUVHSDUDWHVDQG
PHDVXUHV WKH FKDUJHG 8 DQG 8 DWRPVPROHFXOHV DFFRUGLQJ WR WKHLU GLIIHUHQW PDVVWRFKDUJH
UDWLRV

*DVVRXUFHPDVVVSHFWURPHWU\*606DFFHSWVJDVHRXV8)VDPSOHVGLUHFWO\IRUHQULFKPHQWDVVD\PHDVXUHPHQWV%HFDXVHRI WKH KRPRJHQHLW\ RI JDVHRXV VDPSOHV LW LV FXUUHQWO\ WKHPRVW VHQVLWLYH
DQG SUHFLVH PHDVXUHPHQW WHFKQLTXH >@ +RZHYHU LWV GUDZEDFN IRU 8) DQDO\VHV LV LWV ORQJPHDVXUHPHQWWLPH7KHORQJPHDVXUHPHQWF\FOHLVUHODWHGWRPHPRU\HIIHFWVGXHWRWKHFRUURVLYHDQG
UHDFWLYH QDWXUH RI JDVHRXV 8) ZKLFK FDQ EH FRPSHQVDWHG RQO\ E\ PXOWLSOH PHDVXUHPHQWVDOWHUQDWLQJ EHWZHHQ WKH VDPSOH DQG WZR FDOLEUDWLRQ VWDQGDUGV $V D UHVXOW WKH GXUDWLRQ IRU RQH
PHDVXUHPHQWF\FOHLVDERXWKRXUV>@)RU7,06PHDVXUHPHQWVVDPSOHVDUHXVXDOO\SUHVHQWHGDV
DVROXWLRQDQGGHSRVLWHGRQWRWKH7,06ILODPHQWIRUHOHFWURWKHUPDOYDSRUL]DWLRQDVZHOODVLRQL]DWLRQ
0HDVXUHPHQWSUHFLVLRQIRU7,06LVVOLJKWO\ORZHUWKDQ*606EHFDXVHWKHVDPSOHRQD7,06ILODPHQW
EHFRPHVLVRWRSLFDOO\LQKRPRJHQHRXVGXHWRIUDFWLRQDWLRQGXULQJWKHPHDVXUHPHQWSURFHVV>@0&
,&306 HPSOR\V D KLJK WHPSHUDWXUH !. LQGXFWLYHO\ FRXSOHG SODVPD ± UHTXLULQJ KLJK SRZHU
aN:±DVWKHDWRPL]DWLRQDQGLRQL]DWLRQVRXUFH7KH0&GHVLJQDWLRQUHIHUVWRWKHVSHFLILFW\SH
RI PDVV DQDO\]HU D PXOWLFROOHFWRU 7KH 0&PDVV VSHFWURPHWHU LV D GRXEOHIRFXVLQJ V\VWHP
FRQVLVWLQJRIDQHOHFWURVWDWLFVHFWRUDQGDPDJQHWLFVHFWRU LQZKLFK LRQVDUHVHSDUDWHGDFFRUGLQJWR
WKHLU PDVVWRFKDUJH UDWLR DQG IRFXVHG RQWR D IRFDO SODQH 7KH 0&V\VWHP DOORZV WKH RSHUDWRU WR
SRVLWLRQVHYHUDOGHWHFWRUVDWGLIIHUHQWSRVLWLRQVDORQJWKHIRFDOSODQHRIWKHPDVVVSHFWURPHWHU>@IRU
VLPXOWDQHRXVFROOHFWLRQDQGPHDVXUHPHQWRIVHYHUDOPDVVHV

$MRLQWODERUDWRU\VWXG\>@FRPSDUHG8LVRWRSLFUDWLRPHDVXUHPHQWVE\*6067,06DQG0&,&3
06)RUD8)VDPSOHZLWK8DWQDWXUDODEXQGDQFHWKH56'VZHUHDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\ >@ 6DPSOH WKURXJKSXW LV DERXW  VDPSOHVGD\ IRU *606 LQFUHDVHV WR 
VDPSOHVGD\IRU7,06DQGIXUWKHULQFUHDVHVWRDURXQGVDPSOHVGD\IRU0&,&306>@

7KH &2038&($ WHFKQLTXH GHYHORSHG DW WKH ,QVWLWXWH IRU 7UDQVXUDQLXP (OHPHQWV ,78 LV D
WUDQVSRUWDEOH DQDO\WLFDO V\VWHP IRU RQVLWH XUDQLXP FRQFHQWUDWLRQ DQG HQULFKPHQWV DVVD\V >@ ,WV
DSSOLFDWLRQVSHFLILFDOO\IRU8)HQULFKPHQWDVVD\LVVWLOOXQGHUGHYHORSPHQWE\WKH,$($>@DOWKRXJKLWV XVH RQ /(8R[LGH VDPSOHV LV FRQVLGHUHG URXWLQH ,Q IDFW ,$($ KDV SXEOLVKHG DQ ,79 IRU
&2038&($ ±  u(r) DQG  u(s) IRU 8 HQULFKPHQW LQ /(8 R[LGHV >@ ,79V IRU RWKHU
HQULFKPHQWOHYHOVLH'818DQG+(8R[LGHVDUHQRWSXEOLVKHG>@

7KH&2038&($ WHFKQLTXH LVEDVHGRQHQHUJ\GLVSHUVLYH;UD\DEVRUSWLRQHGJHVSHFWURPHWU\DQG
JDPPDUD\VSHFWURPHWU\%HIRUHSUHVHQWHGWR;UD\DQGJDPPDUD\PHDVXUHPHQWVWKHVROLGVDPSOH
QHHGV WR XQGHUJR VRPH ODERULRXV SUHSDUDWLRQ VWHSV %ULHIO\ WKH VROLG VDPSOH LV TXDQWLWDWLYHO\
WUDQVIRUPHG LQWR D XUDQ\O QLWUDWH VROXWLRQ ZKLFK LQYROYHV VDPSOH GLJHVWLRQ LQ  0 QLWULF DFLG DQG
VXEVHTXHQWGLOXWLRQWR0DFLGLW\ZLWKDWDUJHW8FRQFHQWUDWLRQDERXWJ/>@7KHVROXWLRQLVILUVW
FKDUDFWHUL]HGIRU LWVGHQVLW\DQGWHPSHUDWXUH>@'XULQJWKHSURFHVVVWDQGDUGODERUDWRU\WRROVHJ
SRUWDEOH GHQVLW\PHWHU JODVVZDUH FKHPLFDOV KRW SODWHZHLJKLQJEDODQFHDQG RSHUDWRUV¶ IDFLOLWLHV
HJIXPHKRRGDUHXVHG>@

7KHVROXWLRQVDPSOH LVWKHQPHDVXUHGE\;UD\DQGJDPPDUD\VSHFWURVFRS\7\SLFDOO\ IRUDQ/(8
VDPSOH WKUHH UHSOLFDWHV RI HDFK PHDVXUHPHQW W\SH DUH SHUIRUPHG DFTXLVLWLRQ RI HDFK ;UD\ DQG
JDPPDUD\ VSHFWUXP WDNHVDERXW V DQG V UHVSHFWLYHO\ >@ )RU D QDWXUDO8 VDPSOH WKH
WLPH LV LQFUHDVHG WR  V IRU HDFK JDPPDUD\ FRXQWLQJ >@ 'DWD WUHDWPHQW LV QRW YHU\
VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG EHFDXVH WKH WZR PHDVXUHPHQWV DUH LQWHUGHSHQGHQW 6SHFLILFDOO\ WKH ;UD\
PHDVXUHPHQW QHHGV WKH NQRZOHGJHRI WKH HQULFKPHQW WR DFFXUDWHO\ FRQYHUW WKHPHDVXUHGXUDQLXP
FRQFHQWUDWLRQLQWRPDVVIUDFWLRQZKHUHDVWKHJDPPDPHDVXUHPHQWQHHGVWKHXUDQLXPFRQFHQWUDWLRQ
DV LQSXW WR FRUUHFW IRU VHOIDWWHQXDWLRQHIIHFW >@7KHUHIRUHGDWDHYDOXDWLRQ LVPDGH LQDQ LWHUDWLYH
PDQQHU)XUWKHUPRUHWKHVDPSOHSDUDPHWHUVLQFOXGLQJVROXWLRQGHQVLW\VDPSOHYROXPHDQGERWWRP
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WKLFNQHVV RI VDPSOH FRQWDLQHU QHHG WR EH WDNHQ LQ DFFRXQW >@ 6RIWZDUH KDV EHHQ GHYHORSHG IRU
DXWRPDWLFGDWDDFTXLVLWLRQDQGDQDO\VLVIRUWKHLQILHOG&2038&($PHDVXUHPHQWV\VWHP>@

7KH DQDO\WLFDO SHUIRUPDQFH LV LPSUHVVLYH IRU DQ RQVLWH PHDVXUHPHQW )RU /(8 VDPSOHV WKH
DFKLHYDEOHFRPELQHGXQFHUWDLQW\u(r) DQGu(s)LVW\SLFDOO\DURXQGUHODWLYH>@SXEOLVKHG,79
IRUFRPELQHGXQFHUWDLQW\ LV>@$FFRUGLQJWRDUHFHQW ,$($UHSRUW >@ WKHDGDSWDWLRQRI WKH
FKHPLFDO SUHSDUDWLRQ VWHSV IRU &2038&($ GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI 8) HQULFKPHQW LV FXUUHQWO\ EHLQJVWXGLHG E\ ,$($ DQG ZLWK WKH (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ $V FKHPLFDO WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ RI 8) WR XUDQ\OQLWUDWHVROXWLRQ LVFRPSDUDWLYHO\VLPSOHFRPSDUHGZLWK LWVR[LGHFRXQWHUSDUW LW LVDQWLFLSDWHG WKDW WKH
&2038&($PHWKRGZLOOEHDYDLODEOH IRURQVLWH8)HQULFKPHQWDVVD\ LQ WKHYHU\QHDU IXWXUH7KH
GUDZEDFNRI WKHPHWKRG LV WKH UHODWLYHO\ ORQJ FRXQWLQJ WLPH HVSHFLDOO\ IRU QDWXUDO u V DQG
GHSOHWHGXUDQLXPDQGLWVODERULQWHQVLYHVDPSOHSUHSDUDWLRQSURFHVV


(PHUJLQJPDVVVSHFWURPHWULFWHFKQLTXHV

/LTXLGVDPSOLQJDWPRVSKHULFSUHVVXUHJORZGLVFKDUJHPDVVVSHFWURPHWU\

/LTXLGVDPSOLQJDWPRVSKHULFSUHVVXUHJORZGLVFKDUJHPDVVVSHFWURPHWU\/6$3*'06XQGHUMRLQW
GHYHORSPHQW IURP&OHPVRQ8QLYHUVLW\DQG3DFLILF1RUWKZHVW1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\ 311/ >@ LV
WKHPRVWZHOOFKDUDFWHUL]HGHPHUJLQJPDVVVSHFWURPHWULFWHFKQLTXHHVSHFLDOO\IRUWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
RIXUDQLXPLVRWRSLFUDWLR7KHJORZGLVFKDUJHLVDPLFURSODVPDYROXPHaPPIRUPHGE\LPSRVLQJ
D ORZ GLUHFWFXUUHQW SRWHQWLDO W\SLFDOO\ VHYHUDO KXQGUHG YROWV EHWZHHQ WKH VXUIDFHRI DQ HOHFWURO\WH
VROXWLRQ HJ  QLWULF DFLG DQG D PHWDOOLF FRXQWHU HOHFWURGH > @ 7KH VXSSRUWLQJ HOHFWURO\WH
VROXWLRQ IORZV DW DWPRVSKHULF SUHVVXUH RXW RI D VPDOO aPP JODVV FDSLOODU\ KRXVHG ZLWKLQ D
VOLJKWO\ ODUJHU PHWDO FDSLOODU\ EHWZHHQ ZKLFK FRROLQJ JDV LV SDVVHG >@ 7KH QRUPDO RSHUDWLQJ
SDUDPHWHUVLQFOXGHOLTXLGHOHFWURO\WHIORZUDWHVRI±P/PLQFRROLQJJDVW\SLFDOO\KHOLXPRUDUJRQ
IORZUDWHRI/PLQDQGSRZHUFRQVXPSWLRQRI:>@

&XUUHQWO\ WKH UHVHDUFKHUV FRXSOHG WKLV /6$3*' LRQL]DWLRQ VRXUFH WR D KLJKUHVROXWLRQ PDVV
VSHFWURPHWHUWKH2UELWUDS+RHJJet al.>@UHFHQWO\GLVFXVVHGYDULRXVDVSHFWVRIWKH/6$3*'
DQG2UELWUDS FRPELQDWLRQ IRU XUDQLXP LVRWRSLF DQDO\VHV LQFOXGLQJ RSWLPL]DWLRQ RI YDULRXV RSHUDWLQJ
SDUDPHWHUVERWKIRUWKHGLVFKDUJHDQGWKH2UELWUDSSUHOLPLQDU\DQDO\WLFDOILJXUHVRIPHULWDQGNQRZQ
OLPLWDWLRQV 8FRQWDLQLQJ VDPSOH ZDV LQWURGXFHG LQ D VROXWLRQ IRUP DQG PL[HG ZLWK WKH VXSSRUWLQJ
HOHFWURO\WH7KHUHVHDUFKHUVUHSRUWHGWKDWWKHGRPLQDQW8VSHFLHVLQWKHPDVVVSHFWUDZDV82DQGOLWWOH8RU82ZHUHGHWHFWHG>@

%DVHGRQSXEOLVKHGUHVXOWV >@ WKH UHSRUWHGDQDO\WLFDOSUHFLVLRQ LVHQFRXUDJLQJDQG LVVR IDU WKH
EHVW LQDOO WKHHPHUJLQJ WHFKQLTXHV UHYLHZHG)RUDQDQDO\WLFDO VHVVLRQHDFKFRQWDLQHG WHQVHWVRI
GDWDDFTXLVLWLRQVSUHFLVLRQVLQWKH88UDWLRUDQJHGIURPWR56'>@7KHVDPSOH
ZDVLQWURGXFHGLQWKHIRUPRIDXUDQLXPVROXWLRQPJP/ZLWKQDWXUDOLVRWRSLFDEXQGDQFH>@

$OWKRXJKWKH/6$3*'LQLWVSUHVHQWIRUPZRXOGQRWGLUHFWO\DFFHSWJDVHRXV8)IRUDQDO\VLVDWZRVWHSUHDFWLRQWRWUDQVIRUP8)WRDXUDQLXPVROXWLRQLVZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGDQGUHJDUGHGDVDVRPHZKDW
VWDQGDUG SURFHGXUH >@7KH WZRVWHS UHDFWLRQ LQYROYHVK\GURO\VLV RI8) WR82) 8)+2o
82)+) IROORZHG E\ FRQYHUVLRQ WR QLWUDWH VDOW ZLWK QLWULF DFLG 82)+12 o8212+)
2QHSRWHQWLDOGUDZEDFNRI WKH/6$3*'06 WHFKQLTXH IRU8)HQULFKPHQWDVVD\ LVPHPRU\HIIHFWZKLFKKDVEHHQGRFXPHQWHGLQVHYHUDOUHSRUWV>@7KHFDXVHVIRUWKHPHPRU\HIIHFWLVQRW
ZHOO FKDUDFWHUL]HG EXW LW ZDV VXJJHVWHG WKDW PDWHULDO GHSRVLWHG RQ WKH FDSLOODU\ FRXQWHUHOHFWURGH
DQGRUWKHPDVVVSHFWURPHWHUFDSLOODU\LQWHUIDFHFRXOGEHWKHVRXUFH>@


$WPRVSKHULFSUHVVXUHVROXWLRQFDWKRGHJORZGLVFKDUJHPDVVVSHFWURPHWU\

$WPRVSKHULFSUHVVXUHVROXWLRQFDWKRGHJORZGLVFKDUJHPDVVVSHFWURPHWU\$36&*'06FXUUHQWO\
XQGHUGHYHORSPHQWMRLQWO\DW5HQVVHODHU3RO\WHFKQLF,QVWLWXWHDQG,QGLDQD8QLYHUVLW\>@ LVLGHQWLFDO
LQVFLHQWLILFSULQFLSOH WR WKH/6$3*'06 UHYLHZHG LQ WKH ODVWVHFWLRQEXWGLIIHUHQW LQGHVLJQ IRU WKH
JHQHUDWLRQRIWKHPLFURSODVPDGLVFKDUJH7KH$36&*'LVDGLUHFWFXUUHQWSODVPDVXVWDLQHGGLUHFWO\
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RQWKHVXUIDFHRIDIORZLQJOLTXLGHOHFWURGHW\SLFDOO\DWDUDWHRI±P/PLQVXSSRUWHGLQDPELHQWDLU
ZLWKRXW WKHQHHG IRUDFRROLQJJDVRURWKHUJDV IORZV >@3RZHURI$36&*' LVa: QRUPDOO\
:>@DQGLVJHQHUDOO\VOLJKWO\KLJKHUWKDQWKDWRIWKH/6$3*'$GLVWLQFWGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ
$36&*' DQG /6$3*' LV WKDW $36&*' VXVWDLQV RQ D IORZLQJ OLTXLG FDWKRGH ZLWK WKH OLTXLG LQ
H[FHVVZKHUHDV/6$3*'RSHUDWHVLQDWRWDOFRQVXPSWLRQPRGHLQZKLFKDOOWKHHOHFWURO\WHVROXWLRQ
LV FRQVXPHG >@ $Q DGYDQWDJH RI WKH WRWDO FRQVXPSWLRQ LQ /6$3*' LV WKDW QR FKHPLFDO ZDVWH
VROXWLRQ LV JHQHUDWHG $OWKRXJK WKH H[FHVVLYH IORZ RI HOHFWURO\WH JHQHUDWHV FKHPLFDO ZDVWH IRU $3
6&*' WKH FRQWLQXRXVO\ VHOIUHQHZLQJ OLTXLG VXUIDFH RI WKH IORZLQJ VROXWLRQ FDWKRGH SRWHQWLDOO\
PLQLPL]HVPHPRU\ HIIHFWV ,Q WHUPV RI LQVWUXPHQW VHWXS IRRWSULQW DQG RSHUDWLRQ UHTXLUHPHQWV $3
6&*'VKDUHVPDQ\VLPLODULWLHVZLWK/6$3*'

$OWKRXJKQRW\HWFKDUDFWHUL]HGIRULWVSHUIRUPDQFHRQLVRWRSLFDQDO\VLVWKH$36&*'GHPRQVWUDWHGD
VLJQLILFDQWO\ EHWWHU GHWHFWLRQ OLPLW WKDQ WKH /6$3*' DV DQ LRQL]DWLRQ VRXUFH IRU DWRPLF PDVV
VSHFWURPHWU\ >@ 7KH ODWHVW ZRUN RQ $36&*' >@ UHSRUWHG WKH DQDO\WLFDO SHUIRUPDQFH RI WKLV
VRXUFH FRXSOHG WR DQ 2UELWUDS PDVV VSHFWURPHWHU IRU DWRPLF DQG PROHFXODU PDVV VSHFWURPHWU\
6SHFLILF IRUXUDQLXPVROXWLRQVDPSOHV WKH UHSRUWHGGHWHFWLRQ OLPLW LQ$36&*'ZDVQJP/ZLWK
82 DV WKHPHDVXULQJ LRQ >@ ZKHUHDV HVWLPDWHG GHWHFWLRQ OLPLWV IRU WKH /6$3*'ZHUH JUHDWHU
WKDQ PJP/ IRU 8 DQG OHVV WKDQ PJP/ IRU 82 >@ $V GHWHFWLRQ OLPLW LV UHODWHG GLUHFWO\ WRVHQVLWLYLW\DQGRUEDFNJURXQGQRLVHWKHVLJQLILFDQWO\EHWWHUORZHUXUDQLXPGHWHFWLRQOLPLWIRUWKH$3
6&*' LPSOLHV WKDW LWRIIHUVKLJKHUVHQVLWLYLW\DQGRU ORZHUEDFNJURXQGQRLVH WKDQ WKH/6$3*'$V
ERWKIDFWRUVDUHLPSRUWDQWIRULVRWRSLFUDWLRPHDVXUHPHQWVWKH$36&*'VKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGDVD
FDQGLGDWH HPHUJLQJ WHFKQRORJ\ PHULWLQJ IXUWKHU HYDOXDWLRQ RI LWV IXOO SRWHQWLDO IRU XUDQLXP LVRWRSLF
DVVD\


,V2UELWUDSVXLWDEOHDVILHOGGHSOR\DEOHPDVVVSHFWURPHWHU"

,Q WKH WZRHPHUJLQJPDVVVSHFWURPHWULF WHFKQLTXHVFRYHUHGDERYHERWK UHVHDUFK WHDPVHPSOR\HG
2UELWUDS PDVV VSHFWURPHWHU *LYHQ WKH LPSUHVVLYH LVRWRSLFUDWLR SUHFLVLRQV DQG GHWHFWLRQ OLPLWV
DFKLHYDEOHE\WKHWZRWHFKQLTXHVRQHPLJKWWKLQNWKDWWKHSUREOHPRIORRNLQJIRUWKHQH[WJHQHUDWLRQ
RI ILHOGGHSOR\DEOH LQVWUXPHQW IRU 8) HQULFKPHQW DVVD\ LV VROYHG 8QIRUWXQDWHO\ WKH FXUUHQWWHFKQRORJ\RI WKH2UELWUDSPDVVVSHFWURPHWHUPDNHV LW LQDSSURSULDWH WR VHUYHDVD ILHOGGHSOR\DEOH
LQVWUXPHQW>@$FRPPHQWIURPWKH/6$3*'06UHVHDUFKWHDP>@LVWKDW³Although a conveniently
available instrument for this work WKH /6$3*'06, it WKH 2UELWUDS is not one that would be
appropriate for the type of in-field work envisioned by the potential user.”7RHODERUDWHDOWKRXJKWKH
2UELWUDSLVDEHQFKWRSLQVWUXPHQWLWLVUDWKHUODUJHDQGKHDY\SRXQGV>@$OVRWKHUHTXLUHPHQW
IRU HQYLURQPHQWDO FRQGLWLRQV IRU WKH2UELWUDSPDVV VSHFWURPHWHU LV TXLWH GHPDQGLQJ )RU LQVWDQFH
DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH SUHLQVWDOODWLRQPDQXDO RI WKH2UELWUDS >@ WKH RSWLPXP RSHUDWLRQ WHPSHUDWXUH LV
EHWZHHQq&WRq&DQGWHPSHUDWXUHIOXFWXDWLRQVRIq&RUPRUHRYHUDPLQXWHSHULRGFDQDIIHFW
SHUIRUPDQFH7KHUHDUHDOVRUDWKHUVWULFWUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUKXPLGLW\DQGYLEUDWLRQFRQWUROV>@

,W VKRXOG DOVR EH QRWHG WKDW WKH KLJK UHVROXWLRQ RIIHUHG E\ WKH 2UELWUDS OLNHO\ FRQWULEXWHV WR WKH
LPSUHVVLYHDQDO\WLFDOILJXUHVRIPHULWUHSRUWHGIRUWKH/6$3*'06DVLWLVGRFXPHQWHGWKDWVHYHUDO
ORZLQWHQVLW\ QRQXUDQLXP LRQV UHPDLQ DIWHU FROOLVLRQLQGXFHG GLVVRFLDWLRQ &,' D SURFHVV WR
GLVVRFLDWH DQG UHGXFH EDFNJURXQG LRQV LQ WKH PDVV VSHFWURPHWHU DQG UHTXLUH WKH KLJKUHVROXWLRQ
FDSDELOLW\RIWKH2UELWUDSWRUHVROYHWKHP>@,IWKH2UELWUDSLVUHSODFHGE\DPRUHILHOGDEOHDQGYHU\
OLNHO\ORZHUUHVROXWLRQPDVVVSHFWURPHWHULWLVFXUUHQWO\XQNQRZQKRZVXFKUHSODFHPHQWZRXOGDIIHFW
WKHDQDO\WLFDODFFXUDF\DQGSUHFLVLRQ&OHDUO\WKHUHLVDQHHGWRFRXSOHFKDUDFWHUL]HDQGHYDOXDWHWKH
/6$3*'DQG$36&*'DQGSRVVLEO\RWKHUVLPLODUJORZGLVFKDUJHYDULDQWVWRDPDVVVSHFWURPHWHU
WKDWLVPRUHILHOGGHSOR\DEOHDQGSUHIHUDEO\FDSDEOHRISHUIRUPLQJWUXO\VLPXOWDQHRXVPHDVXUHPHQWV


(PHUJLQJRSWLFDOVSHFWURPHWULFWHFKQLTXHV

/DVHUDEODWLRQDEVRUEDQFHUDWLRVSHFWURPHWU\

/DVHUDEODWLRQDEVRUEDQFHUDWLRVSHFWURPHWU\/$$56FXUUHQWO\EHLQJGHYHORSHGDW311/LVDQDOO
RSWLFDO WHFKQLTXH IRU XUDQLXP LVRWRSLF DVVD\ ,WVZRUNLQJ SULQFLSOH LV EDVHG RQ WKH LVRWRSLF VKLIWV LQ
DWRPLFWUDQVLWLRQVEHWZHHQ8DQG8DWRPVDQGHPSOR\VDWRPLFDEVRUSWLRQDVWKHPHDVXUHPHQW
PHDQV 7KH WHFKQLTXH HPSOR\V WKUHH ODVHUV ± RQH IRU DEODWLRQ VDPSOLQJ DQG WZR IRU VLPXOWDQHRXV
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PHDVXUHPHQWVRIWKHUHODWLYHDEXQGDQFHVRI8DQG8>@/DVHUDEODWLRQFUHDWHVIUHHXUDQLXP
DWRPV IURP D VROLG VDPSOH DQG WKHVH DWRPV DUH WKHQ SUREHG E\ GLRGH ODVHU WKURXJK DWRPLF
DEVRUSWLRQ0HDVXUHPHQWVDUHFRQGXFWHG LQDUHGXFHGSUHVVXUHHQYLURQPHQW WRUHGXFHVSHFWUDOOLQH
EURDGHQLQJ

7KH 1LHPD[ UHVHDUFK JURXS LQ  >@ LV SUREDEO\ WKH ILUVW WR UHSRUW PHDVXUHPHQWV RI XUDQLXP
LVRWRSHUDWLRVLQVROLGVDPSOHVWKURXJKFRPELQDWLRQRIODVHUDEODWLRQVDPSOLQJDQGGLRGHODVHUDWRPLF
DEVRUSWLRQEHIRUHWKHWHFKQLTXHZDVFRLQHGDV/$$56/LXet al.>@XWLOL]HGWZRGLRGHODVHUV±RQH
WXQHG VSHFLILFDOO\ IRU 8DEVRUSWLRQ DQG WKH RWKHU IRU 8 7KLV WZRGLRGHODVHUV DSSURDFK DOORZV
simultaneousPHDVXUHPHQWVRIWKHWZR8LVRWRSHVOHDGLQJWRPHDVXUHPHQWSUHFLVLRQRI56'IRU
DSXUHXUDQLXPR[LGHVDPSOHZLWK8DWQDWXUDODEXQGDQFH>@5HSRUWHGDFFXUDF\IRUWKH88
UDWLRZDVZLWKLQUHODWLYHIRUDXUDQLXPPLQHUDOVDPSOHLHDQLPSXUHVDPSOHDWQDWXUDOLVRWRSLF
DEXQGDQFH

7KH/$$56VHWXSGHYHORSHGDW311/ >@ LVVLPLODU WR WKDW UHSRUWHGE\/LXet al. >@ LQPDQ\
DVSHFWV)RUH[DPSOH/$$56DOVRHPSOR\VWZRGLRGHODVHUVWRVLPXOWDQHRXVO\PHDVXUHWKHUHODWLYH
DEXQGDQFHVRI8DQG8>@+RZHYHULWVKRXOGEHVWUHVVHGWKDWWKHDWRPLFWUDQVLWLRQVHPSOR\HG
E\/$$56>@DQGWKRVHE\/LXet al.>@ZHUHGLIIHUHQW7KHH[DFWSURELQJZDYHOHQJWKVLQ/$$56
ZHUHQRWGLVFORVHGEXWLWZDVPHQWLRQHGWKDWLWVWZRGLRGHODVHUVRSHUDWHGDWaQPDQGaQP
>@ ZKHUHDV WKH DEVRUSWLRQ OLQHV DW QP DQG QP ZHUH XVHG IRU 8 DQG 8
UHVSHFWLYHO\ LQWKHZRUNRI/LXet al. >@ ,QERWKFDVHVWKHSUREHGWUDQVLWLRQVIRU8DQG8DUH
IURPGLIIHUHQWDWRPLFWUDQVLWLRQV>@

6SHFLILF IRU 8) HQULFKPHQW DVVD\ /$$56 HPSOR\V D WDLORUHG VROLG WKLQILOP VRUEHQW WR FRQYHUWJDVHRXV 8) WR XUDQ\O IOXRULGH WKURXJK D K\GURO\VLV UHDFWLRQ >@ 'DWD IURP D SUHVHQWDWLRQ GDWHG2FWREHU  >@ VKRZHG WKDW DFFXUDF\ DQG SUHFLVLRQ FDQ DFKLHYH  8 HQULFKPHQW
6SHFLILFDOO\ IRU WKUHH 8) VDPSOHV ZLWK 8 DEXQGDQFHV DW   DQG  WKHUHSRUWHGrelativeELDVZLWKIUHTXHQF\ORFNHGSUREHODVHUVZHUHDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\>@
5HSRUWHG UHODWLYH SUHFLVLRQV IRU WKHVH WKUHH8) VDPSOHVZHUH  DQG  UHVSHFWLYHO\>@7KHODWHVWUHVXOW>@GHPRQVWUDWHGLPSURYHPHQWVLQERWKDFFXUDF\DQGSUHFLVLRQ)RUDVDPSOH
ZLWK8DEXQGDQFHDWUHODWLYHELDVDQGSUHFLVLRQZHUHDERXWDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\

0HDVXUHPHQWWLPHIRU/$$56LVIDVWDQGLVW\SLFDOO\DURXQGPLQXWHV>@7KHRYHUKHDGIRUVDPSOH
SUHSDUDWLRQLVDOVRPLQLPDOWKHUHDFWLRQWLPHIRUWKHFRQYHUVLRQRIJDVHRXV8)RQWRWKHVROLGWKLQILOPVRUEHQW LVVHYHUDOPLQXWHV>@%HFDXVHZDYHOHQJWKVHOHFWLYLW\ IRU WKHWZRLVRWRSHVFRPHVIURPWKH
QDUURZEDQGZLGWK GLRGH ODVHU DQ RSWLFDO VSHFWURPHWHU LV QRW QHHGHG ZKLFK IXUWKHU UHGXFHV WKH
IRRWSULQWRIWKHLQVWUXPHQW

)URPLWVRSHUDWLQJSULQFLSOHWKH/$$56LQVWUXPHQWPLJKWQHHGVOLJKWO\PRUHGHPDQGLQJHQYLURQPHQW
FRQWURO7KHWZRGLRGHODVHUVQHHGWREHSHUIHFWO\DOLJQHGZLWKHDFKRWKHUVRWKDWWKHWZRODVHUEHDPV
DUHSURELQJLGHQWLFDOYROXPHVRIWKHSODVPDSOXPHJHQHUDWHGE\WKHDEODWLRQODVHU7KXVDKLJKOHYHO
RI PHFKDQLFDO UREXVWQHVV HJ DQWLYLEUDWLRQ WKHUPDO H[SDQVLRQ FRQWURO LV OLNHO\ UHTXLUHG $OVR
HPLVVLRQZDYHOHQJWKRIDGLRGHODVHULVYHU\VHQVLWLYHWRWHPSHUDWXUHWKHGLRGHODVHULVPRXQWHGRQWR
D3HOWLHUHOHPHQWRSHUDWHGKHDWVLQNDQGWKH WHPSHUDWXUH LVSUHFLVHO\PRQLWRUHGDQGFRQWUROOHG>@
(YHQZLWKSUHFLVHWHPSHUDWXUHFRQWUROWKHGLRGHODVHUQHHGVDFWLYHIHHGEDFNDQGIUHTXHQF\ORFNLQJWR
PLQLPL]HZDYHOHQJWKGULIW2YHUDOO WKH/$$56 LQVWUXPHQWDWLRQVHWXS LVPRGHUDWHO\FRPSOH[ZKLFK
FRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\EHDGUDZEDFNLQLWVDGDSWDWLRQDVDQLQILHOGLQVWUXPHQW


/DVHULQGXFHGVSHFWURFKHPLFDODVVD\IRUXUDQLXPHQULFKPHQW

/DVHU LQGXFHGVSHFWURFKHPLFDO DVVD\ IRU XUDQLXPHQULFKPHQW /,6$8( LV LQ D YHU\HDUO\ VWDJHRI
GHYHORSPHQW VWDUWLQJ 2FWREHU  DQG LV D MRLQW HIIRUW EHWZHHQ /DZUHQFH %HUNHOH\ 1DWLRQDO
/DERUDWRU\ /%1/ DQG 2DN 5LGJH 1DWLRQDO /DERUDWRU\ 251/ ,W LV DQ DOORSWLFDO WHFKQLTXH IRU
XUDQLXP LVRWRSLF DVVD\ DQG LQ IDFW LV DQ H[WHQVLRQ RI WKH ZHOONQRZQ ODVHU LQGXFHG EUHDNGRZQ
VSHFWURVFRS\ /,%6 WHFKQLTXH WR ORZSUHVVXUH JDVHRXV 8) VDPSOHV /LNH /$$56 LWV SULQFLSOH LVEDVHGRQWKHLVRWRSLFVKLIWVLQ8DQG8DWRPLFWUDQVLWLRQV,QVWHDGRIXWLOL]LQJDWRPLFDEVRUSWLRQ
/,6$8( HPSOR\V DWRPLF HPLVVLRQ DV WKHPHDVXUHPHQWPHDQV ,W LV NQRZQ WKDW LVRWRSLF VKLIWV IRU
VRPHXUDQLXPDWRPLFHPLVVLRQOLQHVFDQUHDFKWHQVRISLFRPHWHUVDQGDUHODUJHHQRXJKWREHUHDGLO\
PHDVXUHG ZLWK DQ RSWLFDO VSHFWURPHWHU HYHQ XQGHU DPELHQW SUHVVXUH DQG FRPSDUDWLYHO\ KLJK
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WHPSHUDWXUH HJ . >@ ,Q IDFW DWRPLF HPLVVLRQ VSHFWURPHWU\ KDV D ORQJ KLVWRU\ RI EHLQJ
XWLOL]HG IRU XUDQLXP LVRWRSLF DQDO\VLV > @ 5HFHQWO\ .UDFKHU et al. > @ YDOLGDWHG LVRWRSLF
DQDO\VLV RI 8 DQG 8 LQ GHSOHWHG QDWXUDO DQG HQULFKHG XUDQLXP ZLWK ,&3DWRPLF HPLVVLRQ
VSHFWURPHWU\DQGIXUWKHUH[WHQGHGWKHDQDO\VLVWRRWKHU8LVRWRSHVOLNH8

7KH/,6$8(V\VWHPLVWDUJHWHGIRUGLUHFWDQDO\VLVRIJDVHRXV8)VDPSOHVDOWKRXJKDVROLGVDPSOHHJ8)DEVRUEHGRQDVROLGVXEVWUDWHDOVRFDQEHXVHG6SHFLILFDOO\ IRUJDVHRXV8)VDPSOHVDVPDOOJDVFKDPEHUZLWKRSWLFDODFFHVVFRXSOHVGLUHFWO\WRD8)F\OLQGHUSLSHOLQHYDOYHIRUVDPSOLQJ7KURXJKWKHRSWLFDOSRUWDSXOVHGODVHUEHDPLVIRFXVHGLQWRWKH8)JDVVDPSOHDQGWKHODVHU±JDVLQWHUDFWLRQWKHQFUHDWHVDWUDQVLHQWKLJKWHPSHUDWXUHSODVPDH[FLWDWLRQVRXUFH7KLVKLJKWHPSHUDWXUH
SODVPDLVFDSDEOHRIEUHDNLQJGRZQWKHFKHPLFDOERQGVLQWKHVDPSOHFRQYHUWVLWLQWRLWVFRQVWLWXHQW
DWRPVDQGSURPRWHVDSRUWLRQRIWKHVHDWRPVLQWRWKHLUH[FLWHGVWDWHV7KHVHH[FLWHGVWDWHVWKURXJK
UDGLDWLYHGHFD\HPLWSKRWRQVWKDWDUHFKDUDFWHULVWLFRILWVHOHPHQWDODQGLVRWRSLFLGHQWLWLHV:KHQWKLV
WUDQVLHQW SODVPD VWDUWV WR FRRO W\SLFDOO\ DIWHU VHYHUDO PLFURVHFRQGV PROHFXOHV IRUP WKURXJK
UHFRPELQDWLRQ ,W KDV UHFHQWO\ EHHQ UHSRUWHG WKDW UHVXOWLQJPROHFXODU HPLVVLRQV DOVR FDUU\ LVRWRSLF
LQIRUPDWLRQ>@7KHWHFKQLTXHLVSRWHQWLDOO\DSSOLFDEOHWRERWKRIIOLQHDQGRQOLQHPHDVXUHPHQWV

7KHUHDUHVRPHPDUNHGFRQWUDVWVEHWZHHQ/$$56DQG/,6$8(2QO\RQHDEODWLRQODVHULVUHTXLUHG
LQ/,6$8(ZKHUHDV/$$56QHHGVWKUHHODVHUV>@6LPLODUWRWKH/$$56DEODWLRQODVHUWKHUHDUHQR
FRQVWUDLQWVRQWKH/,6$8(ODVHUZDYHOHQJWKDQGDODVHUZLWKQDQRVHFRQGRUVKRUWHUSXOVHZLGWKLV
UHTXLUHG LQ ERWK FDVHV3ODVPDHPLVVLRQV LQ /,6$8( DUH FROOHFWHG E\ VLQJOH VHW RI OLJKWFROOHFWLRQ
RSWLFVIRUVLPXOWDQHRXV8DQG8PHDVXUHPHQWZKLFKDOVRLQKHUHQWO\JXDUDQWHHWKDWDQLGHQWLFDO
SODVPDHPLVVLRQYROXPHLVSUREHG)XUWKHUPRUHRQHSRWHQWLDODGYDQWDJHRIHPSOR\LQJHPLVVLRQRYHU
ODVHUDEVRUSWLRQLVWKDWDODUJHFROOHFWLRQRIVSHFWUDOOLQHVDWRPLFDQGEDQGVPROHFXODUDUHHPLWWHG
IURP WKH ODVHU LQGXFHGSODVPDZKLFKFDQEHVLPXOWDQHRXVO\PHDVXUHGZLWKDPXOWLFKDQQHORSWLFDO
VSHFWURPHWHU$VPDQ\RIWKHVHVSHFWUDOIHDWXUHVFDUU\WKHLVRWRSLFLQIRUPDWLRQRIWKHVDPSOHPXOWLSOH
HPLVVLRQOLQHEDQG PHDVXUHPHQW KDV EHHQ VKRZQ WKURXJK VLPXODWLRQV WR LPSURYH DQDO\WLFDO
SUHFLVLRQ>@

$V /,6$8( LV LQ D YHU\ HDUO\ VWDJH RI GHYHORSPHQW LWV DQDO\WLFDO FDSDELOLWLHV DUH QRW \HW NQRZQ
+RZHYHULWLVDQWLFLSDWHGWKDWHPLVVLRQPHDVXUHPHQWVRQDFROOHFWLRQRIVSHFWUDOIHDWXUHVOLNHO\RIIHUV
DGYDQWDJH RYHU VLQJOH OLQHSDLUV FRPPRQO\ HPSOR\HG LQ DEVRUSWLRQPHDVXUHPHQWV )RU H[DPSOH LW
KDV EHHQ VKRZQ WKURXJK FRPSXWHU VLPXODWLRQ WKDW WKH XVH RI D FKHPRPHWULF DOJRULWKP IURP D
FROOHFWLRQRIVSHFWUDOIHDWXUHVSURYLGHVVHYHUDOWLPHVLPSURYHPHQWLQWKHSUHFLVLRQRI8DEXQGDQFH
FRPSDUHGWRWKRVHPHDVXUHPHQWVXWLOL]LQJRQO\DVLQJOHSDLURIHPLVVLRQOLQHV>@,QVLPXODWLRQWKH
XOWLPDWH SUHFLVLRQZDV DERXW  LQ DEVROXWH 8DEXQGDQFH IRUPXOWLSOH OLQH DQDO\VLV >@ZLWK
VLJQDOVDFFXPXODWHGIURPODVHUSXOVHV&OHDUO\IXUWKHULPSURYHPHQWLQSUHFLVLRQFDQEHDFKLHYHG
WKURXJKPRUHVLJQDODFFXPXODWLRQLHDFFXPXODWLQJVLJQDOIURPPRUHWKDQODVHUSXOVHVDOWKRXJK
LWLVDOVRDQWLFLSDWHGWKDWFRPSXWHUVLPXODWLRQSUREDEO\RIIHUVWKHEHVWFDVHVFHQDULR7KHDQWLFLSDWHG
PHDVXUHPHQW WLPH LV D IHZ PLQXWHV IRU HDFK 8) VDPSOH &RPPHUFLDO ILHOGGHSOR\DEOH /,%6LQVWUXPHQWVIRUGLUHFWVROLGVDPSOHDQDO\VLVDUHUHDGLO\DYDLODEOH$OWKRXJKWKHVHFRPPHUFLDOV\VWHPV
DUH QRW VSHFLILFDOO\ GHVLJQHG IRU JDVHRXV VDPSOHV PRGLILFDWLRQ IRU KDQGOLQJ JDVHRXV VDPSOHV LV
IHDVLEOH7KHVL]HDVZHOODVSRZHU UHTXLUHPHQWVRI WKHFRPSRQHQWVFDQEH UHDGLO\ ILW LQWRD ILHOG
GHSOR\DEOH LQVWUXPHQW :KLOH LW LV H[WUHPHO\ HDUO\ LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW F\FOH WKH /,6$8(
LQVWUXPHQWDWLRQVHWXS±ZLWKDVLQJOHODVHUH[FLWDWLRQVRXUFHDQGDVLQJOHVHWRIOLJKWFROOHFWLRQRSWLFV
±LVOLNHO\WREHWKHVLPSOHVWDPRQJDOOWKHWHFKQLTXHVGLVFXVVHGDERYHZKLFKLVDGYDQWDJHRXVDVDQ
LQILHOGLQVWUXPHQW


2XWORRN

7RVXPPDUL]HDFRPSUHKHQVLYHDQGLQGHSWKUHYLHZZDVFRQGXFWHGRQVWDWHRIWKHDUWDQGHPHUJLQJ
WHFKQRORJLHVIRU ILHOGHQULFKPHQWDQDO\VLVRI8)$OO WHFKQLTXHVZHUHDVVHVVHGIRU WKHLUSRWHQWLDO WRVHUYH DV DQ DOWHUQDWLYH IRU ODERUDWRU\EDVHGPDVV VSHFWURPHWU\ 7KH HYDOXDWLRQ ZDV FRPSULVHG RI
VHYHQFULWHULDEURDGO\GHILQHGPHDVXUHPHQW FKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGDQDO\WLFDO FDSDELOLW\PHDVXUHPHQW
WLPHDQGRYHUDOOHDVHRIRSHUDWLRQDQGV\VWHPFRPSOH[LW\

,QWHUPVRIERWKDQDO\WLFDOSHUIRUPDQFHDQGVDPSOHWKURXJKSXWWKH/6$3*'06LVFXUUHQWO\WKHEHVW
LQ DOO WKH HPHUJLQJ WHFKQLTXHV UHYLHZHG 7KH $36&*'06 DOWKRXJK FXUUHQWO\ XWLOL]HG RQO\ IRU
HOHPHQWDODQDO\VLVDQGQRW\HWIRULVRWRSLFPHDVXUHPHQWVDOUHDG\H[KLELWVLWVSURQRXQFHGVHQVLWLYLW\
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DGYDQWDJHIRUXUDQLXPGHWHFWLRQ8QOLNHWKH,&3WKHVHJORZGLVFKDUJHLRQVRXUFHVXVHPLFURSODVPDV
ZKLFKDOORZRSHUDWLRQXQGHUORZSRZHUDQGORZJDVIORZLIDSODVPDJDVLVHYHUQHHGHG²DQGWKXV
DUHKLJKO\ ILHOGGHSOR\DEOH7KHWHFKQLFDOFKDOOHQJHWR WUDQVIRUPWKHPLQWR WKHQH[WJHQHUDWLRQILHOG
GHSOR\DEOH8)HQULFKPHQWDVVD\ LQVWUXPHQWSHUKDSVUHODWHVWR LGHQWLI\LQJDQGFRXSOLQJWRDPXOWLFKDQQHO ILHOGGHSOR\DEOHPDVVVSHFWURPHWHU WKDW WKURXJKVLPXOWDQHRXVPHDVXUHPHQW FDQPDLQWDLQ
WKHFXUUHQWDFKLHYDEOHDQDO\WLFDOILJXUHVRIPHULW

6RPH HPHUJLQJ WHFKQLTXHV EDVHG RQ RSWLFDO VSHFWURPHWULF WHFKQLTXHV DUH DOVR SURPLVLQJ /$$56
VKRZVLWVSURPLVHZLWKDUHODWLYHELDVRIDQGUHODWLYHSUHFLVLRQRIIRUD/(88
VDPSOH/,6$8(LVDQHZGHYHORSPHQWDQGLVEDVHGRQZHOOHVWDEOLVKHGDWRPLFHPLVVLRQV/,%6$OO
RI WKHVH HPHUJLQJ WHFKQRORJLHV VKRZ SRWHQWLDO WR EH WKH QH[W JHQHUDWLRQ RI UDSLG ILHOG GHSOR\DEOH
LQVWUXPHQWDWLRQIRU8)HQULFKPHQWDVVD\

$FNQRZOHGJHPHQWV

7KLVZRUNZDVSHUIRUPHGXQGHUWKHDXVSLFHVRIWKH86'HSDUWPHQWRI(QHUJ\E\/DZUHQFH%HUNHOH\
1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\XQGHU&RQWUDFW'($&&+7KHSURMHFWZDVIXQGHGE\WKH6DIHJXDUGV
7HFKQRORJ\ 'HYHORSPHQW 3URJUDP LQ WKH 86 'HSDUWPHQW RI (QHUJ\1DWLRQDO 1XFOHDU 6HFXULW\
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V'2(116$¶V2IILFHRI1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQDQG$UPV&RQWURO13$&


5HIHUHQFHV

 $QKHLHU1&DQQRQ%0DUWLQH]$%DUUHWW&7DXEPDQ0$QGHUVRQ.DQG6PLWK/(A new
approach to enrichment plant UF6 destructive assay sample collection and analysis; 311/6$3DFLILF1RUWKZHVW1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\
 %DULQDJD&-+DJHU*-+RHJJ('&DUPDQ$-DQG+DUW*/Feasibility of a fieldable mass
spectrometer FY 2015 year-end report; 311/ 3DFLILF 1RUWKZHVW 1DWLRQDO /DERUDWRU\

 6PLWK /( DQG /HEUXQ $5 Design, modeling and viability analysis of an online uranium
enrichment monitor; in 2011 IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium Conference Record;  S

 (UGPDQQ1$PDGRU3$UERUp3(EHUOH+/XW]HQNLUFKHQ.2WWPDU+6FKRUOp+YDQ%HOOH
3/LSFVHL)DQG6FKZDOEDFK3COMPUCEA: A high performance analysis procedure for timely
on-site uranium accountancy verification in leu fuel fabrication plants;ESARDA Bulletin;

 %HUOL]RY$6FKDFKLQJHU$5RHWVFK.(UGPDQQ16FKRUOp+9DUJDV0=VLJUDL-.XONR$
.HVHOLFD0&DLOORX)8QVDO9DQG:DOF]DN7\SNH$Feedback from operational experience
of on-site deployment of bias defect analysis with COMPUCEA;J. Radioanal. Nucl. Chem.;

 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $WRPLF (QHUJ\ $JHQF\Development and implementation support programme for
nuclear verification 2016-2017;675,QWHUQDWLRQDO$WRPLF(QHUJ\$JHQF\,$($
 +LHIWMH*0The future of plasma spectrochemical instrumentation. Plenary lecture;J. Anal. At.
Spectrom.;
 0LDOOH 6 5LFKWHU 6 +HQQHVV\ & 7UX\HQV - -DFREVVRQ 8 DQG $UHJEH <Certification of
uranium hexafluoride reference materials for isotopic composition; J. Radioanal. Nucl. Chem.;

 %RXO\JD 6 .RQHJJHU.DSSHO 6 5LFKWHU 6 DQG 6DQJHO\ /Mass spectrometric analysis for
nuclear safeguards;J. Anal. At. Spectrom.;
$UGHOW ' 3RODWDMNR $ 3ULPP 2 DQG 5HLMQHQ 0 Isotope ratio measurements with a fully
simultaneous Mattauch-Herzog ICP-MS;Anal. Bioanal. Chem.;
2NDGD<.DWR66DWRRND6DQG7DNHXFKL.Measurements of U-235/U-238 isotopic ratio in
the photoproduct UF5 by multiphoton ionization and time-of-flight mass spectrometry;Appl. Phys.
B;
$UPVWURQJ '3 +DUNLQV '$ &RPSWRQ 51 DQG 'LQJ 'Multiphoton ionization of uranium
hexafluoride;J. Chem. Phys.;
:KLWWHQ:%5HLOO\37$9HUEHFN*DQG5DPVH\-0Mass spectrometry of UF6 in a micro
ion trap; in7th International Conference on Facility Operations: Safeguards Interface;&KDUOHVWRQ
6&3DSHU
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
533
116$ 2IILFH RI 1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ DQG $UP &RQWUROSafeguards technology factsheet - portable
mass spectrometry working group (MSWG);
+RHJJ('%DULQDJD&-+DJHU*-+DUW*/.RSSHQDDO':DQG0DUFXV5.Preliminary
figures of merit for isotope ratio measurements: The liquid sampling-atmospheric pressure glow 
discharge microplasma ionization source coupled to an Orbitrap mass analyzer;J. Am. Soc. Mass
Spectrom.;
+RHJJ(' %DULQDJD&- +DJHU*- +DUW*/ .RSSHQDDO ': DQG0DUFXV5. Isotope
ratio characteristics and sensitivity for uranium determinations using a liquid sampling-atmospheric 
pressure glow discharge ion source coupled to an Orbitrap mass analyzer;J. Anal. At. Spectrom.;

%DULQDJD&- +DJHU*- +DUW*/ .RSSHQDDO ':0DUFXV5. -RQHV 60 DQG0DQDUG
%7 Toward a fieldable atomic mass spectrometer for safeguards applications: Sample
preparation and ionization; in 12th Symposium on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy,
Implementation and People (IAEA-CN-220);9LHQQD$XVWULD3DSHU6
6FKZDUW] $- :LOOLDPV ./ +LHIWMH *0 DQG 6KHOOH\ -7 Atmospheric-pressure solution-
cathode glow discharge: A versatile ion source for atomic and molecular mass spectrometry;Anal.
Chim. Acta;
.UDFKOHU 0 DQG &DUERO 3 Validation of isotopic analysis of depleted, natural and enriched
uranium using high resolution ICP-OES;J. Anal. At. Spectrom.;
.UDFKOHU0DQG:HJHQ'+Promises and pitfalls in the reliable determination of U-233 using
high resolution ICP-OES;J. Anal. At. Spectrom.;
=DP]RZ ' 0XUUD\ *0 'VLOYD $3 DQG (GHOVRQ 0& High-resolution optical-emission
spectroscopy of uranium hexafluoride in the argon afterglow discharge; Appl. Spectrosc.; 

%DUVKLFN &0 6KDZ 5: <RXQJ -3 DQG 5DPVH\ -0 Evaluation of the precision and
accuracy of a uranium isotopic analysis using glow-discharge optogalvanic spectroscopy;Anal.
Chem.;
6PLWK%:4XHQWPHLHU$%ROVKRY0DQG1LHPD[.Measurement of uranium isotope ratios
in solid samples using laser ablation and diode laser-excited atomic fluorescence spectrometry;
Spectrochim. Acta Part B;
%R\HU %' $QKHLHU 1 &DEOH'XQORS 3 DQG 6H[WRQ / Incorporation of new, automated
environmental sampling systems into safeguards approaches; /$85 /RV $ODPRV
1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\
%XVKDZ%$ DQG $QKHLHU -U 1& Isotope ratio analysis on micron-sized particles in complex
matrices by laser ablation-absorption ratio spectrometry; Spectrochim. Acta Part B;  

116$)DFW6KHHWFieldable atomic beam laser spectrometer for isotopic analysis;
%HUH]LQ$*0DO\XJLQ6/1DGH]KGLQVNLL$,1DPHVWQLNRY'<3RQXURYVNLL<<6WDYURYVNLL
'%6KDSRYDORY<39\D]RY ,(=DVODYVNLL9<6HOLYDQRY<**RUVKXQRY10*ULJRULHY
*<DQG1DELHY66UF6 enrichment measurements using TDLS techniques;Spectrochim. Acta
Part A;
*ULJRU
HY*</HEHGHYD$60DO\XJLQ6/1DELHY661DGH]KGLQVNLL$, DQG3RQXURYVNLL
<< Investigation of 235UF6 and 238UF6 spectra in the mid-IR range;Atomic Energy;
116$)DFW6KHHWSpectroscopic mathods for ultra-low isotopic analysis of proliferant material;

=KDR.3HQNLQ01RUPDQ&%DOVOH\60D\HU.3HHUDQL33LHWUL&7DSRGL67VXWDNL<
%RHOOD 0 5HQKD -U * DQG .XKQ ( International target values 2010 for measurement
uncertainties in safeguarding nuclear materials; 675 ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $WRPLF (QHUJ\ $JHQF\
,$($
+LHIWMH*0Emergence and impact of alternative sources and mass analyzers in plasma source
mass spectrometry;J. Anal. At. Spectrom.;
0HLMD-DQG0HVWHU=Signal correlation in isotope ratio measurements with mass spectrometry:
Effects on uncertainty propagation;Spectrochim. Acta Part B;
*URWWL07RGROL-/DQG0HUPHW-0Influence of the operating parameters and of the sample
introduction system on time correlation of line intensities using an axially viewed CCD-based ICP-
AES system;Spectrochim. Acta Part B;
6FKLOOLQJ*'5D\6-6SHUOLQH53'HQWRQ0%%DULQDJD&-.RSSHQDDO':DQG+LHIWMH
*0Optimization of Ag isotope-ratio precision with a 128-channel array detector coupled to a
Mattauch-Herzog mass spectrograph;J. Anal. At. Spectrom.;
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
534
5LFKWHU 6 .XKQ + 7UX\HQV - .UDLHP 0 DQG $UHJEH < Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas
source mass spectrometry for certification of reference materials and nuclear safeguard 
measurements at IRMM;J. Anal. At. Spectrom.;
:LHVHU 0 6FKZLHWHUV - DQG 'RXWKLWW & 0XOWLFROOHFWRU LQGXFWLYHO\ FRXSOHG SODVPD PDVV
VSHFWURPHWU\ LQ ,VRWRSLFDQDO\VLV  IXQGDPHQWDOVDQGDSSOLFDWLRQVXVLQJ ,&306VWHG:LOH\
9&+9HUODJS
GH2OLYHLUD23GH%ROOH:$ORQVR$5LFKWHU6:HOOXP53RQ]HYHUD(6DUNLV-(6DQG
.HVVHO 5 Demonstrating the metrological compatibility of uranium isotope amount ratio
measurement results obtained by GSMS, TIMS and MC-ICPMS techniques; Int. J. Mass
Spectrom.;
(UGPDQQ1$OEHUW1$PDGRU3$UERUp3(EHUOH+/XW]HQNLUFKHQ.2WWPDU+6FKRUOp+
YDQ %HOOH 3 /LSFVHL ) 6FKZDOEDFK 3 -XQJ 6 DQG /DIROLH 5COMPUCEA 2nd generation
performance evaluation;,$($&1,QWHUQDWLRQDO$WRPLF(QHUJ\$JHQF\
4XDUOHV&'&DUDGR$-%DULQDJD&-.RSSHQDDO': DQG0DUFXV5.Liquid sampling-
atmospheric pressure glow discharge (LS-APGD) ionization source for elemental mass 
spectrometry: Preliminary parametric evaluation and figures of merit;Anal. Bioanal. Chem.;

0DUFXV5.4XDUOHV&'%DULQDJD&-&DUDGR$- DQG.RSSHQDDO':Liquid sampling-
atmospheric pressure glow discharge ionization source for elemental mass spectrometry;Anal.
Chem.;
&DUDGR$-4XDUOHV&''XIILQ$0%DULQDJD&-5XVVR5(0DUFXV5.(LGHQ*&DQG
.RSSHQDDO ': Femtosecond laser ablation particle introduction to a liquid sampling-
atmospheric pressure glow discharge ionization source;J. Anal. At. Spectrom.;
6FKZDUW] $- 5D\ 6- DQG +LHIWMH *0 Evaluation of interference filters for spectral
discrimination in solution-cathode glow discharge optical emission spectrometry; J. Anal. At.
Spectrom.;
7KHUPR )LVKHU 6FLHQWLILF ExactiveTM series: ExactiveTM and Q ExactiveTM preinstallation
requirements guide;5HYLVLRQ$
/LX+4XHQWPHLHU$DQG1LHPD[.Diode laser absorption measurement of uranium isotope
ratios in solid samples using laser ablation;Spectrochim. Acta Part B;
$QKHLHU 1 &DQQRQ %0DUWLQH] $ %DUUHWW & 7DXEPDQ0 $QGHUVRQ . DQG 6PLWK /(A
laser-based method for onsite analysis of UF6 at enrichment plant; 311/6$ 3DFLILF1RUWKZHVW1DWLRQDO/DERUDWRU\
116$6DIHJXDUGV7HFKQRORJ\)DFWVKHHWLaser ablation absorption ratio spectroscopy (LAARS);
311/6$
1LHPD[.=\ELQ$6FKQXUHU3DWVFKDQ&DQG*UROO+Semiconductor diode lasers in atomic
spectrometry;Anal. Chem.;$$
&KDQ *&< &KRL , 0DR ; =RUED 9 /DP 23 6KXK '. DQG 5XVVR 5( Isotopic
determination of uranium in soil by laser induced breakdown spectroscopy;Spectrochim. Acta
Part B;
%XUNKDUW/(6WXNHQEURHNHU*DQG$GDPV6Isotope shifts in uranium spectra;Phys. Rev.;

(GHOVRQ0&DQG)DVVHO9$Isotopic abundance determinations by inductively coupled plasma
atomic emission spectroscopy;Anal. Chem.;
0DR ; &KDQ *&< &KRL , =RUED 9 DQG 5XVVR 5( Combination of atomic lines and
molecular bands for uranium optical isotopic analysis in laser induced plasma spectrometry; J.
Radioanal. Nucl. Chem.;
&KDQ*&<0DR;&KRL,6DUNDU$/DP236KXK'.DQG5XVVR5(Multiple emission
line analysis for improved isotopic determination of uranium – a computer simulation study;
Spectrochim. Acta Part B;



39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
535
Alternative nuclear certified reference materials for safeguards and 
industry 
SANCHEZ HERNANDEZ Ana Maríaa, TOTH Kalmanb, AREGBE Yetundeb, BANIK 
Nidhu Lala, BAUWENS Jeroenb, BUDA Razvana, BUJAK Renatab, CARLOS 
MARQUEZ Ramóna, CASTELEYN Karina, DUINSLAEGER Lilya, HENNESSY 
Carmelb, JAKOPIC Rozleb, KEHOE Francesb,  
VAN BELLE Pietera, ZULEGER Evelyna 
a JRC G.II.6 Nuclear Safeguards and Forensics 
Hermann-von-Helmholtz-Platz 1, 76344 Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen, Germany 
JRC Directorate G - Nuclear Safety and Security 
b JRC G2 Standards for Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards 
Retieseweg 111, 2440 Geel, Belgium 
Abstract: 
Large-Sized Dried (LSD) spikes are Certified Reference Materials (CRMs) used in nuclear safeguards 
for accurate determination of nuclear material inventories by Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry 
(IDMS). They are a metrological quality tool to meet the existing requirements for reliable accountancy 
and verification measurements (IAEA STR-368).  
LSD spikes are produced by drying down accurately weighed quantities of uranium and plutonium 
nuclear reference solutions into vials. The dried deposits are not stable over time. To keep the spikes 
integrity and to prevent unintended losses of material, the CRMs need to be protected with a matrix or 
coating material. This substance is a critical component for the quality and long-term stability of these 
CRMs. 
IDMS relies on the mechanical integrity of the spikes; they need to be robust during transport and 
storage for their guaranteed life-time. The main requirements for coating materials are good 
adherence to glass, mechanical stability, resistance to radiation and long term stability. The material 
should furthermore, not interfere with the preparation and mass spectrometric measurements. 
Under the project "Innovative nuclear CRMs for EURATOM safeguards and industry" (INS-CRM), the 
JRC Directorate G for Nuclear Safety and Security examines alternative substances for coating 
spikes. The main candidate is CarboxyMethyl Cellulose (CMC) which seems to meet the requirements 
mentioned above. The goal of the project is to find the right methodology and composition for the 
preparation of the coatings. Additionally, the mechanical integrity needs to be proven under simulated 
transport and radiation conditions, and finally the spikes shelf life will be determined. Furthermore, to 
understand better the interaction between the matrix and the actinides, the structure and chemical 
properties have to be investigated using different analytical techniques. It is also planned to test 
several U/Pu ratios for CRMs suitable for different sample types. This paper reports on the current 
status of the project. 
Keywords: Safeguards, Spikes, Coating, IDMS, ITV2010. 
1. Introduction
The European Commission is responsible for the control of all civil fissile nuclear material in the 
European Union, EURATOM Treaty Chapter VII: The European Commission shall satisfy itself that 
nuclear material is not diverted from intended uses [1]. One of the JRC core activities is supporting 
EURATOM safeguards (DG ENER), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and industry with 
metrological quality control tools and top notch analytical service. 
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Large-Sized Dried (LSD) spikes are Certified Reference Materials (CRMs) used in Nuclear Safeguards 
and industry. They are a metrological quality tool for nuclear plant operator and safeguards 
laboratories for accurate determination of nuclear material inventories by Isotope Dilution Mass 
Spectrometry (IDMS). Using high quality spikes in IDMS as one of the primary measurement 
techniques provides accurate and traceable measurement results (IAEA/ESARDA International Target 
Values, ITV) [2]. In particular, the IRMM-1027 series of LSD spikes are certified for the mass of 235U,
238U and 239Pu per unit and the uranium and plutonium isotope amount ratios [3]. The spikes are
covered with a thin layer of the organic substance cellulose acetate butyrate (CAB) to preserve 
integrity of the dried nitrates. The quality and reliability of the LSD spikes determine the accuracy of 
the fissile material accountancy of irradiated nuclear fuel at the EURATOM on-site laboratories and at 
reprocessing plants. The EURATOM laboratories operated by DG JRC on behalf of DG ENER, are 
located at the reprocessing plants in Sellafield, UK and La Hague, France. Both laboratories are 
instrumental in providing independent assurance to the European Commission that nuclear material is 
not diverted from its declared use. 
The main requirements for suitable coating materials are good adherence to glass, mechanical 
stability, good complexation properties, resistance to radiation and long-term stability. The material 
should not interfere with the preparation/chromatographic separation steps and mass spectrometric 
measurements. The preparation of spike CRMs should furthermore allow the production in large 
batches in compliance with ISO Standard 17034 to fulfil the demands for fissile material control by 
safeguards authorities and plant operators [4]. 
Currently the CAB coated IRMM-1027 LSD spikes provided by JRC-Geel have a shelf life of 3 years. 
Customers, however, require a longer shelf life. Therefore the optimization of the preparation of the 
organic layer with embedded uranyl- and plutonium nitrate as well as investigations on new types of 
coatings have been undertaken as a joint endeavour by the JRC-Geel and JRC-Karlsruhe. Different 
approaches have been used to address these goals: 
1. Use of carboxymethyl cellulose sodium salt (CMC) foam as coating material [5].
2. Improvement of the mechanical properties of the CAB film by using plasticizer [6].
3. Reconditioning of CAB spikes by treatment with phosphoric acid (H3PO4).
The well-defined objective and the limited granted time span render this project a project of mainly 
experimental nature. In addition, several characterisation techniques such as X-ray diffraction (XRD), 
Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) with Energy Dispersive X-Ray Analysis (EDX) and Transmission 
Electron Microscopy (TEM) are applied with the aim to better understand the binding mechanism and 
distribution of the U and Pu in nitric systems. 
2. CMC
CMC is the sodium salt of carboxymethylcellulose [7]. It is produced from cellulose, which is made 
water-soluble by introducing carboxymethyl groups along the cellulose chain. CMC is formed by the 
reaction of cellulose with chloroacetic acid and sodium hydroxide.  
The applications of CMC in many areas, particularly in food industry, are well known, but there are not 
many studies on the interaction of CMC with nuclear materials. According to the experimental 
research carried out by the JRC [5] with actinides embedded in CMC, the material shows properties 
which make this substance a very good candidate to be used as coating material for the LSD spikes. 
Some of these properties are listed below:  
 CMC is a powder that dissolves in water or nitric acid solutions. For the envisaged application, a
nitric acid solution is required for several reasons. Most important is to create a coating that
embeds the nuclear material, which at the same time, impedes the formation of plutonium colloids
[8, 9]
 When the CMC solution is dispensed and dried, it builds a foam, see Figure 1. Over time and
during storage the structure changes starting with carboxylic acid formation; nevertheless, the
product remains stable. The final product depends on the used protocol for the preparation and
final composition of the CMC solution (composition in terms of CMC and nitric acid concentration)
 The final product tends to remain fixed on the walls and at the bottom of the vials
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 The foam appears to offer a good adsorption capability for the dried U and Pu nitrates; the U and
Pu element distribution within the foam appears homogenous as demonstrated by SEM studies [5]
 The final product quickly dissolves in nitric acid solution
Figure 1. Formation of CMC-foam from the mother solution to different stages of maturation. 
2.1. CMC solution and coating preparation 
The first part of the project has been mainly dedicated to define the parameters for the optimal 
composition of the CMC solution, the working range and the protocol for the production of the CMC 
mother solution. 
The objective has been to produce a robust product suitable for production on a large scale. In 
particular, production and treatment under the special conditions required for the preparation of 
nuclear CRMs (i.e. working in glove boxes).  
2.1.1. CMC protocol 
During the production and evaluation of the foams prepared during the first stage of the project, it was 
realized that the protocol for the preparation of the CMC solution has a strong influence on the quality 
and the ageing of the final product. 
Preliminary tests performed [5] used a solution in the form of a gel with high viscosity which was very 
difficult to dispense into vials. The concentration of CMC was limited by the solubility of the CMC in 
water to about 5 % CMC. Another drawback of this protocol was that during the drying process the 
solution had a tendency to produce a very thin ring of dried of dried CMC on the wall of the vial; this 
ring is liable to produce flakes and thus nuclear material could be dispersed. 
Several protocols have been checked until the final one met the following requirements: 
 CMC starting solution easy to prepare
 CMC solution in liquid form easy to dispense
 Reasonable foam production repeatability
 Good quality of the foam
 Better control of the foam formation time (drying time)
The drying time of the solution, produced using the current protocol, varies between 24 and 72 hours 
depending on the drying temperature applied on the heating device. Setting up variable temperatures 
depending on the drying stage (evaporation phase or formation of foam) allows reducing the drying 
time; the maximum temperature during the foam formation phase should not exceed 45 °C. 
2.1.2. Heating device – Foil Heater 
An appropriate hot plate has been developed in collaboration with the workshop of the JRC.G.1 - JRC 
Sites Radioprotection and Security Unit (Figure 2). The design has been tailored considering the main 
requirements for the production of LSD spikes in large batches and in particular the requirements of 
the JRC-Geel facilities.  
Heat is provided by a flexible thermofoil heater; several manufactures (Minco, Termya, Synomas) 
provide these heaters with the required features: Polyimide material, 101.6x101.6 mm, with pressure-
sensitive adhesive, Voltage 24V, Watt density 0.39 W/cm2, Teflon leads and insulated connection
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points. The operational range to dry down the coating solution is between 7.5 V and 9 V depending on 
the equipment set up. An aluminium plate has been adapted to the foil heater in order to better 
disperse the heat which in return provides for a homogeneous surface temperature. The temperature 
gradient has been thus reduced from about Δ 10 °C to Δ 2 °C.  
The heating element is enclosed in an outer casing made of polycarbonate with UL94 V-0 certification. 
The heat output is negligible. The external-surface temperature of the foil heater enclosure is below 60 
°C which is acceptable for the use inside a glove box. An outlet in the casing is connected to the 
ventilation system to remove acid fumes. The hotplate has inserts allowing secure placement of spike 
vials. Three heating devices have been connected in series. The power supply and the temperature 
control unit are located outside the glove box. Temperature sensors placed on the foil heater are 
connected to the control unit. The cabling is ensured via feed-through "LEMO" connectors. 
The construction has been installed at the JRC-Karlsruhe and  the JRC-Geel facilities for the 
preparation of the spikes.  
Figure 2. Chamber foil heater developed at the JRC-Karlsruhe. 
2.1.3. Optimisation of the CMC coating 
With the aim to find the most suitable composition, different concentrations of CMC and HNO3 and 
different viscosity of CMC have been tested on a set of cold tests (inactive samples without nuclear 
material). Furthermore, the influence of different environmental parameters has been also evaluated. 
The four main variables which have been controlled are summarised more concretely below: 
 Concentration of CMC in mass fraction, from 6 to 17 %
 CMC viscosity (Low viscosity – CMC LV, High viscosity – CMC HV)
 HNO3 molarity from 1 to 6 mol/L
 Environmental parameters (temperature, humidity and environmental acidity)
To test the CMC behaviour under different environmental conditions, samples have been produced 
outside and inside glove-boxes and in different laboratories at JRC-Karlsruhe and JRC-Geel facilities. 
The main indicators used for the evaluation of the foam are the quality (in terms of development, 
colour and height of the foam), the ageing of the product and finally the resistance to the mechanical 
tests. The height of the foam should be limited in order to avoid material dispersion and to concentrate 
all material at the bottom of the vessel. A homogeneous white colour on the fresh foam indicates that 
the foam has been properly developed and that the product has not been over-heated. 
As a result of the tests performed with non-active samples the protocol for the preparation has been 
improved. The working range has been defined for the different laboratories, considering that the final 
composition required depends on the environmental conditions mentioned before.  
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The concentration of HNO3 is a deciding factor for the quality of the coating. A minimum of molarity of 
nitric acid is required for the formation of the foam, but an excess has a negative impact on the quality 
of the foam: higher foams and faster degradation presumably because of the unreacted acid. 
In order to incorporate the typical amount of nuclear material of the LSD spikes in the coating matrix, 
the minimum mass of CMC per vial was ascertained [5]. The concentration of CMC is limited by the 
concentration of nitric acid; the foam will not be fully developed with an excess of CMC.  
Regarding the CMC viscosity, based on our experimental results, the low viscosity CMC is preferred 
for the preparation of spikes; it has also a higher degree of substitution which, together with the lower 
molecular weight, facilitates the dissolution in water based systems. 
According to the tests done at JRC-Geel and JRC-Karlsruhe, the optimal nitric acid concentration 
varies in a range between 2 and 3 mol/L (depending on the laboratory environmental conditions) for a 
mass fraction of 10-11 % LV CMC. The amount of CMC solution dispensed in the vials has been fixed 
at 1.5 mL; this quantity has been adjusted in such a way that the actinides complexation capacity is 
maintained with respect to the previous tests [5] and the content of nitric acid can be kept as low as 
possible. Also this volume of solution is large enough to cover all remainings of nuclear material that 
might be sorbed on the walls of the vials in the previous step of drying the spiking material. 
2.1.4. Ageing and transport simulation tests 
The non-active CMC vials have been visually inspected (ageing test) monthly during the first 6 months 
and then every 3 months in the first year after the production. Furthermore, mechanical tests have 
been performed 6 months after the production of the sample.  
According to the visual inspections carried out, the most changes due to ageing take place during the 
first 5-6 months. Afterwards the product is more stable and suffers less modifications. 
Considering the constraints of working in a nuclear facility, some transport conditions have been 
simulated. The following tests have been performed: 
 Vibration test using a laboratory shaker at 1500 rpm for 6 hours
 Low temperature test (-15°C) for 8 hours
 Elevated temperature (43-45 °C) for 8 hours
The outcome of these ageing and transport simulation tests is very promising. The integrity of the 
matrix produced with the most optimal protocol and exposed to the transport simulation tests has not 
been affected. The structure of the CMC does not change and no flakes or cracks could be detected. 
Furthermore, a collaboration with the Centrum voor Polymer & Materiaaltechnologie (CPMT) of the 
Ghent University in Belgium has been established under this project. Experimental techniques 
commonly used in polymer research will also be applied with the aim to discover more about the 
chemical and mechanical properties of the organic substances evaluated under this project. Apart 
from alpha and gamma radiations degradation is also caused by the presence of nitric acid that 
induces hydrolytic cleavage of the etheric bonds of CMC. Blank CMC foams will be analysed by gel 
permeation chromatography (GPC) to assess the effect of nitric acid on the molecular weight and to 
evaluate the degradation process. 
2.2. CMC active spikes 
In order to test the coating capabilities and to check that the material meets the requirements, several 
sets of spikes with different ratios of nuclear materials have been produced. Some of the samples will 
undergo the same tests as the non-active CMC: exposition to elevated and low temperature, resilience 
during simulated transport and irradiation conditions. Finally, in order to confirm the reliability of the 
spikes, several samples from every set will be analysed for the concentration of the U and Pu by 
IDMS. Figure 3 summarizes the sets of samples and tests envisaged; for sets 4 and 5 different tests 
will be performed on the same spikes. The U/Pu concentration determination by IDMS is the last test 
for some of the vials from sets 3, 4 and 5 as this step is destructive. 
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Figure 3: Outline of the different tests to be done. 
Set 1 will serve to determine any possible interferences of the coating with the actinide and fission 
product chromatographic separation and mass spectrometry measurements. The JRC-Karlsruhe will 
follow the procedure routinely used for the verification of spikes produced by external customers of the 
Analytical Service [10], using the chromatographic separation on resin UTEVA®: Eichrom [11]. In the 
case of the JRC-Geel the anion exchange method (Bio-Rad AG1-X4 100-200 mesh resin) [12] is used 
for the actinides separation.  
For the evaluation of the stability of the CMC the full kinetic and thermodynamic processes of the 
chemical reactions need to be ascertained for the desired shelf life of at least five years. The ageing 
and long-term stability of the spike will be evaluated using about 30 vials (Set 2) of the internal 
reference materials prepared (see Table 1, SPK1-6), capped and kept in a glove-box. For this it is 
necessary to visually inspect the samples monthly during the first 6 months and every 2-3 months for 
the lifetime of the samples.  
The timespan of the project does not cover the entire period. Nevertheless, several specific tests have 
been performed to simulate as much as reasonable possible the behaviour of the products over longer 
periods of time under the influence of internal and external factors like intrinsic radiation or exposure to 
heat variations and vibrations.  
In order to understand the influence of radiolysis stemming from the alpha-emitting Pu in the CMC 
foam, a third series (Set 3) of 34 vials with nuclear material high enriched in 238Pu (strong alpha 
emitter) has been loaded. These samples are also kept in a glove-box and visually inspected 
periodically. A few vials have been coated with CAB in order to compare the influence of the self-
irradiation and the ageing in the two coating materials. 
In addition, for the assessment of the robustness, influence of temperature and irradiation 2 more sets 
of samples (Set 4 and Set 5) will be processed and exposed to high and low temperature and 
resilience tests. Also the Hot Cell facilities of the JRC-Karlsruhe will be used to expose the CMC 
covered spikes to about 1Sv/h dose rate of gamma rays radiation. As part of the testing several vials 
of the Set 4 and 5 will be examined in order to assess the influence of the experiments on the CMC 
foam after the elapsing of carefully chosen periods of time 
Another goal of the project is to introduce various U/Pu ratios suitable for different sample types; the 
present U/Pu ratio ~25:1 is a compromise. To achieve measurement uncertainties below the ITVs for 
the large range of samples currently measured, the spikes need to be provided with different U/Pu 
ratios. To this end, various laboratory internal reference materials have been produced and 
characterized for the different tests. Seven spike solutions with mainly different U concentrations (Pu 
concentration is maintained stable except for SPK7 as explained below) and variable U/Pu ratios have 
been produced (Table 1): 
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SPIKE RATIOS 
Ratio U/Pu Pu (mg) U (mg) 
SPK1 25 2 50 
SPK2 8 2 16 
SPK3 100 2 200 
SPK4 Pure U - 18-50 
SPK5 Pure Pu 2 - 
SPK6 1 2 2 
SPK7 Pu-238 0.06 - 
Table 1: Preparation of spike solutions and U/Pu amount per vial. 
The isotopic composition of the U and Pu solutions from SPK1 to SPK6 is comparable to the current 
LSD spikes IRMM-1027 [3]. The quantity of Pu in the spikes is also comparable to the LSD spikes, 2 
mg Pu per vial and the amount of U has been adjusted in order to reach the desired U/Pu ratio.  
The spike SPK7 has been prepared in order to check the self-irradiation and radiolysis influence (Set 
3). SPK7 contains only Pu with a different isotopic composition, elevated relative mass fraction of 
238Pu (238Pu/Pu 73.32 ± 0.21 % [k=2] 23/03/2016). The amount of Pu dispensed is calculated in such a
way that the radioactivity in 1 month in this spike is equivalent to the radioactivity over 6 months in one 
of the IRMM 1027 series LSD spikes [3].  
34 SPK7 spikes have been dispensed and coated in the facilities of the JRC-Karlsruhe, 10 CAB, 12 
CMC LV and 12 CMC HV. Figure 4 shows the ageing of three SPK7 spikes covered with CAB, CMC 
LV and CMC HV respectively: 
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Figure 4: SPK7 spikes coated with CAB and CMC LV and HV. 
In all the CAB spikes, the coating starts to react and to form small bubbles around the areas where the 
nuclear material and consequently the radioactivity are concentrated. Nevertheless, the spike SPK7 
without uranyl nitrates is not representative the real LSD spikes but serves as described above for 
understanding the influence of the self-irradiation effects in a limited time span; the CAB coating 
dissolves partially the Pu nitrates and the nuclear material is not homogeneously dispersed in the 
coating. The presence of U in spikes plays a key role for the dissolution of the material in the CAB 
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solution before drying down. In the case of the CMC, the solution totally dissolves and incorporates 
the dried Pu nitrates before creating the foam. The CMC ageing is comparable to the non-active 
samples. Therefore, the influence of the self-irradiation in the case of the CMC is not significant for the 
time of observation. 
For the coating of the spikes from SKP1 to SPK6, initially the composition of the CMC solution chosen 
to prepare the active spikes was the one optimised during the tests with the non-active samples. 
However, while producing the CMC foams with the different ratios, we have appreciated that the nitric 
acid concentration can be customised according to the amount of nuclear material, but always in the 
range of 2-3 mol/L HNO3; higher amounts of nuclear material require less HNO3 concentration which 
could enhance the long-term stability of the spikes.
One of the main outcomes of these active tests is the confirmation of the high complexation capacity 
of the CMC. This property allows the production of spikes with different U/Pu ratios using higher 
amounts of nuclear material. Figure 5 shows a spike SPK3, U/Pu ratio 100 with 200 mg of U and 2 mg 
of Pu, before and after being coated with CMC solution. Besides, due to the characteristics of the 
drying process of the CMC, the possible remaining material fixed on the walls of the vials is 
incorporated and dissolved in the solution before the formation of the foam, see Figure 6.  
Figure 5: Picture on the left dried SPK3 spike 
(without CMC) and on the right the same spike 
coated with CMC. 
Figure 6: Dried test spike with some nuclear 
material on the tube walls. 
So far no disturbances during spike dissolution, actinides separation and mass spectrometry 
measurements could have been observed due to the present of CMC coating. The tests have been 
carried out for Set 1 spikes. 
Furthermore, in order to verify that the final product does not depend on the CMC material 
manufacturers two materials from different producers are being tested with the same production 
protocol at the moment. Figure 7 shows CMC spikes from the different sets of ratios coated with CMC 
from the following producers: Calbiochem [13] in the first row and Alfa Aesar [14] in the second row of 
pictures:  
SPK1 SPK2 SPK3 SPK4 SPK5 
Figure 7: Different spikes and ratios coated with Calbiochem CMC (first row) and Alfa Aesar (second row). 
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The first impression is that  the coatings produced with both materials meet the requirements in terms 
of foam quality. Further investigations are undergoing on the coatings produced with the second 
material. 
2.2.1. Additional analysis techniques 
In order to complement the experimental results and to understand better the behaviour of the 
coatings, further investigations are planned to be applied using the following techniques: 
 GPC for polymer molecular weight and polydispersity analysis
 Thermo Gravimetrical Analysis (TGA) and Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) for thermal
analysis
 Mechanical testing for tensile stress and tensile strain behaviour
 SEM-EDX, TEM, imaging techniques used to analyse morphology, defects, etc.
 Nuclear Magnetic Resonance spectroscopy (NMR) for chemical structure
 XRD and X-ray Absorption Spectroscopy (XAS) for molecular structure
 Molecular modelling
CMC foams containing REIMEP17A U/Pu material [15] were subjected to SEM/EDX investigations [5] 
and the distribution of both U and Pu was proven to be homogeneous. Additional preliminary analyses 
with TEM have been performed on CMC foam contacted with nuclear material with U/Pu ratio ~20 (~2 
mg Pu), and the diffraction of the resulted figure shows a perfectly amorphous material, with no rings 
or single diffraction spots which could be assigned to any crystallinity (see Figure 8).  
Figure 8: Low resolution bright field images of typical particles on the CMC –U/Pu material in the first and second 
pictures from the left. Last picture demonstrates by electron diffraction the typical amorphous appearance.  
3. CAB
Cellulose acetate butyrate (CAB) has been applied as the organic matrix of LSD spikes for the last 16 
years. It was the successor of the 'THF spikes' due to its better solubility in nitric acid and easy 
preparation procedure. CAB is cellulose derivative partially esterified with acetyl and butyryl groups 
where the ratio of –OH/acetyl/butyryl functional groups differ (see Figure 9). Depending on the degree 
of substitution, the ratio of the different functional groups and the degree of polymerization the physical 
and chemical properties of the polymer can be altered. Commercially available CABs are usually 
characterized by their butyryl content, given as wt%, and this value can vary between ~17-55% (the 
hydroxyl content of the CABs is typically low < 2 wt%). 
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Figure 9: Chemical structure of cellulose acetate butyrate (source: Sigma-Aldrich [16]) 
First CAB with 17 wt% butyryl content (CAB-17) was used with metallic spikes as well as on the LSD 
spikes [17]. Films made of CAB are strong but they do not stretch appreciably. The least flexible films 
are obtained with CAB-17 within the CAB family due to the low butyryl content. This layer tends to chip 
and flake after about two years of storage, which did not meet anymore the demand from the end-
users. Hence, the CAB-17 was replaced with CAB-35 and later with a 9 to 1 mixture of CAB-35 and 
CAB-50 [6]. Currently, the shelf life of LSD spikes coated with any of the latter two organic matrixes is 
3 years. In order to further prolong the shelf life to at least five years we made the following efforts: 
1) Increasing flexibility and attempt to delay flaking by the addition of plasticizer
2) Reconditioning of the flaked CAB coated spikes by H3PO4
3.1. Use of plasticizer (CAB+DIOP) 
Plasticizers are commonly used additives of CAB to increase strain or modify other physical 
properties. The effect of the type and amount of plasticizer on the mechanical properties of the CAB 
film has been widely studied [18]. Based on those finding we decided to test only a few plasticizers 
including dioctyl phthalate (DIOP) which have the most beneficial effect on the mechanical properties. 
CAB has very high tensile strength (comparable to artificial bone) but it is very stiff. The use of only a 
mass fraction of 10 % of DIOP plasticizer increased the flexibility of solvent cast CAB films by ~40% 
while the tensile strength dropped less than 15% (Figure 10). The flexibility improvement is 
supposedly even higher with the addition of 20 or 30% DIOP which is important because the stress 
strain gradually decreases with polymer degradation. The preservation of a relatively high elongation 
could potentially lead to retarded brittleness and flaking. 
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Figure 10: Stress-strain curve of solvent cast films made of a) CAB-35 and b) CAB-35 + 10 % DIOP 
The use of plasticizer did not alter the appearance, chemical separation process or IDMS results of 
the spikes. Several spikes are currently undergoing long-term (i.e. five years) stability experiments. 
3.2. Reconditioning with H3PO4 
The CAB coating on LSD spikes undergoes degradation due to alpha and gamma radiation from U 
and Pu, acid hydrolysis induced by HNO3 and the formation of minute air bubbles during solvent 
casting and/or chemical reactions. All these combined effects lead to discoloration, crack formation 
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and finally flaking and then the certified value cannot be guaranteed any more. It is worth 
reconditioning existing spikes before they reach this stage and thus to prolong their shelf life. 
Therefore, we decomposed the remaining organic matrix with 8 mol/L HNO3 at 50-60°C and once the 
spike was dried we added 1 mol/L H3PO4. The water was evaporated at 100-120°C by increasing the 
temperature stepwise and an orange to green amorphous product was obtained (Figure 11). This 
product has a tendency to become a viscous liquid after 1-2 months of storage. Nonetheless, flaking 
will never occur, there is less chance for the active material to 'escape' and this spike could be used 
for many more years if handled properly. Moreover, it can be heated up again before use or in case of 
need to recreate the amorphous solid form. With the selected phosphoric acid concentration the most 
likely formed products are: UO2HPO4×H2O and Pu(HPO4)2×H2O (although at higher temperature an 
oxidation state change of U and/or Pu might occur) [19]. The structure will be further investigated by 
XRD and UV-Vis. 
There is a different but much faster approach for the reconditioning: if the H3PO4 is directly applied on 
the organic cover at the same temperature then the reconditioned product is a dark brown to black 
foam. The main advantages of this process are that it takes only a few hours to prepare and it is more 
environmentally friendly as mostly water is evaporate and the acid remains in the vial. The stability of 
the foam is under evaluation and still has to be further investigated.   
Figure 11: Appearance of CAB coated spike before and after reconditioning with H3PO4. (In practice it is better to 
recondition the spikes before any flaking occurs) 
Both, the improved CAB spikes and the reconditioned ones will undergo the same studies and will be 
analysed using the same characterisation techniques and equipment as applied to the CMC spikes. 
4. Conclusions
The first stage of an exhaustive study has been done on the new options proposed for coating LSD 
spikes. For CMC, which has the potential to become the successor in the future of the currently used 
CAB, the protocol for the preparation of the coating solution has been optimised according to the 
production requirements. The molarity of the nitric acid solution and solid content of the coating has 
been also defined. It needs to be pointed out that the protocol for preparation and application of any 
organic layer also depends on environmental conditions and needs therefore to be adapted to the 
respective laboratory ambient conditions. 
During the coating of the LSD test spikes with CMC some good and promising properties of this 
material have been discovered: CMC is a good choice for coating spikes even when the nuclear 
material is unevenly dispersed on the lower part of the vial walls. CMC has a high U/Pu complexation 
capacity allowing the production of spikes with a wide range of U/Pu ratios. 
Over time, the CMC foam suffers a transformation which depends on the initial concentration, possibly 
leading to a final product similar to a viscous gum. Nevertheless, it preserves the same desired 
properties as the foam: the final product has good adherence to the glass and keeps the material at 
the bottom of the vial. It has no tendency towards crack formation and flaking off. It can be thus 
concluded that CMC can ensure the integrity of the spike over long periods of time. 
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The distribution of actinides within the matrix is homogeneous as shown by SEM-EDX results. This 
property provides for an even distribution of the radioactivity in the foam volume which in turn prevents 
the development of local damages due to the formation of hot-spots. Furthermore, according to the 
tests done providing an accelerated alpha irradiation, the self-irradiation and radiolysis seems not to 
be significant for the time of observation. 
CMC spikes have additional beneficial properties for the final user. As the CMC final product tends to 
be sticky, the risks of losing any spike material when opening the vial in a hot cell or glove box is very 
low. Besides, the CMC coated spike dissolves almost instantly in HNO3. Until now, no interferences 
during actinide separation or mass spectrometry measurements have been observed. CMC is used 
also in the food industry so it is not a harmfull material. Thus it can be easily handled in laboratories 
posing no hazards during the handling under fumehoods as provision for larger sets of spike 
preparation campaingns. 
In parallel it was shown that the currently used CAB coating can also further be optimized towards 
longer shelf life (aiming at least 5 years). As the main problems are brittleness and flaking the effort is 
focused on boosting flexibility and producing defect-free films. Even relatively low level of plasticizer 
additive (i.e. 10 % DIOP in mass fraction) can increase elongation by up to ~40%, while the long term 
stability of such spikes is yet to be tested. 
The reconditioning of discoloured or cracked CAB based LSD spikes where the certificate has expired 
is also possible with the use of phosphoric acid. The appearance of the reconditioned spikes can differ 
depending on whether or not the remaining organic layer was destroyed prior to the addition of 
phosphoric acid. Although, this process requires additional effort from the end-user the initial 
experiments suggest that the shelf life of the spikes can be increased. Moreover, if one considers the 
administrative burden related to the transport of nuclear materials spike reconditioning of 'old' spikes 
may offer significant advantages in fissile material accountancy of irradiated nuclear fuel. 
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6 Legal matters 
6.1. Privacy regulations and protection of personal data 
In order to comply with the European Directive 95/46/EC as approved by the European Parliament 
and the Council of Ministers on the 24th October 1995 relating to the protection of individuals with 
respect to the processing of data of personal nature and on the free circulation of such data, it is 
necessary that you provide us with written consent. Feel free to use the example below as a template: 
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Bulletin/Symposium proceedings or any other ESARDA publications and when necessary for any 
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6.2. Copyright 
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Abstract: 
Nuclear material which has been used for R&D purposes at a given facility generally must be shipped 
back to the legal owner or sent for disposal. The various efforts required to prepare nuclear material 
for the purpose of an off-site shipment include conditioning and characterisation. Subsequently, the 
material can be fed into the nuclear fuel cycle or be stored for a longer term. 
At the JRC Karlsruhe, a conditioning facility has been installed for such purposes. It consists of a 
chain of three glove-boxes, a set of pellet crushers and various furnaces. Uranium and plutonium 
materials can be effectively handled as appropriate for commercial transport containers. 
In addition to crushing, mixing and oxidation, nuclear material has to be properly characterized. 
Usually, information on the uranium and plutonium concentration, the isotopic composition and the 
amount of fission products is required, as well as the water content and transport related sensitive 
impurity contents such as beryllium, fluorine, chlorine and oxygen. Techniques to meet these 
requirements include Thermo-gravimetric Analysis, High-Resolution Gamma Spectrometry, Hybrid-
Kedge Densitometry, Thermal-Ionisation and Inductively-Coupled Mass Spectrometry. This paper 
focuses on a description of the analytical measurements carried out for material characterisation. 
Keywords: waste, nuclear material, conditioning, transport, storage, analysis, kedge, impurities, ICP-
MS, TIMS. 
1. Introduction
Nuclear material which has been used for scientific purposes at a R&D facility must in general either 
be shipped back to the legal owner or sent for disposal. One example is nuclear material removal 
actions in the frame of the global threat reduction initiative (GTRI) [1]. In any case the material has to 
be conditioned, repackaged and characterised. The requirements for transport such as mass, 
composition, transport devices are defined in the IAEA safety standard SSR-6 [2]. In addition to 
transport regulations depending if the material is fed back to the nuclear fuel cycle or stored for a 
longer term, national and/or site license requirements have to be fulfilled. The technical strategy set up 
at the JRC Karlsruhe to prepare nuclear material for transport or storage is described in the following 
chapters, using the expertise of the various units of the JRC Karlsruhe to build up a unique facility for 
conditioning, repackaging and using the analytical capabilities to characterize the material for the 
requested assays and isotopic compositions. For example, non-oxidized nuclear material needs to be 
pre-oxidized. All material is required to be thermally stabilized at a minimum of 950 C. An additional 
stringent licensing requirement for nuclear transports is the moisture content, which often has to stay 
below 0.5 wt% of the nuclear material. Especially for nuclear accountancy purposes the isotopic vector 
as well as the assay content of the nuclear material has to be well known. Depending on the history 
and future of the material the absence of alkaline earths, chlorides and other trace elements have to 
be demonstrated. The first of such campaigns at JRC Karlsruhe has been successfully performed in 
2016 [3] and the experience gained is the basis of this paper. 
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2. Conditioning of samples
In order to prepare such material a conditioning facility has been installed as an essential component 
in the elimination of non-irradiated legacy waste and materials in the next decades. This facility can 
handle large, but still laboratory sized, batches, typical for transport containers due to the innovative 
solutions eliminating nuclear criticality risks implemented. It is composed of three glove boxes with a 
pellet crusher, mixer, and a furnace included. The boxes are adapted for the requirements of having a 
pre-oxidizing atmoshere in the furnace and glove box operation under inert gas atmosphere for safety 
reason and to eliminate water pick up by the samples even under short storage times.  
During the first campaign, different types of material had to be treated. Pu-oxides, MOX, oxidized U/Pu 
powder, U-Pu nitrides and carbides, as well as U-Pu alloys and metallic HEU have been selected. 
Some containers were filled with only one sample, others with several. Also short fuel pins belonged to 
the campaign and has to be opened and the material therein prepared for relocation. 
The containers had to be checked for outside contamination, and for integrity of the packages. Prior to 
opening, the packages had to be bagged into a glove box and the content verified against the 
accountancy of fissile material (NMA) sheets. In cases when several sub-containers are found inside 
the containers, each was treated individually. Organic material and any sort of metal or plastic had to 
be removed, U and Pu powder and pellets are weighed into trays. Pellets and material larger than 2 
mm are transferred to a pre-weighed crusher tray and crushed with a Retsch Jaw Crusher for 
approximately 5 minutes to a grain size smaller than 2 mm. Afterwards the tray is weighed again to 
make sure all material is removed from the crusher and the accountancy updated.    
2.1. Pre-oxidation of metals and alloys 
One requirement for conditioning was that non oxidized material had to be oxidized. This was 
performed using an leak-tight Linn High Therm VMK-80 muffle furnace (Figure 1). For safety reasons 
only small batches (≤ 100 g) are treated in one run. For the pre-oxidation of metallic material, an Ar/O2 
gas inlet with flow rate of approx. 2 L/min is used. The material can only be introduced to the 
stabilisation and packaging process if the grain size after pre-oxidation is ≤ 2 mm. The grain size is 
verified by visual inspection. 
2.2. Thermal stabilization of the oxidized material 
Another requirement was to thermally stabilize the oxides at a temperature of at least 950C for more 
than 2 hours, guaranteeing that all material has been stabilized in an oxidizing atmosphere. 
The leak tight Linn High Therm VMK-80 muffle furnace (Figure 1) consists of Inconel chamber, where 
the oxidising atmosphere is provided via gas inlet. The oxidising atmosphere supplied is compressed 
air with <100 ppm H2O from JRC-Karlsruhes central gas system.  
The original cooling plates of the muffle furnace with a total water content of more than 12 litres had to 
be modified in order to comply with laboratory internal regulations (maximum 3 litres of water in the 
glove box) (Figure 1). Copper tubes were soldered on copper plates and installed as replacement of 
the former cooling. The amount of cooling water was reduced to less than 1,5 Litre in the glove box, 
while cooling performance actually improved. In addition, the door was modified with the purpose to 
improve the temperature profile of the muffle furnace.  
The furnace chamber is flushed by compressed air (approx. 21% O2, flow rate 2 L/min) only during the 
heating process. When the heating is off, before and after the thermal treatment, an automatic 3/2 way 
valve is switching to Argon (Argon 5.6; flow rate 2 L/min) to flush the chamber and to protect the 
purified inert glove box atmosphere from oxygen when the furnace door is opened. 
To guarantee that the funace provides a minimum temperature of 950C to all material in the tray,  an 
acceptance test was performed using a CeO2 bed to simulate a Pu oxid bed.  Cu wires distributed in 
this bed are used to demonstrate that the oxidizing atmoshere reached all the material introduced into 
the oven. Therefore the stabilisation was performed at a temperature of 1050C for 4 hours. Again 
careful weighing of the empty and filled trays had to be performed in order to guarantee that no 
material was lost. 
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Figure 1: LINN VMK-80 leak-tight muffle furnace. Left: front door showing the inlet for cooling water. Right: 
Modification of the cooling plate; this set-up reduces the volume of cooling water to 1.5 L. The outlet was used to 
insert the thermocouples for the furnace acceptance test. 
2.3. Mixing, subsampling and packaging 
Prior to taking sub samples for analysis the material has to be mixed. Therefore, batches of maximum 
800 g are filled in a mixing vessel (see Figure 2), while weighing the container empty and filled. The 
vessel is then shaken for 5 minutes to guarantee homogeneity of the material.  
Four sub samples are filled in pre-weighed sample containers under a relative humidity of less than 
40% (water content was kept below 10 ppm) and forwarded to the different analytical steps. 
The main sample content is filled under the same conditions and careful weighing into a slip-lid 
container (SLC). This container is bagged out of the glove box and then packed into an Al transport 
container for internal transport. In a final step the SLC is packed into an outer screw lid container 
(OSC 18 cm height, 11 cm diameter), waiting to be loaded into the transport package 9975 (Figure 3). 
However, this could only be done after full gamma spectrometry verification had been performed using 
ISOCS (see 3.2). 
Figure 2: The Mixer used for  Figure 3: 9975 shipping package 
homogenisation of the material. (Photo taken from Kerry A. Dum) 
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3. Analytical Methods
Prior to the transport a verification of the accountancy has to be performed, as well as a consistency 
check with the limits defined in transport regulations. It is important to note that the detection limits of 
the methods described must be low enough to meet the mass limits specified for the transport 
container 9975.  
Quantitative information on the water content and several other impurities are requested by the 
receiver and the transport authorities. Thermogravimetry was used to determine the water content. 
Gamma spectrometry has been used to provide the U and Pu isotopic composition as well as Be, F 
and fission products. Other impurities like Al, B, Li, Mg, Na, 244Cm, 243Am and 232Th have been 
analysed by Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS). U and Pu assay was 
performed by Hybrid Kedge densitometry and the isotopic composition by Thermal Ionization Mass 
Spectrometry TIMS). Many of the analytical laboratories of the JRC Karlsruhe worked together to 
provide the characterisation of the stabilized nuclear material using destructive and non-destructive 
methods. Details are given below.  
3.1. Determination of the water content by Thermogravimetry (TGA) 
One requirement for transport and of receivers of nuclear material is a moisture content below 0.5wt % 
after the samples have been conditioned in a furnace at 1050°C. TGA Analysis to 1000°C with an inert 
cover gas is used for measuring the moisture content. Therefore, from every batch of material 2 
representative samples are determined using a Netzsch 449C Jupiter TGA housed in a glove box 
(Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Netzsch 449C Jupiter thermogravimetric analyzer 
To assure that the TGA is working properly a temperature calibration and a weight loss checks have to 
be performed. The temperature calibration is done before each measurement campaign, starting by 
measuring the melting point of Ag metal (961.78 °C) which is close to the required max temperature 
of 1000°C. The temperature calibration measurements are achieved under the same conditions as the 
sample measurement under Argon atmosphere, and with a heating rate of 20°C/min.  
To assure that the weight measurement is correct a control measurement with CaC2O4.H2O is made 
after the second sample measurement of each batch, again performed under the same conditions as 
the samples. A control chart for the measurement of the CaC2O4.H2O guarantees correct weight 
measurements. The Standard deviation of the method has been determined performing 15 
measurements with the heating program used for the analysis of samples. The heating program is as 
follows: step 1 a stabilization time of 15 minutes, step 2 heating up to 1000°C with 20°C/min., step 3 
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cooling with 20°C/min to room temperature. During the entire run Argon (>5 ppm H2O) from the 
central gas supply is flushed through the instrument at a flowrate of 60 ml/min. 
Before the measurements are done a blank measurement has to be performed so that the influence of 
the buoyancy effect can be eliminated. A representative sample (2 – 3 g) is taken after good mixing 
with the tumbler out of the main batch, from which two 400-600 mg sub samples are taken. 
All the weight loss is reported as moisture. When both samples give a result < 0.42wt% and are close 
to each other, then this proves that the moisture contained in the batch is below the requested 
0.5wt%. The higher of the two measured values is reported. 
3.2. Characterisation of fission products and of the U, Pu isotopic composition by 
Gamma spectrometry 
Different approaches have been taken to verify the isotopic composition of U and Pu as well as the 
impurities Be, F and fissions products. Firstly, bulk samples have been analysed to quantify the 
radiological content of the sample. Secondly, high resolution gamma spectrometry has been employed 
to analyse parameters where the bulk sample analysis could not guarantee that the limits for the 
transport containers 9975 as well as the transport license requirement are respected (Table 1) or 
additional information to verify the decay products such as 232U are needed.
Table 1: Analytical parameters for radionuclides: minimum detectable quantities, mass limits for 9975 transport 
container, mass limits for the transport license, and uncertainties 
Radio-
nuclide 
Determined 
by 
Min. 
Detectable 
Activity 
[Bq] 
Min. Detectable 
Mass [g] 
Limits for 9975  
[g] 
Limits 
Transport 
licence [g] 
Uncertainty 
[%] 
Pu-
238 PC/FRAM 1.42E+10 0.022 34 >7 
Pu-
239 Genie 2000 6.50E+06 0.003 4400 660  2 to 4 
Pu-
240 PC/FRAM 5.63E+06 0.001 2200  2 to 4 
Pu-
241 PC/FRAM 1.94E+11 0.051 188.9  2 to 4 
Pu-
242 PC/FRAM - - 2200 >7 
Am-
241 PC/FRAM 1.24E+03 0.00001 
188.9  
(in combination 
with Pu-241)  3 
Am-
243 Genie 2000 1.98E+05 0.00003 1.00  5 
Np-
237 PC/FRAM 4.72E+04 0.002 220  3 
Th-232 Genie 2000 9.48E+03 2.3 4400 100  5 
U-235 Genie 2000 1.07E+03 0.013 4400 1300  4.5 
U-238 Genie 2000 5.67E+04 4.558 4400  4.5 
U-232 Genie 2000 6.10E+08 0.0007 
0.00044 (not in 
fresh) - 
U-233 Genie 2000 3.20E+08 0.9 427 
(0.103 
expected) - 
Be-9 
dedicated 
analysis - 
Method 1: 0.005 
Method 2: 0.150 0.9 - 
F-19 
dedicated 
analysis - 
Method 1: 0.7 
Method 2: 2.0 9.7 - 
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3.2.1. Gamma spectrometry of bulk samples using ISOCS 
The samples have been used for the radiological characterization with gamma spectrometry. Table 1 
shows the detection limits and uncertainties of the measurements. The characterization is performed 
for each sample in two steps: 
1. The quantitative determination of the Plutonium and Uranium and other gamma-emitting
radionuclides, such as 232Th, 243Am, 137Cs, 154Eu; using the OSC container as described in 2.3;
2. The determination of impurities due to light elements (Beryllium and Fluorine), using a
separate subsample of approximately 2 g.
Each step needed a dedicate gamma spectrum and also a dedicated detector calibration performed 
by means of the ISOCS (In Situ Object Counting System) system developed by Canberra. The system 
had a liquid nitrogen cooled REGe (Reverse Electrode Germanium) high-purity germanium detector in 
coaxial geometry with 40% of relative efficiency. 
For the assay of Plutonium and Uranium, the gamma analysis was focused on the energy range 100 – 
1000 keV. The “bulk” spectrum (i.e. the spectrum collected on the entire sample) was acquired for 3 
hours with a distance detector-sample of 1 meter, the detector collimation of 30° and a few mm-thick 
absorbers. The geometry setup was defined in order to keep the dead time lower than 10%. The 
gamma spectrum was collected by a multi-channel analyser covering the energy range of interest. The 
bulk sample was measured in a double steel-made containment in cylindrical geometry.  
The analysis was performed using the Genie 2000 software by Canberra to assess the mass of the 
239Pu, 235U and 238U isotopes and to determine the other gamma emitting radionuclides.
The setup characteristics were entered into the Geometry Composer software for the efficiency 
calculation. The historical data were used for the evaluation of the matrix composition (in particular 
about the Plutonium and the Uranium content). 
The determination of the absolute 239Pu, 235U, 238U mass was combined with the analysis of the Pu
isotopic composition performed with the software PC/FRAM developed by LANL [4].  The Pu isotopic 
composition computed using PC/FRAM was combined with the mass of 239Pu computed using 
Genie2000 to calculate the mass of the other Plutonium isotopes (238Pu, 240Pu, 241Pu, 242Pu), as well
as the mass of 241Am and 237Np.
The gamma spectrometric assay of Beryllium and Fluorine was performed with a small sub-sample of 
2 grams collected from the bulk sample during the finalization of the treatment process. Due to the 
homogenization process, the sub-sample could be considered as representative of the bulk material.  
The assay was prepared to yield a minimum detectable activity which would satisfy the limits imposed 
by the competent authorities for transport. 
The Beryllium content was evaluated for the sub-sample studying the 4.4 MeV photons emitted due to 
the following reaction: 
α + Be4
9 → C∗6
12 + n 
C∗6
12 →  C6
12 + γ(4.4 MeV) 
Two independent methods were used to extrapolate the Beryllium mass from the detected counts at 
4.4 MeV, one based on a theoretical approach and the second one based on an experimental 
calibration.   
Theoretical approach: The rate of events was computed from the alpha activity of the source and a 
number of nuclear reaction parameters (cf. [5]).  
Experimental approach: it is based on a calibration performed at LANL [6] which relates the number of 
counts of the 4.4 MeV energy line with the mass of Be obtained by chemical analysis. The data were 
collected on samples of plutonium dioxide with small contaminations due to light elements. The Be 
concentration depends on the 4.4 MeV gamma counts according to  
x(ppm) = b ∙ NA 
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where x(ppm) is the Be concentration from the chemical analysis, N is the “normalized” net area at 4.4 
MeV and A and b are fit parameters. For Beryllium, the calibration gives A=0.813 and b=33651. 
The two methods are independent and so both were used comparing and integrating the results.  
A Fluorine containing sample can emit gamma rays in a similar way according to 
α + F9
19 → Na∗11
22 + n 
Na∗11
22 →  Na11
22 + γ(891 keV) 
The two methods presented for the Beryllium estimation have been adapted and used for the 
assessment of Fluorine. With the experimental method, the calibration parameters are A=1.029 and 
b=741310.  
3.2.2. High resolution gamma spectrometry 
High resolution gamma measurements are used to provide information which could not be delivered 
by the bulk sample measurements.  
a) 232U content to give information about the decay matrix 
b) Gamma spectra to define if Am is present as a decay product or as surface contamination
The 232U content was restricted in the container validation to 0.00044 g per batch (= per transport
container) as it decays to 208Tl, which is a hard gamma ray emitter (2,6 MeV), in order to comply with
maximum dose levels at the container surface of 2 mSv/h.  
The 232U content of the samples was measured by high-resolution gamma spectrometry, using the
radiation from the short-lived daughter products of 232U, 212Bi and 208Tl. To account for the buildup of
these isotopes from the possibly present 232Th, the gamma radiation from the 232Th daughter 228Ac
was also monitored. To avoid problems with calibration for absolute activity measurements, the 232U
mass was measured relative to the mass of 238U.  Then the 232U content of the samples was obtained
by multiplying the 232U/238U mass ratio with the 238U content of the samples known from mass 
spectrometry. The procedure for the gamma-spectrometric measurement of the 232U/238U ratio in
uranium samples is given in detail in [7]. 
Clarification regarding presence of Am has been required. Sometimes 241Am had been observed in
gamma spectra of the original samples. In such cases the sub-samples have been leached with acid 
until they have lost more than 10% of their mass. Then they have been re-measured with a planar 
HPGe detector. In all the leached sub-samples where the 241Am gamma peak could be observed in
the spectra, its relative intensity (vis-a-vis U isotopes) decreased at least 6 fold in comparison with the 
relative intensity of the 241Am peak in the original sub-samples' spectra. Therefore, it was concluded
that 241Am is a surface contaminant.
3.3. Destructive Analysis 
3.3.1. Dissolution and sample preparation 
The representative sample (2 – 3 g) taken from the main batch after thorough mixing with the 
tumbler is dissolved in various media. MOX (mixed Uranium – Plutonium oxides), and pure Plutonium 
samples are dissolved overnight in an acid mixture of 14 M nitric acid : 0.1 M hydrofluoric acid, using 
about 6 ml of mixture per g of sample at 80C. Then the solution is adjusted to the required final 
conditions for further dilution and analysis. Pure Uranium samples are dissolved overnight in 5 ml 8M 
nitric acid per gram of sample at 80C. 
Suitable amounts for determining the U and Pu assay by Hybrid K-edge/XRF densitometry are 0.5 to 1 
grams of plutonium oxides and 5 (± 2) grams of MOX. The solutions have been further diluted for 
chromatographic separation prior to mass spectrometry. 
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3.3.2. U and Pu assay by Hybrid K-edge/XRF densitometry (HKED) 
The U and Pu content of the samples had to be analysed with good precision and in a timely manner. 
The combination of K-Edge Densitometry with X-ray fluorescence, the so called Hybrid K-Edge 
(HKED) [8] has been used for this purpose. This instrument is using a single X-ray source for the K-
edge absorption and the fluorescence excitation. The combination of the two techniques allows the 
simultaneous and quantitative determination of Uranium and Plutonium. A filtered and collimated X-ray 
beam with cut-off energy of about 150 keV passes through a solution along a well-defined path length. 
Its transmission energy ("K-edge") spectrum is measured and later analysed. The step-like decrease 
of the transmitted X-ray intensity (Figure 5) beyond the K absorption edge is a measure of the uranium 
or plutonium concentration in the sample in terms of g/l.  
The K-edge instrument needs a series of carefully characterized solutions of uranium and plutonium to 
establish a calibration curve. These solutions, in turn, are calibrated by an IDMS measurement (see 
below).  
For the purpose described here, the range of calibrations has been extended as compared to 
safeguards applications to cover the full expected range of uranium/plutonium ratios.  
In order to deliver results in g/g, one needs to determine the density of the solutions under 
investigation to compare the measurement results obtained by the different techniques. The X-ray 
fluorescence spectrum, taken at the same time as the K-edge spectrum, is used to determine U/Pu 
ratio. 
The analyses are performed with a combined uncertainty <1% (K=2) for solutions with a U 
concentration between 100 g/l and 300 g/l [9]. 
Figure 5: X-ray transmission spectra for uranium solutions with 
concentration from 48.2 to 383.8 g/l. The count rate is shown 
as a function of incident X-ray energy. The K absorption 
edge with the step-like intensity decrease is at 115.6 keV [9] 
3.3.3. U and Pu assay and isotopic composition determination by thermal ionisation mass 
spectrometry (TIMS) 
Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) (Figure 6) is widely applied for isotopic measurements 
in nuclear analytical laboratories and suitable for practically all types of material. However, the sample 
is required in liquid form, to allow conversion to the appropriate species. For many sample types an 
additional purification of the sample is needed either to remove matrix effects and in the case of 
Uranium and Plutonium samples to avoid interferences on different masses. Therefore, a separation 
step has to be performed using the chromatographic separation technique on resin (UTEVA®: 
Eichrom, Figure 7). In addition, an alpha spectrometric analysis is performed to provide an 
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approximate Pu concentration to the TIMS analyst. The sample is then deposited onto a filament from 
which it is evaporated once being introduced in the mass spectrometer. These “vapors” are then 
atomized and ionized at a hot surface, from which the name “thermal ionization” is derived. The ions 
are subjected to acceleration by applying a high voltage and subsequent mass separation (e.g. 234U,
235U, 236U, 238U, 238Pu, 239Pu) by means of a magnetic field. An appropriate detection system allows the
measurement of ratios of ion beam intensities. The isotope abundances are derived from these ratios 
using the total evaporation method [10] using a mass spectrometer Thermofisher Triton. In order to 
determine the Uranium and/or the Plutonium content Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry (IDMS) is 
performed.  
Figure 6: Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometer Figure 7: Chromatographic separation by 
Triton connected to a glove box for U-Pu analysis UTEVA®: Eichrom UTEVA 
Again samples are dissolved and diluted to a suitable concentration. For a precise determination of 
the analyte concentration in the samples the IDMS method requires a pre-spiking of the sample. By 
addition of a known amount of the analyte with a validated isotopic composition (spike) a very precise 
determination of the concentration for the sample is performed. The isotopic composition of the spike 
is chosen to be as different as possible from the expected isotopic composition of the sample. Where 
necessary, samples undergo the above described chromatographic separation from fission/decay 
products and other interferences. 
Standards of known composition are regularly prepared in parallel to the samples for the verification of 
the method. The uncertainty of the Uranium and Plutonium content analysis is less than 0.2 % 
(combined uncertainty K=2). The Uranium isotopic composition for material with enrichments  between 
0.3 and 20% 235U as well as the Pu isotopic composition for material with 239Pu composition between
50 and 80 atom % are analysed with an uncertainty of less than 0.1 % (combined uncertainty K=2) 
[11]. 
3.3.4. Impurity determination by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) 
Inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry is an analytical method that can determine the content 
of more than 70 elements in different matrices with low level of detection, as well as the isotopic 
composition of elements [12]. The elements are atomised and ionised by a high-frequency plasma. 
After extraction the ions are separated in the mass spectrometer according to their mass-to-charge 
ratio. Quantitative determination is possible using an appropriate standardisation method. 
For the transport and storage of material the absence of earth alkaline chlorides and other trace 
element concentrations had to be demonstrated. Therefore, the content of Al, Mg, Be, B, Na, Li and 
Th have been determined as well as the 244Cm and 243Am content. In one case also the Th isotopic
composition was requested. 
However, the sample is required in liquid form, and as the ICP-MS is a very sensitive technique and 
the possibility of contaminating the samples is high, all materials have to be dissolved in high purity 
acids and all material which is brought in contact with the sample needs to be pre-cleaned in high 
purity acids and dissolved in high purity grade acids. Therefore, sample aliquots of about 300 mg are 
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dissolved in high purity aqua regia (hydrochloric acid/nitric acid 3:1 v:v) + 0.05 M hydrofluoric acid and 
further diluted with high purity 5% nitric acid to:  
o reach a maximum concentration of 100 μg/g TDS (total dissolved solids) in order not to
overload the plasma and to minimise quenching of elements in the low mass range and
o reach a concentration, where none of the elements of interest produce count-rates >2x109
cps.
As an internal standard Rh (Inorganic Ventures) is added to compensate for possible instrument drift 
and a two point calibration is used, prepared from multi element standards containing all elements to 
be analysed except for Am, Ac, Cm and Pu. As no element standards exist and the behaviour in ICP-
MS can be considered the same as for U and Th, the evaluation is made based on the U and Th 
calibration curve. For quality control a control sample is prepared from different certified reference 
material. A blank is produced from the used high purity nitric acid and taken into account for result 
preparation.  
The samples are analysed with a ThermoFinnigan Element 2 (Figure 8). Table 2 provides the 
detection limits of the elements requested. The measurements have been performed with a total 
expanded uncertainty of less than 12 % rel. (combined uncertainty K=2), confirmed by participation of 
proficiency tests. 
Table 2: Detection limits of the requested 
Elements by ICP-MS 
Isotope g/l 
Li7 25-420x10-6
Be9 9-100x10-6
B11 50-3000x10-6
Na23 280-1100x10-6
Mg24 7-25x10-6
Al 27 110-520x10-6
Ac223 200-600x10-12
Th228 2x10-9
Th230 200-1000x10-12
Th 232 0.7-100x10-9
Pu242 400-900x10-12
Am243 2.2-0.13x10-9
Cm244 600-850x10-12
Figure 8: ICP-MS Thermofinnigan Element 2 
The samples are analysed with a ThermoFinnigan Element 2. Table 2 provides the detection limits of 
the elements requested. The measurements have been performed with a total expanded uncertainty 
of less than 12 % rel. (combined uncertainty K=2), confirmed by participation of proficiency tests. 
3.3.5. Quality control and Uncertainty estimation 
All methods described are controlled via control charts, prepared measuring certified reference 
material (CRM) or reference material traceable to CRMs. Uncertainty calculations are done in 
accordance with the ISO “Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement” and 
EURACHEM/CITAC Guide "Quantifying Uncertainty in Analytical Measurement". As uncertainty the 
expanded uncertainty with a coverage factor k = 2 is commonly stated.  
4. Conclusions
Technical infrastructure has been built up at JRC Karlsruhe to condition nuclear material like legacy 
waste for transport, but also for medium or long term storage. It consists of 3 glove boxes with 
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equipment for pre-oxidation, thermal stabilisation, mixing, sub-sampling and packaging of the 
materials. Analytical techniques deployed for nuclear safeguards and forensic purposes or for the 
study of nuclear material properties were used for elemental and isotopic characterisation of the 
conditioned samples. The infrastructure described can be used for similar needs also in the future.   
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Abstract: 
The potential for gamma emission tomography (GET) to detect partial defects within a spent nuclear 
fuel assembly has been assessed within the IAEA Support Program project JNT 1955, phase I, which 
was completed and reported to the IAEA in October 2016. Two safeguards verification objectives were 
identified in the project; (1) independent determination of the number of active pins that are present in 
a measured assembly, in the absence of a priori information about the assembly; and (2) quantitative 
assessment of pin-by-pin properties, for example the activity of key isotopes or pin attributes such as 
cooling time and relative burnup, under the assumption that basic fuel parameters (e.g., assembly 
type and nominal fuel composition) are known. The efficacy of GET to meet these two verification 
objectives was evaluated across a range of fuel types, burnups and cooling times, while targeting a 
total interrogation time of less than 60 minutes. 
The evaluations were founded on a modelling and analysis framework applied to existing and 
emerging GET instrument designs. Monte Carlo models of different fuel types were used to produce 
simulated tomographer responses to large populations of “virtual” fuel assemblies. The simulated 
instrument response data were then processed using a variety of tomographic-reconstruction and 
image-processing methods, and scoring metrics were defined and used to evaluate the performance 
of the methods. 
This paper describes the analysis framework and metrics used to predict tomographer performance. It 
also presents the design of a “universal” GET (UGET) instrument intended to support the full range of 
verification scenarios envisioned by the IAEA. Finally, it gives examples of the expected partial-defect 
detection capabilities for some fuels and diversion scenarios, and it provides a comparison of 
predicted performance for the notional UGET design and an optimized variant of an existing IAEA 
instrument. 
Keywords: Spent nuclear fuel assemblies; Partial defect verification; Gamma-ray emission 
tomography 
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1. Introduction
The accurate verification of declarations about the fissile content of spent fuel is central to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards of facilities handling and storing irradiated 
fuel. IAEA safeguards approaches for used fuels that are being transferred to difficult-to-access 
storage and that have a design allowing disassembly call for verification using a partial-defect or best-
available method [1]. At present, IAEA’s authorized instruments for attended partial-defect detection 
have limitations in terms of independence, defect sensitivity, and implementation flexibility. 
Furthermore, there is no authorized instrument for unattended partial-defect detection in spent fuel. 
Accordingly, the IAEA has expressed a need for “more sensitive and less intrusive alternatives to 
existing NDA instruments” for partial-defect detection [2]. 
Passive gamma-ray emission tomography (GET) is attractive for addressing partial-defect detection 
because it has the potential to non-destructively image the spatial distribution of the active fuel 
material in the assembly structure, and extract numerical data on individual fuel pins, without the need 
for any operator-declared information or disassembly of the fuel. Advantage is taken of the high level 
of radioactivity in used nuclear fuel in a two-step procedure: 
(i) The gamma radiation field around a fuel assembly, at a selected axial level, is 
collected using one or several gamma-ray detector elements in a large number of 
positions relative to the fuel, and; 
(ii) The internal source distribution in the fuel is reconstructed based on the recorded 
data, using tomographic algorithms. 
In both steps, one may identify a multitude of alternative approaches, e.g. in terms of choice of 
detector set-ups and measurement schemes (step i) and choice of data analysis and reconstruction 
algorithms (step ii). In addition, for the case when the assay result is an image, there is a variety of 
image-analysis methods that may be applied to draw conclusions on the individual fuel pin level. 
As described in this paper, reconstructed images and pin-wise data may be used directly to draw 
conclusions on possible pin diversion. Measured gamma-ray source concentrations can also be 
strongly correlated to fuel parameters such as burnup (BU) and cooling time (CT), thereby achieving 
more specificity than other partial-defect detection methods. Further, tomographic assessment at 
multiple axial locations along the assembly length enables axially resolved pin-level assay (as 
opposed to volume-integrating assay). Finally, GET is viable in both wet and dry measurement 
environments, and in either unattended or attended modes, thus offering operational flexibility. 
The IAEA attention to the GET technique began in the 1980’s, leading to the development and testing 
of small-scale systems in multiple field campaigns on BWR and PWR fuel items [3]. Building on those 
efforts, the JNT A 1510 project began in 2003 and was completed in late 2015. Under JNT 1510, a 
full-scale, transportable tomography system based on IAEA’s user requirements for underwater 
application was designed, fabricated, and field-tested [4]. This system is referred to as PGET (Passive 
Gamma Emission Tomography) and is used in attended mode. 
In parallel to the IAEA-led efforts, a Swedish project for validating core simulators for pin-power 
distributions led to the construction of a heavy (30-metric tons) tomographic device, which was used 
for measurements on short-cooled (2-4 weeks) BWR fuel assemblies [5], [6]. As a consequence, the 
project also covered studies of the safeguards aspects of this technique [7]. During recent years, 
international nuclear research institutes have also gained interest in the application of tomographic 
techniques on complete fuel assemblies [8], [9]. Leveraging from the relatively large pool of knowledge 
and expertise that is now available on GET, the JNT 1955 Phase I project was launched by the IAEA 
in 2013 and was reported in 2016 [10]. This paper accounts for its main outcomes. 
2. Scope of the JNT 1955 Phase I project
The JNT 1955 Phase I project was carried out 2013-2016 by the IAEA Member States Support 
Programs of the United States, Sweden, Finland and European Union, under the leadership of the 
IAEA. It was intended to complement previous IAEA projects on the GET technique, e.g. by 
considering  unattended GET and an extended range of fuels and implementation scenarios. 
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Verification 
Objective Description Assumptions 
1 Independent determination of the number of active pins that are present in a measured fuel assembly. 
No a priori information about the 
assembly is available. 
2 
Quantitative assessment of pin-by-pin properties, for 
example the activity of key isotopes or pin attributes 
such as cooling time (CT) and relative burnup (BU). 
Basic fuel parameters (e.g., assembly 
type, geometry and nominal fuel 
composition) are known. 
Table 1: Verification Objectives covered in the JNT 1955 Phase I project. 
At the project start-up, two Verification Objectives were identified, as defined in Table 1, where only 
Objective 1 may be considered addressed by the already existing PGET device. With these 
Verification Objectives in mind, efforts were made within the following areas: 
− GET performance analysis framework: A modelling and analysis framework was developed for 
partial-defect detection capability evaluation, including a procedure for simulating tomographic 
data for selected experimental setups, fuel types, diversion and implementation scenarios; 
− GET instrument design: The design of a “universal” GET instrument (UGETv1) was developed, 
intended to support the full range of verification scenarios envisioned by the IAEA; 
− Reconstruction and analysis methods: A set of tomographic reconstruction and analysis 
methods were identified, described and demonstrated; 
− Proposed metrics for GET partial-defect sensitivity: Metrics for quantifying the partial-defect 
detection capability of alternative GET approaches on selected diversion cases were suggested; 
− Quantitative performance predictions: Quantitative performance predictions were made for the 
PGET and UGETv1 instrument designs, for a set of different fuel types, fuel parameters and 
diversion scenarios; 
− Inspection procedures: An envisioned inspection procedure was presented. 
Due to the extent of the work, each area is only covered superficially in the coming sections of this 
paper, while details may be found in [10]. 
3. GET performance analysis framework
One important outcome of the JNT 1955 project is the creation of a modelling and analysis framework 
for the evaluation of GET partial-defect-detection performance, which can be applied to various GET 
instrument designs, fuel assembly types and parameters, diversion scenarios and analysis methods. A 
flowchart describing this framework is illustrated in Figure 1. It provides end-to-end capability to 
assess tomographer performance for nuclear fuel assay, and could be considered a new, standing 
capability for the international safeguards community. 
Figure 1: Flowchart describing the developed modelling and analysis framework for GET performance evaluation. 
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The inputs are the specifics of the fuel to be analyzed, the instrument design, including data-collection 
schemes such as the set of angular and lateral detector element positions used, and the conditions 
under which the analyses are made (e.g. the level of access to a priori information), which governs 
what tomographic reconstruction and analysis methods that are applicable. (Verification Objectives 1 
and 2 presented in Table 1 are examples of such conditions.) The framework allows for the 
deployment of various reconstruction and analysis methods as well as various metrics of performance. 
The heart of the framework is the simulation toolkit, marked in red in Figure 1. Here, a brief overview 
of the simulation procedure is presented, and the reader is referred to ref. [10] for more details; 
1. First, pin-by-pin gamma-ray source terms for each fuel type and fuel parameter set under study
are calculated using a combination of codes and methods, as described in refs. [11] and [12].
2. Second, the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code [13] is used for transport of emitted
gamma quanta from the fuel to the surface of the detector elements, taking into account the
specifics of the studied fuel geometry (including possible pin diversions) and the device design.
This is done pin-by-pin and energy-by-energy to get single-pin flux data for the complete set of
detector element positions, which can be added together to form complete assembly data. In this
summation, pin-wise weights are applied according to the source terms calculated in the first
step. (In this way, the results from the time-consuming transport calculation can be re-used when
changing pin-wise fuel parameters.) In this work, alternative simulations using the Geant4 code
[14] have also been performed to benchmark the MCNP simulations, as described in section 7.2.
3. Third, separate Monte Carlo calculations of the detector response are performed, taking into
account the complete gamma-ray flux into the detector elements, at all energies, while also
considering detector specifics (e.g. energy resolution). Consequently, performance of different
detector types in the same setup can be assessed using the same data from the first two steps.
This three-step simulation procedure allows for the creation of tomographic data for large virtual 
assembly populations, in terms of; (i) varying pin-by-pin BU, and; (ii) varying sets and levels of 
statistical noise. The former variation responds to the fact that authentic fuel assemblies have a pin-
by-pin variation in BU, which may be as large as ±20% under normal operation. The latter variation 
allows e.g. measurement time to be accounted for. Altogether, analyses of large assembly 
populations, with these variations included, enable the deployment of statistical performance metrics, 
as discussed in section 6. 
4. GET instrument design
A basic requirement for a GET device is spatial selection capability, so that a well-defined region of 
the fuel contributes to the gamma-ray intensity in a certain detector element position. This capability is 
typically achieved using heavy collimators, which shield the detector elements while allowing radiation 
to enter through well-defined slit openings. The choice of detector as well as collimator material and 
dimensions depend on a number of factors such as; 
− Fuel properties, e.g. BU, CT and size: Highly radioactive fuel (short CT, high BU, large mass) 
generally requires better shielded detector elements to avoid high levels of background radiation; 
− Requirements on isotopic selectivity: Detector elements with high energy resolution and 
spectroscopic data collection may be required to select specific gamma peaks, in particular for 
Verification Objective 2. Also, high full-energy peak efficiency will enable more efficient 
subtraction of background from scattered gamma rays, and thus enhanced data quality; 
− Spatial resolution requirements: Long and narrow collimator slits enable higher spatial resolution; 
− Count-rate management: The collimator slit dimensions should preferably be large enough to 
allow for high counting rates in order to reduce measurement time, while staying within 
acceptable limits for the selected detector type in terms of count-rate saturation; 
− Time requirements: Assay time can be shortened by using many, tightly-packed, detector 
elements as well as using detectors with high-count-rate capability. 
Altogether, there is a strong inter-dependence between these design factors. As an example, detector 
elements offering high full-energy peak efficiency are generally relatively large, implying that a 
relatively small number of detectors will fit into the device, thus leading to longer assay times. 
Accordingly, instrument design will include a trade-off between e.g. time and precision. 
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The device design performed in this work was informed by two previous underwater designs, 
PGET [4], which was constructed in the JNT 1510 project to deliver on Verification Objective 1 for 
relatively long-cooled fuel, and PLUTO [6], which was constructed in Sweden to deliver pin-wise 
power in short-cooled fuel, a task similar to Verification Objective 2. The resulting notional Universal 
GET design (UGETv1) was developed to meet both Verification Objectives 1 and 2. The PGET and 
UGETv1 designs are illustrated in Figure 2, and their respective properties are listed in Table 2. A 
more thorough presentation of the UGETv1 design considerations can be found in refs. [10] and [15]. 
As described in section 7, performance evaluations have been carried out for the PGET and UGETv1 
designs. In short, the main differences between these designs are; (i) PGET uses CdTe detectors with 
limited spectroscopic capability, while UGETv1 uses LaBr scintillator detectors to provide 
spectroscopic full-energy gamma-ray peak analysis, and; (ii) PGET uses relatively light collimation, 
while additional shielding is included in UGETv1 to manage count rates for more short-cooled fuels 
(CT down to 1 year). As a result of these design selections, PGET allows for tightly-stacked detector 
arrays that offer rapid data collection in a rotate-only geometry, while the fewer number of LaBr 
detectors in UGETv1, which offer isotopic-specific data, require both rotation and translation of the 
detector arrays to record complete intensity projections, leading to longer assay times. 
Figure 2: The two device designs analysed in section 7. Left: The existing PGET device, which was constructed 
in the JNT1510 project. It is based on two large arrays of small, non-spectroscopic CdTe detectors in a rotate-only 
geometry. Right: A single detector head of the notional UGETv1 design, developed in this work. The full 
instrument would include four heads, 8 spectroscopic LaBr detectors in each, in a translate-rotate geometry. The 
devices are not to scale. 
Design parameter PGET* UGETv1 
Maximum object diameter 30 cm 37.5 cm 
Number of detector heads 2 4 
Number of detectors per head 104 8 
Detector type CdTe LaBr 
Detector dimensions Cuboid: 10×5×2 mm3 Cylindrical: 38x38 mm 
Spectroscopic analysis Broad ROI Peak analysis 
Collimator slit length 100 mm 200 mm 
Collimator slit width 1.5 mm 1.5 mm 
Collimator slit height Tapered 70→10 mm 10 mm 
Detector (and slit) pitch 4 mm 46 mm 
Number of lateral steps per angular 
projection for 2 mm sampling 
 - 
(rotation only) 
23 
* PGET parameters reflect design under JNT 1510. During 2016, PGET was refurbished, changing the design slightly.
Table 2: Parameters of the JNT1510 PGET and the JNT 1955 Phase I UGETv1 device designs. 
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5. Reconstruction and analysis methods
There are a variety of algorithms available for emission tomography, which over the years have been 
developed and applied mainly for medical applications. However, a nuclear fuel assembly, with its 
highly inhomogeneous mix of strongly gamma-ray attenuating materials (such as uranium dioxide) and 
less attenuating materials (such as water or air), is a challenging object for tomographic measurement 
and reconstruction. If not taken into account in the reconstructions, gamma-ray attenuation will 
strongly influence the resulting representation of the source distribution. In this work, options from the 
two main classes of tomographic reconstruction algorithms; analytic and algebraic [16], have been 
explored for use on nuclear fuel assemblies. Analytic methods, such as filtered back-projection (FBP), 
typically use the Fourier transform, while the algebraic methods express the reconstruction in terms of 
an equation system, allowing for detailed modelling of e.g. attenuation when defining the equation 
system’s weight matrix (the system matrix). The quantitative capabilities of some analysis methods 
when applied on emission data from nuclear fuel assemblies are presented in ref. [17]. 
5.1. Image reconstruction and image analysis for Verification Objective 1 
For Verification Objective 1, the number of fuel pins present should be determined without assuming 
any a priori information on the fuel. The route taken in this case is to reconstruct an image of the axial 
cross section of fuel, based on the collected sinogram of a fuel assembly (i.e. the collected intensities 
in a set of angular and lateral detector element positions relative to the fuel). See Figure 3. This image 
is then further analysed to deduce pin-wise data and allow for counting of the fuel pins. 
Most image reconstructions in this work have been done using an FBP algorithm without attenuation 
correction [16]. Some reconstructions have also been done using an algebraic method, including the 
spatial response of the collimator-detector system and a gross model for gamma-ray attenuation in the 
object when defining the system matrix [17]. The spatial response function of the UGETv1 design for 
1274 keV gamma rays is presented in Figure 4. The corresponding ideal response function used in 
FBP analysis is a single-valued line integral at Y=0. The more realistic physics representation shown 
in Figure 4 is achieved using no prior fuel information, thus fulfilling the assumptions for Objective 1. 
Once the image is obtained, image analysis methods are required to extract pin-by-pin data, here 
called “pin scores”. The most fundamental image analysis is to aggregate the reconstructed activities 
of multiple pixels in a “neighbourhood” centred on each pin location, as illustrated in Figure 5. 
However, irregularities that may arise from e.g. assembly torsion and pin dislocations may call for 
more advanced methods. A toolkit of such methods has been developed for analysis of fuel assembly 
images [18]. As part of the JNT1955 Phase I project, these methods were demonstrated on 
experimental tomographic images, proving functional on disturbed geometries [10]. 
Examples of analysis results for PGET and UGETv1 are given in section 7 for two combinations of 
methods; (i) FBP reconstruction and fundamental image analysis; and (ii) algebraic reconstruction and 
advanced image analysis. All analysis codes used can be made available to the IAEA. 
Figure 3: Tomographic data may be presented as a sinogram, with intensities as a function of lateral detector 
element position (horizontal axis) and angular position (vertical axis). Image reconstruction methods transform 
sinogram data into images of gamma-ray emission intensity, which are further analysed to deduce pin-wise data. 
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Figure 4: An example spatial response function (a.u. on the z axis) of the UGETv1 device design, used in 
algebraic reconstructions (left figure). The origin (X,Y=0) of the response function is centred at the front of the slit 
opening, and only positive Ys are presented. The function takes into account the physical properties of the 
measurement system (e.g., in terms of finite collimator slit width and gamma-ray transmission through the 
collimator material), which give rise to significant contributions from penumbra and umbra regions (right figure).  
Figure 5: Example reconstructed image of simulated data for a VVER-440 assembly (left). The most fundamental 
image analysis is the aggregation of pixel intensity values in beforehand-defined pin-centred quadratic regions 
(right). A toolkit of more advanced image-analysis methods have also been developed to search the image for 
pins, being capable of adapting to possible irregularities in the geometry, as presented in ref. [18]. 
5.2. Pin-activity reconstruction for Verification Objective 2 
For Verification Objective 2, pin-wise fuel properties should be determined under the assumption that 
information on the fuel and its geometry is available. This opens a possibility to apply detailed 
modelling of the fuel configuration using algebraic methods, enabling a level of detail not accessible 
using analytic methods. In the work on Objective 2, three different alternatives have been used for 
defining a detailed system matrix in algebraic reconstructions, for which software can be made 
available to the IAEA; (Results obtained using the two latter methods are presented in section 7.4.) 
− MCNP-generated matrix: For simulation data obtained using MCNP (see section 3), the same 
transfer function as was used to create the data may be used to reconstruct the modelled source 
distribution. While being “unrealistically perfect” for the simulated data set, this approach enables 
analyses of the sensitivity to stochastic noise, added to the simulated data. For experimental 
data, one may also envisage the use of MCNP or similar Monte Carlo codes to model the system 
matrix, however, such a procedure would be excessively slow for “new” measured cases. 
− Ray-tracing: The reconstruction toolkit TOMOPACK, with established use for reconstructions of 
tomographic data from the PLUTO [5] and Halden [9] devices, where %-level precision of pin-
wise data has been demonstrated, is essentially based on ray-tracing and is thus suitable for 
analysis of spectroscopically-analysed full-energy-peak data. This modelling comprises the 
following features; (i) modelling of the instruments spatial response function, see Figure 4; (ii) 
modelling the full-energy gamma-ray transport through the detailed 3D configuration of fuel pins, 
taking the axial symmetry into account, and; (iii) adaption of the pixel pattern to fit the object. 
− RADSAT-based matrix: The Radiation Detection Scenario Analysis Toolbox (RADSAT) [19] 
combines 3-D deterministic transport through the measurement geometry with a stochastic model 
for detector response. Its use for tomography is somewhat exploratory, but it offers the capability 
to generate object-scatter contributions in the system matrix coefficients, for each pin, which may 
be essential for the analysis of data with low full-energy peak specificity, such as that of PGET. 
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6. Proposed metrics for GET partial-defect detection capability
For Verification Objective 1, so-called receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curves are suggested to 
provide metrics of the partial-defect detection capability, since they can be used to understand the 
trade-off between probability of detection (PD) and probability of false alarm (PFA). ROC analysis is 
used in many fields; a standard reference from imaging sciences relevant to this work can be found 
in [20]. In the present case, the pin scores obtained from a measurement (calculated as described in 
Section 5.1) can be plotted as histograms, one histogram for the pins present and another for missing 
(or replaced) pins. In the ROC analysis, a threshold value is selected, so that pin scores above the 
threshold are defined as present pins, while scores below the threshold are defined as non-fuel 
objects. If the two histograms do not overlap, perfect detection of missing pins without any false 
alarms can be realised. If the histograms overlap, then false alarms and/or non-detected missing pins 
will occur, depending on the threshold. By varying the threshold, the tradeoff between detection and 
false alarm can be quantified. An example of how the pin-score distributions for missing and present 
pins can be used to generate a ROC curve is given in Figure 6. When selecting an acceptable false 
alarm rate (setting the threshold), the ROC curve will give the corresponding probability of detection. 
Figure 6: Pin-score distributions for missing and present pins (left) can be used to calculate the probably of 
detection (PD) and probability of false alarm (PFA) as a function of threshold, T, in terms of a ROC curve (right). 
For Verification Objective 2, the metric used in this work (see e.g. section 7.4) is simply the agreement 
of reconstructed pin-wise isotopic activities with the simulated source distribution, expressed as a 
relative difference, or “fractional error”. At the event of inspection, pin-wise data measured using a 
benchmarked methodology may be used to verify operator-declared data (in case such are available 
on the individual pin level) or to evaluate consistency among the population of pins in an assembly at 
a level within the demonstrated precision. 
7. Quantitative performance predictions of PGET and UGETv1 device designs
Using the modelling and simulation framework described in section 3, the expected performance of 
two device designs has been analysed; the existing PGET device and the notional UGETv1 device 
(see section 4). The reconstruction tools described in section 5 have been deployed, as well as the 
performance metrics described in section 6. 
7.1. Analysed cases 
Since the number of imaginable GET implementation alternatives and diversion scenarios are 
exceedingly large, and a vast amount of time is required for simulating each foreseeable case, a 
comprehensive study of all possibilities would not be manageable. Consequently, this study was 
limited to a relatively small set of implementation and pin-diversion scenarios, fuel types and 
parameters, and gamma-ray energies used for assay, according to the following; 
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Implementation scenarios: The matrix of implementation scenarios (including fuel CTs), deployment 
constraints and target measurement times considered in this work is presented in Table 3. The 
notional UGETv1 device covers a CT range from 1 to 40 years, while PGET is not applicable for CTs 
as short as 1 year. Measurement times up to approximately 60 minutes were assumed acceptable. 
Only underwater assay was studied. 
Pin-diversion scenarios: Three partial defect scenarios were considered; (i) Pin removal without any 
substituting materials, i.e. with water replacing the pins; (ii) Pin replacement with depleted-uranium 
pins (replicates low- or no-activity containing high-density substitute), and; (iii) Pin replacement with 
fuel pins of the same construction but lower BU (replicates material diversion between reactor cycles). 
However, as described in [10], scenario (ii) poses the least tomographically challenging case. 
Focusing on the more challenging cases, only results from scenarios (i) and (iii) are presented here. 
Fuel types, parameters and pin configurations: Three fuel types were studied, for which the 
simulated fuel pin configurations are illustrated in Figure 7; (i) SVEA-96S BWR fuel with 96 fuel pins, 
of which 5 were diverted; (ii) VVER-440 fuel with 1 water channel and 126 fuel pins, of which 6 were 
diverted, and; (iii) PWR 17x17 fuel with 25 water channels and 264 fuel pins, of which 11 were 
diverted. Due to gamma-ray attenuation, it is more challenging to tomographically measure fuel types 
with large and dense pin configurations, where information obtained from central fuel pins is scarce. 
Accordingly, BWR fuel poses the least challenging configuration and PWR poses the most 
challenging. Fuel BUs from 10 to 40 GWd/MTU were analysed in order to span typical values 
encountered in commercial power industry. 
Gamma-ray energies: The gamma-ray source terms will depend on the fuel parameters; short-cooled 
assemblies will contain short-lived as well as long-lived fission products and higher total activity, while 
the gamma-ray spectrum emitted from long-cooled assemblies (CT>30 years) will be dominated by 
137Cs. All simulations covered a large number of gamma emitters and energies, but in the tomographic 
analyses only a few energy regions were selected (taking detector characteristics into consideration), 
corresponding to specific gamma-emitting fission products. The gamma-ray energies under study in 
this work are presented in Table 4. For each gamma-ray energy, relevant stochastic noise levels 
corresponding to assay time, BU and CT, were included in the statistical analyses of each simulated 
fuel type. The noise levels were given by Poisson statistics, based on simulated absolute intensities. 
Implementation Scenario 
Cooling time 
(years) 
Deployment 
constraints 
Routine verification of old fuel being transferred to a 
geologic repository 
40 Attended or 
unattended 
Routine verification of fuel being transferred to dry 
storage 
5 Attended or 
unattended 
Random verification of in-pool inventory 1 Attended 
Table 3: Description of GET implementation scenarios considered in this work. The hardware configurations 
studied were the existing PGET device and the notional UGETv1 design (see section 4), for both Verification 
Objective 1 and Objective 2. 
Figure 7: Map of the simulated diverted pin locations (in red) in the three assembly types under study: five for 
BWR (left), six for VVER-440 (middle) and 11 for PWR (right). In addition, VVER fuel by design includes one 
central water channel and PWR fuel includes 25 water channels (marked in grey). 
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Isotope Energy, MeV Half-life Relevant CT range 
137Cs 0.662 ~30 y up to 100-150 y 
134Cs 0.605 2.1 y up to 10 y 
0.796 
154Eu 
0.723 
8.5 y up to 25–30 y 
0.873 
0.996 
1.005 
1.274 
144Pr (144Ce) 2.186 285 d up to 5 y 
Table 4: Characteristic fission products and associated gamma-ray emissions from spent fuel in the 0.4-2.5 MeV 
energy region. 
In general, the higher gamma-ray energies in Table 4 facilitate tomographic assay, since their higher 
penetrability enables more information to be obtained from the assemblies’ innermost sections. 
However, also the emission intensity is important. For 154Eu, the highest energy (1.274 MeV) is also 
the most intense and thus the most useful. One should note that for relatively long-cooled fuel (CT 
between 30 and about 100 years), only the long-lived, lower-energy gamma emitter 137Cs is abundant 
enough to be measured. 
7.2. Simulation and benchmarking 
The simulation toolkit described in section 3 was used to create tomographic data for sets of virtual 
fuel assemblies for the cases accounted for above. Following the procedure described in section 3, 
“single-pin base sinograms” were weighted and added together to comply with isotopic contents due 
to selected pin-wise BU and CT. Accordingly, high statistical quality of these calculated “single-pin 
base sinograms” was critically important for reducing systematic effects in the large sets of derived 
virtual assemblies that were used to assess performance evaluation. A particular concern was the 
sampling of pin contributions from the inner regions of the assembly, where gamma-ray self-shielding 
and line-of-sight obstructions are severe, leading to few sinogram counts. However, the calculation 
scheme did not allow for statistical analyses of individual single-pin sinograms. Instead, an estimate of 
precision emanating from the base data was achieved based on two separate, independent 
simulations of a “difficult” case (low gamma-ray energy from 137Cs in a large PWR fuel configuration). 
The resulting reconstructed source concentrations for central fuel pins, obtained in identical 
reconstructions of the simulated data sets, matched within 3% [10], constituting a measure of the 
precision of the base data and thus defining a limit of the achievable precision in the tomographic 
analyses of pin-wise source contents. One may note that implications of counting statistics, due to e.g. 
variations in detector count rate or measurement time, may be evaluated at a higher level of precision 
by investigating the statistical spread obtained when adding such variations to the base data. 
In order to ensure that the simulation-based conclusions drawn on PGET and UGETv1 performance 
for various fuel parameters and measurement times were correct, the Monte Carlo simulations were 
verified and validated in multiple ways; 
− Gamma-ray source terms and detector response calculations (simulation steps 1 and 3) were 
evaluated using experimental data from measurements performed at the Clab interim storage 
facility for spent fuel in Sweden. This benchmark included relative peak intensities for a large 
number of gamma peaks as well as peak shape and level of Compton-scattered background; 
− The Monte Carlo-based gamma-ray transport (simulation step 2) was evaluated using 
tomographic data from the PLUTO device [5]. Both simulated gamma-ray projections as well as 
properties of reconstructed images were evaluated; 
− The MCNP model of the PGET device was evaluated using experimental PGET data; 
− A model of the PGET device was also developed in the alternative Monte Carlo simulation tool 
Geant4, and the Geant4 simulations were evaluated using experimental PGET data, and; 
− The MCNP model of the notional UGETv1 device was evaluated in inter-code simulation 
comparisons to an independent Geant4 model. 
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All evaluations were considered satisfactory, thus providing confidence in the comparisons made 
between expected instrument performance for the existing PGET and the notional UGETv1 devices. 
Details on the evaluations can be found in ref. [10]. 
7.3. Results for Verification Objective 1: Independent pin counting 
As accounted for in section 5.1, the approach for Verification Objective 1 was to use tomographic data 
in different types of image reconstructions, and perform image analysis on the reconstructed images 
to independently count the number of fuel pins. Two alternative analysis routes were taken: 
− Analysis Route 1: Basic analytic FBP image reconstruction, followed by basic image analysis 
(summing sets of pixel values said beforehand to represent each fuel pin). While not allowing for 
inclusion of spatial response or gamma-ray attenuation in the reconstruction, nor adaption to 
possible dislocation or torsion of the fuel in the image analysis, this route enabled automated 
analysis of large populations (up to 1,000) of simulated assemblies with varying BU distributions 
and stochastic noise. Consequently, this route enabled ROC curve analyses, as described below. 
− Analysis Route 2: Algebraic image reconstruction and analysis, including modelling of the 
device’s spatial response function and homogeneous gamma-ray attenuation in the image 
reconstruction as well as more advanced image analysis tools to identify and quantify pin-shaped 
objects in the reconstructed image. This route was not automated and thus smaller populations of 
assemblies could be analysed (up to 10), excluding ROC curve analyses of the results. 
Apart from demonstrating the methods’ capabilities to distinguish diverted fuel pins from present pins, 
one important aspect of these studies was to compare the performance of the PGET and UGETv1 
devices. 
Examples of quantified pin-wise 154Eu activities when applying the two alternative analyses routes on 
simulated UGETv1 data for short-cooled PWR fuel assemblies with missing pins, offering a 
challenging diversion scenario for the most challenging fuel type of the three under study, are 
presented in Figure 8. As seen in the figure, the FBP reconstruction (which does not take gamma-ray 
attenuation into account) calculates lower pin activities in the assembly interior than in its periphery, 
whereas a more leveled response is given by the model-based algebraic reconstruction (which takes 
gamma-ray attenuation into account). In agreement with ref. [17], model-based reconstruction seems 
to allow for better separation between fuel pins and missing pins respectively water channels. 
However, one should also note that the simulation for the latter does not include any pin-BU variation. 
ROC curve formalism (see section 6) was used to compare the expected performance of the existing 
PGET device with that of the notional UGETv1 device. For both devices, perfect energy and efficiency 
calibration of detector elements was assumed in the simulations. The evaluations were based on 
automated FBP reconstruction and summation of pixel values (Analysis Route 1) for sets of 1,000 
virtual fuel assemblies with a BU variation within ±20% and stochastic noise corresponding to a 60-
minute assay for UGETv1 and a 10-min assay for PGET. The results for the three fuel types under 
study with fuel parameter sets {BU=20 GWd/MTU, CT=5 years} respectively {BU=10 GWd/MTU, 
CT=40 years} are presented in Figure 9. For the sets with CT=5 years, the 1274-keV radiation from 
154Eu was analysed, while the 662-keV radiation from 137Cs was used for the sets with CT=40 years.  
The ROC curves in Figure 9 indicate that PGET offers more confident or similar capability of detecting 
missing pins as UGETv1. However, one should also note that no ROC analyses have been made for 
Analysis Route 2, which might offer different detection capability according to the results in Figure 8. 
The detection capability is further discussed in section 7.5. 
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Figure 8: Pin-scores for present and missing pins, simulating the deployment of the UGETv1 device on sets of 
PWR assemblies (BU=40 GWd/MTU, CT=1 year) using the 1275 keV emission from 154Eu. The upper figure 
accounts for simple FBP reconstruction and pixel summation on a set of 100 virtual assemblies with ±20% pin-
wise BU variation. The lower figure accounts for model-based algebraic reconstruction and image analysis on a 
set of 10 virtual assemblies with no pin-wise BU variation. Both data sets include stochastic noise. 
Figure 9: Predicted detection sensitivity of a single missing pin (i.e., bias defect) for perfectly-calibrated PGET 
and UGETv1 for BWR, VVER and PWR fuels, deploying simple FBP reconstruction and pixel summation. Left: 
Nominal BU of 20 GWd/MTU and 5 year CT with assay based on 154Eu. (BWR performance is even higher than 
VVER and therefore not shown.) Right: Nominal BU of 10 GWd/MTU and 40-year CT with assay based on 137Cs. 
Pin number, ordered by ring, by radial distance from assembly centre (a.u.)
Radial distance from assembly centre (a.u.)
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7.4. Results for Verification Objective 2: Pin-wise fuel properties 
Verification Objective 2 assumes availability of the fuel-geometry information needed to enable the 
detailed algebraic reconstruction methods described in section 5.2. Using these methods, pin-wise 
isotopic contents are reconstructed (rather than images as in Verification Objective 1). The quality of 
the results, i.e. the precision of the calculated pin-wise isotopic contents, will depend on the fidelity of 
the algebraic system matrix. If spectroscopic full-energy peak analysis is applied, such as in the 
notional UGETv1 design (see section 2.2), full fidelity may be provided by full-energy transport 
calculations (ray tracing). If the collected data comprises significant scattered components, which may 
be the case for the PGET design, the calculations may require the inclusion of gamma-ray scattering 
as well. However, the more detail that is included in the calculations, the longer the execution time, 
which may make the most detailed calculations, such as MCNP, prohibitively long. 
The results from three types of analyses are presented below; 
1. Pin-wise isotopic-content reconstructions using the ray-tracing toolkit TOMOPACK, applied on
simulated data for the notional UGETv1 device design for PWR fuel assemblies; 
2. Pin-wise isotopic-content reconstructions using the RADSAT toolbox, which includes
calculations of gamma-ray scattering components, applied on simulated data for the notional 
UGETv1 device design and the existing PGET device. 
3. Estimation of pin-wise BU and CT, based on measured pin-wise isotopic contents.
For a complete description of all analyses performed, we refer to [10]. 
7.4.1. Ray-tracing-based reconstruction models 
Simulations of UGETv1 assay of PWR fuel assemblies with 11 fuel pins missing (see Figure 7) have 
been analysed using the TOMOPACK ray-tracing-based reconstruction toolkit. In the simulations, the 
assemblies contained uniform pin-wise isotopic contents, and sets of 10 virtual assemblies were 
analysed for each case under study. Results for a short-cooled (1 year), high-BU PWR assembly 
(40 GWd/MTU) with 11 fuel pins missing are presented in Figure 10. Reconstructed relative pin-by-pin 
isotopic contents of 137Cs, 134Cs and 154Eu are presented in terms of the fractional error from the 
simulated values, ordered ring-by-ring from the fuel assembly centre to the periphery. In the presented 
cases, the level of statistics in the analysed data sets corresponds to 40 minutes total assay time. 
Since a prerequisite for Verification Objective 2 was a priori known fuel geometry, activities are only 
reconstructed in present fuel pins and not in water channels or positions of missing pins. 
For all three isotopes in Figure 10, precision is high in peripheral fuel pins and up to about 10% (1 σ) 
in central fuel pins. Systematic deviations are generally smaller than a few %, except for the most 
central sections, where insufficient sampling of single-pin base sinograms may disturb the analysis 
(see section 3). The best and most stable results are obtained for 154Eu, which emits the highest 
gamma-ray energy (1274 keV) and thus offers the highest escape fraction from the assembly centre. 
The TOMOPACK ray-tracing toolkit was also used for reconstructing the pin-wise content of 137Cs 
based on simulations of long-cooled (40 years) low-BU (10 GWd/MTU) PWR fuel. In this “difficult” 
case (low source concentration, low gamma-ray energy, large-sized fuel), longer measurement times 
would be required to obtain good statistics, and approximately 2 hours total assay time would give 
similar results as presented in Figure 10 (top). 
7.4.2. Reconstruction models including scattered components 
The RADSAT-based reconstruction approach offers an attractive path to analysis of PGET 
performance, in particular when broad energy windows are deployed so that object scatter constitutes 
a significant portion of the sinogram signal. Here, RADSAT has been used to analyse simulated data 
for both the UGETv1 and the PGET device. Data sets from 100 virtual VVER assemblies were 
studied, including ±20% variation in pin BU and six tampered fuel pins with 50% of the average BU 
value (replicating material diversion at about mid-life of the fuel). Figures 11 and 12 show the results 
for pin-by-pin quantification of the 137Cs and 154Eu concentrations in VVER fuel with two sets of fuel 
parameters; {BU=20 GWd/MTU, CT=5 years} respectively {BU=10 GWd/MTU, CT=40 years}. 
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Figure 10: Results obtained in TOMOPACK reconstructions of simulated data for short-cooled, high-BU PWR 
17x17 fuel assemblies in the suggested UGETv1 device design, presented as mean values of fractional error in 
reconstructed pin-by-pin isotopic contents obtained in analyses of 10 datasets, including error bars corresponding 
to ±1 σ confidence intervals. All pins were assigned equal isotopic contents in the simulations. The analyses were 
based on full-energy gamma peaks at 662 keV (137Cs), 796 keV (134Cs) respectively 1274 keV (154Eu). 
As seen in Figure 11 (top) and Figure 12 (top), RADSAT calculates activities in normal fuel pins within 
a few percent for all VVER fuels under study, when applied on simulated data for the UGETv1 device. 
Statistical uncertainty is smaller in the assembly periphery (as expected), but also in the inner sections 
precision is in the order of a few percent. Some systematic deviations may be identified, but these are 
also on the few-percent level. Performance is good also for tampered fuel pins, although their content 
of 154Eu is generally slightly overpredicted and the statistical uncertainty is higher than for normal fuel 
pins. Accordingly, one would expect these tampered fuel pins to be confidently detected. In addition, a 
short-CT (1 year), high-BU (40 GWd/MTU) fuel was studied, giving similar results for 154Eu assay 
using UGETv1 as presented in Figure 11 (top). (For this short-cooled fuel, only UGETv1 assessment 
was covered because PGET cannot manage the high count rates encountered for such fuel.) 
In the analyses of simulated data for the PGET device, there is a systematic overprediction of the 
activities in normal fuel pins, which increases towards the assembly centre. The tampered fuel pins 
are strongly overpredicted, especially for the 154Eu assessment in Figure 11 (bottom), which would 
complicate their detection.  
Simulation settings: 
PWR17x17, BU 40 GWd/tU, CT: 1 y 
Total assay time: 40 mins 
10 assemblies, no pin-wise variation 
Narrow peak ROI, no scatter from other peaks 
Pin number, ordered by ring, by radial distance from assembly centre
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Figure 11: Fractional error, relative to true values, for pin-by-pin 154Eu activity reconstruction with RADSAT-based 
system matrix using UGETv1 (top panel) and PGET (bottom panel). The 100-assembly population assumed 
VVER fuel with nominal BU of 20 GWd/MTU, 5-year CT, and ±20% pin-wise BU variation. Tampered pins (blue), 
have a nominal activity half that of the present pins (green). 
Figure 12: Fractional error, relative to true values, for pin-by-pin 137Cs activity reconstruction with RADSAT-based 
system matrix using UGETv1 (top panel) and PGET (bottom panel). The 100-assembly population assumed 
VVER fuel with nominal BU of 10 GWd/MTU, 40-year CT and ±20% pin-wise BU variation. Tampered pins (blue), 
have a nominal activity half that of the present pins (green). 
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7.4.3. Pin-wise BU and CT determination 
Gamma-ray spectroscopy is an established technique to characterize nuclear fuel, and several studies 
have been made to establish correlations between full-energy peak intensities of gamma rays from 
137Cs, 134Cs and 154Eu, recorded in gamma-scanning measurements of nuclear fuel assemblies, to fuel 
parameters such as BU and CT [21]. In a similar manner, tomographically measured pin-wise activities 
of these isotopes may be used to determine BU and CT on the single-pin level. These pin-wise fuel 
parameters may, in turn, be used to control the consistency of the population of fuel pins in an 
assembly or even to verify operator-declared data, if available on the single-pin level. However, such 
data are not typically provided to the IAEA today in spent fuel declarations. 
As described in [10], the investigations performed in this work lead to the following conclusions; 
− For short-cooled fuels, analysis of the quotients of the tomographically measured pin-wise 
contents of 134Cs and 154Eu would offer the smallest statistical uncertainty in the determination of 
pin-wise BU and CT, using the methods in [21], when these isotopes are available (i.e. at 
CT<10 years). 
− At intermediate CT (10 to 30 years), the quotient of 154Eu and 137Cs can be used, with slightly 
larger statistical uncertainties. 
− At long CT (>30 years), only 137Cs will be available. However, 137Cs can still give a direct measure 
of the fuel BU, provided that all fuel pins have the same CT. Consequently, the precisions 
demonstrated in e.g. Figure 10 (top) or Figure 12 (top) give a direct measure of the achievable 
precisions in pin-wise BU determination. 
Considering a 40-minute assay using the notional UGETv1 device, the simulations and ray-tracing-
based analyses in this work (see section 7.4.1) show that even for the innermost sections of PWR fuel 
assemblies with CT=1 year and BU=40 GWd/MTU, the pin-wise BU and CT may be determined with 
statistical uncertainties below 6% and 0.4 years, respectively, based on the quotients of the pins’ 134Cs 
and 154Eu contents. However, one should note that this represents the highest achievable precision, 
which requires that systematic uncertainties are eliminated. For more information, we refer to [10]. 
7.5. Discussion on predicted UGETv1 and PGET performance 
As seen in Figure 9, the evaluations on Verification Objective 1 indicate that PGET performance would 
exceed that of UGETv1 for most analysed cases. The reason is mainly the larger number of detector 
elements in PGET, which leads to more efficient data collection and thus to better counting statistics 
during a fixed measurement time. Assuming an operationally tolerable false alarm rate of 
approximately 0.05 (1 false alarm per 20 assemblies), these findings indicate that Analysis Route 1 
(FBP reconstruction and summation of pixel values) would achieve a probability of detecting a single 
missing pin, at any location in the assembly, that is greater than 0.80 for VVER and BWR fuels, with 
both devices, regardless of BU and CT. However, the evaluation also indicates that the single-
missing-pin performance for both devices would be low for PWR fuel (due to its large physical 
dimension and relatively tight fuel-pin spacing). Referring to Figure 8, one should note that alternative 
analyses, such as Analysis Route 2 (algebraic reconstruction and advanced image analysis) may 
perform better, albeit efforts must be made to automate it for use in unattended mode. 
As seen in Figure 11 and 12, the evaluations on Verification Objective 2 indicate superior performance 
of the UGETv1 device as compared to PGET, contrary to Objective 1. The reason is the capability of 
UGETv1 to select full-energy gamma, which enables the analysis of isotope-specific data. However, 
one may expect that smaller energy windows (for example 630-680 keV instead of 400-700 keV for 
137Cs, which was simulated here), may help to reduce the systematic bias in the application of PGET 
to Objective 2. More investigations of object-scatter effects, as a function of energy-window width in 
PGET, is needed. For UGETv1, a potential to deduce pin-wise BU and CT in short-cooled PWR fuel 
with statistical uncertainties below 6% respectively 0.4 years, has been indicated even for central pins. 
Finally, one should note that PGET is not operational at CTs down to 1 year due to count-rate 
saturation of the detector elements in the high gamma flux from short-cooled fuel, while UGETv1 was 
designed to be operational also at short CTs. For Verification Objective 1, results obtained when 
applying Analysis Route 1 on UGETv1 data at CT=1 year shows that a probability >95% for detecting 
a single missing fuel pin would be achievable for all three fuel types under study, assuming a tolerable 
false alarm rate of 0.10. For more detailed information of these analyses, we refer to [10]. 
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8. Envisaged inspection procedure
The envisioned inspection procedure, identified and refined as part of the JNT 1955 Phase I project 
can be outlined according to the following: 
A. Baseline inspection procedure, performed on-site, either automatically in case of 
unattended use or by an inspector in the case of attended use: 
1. Tomographic measurement
2. Online image reconstruction
3. Online image analysis
4. On-site initial integrity statement
B. If undeclared removal/replacement is suspected: 
5. Detailed pin-activity reconstruction based on current fuel type and position in
device. (No additional measurement required.) 
The last step (B.5) reflects the functionality of Verification Objective 2, at least if operator-declared 
information is used for the detailed modelling. However, it may also be envisaged that geometric 
information is extracted directly from reconstructed images in step A.2, without any need for operator-
declared data. Such a possible procedure (“Verification Objective 1.5”) is also discussed below.  
9. Conclusions, discussion and outlook
According to this and previous studies, GET has the potential to provide bias-defect sensitivity in most 
fuel verification scenarios, a significant improvement over IAEA’s current partial-defect capabilities 
using a Fork-based system or Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device. The IAEA also possesses a GET 
measuring device for attended use (PGET), which was refurbished during 2016, introducing e.g. new 
detector elements to provide adequate efficiency and energy calibration. The current study covers 
analyses of expected PGET performance assuming high-fidelity calibration (but with detailed device 
design before refurbishment) for a variety of fuel types and fuel parameter sets. However, there may 
still be room for improvements in terms of e.g. optimisation of energy windows used for selecting the 
detected gamma rays to be analysed, which can be a subject for future studies. 
In this study, a “Universal” GET design has been developed (“UGETv1”), which is capable of 
supporting the full range of fuel characteristics considered in this study, but that versatility comes at a 
price in terms of both assay time and instrument lifecycle cost. (For cost estimates, see [10].) 
A set of tomographic reconstruction algorithms have been identified, described and used, which may 
find use in the application of GET for safeguards. For Verification Objective 1 (counting of fuel pins 
without any prior information on the fuel), image reconstruction algorithms have been presented, 
which are complemented by image-analysis methods to count the number of fuel pins present in the 
measured assembly. For Verification Objective 2 (determination of pin-wise fuel properties, making 
use of prior information on e.g. fuel geometry), algebraic methods have been suggested that include 
detailed modelling of the gamma-ray transport through the fuel configuration. 
Among the outcomes of this work is the creation of a simulation and modelling framework, which 
provides end-to-end capability to assess tomographer performance for nuclear fuel assay, and could 
be considered a new, standing capability for the international safeguards community, available on 
request. It is modularised to allow for studies of expected performance of various GET measurement 
device designs for a variety of fuel types, fuel properties and data analysis methods. 
For Verification Objective 1, it was found that the PGET and UGETv1 devices exhibit, in general, 
comparable performance despite their very different designs, but PGET achieves that sensitivity in 
shorter assay times. The higher collection efficiency of PGET elevates its performance over UGET for 
cases where the signal coming from interior pins is particularly weak (e.g., PWR assemblies), while 
UGET achieves high performance for the shortest-cooled fuels that cannot be measured by PGET. 
These comparative findings are based on an analytic FBP reconstruction; however, results may vary 
with other reconstruction methods. Among the conclusions drawn for Objective 1 were namely that 
algebraic reconstruction including modelling of system’s intrinsic response function and uniform 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
579
attenuation gave the most promising results in terms of separation between fuel pins and background. 
Prior work has also indicated that image analysis and algebraic reconstruction methods offer the 
potential robustness to issues such as misalignment of assemblies, bowing of individual fuel pins, non-
functioning detector elements, irregular measurement positions etc. 
For Verification Objective 2, predicted performance for PGET was lower than for UGETv1, primarily 
because significant object-scatter contributions in PGET’s wide energy windows perturb a relatively 
small full-energy peak signal. Smaller energy windows might offer improvements in Objective 2 
performance for PGET, but more studies are needed to quantify this potential. It may also be 
envisaged that geometric information may be extracted from reconstructed Objective 1-type images, to 
be used in Objective 2-type analyses without any need for operator-declared data. The project team 
and stakeholders have discussed the potential for such a procedure (“Verification Objective 1.5”), but 
analysis of such an approach was beyond the scope of this study. 
Finally, one may note that the performance metric used for Verification Objective 1 relates to bias 
defects, i.e. diversion of single fuel pins. If the performance metric were defined for higher defect 
levels (e.g. 5% or 10% of the pins instead of the <0.5% bias defect at the event of 1 missing pin out of 
264 pins in a PWR assembly) the ROC curves are expected to look considerably better also for PWR 
fuels. This is an area for future work. 
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Abstract: 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory is developing a new capability to perform passive fast neutron emission 
tomography of spent nuclear fuel.  The goal of this capability is to detect vacancies or substitutions of 
individual fuel pins in spent nuclear fuel assemblies for international safeguards applications, such as 
verifying the integrity of an assembly prior to transfer to “difficult to access” storage. Emission 
tomography uses collimation to isolate activity along “lines of response” through an object. By combining 
many collimated views through an object, the neutron emission from each fuel pin can be mathematically 
extracted and an image of the fuel assembly can be constructed. However, performing fast-neutron 
imaging is challenging for the very reason that it is desirable, namely, that fast neutrons penetrate a 
good deal of shielding and are consequently difficult to collimate and measure with high resolution.  For 
spent fuel, additional challenges include the modest neutron source strength and the overwhelming 
gamma-ray emissions. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is presently investigating 
the use of passive gamma emission tomography for the same application, it is useful to investigate 
neutron emission tomography because fast neutrons better penetrate larger fuel assemblies and 
because fast neutrons (originating primarily from curium-244 which is mainly produced at the end of the 
exposure cycle) may be sensitive to replacement fuel pins that are subsequently irradiated. In the 
present work, we present a novel collimator concept that will enable rapid transaxial tomographic 
imaging of spent nuclear fuel using the spontaneous fast neutron emissions from the fuel. Initial design 
simulations of an imager based on this collimator indicate sufficient resolution to identify individual fuel 
pins. Employing such a collimator, the resulting imager can be sufficiently compact, efficient, and 
radiation resistant to make fast neutron emission imaging practical. 
Keywords: safeguards, fast neutrons, tomography, imaging, spent fuel, non-destructive analysis 
1. Introduction
Due to the thousands of metric tons of heavy metal being discharged from nuclear reactors globally, 
countries like Finland and Sweden are taking the lead to develop underground repositories to store their 
used nuclear fuel [1][2]. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has developed safeguards 
approaches under integrated safeguards for encapsulation plants and geological repositories [3]. Spent 
fuel safeguards rely primarily on material containment and surveillance techniques along with item 
counting and non-destructive assay (NDA) verification measurements [4]. These types of measurements 
are required before spent fuel assemblies are transferred to long-term dry storage, final disposal at a 
repository or, in general, to other facilities where they are not easily accessible [2].   
The majority of plutonium safeguarded by the IAEA is contained in spent nuclear fuel from light water 
reactors (LWRs). The LWR fuel assemblies are safeguarded as items, where absence of diversion is 
only confirmed when all items are accounted for after their integrity is verified. All nuclear material in 
LWR fuel assemblies used to remain in the same items during the whole irradiation lifetime of the fuel 
assemblies. However, since the 1980’s, most LWR operators can replace leaking rods during planned 
refuelling outages and as a result, a small population of assemblies has rods stripped out or replaced 
[5]. Several attempts have been made by the IAEA and its Member States to develop technologies to 
detect diversions of pins from a spent fuel assembly and to determine whether pins have gone missing 
or have been replaced with dummy or fresh fuel pins. This mode of verification is known as partial defect 
detection [1]. The IAEA partial defect test addresses a diversion scenario where irradiated pins are 
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extracted from the fuel assembly or the pins are replaced with un-irradiated material, and no subsequent 
irradiation after the fuel rod substitution is envisaged. The current policy of the IAEA is to carry out a 
partial defect test on all easily dismountable spent fuel that is being transitioned to storage where re-
verification would be impossible or difficult, such as in dry storage casks, or repositories [4]. 
The unit of special nuclear material (SNM) in a reactor is a nuclear fuel assembly made up of an array 
of fuel rods. For example, a four-loop pressurized water reactor (PWR) Westinghouse reactor core has 
193 fuel assemblies, a third of which is replaced approximately every 12-18 months depending on the 
reactor design and operating history [6]. The instruments currently approved and in use for the partial 
defect testing of spent fuel for verification before transfer to dry storage are the fork detector (FDET), 
and the digital Cerenkov viewing device (DCVD) [7-8]. For these devices, the performance criteria for 
verifying the integrity of a spent fuel assembly means detecting a diversion of 50% of the material in an 
assembly with high confidence (90%) [5]. The DCVD is less accurate in measuring fuel with long cooling 
times, low burnup, or in dirty pool conditions [1]. The DCVD also cannot detect a single replaced fuel 
rod and is limited in scenarios in which random pins are missing since adjacent fuel pins can cause the 
device to register a false negative [1] [7]. FDET measurements use both the passive neutron and gamma 
emissions from the spent fuel assembly to characterize it and cannot be employed to independently 
verify pin diversion [8].  FDET relies upon the facility operator’s declared data to conduct verification of 
spent fuel assemblies before the fuel is transferred to dry storage casks [7]. According to the IAEA, a 
major weakness of both the DCVD and FDET is that the detection probability is insignificant for carefully 
designed low-level diversions of a few fuel rods in each fuel assembly within a large population [5]. 
The IAEA in conjunction with some Member State Support Programs is presently supporting the 
development of a Passive Gamma Emission Tomography (PGET) system for partial and bias defect 
detection in spent fuel [7-8]. This technique has been demonstrated to be capable of resolving individual 
fuel pins in smaller fuel assemblies. It is envisioned that fast neutron emission tomography could be 
used in the same situations for larger fuel assemblies where gamma emission tomography would have 
difficulty resolving individual pins towards the center of the assembly. The neutron tomography system 
could be built into a facility – such as one handling fuel before sending it to a repository – or could be 
built into a cask-like container that could be housed at each facility or shipped to various sites. 
The objective of the work described in this paper is to develop a new passive NDA capability for detecting 
the diversion of single fuel pins (rods) from nuclear spent fuel assemblies using neutron emission 
tomography before the fuel is moved to difficult to access storage. The results of the tomographic 
measurements are correlated to the measured neutron flux originating from each fuel pin within a square 
or hexagonal-lattice fuel assembly, and an image of the cross section of the assembly is generated. This 
pin-by-pin accounting is predicted to provide a robust check on the integrity of a fuel assembly against 
pin removals or substitutions prior to transfer to difficult to access storage.  
2. Overview and System Concept
The intent of the present work is to develop the capability to perform fast neutron emission tomography 
of spent nuclear fuel.  In this way, the integrity of fuel assemblies can be verified using the measured 
neutron emission rate from each fuel pin in the assemblies. 
Most readers are familiar with the notion, if not the details, of computed tomography (CT) from medical 
physics where x-ray CT has been commonplace for decades.  Similarly, emission tomography such as 
positron emission tomography (PET) and single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) see 
wide diagnostic use. In each form of CT, projection data from many angles are used to reconstruct cross-
sectional images of patients for diagnostic purposes. The crucial elements of this process are that 
measured data divide the object (patient) into “lines of response,” and multiple views through the object 
are mathematically combined to estimate an image. Here, a “line of response” refers to a path through
the patient (or other object) along which an observable (such as activity) can be integrated. For passive 
neutron imaging, collimation is used to isolate such paths, or lines of response, through the fuel 
assembly, and neutron counts in a detector correspond to an integral of neutron activity along the 
corresponding path. Fast neutron tomography having the desired resolution is possible provided each 
line of response sufficiently isolates a path through the object, the object is sampled with a sufficient 
number of lines of response, and there are a sufficient number of views through the object to invert 
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measured data to form an image. Previously, ORNL demonstrated the ability to perform fast neutron 
emission tomography of small arrays of fresh plutonium mixed oxide rods [9].  
Unfortunately, performing fast-neutron imaging is challenging for the very reason that it is desirable, 
namely, that fast neutrons penetrate a good deal of shielding. As a result, they are difficult to collimate 
and measure with fine spatial resolution. For spent fuel, additional challenges stem from the modest 
neutron source strength and the overwhelming gamma-ray emissions. In general, attributes that 
maximize one desirable characteristic are in conflict with other desirable characteristics. The extreme 
gamma dose rates require a collimator construction that manages the gamma dose on detectors and 
detectors that are exceptionally gamma blind. While polyethylene or borated polyethylene are suitable 
materials for the collimation of fast neutrons, they do little to reduce gamma ray dose rates.  Typically, 
the most gamma blind detectors function via neutron capture reactions that require neutron moderation 
and a corresponding detector size to achieve this. The modest neutron source strength of spent fuel 
prescribes efficient use of the available neutrons, such as by placing detector close to the fuel, but the 
need to manage dose rates, have effective collimation, and use moderated (larger) detectors all 
prescribe the opposite. Efficiency also prescribes measuring all lines of response simultaneously, but 
removing material from the collimator for additional slits reduces the effectiveness of the remaining slits. 
Despite these challenges, the use of a novel collimator concept appears to make it possible to construct 
an imager having sufficient resolution to identify individual fuel pins while also keeping the imager 
sufficiently compact, efficient, and radiation resistant to be practical. 
In the remainder of this section, example lines of response will be shown for a single collimator slit, the 
novel “modified parallel slit collimator” will be introduced, and the neutron source term per fuel rod will 
be estimated. 
2.1. Example Lines of Response 
Tomographic imaging depends on isolating lines of response through an object.  For neutron emission 
tomography, that means that the neutron counts that are recorded in each detector correspond primarily 
to those originating along a known path through the object.  These lines of response are achieved via 
collimation.  To illustrate the concept of a line of response, a series of simulations were performed using 
a collimator consisting of an annulus of material with a single 3 mm wide slit cut in it.  A schematic 
diagram of this geometry is shown in Fig. 1 (a). MCNP6 Simulations were performed with a 244Cm point 
source placed at the 172 locations corresponding to a grid separated by the pin pitch of a 17 × 17 PWR 
fuel assembly (however, note that no assembly was present in the simulations.) For each simulation, 
the neutron counts were tallied at the exit of the slit via the FMESH card with the F4 tally for calculating 
neutron flux through a cell. The resulting image in Fig 1. (b) shows the neutron counts associated with 
each source location for a collimator thickness of 15 cm.  In this image, there is an identifiable path 
through the inspection volume that contributes more counts, but significant contributions remain from all 
the source positions.  Similarly, Fig. 1. (c) shows the counts associated with each source location for a 
collimator thickness of 30 cm.  Here, almost all response is limited to a particular path across the 
inspection volume, but the larger collimator thickness reduces the total intensity. 
Figure 1: Example lines of response for a detector counting neutrons that exit a single 3 mm wide collimator slit, 
shown (a) as a schematic diagram. The results of a 244Cm point source simulated at each assumed fuel pin 
location are shown (b) for a 15 cm thick collimator and (c) for a 30 cm thick collimator. 
One 
slit 
Collimator 
thickness 
(a) (b) (c) 
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2.2. The Modified Parallel Slit Collimator 
The intent of the present work is to make a functional equivalent to a parallel slit collimator that can be 
used for large detector pixels in close proximity to the fuel. To reconstruct with resolution sufficient to 
identify individual fuel pins, it is desirable to oversample each fuel pin approximately three times giving, 
for a conventional parallel slit collimator, a total of about 100 slits spaced across 35 cm. It is recognized 
that a conventional parallel slit collimator (due to the required detector element size or the efficiency of 
the collimator) can only work by reducing the number of slits and scanning the apparatus to achieve the 
required resolution.  While this solution is acceptable for the more numerous gamma rays, an increase 
of an order of magnitude (or more) in measurement time due to the necessity to scan would be 
unacceptable for neutrons. Instead, the required spacing between slits (and detector elements) is 
achieved by rotating the position of each slit through a known angle so that the detectors around the 
outside of the collimator annulus are equally spaced. In this way, the essential function of the collimator 
is enabled and correspondence to the parallel slit collimator is maintained, that is, isolating lines of 
response along particular chords across the central volume of the annulus. 
To illustrate, imagine a parallel slit collimator that is part of the annulus of shielding. In the example 
shown in Fig. 2 (a), 20 slits are shown for ease of viewing. These slits are spaced too closely to modulate 
neutrons effectively, and in addition, this geometry would require small (mm scale) neutron detectors. 
Instead, the detectors can be moved farther apart by rotating each slit through a known angle to place 
the detectors at equiangular points around the outside of the collimator circle, as shown in Fig. 2 (e). 
Now, each slit is looking at the same line of response as it originally was, but for a different rotation of 
the object.  For tomography, measurements will be made from angles spaced around 360°, so an 
equivalent set of views will be acquired for the rotated slits as for the original ones.  
An advantage of this collimator design is that the fuel and detectors can remain stationary, and only the 
collimator need rotate. As a result, fuel-detector positioning does not have to be made very precisely 
provided there is no relative motion during the measurement.  Note that the proximity to the fuel dictates 
that the detectors need to tolerate substantial radiation fields. 
Figure 2: The modified parallel slit collimator is equivalent to the parallel slit collimator shown in (a). Then, in (b)-
(d), each slit is rotated from the dashed to the solid red line so that after rotation, the resulting slits are (e) spaced 
equally around the circle.  Each slit still inspects the same chord of the inspection volume.  
(a) (b) (c) 
(d) (e) 
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2.3. The Neutron Source Term 
Neutron emission from spent nuclear fuel is dominated by the spontaneous fission of 244Cm, which has 
a half-life of 18.2 years and a neutron production rate of 1.64×107 neutrons s-1 gram-1 [10]. A plot of the 
neutron rate (per meter per fuel rod) from spontaneous fission of 244Cm in spent fuel having 3% initial 
enrichment, 2 years of cooling, and the prescribed exposure is shown in Fig. 3 [11].  Note that for most 
commercial fuels the source strength per meter of fuel rod will exceed 105 n/s.  Note also that this 
emission rate is many orders of magnitude lower than the gamma ray emission rate. 
Figure 3: Neutron rate per fuel rod due to Cm-244 as a function of exposure within an average commercial PWR 
(shown for 3% initial enrichment and 2-year cooling time) [13]. 
3. The Baseline Imager Design
At the present stage of development, a baseline design for the fast neutron tomographic imager has 
been identified. The baseline design was driven by the need to have: 
 The neutron detector (due to its inherent properties and shielding by the collimator) sufficiently
gamma-blind so that it can operate in close (50-60 cm) proximity to the spent fuel.
 The combination of the collimator and detector sufficiently able to isolate lines of response
through the assembly to enable resolving individual fuel pins.
 The combination of the collimator and detector have sufficient efficiency to measure most
assemblies in minutes.
 The combination of the collimator and detector is sufficiently compact and robust to ship and
use in an operational environment.
The baseline design consists of an annular collimator that fits around a spent fuel assembly, as shown 
in Fig. 4.  The innermost 10 cm of the collimator is constructed of stainless steel (shown in green) for 
gamma ray shielding and structural integrity.  Surrounding the stainless steel, there is a further 35 cm 
of collimator constructed from borated polyethylene (shown in yellow). The collimator has one hundred 
3-mm-wide slits in it, each terminating on a detector (shown in gray).  The 3-mm width was chosen 
because it is approximately the same as the slit spacing, so a larger slit width will be sampling some of 
the same activity as the neighboring slits.  Each detector is wedge-shaped in cross section and has an 
active length of 1 m; it is composed of a high-density polyethylene (HDPE) moderator with 23 boron 
straws embedded in the moderator.  There is an additional 5 cm of borated polyethylene shielding on 
the outside of the detectors. 
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Figure 4: 2D view of the collimator: stainless steel (green), borated poly (yellow), and neutron detectors around. 
Once the baseline design is determined, aspects of the design can be varied in order to further optimize 
it. In the remainder of this section, the detectors will be described, dose rate calculations will be 
described to identify configurations consistent with the capability of the detectors, signal to noise 
estimates will be described to identify a metric for identifying better imager configurations, and an 
example image reconstruction will be performed to identify that the imager response has sufficient 
resolution to resolve individual fuel pins.  
3.1. The Detectors 
Based on the geometry of the collimator, the imager requires 100 detectors (one at the outer radius of 
each collimator slit).  Each detector is roughly wedge-shaped and approximately 1 m tall to intercept a 
reasonable fraction of the neutrons from the fuel assembly. The ideal detector for such an application 
would be perfectly gamma blind but highly efficient to fast neutrons. In choosing a commercially-
available solution, 10B straws were found to be the best combination of gamma blindness, efficiency, 
and cost per volume instrumented. The 10B straws in this project are manufactured by Proportional 
Technologies, Inc. (PTI). 10B tubes or straws rely on thermal neutron capture, and thus require 
moderation of the fast neutrons. By incorporating boron in the collimator and placing a Cd thermal-
neutron filter between the collimator and detector, the imager still responds primarily to fast neutrons. 
For this application, it was desirable to maximize neutron efficiency while minimizing gamma-ray 
efficiency. In practice, minimizing gamma-ray efficiency corresponds to minimizing the number of 
boron straw detectors per readout channel, thereby minimizing gamma-ray pileup. To investigate the 
most favorable configurations of boron straws, the efficiency was calculated as a function of 10B4C 
coating thickness and the straw spacing in a high-density polyethylene matrix. When calculating the 
efficiency of the boron straws, the overall detection efficiency is the product of the absorption fraction, 
the wall escape efficiency (WEE), and the threshold efficiency (TE).  The absorption fraction is 
obtained from simulation (MCNP). The wall escape efficiency is the fraction of reaction products that 
escape the 10B4C coating, and enter the gas, where they can be counted. This number is a function of 
the 10B4C coating thickness, T, (in m). The threshold efficiency is the fraction of events counted 
above the discriminator threshold. For the straw detectors, this has been found to be around 0.95.  
An image of the various wedge detector geometries simulated are shown in Fig. 5; the results from the 
efficiency studies as a function of boron carbide thickness is shown in Fig. 6. The option with a coating 
thickness of 1.4 m and a straw pitch of 1.2 cm yielding 23 straws per detector for a total of 2300 straws 
was chosen because it provided 97.5% the efficiency of the most efficient configuration while using the 
least number of straws, thus making it more economical and less gamma sensitive. 
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Figure 5: Various wedge and straw geometries simulated by PTI. 
Figure 6: Efficiency as a function of boron carbide coating thickness for the four different straw geometries 
simulated by PTI. 
3.2. Dose Rates 
For the gamma calculations, a 17 x 17 PWR fuel assembly with an exposure of 48 GWd/MTU and a 
cooling time of 1 year was simulated to estimate the dose to which the detectors may be exposed. The 
gamma source intensity after 1 year of cooling time was 4.03x1016 photons/sec. The MCNP F6 tally (in 
the unit of MeV/g) was used and conversion factors were used to convert from MeV/g to rad to Roentgen. 
A 3D configuration of the collimator and neutron detectors around a typical fuel assembly is shown in 
Fig. 7. The boron straw detectors are thought to be robust to radiation fields up to 1000 R/hr when 
instrumented on a straw-by-straw basis. 
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Figure 7: 3D configuration of the collimator and neutron detectors around a typical fuel assembly (green). The 
imager is shown (left) without and (right) with stainless steel (pink) and borated polyethylene shielding (yellow) at 
the top and bottom of the imager to shield from the fuel above and below. 
Gamma simulations were performed to estimate the amount of shielding that would be needed at the 
top and bottom of the imager that would otherwise be directly visible to the spent fuel assembly as seen 
in Fig. 7 on the left.  The purpose of the simulations was to determine a composite (borated polyethylene 
and stainless steel) shield sufficient to minimize the contribution of the fuel assembly outside the active 
imaging region. For this purpose, the minimum thickness of stainless steel to bring the dose at the 
detectors down to a reasonable value was found to be 10cm. Likewise, the thickness of the borated 
polyethylene for the neutron shielding on the top and bottom of the imager was calculated by using an 
absorption reaction rate tally in the 10B straws to estimate the reaction rates in the boron straw detectors. 
The minimum thickness of borated polyethylene that would shield the detectors from the neutrons 
originating from either end of the fuel assembly was found to be 20cm.     
Once suitable shielding on the top and bottom of the collimator was identified, the properties of the 
collimator itself were investigated. For this purpose, various combinations of stainless steel and 
polyethylene have been investigated as shown in Table 1. 
Stainless Steel 
(cm) 
Borated 
Polyethylene (cm) 
Total Collimator 
Thickness (cm) 
5 35 40 
5 40 45 
5 45 50 
5 48 53 
5 50 55 
10 30 40 
10 35 45 
10 40 50 
10 45 55 
Table 1: Simulation case studies for the imager designed to fit into two different commercially available spent fuel 
casks. Also shown are the various combinations of stainless steel and polyethylene simulated. 
For the case with 10cm stainless steel and 30cm borated poly, gamma dose rates for various collimator 
slits widths have been estimated. A slit width of 3mm was used to calculate the dose for all subsequent 
studies. The gamma dose rates at all 2,300 straw locations are shown in Fig. 8. Simulations showed 
that the highest gamma dose rates occur at detector 19, but the dose rates are still within the limits of 
what the straws can handle. The highest dose calculated in the straws is less than 500 R/hr, which is 
much lower than the 1000R/hr upper limit.  
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Figure 8: The gamma dose rate distribution for all 2300 detector locations for the case of 3mm slit widths 
Figure 9: (Left) Gamma dose rates averaged over a total of 23 detectors in wedge 19 for parallel and tapered 
slits. (Right) Gamma dose rates averaged over detector 19 for 5 cm and 10 cm of stainless steel (SS) and varied 
thicknesses of borated polyethylene. 
The dose rates at detector #19 when the slit widths are changed or tapered are shown in Fig. 9 on the 
left. The gamma dose rates increase exponentially as the slit width increases when parallel; however, 
when tapered, the dose rate increases at a much lower rate and is lower at larger slit widths. With a 
3mm slit width, the gamma dose rates at detector #19 for a collimator consisting of 5 cm and 10 cm of 
stainless steel towards the center and various amounts of polyethylene are shown on the right in Fig. 
9. These results show that gamma dose rates can be limited to a 200-300 R/hr by having the
innermost 10 cm of the collimator constructed from stainless steel. 
3.3. Imager Response and Signal to Noise 
The various cases in Table 1 were simulated using MCNP6’s F4m Tally function to generate a reaction
rate for the neutrons interacting with 10B in each of the 100 wedge-shaped detectors. This reaction rate 
when plotted as a function of detector number, is called the “point spread function.” For each case, an 
isotropic 244Cm source was simulated at the center of the cavity in air as shown in Fig. 10. The detectors 
are numbered clockwise from detector #1, which corresponds to the detector wedge facing the bottom 
tangent collimator slit. 
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Figure 10: The MCNP geometry used to simulate the point spread functions. There are 100 slits in the collimator 
made up of stainless steel (SS), and borated polyethylene (BP). The nomenclature for numbering the wedges is 
also shown with the 1st and 100th wedges highlighted in red. 
The point spread function for the case of 10 cm stainless steel and 35 cm borated polyethylene is shown 
in Fig. 11. Here, the peak at detector 50 is as expected for the position of the source. The design of the 
collimator is intended to maximize the signal (peak) and suppress the background (areas to the sides of 
the peak).  
Figure 11: An example point spread function for the collimator having 10 cm (SS) and 35 cm borated 
polyethylene (BP). 
When varying the dimensions of the collimator, as the thickness of borated polyethylene increases, the 
background counts in the point spread function decreases. However, the peak counts decrease as well. 
With a basic understanding of the contribution of the different collimator components, signal to noise 
ratio (SNR) calculations of the nine potential designs were performed to identify an optimal combination. 
The SNR was calculated for each of the point spread functions above to a sample problem where a 
single pin in a sample 17 x 17 PWR fuel assembly is missing. Fig. 12 shows the geometry using 10 cm 
stainless steel and 35 cm borated polyethylene for which the reconstruction was attempted and SNR 
0.0E+00
1.0E-05
2.0E-05
3.0E-05
4.0E-05
5.0E-05
6.0E-05
0 20 40 60 80 100
C
o
u
n
ts
 p
er
 S
o
u
rc
e 
P
ar
ti
cl
e
Detector Number
Centered on
Detector 50
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
591
calculated. In this fuel assembly simulation, the red circles represent fuel rods, white circles the empty 
channels, and the dark gray circle signifies the missing rod.  
Figure 12: Assumed geometry of a 17 x 17 PWR fuel assembly used to calculate the SNR response of the full 
imager with 1 fuel pin missing (black) 
Each pin in the assembly will have a unique contribution to the sinogram associated with it, which is 
calculated by summing the activities along a line. First, assuming all 264 pins are present, each point 
spread function was applied to a full assembly, and accounting for the fuel pin location, 264 sinograms 
were generated by summing up the activities in lines. The sinogram for the fuel assembly with the 
missing rods was found by subtracting the calculated sinogram from two pins located in the missing fuel 
pins’ location from the calculated sinograms from 264 pins as seen in Fig. 13. 
Figure 13: Sinograms as seen by 100 detectors for a full 17 x 17 PWR fuel assembly with 264 rods (left), and one 
with only 262 rods (right). 
Figure 14: The ideal detector responses (left) and after applying a point spread function (PSF) to account for 
scatter and background (right) are shown here. The blue line is the expected signal from the missing rod if it were 
present in the fuel assembly. The red line is the signal from the missing rod plus the signal from the other 263 
rods, and the black line is the signal from only the 263 rods. 
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From Fig. 14, we see that separating the expected signal from a missing pin from the signal from a full 
up assembly is non-trivial since the signal from the missing rod (red line) is barely above the signal from 
the 263 other rods. Fig. 15 shows the relative SNR values calculated for the cases in Table 1. This 
calculation assumes 2.55x105 n/s/m/fuel rod. 
Figure 15: Signal to noise ratios are presented here for all 10 cases identified in Section 3.4. 
Note that these SNR values are calculated for a 1 s measurement time. The SNR scales as a function 
of the square-root of time. From the SNR calculations, a first order approximation of what the optimal 
thickness of collimator is for a 3-mm slit width due to the peak at a total thickness of 45cm. It should be 
noted that this analysis does not account for the effects of scatter and self-attenuation that emitted 
neutrons would experience within the spent fuel assembly. This is expected to reduce the signal to noise 
further, and would increase the measurement time.  
While the present work has achieved an incomplete understanding of the behaviour of a fast neutron 
imager, the predicted resolution and efficiency are capable of resolving individual fuel pins or vacancies 
in an assembly. A reconstructed image for a geometry with one missing fuel pin is shown in Fig. 16. The 
simulated data for this image was generated simply by applying the point spread function to a forward 
projection of an idealized 17 x 17 fuel assembly with a single pin missing without accounting for 
scattering or self-attenuation. The image was reconstructed using maximum likelihood expectation 
maximization that included knowledge of the point spread function in Fig. 11. Fig. 16 shows preliminary 
results that will change when factors such as self-attenuation and scattering are accounted for. In the 
reconstruction, the missing pin is clearly visible, indicating that there are sufficient counts and resolution, 
which shows that this method is promising. 
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Figure 16: Reconstructed image with one missing fuel pin. 
4. Future Work
Although a preliminary design basis for the imager has been identified, more parametric studies need to 
be implemented to converge on a final imager design. One of the parameters currently being optimized 
is the collimator slit width for various borated poly and stainless steel combinations. In conjunction, the 
use of tapered slits will be investigated to see if the efficiency and resolution can be optimized. First 
order simulations show that the detector concept works and that a pin-by-pin reconstruction can be 
achieved. Future simulations will include the effects of neutron scattering within the fuel assembly and 
self-attenuation to see how this affects the image reconstruction. Revised SNR values will be calculated 
once the additional parameters have been incorporated, and a final design will be decided upon. 
Additionally, once the PTI detectors are procured, a thorough performance evaluation under a high 
gamma environment will be conducted. 
5. Conclusions
ORNL has utilized existing expertise in fast neutron imaging to demonstrate to first order a new capability 
to detect diversion of fuel pins from spent nuclear fuel assemblies based on passive fast neutron 
emission tomography for international safeguards applications. Simulations thus far show that this has 
the potential to detect single fuel pin diversion. The Monte Carlo simulations performed showed that it 
is possible to isolate activity along lines of response using emission tomography. The line of response 
simulations helped identify a minimum collimator thickness consisting of borated polyethylene and 
stainless steel, and gamma measurements helped identify the minimum amount of stainless steel 
shielding necessary above and below the detection system to shield the detectors from the length of the 
fuel assembly. Commercially available 10B straws that can withstand the high gamma rate environments 
that the imager will be subject to were identified as the best detectors for this application. Results show 
that the detector concept identified in this paper works, and that a pin-by-pin image reconstruction of a 
17 x 17 PWR fuel assembly can be achieved, and a missing fuel pin can be discerned. The first order 
simulations accounting for detector efficiency show that a good SNR value can be achieved in a relatively 
quick time (25sec). Once the scattering of neutrons within the fuel assembly is accounted for, this 
measurement time will increase. A final imager design will be decided upon once a few remaining 
parameters are optimized based on the notional imager design described in this paper.  
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Abstract: 
Current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) methodologies for the verification of fresh low-enriched 
uranium (LEU) and mixed oxide (MOX) fuel assemblies are volume-averaging methods that lack sensitivity 
to individual pins. Further, as unirradiated fuel assemblies become more and more complex (e.g., heavy 
gadolinium loading, high degrees of axial and radial variation in fissile concentration), the accuracy of current 
IAEA instruments degrades and measurement time increases. Particularly in light of the fact that no special 
tooling is required to remove individual pins from modern fuel assemblies, new capabilities for the verification 
of unirradiated (i.e., fresh LEU and MOX) assemblies are needed to ensure that fissile material has not been 
diverted. Passive gamma emission tomography has demonstrated potential to provide pin-level verification 
of spent fuel, but gamma-ray emission rates from unirradiated fuel emissions are significantly lower, 
precluding purely passive tomography methods. The work presented here introduces the concept of Hybrid 
Gamma Emission Tomography (HGET) for verification of unirradiated fuels, in which a neutron source is 
used to actively interrogate the fuel assembly and the resulting gamma-ray emissions are imaged using 
tomographic methods to provide pin-level verification of fissile material concentration. This paper describes 
the status of a viability study on the HGET concept, including: envisioned use-case scenarios and 
corresponding definitions of fuel assemblies; modeling framework based on Monte Carlo and deterministic 
transport methods, and its validation; quantitative assessment of candidate HGET signatures with a focus 
on prompt fission gamma rays and delayed fission gamma rays; a nominal HGETv1 instrument design; 
candidate HGET-specific tomographic reconstruction methods that fully incorporate declared information; 
and examples of simulation-based predictions of HGET performance.  
Keywords: safeguards; fuel verification; gamma emission tomography 
1. Introduction
Current IAEA methodologies for the verification of fresh LEU assemblies at fuel fabrication facilities utilize 
active neutron interrogation with neutron coincidence counting; verification of fresh MOX fuel utilizes passive 
neutron coincidence counting with gamma-ray spectroscopy for Pu isotopics. These volume-averaging 
methods are not capable of individual-pin sensitivity and as fuel assemblies become more complex (e.g., 
heavy gadolinium loading, and axial variation in boiling water reactors [BWRs]), their accuracy degrades 
and measurement times increase. Particularly in light of the fact that no special tooling is required to remove 
individual pins from modern fuel assemblies, the IAEA needs new capabilities for the verification of 
unirradiated fuel assemblies that can provide high-precision fissile-mass quantification, ideally at the single-
pin level. The IAEA has documented the need for new unirradiated-fuel verification tools in the IAEA 
Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D Plan [1]. Other potential users of a new fuel verification tools 
include EURATOM, and State regulators. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
596
PNNLͲSAͲ125791
Passive gamma-ray emission tomography (GET) is a promising candidate for verification of item integrity in 
fuel assemblies because it has the potential to directly image the spatial distribution of the active fuel 
material, without the need for operator-declared information [2]. In this sense, it is an absolute, rather than 
comparative verification method. In addition, the relative intensity of gamma-ray signatures can be used to 
verify declared attributes on a pin-by-pin basis (e.g., burnup in irradiated fuels; uranium enrichment or 
plutonium isotopics in unirradiated fuels). The viability of GET for the detection of missing pins in irradiated 
fuels, where relatively intense, higher-energy gamma emissions are available, appears promising based on 
findings of a recent IAEA study [3] and ongoing testing of a prototype passive GET instrument by the IAEA. 
For unirradiated fuels with relatively weak and lower-energy emissions, the ability to see interior pins with 
purely passive tomography is less clear. The use of active neutron interrogation to stimulate gamma-ray 
emission can provide additional signal intensity for emission tomography, here referred to as Hybrid Gamma 
Emission Tomography (HGET). There are several candidate signatures for hybrid (i.e., tomographic imaging 
of an active interrogation signature) assay of unirradiated fuels, including prompt capture gamma rays in the 
isotopes of interest (e.g., 1.28 MeV from 235U); prompt fission gamma rays (continuum peaked at ~ 1 MeV); 
and delayed gamma rays from short-lived fission products (discrete lines generally from 1 to 7 MeV). 
Each of the candidate signatures above has been studied previously, and sometimes in combination, for 
the assay of both irradiated and unirradiated fuels. For example, delayed-gamma methods have been 
studied for the direct assay of fissile isotopes in irradiated fuels [4, 5], but the delayed-gamma methods 
studied to date provide no spatial information about the origin of the signatures and therefore, localized 
neutron moderation effects and self-attenuation can produce biases in fissile isotope quantification. In 
addition, the high passive background in spent fuel forces the use of only the higher-energy (> 3 MeV) 
delayed-gamma signatures, while the most intense signatures are presented at lower energies. In 
unirradiated fuels, these more-intense, lower-energy delayed-gamma signatures are accessible, but 
information about their location of origin in the fuel assembly is needed.  
To the authors’ knowledge, no prior work has demonstrated the ability to provide spatial information about 
the origin of the candidate signatures and therefore, verify fuel characteristics at the pin level. In the HGET 
concept, it is postulated that the collection of these candidate signatures through a tomographic lens will 
support pin-by-pin verification of fissile materials in the assembly. 
Here we describe an ongoing modeling-based viability study of the HGET concept. This paper discusses 
potential IAEA use cases and implementation approaches, a novel method for modeling instrument 
response that couples Monte Carlo and deterministic transport methods, candidate signatures, and a 
method for extracting fissile isotope concentrations on a pin-by-pin basis. Example results for pin-level 
verification of fissile isotope concentrations in MOX fuel assembly are presented. The paper concludes with 
a discussion of the ongoing and planned analyses that are needed to more fully assess the viability of the 
HGET concept for safeguards verification.  
2. Potential Use Cases in International Safeguards
The use case for an HGET instrument by safeguards inspectorates is presumed to be consistent with how 
current IAEA instrumentation is used for the verification of unirradiated fuels. For fresh LEU fuel, the IAEA 
uses the Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar (UNCL); for MOX fuel the Passive Neutron Coincidence 
Collar (PNCL). Both instruments use neutron coincidence signatures to verify the total uranium or plutonium 
in the assembly--additional information about each method can be found in  [6], with IAEA’s International 
Target Values (ITVs) for verification of unirradiated assemblies in  [7]. 
For fresh LEU fuel, the UNCL is used to measure the mass density of 235U at a given axial location of the 
assembly. It is assumed that the 235U is the only fissile isotope in the assembly and therefore, that all induced 
fission comes from 235U. This localized 235U mass density is translated to total 235U mass for the assembly 
using an active length measurement (e.g., gamma scanning). The ITV for determination of total 235U mass 
in an LEU assembly is 4.5% (one-sigma relative), assuming relatively low gadolinium (Gd) content. Count 
times are not specified in the ITV document, but information provided by other sources indicate that 
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measurement times for UNCL, on fuels with relatively low Gd concentration, are approximately one hour to 
reach the desired statistical uncertainty. Systematic uncertainties for high-Gd assemblies can be 10 or more 
times higher. 
For MOX fuel, the PNCL is used to measure the mass density, at a given axial location, of the Pu isotopes 
with appreciable spontaneous fission yields (240Pu dominates). High-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy on 
exterior pins of the assembly is then used to infer the linear density of total Pu. An active length 
measurement (e.g., gamma scanning) is employed to translate that value to total Pu for the assembly. The 
ITV for determination of total Pu mass in a MOX assembly is 3.2% (one-sigma relative). Count times are 
not specified in the ITV document, but information provided by other sources indicates that measurement 
times are typically on the order of 15 minutes.  
The use cases and ITVs for UNCL and PNCL provide useful context for the HGET viability study, and are 
the basis for the assumptions that were adopted to guide the first phase of this study:  
x Verification of unirradiated fuel will occur in an air environment and the operator will position the fuel
assembly in such a way that the HGET collar will assay one or more vertical segments of the 
assembly. As with UNCL and PNCL, it is assumed that some form of active-length measurement will 
inform the translation from the HGET-measured 235U and total Pu linear densities to a 235U and total 
Pu assembly mass value. Note that the HGET gamma-spectrometer array, operating in purely passive 
mode, could provide an active-length measurement similar to what is performed today using a 
handheld gamma-ray detector. (This assumes that the operator moves the fuel assembly through the 
HGET collar.) x Total measurement time for HGET verification of unirradiated fuel assemblies should be on the order
of 1-2 hours. While today’s measurements may be shorter in duration for many fuel types, the fact 
that HGET will provide pin-by-pin verification of fissile content encourages a broader window of assay-
time acceptability for the first phase of the study. x The physical dimensions and mass of HGET should be comparable to existing IAEA instruments:  for
example, the JCC-71 PNCL/UNCL instrument sold by Canberra weighs approximately 40 kg [8]. A 
maximum neutron moderator/reflector weight of 100 kg was enforced during the design study, on the 
logic that this represented a reasonable size for a mobile instrument deployed at a fuel fabrication or 
reactor facility. 
3. MOX Fuel Assembly as Initial Case Study
While the HGET study is also investigating low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels with and without burnable 
poisons, an initial use case was defined for a pressurized water reactor (PWR) assembly of 17x17 pins with 
mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. PWR fuel is at the more-challenging end of the continuum of fuel types under 
safeguards in terms of neutron and gamma-ray attenuation, due to its relatively dense pin-array geometry 
and overall large dimension. The age since separation for the reactor-grade Pu was assumed to be 5 years, 
an upper limit in terms of occupational health hazards (after about 5 years enough 241Am has grown in to 
make handling difficult; this process has little impact on the amount of fissionable material for the HGET 
measurement), and the composition is shown in Table 1. 
Generally speaking, the composition of MOX fuel pins varies with pin position. An IAEA technical report, 
provides Pu concentrations of each pin type in an example MOX assembly, as shown in Figure 1 [9]. Note 
that the overall Pu concentration varies from pin to pin but the relative Pu isotopics, as defined in Table 1 is 
consistent across all pins. 
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MOX LEU 
Atom Isotope 
Atom 
Fraction (X3) 
Atom 
Fraction (X3) 
U 234 5.20x10–5 3.12x10–3 
U 235 6.81x10–4 4.05x10–2 
U 238 9.39x10–1 9.60x10–1 
Pu 238 1.36x10–3 
Pu 239 3.21x10–2 
Pu 240 1.52x10–2 
Pu 241 7.06x10–3 
Pu 242 4.21x10–3 
O 16 2 2 
density 
(g/cc) 10.4538 10.4538 
Table 1. Initial composition (before decay) of the fuel assembly definitions used in the HGET viability study (atom 
fractions displayed are 3x the total atom fraction, such that the U/Pu isotopes add to approximately 1). 

Figure 1. PWR MOX assembly design of the 17x17—24 type with assembly averaged plutonium concentration of 7.2 
wt% Pu. (From [9]) 
4. Overview of HGET Modeling Methods
An overview of the HGET modeling methods is given in Figure 2 below. Neutron transport was performed 
using MCNP6 and the calculated fission rates in the fuel pins were used to generate the prompt- and 
delayed-gamma source terms. Those gamma-ray source terms were then used as input to a separate 
calculation for the transport of the photons out of the assembly and into the detector. Gamma-ray transport 
through a highly attenuating assembly can be prohibitively time-consuming with pure Monte Carlo methods. 
The gamma-ray transport was performed using a deterministic transport by the discrete-ordinates package 
Attila [10]. More detail on the HGET modeling method and validation can be found in [11]. 
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Figure 2. Schematic of HGET modeling approach for modeling neutron-induced gamma-ray signatures and detector 
response functions. 
5. Candidate HGET Signatures
Gamma emission tomography is based on detecting gamma emissions selectively, sensitive to both their 
location and their angle of incidence. Detection of inner pins can be very difficult, since radiation from these 
pins must pass through a considerable distance of dense fuel. Gamma rays with energies of less than 500 
keV have a very low probability of escaping from inner pins to the outside. Penetration increases with 
increasing energy to a broad maximum at around 3 MeV to 4 MeV, beyond which the pair production 
mechanism of absorption causes penetration to decrease. Isotopic specificity is also desirable; if a gamma-
ray emission is uniquely tied to a given isotope (e.g., fissile isotope or fission product), it will likely be more 
useful in characterizing the fissile content of the assembly. Finally, methods based on excessively complex 
signatures may be difficult to implement, limiting their utility.  
An order-of-magnitude comparison of typical spent-fuel assay signatures, to the candidate signatures for 
HGET assay of a nominal MOX fuel assembly is given in Table 2. The actively induced count rates were 
estimated using the neutron-gamma modeling methods described in the previous section, and the nominal 
HGETv1a design described later that employs a commercial, off-the-shelf deuterium-tritium (D-T) neutron 
generator producing approximately 108 n/s at 14.1 MeV.  
Technique 
Emission rate 
(Ȗ/pin/cm/s)
Spent fuel, 1 year CT, 154Eu 1274 keV 1 x 108 
Spent fuel, 30 year CT, 137Cs 662 keV 5 x 109 
239Pu 414 keV  5 x103 
Prompt fission > 1000 keV 1 x104 
Delayed gamma individual lines < 2 x101 
Delayed gamma at 1 s, > 1000 keV 
Delayed gamma at 1000s, > 1000 keV 
4 x 102 
5 x 103 
Prompt capture gamma, U Uncertain, ~1 x102 
Prompt capture gamma, Pu <1 x103 
Activation gammas > 500 keV Uncertain, small 
Table 2. Order-of-magnitude comparison of signal intensities from passive tomography of PWR spent fuel variants (top 
three entries) and HGET for unirradiated MOX fuel. HGET signatures highlighted in gray are the most promising in terms 
of absolute emission intensity.
Clear from Table 2 is that the passive Pu emissions from unirradiated MOX fuel are many orders of 
magnitude less than from spent fuel, and have low penetrating power. The actively induced signatures offer 
Material
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somewhat higher intensities and importantly, their higher energies offer the promise of greater penetrability 
through the fuel assembly. Delayed gamma signatures are more complex, due to their time dependence, 
and no individual lines are observed with sufficiently high emission intensity for tomography. It is possible 
that a delayed gamma-ray signature summed over broad energy windows could be imaged – but fissile-
isotope specificity would be lost. The assay of other activation products to infer fuel composition offers little 
promise both because of low intensity and limited direct connection to the fissile material that is the focus of 
IAEA verification. Given that no isotope-specific signatures are high enough in intensity for direct fissile 
isotope assay, the most useful signature for verifying the integrity of fuel assemblies and total fissile content 
appears to be the prompt fission gamma rays, possibly in combination with the delayed gamma rays. The 
relatively high production of these signatures at energies above 1 MeV is key, although still four orders of 
magnitude below emission rates typical of spent fuel.  
This large gap in emission intensity points to the need for the development of HGET-specific tomographic 
designs and methods, for example neutron moderation and reflector designs that are efficient for inducing 
fission in the assembly, detector and collimator designs that balance gamma-ray collection efficiency with 
spatial resolution for imaging, and tomographic reconstruction methods that wring as much information as 
possible from the collected data by relying heavily on the declared, a priori information about the pin 
assembly geometry. These topics are discussed in the sections below.  
6. Nominal HGET Design
A wide range of source/moderator/reflector designs and materials (e.g., poly, graphite, hydrided DU) were 
considered in the early stages of the HGET v1 design study. Both a D-D and a D-T neutron generator were 
considered; the lower energy neutrons from D-D produce a smaller background of 238U fissions but D-D 
generators are generally significantly lower in achievable intensity, given similar form factors. The metrics 
for evaluating the various designs were: 1) uniformity of thermal and epithermal flux across the assembly 
cross-section, 2) total fission rate induced in the MOX fuel definition, and 3) relative contributions of fissile 
and 238U fission. Several of the early designs were discarded based on these metrics; Figure 3 (left) depicts 
the design that demonstrated considerable promise: HGETv1a. Figure 3 (right) shows the low-energy fission 
rate distributions for the HGETv1a designs, with an assembly present (each pixel in the image corresponds 
to an individual pin). Immediately evident is a relatively high fission rate on the generator side of the 
assembly, in the outer row of pins. The neutron self-shielding effect, which depresses the fission rate on the 
interior of the assembly due to interactions between the neutrons and the fuel pins, is also clear. The overall 
effect is a gradient of approximately 10X between the fission rates at the outermost to innermost pins – 
although if the outer row of pins is neglected, the fission rate in the rest of the assembly is within a factor of 
~3X and has a predictable gradient structure, with no highly localized changes on the interior of the 
assembly.  
For the collection of the prompt and delayed gamma rays produced by the induced fissions, an array of 
highly collimated gamma detectors is rotated around the assembly to build up the tomographic projection 
data, as a function of both energy and angle. A number of potential collimator/detector combinations are 
possible, but the nominal HGET design assumes a configuration founded on the IAEA’s original Passive 
Gamma Emission Tomographer (PGET), as described more fully in [3] and depicted in Figure 4 below. 
Though PGET is intended for verification of spent fuel, a variant on PGET tailored for unirradiated fuels 
would benefit from a high degree of familiarity among tomography practitioners and the potential for 
leveraging of hardware components (e.g., detector arrays, pulse-processing electronics).  
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
Figure 3. Left: Cross-section of the HGETv1a instrument geometry including a D-T generator (far left), a PWR assembly, 
and a combination of poly and graphite moderator/reflector. Right: Mapping of fission rate induced by low-energy 
neutrons, assuming the HGETv1a design (each pixel represents one fuel pin).
 
Figure 4. Rendering of the IAEA’s PGET instrument design showing a vertical view of the detector heads containing 
104 CdTe detectors in each head (right) [3]. 
The central challenge in designing the HGET collimator/detector combination is to increase the collection 
efficiency significantly while preserving sufficient spatial resolution to resolve individual pins. To increase 
the collection efficiency for HGET gamma-ray signatures, the aperture’s field of view was opened 
significantly in the horizontal and vertical directions. These adaptations produce an increase of 
approximately 30X compared to the PGET collimator.  
Bi4Ge3O12 (BGO) was chosen as the nominal gamma-ray spectrometer material for the HGETv1a design. 
Although it has significantly poorer energy resolution than other candidates such as NaI(Tl), CZT or LaBr3, 
energy resolution is not expected to be critical for the broad energy windows for collection of prompt-fission 
and delayed-gamma signatures. BGO’s high density and atomic number translate to high stopping power 
for higher-energy gamma rays, whilst maintaining a relatively small form factor that can support a highly 
arrayed detector arrangement like the one used in PGET. Importantly, BGO is a very common material for 
positron emission tomography systems used in nuclear medicine, which means that large arrays of relatively 
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small voxels are readily available in the commercial market. The BGO detector is observed to give a factor 
of three improvement in intrinsic efficiency for the collection of gamma-rays above 1 MeV, when compared 
to the CdTe detectors employed in the original PGET device.  
The combination of higher collimator efficiency (~30 X) and greater intrinsic detector efficiency (~3X) results 
in an overall HGET gamma-ray collection efficiency that is approximately two orders of magnitude higher 
than the original PGET design, thereby helping to recover a significant portion of the signal discrepancy 
(several orders of magnitude) between the spent fuel applications for which PGET was originally designed 
and the HGET scenarios for unirradiated fuels.  
7. Reconstruction and Analysis Methods for HGET
The simplest approach to tomographic reconstruction is filtered backprojection, which solves analytically for 
the distribution of emissions, assuming that measurements are spaced at equal angles and that attenuation 
is minimal. This approach has the advantage of being both fast and requiring few assumptions about the 
system [12], and has been successfully used to locate missing pins in spent nuclear fuel [3]. However, since 
FBP in its simplest form makes no assumptions about attenuation, it cannot correct for the highly attenuating 
pins that block emissions from the center of the assembly. This leads to a reconstructed image which is 
systematically lower in intensity inside the assembly. 
The case of fresh fuel is different from the spent fuel application in two important ways. First, the emission 
intensity is much lower, indicating that without other modifications a much longer measurement time will be 
needed. Second, emission intensity is a function not only of fuel composition, but also of illumination by the 
neutron field. Achieving a high and relatively uniform flux of thermal neutrons in the center of a large 
assembly is difficult, as discussed previously. The difference in counts at the detector from inner pins to 
outer pins is already large in passive emission tomography, but neutron interrogation adds another 
significant gradient, on the order of 10X, between inner and outer pins. Reconstructing a dataset with such 
an extreme gradient results in poor image quality. 
While the HGET application is challenging from the reconstruction standpoint, it is decidedly different from 
other tomographic applications (e.g., nuclear medicine) in that it is fundamentally a confirmatory 
measurement of the operator’s declaration about the assembly (as opposed to a blind test in which nothing 
about the object is known). This means that a priori information about a declared assembly, perhaps after 
initial verification via FBP, can be used to extract as much information as possible from each collected 
gamma ray and thereby improve the quality of the resulting image reconstruction. There are a number of 
ways to incorporate this information, but one straightforward approach is to assume a declared assembly 
geometry and solve for average emission values for each pin. Mathematically, this is phrased as 
measurement data (gĮ) with Į as the sinogram angle/offset index according to
 (1) 
where fk is the reconstructed activity estimate, here with k as the pin index, and HĮk is the model-based 
system response matrix, in this case the detector response to each possible emitting pin in the presence of 
attenuation due to the whole assembly. This approach is described more fully in [3][11].  Reconstructing at 
the level of individual pins, rather than over a series of pixels, incorporates the assembly geometry and 
greatly decreases the number of unknowns, regularizing the inverse problem. This results in much lower 
relative statistical error, but contingent upon the accuracy of the model. 
The model-based tomographic reconstruction methods translate the collected gamma-ray signature into the 
emission intensity of prompt and delayed fission gammas in each pin, and therefore the pin-wise fission 
rate. Next, the pin-by-pin fission rate produced by the tomographic inverse problem must be translated to 
the verification parameter of interest: fissile-material concentration. De-tangling the fissile concentration 
from the fission rate must recognize that fission from non-fissile isotopes, most notably 238U, can contribute 
significantly to the total induced fission rate, but the concentration of the non-fissile isotopes is not the IAEA 
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verification parameter of interest. Such a translation can be complex since the fission cross-sections for the 
fissile and fissionable isotopes are highly dependent on incident neutron energy (including resonance 
structures and threshold reactions), and the neutron energy spectrum varies by pin location—due to 
attenuation from surrounding pins and attenuation within the pin of interest due to its own fissile loading. 
The methods used to translate total fission rate in a pin into fissile-isotope concentrations in that pin are 
beyond the scope of this paper but are described fully in [11].  
8. Example Performance Prediction Results
In the early rounds of performance prediction studies, only the prompt-fission gamma-ray signal has been 
considered, and a straightforward model-based reconstruction on a pin-by-pin basis was used to bound the 
tomography inversion problem. The primary question to be addressed was: Based on the HGET v1a design, 
the “MOX A” assembly definition, anticipated operator declarations, and simulated prompt-gamma 
signatures, can reasonable statistical uncertainties be achieved for fissile-mass concentration on a pin-by-
pin basis within 1-2 hours? The end-to-end HGET analysis process is shown in Figure 5 for this MOX A 
case study and reflects the discussions in the previous sections of this paper. In the example case-study 
results presented in Figure 6, it is assumed the operator declares the Pu isotopics for each pin  
Figure 5. Overview of HGET performance-prediction methodology (assuming a PWR MOX assembly) that begins with 
forward calculations of induced fission rate (upper left) and culminates in quantification of fissile Pu concentration in 
each pin (lower right). 
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Figure 6. Example results for the determination of Fissile Pu (239Pu + 241Pu) fraction in MOX A, when incorporating 
assembly geometry and Pu isotopics data in the analysis process. Calculated values are based on 2-hour total assay 
time; one-sigma error bars on statistical uncertainty are shown. Dashed lines are the actual fissile fraction (239Pu + 241Pu) 
for the three Pu loading levels. (Note that Pu isotopics are identical for all loading levels). 

The preliminary results shown in Figure 6  indicate that: given a careful system design, a COTS portable 
neutron generator and reconstruction and analysis algorithms that fully acknowledge operator-declared 
information about the assembly, HGET has the potential to verify fissile-mass concentration on a pin-by-pin 
basis in total assay times of approximately 2 hours for a representative PWR MOX assembly. These initial 
performance estimates assumed that assembly type, missing-pin locations and Pu isotopics were accurately 
declared by the operator and incorporated in the analysis process. Under those assumptions, the relative 
standard deviation of the fissile-Pu quantification was less than a few percent for most pins, but approached 
20% for the interior pins. The uncertainty in fissile concentration is small compared to the reconstructed 
contrast for the 11 missing pins. 

9. Summary and Next Steps
While the initial HGET performance predictions presented in this paper are encouraging, they were 
generated using simulated data that does not include background terms, assuming full availability and 
accuracy of declared data for the assembly of interest, and assuming a near-perfect system response 
function in the tomographic reconstruction. Considerably more analysis is needed to more fully understand 
the potential of HGET and its viability for IAEA verification scenarios. The highest priority is the extension of 
the feasibility analysis to LEU, and to LEU with burnable poisons (Gd rods). The case of Gd loading in 
particular is challenging for coincidence counting assay, and the possibility of using the high-energy and 
high-intensity gamma rays from Gd to account for the burnable poisons offers potential advantages for 
HGET in overcoming the burnable poison effects. The performance predictions presented here were 
performed using only the prompt-gamma signature but delayed-gamma signatures become significant as 
the active-interrogation measurement progresses, and could be included in the reconstruction algorithms 
as a smoothly varying time dependent term. Continued study of HGET-specific reconstruction algorithms, 
particularly those that can identify the perturbation patterns created by missing pins and have robustness to 
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imperfections in the system response function (e.g., undeclared or inaccurately declared missing pins), is 
needed. Perhaps most importantly, the HGET viability study needs to move into empirical space. The 
challenges of high-fidelity simulation for this relatively complex active interrogation approach (for which even 
basic cross-section data are not always available), and the inability of simulations to accurately capture the 
background terms that may arise in this active-interrogation scenario, strongly encourage proof-of-principle 
laboratory measurements using a representative tomographic device and objects (e.g., LEU fuel rodlets), to 
benchmark the predictive modeling tools and guide refinement of the nominal HGET instrument design.  
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Abstract: 
Cosmic-ray muon tomography uses naturally-occurring muons to detect the presence of high-Z material 
within shielded containers. The fundamental physics of muon tomography is that the RMS width of the 
deflection angle and/or the lateral displacement of muons within a material is dependent on the Z of the 
material. Muon tomography systems work just like a CT scanner in the medical field that can reveal 
information about the inside of a target. Muon tomography works by measuring the deflection angle and 
or the lateral displacement of each individual muon, and inversely calculates the radiation length of the 
target materials inside the image area. The deflection angle and lateral displacement can be calculated 
from the trajectories of muons, which can be measured by suitably-positioned sensitive detectors. One 
advantage of muon tomography is the super-penetrative ability of the muon, which allows it to image 
large, shielded objects like spent nuclear fuel canisters. Therefore, it is perfect for safeguards 
applications. In this paper, detailed Geant4 simulations have been carried out to investigate the factors 
that will affect the performance of a muon tomography detector for use within safeguards. The capability 
of a Muon Tomography system is successfully demonstrated through this detailed simulation study that 
highlights the image quality achievable and the imaging time required for a spent fuel canister. 
Keywords: muon tomography; multiple scattering; spent fuel canister; Geant4 
1. Introduction
Cosmic-ray Muon Tomography was invented by scientists in the Los Alamos National Laboratory about 
a decade ago[1], which is based on the multiple scattering of muons. It can be used to detect the 
presence of high-Z material within shielded containers by using naturally-occurring muons. There are 
active studies for its application in many areas, such as, detecting high Z materials  in shipping 
containers for border security control[2], examining damaged nuclear reactor cores[3], and other 
applications demonstrated by publications[4-9]. One advantage of Muon Tomography is the super-
penetrative ability of the muon, which allows it to image large, shielded objects like spent nuclear fuel 
canisters.  
The fundamental physics of muon tomography is that the RMS width of the deflection angle and/or the 
lateral displacement of muons within a material is dependent on the Z of the material.  According to the 
Moliere theory[10], the scattering angle distribution follows a roughly Gaussian distribution for the centre 
part and with a rather heavy tail. The width of this Gaussian distribution of scattering angle can be well 
described using the Rossi formula[11], which has the following form, 
𝜎 =
15𝑀𝑒𝑉
𝑝𝛽
√
𝑡
𝐿0
   (1) 
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where σ is the RMS width of the Gaussian distribution, t is the path length, p is the particle momentum,
β is the particle velocity and the L0 is the radiation length (unit in length), which can be described as:  
𝐿0 =
716.4𝑔𝑐𝑚−2𝐴
𝜌𝑍(𝑍+1)ln⁡(
287
√𝑍
)
  (2) 
We can rewrite the equation (1) as, 
𝜎2 = (
15𝑀𝑒𝑉
𝑝𝛽
)
2 𝑡
𝐿0
  (3) 
The equation (3) links the multiple scattering width to the radiation length, which is further dependent on 
the atomic number Z, as can be seen from the equation (2). However, the equation (3) only works for 
single material. In reality, we are more interested in complex materials. Schultz et al. developed a 
relationship between the variance of scattering angle and the radiation lengths for complex materials in 
reference[12], which can be shown as,   
𝜎2 = ∑ (
15𝑀𝑒𝑉
𝑝𝑖𝛽𝑖
)
2 𝑡𝑖
𝐿0𝑖
𝑖 (4) 
From equation (4) it can be seen that the variance of the muon scattering angle equals to the integral of 
the inverse of the radiation length along the muon path. With a large number of muon measurements 
from different angles and different positions, we will get a system of equations. If the variance of the 
scattering angle can be obtained accurately, the radiation length can be inversely reconstructed by 
solving this linear system of equations by using algebraic methods. However, as the muon multiple 
scattering is a stochastic process, we can only directly measure the scattering angle for each muon, but 
we need to know the expected variance of scattering angle along each muon path. To overcome this 
difficulty, Schultz opted to use the Maximum likelihood method for the image reconstruction[12]. They 
first used the Newton method to get the Maximum likelihood estimator, later they developed a Maximum 
likelihood Expectation Maximization (MLEM) method[13]. In reference [12], Schultz also showed that 
the lateral displacement of each individual muon can be used for the image reconstruction, and the 
image reconstructed using both the angle and lateral displacement information has better quality.  
The deflection angle and lateral displacement can be calculated from the muon trajectories, which can 
be measured by suitably-positioned sensitive detectors. Since the muon is a charged particle, there are 
quite a large number of detector techniques can be used for obtaining the muon striking position, such 
as the drift chamber[2], scintillating fibre trackers[14], GEM [15] and RPC detector [16] etc.   
Using the muon tomography technique for safeguards application has drawn considerable interests in 
the recent years[17-20]. This is because it can provide a viable way to verify the nuclear spent fuels for 
deterring potential diversion to plutonium reprocessing, and to monitor the health of casks to prevent 
failures.  Due to the heavy shielding of the spent fuel canisters, techniques like neutron and gamma ray 
imaging are struggling to provide enough information for the above purpose [21]. On the other hand, 
because of the high penetrative capability of cosmic ray muon, muon tomography is the most suitable 
technique for this purpose.   
The first experiment using muon tomography to verify the contents of dry storage casks was carried out 
by Durham et al.[17]. They used a pair of drift detectors to measure a MC-10 dry storage cask from the 
side; their result proved that muon tomography is capable to detect missing fuel assembly. However 
their measurement failed in providing the exact locations of the missing fuel elements because it can 
only produce the integrated density along the measuring direction.  In a recent study, Poulson et al who 
used a cylindrical detector and the filter-backproject(FBP) algorithm for image reconstruction provided 
a clear 2 D horizontal section image of a dry storage cask, where exact locations of each fuel assemblies 
can be identified[20]. However, in their simulation, ideal detector with perfect resolutions is used, which 
is not available in a practical application. In this paper, studies by using a scintillating fibre detector with 
a MLEM image reconstruction method are used to investigate the application of muon tomography for 
the nuclear safeguards. We focused on the study how the detector arrangement will affect the 
reconstructed image, and the effect of the detector resolution on the image quality.  The effects of factors 
like the voxel size, muon number etc. on the image quality are studied in this paper as well.  
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2. Muon tracking detector design
The tracking detectors should be positioned in such a way that the striking positions of incoming and 
outgoing muons can be measured, and subsequently the trajectories can be determined from the 
measured striking positions. Since the cosmic ray muon is isotropic in azimuth and falls off 
approximately with (cos(theta))2, where theta is the angle from the zenith[20], an optimal detector set 
up will require to have a 4pi coverage to order to be able to detect muons for all possible directions.  For 
the application in the dry storage casks, we assume that it is difficult or impossible to put detectors 
directly above and below the casks due to the heavy weight of the casks and the casks have circular 
shape in the horizontal sections, therefore, a cylindrical detector that fits around the outside of the cask 
will be ideal. However, it will be difficult to construct such a cylindrical detector, because it needs curved 
detector elements. The cost to build such a system will also be prohibitive.  Instead a pair of planar 
detectors which were placed on the opposite sides of the imaging volume will be more cost effective 
and easier to build. However, a planar detector with limited width can’t cover the whole range of
azimuthal angle, therefore such a system has to be operated in several azimuthal angles separately to 
cover the whole angle range. 
The planar detector has four modules, the effective area of each module has a size of 2.8 m by 4.2 m. 
For each planar detector module, there are two orthogonal layers of tracking elements.  While the 
cylindrical detector has only one circular module with two rings of detectors. The inner ring has a 
diameter of 2.8 m, while the outer ring has a diameter of 3.4 m. The position of the detect relative to the 
dry storage cask can be find in figure 1. 
Figure 1: sketches of the planar and cylindrical detector systems. 
3. Geant4 simulation
To verify the effectiveness of the detector system and to optimize the design, detailed Geant4 simulation 
have been carried out. Geant4 is a scientific software tool-kit which is developed by CERN[23]. It has 
been widely used in the high energy, nuclear and accelerator physics, as well as studies in medical and 
space science areas. In the past, we had compared the Geant4 simulation results with the experimental 
results for the performance of our muon tomography prototype detector[14]. Our results show that the 
Geant4 simulation agrees very well with the experimental results. Therefore, using Geant4 simulation 
to verify the detector design is technically reliable. 
Plastic scintillator fibres with various diameters from 2mm to 32mm are used in the simulation. These 
scintillator fibres are placed in the grooves made on the Rohacell plate which is rested on aluminium 
plates for further support. The technique for making the plastic scintillator fibres detectors for use for the 
muon tomography application can be found in reference [14]. 
For the planar detector system, to cover the whole azimuthal angle range, the detector system has to 
be rotated by a fixed angle step around vertical z axis until it return to its original position, while at each 
angle, a fixed number muon is generated by the muon generator. 
In the imaging volume, a partially loaded Westinghouse MC-10 cask was simulated. In the simulation, 
the MC-10 has a 25 cm thick steel wall, and an aluminium basket to holds the fuel assemblies in the 
centre of the cask. 20 out of 24 of the aluminium basket holder slots filled with pressurized water reactor 
fuel assemblies and leaves 4 of them empty; a neutron shielding layer and 24 fins for heat transfer.  
Each fuel assembly contains 204 fuel rods, 20 control rod guide tubes, and one instrument tube. The 
Cylindrical detector 
Detector 
Module 
1 and 2 
Detector 
Module 
3 and 4 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
609
fuel rods are filled with UO2 and surrounded by a zirconium alloy cladding. The control rods and 
instrument tube were simulated an empty cladding, with no fuel present. The dimensions and geometry 
of the MC-10 cask and the water pressure fuel assembly used in the simulation was found in reference 
[24, 25].   
4. Results
Both the cylindrical detector and the planar pair detector can't cover the full 4pi solid angle, therefore it 
is not possible to detect the incoming and outgoing muon tracks for all the muons that are going through 
the casks; some of the muon will interact with only part/or none of the tracking detectors, therefore were 
ignored by the analysis software. It is estimated that there will be around 4 to 5 million muons passing 
the planar detectors with valid incoming and outgoing tracks in one day. The true momentum is used in 
the image reconstruction for each individual muon.  A MLEM method is applied for the image 
reconstruction. This reconstruction method was detailed in paper[13]. 
The imaging volume is divided into voxels. The x and y dimensions of the voxel are in the range from 5 
mm to 40 mm, while the z dimension is 6000 mm. The reason for using a very large vertical voxel size 
is because there is very little materials variation along the vertical direction for the vertical dry storage 
casks. With a larger voxel, more muon will be gathered in one voxel therefore better statistics can be 
achieved. 
Figure 2: section images for each angular settings, from left to right, the angle steps 180 degrees, 90 degrees, 45 
degrees, 22,5 degrees. 
Figure 3: angular distribution for each angular settings, from left to right, the angle steps 180 degrees, 90 
degrees, 45 degrees, 22,5 degrees 
In figure 2, horizontal section images reconstructed from different planar detector settings are shown. 
From the left to the right the rotation angle steps are 180 degrees, 90 degrees, 45 degrees and 22.5 
degrees. It can be seen that with a 22.5 rotation angle step, the horizontal section image of the cask 
has been correctly reconstructed; all the important features of the cask can be seen. Each individual 
fuel assembly can be clearly distinguished between each other and missing assemblies can be easily 
identified. For the images reconstructed with larger rotation angle steps, there are large distortions. The 
bigger the rotation angle step, the bigger the distortion. The distortion of the reconstructed image is a 
common problem for muon tomography, it often appears as vertical smearing problem, as for most of 
the muon tomography applications planar tracking detector were placed on top and underneath of the 
target. This problem is similar to the limited angle problem in the medical imaging field. In figure 3, the 
azimuthal angle distribution of muons used in the image reconstruction are shown. It can be seen that 
for larger rotation angle steps, the muon angle intends to concentrate in a few directions, while with 
smaller rotation angle step, there is a more uniform azimuthal angle distribution.  
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Figure 4: images reconstructed from data simulated with the planar (left) and cylindrical (right) detectors. 
In figure 4, the horizontal section images of the storage cask are shown for cylindrical detector and for 
a planar detector with a rotation angle step of 22.5 degrees.  It can be seen that both images correctly 
revealed the inner structure of the modelled cask. They looks identical.  In the simulation, the fibre size 
was 2mm.  
In figure 5, image reconstructed with detectors equipped with different fibre size are shown, it can be 
seen , that with the increase of fibre size, the quality of reconstructed image is decreasing slightly.  With 
the fibre diameter of 16mm, the fuels assembly can still be seen. Our study shows that the fibre diameter 
can be further increased to 32 mm, however, the imaging voxel size have to be increased to match the 
fibre size. A larger fibre size can significantly reduce the number of electronics channels, therefore a 
save to the cost, but it also means it lost the ability to see small features.   
Figure 5: image quality vs scintillator fibre size, from left to right, the fibre size are 2mm, 4mm, 
8mm,16mm diameters. 
Figure 6: image quality vs voxel size, from the left to the right, the pixel sizes are 5mmx5mm, 
10mmx10mm, 20mmxmm, 40mmx40mm. 
The voxel size can affect the image quality as well. In figure 6, section images reconstructed with 
different voxel sizes are shown. All these images are reconstructed with the same number of muons. It 
can be seen, that although the main feature of the image can still be seen in the image with a 5mm by 
5 mm pixel size, the background noise can be seen increased dramatically. The image with a 40 mm by 
40 mm pixel size shows the smallest back ground noise. However, further increasing the pixel size, the 
partially occupied pixel elements will reduce the image quality. 
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Figure 7: image quality vs muon number. From left to right, muon numbers are, 1.12M, 
560K,208K,140K. 
In figure 7, the images reconstructed with different muon numbers are shown. It can be seen that with 
the decrease of muon number, the image quality is decreasing. The boundary of each fuel assembly 
can be clearly identified with around one million muons. Missing fuel assembly can be confirmed with 
only a few hundreds of thousands muons with naked eyes.  However, it should be mentioned that the 
above simulation was carried out with the full knowledge of the momentum for each muon. Technically, 
it is very difficult to measure the muon momentum accurately, and cost effective method is needed to 
measure the muon momentum. Without the muon momentum information, high quality image can still 
be obtained with increased muon numbers.  In figure 8, a section images reconstructed with 32 and 6 
million muons are shown, which are reconstructed without using the true momentum information, and 
the data was simulated with a 2 mm diameter fibre.  
Figure 8: image reconstructed with 32 million muons and 6 million muons (from left to right) without 
using true momentum in image reconstruction.  
5. Conclusions
The study about the application of muon tomography for nuclear safeguards is carried out. By 
considering the capability of cosmic muon tomography and the feature of vertical dry storage cask, the 
effect of detectors position and arrangement had been studied. GEANT4 simulations of muon imaging 
of a partially loaded dry storage cask show that missing fuel assemblies can be located with high 
confidence.  This will help determine the diversion of spent fuel assemblies without opening the cask.   
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Abstract: 
At present no validated methods to verify the content of Dry Storage Containers exist. The 
investigation profiting of cosmic muons may constitute a very effective method to detect or exclude the 
presence of spent fuel bundles. The layout of a possible detector and the techniques to provide the 
relevant information are described. A specific proposal to evaluate effects of surrounding radioactivity 
on detector performance is presented.  
Keywords: muons tomography; spent fuel control; muon detectors 
1. Introduction
Cosmic rays at sea level consist mainly of charged elementary particles called muons. Muons are 
produced by the decay of several types of very short-lived elementary particles, created in the upper 
part of the atmosphere by the interactions of  primary cosmic rays, mainly protons or alpha particles, 
with atoms or molecules. Primary cosmic rays originate from galactic processes and thus their flux on 
earth is constant and isotropically distributed. At sea level the muon flux is about 104/m2/minute, with
maximum intensity in the vertical direction and an approximate dependence on the zenith angle θ as
cosθ2. The cosmic muon energy spectrum is quite broad, with an average value of several GeV/c2.
Energetic muons can cross very thick layers of dense materials since they do not undergo nuclear 
interactions. 
The use of the highly penetrative properties of cosmic-ray  muons to explore inaccessible  volumes 
has been proposed in the past [1], [2] and recently many efforts have been produced to demonstrate 
the potential of muon tomography  in many application fields [3],[4]. A detailed review of possible 
applications can be found in [5].  
2. Spent nuclear fuel inspection with cosmic muons
In the particular case of the dry storage containers (DCS), the approach to explore their content can 
profit of different physical processes occurring when muons cross the container. Firstly, since all the 
charged particles travelling in a medium loose energy as a function of the medium density, a fraction 
of muons is stopped inside the container. In addition, depending on the density and the atomic number 
of the crossed material, the muon trajectories undergo detectable deviations from the initial direction 
(multiple Coulomb scattering). These phenomena would give a three-fold information on the content of 
the material inside the hidden volume provided a set of muon detectors could be installed around the 
container. In detail, cylindrical detectors can be placed around the lateral surface of the containers. 
They should measure the position and direction of the muons entering in the container. They should 
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also measure position and direction of the particles that exit crossing the lateral surface of the 
container as shown in Figure1. 
Figure 1:  Sketch of a Muon Tomography station (not in scale) Top and lateral view. 
With this configuration it is possible to know: i) the most probable path of muons that pass through the 
container; ii)  most probable path of muons that should exit from the lateral surface but are absorbed; 
iii) the scattering angle of the passing-through muons.
The first two items contain a complementary information. Indeed the abundance of passing-through 
particles is connected to spatial regions with light material (e.g. air), while the absorbed particles are 
located in correspondence to dense regions. In case of an inhomogeneous material distribution (e.g. 
because a fuel bundle is missing) the first set of data would show an excess of particles with a path 
crossing a large fraction of the light material region. At the opposite, the absorbed particles whose 
trajectory points to the light material region would be less copious, since they have a smaller 
probability to stop inside the container. 
The measurement of the muon scattering angle allows to determine a two or three-dimensional image 
of the container. The image reproduces the spatial distribution of a quantity, the linear scattering 
density, that is roughly proportional to the product of the material density times its atomic number. This 
method requires a complex formalism and noise filtering techniques as described in [6] , [7]. 
In more detail, to obtain a three-dimensional distribution of the material linear scattering density in the 
inspected volume, the space is divided into finite volume elements called voxels. The density is 
assumed to be uniform in the single voxel. It is important to stress that the particular geometry of the 
inspected volume and the well-known shape of the fuel bundles, allow the choice of voxels with 
vertically-elongated geometry. This results in a small size set of voxels, high statistics as regards 
muons per voxel, and low inspection time required. 
2.1. Results with simulated data 
It is possible to produce a realistic simulation of an inspection system and to obtain simulated cosmic-
muon data in a situation similar to the one sketched above. The simulation software chain is based on 
GEANT4 package that is designed for modeling a broad range of particle processes and their 
interaction with matter and it is used in a variety of applications, including High Energy Physics (HEP), 
nuclear physics experiments, astrophysics, space science and medical physics [8]. In the present 
environment, the simulation includes the generation of cosmic-muon spectrum, the description of the 
muon detectors and the tracking of muons through a DCS. Several sets of data can be produced 
simulating different detectors and different containers. For each configuration, datasets with the 
presence of all the foreseen fuel bars and others with missing bars can be produced. 
.  
Using GEANT4, a complete CASTOR®  container with and without a missing bar placed in different 
positions has been simulated. The simulation includes a   cylindrical detector placed around the 
CASTOR, covering its entire lateral surface. The detector is composed by 8 layers of cylindrical drift 
tubes. Figure. 2 shows the top view sketch of the simulated CASTOR.  
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Figure 2:  Top- view of a drift tube detector  placed around a CASTOR®   container with a missing fuel bar. 
Preliminary results about the detection of a missing bar in a CASTOR container, for simulated samples 
corresponding to one to three hours of cosmic-muons data taking, are shown in Figure 3. On the left 
there is the reconstructed CASTOR density average along vertical axis, obtained using absorbed 
muons information. The right image shows the same set of data when muons passing through the 
container are analyzed. The missing bar is clearly visible with both techniques. Given the large size of 
CASTOR containers, comparable or even better results can be reasonably expected for other types of 
containers. These results are based on the simulation of a DCS without any nuclear activity and 
radioactivity emission. In real case, canisters with spent nuclear material emit gamma and neutrons 
that could interfere with the cosmic muons detection. 
Figure 3:  Top-view of the reconstructed CASTOR®  density, averaged over vertical axis, obtained using 
absorbed muon (left) and passing-through muon information ( right). The simulated container has one missing 
bar. 
3. An operative proposal
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While the perspectives of a system based on cosmic-muon tracking used  to provide an effective 
control are encouraging, several concerns could arise from the environmental radioactivity in proximity 
of a DCS and the consequences on the muon detector response.  
3.1. Detector layout for canister inspection 
It has been shown that one of the cheapest way to provide muon detection with good tracking 
capability and large area coverage is based on drift tube technology [9],[10],[5]. 
As sketched in Figure 2, an ideal detector could be realised by several circular  layers of  drift tubes 
surrounding the cylindrical container. Muons crossing  the tubes before entering the container and, if 
not absorbed, after exiting, release with large efficiency a hit in each crossed tube. It is then possible 
to have a good tracking of particles with a hit multiplicity that can be as large as twice the number of 
circular layers.   
However, the presence of an intense radioactivity produced inside the container and reaching the 
detector can induce a number of signals with a frequency and an occupancy that could, in principle, 
spoil the detector performance. To quantify this effect it is necessary to quantify the activity and the 
impact of its components on the detector.  It is therefore not straightforward to clarify this point until 
several details will be available. 
In any case, even if it has been demonstrated that the proposed type of detectors can be operative in 
presence of high radioactivity, the best way to prove their response in problematic environmental 
conditions is to perform a dedicated test.   
3.2. A detector for a dedicated test 
The proposed test consists in producing a small prototype of drift tube detector with a reasonable 
number of channel to measure properly a cosmic muon track and sufficiently light to be moved and 
transported in proximity of a DCS. The detector should be capable to self trigger the data recording in 
the event of a muon passage. Once positioned in proximity of a DCS, the response of the prototype in 
presence of the radioactivity could be easily monitored.  In particular, it could be proved that the 
tracking capability is maintained even with the coincidence of several additional hits induced by photon 
conversion or nucleon interactions in some of the tubes of the detector. 
The design of such a prototype is shown in Figure 4 and consists of 8 layers of 8 drift tubes each for a 
total of 64 channels. Each drift tube is realised with a 50 mm diameter Al tube, 1.5 mm thick and a 
length of 2 meters. The tubes are equipped with a 100 µm anodic wire, connected to a High Voltage
supply (~3000 V), to produce a radial electric field and the necessary multiplication of the charges 
released by incident muons. The collected signal is then amplified  and shaped by the front end (FE) 
electronics and then processed (time digitalization, trigger and remote transmission) by the readout 
block.The tubes are operated with a gas mixture (Ar85%/CO215%) that should not present any safety 
issue.  
Figure 4:  schematic  view of a drift tube prototype detector  (left). A detail of the front-end side of the tubes 
(right). 
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The total size of the prototype, including mechanical supports, would be about 0.6 m x 0.5m x 2 m, 
with a total mass of about 100 kg.  A sufficient  number of tubes have been produced so far by the 
Padova group in the INFN national laboratory of Legnaro (LNL), as shown in Figure 5. To complete 
the prototype, it is then sufficient to assembly the cells and to equip the detector with HV and FE 
electronics and to complete the gas distribution system. A read-out system based on field-
programmable gate array (FPGA) circuits  installed in the detector and remote data transmission to an 
on-line computer is foreseen. The whole electronic chain has been developed for the muon chambers 
produced for the CMS experiment at CERN-LHC [11] and is available to realize the prototype.    
The time needed for an “on site” test would require a couple of days for far (low radioactivity) and near 
DCS data taking. 
Figure 4:  set of 2m long drift tubes produced in LNL INFN laboratory. 
4. Conclusions
The volume reconstruction using cosmic muons represents a promising technique for spent nuclear 
fuel control inside Dry Storage Canisters. It could ensure an effective inspection of the content of 
disposal canisters after closure. Remaining doubts about the detector capability to operate in 
presence of radioactivity can be quickly understood with a simple test in proximity of a real canister. A 
detector prototype for this kind of tests is proposed.     
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Abstract 
Every year, thousands of days are spent by IAEA inspectors in nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) facilities and 
other sites around the world. A large portion of this time is used for carrying out in-field measurements 
by various non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques and for taking environmental samples (ES) and/or 
destructive analysis (DA) samples. Comparably intensive resources are needed to maintain continuity 
of knowledge (CoK) on the verification data collected through these activities by means of a range of 
sophisticated containment and surveillance (C/S) systems. The IAEA collects, authenticates, quality 
controls, maintains and evaluates a large body of verification data and compares them with State 
declarations to support two of the main objectives of safeguards under the State-level concept (SLC), 
that is: the detection of diversion of nuclear material and of undeclared production or processing of 
nuclear material at declared facilities and locations outside facilities (LOFs). 
In recent years, the NFC Information Analysis Section of the Safeguards Department Division of 
Information Management (SGIM-IFC), which is in charge of the evaluation of verification data, has 
been faced with a number of challenges: the first and most demanding is the need to evolve facility-
based evaluation concepts to innovative, consolidated concepts that can integrate different types of 
information and support credible State-level safeguards conclusions, the second is the increasing 
volume and diversification of verification data to be evaluated given static resources, and the third is 
the need to keep abreast of modern methodologies and technologies with a view to ensure optimal 
effectiveness and efficiency.  
This paper reviews the conceptual and methodological issues associated with these challenges and 
the approach that was applied to address them while taking advantage of the corresponding 
development opportunities. It presents the overall strategy adopted as well as the supporting project 
plan and the progress made to date in the related project components, with a special emphasis on the 
implementation of data visualization tools. 
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1. Introduction
The main mission of the IAEA Department of Safeguards is to provide credible assurances that States 
are abiding by their safeguards obligations. Since the safeguards system was strengthened after the 
discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapon programme in Iraq in the early 1990s and its legal authority 
was subsequently reinforced by the additional protocol (AP) in 1997, the nature and sources of 
information collected and evaluated by safeguards experts have extensively diversified and the 
volume of material to be researched has considerably increased. The Division of Information 
Management provides the Department of Safeguards with services of data processing, secure 
information distribution, information analysis and knowledge generation and consists of teams of 
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professionals specialized in the analysis of different types of information plus a team in charge of 
information integration. These specialists play a critical role in the work of the Division of Operations’ 
State evaluation groups (SEGs) in identifying, analysing and consolidating safeguards-relevant 
information from all sources to draw independent, non-discriminatory and soundly based conclusions 
for all States having concluded a safeguards agreement (Fig. 1).  
All-source safeguards-relevant information falls in three broad categories: 
• Information declared by States, which consists in nuclear material accountancy (NMA) reports
and reports submitted to the IAEA pursuant to the AP to the States’ safeguards agreements. 
• Information resulting from verification activities, e.g. results of NDA measurements, DA
samples and environmental samples (ES), seals verification, surveillance review and other
verification activities.
• Information from open sources (OS) such as, for example, media, scientific publications, IAEA
and public databases, trade import/export information and commercial satellite imagery.
Fig.1: All Source safeguards-relevant information analysis – from data to actions [3] 
The organizational structure of the Division of Information Management reflects these categories, 
which correspond to different analytical competencies. Besides the Integration and Coordination 
Team, it comprises four specialized Sections: the Declared Information Analysis Section whose role is 
self-explanatory, the State Factor Information Analysis Section in charge of general OS information 
analysis, the State Infrastructure Analysis Section specialized in geospatial information and satellite 
imagery analysis and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (NFC) Information Analysis Section which collects, 
performs quality control of, stores, and evaluates results from in-field NDA measurements and from 
ES and DA samples to compare them with State declarations. 
This paper will focus on the activities of the NFC Information Analysis Section. Its objective is to 
describe the challenges and opportunities encountered in this area from the evolution of the 
safeguards landscape and concepts, from the need for enhanced efficiency to cope with an ever 
increasing volume of data under static and sometimes reduced resource conditions, as well as from 
the progress made in information technology (IT) and data processing and evaluation methodologies. 
Section 2 below describes the strategy that was developed to address these challenges in a 
consistent, integrated and synergic manner, while utilizing state-of-the art IT tools and innovative data 
analysis and presentation. It will review the progress accomplished to date as well as future 
development plans.   
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2. Verification data evaluation and its evolution under  the State Level Concept
Every year, thousands of days are spent by IAEA safeguards inspectors in NFC facilities and other 
sites around the world. A large portion of this time is used for carrying out in-field measurements by 
various NDA techniques and for taking ES and/or DA samples. Comparably intensive resources are 
needed to maintain CoK on the verification data collected through these activities by means of a range 
of sophisticated C/S systems. The IAEA collects, authenticates, quality controls, maintains and 
evaluates a large body of verification data. In this context, the specific mission of the NFC Information 
Analysis Section, as illustrated in Fig. 2 below is defined as follows: to contribute to the Department’s 
provision of credible safeguards conclusions through the evaluation of verification data from samples 
(ES, DA) and in-field measurements (NDA) and their comparison with State declared information in 
order to detect and deter diversion and undeclared activities at declared facilities and sites. 
Fig.2: Role of verification data evaluation in supporting safeguards objectives under the State-
level concept (example: States with a CSA). 
2.1. ES data evaluation – detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities. 
Fig. 2 shows that the role of ES data evaluation is different from that of NDA and DA data evaluation 
and that it requires different expertise profiles. Its purpose is to confirm that NFC facilities are operated 
as declared, that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in these facilities and, within 
the limits of its implementation modalities, that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities 
in the State as a whole. The principle of ES rests on the premise that nuclear processes release 
traces of nuclear and other material that constitute a signature of these processes and that can be 
transferred to samples collected at appropriate places. The characteristics of materials found on swipe 
samples (e.g. isotopic ratios, association with radionuclides or other elements) are compared with 
those predicted by specialized process modelling tools. Particle analysis methods rely on the detection 
and measurement of individual nuclear material bearing particles on the sample while bulk analysis 
methods involve the analysis of an entire swipe sample - in this case, the analytical results represent 
average values associated with the nuclear material contained within the sample [7].  
ES was implemented in the context of strengthening the effectiveness of the safeguards system 
following the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme in the aftermath of the 1991 
Gulf War. Its feasibility and detective power were established through a series of field trials in the 
context of the Programme 93+2 with the support of Member States. Analytical laboratories that would 
later form the basis of the present international network of analytical laboratories (NWAL) 
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demonstrated their capability to perform the extremely low-level radiochemical and isotopic 
measurements needed for the analysis of environmental samples. The field trials also showed that 
swipe sampling is the preferred method and it is now the standard, although other types of samples 
may be collected according to the technical objective pursued. For example, small quantities of ore or 
other compounds are collected for material characterization as described below.    
Since 1995, ES samples have been taken at locations where IAEA inspectors have access during 
inspections and design information verifications (DIV) and, following the approval of the Additional 
Protocol by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997, ES can be taken at a broader range of locations in 
States where an AP is in force. ES has expanded over the years to include all NFC facility types and 
the number of ES collected increased steadily to reach the current number of up to ~400 samples per 
year. Sub-samples are distributed to the NWAL, which presently includes 21 laboratories in 8 States in 
addition to two European Commission Joint Research Centers and the IAEA safeguards analytical 
laboratory (SAL) in Seibersdorf, Austria.   
ES continues to evolve through scientific and technical developments supported by Member States’ 
laboratories in close collaboration with the IAEA. IAEA International technical meetings are held every 
year, alternatively focusing on bulk or particle analysis, to review technological advances, among other 
objectives, and to discuss potential developments with representatives of the NWAL. For example, 
age dating makes it possible to establish the chronology of certain processes based on the isotopic 
composition of plutonium bearing particles. Age dating of uranium bearing particles based on thorium 
in-growth would require an improvement of the sensitivity of laboratory analyses but is also of high 
interest for potential future applications. Another promising development field is nuclear material 
characterization (aka impurity analysis), which associates samples of ore and other uranium 
compounds with signatures in terms of the trace elements they contain (for example lanthanides). 
These signatures, compared with global databases currently being populated, can be used to 
determine the origin of these materials by applying specialized statistical algorithms. Trace element 
fingerprints can also provide information about processes the material may have undergone. More 
generally, stable chemical elements in nuclear material bearing particles could reveal chemical 
signatures associated to processes such as reprocessing or enrichment. The feasibility and technical 
requirements of such evaluation methods are currently being investigated. An existing routine 
application of impurity analysis is to determine if the purity of the material sampled is suitable for fuel 
fabrication or isotopic enrichment and hence, if it should be subject to nuclear material accountancy 
measures under article 34 (c) of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.). 
Since they have been developed in the wake of the strengthened safeguards system and in synergy 
with the evolution of safeguards concepts in the last decades, ES evaluation processes and 
deliverables are well integrated in the present SLC system. ES evaluation reports are delivered to 
Operation Divisions at both sample and State level according to increasingly performant time targets. 
Weekly performance indicators are regularly issued to monitor the timeliness of the process and the 
number of ES samples evaluated in different categories. The ES evaluation processes are effectively 
and efficiently supported by a state-of-the art ES database, automated report generation tools and 
regularly upgraded expert NFC modelling tools. This advanced IT environment makes it possible to 
compare the characteristics of isotopic species found in samples with those predicted by theoretical 
models and with isotopic species observed at other facilities worldwide. However, the unique expertise 
necessary for ES evaluation is very rare and its application to safeguards requires a long on-the-job 
training period. Therefore, a well-thought-out long-term recruitment and training plan is needed to 
maintain an adequate level of professional capacity and capability in the ES evaluation area. 
2.2. DA and NDA data evaluation – detection of nuclear material diversion. 
For their part, the NDA and DA data resulting from inspectors’ verification sampling plans and 
combined with bulk measurements, i.e. weight and volume measurements, are compared with the 
State’s NMA reports to detect diversion through the material balance evaluation (MBE) process. MBE 
is a complex analytical activity which assesses all quantitative declared information and verification 
results. In particular, at bulk handling facilities (BHF) where material is processed in loose forms 
(gases, liquids, powders) complex measurement systems are needed to establish the flows and 
inventories of material. The conclusions regarding material balances rest on resource-intensive 
statistical and metrological analyses based on the estimation and propagation of measurement 
uncertainties into uncertainties associated to balance statistics in order to determine if the BHF 
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operators’ imbalances and the differences between nuclear material amounts declared by operators 
and measured by inspectors can plausibly be explained by legitimate measurement errors and, hence, 
to conclude on the absence of diversion from these facilities.  
In contrast with ES data evaluation, MBE was developed at a much earlier stage of the safeguards’ 
history and is rooted in the criteria-driven, facility-based approach which has long underpinned the 
IAEA’s conclusions. While MBE principles and methodologies remain generally valid in the framework 
of a State-level evaluation, their scope (previously restricted to material balance areas (MBA) within 
facilities) needs to be expanded to the analysis of the nuclear material flows, inventories and balances 
of the whole State, taking into account the increasing use of random inspection schemes in State level 
approaches (SLA) and the implications for the statistical analysis of data collected according to these 
patterns. In addition to this undertaking, which poses a number of methodological challenges, new 
approaches are needed to optimize the distribution of limited MBE resources, to align them with the 
State-level technical objectives (TO) that are identified through the acquisition path analysis (APA) 
performed by the SEGs and to consolidate and compare MBE results with information from other 
sources. Last but not least, considerable progress was made in the field of IT and statistical 
methodologies since MBE was first developed several decades ago, and the migration of the 
safeguards Departmental IT platform under the Modernization of Safeguards Information technology 
(MoSaIc) project provides a unique opportunity to adapt and evolve methodologies and to integrate 
them into new software tools. 
An additional and stringent practical challenge is to effectively address these development needs 
under a static budget with a small group of statistical analysis professionals whose primary mission is 
to deliver timely input to safeguards approaches, evaluations and conclusions for all States with 
extended NFCs, including a substantial support to priority mandates like the IAEA verification activities 
under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Iran. Furthermore, evolving evaluation 
approaches and processes make it necessary to regularly communicate and collaborate with 
stakeholders within and outside the Safeguards Department through the organization of training and 
liaison actions. A fruitful project to evolve safeguards verification data evaluation must therefore rest 
on a well-structured and synergic strategy, based on a clear long-term development plan and taking 
into account manpower limitations while making the best use of available extra-budgetary support, e.g. 
in the form of Member State Support Program (MSSP) human resources and expertise. The strategy 
implemented by the NFC information analysis Section since its creation in July 2011 and illustrated 
schematically in Fig. 3 is articulated around a set of components whose common objective is to 
promote and provide new types of evaluation reports designed to effectively support the work of SEGs 
in drawing sound safeguards conclusions:   

Fig.3: Organization and components of the NFC Information Analysis Section strategy to 
evolve verification data evaluation under the State-level concept 
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Quite evidently, the starting point of any strategy, as represented in the top of the diagram 
is to ensure sufficient human resources (HR) both in terms of manpower and expertise. 
The first implementation phase of the project therefore consisted in rebuilding a team of 
competent statistical data evaluators after the Safeguards Department capability and 
capacity in this field had virtually vanished following retirements and rotation of long-
standing specialized staff. This was achieved through an extensive recruitment and training campaign 
completed in 2013 and 2014. However, maintaining adequate staffing, based on a regularly reviewed 
succession plan, remains a continuous effort, given the current shortage of adequate expertise on the 
world market. 
In order to address the methodological component of the project and to foster new ideas, 
a biennial Technical Meeting (TM) on Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards was 
initiated to establish an overview of the methodological landscape in this field, gather 
worldwide expertise in addressing current gaps and questions, draft recommendations 
and build a network of specialists to remedy the lack of internal resources by identifying 
potential MSSP support tasks. The first meeting was held in Vienna in October 2013 and detailed 
recommendations were prepared around the high-level structure represented in Fig.4 below, which 
distinguishes to establish an overview of the methodological landscape in this field, gather worldwide 
expertise in addressing current gaps and questions, draft recommendations and build a network of 
specialists to remedy the lack of internal resources by identifying potential MSSP support tasks.. 
Fig.4: Three high-level interconnected methodological development areas as identified during 
the 1st TM on Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards (Vienna, October 2103).
Considerable progress, described in numerous publications [10], was made to date in the first two 
areas (uncertainty quantification and random verification schemes) and led to the preparation of 
several new safeguards technical reports (STR), thanks to extensive MSSP support in the form of cost 
free experts (CFE) and individual support tasks. The next phases planned include the harmonization 
of uncertainty quantification terminology between safeguards partners (evaluators, facility operators, 
laboratories) in preparation of the periodic review of international target values (ITV -2020) as well as 
a methodological consolidation of random inspections schemes. These topics will be the focus of the 
3rd TM in October 2017. On completion of the prerequisite methodological work on uncertainty
quantification and random verification schemes, the final phase will consist in reviewing and upgrading 
data evaluation methodologies which constitute the cornerstone of the overall project. 
In parallel to the methodological review, evaluation processes and procedures are being 
adapted to the Departmental organisation which supports the work of the SEGs under the 
State-level concept. Process improvements were implemented in coordination with 
Operation Divisions in order to optimize both timeliness and quality based on available 
resources. Direct collaboration with inspectors in the framework of State-level approaches 
have significantly increased as well as in-field integration of evaluator expertise through their 
participation in inspections and design information verification (DIV) activities. This has greatly 
improved communication and collaboration between inspectors and evaluators and, in some cases, 
has allowed the resolution of long-standing issues. Quality control (QC) continues to be an essential 
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component of the data evaluation activities and is now implemented both at the level of source data 
and to the evaluation process and the resulting conclusions, by systematic peer-review, and by an 
additional review by inspectors in charge of facilities and States to ensure that all in-field and 
operational information has been taken into account.  
In the context of the re-engineering and integration of safeguards databases and 
software under the MoSaIc project and their migration into the secure integrated 
safeguards environment (ISE), all legacy software that was developed over the last 
decades to support statistical analysis, e.g. sampling plans, verification performance 
evaluation, analysis of DA sample results, and MBE, are also being re-engineered and 
integrated under the Statistical Testing, Evaluation and Planning for Safeguards (STEPS) project. The 
STEPS project is designed to take into account both methodological and best practise developments 
and is expected to substantially increase the efficiency of the evaluation processes through the 
automation of calculations, QC checks and report generation.  
In the framework of the State-level concept, Operations inspectors and safeguards 
analysts need to understand and consolidate conclusions from many different sources of 
information. A structured programme of seminars is organised by the NFC Information 
Analysis Section to ensure effective communication with safeguards analysts from 
different areas and with Operation inspectors. These seminars address the mathematical 
rationales underlying safeguards verification strategies as well as the statistical treatment of the 
quantitative data declared by NFC facility operators and collected by Operations inspectors. Their 
objective is to present the mathematical and statistical methodologies applied in safeguards in a clear 
and progressive way, using a minimum of formalism and with special emphasis on practical examples 
taken from everyday safeguards experience. 
In addition to training and regular liaison with IAEA partners, a valuable measure in 
monitoring the quality of NMA and verification data is a trilateral liaison framework [11] 
with the SRA and facility operators to discuss MBE results for the elapsed material 
balance period, review trends in material balance statistics, investigate their causes and 
agree upon recommendations and possible remedial actions. When available, DA sample 
results from three laboratories (IAEA, SSAC, facility operator) are also examined to identify biases and 
compare analytical uncertainties. Using not only IAEA’s and operators’ measurement results but also 
the SRA’s results can help to investigate the source of significant pairwise differences of DA sample 
results. The cooperation of SRAs and facility operators with the IAEA in the framework of trilateral 
liaison meetings provides a useful mechanism to remedy any issue related to the quality of the 
operator’s measurement systems before it becomes a safeguards concerns, thereby promoting a 
proactive rather than reactive approach. This considerably enhances safeguards effectiveness and 
efficiency since the root cause of NMA issues may be difficult to establish at a later point, when their 
effects on the material balance have reached a safeguards significant threshold.  In several instances, 
yearly trilateral liaison meetings organized between the IAEA, SRA and plant operators have 
noticeably improved the operators’ accounting procedures and/or measurement performance. In 
addition, trilateral meetings considerably improve the communication between safeguards partners by 
fostering direct contacts between IAEA, SRA experts and facility staff specialized in NMA and by 
making it possible to maintain continuity of knowledge on complex technical files in case of rotation of 
responsible staff on all sides. Given their in-depth knowledge of industrial processes, operational 
conditions and accounting systems, nuclear fuel cycle facility operators are often the most 
knowledgeable when it comes to identifying the source of procedural or measurement issues. A 
regular dialogue with them is an important confidence building measure that improves their 
understanding of safeguards objectives and practices and engages them to willingly cooperate in 
ensuring the performance of the facility’s accounting and measurement system. 
As was commented above, the bases for evolving DA, NDA and MBE data evaluation 
reports and designing new report types were laid by the NFC Information Analysis 
Section as a keystone and convergence point since the strategy described in this paper 
was first implemented. However, the deployment of new reports is progressive and 
depends on the development stage of the project components described above. The 
central challenge is to design a concept addressing the complexity of MBE at State level while 
optimizing its effectiveness at detecting diversion and/or misuse at key points of the State nuclear fuel 
cycle. This paragraph describes some of the main guiding principles, i.e. a) evolution from a facility 
oriented approach to a State-level approach b) integration of the Physical Model [8], as a backbone of 
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the method, to support flow analysis and information consolidation; c) use of modern visualization 
tools to extract significant facts and patterns and identify potential inconsistencies in growing volumes 
of data. 
The table in Fig. 5 compares the main features of the new data evaluation reports with the former 
facility-oriented concept:   
Fig.5: Evolution from a facility oriented approach to a State-level approach 
In addition to providing a solution to resource limitations related to internal processes and timetables, 
the highlight of this new evaluation approach is that it is in line with one of the main tenets of the SLC, 
i.e. it addresses specific technical objectives (TO) resulting from the SEGs’ APA and makes it possible 
to focus analytical resources on these TO as opposed to systematically checking a certain number of 
predetermined criteria. For example, while MBE evaluation was performed in the past for BHF holding 
more than one significant quantity (SQ) only, it can now be performed at any facility in agreement with 
the SEG if this is considered relevant to an identified acquisition path. Conversely, although it is 
important to mention that all large BHF will continue to be subject to MBE, the thoroughness of the 
evaluation may be adapted to prioritize analytical resources in case diversion during a given material 
balance period was covered by effective and conclusive measures (e.g. C/S), making MBE redundant, 
or in case the effectiveness of MBE is insufficient (e.g. low detection probabilities due to very large 
material flows/inventories). 
The key principle of the method consists in visually representing nuclear material flows on a backdrop 
structure based on the Physical Model (PM) as shown in Fig 6. It can be outlined as follows:  
• Facilities are represented by boxes grouped according to their function in the State nuclear
fuel cycle (stages of the PM).
• For a period that can be customized by the user, nuclear material flows between facilities are
visualized by solid curves whose colour represents material types and whose width is
proportional to their magnitude (normalized in SQ), which can be read from the tick marks on
the PM separation lines.
• Beginning and ending inventories are represented according to the same scale convention.
• Flows into and out of the States are symbolized by ellipses.
The APAs developed by SEGs identify paths, steps and the corresponding TOs which involve 
diversion or misuse of nuclear material at declared facilities. This makes it possible, as described 
above, to align data evaluation efforts with the results of the APA, taking into account the other 
safeguards measures foreseen by the SLA. In addition, operational links between facilities that can 
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influence specific MBE statistics and their trends are emphasized and integrated in the data 
evaluation. Initial trials performed in collaboration with SEGs demonstrated that the interest of the 
nuclear material flow diagrams underlying this method –referred to as Sankey diagrams1 or “Snakeys”
in reference to their sinuous appearance (Fig.6 below)  - go beyond data evaluation and can usefully 
support the general work of SEGs, inter alia, the APA itself. The method has now evolved from the key 
elements described above to include a number of interactive features which support the current 
Departmental evolution from paper to electronic deliverables. In addition, the original concept is 
designed to integrate other types of relevant information (e.g. APA, SLA as well as ES, NDA and DA 
verification results). It is envisioned that, in future, it could serve as a possible portal to safeguards 
information in a State seen from a nuclear material perspective. 
Fig.6: Snapshot of a nuclear material flow “Snakey” diagram for a hypothetical State 
3. Conclusion
A structured, comprehensive and synergic long-term strategy is implemented by the Department of 
Safeguards’ Division of Information Management NFC Information Analysis Section to evolve the 
evaluation of verification data in order to ensure the integration of its concepts, methods and 
processes into the SLC framework while optimizing its effectiveness in detecting undeclared nuclear 
material and activities and diversion of nuclear material at declared facilities. The present paper 
presents the complementary and mutually supporting components of this strategy, which converge 
towards the promotion and provision of new types of data evaluation reports designed to better 
support the work of SEGs.  
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An essential and innovative feature of this new generation of safeguards data evaluation reports is 
that it utilizes the power of modern IT, which allows interactivity, supports the Department’s evolution 
to secure electronic deliverables and takes advantage of data visualization to complement the limited 
capacity of the human brain to extract useful and relevant information from large volumes of data. 
Fig.7: Data visualization can help analyze and understand large volumes of data 
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Abstract: 
Today’s international nuclear safeguards inspectors have access to an increasing volume of 
supplemental information about the facilities under their purview, including commercial satellite 
imagery, nuclear trade data, open source information, and results from previous safeguards activities. 
In addition to completing traditional in-field safeguards activities, inspectors are now responsible for 
being able to act upon this growing corpus of supplemental safeguards-relevant data and for 
maintaining situational awareness of unusual activities taking place in their environment. However, 
cognitive science research suggests that maintaining too much information can be detrimental to a 
user’s understanding, and externalizing information (for example, to a mobile device) to reduce 
cognitive burden can decrease cognitive function related to memory, navigation, and attention.  
Given this dichotomy, how can international nuclear safeguards inspectors better synthesize 
information to enhance situational awareness, decision making, and performance in the field? This 
paper examines literature from the fields of cognitive science and human factors in the areas of 
wayfinding, situational awareness, equipment and technical assistance, and knowledge transfer, and 
describes the implications for the provision of, and interaction with, safeguards-relevant information for 
international nuclear safeguards inspectors working in the field. 
Keywords: safeguards; inspection; cognition; information 
1. Introduction
In today’s information age, more safeguards-relevant data is available for International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) nuclear safeguards inspectors than ever before. Inspectors are not only responsible for 
an increasing number of nuclear facilities as the number of safeguarded facilities continues to grow 
around the world, but more information about those facilities is available. This increased information 
availability is in part due to enhanced reporting requirements under the Additional Protocol, but also 
due to the unprecedented growth in availability and diversity of open source information. Providing this 
information alone will not support more effective safeguards inspections. More important, for both the 
traditional and emerging sources of information that can be used to support IAEA safeguards 
inspections, is the actionable provision of that information – providing the right information, in the right 
format, at the right time. 
Since at least the 1990s, proposals have been brought forward to provide advanced information 
technology platforms for IAEA safeguards inspectors. Some of these proposals, such as deploying 
Agency laptops with inspectors, have become a reality and now a norm. Other proposals such as the 
integration of mobile touch screen devices like tablet computers or smart phones into inspection 
information collection or documentation, or the use of 3D holographic displays, have been more 
futuristic and less likely to be deployed near-term [for example, references 1, 2, 3]. Meanwhile, new 
software products have been developed or commercially procured by the Department of Safeguards 
to support information collection, analysis, and processing both at Headquarters and in the field [4, 5, 
6, 7, 8]. While these tools appear to have preliminary positive results, there has been little evidence of 
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formal assessments of how these tools impact a safeguards inspector’s or analyst’s cognition of the 
safeguards information being presented. 
In this paper, we will explore unique insights from the cognitive science and human factors 
communities as they apply to international safeguards inspector use of, and interaction with, 
information during in-field activities. To identify the cognitive science and human factors principles 
most relevant for international nuclear safeguards activities, we first catalogued the most common 
safeguards activities conducted in the field. We then documented procedures for commonly used 
equipment or activities, and the information available to inspectors while conducting those activities. 
General categories of safeguards activities included, for example, destructive sampling, visual 
observation, and the use of safeguards equipment for non-destructive measurements of radioactive 
materials. From the catalogue of in-field safeguards activities and their relevant information 
environments, a list of relevant cognitive science and human factors concepts was assembled which 
included the following areas of study: x Wayfinding;x Inattentional blindness;x Situational awareness;x Equipment troubleshooting; andx Knowledge transfer.
In addition to these cognitive science and human factors concepts relevant for safeguards tasks, a few 
common themes were identified that span across safeguards activities, including operation in one’s 
non-native language, exhaustion, stress due to time constraints, and operation in industrial 
environments. While these factors were also considered relevant to effective execution of international 
safeguards activities in the field, their pervasiveness and the difficulty to ameliorate them within 
international safeguards inspection scenarios led to removal from consideration in this aspect of our 
research. 
In this paper, we will describe each of the selected cognitive science and human factors areas of study 
in turn, including a discussion of their relevance to safeguards activities and the current understanding 
of best principles or practices that may influence how to interpret their findings for international nuclear 
safeguards. 
2. Application of Cognitive Science and Human Factors Literature to
International Nuclear Safeguards 
Cognitive science and human factors are scientific fields that study human behavior, activity, and 
learning from two distinct perspectives. For the purposes of this research, cognitive science studies 
human thought, learning, and mental organization related to how individuals interact with and 
understand information related to international nuclear safeguards inspection activities. Human 
factors, on the other hand, studies human interactions with a system (such as a safeguards procedure 
or piece of equipment) and can impact how individuals act in their physical environment based upon 
information they are provided. Thus, both disciplines can provide unique insight into effective and 
efficient means to provide information to international nuclear safeguards inspectors working in the 
field.
2.1. Wayfinding 
Wayfinding is a form of spatial cognition in which people determine where they are in an environment 
and how to navigate to where they want to go [9]. Wayfinding can include navigation by map, 
landmarks, or verbal/written directions outdoors or indoors. 
2.1.1. Wayfinding for International Safeguards 
When safeguards inspectors move from one part of a facility to another, they must rely on their 
wayfinding skills to effectively navigate a nuclear site or facility. This includes both indoor and outdoor 
navigation. For outdoor navigation, inspectors can have access to GPS, maps with landmarks, or 
other aids. But indoors, inspectors rely on a facility map or their own mental map of the facility based 
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on previous experience. Even if they are being escorted by an operator, inspectors should be aware of 
where they are so that they can efficiently go from one area to another within a facility and ensure that 
they are being taken to the correct location. They should also be able to note if routes taken at a site 
or facility appear circuitous or seem to avoid areas that were previously on the regular route (which 
may be cause for follow-up questions). 
2.1.2. Theoretical Background of Wayfinding Research 
Some prior studies have potential relevance for international nuclear safeguards inspections. Several 
studies [10, 11, 12] have attempted to compare wayfinding using paper maps to wayfinding using 
mobile maps or GPS devices. These studies have had mixed results, with some finding that users took 
longer to reach their destinations when using a paper map [11] and others finding that participants 
took longer when using GPS [12]. The generalizability of the results of these studies is limited by 
factors such as small sample sizes [10], small screen sizes on the electronic devices [12], and 
inexperience with mobile maps on the part of the participants [12]. In the years since these studies 
took place, increasing familiarity with mobile maps and GPS among the general population could lead 
to very different results. However, one finding that is likely to hold true is that mobile map users tend to 
have a poorer understanding of the overall layout of the area in which they are navigating [10]. A 
paper map provides participants with an overview of the area, an aspect of navigation that is often 
absent when people navigate using point-to-point directions provided by a navigation app. This finding 
indicates that safeguards inspectors may have very different mental models of a facility if they learn its 
layout by walking through it as opposed to studying blueprints or diagrams. This in turn may influence 
how they navigate through a site or facility and how they notice changes or discrepancies. 
Another area of wayfinding research that applies directly to the safeguards domain addresses indoor 
navigation. This is an area of interest for researchers who are trying to understand how to help people 
navigate through complex buildings, such as hospitals, transportation hubs, or large shopping centers. 
While navigation apps and mobile maps have been widely adopted for outdoor use, these tools 
typically fail for indoor environments, where GPS does not work (due to signal weakness) and 
navigation landmarks such as street names and numbers are absent. Researchers have attempted to 
address these problems by developing indoor navigation systems that use waypoints rather than 
continuous information about a person’s location. For example, Mulloni, Seichter and Schmalstieg [13] 
demonstrated a system that provides turn-by-turn directions from one waypoint to another. In another 
study, Mulloni et al [14] used a similar system in which localization markers were used to help 
attendees navigate during a conference. Trilateralization from Wi-Fi transmitters is also a possible 
solution [see 15]. 
These navigation techniques might be applicable within the safeguards domain to help inspectors 
navigate a complex facility. However, in any application of navigation aids, it is important to note that 
there are substantial individual differences in terms of how people navigate [16]. Indoor navigation 
systems must be designed so that they are robust to individual differences in the users’ spatial abilities 
and navigation preferences. Furthermore, indoor navigational aid deployment would require approval 
and cooperation from the facility operator regarding placement of such markers, maintenance of their 
integrity, and the use of mobile technologies to engage or interpret them. 
2.2 Inattentional Blindness 
Inattentional blindness, also known as “change blindness” or “perceptual blindness”, is the concept 
that the changing of certain stimuli, considered to be in plain sight, is missed by an observer. Studied 
to a relatively large extent within the academic psychological research community, it has sometimes 
been relegated to a status of marginal importance due to the historical difficultly ability of drawing 
practical inferences from the research results [17]. However, human observers’ tendency to miss 
changes that occur right in front of them has been demonstrated repeatedly [18, 19].  
2.2.1 Inattentional Blindness and International Safeguards 
The discovery of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program the early 1990’s led to a shift in international nuclear 
safeguards from the verification of solely the correctness of a state’s declaration, to verification of both 
the correctness and completeness (i.e., no undeclared nuclear activities) of the declaration. This led to 
a change in expectation that safeguards inspectors would become more investigative, and the 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
634
SAND2017-3795 C 
incorporation of multiple visual observation and detection of anomaly tasks required as part of 
safeguards inspection activities. However, inattentional blindness research indicates that even highly 
focused safeguards inspectors may miss key information from their environment. For example, one of 
the most well-known examples of inattentional blindness is from an experiment conducted by Daniel 
Simons and Christopher Chabris [20], in which the researchers documented a sustained period in 
which test subjects asked to count the number of ball passes between a select group of individuals 
failed to notice the presence of someone dancing in a gorilla suit in the scene. The experiment calls 
into question whether international safeguards inspectors focused on one type of data collection in the 
field might inadvertently miss critical information that could indicate anomalous or undeclared activities 
at a facility or site under IAEA safeguards.  
2.2.2. Theoretical Background of Inattentional Blindness Research 
Recent research in the field of inattentional blindness has focused on humans in real-world contexts 
rather than laboratory studies. This research is showing that change blindness occurs often and in 
many circumstances in the real-world. One such study demonstrated that many observers failed to 
notice when a conversation partner was replaced in the middle of a real-life interaction [21, 22]. These 
research efforts have established that attention is needed to see change, and that we possess a finite 
ability to focus our attention on our environment. Therefore, changes to semantically central items in a 
scene are detected faster than changes elsewhere [18] which suggests that we assign preferential 
attention to certain objects based on context [23]. While attention is required for conscious change 
perception, the focus of our attention can change frequently while viewing a scene. If a change occurs 
in the scene, we may miss it despite actively viewing the scene [24, 25].  
Various studies in change detection have shown that only about four items can be monitored at a time. 
This supports other research which implies we possess only one mechanism for the formation and 
maintenance of coherent visual attention, primarily concerned with the perception of objects [26]. This 
research may have implications on how safeguards inspectors divide tasking within an area of a 
nuclear facility in order to limit over-burdening the brain’s visual observation capacity. 
Additionally, scene representation plays a large part in our ability to visually attend to objects, and we 
only attend to what we need from the scene for the task at hand [25], reinforced by our experience 
with the stimuli being viewed. We usually do not need to mentally represent all the objects around us 
at any given time in order to make sense of our environment. Rather, we need only to represent the 
objects, and properties of those objects, involved in a task at hand. Thus it is possible that we operate 
with a dynamic representation of a scene that is highly sensitive to the demands of the current task 
and the expectations of the observer [27]. For safeguards inspectors working in the field, therefore, 
their mental models will appropriately shift between broad site-level understanding and smaller, more 
detailed visual representations needed to complete specific safeguards verification tasks. 
Other studies in inattentional blindness indicate that the amount of knowledge or familiarity an 
individual possesses about the objects in any given scene influences their ability to detect changes to 
that object [28]. For example, social drug users are more likely to detect changes to drug 
paraphernalia in photographs than are non-drug users [29] and American football experts are better 
able to spot changes to football scenes than are novices [30]. This has also been demonstrated 
regarding change detection with people [21], for objects described to individuals about scenes they 
view afterwards [18], and objects of interest to the observer [31]. This means we detect changes much 
more easily for objects we are familiar with or are told are of importance in a particular scene. In this 
context, international nuclear safeguards inspectors would be expected to have higher than average 
change detection capabilities in nuclear facilities they are familiar with, but may still suffer from 
inattentional blindness to changes in a facility when focusing on a specific task or area not associated 
with the change.    
2.3 Situational Awareness 
Situational awareness is the term used to describe a person’s understanding of “what is going on” [32, 
33]. This topic has received considerable research attention over the past three decades because it is 
a crucial component of human performance in any dynamic situation. According to the most widely-
used model of situational awareness, to perform efficiently humans must be able to 1) perceive the 
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important things in their environment, 2) understand them, and 3) be able to predict what will happen 
next [32].  
2.3.1. Situational Awareness for International Safeguards 
The highly investigative and observational nature of international nuclear safeguards activities, 
combined with a potentially hazardous working environment, makes inspector situational awareness 
crucial for their ability to safely and effectively observe anomalous or unusual activities during the 
course of their on-site activities. Inspectors must be aware not only of their current task at hand, but 
the operation of a nuclear facility or site that provides broader context to their safeguards verification 
activities. 
2.3.2 Situational Awareness Theory 
A variety of methods have been employed for improving situational awareness. Experience is a key 
component of situational awareness, with more experienced individuals generally exhibiting higher 
levels of situational awareness [34]. Thus, training and knowledge transfer can directly influence 
situational awareness. The way in which information is presented to an individual also has significant 
impact on situational awareness, which has led to a great deal of research on how to visualize 
information for rapid consumption by the user [35, 36, 37, 38]. 
In general, the design of a system has a substantial impact on situational awareness. A well-designed 
system or tool should present the user with the right information at the right time and in the right format 
to support the components of situational awareness: perception, comprehension, and projection. The 
details of these tasks are often domain-specific, so many researchers have focused on developing 
methodologies for understanding situational awareness within a specific operational context such as 
cyber defense [35], emergency medicine [39] and law enforcement [40].  
Though situational awareness has not been explicitly studies in relation to international safeguards 
inspections, the techniques outlined above could be applied to understanding the components of 
situational awareness for different types of inspection activities. Once these components have been 
identified, new technologies such as data visualizations or enhanced training techniques could be 
developed to improve inspectors’ situational awareness. 
2.4 Equipment Troubleshooting 
Humans interact with systems such as technical equipment on a regular basis, most commonly via 
intuitive action/reaction modes. This is especially true for people who are frequent users of the 
equipment. However, when equipment malfunctions or breaks, use of that equipment can quickly 
become frustrating. User guides are not always straightforward or available, and often require the user 
to know the specific problem with the equipment in order to troubleshoot it effectively. Troubleshooting 
is a form of problem solving in which users “diagnose faulty systems and take direct, corrective action 
to eliminate any faults in order to return the systems to their normal states” [41].  
2.4.1 Equipment Troubleshooting for International Safeguards Equipment 
IAEA safeguards inspectors use a large variety of safeguards equipment depending on the activity 
they will be carrying out in the field, and facility-specific requirements. Some equipment is brought with 
the inspector or shipped from IAEA headquarters, while other safeguards equipment is stored on-site. 
While an inspector might only use a limited number of pieces of equipment for a specific safeguards 
inspection, there are many types of equipment that they might use over the course of their safeguards 
activities at different facilities or for different inspection types. In cases where maintenance is 
scheduled or an especially challenging piece of equipment will be used, a technician may accompany 
the inspector. However, inspectors often encounter equipment failure or malfunction during the course 
of routine use of equipment that they are required to resolve in the field. 
2.4.2. Theoretical Foundations of Equipment Troubleshooting 
Research in novice troubleshooting strategies tends to focus on structured representations of the 
system in which large parts of the problem space can be discounted early on [42]. (This “pruning of 
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the search tree” is much like the selective search carried out by expert chess players.) The 
representation of the system as a functional hierarchy can be used to facilitate their troubleshooting in 
some cases [43, 44, 45].  
Kurland and Tenney posit that documentation provided for troubleshooting can be too difficult for a 
novice to extract, leading to information overload. In other cases, documentation might not be 
available. According to research conducted by Schaafstal [42] and Kurland and Tenney [46], 
challenges facing novice troubleshooters can come from one of two areas: 1) their limited experience 
with and understanding of the system, or 2) lack of a systematic approach in which robust and flexible 
troubleshooting strategies are applied for goal-oriented problem solving. Both Shaafstal et al [42] and 
Jonassen and Hung [41] stress the importance of a training regimen for troubleshooting that includes 
both a systematic understanding of the equipment at hand as well as a system-independent strategy 
for troubleshooting that prevents information overload and ensures a consistent troubleshooting 
approach across systems. For international safeguards inspectors, this will require training both on the 
safeguards equipment the inspectors will use in the field and equipment troubleshooting strategies 
that are equipment-agnostic. 
2.5 Knowledge Transfer 
Knowledge transfer refers to sharing information and experience across different teams or parts of an 
organization [47]. This includes knowledge that individuals or teams have gained through experience, 
as well as routines and procedures that have been developed over time [48]. Institutional knowledge 
resides in many places, including individuals, organizational structures, operating procedures, 
institutional culture, tools and technologies, and in the interrelationships created by combining 
individuals, tasks, and tools [47]. When one team hands off work to another, or when people move in 
or out of an organization, transferring knowledge is crucially important for maintaining continuity. 
Similarly, as new forms of institutional knowledge are acquired, they must be disseminated through 
the organization in order to improve the performance of the organization as a whole.  
2.5.1 Knowledge Transfer for International Safeguards 
Knowledge transfer is a critical component of international safeguards inspection activities, to ensure 
that facility subject matter expertise is passed from experienced to newer inspectors, as well as the 
transfer of information learned from in-field inspection activities from one inspector (or inspection 
team) to another. While most of the research regarding knowledge transfer has related to shift workers 
who have brief periods of overlap, IAEA safeguards inspector knowledge transfer poses a new 
challenge due to the amount of time between inspector visits to a facility. In this case, knowledge is 
being transferred mostly through paper or electronic documentation (though some may occur via in-
person briefs before an inspection). Due to travel time and the potential for multiple inspections at 
different facilities or countries to occur in a single trip, an in-person brief may take place days or weeks 
before visiting the facility. Further, some information may be left at IAEA headquarters with only notes 
taken into the field to avoid potential loss or exposure of sensitive information (significantly increasing 
reliance on memory). 
2.5.2. Theoretical Background of Knowledge Transfer 
Knowledge transfer has been studied in shift work environments, such as manufacturing environments 
[48], hospitals [49], and nuclear power plants [50]. Handoffs between shifts are crucial for maintaining 
continuity and preventing duplication of effort in which different teams are independently trying to solve 
the same problems [48]. Failures of knowledge transfer between shifts have been identified as key 
components in industrial accidents [51, 52] and medical errors [53]. Research on knowledge transfer 
in these domains has identified key strategies that are used to facilitate the handoff of information 
(Patterson et al., 2004) and handoff checklists that could be applied to a variety of domains [52]. 
Face-to-face meetings are often used to transfer knowledge from one shift to the next, but this transfer 
can also occur via boundary objects. Boundary objects are artifacts that support the translation of 
information from one group to another, allowing disparate groups to communicate and work toward 
common goals [54, 55]. Bosua and Venkitachalam [48] explored the use of boundary objects in shift 
handovers. Of the three shift environments studied, only one had a system for codifying knowledge 
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and making it easily available to all shifts. The culture of codifying and transferring knowledge 
facilitated handoffs from one team to the next. 
The safeguards domain shares some features with shift work environments, such as the need to 
transfer knowledge from one inspection team to the next. However, it also differs from shift work 
environments in several key ways. For example, shifts in a hospital setting occur back-to-back, 
allowing different teams to overlap and share information during the transition between shifts. In 
contrast, there may be weeks or months between facility inspections and different teams of inspectors 
may not meet face-to-face. This introduces additional challenges, such as the need for robust 
boundary objects that can adequately transmit knowledge from one team to the next, as well as the 
need to account for changes that may occur between inspections. While international safeguards 
inspectors do complete extensive documentation regarding their in-field inspection activities, the 
format of this information may or may not support effective knowledge transfer between teams. The 
question remains as to how safeguards-relevant knowledge from inspections at a specific site is best 
transferred from one team to the next. 
3. Conclusions
Some of the cognitive science and human factors disciplines related to mechanisms by which 
international safeguards inspectors interact with information in the field are well studied, such as 
interior and outdoor wayfinding using various navigational aids. Others, such as knowledge transfer, 
are well studied in specific situations but do not currently capture significant nuances for international 
safeguards application space. Over the next three years, researchers at Sandia National Laboratories 
will develop and execute human performance experiments on mechanisms for the effective provision 
of information for safeguards inspection-like scenarios. We will seek to measure accuracy, timeliness, 
and situational awareness of test subjects performing safeguards-relevant activities and suitable 
proxies dependent upon the type, quantity, and provision mechanism of information to which test 
subjects have access. In this way, the project team seeks to have both an impact on the state of 
understanding in the cognitive science and human factors fields, as well as provide meaningful and 
actionable results that can be implemented to support international safeguards inspectors working in 
the field. 
4. Acknowledgements
The work described in this paper is funded by Sandia National Laboratories’ Laboratory Directed 
Research & Development office. 
5. References
1. DeLand, S, Blair, D and Horak, K; Mobile Computing for On-Site Inspection; Proceedings of the
Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management; Indian Wells, CA, USA; 2015. 
2. Gastelum, ZN, Henry, MJ, Burtner, ER, Doehle, JR, Zarzhitsky, DV, Hampton, SD, LaMothe, RR,
Nordquist, PL; The Development of an Example Precision Information Environment for International 
Safeguards Use Cases; Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials 
Management; Indian Wells, CA, USA; 2015. 
3. Gastelum, ZN, Brotz, JK, Le, TD, Whalen, RT, Bolles, JC; Proposed Use Cases for Augmented
Reality for Nuclear Nonproliferation Verification and Training; Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear 
Materials Management; Atlanta, GA, USA; 2016. 
4. Steinmaus, K, Norman, C, Ferguson, M, Rialhe, A, Baute, J; The Role of the Geospatial
Exploitation System in Integrating All-Source Analysis; Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the 
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management; Palm Desert, CA,  USA; 2013. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
638
SAND2017-3795 C 
5. Vilece, K, Norman, C, Baute, J, Giaveri,cG, Kiryu, M, Pellechi, M; Visualization of Environmental
Sampling Results at Inspected Facilities; Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear 
Materials Management; Orlando, FL, USA; 2012. 
6. Norman, C, Baute, J, Binner, R, Walczak-Typke, AI, Aillou, F, Zhao, K, Bonner, E; Dynamic
Exploratory Visualization of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Verification Data in Support of the State Evaluation 
Process; Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management; Indian 
Wells, CA, USA; 2015,. 
7. Crowley, J, Gagne, D, Calle, D, Murray, J, Kirkgoeze, R, Moser, F; Computational Methods for
Physical Model Information Management: Opening the Aperture; Proceedings of the 2014 Symposium 
on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and People;  Vienna, Austria; 2014. 
8. IAEA; The Modernization of Safeguards Information Technology: Completing the Picture; 2017.
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/01/mosaic.pdf
9. Raubal, M, Egenhofer, M; Comparing the complexity of wayfinding tasks in built environments;
Environment & Planning B; 25; 1998; 895-913. 
10. Willis, KS, Hölscher, C, Wilbertz, G, Li, C; A comparison of spatial knowledge acquisition with
maps and mobile maps; Computers, Environment and Urban Systems; 33; 2009; 100-110. 
11. Lee, W, Cheng, B; Effects of using a portable navigation system and paper map in real driving;
Accident Analysis and Prevention; 40; 2008; 303-308. 
12. Ishikawa, T, Fujiwara, H, Imai, O,  Okabe, A; Wayfinding with a GPS-based mobile navigation
system: A comparison with maps and direct experience; Journal of Environmental Psychology; 28;
2008; 74-82.  
13. Mulloni, A, Seichter, H, Schmalstieg, D; Handheld augmented reality indoor navigation with
activity-based instructions; Proceedings of MobileHCI; 2011. 
14. Mulloni, A, Wagner, D, Schmalstieg, D, Barakonyi, I; Indoor positioning and navigation with
camera phones; Pervasive Computing; 2008; pp. 22-31. 
15. Shchekotov, M; Indoor Localization Method Based on Wi-Fi Trilateralization Technique;
Proceedings of the 16
th
 Conference of Fruct Association; Oulu, Finland; 2014.
16. Lawton, CA; Strategies for indoor wayfinding: The role of orientation; Journal of Environmental
Psychology;16; 1996; 137-145. 
17. Simons, DJ, Rensink, RA; Change blindness: past, present, and future; TRENDS in Cognitive
Science; Vol. 9; No. 1; 2005. 
18. Rensink, RA, O’Regan, JK, Clark, JJ; To see or not to see: The need for attention to perceive
changes in scenes; Psychological Science; Vol. 8; Issue 5; 368–373. 
19. Simons, DJ, Levin, DT; Change blindness; Trends in Cognitive Sciences; Vol 1; Issue 7; 1997;
261–67. 
20. Simons, DJ, Chabris, CF; Gorillas in our Midst: Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic
Events; Perception; Vol 28; Issue 9; 1999. 
21. Simons DJ, Levin DT. Failure to Detect Changes to People during a Real-World Interaction;
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review; Vol 5; Issue 4; 1998; 644–49. 
22. Levin, DT; Simons, DJ, Angelone, BL, Chabris, CF; Memory for Centrally Attended Changing
Objects in an Incidental Real-World Change Detection Paradigm; British Journal of Psychology; Vol 
93; Issue 3; 2002; 289–302. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
639
SAND2017-3795 C 
23. Kelley, TA, Chun, MM, Chua, K-P; Effects of scene inversion on change detection of targets
matched for visual salience; Journal of Vision; Vol 3, Issue 1; 2003; 1–5. 
24. Williams, P, Simons DJ;  Detecting changes in novel, complex three-dimensional objects; Visual
Cognition; Vol 7; Issue 1-3; 2000; 297–322. 
26. Rensick, RA; Seeing, sensing, and scrutinizing; Vision Research; Vol 40; 2000; 1469 – 1487.
27. Rensick, RA; Change Detection; Annual review of Psychology; Vol 53; 2002; 245 -77.
28. Archambault, A, O’Donnell, C, Schyns, PG; Blind to Object Changes: When Learning the Same
Object at Different Levels of Categorization Modifies its Perception; Psychological Science; Vol 10; 
1999; 249–255. 
29. Jones, BT, Jones, BC, Smith, H, Copley, N; A Flicker Paradigm for Inducing Change Blindness
Reveals Alcohol and Cannabis Information Processing Biases in Social Users; Addiction; Vol 98; 
2003; 235–244. 
30. Werner, S, Thies, B; Is ‘Cange Blindness’ Attenuated by Domain-Specific Expertise? An Expert-
Novices Comparison of Change Detection in Football Images; Visual Cognition; Vol 6; 2000; 163–173. 
31. Shore DI, Klein, RM. The Effects of Scene Inversion on Change-Blindness. Journal of General
Psychology; Vol 127; Issue 1; 2000; 27-43. 
32. Endsley, M R; Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems; Human Factors; Vol
37; 1995; 32-64. 
33. Endsley, M; Theoretical Underpinnings of Situation Awareness: A Critical Review; Situation
Awareness: Analysis and Measurement (Eds. Endsley, M, Garland, D); Erlbaum; Mahwah, NJ, USA; 
2000; 3-32. 
34. Underwood, G, Ngai, A, Underwood, J; Driving Experience and Situation Awareness in Hazard
Detection; Safety Science; Vol 56; 2013; 29-35. 
35 D'Amico, A, Kocka, M; Information Assurance Visualizations for Specific Stages of Situational 
Awareness and Intended Uses: Lessons Learned; IEEE Workshop on Visualization for Computer 
Security; 2005; 107-112. 
36. Feibush, E, Gagvani, N, Williams, D;  Visualization for Situational Awareness; IEEE Computer
Graphics and Applications; Vol 20; Issue 5; 2000; 38-45. 
37. Kim, YJ, Hoffmann, CM; Enhanced Battlefield Visualization for Situation Awareness; Computers &
Graphics; Vol 27; Issue 6; 2003; 873-885. 
38. Toet, AI, Jspreert, JK, Waxman, AM, Aguilar, M; Fusion of Visible and Thermal Imagery Improves
Situational Awareness; Displays; Vol 18; 1997; 85-95. 
39. Sapateiro, C, Antunes, P; An Emergency Response Model toward Situational Awareness
Improvement; Proceedings of the 6
th
 International ISCRAM Conference; Gothenburg, Sweden; 2009.
40. Datcu, D, Lukosch, S, Lukosch, H,  Cidota, M;  Using Augmented Reality for Supporting
Information Exchange in Teams from the Security Domain; Security Informatics; Vol 4; 2015. 
41. Jonassen, DH, and Woei H; Learning to Troubleshoot: A New Theory-Based Design Architecture;
Educational Psychology Review; Vol. 18; No. 1; 2006; 77-115.
42. Schaafstal, A, Maarten, J, van Berlo, M; Cognitive Task Analysis and Innovation of Training: The
Case of Structured Troubleshooting; Human Factors; Vol 42; No. 1; 2000 75-86. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
640
SAND2017-3795 C 
43. Bereiter, SR, Miller, SM; A Field-Based Study of Troubleshooting in Computer-Controlled
Manufacturing Systems; IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics; Vol 19, 1989; 205–
219.
44. Egan, DE, Schwartz, BJ; Chunking in Recall of Symbolic Drawings; Memory and Cognition; Vol 7;
1979; 149–158. 
45. Rasmussen, J; Information Processing and Human-Machine Interaction: An Approach to Cognitive
Engineering; Elsevier; Amsterdam; 1986. 
46. Kurland, LC, Tenney, YJ; Issues in Developing an Intelligent Tutor for a Real-World Domain:
Training in Radar Mechanics; Intelligent Tutoring Systems: Lessons Learned (Eds Psotka, J, Massey, 
LD, Mutter, SA); Psychology Press; Hove, UK; 1988; 119–180. 
47. Argote, L, Ingram, P; Knowledge Transfer: A Basis for Competitive Advantage in Firms;
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes; Vol. 82; 2000; 150-169. 
48. Bosua, R, Venkitachalam, K; Fostering Knowledge Transfer and Learning in Shift Work
Environments; Knowledge and Process Management; Vol. 22; 2015; 22-33. 
49. Kerr, MP; A Qualitative Study of Shift Handover Practice and Function from a Socio-Technical
Perspective; Journal of Advanced Nursing; Vol. 37; 2002; 125-145. 
50. Patterson, ES, Roth, EM, Woods, DD, Chow, R, Gomes, JO; Handoff Strategies in Settings with
High Consequences for Failure: Lessons for Health Care Operations; International Journal for Quality 
in Health Care; Vol. 16; 2004; 125-132. 
51. Lardner, R; Effective Shift Handover: A Literature Review; Offshore Technology Report - Health
and Safety Executive OTO; 1996. 
52. Wilkinson, J, Lardner, R; Pass it on! Revisiting Shift Handover after Buncefield; Loss Prevention
Bulletin; Vol 229; 2012; 25-32. 
53. Cook, RI, Woods, DD, Miller, C; A Tale of Two Stories: Contrasting Views of Patient Safety;
National Health Care Safety Council of the National Patient Safety Foundation at the AMA; 1998. 
54. Star, SL, Griesemer, JR; Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and
Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology; Social Studies of Science; Vol 19; Number 
3; Issue 1907-39; 1989; 387-420. 
55. Trompette, P, Vinck, D;  Revisiting the Notion of Boundary Object; Revue d'Anthropologie des
Connaissances; Vol 3; 2009; 3-25. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
641
The forward-problem approach in Safeguards verification: directly 
comparing simulated and measured observables 
S.Vaccaro1, I. Gauld2, M. Vescovi3, H. Tagziria4, 
A. Smejkal1, P. Schwalbach1 
1European Commission, Directorate General Energy,
Directorate Euratom Safeguards, Luxembourg
2Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN, USA
3iScience, Milan, Italy
4European Commission, Directorate Joint Research Centre,
Directorate Nuclear Safety & Security, Ispra, Italy
Abstract: 
Physical verification by NDA in nuclear safeguards implies typically the adoption of an inverse-problem 
approach. This is, indeed, the definition of a problem, in which we use physical observables to deduct 
other physical quantities, which in our case are contained in the operator’s declaration. A typical 
example is the Plutonium mass, measured using Pu isotopics and neutron coincidence doubles 
counts, linked to the Pu 240 effective mass by a calibration.  
An alternative approach has been recently proposed and is now close to the in-field deployment by the 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate of European Commission's DG ENER. In fact, the detailed 
knowledge of the physical processes that are taking place in the sample and within the detector allows 
computing the amount of the measured observable, by modelling the physical system as it results from 
the operator's declaration, in a forward-problem approach. 
The present paper describes the first two examples of the forward-problem approach’s application to 
actual real-life safeguards verification. The first example deals with a Monte-Carlo-based modelling 
tool that has been developed to enable the inspectors to perform an improved verification of fresh fuel 
assemblies by neutron coincidence collar (NCC), taking into account the growing complexity of the 
fuel's design. The second example shows how the verification of spent fuel is improved regarding the 
false alarm rate and the partial defect detection capability, by the integration of the automated review 
package iRAP and the modelling by the Oak Ridge transmutation code (ORIGEN).  
The potential applications of the new approach are not limited to the two described in this article, 
which, however, represent relevant proofs of concept of the potential that a change of perspective in 
verification by NDA may generate. 
Keywords: NDA, Forward problem, Spent Fuel, Fresh Fuel, ORIGEN, Neutron Coincidence Collar
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1. Introduction
In 2017, Euratom Safeguards celebrates its 
60th anniversary – the legal being the Euratom 
Treaty, signed in Rome on March 25, 1957. 
During this long history, a number of field 
practices, approaches and methods have been 
developed, consolidating Euratom inspectorate 
position as one of the reference institutions in 
the international Safeguards community.  
An essential component of the conformity 
controls, which allow the inspectors to draw 
independent conclusions, is the Credibility 
Control, linking the declarations by the nuclear 
operators to the physical reality, as observed 
by the inspectors. The physical verifications, 
that the inspectors carry out in order to perform 
a credibility control, often consist in the 
measurement of physical quantities, related to 
the declared nuclear material properties, by 
Non-Destructive Assay (NDA).  
The advantage of NDA measurements is the 
possibility to perform the necessary 
verification, without excessive interference with 
the operator's industrial process and without 
alteration of the nuclear material under assay, 
its physical form or its container. However, one 
drawback of NDA methods is the not always 
obvious interpretation of discrepancies, 
because of an imperfect estimate of 
measurement uncertainty, especially caused 
by the difficult quantification of uncertainty in 
the instrument calibration. Moreover, for the 
measurement methods used in NDA 
verification, an appropriate metrological 
traceability is made impossible by the non-
existence of reference materials of the same 
type, quantity range and physical form of the 
samples to be measured. 
The growing availability of technologies 
allowing high performance calculations, since 
the late 1990s, has allowed tackling these 
limitations of the NDA methods, by using 
physical-model-based simulation to define the 
instruments' calibration, starting from a 
detailed knowledge of the physical system 
defined by the instrument, the sample and by 
their mutual interactions. In this perspective, 
although modeling was used to overcome 
some of its limitations, simulation did not 
change the traditional calibration approach, 
relating an observable physical quantity (for 
instance, a neutron or gamma count rate) to 
the values of the quantity of interest (for 
instance, the quantity of nuclear material). 
More recently, a further step has been taken, 
by using real-time simulation to predict directly 
the observable physical quantities, which are 
then compared with the measurement results 
[1][2]. This different forward-problem approach, 
has allowed overcoming some limitations of 
the traditional calibration approach in 
particularly complex cases. The following 
paragraphs will describe its consequent 
practical and conceptual implications. 
2. Inverse and Direct problems:
definition and application to
Nuclear Safeguards
Measurements
During verification, as in every measurement 
operation, we establish a relation between two 
different abstract spaces.  One, which we 
define as Model Space ( M), contains all the 
knowledge we have from the physical system, 
defined by a set of parameters including the 
information contained in the operator 
declaration. The other abstract space, which 
we define as Data Space (D), consists of the 
data from the observable quantities.  
The general measurement problem is defined 
by the following relationship: 
𝑑 = 𝑮(𝑚) 
where 𝑑 ∈ D , 𝑚 ∈ M and G is a generic 
operator linking explicitly the observed data 
and the model parameter. 
In other terms, the general measurement 
problem is about establishing a relationship 
linking the causes (the physical theory leading 
to the model parameters) and the effect (the 
observed data). As shown in Figure 1, the 
direction we choose interpreting this link 
determines whether we are dealing with a 
direct (forward) or with an inverse problem. 
The inverse problem approach will be, then, 
the one starting from the measured data (e.g. 
correlated neutron flux) to determine one or 
more unknown parameters (e.g. fissile material 
mass and/or isotopic composition) defining the 
physical system under observation. Those 
parameters subject to verification are thus not 
measured directly, but they are rather the 
result of inversion algorithms solving complex 
equations, deriving the unknowns from the 
measured observables. 
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of direct and 
inverse problems 
The inverse problem approach will be, then, 
the one starting from the measured data (e.g. 
correlated neutron flux) to determine one or 
more unknown parameters (e.g. fissile material 
mass and/or isotopic composition) defining the 
physical system under observation. Those 
parameters subject to verification are thus not 
measured directly, but they are rather the 
result of inversion algorithms solving complex 
equations, deriving the unknowns from the 
measured observables.   
Figure 2 schematically represents the inverse 
problem, in the specific case of nuclear 
safeguards verification: the measured data go 
through a model, in order to deduct the 
unknowns, which are eventually compared to 
the declared values in the verification phase. 
One of the implications of this process is that 
measurement uncertainties on the initial 
observables need to be propagated throughout 
the inversion model, which is not trivial from 
the mathematical point of view.  
Sometimes, to simplify the model, assumptions 
like "infinite thickness" of the samples need to 
be taken or the model is replaced by empirical 
calibration curves. These latter suffer from a 
critical drawback: the Certified Reference 
Materials of the same type (i.e. in size, weight, 
matrix, fissile mass, package form) do not 
exist; therefore, selected samples from the 
operator's facility are used for calibration. In 
this way, measurement's metrological 
traceability not directly possible (sometimes 
indirect traceability can be established, e.g. by 
help of destructive assay of samples). 
Interpreting discrepancies in the verification 
results is then only possible with the 
intervention of experts in the specific 
measurement technique, who are able to 
assess uncertainties including knowledge from 
additional information sources. 
Moreover, the inverse problem can represent a 
case of ill-posed problem in the sense of 
Hadamard [3], where the well-posedness 
conditions are that 
a. A solution exists;
b. The solution is unique;
c. The solution's behavior changes
continuously with the initial
conditions.
In particular, we can immediately understand 
why the condition b. is not met in a simple 
practical case: two fuel assemblies with 
different 235U masses, but different location of
burnable poison rods, may give the same (i.e. 
statistically comparable) double neutrons count 
rate, if measured in a thermal-mode neutron 
collar. In this case, thus, the solution of the 
observed data inversion is not unique.  
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the inverse 
problem as applied to nuclear safeguards 
verification. 
On the other hand, the choice of a forward 
problem approach would start from the 
modeling of the physical system involved in the 
measurement, where the quantities of interest 
(e.g. fissile material mass/isotopic composition) 
become parameters of the model. As shown in 
Figure 3, the operator's declaration will then 
identify specific values of the mentioned 
parameters, while the model will predict the 
observable's quantities under these specific 
conditions. The verification phase will then 
consist in the direct comparison of the 
measured versus the predicted observables. 
The whole verification task becomes, in this 
way, a typical hypothesis testing exercise, in 
which a predicted quantity undergoes a direct 
comparison with its experimental value, under 
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the hypothesis defined by the operator 
declaration.  
 
We can then observe that a forward problem 
approach avoids the most difficult aspects of 
the mathematical inversion (deconvolution 
algorithms, non-unique solution, experimental 
error propagation), which are no longer needed 
in the verification task. At the same time, using 
the same set of information available and the 
same set of data, the credibility of the 
verification conclusion is not affected. Even in 
a forward-problem approach, though, one can 
still postulate other operator declarations that 
could result in the same or similar predicted 
quantities (within measurements and model 
uncertainties). However, we have to keep in 
mind that the primary task of the inspectorate 
is to verify the declarations provided by 
operator, not necessarily role to develop the 
declared parameters independently.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the forward 
problem as applied to nuclear safeguards 
verification. 
 
 
3. Euratom field-ready inspection 
tools using a forward-problem 
approach   
 
Euratom Safeguards directorate makes use of 
Monte Carlo modeling in several deployed 
instruments, thus overcoming the issues with 
lack of reference materials and metrologically 
traceable calibration standards [4][5]. The 
improved computing capabilities and some 
specific verification issues have recently 
suggested that a forward problem approach 
with real-time simulation can improve the 
current verification practices. Clearly, every 
model needs to be appropriately benchmarked 
against well-characterised reference materials.  
 
3.1. XFuelBuilder tool for Fresh LWR 
Fuel verification 
 
Fresh fuel verification by Neutron Coincidence 
Collar (NCC) poses difficulties, in particular 
due to the increasing optimization of fuel 
performance, resulting in greater complexity of 
fuel design. In particular, fuel producers 
optimize the fuel assemblies by the use of 
strategically located burnable poison-enriched 
rods and by pins that have a variation in 235U 
enrichment both axially and radially in the 
assembly. 
 
In order to allow the inspectors to cope with 
this complexity, European Commission's Joint 
Research Centre and iScience have developed 
for Euratom Safeguards inspectorate 
XFuelbuilder, a tool based on the Monte Carlo 
simulation of NCC measurements. 
XFuelbuilder is in fact a software package, with 
a user friendly graphical interface, that allows 
the inspector to prepare a MCNP-PTA input in 
a simple visual way and then run the 
simulation of the fuel + collar physical system. 
 
XFuelbuilder includes already the built-in 
models of the NCCs used by Safeguards 
inspectorates, both in thermal and fast mode 
configuration. The inspector can retrieve a 
stored assembly model or add a new pin or 
assembly design. Once chosen the collar type, 
the fuel design and the collar position along the 
fuel's active length, the inspector can run the 
simulation, thus obtaining the Reals, the 
Accidentals and the Totals as he or she would 
do in any neutron measurement. These values 
are then easily compared with the measured 
data, acquired by NCC assay of the assembly. 
Figure 4 describes the data flow of the whole 
verification task. 
 
XFuelbuilder, choosing a forward-problem 
approach, is not affected by the already 
mentioned ill-posedness of the NCC 
verification problem and will be a user friendly 
tool for the inspector. At the same time, it is 
capable to integrate many of the declared fuel 
details in the verification itself. Moreover, this 
approach is going to improve practical aspects 
of NCC verification, usually needing a passive 
measurement before the active one, in order to 
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take into account for the 238U spontaneous 
fission correlated neutrons. While this two-
phase process obliges the inspector to deploy 
and remove the source and is a practical limit 
to the possibility to make such measurements 
as unattended, in XFuelbuilder both induced 
and spontaneous fission are taken into 
account. Then only the active measurement 
needs to be done, thus giving the inspectorate 
the possibility of unattended measurements. 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4. Screenshot and data flow of XFuel Builder 
 
3.2. iRAP-ORIGEN method for 
improved Fork detector measurement 
results evaluation 
 
Spent-fuel is one of the big challenges for 
NDA. In fact the high neutron and gamma 
activity from irradiated assemblies make it 
extremely difficult to measure and quantify 
fissile material in a simple and direct way. 
Although some promising methods may 
address this issue in the future [8], the FORK 
detector is at present the workhorse for the 
verification of fuel in preparation of 
intermediate/long term or final, geological 
storage, where recovery (and re-
measurement) is practically not possible. In 
FORK detector verifications, safeguards 
inspectors measure the neutron and total 
gamma fluxes from an irradiated fuel assembly 
to check its consistency with the declared burn 
up, initial enrichment and cooling time of the 
assembly itself.  
 
 
 
 Figure 5. Data flow of an iRAP-ORIGEN 
Verification 
 
 
Euratom Safeguards is presently field testing a 
data evaluation tool [9][10], based on the 
integration of the review code iRAP (joint 
development of Euratom and IAEA) and the 
ORIGEN code (Oak Ridge Isotope 
GENeration), part of the package SCALE 
developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
[11]. The iRAP-ORIGEN integration has been 
developed and improved under various Action 
Sheets on the EC-US DOE agreement in the 
field of nuclear material safeguards R&D.  
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 The iRAP-ORIGEN tool allows, on the one 
hand, to process unattended FORK 
measurements, extract the assembly neutron 
and gamma signature. On the other hand, a 
simulation combining an ORIGEN irradiation 
and depletion calculation, using the operator's 
declarations as input data, and a Monte Carlo 
computed detector response function compute 
the expected values of the same signature. 
The data flow of the complete process is 
explained in  
 Figure 5. 
 
This tool has already proven to be accurate in 
in taking into account the factors, which may 
influence the neutron and gamma signatures of 
spent fuel (e.g. cooling between irradiation 
cycles, within-assembly neutron multiplication). 
iRAP-ORIGEN is also ready for unattended 
measurements evaluation and is proving 
particularly inspector-friendly in installations 
where remote data transmission is available. 
The tool helps inspectors and operators 
making the data reception from the operator, 
the measurement and the evaluation a fast and 
seamless process, minimizing risks of clerical 
errors and false alarms, reducing the need for 
re-verification and provides better timeliness 
for inspectors. 
Finally, still remaining a rather simple and 
limited technique, this improved version of 
FORK measurements is complementary to 
other techniques, aimed at the assembly 
integrity verification, like tomography [13], or 
aimed at other types of fuel characterization, 
like Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) 
[8].  
 
4. Conclusions 
A forward-problem approach, consisting in 
real-time simulations using declaration data as 
parameters in a model that predicts directly 
measured observables, may be helpful in 
nuclear safeguards NDA verification, especially 
in cases where calibration can hardly take into 
account the complexities of the specific 
sample. 
 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate, in 
partnership with research institutions such as 
the European Commission's Joint Research 
Centre and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
has already developed tools, which are ready 
to bring this hypothesis testing approach into 
every day's inspection activities. The first two 
application fields are the verification of fresh 
LWR fuel by Neutron Coincidence Collar and 
the verification of irradiated fuel assemblies by 
FORK detector.  
 
The forward-problem approach is also an 
opportunity for resource optimization, as it can 
be very well integrated in a remote data 
infrastructure, which allows performing the 
computational part of the verification at the 
headquarters.  
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Se s s ion 1 5   
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Cont ai nment  and Sur vei l lance S yst ems – 
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Abstract: 
Euratom Safeguards is currently implementing in the field the Next Generation Surveillance System 
(NGSS), close to 700 units are to be installed in the next years. 
This paper deals with the time after NGSS. It is time to design the technology that follows, to discuss 
the requirements for containment and surveillance systems in a broader sense, to study the very 
volatile general technical environment and select options for further development. 
With the growth of the security markets, with the advent of autonomously driving cars, with increasing 
threats in cybersecurity, with the appearance of more intelligent, smart sensors using various physical 
technologies beyond optical vision, opportunities can be envisaged and analysed for applicability. This 
may allow more efficient and effective safeguards implementation, and ideally, could contribute to an 
opening of the market and help reducing cost.  
At the same time, a growing number of facilities particularly at the back end of the fuel cycle turn static 
and new facility types appear. These pose their own challenges and may call for revised inspection 
approaches utilizing non image based sensors. 
K e yw o rd s:  Containment and surveillance, remote transmission 
1 . I ntr oduc ti on
Inspectorates are constantly being challenged with decreasing funding, personnel, inspection days 
and mission budget and therefore need to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards 
activities. At the same time, new equipment must be developed to replace old technologies which 
have come close to their end of life cycle. 
In order to make safeguards more effective and efficient, we need to increase the number of sensors 
connected together with an intelligent and automated event extraction. The “integrated Review and 
Analysis Program” (iRAP) is a joint development project by IAEA and DG-ENER with constantly 
increasing functionalities [1]. Adding the automated data transfer using techniques such as RADAR 
and Rainstorm is building a very cost-optimized solution.  
Could we not in the (near) future have even more unattended equipment in place, which observes the 
processes transmitting relevant data to a local storage? Automated processes could identify events 
and assist the nuclear inspectors to confirm declared operations and to analyse situations that are 
potentially safeguards-relevant. The unattended systems could be based on a combination of 
dedicated components and OEM modules. 
The above scenario would require a larger amount of unattended sensors that have the capacity to 
transmit data automatically to a central store. Today’s nuclear safeguards  uses an increasing amount 
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of unattended systems, primarily surveillance cameras and a few other connected devices deployed in 
enrichment and reprocessing facilities [2]. 
An integrated review tool, correctly configured and where relevant data is provided, is able to extract a 
list of relevant events and provide, if necessary and available a limited-sized video sequence over the 
time of the events. The strength of such a tool is the efficiency with which the inspector would work, 
i.e. the activity of the inspector is focused on the events and not on all the time in between events. 
With a constantly increasing threat from cyber-attacks, new safeguards tools must be able to 
seamlessly follow the latest advancement in cyber security to ensure the authenticity of all safeguards 
relevant data and be able to handle future cyber-attacks. 
The valid lifetime for dedicated safeguards equipment is very long because the development time and 
validation process of new devices is both long and expensive. The development of new equipment 
from idea to final fully functional system can take 5 to 10 years, sometimes even longer. Often, 
safeguards equipment cannot be updated, changed or replaced because other comparable or better 
equipment neither exists nor can be developed in a reasonable amount of time. 
Whenever new safeguards equipment is designed, it is necessary to consider future technology trends 
and synergies with other industrial branches. By thinking out of the box, one can potentially gain 
strengthened detection capacities and effectiveness. 
Where allowed by the operator and local authorities, the devices can send data to headquarters or 
local site-offices without interaction from inspectors or technicians. The data can be processed 
automatically and benefits can be identified both for inspectors but also for operators and state 
inspectorates. With this in mind, the future safeguards tools must enable secure remote data 
transmission and centralized control. 
2 . Ne x t Ge ne ra ti ons  S ur ve i l l a nc e  S ys te m  (NG S S )
The NGSS is currently deployed in large scale substituting old DCM-14 cameras and other 
commercially available systems such as FAST/NICE. The output video stream files from the camera 
can be handled by both the Safeguards review station GARS, by iRAP but also by new emerging 
video-review tools such as VideoZoom [3] or, in its most basic form, any MPEG enabled video-
application. NGSS implements important features such as multiple asymmetric crypto-keys for 
authentication, enabling joint-use and third party installation and maintenance. 
The primary components, i.e. the imaging sensor and the processing DSP, acquire the images and 
implement scene-change detection. This detection capacity means that the camera can by itself react 
to scene changes, tag the event and change the image storage frequency. The camera can also 
trigger and/or be triggered by external sources via electrical interfaces. 
The subsequent video review tool can list all events that have been detected by the scene-change 
detection and that have been triggered via electrical or network-based connections. In some cases 
NGSS still returns large amounts and long sequences of video data. Generally, it is a very time-
consuming task for the inspectors to perform an efficient and effective analysis of long video-streams. 
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3 .  I nnova ti ve  S e ns or s  for  S a fe guar ds  S urve i l l a nc e  s ys te m s  
 
When considering a future generation of surveillance systems, what kind of additional tools and 
sensors can be added? Since the time from an idea to final deployment is very long, it is now time to 
start thinking of a successor for NGSS. Currently, the commercial market is designing new 
generations of advanced sensors that did not exist some years ago. Some sensors, which may be 
essential for safeguards in 10 years from now, have potentially not even been launched commercially. 
 
The design of a future safeguards surveillance system should consider commercially available or open 
modules while keeping the global aim of a robust system with long term guaranteed operational 
lifespan in mind. Finding adequate devices may be very challenging because of the special conditions 
in which safeguards equipment operates and the requirement thereby put on them. Still, new 
emerging tools, sensors and OEM platforms could be part of a new generation of safeguards systems. 
 
Apart from the basic CMOS/CCD light sensitive sensor, what additional sensors could be of interest to 
design the future system? A list drawn today cannot be fully comprehensive, since future intelligent 
sensors are not known. Trying to answer the question, we can start with a few sensors that appear in 
existing nuclear safeguards equipment, which could also be of interest in a modular sensor system. 
 
3. 1. LI D AR sensor s  
 
Lidar (Light Detection and Ranging) is a sensor which uses electromagnetic waves in the near- or 
visible spectra to measure distances. These sensors have the capacity to measure the near 
surrounding in 3 dimensions. They have already entered into the consumer market and the first smart-
phones equipped with solid-state sensors with active light enabled 3D capacity are commercially 
available [4]. 
 
How would this help future surveillance systems? In the area of design information verification/Building 
Technical characterization (DIV/BTC) or containment verification, LIDAR technology is already a key-
player. Several nuclear safeguards systems use these sensors to draw conclusions; Static 3D 
scanners are used for accurate change detection [5] and mobile scanning equipment is used for large 
scale mapping/change detection and for indoor-localization[6]. 
 
But what can they do for a Surveillance system? As previously mentioned, video-review is a crucial but 
fairly time-consuming activity. A large amount of image sequences may be visualized to identify 
declared activities and an inspector must maintain focus to potentially also find what not searched for, 
i.e. potential non-declared activates.  
 
A safeguards surveillance system combining LIDAR and optical cameras could be designed in such a 
way that an event is triggered whenever something physically happens in a pre-defined area of 
interest. One could neglect changes in the image-scene such as shadows, light changes etc. and 
concentrate on actual movements. 
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F i g u re  1 :  Left: Image of Interim storage pond in La Hague, France (image from Areva Webpage), 
Right: concept pond with green baskets under surveillance and red arrow indicating daily  
movement of equipment with traversal crane. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows a surveillance image and a schematic drawing of a spent fuel pond. The surveillance 
camera is placed to overlook the stored bins where no changes are to take place. The allowed 
movement of the traversal crane with a bin-carrier introduce changes in the camera image. The crane 
will also introduce small waves which make the reflection of illumination to flicker on the water surface. 
In such a situation, an image-based scene change detection will have difficulties to perform well.  
 
By introducing a 2D or 3D based laser scanner we do not need to rely only on the camera image. The 
additional sensor will map in Cartesian dimensions a plane parallel to the water surface above the 
bins; and any interference with a device, rod or traversal crane can be detected and consequently an 
image sequence event can be stored. There are several other examples where an added proximity 
sensor would assist and provide robustness, efficiency and effectiveness to a safeguards camera. 
 
3. 2 Radi at i on sensor s 
 
Both neutron and gamma detectors are playing an important role for triggering a safeguards camera 
when relevant scenarios occur. Most probably, future safeguards cameras would integrate such 
sensing capacities and, based on need, assist in the triggering of events. 
 
3. 3 O t her  sensor s 
 
Considering that we discuss future technologies, why not broaden the concept? Many commercial 
sensors (e.g. pressure gauges, noise sensors, scales, temperature and pyroelectric sensors and ID-
readers) could be of interest. And last but not least, the sensors which are not even commercially 
available yet. 
 
 
4 .  I ntr oduc i ng the  c onc e pt of a  “Re m ote  Sa fe gua r ds  De vi c e ” 
 
Some basic requirements apply to any unattended safeguards device installed in a nuclear facility: it 
must be able to withstand power-outages for days, store data locally and have tamper-proof 
enclosures. It also needs to support secure remote transmission and control.  
 
A future remote safeguards device should have a modular design where a ‘core module’ implements 
the basic capabilities. One or more sensors can be connected to the core module and placed in the 
tamper-indicating housing. As discussed above, the new design should be able to handle future 
sensors within some reasonable limit. 
 
In figure 2, the blue box lists the capabilities of the core module that are required for the installation in 
a nuclear site. All the functionalities for command and control exists; a modular CPU for decision 
making and logics, exchangeable memory module, battery-backup, remote communication for control 
and data-extraction.  The core module must be equipped with a state-of-the-art protection for cyber-
attacks as well as configurable encryption logics for digital encryption and data-authentication. Other 
modules needed for the execution, i.e. the ‘extra sensors’, are added as needed via a pre-defined 
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electrical, logical and physical interface. This enables a concept where several sensors can interact 
within the same tamper-proof enclosure as a single smart device. 
 
From a maintenance point of view, the concept should allow an external actor to perform on-site 
activities. An installation of a pre-configured device and basic maintenance such as battery-change 
and memory-card substitution should be allowed by design. This would mean that safeguards 
organizations significantly could reduce mission costs and manpower. It would also be a clear benefit 
for the operator, which would not need to plan, organize and host visits on the site. 
 
 
 
F i g u re  2 :  Schematic design of a new base unattended system  
with capacity to attach sensors using an internal interface 
 
 
For sure, the imaging sensor will in most cases be used to enable an ‘inspector’s eye’ in case of 
events. But the core modules could also be used as a future remote data acquisition module in an 
extended RADAR architecture.  
 
Ideally, the design is based on existing components that are offered openly by the electronics industry 
or where intellectual property rights (IPR) can be guaranteed for nuclear safeguards. A realistic 
scenario would probably be to use a dedicated and optimized inner core component together with 
added outer OEM or semi-commercial components. By using an existing open operating system and 
maintaining an open architecture, we would meet the nuclear safeguards community concerns and 
requests regarding IPR and cost-optimizations. This would demand a high level of cooperation and 
openness between a few major players in the design and potential development phase.  
 
4. 1 How  t he concept  f its i nt o curr ent and f ut ure r em ot e dat a t r ansm i ssi on par adi gm 
 
The ever-increasing need and request for remotely connected devices lead to the concept for unified 
approaches. Both remote transmission of data from device to headquarters or local servers can be 
implemented with this modular architecture. Streamlining the remote transfer enabling a Rainstorm [7] 
connection in the core module would immediately enable the strength of a compressed and adaptive 
network connection to a large amount of devices. 
 
Once implementing the remote connection capacity with the core module, all systems will inherit the 
same communication interface and thereby unify both data transfer and control logics. 
 
Figure 3 shows the data transfer scheme for a site that has several connected systems based on the 
concept device. As seen, different devices can connect to remote transmission software with 
standardized means for data transfer or optionally connected to data consolidators like RADAR. In 
cases where there is no remote transmission available, data can be hand-carried using digital 
memories. 
 
The same concept for unification applies to control and command. An established unified way to 
communicate state of health and to read/update configuration can be implemented in the common 
core module which greatly simplifies control software. 
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F i g u re  3 :  The concept safeguards surveillance system in a future remote data transmission scenario. The blue 
arrows show the direction of data-transfer. The red lines indicate flow of command and control. 
 
 
4. 2 Concept usage 
 
Future safeguards will require future technologies and new ideas. Currently, the safeguards 
community is facing new challenges such as an increase in dry storages and geological repositories. 
New sensors and systems are entering the arena that need to be managed regarding both installation 
and configuration but also related to remote data and status transmission.  
 
This happens at the same time as efficient work-procedures are under discussion. Remote safeguards 
with less mission days as well as more effective inspections are requested. 
 
The remote devices installed should generate a minimal footprint in volatile memory for normal 
situations, but when an event can be identified, higher framerates, more information and extended 
datasets can be accepted. The only issue is, who is deciding what is an event and when does it 
happen? 
 
Sam p le  ca se 1:  
If we can detect an object physically entering an area of safeguards interest, we would robustly be 
able to consider this as a safeguards relevant event. For a safeguards camera, adding a 2D/3D laser-
based proximity sensor, we would achieve a more effective analysis following an efficient posterior 
review. Such system in the new concept would be based on a combination of an imaging sensor and a 
2D/3D sensor. 
 
Sam p le  ca se 2:  
In a transfer hall or loading cell, observation of loading events is requested. The presence of nuclear 
material would be detectable with either a small gamma or neutron detector. By coupling the presence 
of nuclear material to the imaging sensor, we would achieve a very powerful surveillance system 
within a single tamper-proof case enabling effective and efficient posterior image review where events 
would reveal relevant movements. 
 
Sam p le  ca se 3:  
Monitoring dry-storage casks in a spent fuel storage is a fairly static operation. Very few or no 
movements occur over long periods. In this case, potentially no imaging capacity would be needed. 
Why would we need to generate video-files that show a static scenario? Instead, a 2D laser would be 
able to monitor the casks and in case movements occur; an item tracking file could be extracted. An 
optional still image could be acquired to document the event. Furthermore, adding a radiation sensor 
could add essential information to an event data set. 
 
Sam p le  ca se 4:  
Pressure, temperature, light, pyroelectric, weight, position, item counters, ID readers or other sensors 
already applied to a material-process by an operator could be used to confirm a normal operation. The 
sensor data could be bypassed in a core module with copy functionality as described by Thomas et. Al 
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[8], where the data transmission is read but not logically interfering with the data flow. The data copied 
would then be authenticated and transmitted accordingly. 
 
Sam p le  ca se 5- :  
Today we might not care for sound, ambient temperature and light sensors or other currently not 
known sensors. In the future, there may be the need for a combination of such sensors. We cannot 
design and implement the future sensors but we can to as large degree as possible make space for 
them and allow a smooth integration into the future generations Remote Safeguards Device. 
 
 
 
 
F i g u re  4 :  The base unattended system with a few conceptual sensors and there indicated use-cases. 
 
 
Figure 4 describe in a single image a few realistic sensors and their indicative use which can be part 
of a future toolbox of devices ready to be deployed in the field when deemed necessary. The Orange 
boxes define a few sensor architectures which could be relevant. The green boxes briefly describe the 
potential use of such configurations. 
 
 
5 .  S um ma r y 
 
The development of a new safeguards device is a long process and it is therefore time to start the 
discussion of a post-NGSS safeguards surveillance system. In this paper we introduce the concept of 
a Remote Safeguards Device which would be a modular device with the capacity to host different 
sensors in a tamper-proof case. We have identified core features that are needed for any future device 
such as remote transmission, effective and clever decision making. We propose that the common 
features are implemented in a core module which can be extended with one or more sensors 
according to the needs of the specific use case.  
 
The design should be open and based – as much as possible – on COTS and open-source 
technology. The proposed concept could increase safeguards efficiency and effectiveness as it would 
reduce time and costs of the development; facilitate sensor integration and remote monitoring; and 
reduce the inspector’s workload for routine activities. In order to design a new safeguards device a 
large amount of preparatory work is needed. This paper proposes a new concept and further analysis 
and discussions are needed. 
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Abstract: 
This paper describes the current issues related to sealing devices in the German on-site spent fuel dry 
storage facilities (SFSFs) and investigates options for improving techniques in order to achieve better 
radiation protection and occupational safety during safeguards verification of spent fuel casks stored in 
SFSFs.  
In the context of Germany’s energy transition, the eight still operating reactors will be successively 
disconnected from the power grid by the end of 2022 at the latest. The nuclear material of all power 
reactors has to be removed prior to decommissioning of the reactor building. The defueling of reactors 
increases the handling operations at these sites especially by the temporary higher number of cask 
loadings. Accordingly, the number of transfers of these loaded casks (dual purpose: transport and 
storage casks) from the reactor to the SFSF will further increase as well. By end of 2027, it is foreseen 
that all spent fuel assemblies will have been loaded into casks. After their transfer to SFSFs, the 
SFSFs will have a static inventory of more than 1,000 casks, because no receipts or shipments are 
expected following the final reactor shut down. The spent fuel packed in casks will be stored in interim 
dry storages for several decades until a repository for heat generating high level waste is available. 
The casks may be difficult to be accessed; especially the seals attached at the protection plate on top 
of the approx. 6 meter high casks. A seal verification that involves the replacement of the seal will 
require more time and will lead to a higher radiation dose for both inspector and storage staff than 
easier in-situ verification or seal verification by remote data transmission (RDT). Given this situation 
optimization of safeguards concepts and sealing systems devices applied is needed. Solutions are 
required to ease the verification of the casks and to minimize the exposure of the inspectors and 
storage staff.  
Keywords: spent fuel management, spent fuel storage facilities, sealing systems 
1. Introduction
Following the nuclear accident at Fukushima in March 2011, the German Government decided to 
immediately shut down eight of the 17 operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) and to completely 
phase out the use of nuclear energy for electricity production. The decisions have a significant impact 
on spent fuel management in Germany. After shut-down of another reactor in 2015, the eight 
remaining NPPs will be successively taken from the power grid by the end of 2022 at the latest. On 23 
July 2013, The German Federal government entered an Act into force on the site selection process for 
a deep geological repository for high level radioactive waste, including spent fuel assemblies and 
vitrified waste [1]. This act does not specify a specific host rock type but it determines a selection of a 
final repository site until 2031. The repository site selection procedure should be transparent and 
science-based. Potentially suitable areas should be narrowed down, step y step, on the basis of 
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scientific criteria for the best possible safety for a period of one million years. Furthermore, the 
selection procedure includes public participation. A commission was set up to prepare the site 
selection procedure and in July 2016, the commission submitted a final report including their 
recommendations for the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag). [2] The recommendations of the 
commissions were included in the Act on the further development of the site selection act, which 
entered into force on 16 May 2017 [3]. 
The site selection will be followed by the licensing procedure for the construction, operation and 
decommissioning of the repository. The decision of phasing out the production of nuclear energy 
provides some safeguards challenges in Germany. The defueling of reactors has a major impact on 
the time schedules and frequency of spent fuel handling operations in reactors, storage facilities and 
their associated safeguards activities. Due to the defueling of the reactors the amount of cask 
transfers dramatically increases. Therefore the need for long-term reliable unattended Safeguards 
(SG) measures must be put in place to preserve the continuity of knowledge (CoK).  
This paper describes the current issues related to sealing devices in the German on-site dry spent fuel 
storage facilities. The Research Centre Jülich set up a project on this issue. The next step in this 
project is to investigate options for improving techniques in order to minimize the radiation exposure of 
the inspectors and storage staff as well as occupational safety for verification of spent fuel casks 
stored in SFSFs.  
2. Spent Fuel Storage Facilities in Germany
Due to the defueling of reactors, the number of transfers of loaded casks (dual purpose: transport and 
storage casks) from the reactor to the SFSF are increasing. Accordingly the spent fuel cask 
inspections for safeguards are also rising. 
By the end of 2027, all spent fuel assemblies are foreseen to be loaded into dual purpose casks. Once 
the transfer of all loaded casks to the SFSFs is complete, the SFSFs will have a static inventory of 
more than 1,000 casks because no receipts or shipments are expected following the final reactor shut 
down. Germany’s former plan to store spent fuel in central dry storage facilities at Ahaus and 
Gorleben had to be abandoned due to the prohibition of spent fuel transports on public traffic routes. 
In this context, 12 new decentralized on-site interim dry storage facilities were constructed and 
licensed for the storage of spent fuel assemblies. The assemblies are loaded in dual purpose casks 
for transport and storage - CASTOR® V-casks. The licensed storage period of all German SFSFs is 
limited to 40 years beginning with the emplacement of the first spent fuel containing cask in the 
storage building. The licensed mass of heavy metal (HM) in the on-site dry SFSF varies between 450 
Mg and 2,250 Mg and amounts to 3960 Mg (Ahaus) and 3800 Mg (Gorleben). The storage capacities 
of the on-site dry SFSFs range between 80 and 192 CASTOR® V-casks [7].  
The construction of the 12 on-site dry SFSFs is based on three different concepts: the STEAG, the 
WTI and the tunnel concept. They were constructed as storage halls from steel concrete (at the 
Neckarwestheim site in the form of storage tunnels). The STEAG concept has been applied at six 
North German sites at Brokdorf, Krümmel, Brunsbüttel, Grohnde, Lingen and Unterweser. The WTI 
concept has been applied at the five sites at Biblis, Philippsburg, Grafenrheinfeld, Isar and 
Gundremmingen located in the southern part of Germany. The tunnel concept at Neckarwestheim was 
developed as a special solution due to site-specific conditions [4]. 
In addition to the two central SFSFs and the twelve on-site dry storage facilities, two local interim dry 
storage facilities at Greifswald (ZLN) and Jülich are operated in Germany [4]. 
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STEAG Design: 
The design characteristics of the STEAG concept (designed by the company STEAG encotec GmbH) 
include a one-nave building with thick concrete structures (Figure 1). The wall thickness is about 1.2 m 
and the roof thickness is about 1.3 m. The gap between each cask in X-direction is approximately 55 
cm [4]. 
Figure 1: SFSF built as STEAG Concept [4] 
WTI Design: 
The WTI concept (designed by the company of consulting engineers Wissenschaftlich-Technische 
Ingenieurberatung GmbH) is a two-nave building with two separate storage halls; the wall thickness is 
around 0.85 m, respectively, and the roof thickness about 55 cm (Figure 2). The gap between each 
cask in X- direction is approx. 50 cm [4]. 
Figure 2: SFSF built as WTI Concept [4] 
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Tunnel Design: 
The tunnel storage was designed to the specific on site geological conditions. The facility consists of 
an entrance building, which is arranged aboveground, two tunnel tubes running parallel in east-
western direction, which are connected at their ends by a tunnel, and an exhaust air system and an 
escape construction (Figure 3). The gap between each cask in X-direction is approx. 44 cm [4].  
Figure 3: SFSF built as tunnel concept [4] 
The dense packing of casks can be seen on the three layouts of the SFSFs. Due to this arrangement; 
casks cannot be moved between other casks without more ado. Cask movements over the other 
casks are not allowed. If a cask has to be transferred into the maintenance room (located inside the 
entrance area), all casks in the rows in front of this cask have to be transferred individually to a buffer 
area first in order to allow the movement of the selected cask. 
3. Safeguards Implementation in German Spent Fuel Storage Facilities
The IAEA has drawn the ‘broader conclusion’ for Germany in March 2009 for the first time. The 
implementation of integrated safeguards started with in 2010. This was also the starting point for 
implementing integrated safeguards in the German SFSFs. Since the IAEA concluded on the absence 
of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Germany, the safeguards objectives changed. The 
requirements to timeliness for spent fuel verification and detection probability were lowered; the 
quarterly routine inspections were replaced by randomly performed inspections with a short notice of 
24 h and a probability of occurrence of 20 percent in a given facility. The inspection-interval for 
physical inventory verification (PIV) continues to take place annually. 
Regarding the long-term storage of spent fuel in SFSFs, any safeguards inspection plan for the dry 
interim storage should be ruled by two main aspects. First, CoK of the nuclear material flow by C/S 
measures from the reactor to the storage facility and during the storage period should be maintained. 
Second, verifying the nuclear inventory of the casks by counting and identification should involve an 
evaluation of the C/S system and, as a back-up, non-destructive-analysis (NDA) measures on the 
CASTOR®-casks as appropriate in the hypothetical worst case where all safeguards measures, seals 
and surveillance fail [5, 8]. In order to avoid this worst case, different sealing systems are applied for 
cask sealing in combination with camera surveillance.  
For states under integrated safeguards, such as Germany, the IAEA requires maintaining CoK during 
transport of CASTOR® V-casks to their storage position and during their long term storage. Due to the 
inaccessibility of the nuclear material during interim dry storage, casks loaded with spent fuel should 
be under dual containment and surveillance (C/S). In order to meet this requirement, two independent 
sealing systems using different physical principles are applied by IAEA and EURATOM during long-
term storage, mostly supplemented by surveillance. Three different types of sealing systems (see 
Table 1) are currently used at German SFSFs.  
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Code Equipment name Description/ 
Application 
CAPS Cap seal 
(metallic) 
Cap seal is used with 
several types of contain-
ment. After removal the 
verification of seals is only 
possible at IAEA Head-
quarters. 
Cobra Fibre optic 
general purpose 
seal  
Fibre optic seal; reflective 
particles incorporated in the 
seal body provide unique 
identifier; in situ verifiable 
EOSS Electronic optical 
sealing system 
Reusable seal consisting of 
a fibre optic loop and 
electronical seal. Light 
pulses monitor the loop, 
and every opening and 
closing of the seal is stored 
in the seal. A dedicated 
reader is used to verify the 
seal.  
Table 1: Sealing Systems used in German SFSF [6] 
The loading and transfer of CASTOR® V-casks is not always as straight forward as desirable due to 
the drying process necessary before the seal can be applied. The residual moisture in the cask has to 
meet special criteria and the time needed to reach these criteria is difficult to predict. Practical 
experience shows a range from 10 to 100 hours. To avoid inspectors having to remain on-site or on-
call while the casks dry, the IAEA and EURATOM proposed an approach to delegate the task of 
applying the seals to the operator when the inspectors are not present. After the spent fuel has been 
loaded into the cask the operator provides the cask sealing by using the COBRA seal, the electronic 
seal EOSS and the EOSS seal interface. This procedure is recorded by installed safeguards video 
surveillance. The EOSS seal interface guides the operator through the sealing procedure and confirms 
its successful termination as a storable message. [7]. Casks that were sealed by the operator in the 
reactor and transported to the storage facility are there verified after finishing the loading campaign by 
the two inspectorates of EURATOM and IAEA; at the same time the EOSS seals are replaced by 
metal seals or Cobra seals. Some SFSFs use Cobra seals as group seals. In one SFSF individual 
CASTOR casks are sealed by COBRA seals and additionally groups of those casks are connected by 
a single EOSS seal as a group seal.  
5. Discussion and Outlook
The verification of sealing systems currently used at German SFSFs is a very arduous and time 
consuming task due to the spatially limited storage configuration. 
Seal verification or seal renewing that involve the replacement of the seal on the top of the casks lead 
to a higher radiation dose for both inspector and storage staff than the easier in-situ verification or seal 
verification by RDT. Work safety rules do not allow unsecured movements between casks and thus 
enforce time consuming positioning of persons for each cask separately. Near the casks the radiation 
level is higher than elsewhere. The principle guideline for radiation protection „As Low As Reasonably 
Achievable“ (ALARA principle) calls for a reduction in the duration of stay in this environment as far as 
possible. Efforts should be made to minimize the dose rate for inspectorate and staff in this area for 
example by using RDT systems. 
At present, apparently no convincing approach for safeguarding of static SFSF in the long run exists. 
Given this situation, there is an urgent need to optimize the safeguards concept and to tailor the 
sealing devices to the specific conditions of an interim SFSF in a static operation. Solutions are 
required to ease the verification of the casks and to minimize the exposure of the inspectors and 
storage staff. Therefore, it is important to review suitable current and future sealing systems as well as 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
662
alternative available technologies, such as laser based systems or neutron monitors, and evaluate 
pros and cons of their application to safeguarding spent fuel storage casks in the German SFSFs. 
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Abstract: 
A sealing system has been designed by JRC/ISPRA in cooperation with ABACC and the 
IAEA in order to account for the difficulties in accessing spent fuel located in lower layers 
of spent fuel ponds. 
The system consists of mechanical parts with an ultrasonic seal as containment measure 
combined with a surveillance system. The objective of the sealing arrangement is to 
maintain continuity of knowledge on nuclear material stored in the lower racks of the 
spent fuel ponds by preventing undeclared removal of this material. It will also introduce 
advantages by lowering the re-verification requirements at Physical Inventory 
Verifications (PIVs) and in case of surveillance failure. 
For this application, ultrasonic seals have the necessary characteristics since they are 
designed to be attached underwater, they are very resistant to harsh environments like 
storage pools, they are easy to apply and they can be regularly verified. The verification 
of ultrasonic seals does not involve the replacement of cables or seals, thus improving 
inspector’s productivity and decreasing the burden on the plant operator. 
A six-month field trial will be conducted at the spent fuel storage at the Central Nuclear de 
Atucha 1 (CNA1) – Presidente Juan Domingo Perón, after which ABACC and the IAEA 
will be able to assess whether the system meets the necessary requirements for 
safeguards use. 
The overall impact on safeguards is discussed through a general approach to this facility. 
The key components of a possible safeguards approach that considers the 
implementation of this specific ultrasonic design are also briefly discussed. 
Keywords: Nuclear Safeguards, International Cooperation, Ultrasonic seals, Containment 
System, Spent fuel storage. 
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1. Introduction
The Central Nuclear de Atucha 1 (CNA1) is an on-load refuelling Pressurized Heavy Water 
Reactor (PHWR), where the spent fuels are stored in a closed packet way, in two layers at the 
storage pool, not allowing an easy way to verify the entire pool when it becomes necessary. 
More specifically, in case of fuel element verification, the accessibility of nuclear instrumentation 
to the lower layer of spent fuel is very complex and time consuming. 
One way to maintain the Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) on the nuclear material at the spent 
fuel pond is to apply surveillance and containment measures at racks where these fuels are 
stored. It is important to guarantee that ABACC and IAEA maintain the CoK over multiple layers 
of the spent fuel storage with application of seals on fuel elements, racks or hangers. 
The Ultrasonic Seals (US) have been used for this type of containment [1] [2] and they are 
already approved for safeguards use by both the IAEA (responsible for the implementation of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – NPT) and by the European Commission’s DG-Energy 
(responsible for the implementation of the EURATOM Treaty).  
ABACC and the European Commission engaged into a collaborative project on strengthening 
the safeguards capabilities using the ultrasonic sealing system as containment and its general 
application [3]. ABACC and ARN evaluated the benefits of this system to be consolidated in a 
specific use on the spent fuel storage at CNA1 in Argentina. 
The IAEA/ABACC approval process for application of this technology should go through 
evaluation of diversion scenarios considering the vulnerability aspects of the project and 
improvements required. The results of a field trial at the spent fuel storage planned for 2017 will 
support the final approval of the system, after which ABACC and the IAEA will be able to assess 
whether the system meets the necessary requirements for safeguards use. 
2. Safeguards system based on containment and surveillance
The proposed sealing system already tested in CNA1 pond consists of a stainless steel bar 
attached on each external hanger of the fuel elements support devices. This attachment is 
provided by means of ultrasonic seals, in this way when the bar is installed, it disables any 
possibility to remove the fuel elements from the specific hanger, without breaking the seals. 
The objective of the sealing arrangement at CNA1 is to maintain the CoK of the nuclear material 
stored in the lower and upper racks of the Spent Fuel (SF) ponds by preventing undeclared 
removal of this material. The dual system considered for these ponds consist of the ultrasonic 
seal system as containment and surveillance system based on the Next Generation 
Surveillance System (NGSS).  
The IAEA contracted the development of the NGSS system to replace the DCM-14 cameras. 
NGSS basic level consists of a single camera taking, authenticating, and storing surveillance 
data.  
The system will be applied in order to avoid item counting of the SF stored in the lower racks in 
the ponds during the annual Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) as well as their re-verification 
in case of surveillance failure.  
The re-verification of spent fuel assemblies (SFAs) in tightly configurations in storage ponds is a 
challenge at the Atucha site since SFAs are stored in two layers in the spent fuel pond. A 
prototype Spent Fuel Neutron Counter (SFNC) has been used since November 2002 in 
verifying long decayed spent fuel stored in the upper layer. 
The original SFNC which was developed and tested at the site jointly by the IAEA and ABACC 
used a fission chamber that was lowered into the gap among four adjacent fuel assemblies. In 
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fact, provided that a safe and reliable access of the neutron detector can be gained to the entire 
length of the assemblies in the lower level, the verification of the fuel in the lower layer could be 
done exactly in the same manner as the verification of the fuel in the upper layer. This has, so 
far, not been attempted, mainly because of the difficulty, seen in lowering the neutron detector 
between fuel assemblies of the upper and lower layer. 
A specific project was signed in collaboration with Department of Energy (DoE) for developing a 
spent fuel gross defect system at CNA1 [4]. The objective was to develop a comprehensive 
database for the SFAs at both natural U and enriched 0.85w% covering the range of cooling 
times and burn-up present. An algorithm uses this database to predict expected signals when 
coupled with the SFNC at any location in the pond. 
Although part of a project for optimizing the re-verification of spent fuel assemblies in the pond, 
the activity itself is still time consuming, so ABACC/IAEA are considering the containment 
project using the ultrasonic seals as a back-up component for surveillance, only in case of 
failures of these two components the re-verification would be applied.   
3. Ultrasonic seals project
ABACC has agreed with JRC/ISPRA on a project of containment of Spent Fuel in Complex 
Storage Environment in 2012. The ultrasonic technology was chosen with a potential for future 
joint use with IAEA. 
The requirements for the ultrasonic sealing system are mainly based on:  
 CoK is guaranteed when sealing spent fuel pond;
 Seals on fuel elements, racks or hangers, guarantee knowledge over multiple layers of
spent fuel storage;
 Ultrasonic seals are designed to be attached underwater, they are resistant to harsh
environments, they are easy to apply and they can be regularly verified;
 Verification does not involve the replacement of cables or substitution of the seal, nor
does it require the movement of spent fuel;
 This improves inspector’s productivity, takes due care of radiation, safety considerations
and decreases the disturbance to the plant operator;
 Seals technology are already used in other countries.
For this project a specific agreement with Argentinean National Authority (ARN) was signed and 
it considers training in the use of "Ultrasonic Seals" for the containment of spent fuels located in 
a complex storage environment and difficult to access for verification for safeguards purposes 
and their application in power reactor installations - demonstration of practical application in the 
CNA1. 
3.1 Preliminary design  
The first design was based on a sealing bar with two locking mechanisms, to be inserted over 
the hangers. The locking mechanisms were put instead of the two lateral extreme spent fuel 
rods as shown in Figure 1. 
The seal bolt is tightened outside of the pond, by the inspector. The mechanism is spring 
loaded, once clamped on the hanger it can’t be removed without first breaking the seal, opening 
the locking mechanism.  
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Figure 1: Close 3D view of the bracket locked on the hanger 
This solution was not acceptable since the spent fuel storage positions blocked significantly 
reduces the SFAs storage capacity of the pond. 
3.2 Alternative solution: locking with fuel bundle in position 
The idea was to still use a bar with two locking mechanisms but the triangular tip of the two 
lateral hangers will be used, freeing the two positions for spent fuel assemblies. The seal bolt 
would be tightened underwater to close the locking systems by pushing rods under the 
triangular tips. 
Figure 2: View of the two centering pins and associated positions on the racks 
On the following Figure 3, we can see how the system was working.  
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Figure 3: Unlocked, seal high, pins retracted (top) versus locked, seal in lower position, pins 
extracted (bottom) 
3.3 First infield mission in Atucha 
The first mission was done in June 2015 at CNA1 and ABACC/JRC took the opportunity to have 
access to a hanger outside of the pond (Figure 4) and they were able to discuss changes in the 
design.  
Figure 4: View of the hangers outside of the pond 
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3.4 Proposed third design and associated prototype 
Following the first mission and the comments received by Atucha’s operators and ABACC 
technical staff, JRC updated the design accordingly and the locking mechanism fitted on only 
one triangle on each extremity of the hangers (and not two as on the previous design), in order 
to cope with the relative variability of the distance between two successive individual beams of 
the hangers. 
Figure 5: Mock up of the hangers and view of the locking system 
3.5 Second infield mission in Atucha - Ultrasonic seals tests at the spent fuel 
pond 
JRC and ABACC returned to Atucha in November 2015 with a foldable locking system with 4 m 
bar (cut in four separate 1 m bars), several locking mechanisms, two seals & tools. The 
equipment was tested on various elements outside CNA1 and the overall prototype system on 
the spare hangers. After this first step the bar and locking devices were tested in CNA1.  
The bar was raised from the center with the crane and located on the first row of fuels in the 
pool five as shown in Figure 6. The plug-in process was easier than expected and the 
assistance from the steel bar ends practically was not required. The steel bar has a water tight 
design providing a low weight when it is submerged in the pond. The sealing bar was mounted 
over the hangers, seals tightened and then broken. Following the tests performed with the first 
prototype of sealing bar and locking mechanisms, ABACC and JRC validated the principle of 
locking on the triangular tip of the hanger on CNA1 hangers (underwater storage pond).  
As shown in Figure 7 the system was attached and locked properly, when the steel rod is 
installed it disables any possibility to remove the fuel elements in the complete hanger. 
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Figure 6: Ultrasonic system installation with operator assistance in CNA1 
Figure 7: Close view of sealing bar of hangers into the pond 
4. Jointly Safeguards Approach and Scenarios
Based on the successful results obtained after spent fuel pond tests in Atucha and the training 
with inspectors and operators, ABACC contacted IAEA in 2016 to propose a common approach 
to use this technology.  
After discussion of different diversion possible scenarios pointed out by the IAEA from the lower 
racks, the project [4] was improved to take into account these new considerations, it can be 
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seen from Figure 8 an example of these changes related to the locker system. A joint ABACC-
IAEA procedure on the verification has been discussed based on the criteria for On-Load 
reactors [5], so that part of the spent fuel under dual C/S; both C/S systems should be 
evaluated as follows: 
1. The surveillance system to be serviced and reviewed, during Physical Inventory
Verification and interim inspections;
2. The ultrasonic seals to be verified with low detection probability and the containment to
be examined, including visual observation on the integrity of the metal bars, during
Physical Inventory Verification inspection.
The nuclear material subject to the dual system (C/S) is Pu and U contained in the SF from the 
nuclear power plant at Atucha (RAI1) which is stored in racks.  
Figure 8 – Locking mechanism (new on the left and first model tested in CNA1 on the right) 
Upon filling up the lower rack with SF, the upper rack will be staked on the lower one as a cover 
of the lower rack; the upper rack will be immobilized with the metal bar and sealed as described 
above. The diversion would require possibly tampering of the respective metal bars and 
removal or displacement of the associated upper racks allowing access to the lower levels. 
IAEA/ABACC identified improvements to be done and technical solutions have been discussed 
with JRC and a possible final schematic sealing system with protective arms should be applied 
during field trial, as presented in Figure 9.  
Figure 9: Schematic sealing system with protective arms. 
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5. Field Trial Perspective
The main purpose of sealing using ultrasonic technique is to maintain the CoK and avoid re-
measurement. This is particularly important when applied to SF storages. ABACC, together with 
national authority and operator in Argentina, have been discussing the application of ultrasonic 
seals technologies, and, in particular, on how their use improves safeguards inspections without 
affecting operational tasks and turning activities less intrusive and more efficient.  
Besides technical developments, safeguards approaches and scenarios should be discussed 
among all parties before ultrasonic seals system deployment. The parties involved are the state 
through ARN and the international safeguards agencies, ABACC and IAEA in order to ensure 
ultrasonic seals containment system success during safeguards implementation. 
IAEA has been engaged in the evaluation process of the ultrasonic seal specific application for 
the CNA1 through the Safeguards Technical Service (SGTS) and different tasks need to be 
performed before final approval of the system. 
The field trial, as part of the final IAEA/ABACC approval process, should start during the second 
semester of this year when JRC will be able to fabricate bars, seals and locking mechanisms to 
apply at least in one pond considering the final ABACC and IAEA remarks on the project. 
Meanwhile ABACC/ARN/IAEA would agree on the SF ponds selection, the procedures for 
evaluation of the system during the field trial and the final approval process for this ultrasonic 
sealing containment. 
The use of new technologies in safeguards is important to enhance their effectiveness and 
efficiency. In this particular case, any future application of ultrasonic technology should be 
developed and implemented in such a way to allow joint use application between ABACC and 
IAEA, so the results from the containment provided by the ultrasonic seals during the field trial 
shall permit that ABACC and IAEA approve the technology for specific safeguards use in CNA1. 
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Abstract: 
Most unattended safeguards equipment (e.g. electronic seals) use some form of battery—traditionally 
an expensive, bulky and, oftentimes, hazardous lithium battery. The limited charge-life of these 
batteries necessitates periodically replacing them or the equipment they power (if batteries are not 
field-replaceable) to prevent total battery discharge and potential loss of continuity of knowledge. 
These maintenance cycles present a significant monetary cost to a safeguards inspectorate and 
demand on in-field inspector time, as well a potential increase in personnel exposure to radiation. 
One approach to increasing the operational lifetime of this equipment is known as energy harvesting: 
the process by which energy is replenished by collection and storage from external source(s). The 
replenished, stored energy can be used to supplement the energy available from the initial battery 
charge. This paper examines energy harvesting via photovoltaic (PV) cells, both monocrystalline and 
amorphous, and the cells’ associated performance in converting energy across the entire infrared to 
UV spectrum, including both indoor and outdoor lighting conditions. It then explores the system 
architecture required for energy harvesting as well as the design trade-offs available. Finally, this 
paper assesses the performance of a prototype system incorporating this type of energy harvesting in 
a real-world application. 
Keywords: safeguards, containment, batteries, energy harvesting
1. Introduction
Modern unattended safeguards equipment (e.g. seals) incorporates many low-power electronic
circuits, which are typically powered by expensive and toxic lithium thionyl chloride (LiSOCL2)
batteries. The limited life of these batteries necessitates their periodic replacement. This replacement
must be performed before total battery discharge to avoid potential loss of continuity of knowledge.
Thus, the effective battery capacity becomes significantly less than the actual usable capacity.
Additionally, such maintenance can be a radiological hazard to personnel, as well as a monetary
burden to a safeguards inspectorate.
Energy harvesting, a commercially available technology, could extend the operational life of battery-
powered equipment to achieve significant efficiencies for safeguards deployments. Energy harvesting
involves scavenging and storing ambient energy sources, such as solar, thermal, and kinetic for use in
low-power electronic applications. While the amount of scavenged energy per unit time may be small,
it most often comes from a source that will not be depleted throughout the deployment of the
harvesting device. The best-known energy harvesters are solar panels and wind turbines.
Recently, far-field wireless energy harvesting has become a commercially available option. Far-field
wireless energy harvesting provides consistent, predictable, and un-tethered power over distances up
to 50 feet. This process converts radio frequency (RF) energy, both intentionally emitted and ambient,
into usable direct current (DC) power. Incorporating far-field wireless energy harvesting into
safeguards equipment can significantly extend the equipment’s battery life and perhaps make it 
indefinite. Furthermore, additional functionality can be added to safeguards equipment without
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lowering its operational life expectancy. This type of energy harvesting was previously explored, and 
the results can be found in Reference 1. 
Alternatively, should RF harvesting not be permitted or desired, photovoltaic-based harvesting is a 
promising substitute. Photovoltaic (PV) cells are semiconductor devices that convert incident photons 
directly into electricity via the photovoltaic effect. These cells come in several types depending on the 
underlying crystalline structure and include amorphous, polycrystalline, and monocrystalline. Recent 
advances in monocrystalline panel technology enable such cells to convert up to 22% of ambient light 
energy into usable electric power. Should cost be the overriding factor, cheaper, but less efficient, 
amorphous cells are also an option. 
This paper explores the benefits and drawbacks of integrating energy harvesting into a chosen 
safeguards seal: the Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA). Specifically, it examines the usage of 
commercially-available PV cells, amorphous and monocrystalline, detailing the pros and cons of each 
type as well as the in-system performance. 
2. Photovoltaic energy harvesting overview
Figure 1 shows a simplified diagram of a PV-based energy harvesting system. 
Such a harvesting solution typically contains four main components. First, a source of photonic 
energy, such as the sun, must be available. While solar irradiance is the preferred form of energy, 
providing up to an order of magnitude more photonic energy per unit of collector area than indoor 
lighting, the PV system itself is only weakly constrained to the form and strength of lighting. Certain 
cells are optimized for operation under specific light intensities – for example, indoor cells that must 
not experience greater than 1000 lux illumination. Also, all cells have a varying efficiency across 
wavelength and will produce a larger signal output based on the spectral content of the lighting 
source. This non-ideal behaviour is known as external quantum efficiency and will be discussed later. 
Next, a small PV cell must be exposed to the photonic energy. When irradiated, a PV cell behaves 
analogously to a current source. As irradiation increases, so too does the amount of charge available 
for collection. Such cells are self-limiting; as the attached electronic load increases, the output voltage 
of the cell drops, finally reaching its short circuit current (ISC) at a zero-ohm load. Similarly, as 
electronic load decreases, the output voltage of the cell rises, eventually reaches its open circuit 
voltage (VOC). All points in between are characterizable and form the cell’s I-V curve. Figure 2 displays 
an example I-V curve for an IXYS brand solar cell. The blue line plots the cell’s voltage and current 
under fixed lighting conditions but with an electronic load that varies incrementally from 0 to ∞ ohms.  
Figure 1: PV-based Energy Harvesting System (image courtesy http://lifefreeenergy.com) 
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Figure 2: Representative I-V Curve (image courtesy http://ixys.com) 
As can be seen, even under fixed illumination, the power available from the cell varies based on the 
electronic bias point of circuit. The red line plots the variation of power available from the cell under 
different loads. There is clearly a point of largest power, known as the maximum power point (MPP), 
and, for solar cells, it typically occurs at 80% of the open circuit voltage. 
Because the energy delivered by the cell must be collected in a very specific manner to optimize the 
available power, a specialized circuit is needed that can properly bias the cell at its MPP as well as 
convert the low voltage energy into a more usable form. The charge controller in Figure 1 is this 
element. Even for indoor lighting, the illumination levels, and thus the charge generated by the cell, will 
vary significantly throughout the day. The charge controller must dynamically vary the impedance 
presented to the cell in order to maintain operation at the MPP. Furthermore, most electronic systems 
require a constant, well-regulated voltage to operate correctly. The charge controller must also employ 
a voltage converter to transform the varying input voltage into a constant, predictable output voltage.  
Lastly, solar cells are not able to store energy. Should the cell generate energy in excess of what is 
required for the load, this additional energy would be lost. While such an approach may be tolerable in 
a simple system where the lighting conditions are known and continuous, a more advanced system 
will employ some form of energy storage. This energy storage allows the system to continue to 
operate without depleting the primary batteries when the photonic source is diminished or removed, 
for example at night when the lights are turned off.  Here, the primary batteries serve to power the unit 
upon start-up (while secondary batteries are charging) and when secondary battery power is depleted 
due to lack of photonic energy. 
Many forms of energy storage are available, including rechargeable batteries and supercapacitors. 
Each have different charging methods, such as constant current or constant voltage, and the 
previously mentioned charge controller must be able to provide the appropriate form. Also, each type 
of energy storage has different capacity, cost, and self-discharge, so care must be taken when down-
selecting for an application.  
2.1. PV cell evaluation 
For this study, three PV cells were evaluated, each cell having varying characteristics and use cases. 
Their measured parameters are listed in  
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Table 1. All cells were first tested using white light at an intensity of 1.0 sun (1000 W/m2). They were 
then retested using ambient room lighting (10 W/m2). For each test, the load presented to the cell was 
varied such that the voltage across the cell increased from 0 (zero) V to an open circuit indication in 
0.01 V increments. 
AM-5902CAR AM-1816CAR SLMD121H10L 
Crystal Type Amorphous Amorphous Monocrystalline 
Intended Use Outdoor Indoor Dual 
ISC (1000 W/m2) 58.6 mA 3.55 mA 35.7 mA 
VOC 7.86 V 6.24 V 6.64 V 
PMAX 254 mW 5.26 mW 173 mW 
Fill Factor (FF) 0.550 0.00526 0.728 
ISC (10 W/m2) 202 µA 227 µA 132 µA 
VOC 5.1 V 5.2 V 3.46 V 
PMAX 600 µW 770 µW 264 µW 
Fill Factor (FF) 0.582 0.653 0.577 
Size 8.72 in2  8.50 in2 2.28 in2 
Unit Cost (quantity 10) $23.06 $9.56 $11.81 
Table 1: Evaluated PV Cell Parameters (0.1 Sun) 
ISC is the current through the cell when the cell is shorted, i.e. the voltage across the cell is zero. This 
number represents the maximum amount of current the cell can deliver, and, for a cell with moderate 
resistivity, is relatively flat even as the voltage increases up to the MPP. 
VOC is the voltage across the cell when the cell is open circuited, i.e. the current through the cell is 
zero. This parameter will influence the choice of charge controller, as the value must not be so low 
that the charge controller fails to start-up and not so high that the charge controller is damaged. 
Please note that no power can be extracted from the cell in either ISC or VOC conditions. 
PMAX represents the maximum power the cell can deliver and is easily calculated by tracing the I-V 
curve and using the equation P = I*V. As previously mentioned, power will be zero at the ISC and VOC 
points, with maximum power occurring at some point in between, usually 80% of VOC.  
Fill factor (FF) measures the quality of a solar cell. An ideal solar cell’s I-V curve is a flat square, with 
vertex at (ISC, VOC). For such a cell, PMAX = ISC * VOC = PT (theoretical power) resulting in a FF of 1. 
Actual cells operate below this point due to losses such as internal resistance and diode effects. Fill 
factor is graphically represented in Figure 3, and is the ratio of PT to PMAX. 
Figure 3: Graphical illustration of FF (image courtesy http://ni.com) 
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For all electrical parameters listed above (ISC, VOC, PMAX, and FF), a higher number is better. However, 
size and cost must also be considered when selecting a cell. For both indoor and outdoor lighting 
conditions, the SLMD121H10L has the greatest electrical performance per square inch. If cost is the 
overriding factor, the SLMD121H10L should be used outdoors while the AM-1816CAR should be 
chosen for indoor applications. 
The above measurements were taken under uniform, white light conditions (400 nm to 700 nm). 
Realistic lighting conditions will not be so evenly distributed across all spectral wavelengths. A 
measure of the cell’s response versus frequency is known as the external quantum efficiency (EQE). 
This metric is the ratio of the number of charge carriers collected by the cell versus the number of 
photons incident on the cell. An ideal cell will have a quantum efficiency of 100% across all 
wavelengths. Actual cells will have optical losses due to recombination effects. Figure 4 plots the 
measured EQE of all three cells across the infrared (IR) (700 - 1100 nm) to ultraviolet (UV) (< 400 nm) 
spectrum in 10 nm increments. 
Figure 4: EQE measurements 
The advantages of monocrystalline cell construction are evident in this Figure 4. The SLMD121H10L 
can operate across the entire spectral range, while the two amorphous cells are limited to the 300 nm 
to 600 nm visible portion. This larger area of operation will result in increased power conversion 
efficiency when operated in the presence of infrared and ultraviolet light, especially outdoors. [Note 
that the magnitude of increased efficiency is not fully evident in the Table 1 values since they were 
determined only for the visible portion of the spectrum.] Further, the quantum efficiency is significantly 
higher, allowing a much smaller cell to be used for similar energy harvesting results. 
Lastly, monocrystalline cells have less temperature dependence than other types. In general, the 
voltage output of a cell will decrease with increasing temperature. While this effect occurs in 
monocrystalline cells, the net effect is less severe than in amorphous and polycrystalline cells. For the 
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above tested cells, the monocrystalline will experience a -0.03 %/K degradation in VOC while the 
amorphous cells will undergo -0.3 %/K, an order of magnitude larger impact. 
3. Charge controller and energy storage
The circuit topology for collecting and storing charge generated by the solar cells can take on many 
forms depending on the objectives of the system. The options include battery replacement, battery 
extension, and tiered architectures, which are explained below. 
The first option is the complete removal of system batteries. By calculating the load requirements of 
the attached system over the course of a lighting cycle (usually one full day), the designer can size a 
PV cell arrangement such that it will provide enough harvested energy to fully power the system over 
the entire cycle, with enough margin for off-normal events, such as clouds. Unfortunately, this option is 
unusable in the schema, as batteries (or other large capacity storage) must always be present in a 
secure system such as a seal. Otherwise, an adversary could turn of the lights or cover the cells with 
opaque material to force the equipment to power down since harvestable energy is no longer present. 
The second option is to increase the lifetime of the primary batteries by only powering the system from 
them when the energy harvester is not available. This option necessitates the same load requirement 
analysis as the battery removal option, but, rather than eliminating the batteries, significantly increases 
the time period between battery replacements. 
For this evaluation, a tiered architecture was chosen consisting of a primary battery, a secondary 
storage unit, and the energy harvester. See Figure 5. During normal operation, solar energy is 
harvested and stored in the secondary storage unit. This unit must be carefully sized such that it can 
fully power the system during the course of the lighting cycle where no solar energy is present. On 
initial power-on, the attached load is powered by the primary battery (Line 2 is connected to Line 3 in 
Figure 5). Once the harvester has fully charged the secondary storage, the charge controller switches 
the power source from the primary batteries (Line 3) to the secondary storage (Line 1). The harvester 
will continue to replenish this secondary storage so long as solar power is available. If solar re-
charging is not available, the system will continue to run from the secondary source until the attached 
load drains it below a specified threshold, at which point system power will revert back to the primary 
batteries (Line 3). Figure 5 presents a simplified representation of this tiered architecture. 
Figure 5: Tiered architecture block diagram 
Besides being able to seamlessly switch between primary and secondary power (break-before-make), 
the charge controller must also be capable of several other important functions. These include: 
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 Programmable prevention of secondary storage over- and under-voltage to prevent damage
or irreversible depletion, respectively
 Cold-start operation at extremely low levels of input voltage from the harvesting element (< 0.5
V) for start-up at low light levels
 Wide input voltage range (0.1 V to 5 V ideal) allowing for operation with many different kinds
of PV cells
 Maximum power point tracking for optimal energy extraction
 Low quiescent current (< 1 µA ideal) to maximize energy delivery to the load
Several devices meet these criteria, including the ADP5091 from Analog Devices, the SPV1050 from 
STMicroelectronics, and the BQ25505 from Texas Instruments. For this evaluation, the BQ25505 was 
chosen as it has the lowest quiescent current (325 nA typical) and start-up voltage (330 mV). These 
two parameters are most important, as they will minimize the drain on the primary batteries and allow 
for operation in very low lighting conditions. Additionally, the part has a wider input voltage and power 
range, allowing its use with most outdoor cells. 
4. Seal Integration
To integrate PV energy harvesting into a safeguards seal such as RMSA, only minor modifications 
must take place. First, the PV cells must be mounted to the case and electrically connected to the 
base seal hardware. Because these cells require exposure to ambient light, they must be mounted 
externally. Fortunately, existing RMSA cases already support both external and internal antenna 
configurations. Instead of installing an external antenna, the existing antenna mounting can be used 
for connecting the PV cell(s). These cell(s) are in turn soldered to a custom printed circuit board (PCB) 
and attach via a standard SMA connector. Once the cells are attached, the external connector is 
cabled internally to the base hardware as an antenna would be. This approach minimizes cost, as it 
requires no retooling of the case or RMSA manufacturing process. Figure 6 shows the fully assembled 
RMSA with lid both open and closed. For this work, the SLMD121H10L PV cell was chosen, for 
reasons mentioned in the PV cell evaluation section; two PV cells are needed for maximum system 
lifetime under indoor lighting conditions. Full testing results are presented in the next section. 
Figure 6: Fully assembled unit with lid open and closed 
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As previously mentioned, batteries must still be contained within the unit to prevent external tampering 
and seal power-down. Nevertheless, because ambient PV energy is so abundant, the base hardware 
for this instantiation contains only one battery rather than the standard two. This reduction offsets the 
cost of the second attached SLMD121H10L PV cell. Additionally, because the design is a tiered 
architecture, a secondary storage unit is included. This unit is carefully sized to match the power 
needs of the attached system and the lighting cycle. An EDLC supercapacitor is once again the 
preferred storage medium [1]. Given that the RMSA requires a quiescent current of ~20 µA and an 
operating voltage of 2.5 V – 3.6 V, and assuming a typical warehouse environment with artificial 
lighting available for at least 12 hours a day, a fully charged supercapacitor must contain at least 660 
mF of capacitance to fully power the system without requiring switchover to the primary battery. The 
nearest value commercially available is 470 mF, which is used in this design, allowing for 8.6 hours of 
continuous operation without any available solar energy when fully charged. 
For this work, no modification of the RMSA firmware is necessary. However, should further diagnostics 
be desired, such as the amount of charge on the secondary storage, the hardware connections on the 
base design would require no alteration. Only the firmware would require change, notably to digitize 
such an analog measurement and then add it to the periodic State-of-Health message.  
5. Performance
To measure the performance of the system, three different lighting types were evaluated. The types 
chosen are representative of what might be present in an indoor environment and include LED, 
fluorescent, and incandescent. Each type of lighting contains different spectral power distribution 
curves that characterize the power emitted per wavelength of light. 
For each lighting source, the harvester was placed a fixed distance away, corresponding to a given 
illumination level. The illumination level and color of the light was measured using a spectrometer; the 
test was repeated four times at different illumination levels. For these tests, light illumination was 
measured in lux. If watts is preferred, lux may be converted using the following equation  
Where P is the power in watts, EV is the illuminance in lux, A is the area in square meters, and η is the 
luminous efficacy in lumens per watt. For typical lighting, η is 15 for tungsten incandescent, 60 for a 
compact fluorescent, and 30 for a white LED. 
The results for each type of lighting are shown below, as is the spectral output of each light type. The 
Y axis in each figure represents the current harvested by the device in amps, while the X axis is the 
measured illumination level in lux. The figure also plots the average current required by an RMSA. 
Figure 7: Harvesting Results 
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Figure 8: Incandescent Spectrum 
Figure 9: LED Spectrum 
Figure 10: Fluorescent Spectrum 
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As shown in Figure 7, for illumination levels above ~30 lux for incandescent and ~250 lux for 
fluorescent/LED, the harvester is able to fully power a single RMSA. Incandescent light is clearly 
superior, as it provides the whitest output of the three lighting styles resulting in less required 
illumination. Also, these required illumination levels are low and easily attainable indoors. For 
reference, in a setting with two overhead 40W fluorescent bulbs, the illumination level directly 
underneath at a distance of seven feet is ~500 lux. Likewise, a single 40W incandescent bulb will 
provide ~30 lux at a distance of five feet. 
6. Conclusions
There are many different options and architectures available to integrate PV-based energy harvesting 
with a safeguards instrument, such as a seal. It is up to the designer to match the power requirements 
of the system to the power available over the course of a lighting cycle. This paper has shown that 
~$25 of monocrystalline cells coupled to a $10 PCB assembly can provide enough power, even in 
sparsely lit indoor areas and regardless of lighting type, to fully power a safeguards instrument, such 
as RMSA. Further, by using a tiered architecture, this system permits almost 9 hours of downtime 
within the lighting cycle without having to tap into the primary battery’s charge. So long as the cells are 
not installed in overly dusty or dirty areas, the system will provide self-sustainable operation that is 
only limited by the lifetime of the electronic components and not the battery. 
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Abstract: 
In 2015, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the 
European Commission collaboration started to develop an active neutron NDA system for nuclear non-
proliferation and nuclear security. To the best of our knowledge, no established technique exists that 
allows us to accurately determine the amount of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) and Minor Actinides 
(MA) in high radioactive nuclear materials, such as spent fuel, nuclear fuel for nuclear transmutation, 
melted fuel debris from the damaged reactors and others. The collaboration aims at contributing to the 
establishment of an innovative Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA) system using a D-T pulsed neutron 
source for various applications. We utilize several active neutron NDA techniques, namely Differential 
Die-Away Analysis (DDA), Prompt Gamma-ray Analysis (PGA), Neutron Resonance Capture Analysis 
(NRCA), Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) and Delayed Gamma-ray Analysis 
(DGA). All of these techniques have advantages and disadvantages. The different methods can 
provide complementary information which is particularly useful for nuclear non-proliferation and 
nuclear security. In this project, we have developed a combined NDA system, which enables the 
measurements of DDA and PGA, at NUclear fuel Cycle safety Engineering research Facility (NUCEF) 
in the JAEA Tokai-site. Numerical calculations have been performed to study the effects of the rather 
long pulse width (10μs) of the D-T neutron source on the NRTA measurements. 
In this paper, we will introduce our project and report the recent progress of developments, especially 
in NRTA, DDA and PGA. 
Keywords: active neutron technique, differential die-away, neutron resonance transmission analysis,
prompt gamma-ray analysis, delayed gamma-ray analysis
1. Introduction
Obviously, nuclear material accountancy (NMA) is of fundamental importance for nuclear safeguards
and security. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no established technique that enables us
to accurately determine the amount of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) and Minor Actinides (MA) in
high radioactive nuclear materials, such as spent fuel, MA transmutation fuel and others. At least,
much work needs to be done before a viable instrument is installed in place. The decommissioning of
nuclear power plants produces a number of radioactive waste drums that contain SNM. The
conventional passive γ-ray techniques cannot handle such waste drums. In particular, melted fuel
debris from the damaged reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant is difficult to apply the
current NMA, because the debris contains nuclear fuel, fission product and structural materials such
as concrete, metal and control rod. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and U.S. Department of
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Energy (DOE) provided recommendations for measurement systems of the fuel debris [1-3]. Neutron 
Resonance Densitometry (NRD), which was developed in a collaboration Action Sheet-1 (2012-2015) 
between Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission (JRC), was also proposed for the quantification of U and Pu isotopes in particle-like 
melted fuel debris [4,5]. NRD is very promising and allow us to determine the amount of 235U and 239Pu
in particle like debris in melted fuel within 2% [6,7]. However, NRD is suitable for a rather thin sample, 
and is hard to apply for thick lava-like fuel-containing materials. 
2. R&D project and active neutron techniques
The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European 
Commission collaboration Action Sheet-7 (2015-2017) started to develop an active neutron NDA 
system for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security [8]. Figure 1 shows schematic outline of the 
“Development of active neutron NDA techniques” project. The collaboration aims at contributing to the 
establishment of an innovative non-destructive analysis (NDA) system using a D-T pulsed neutron 
source for various applications. Several active neutron NDA techniques, namely Differential Die-Away 
Analysis (DDA), Prompt Gamma-ray Analysis (PGA), Neutron Resonance Capture Analysis (NRCA), 
Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) and Delayed Gamma-ray Analysis (DGA) have 
been developed in the collaboration. Table 1 shows the basic principles of the active neutron 
interrogation techniques that will be used in the project. All of these techniques have advantages and 
disadvantages. The different methods can provide complementary information which is particularly 
useful for quantification of SNM and MA in high radioactive nuclear materials. In this project, we have 
developed a combined NDA system, which enables the simultaneous measurements of DDA and PGA, 
at NUclear fuel Cycle safety Engineering research Facility (NUCEF) in the JAEA Tokai-site. Numerical 
calculations have been conducted to study the effects of the long pulse width (10 μs) of D-T neutron 
source on the NRTA measurements. The project is built in two phases: 1) Development and 
experimental validation of simulation tools that are used to optimise the design of the system. In 
addition, the quality of the nuclear data and models that are needed for data processing and analysis, 
are verified. 2) Modelling, design and construction of a prototype system for measurements in a MA-
Pu fuel conversion facility as part of nuclear transmutation activities. 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of JRC – JAEA collaboration: Action Sheet -7. 
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NDA methods Principles Quantities of interest 
DDA 
Interrogation by a pulsed neutron 
Detection of induced prompt fission neutrons 
Correction of matrix effect 
Total fissile content 
NRTA 
Irradiation by a moderated pulsed neutron beam 
Detection of neutrons transmitted through a sample 
Analysis of transmission spectrum 
U and Pu contents 
PGA/NRCA 
Irradiation by a (pulsed) neutron beam 
Detection of prompt γ rays from (n,γ) reactions 
Analysis of γ-rays/TOF spectrum 
Specific nuclides contents 
(N as explosive, B as 
neutron absorber, etc.) 
DGA 
Irradiation by a (moderated) neutron 
Detection of delayed γ rays from fission products 
Analysis of γ-rays spectrum 
235U/239Pu
241Pu/239Pu
Table 1: Non-destructive analytical methods and quantities of interest. 
2.1 DDA 
The DDA technique detects fission neutrons, and it can determine very small amounts of the fissile 
mass, such as 235U and 239Pu. A D-T or D-D pulsed neutron generator is usually used for sample
interrogation. A short pulse width (typically about 10 μs) is suited for DDA measurements. The prompt 
fission neutrons are detected in thermal neutron detector modules, and can be separated from the 
interrogation neutrons and background signals. The DDA technique has been investigated and 
developed for many years. Several different hardware and methodologies have been proposed. The 
most common method of DDA uses a thermal neutron for sample interrogation because the fission 
probability remains constant during the interrogation period. On the other hand, JAEA-DDA utilizes 
fast and epi-thermal neutrons for interrogation. There are differences between conventional DDA and 
JAEA-DDA in many ways, such as methodology, hardware and software. The project involves the 
exchange of the results of scientific and technical research for the DDA technique, as well as the 
exchange of information arising from the collaboration. 
2.2 NRTA 
NRTA is an NDA method which uses the energies of resonances to identify nuclides (elements) by the 
time-of-flight technique [9]. NRTA can be used to quantify almost all medium and high-Z elements and 
considered as one of the most accurate NDA techniques to quantify the amount of SNM and MA. In 
fact, NRTA was applied to quantify 235U and 238U in an U3O8 reference sample that was enriched to 4.5
at% in 235U [10]. The difference between the experimentally determined areal densities of 235U and
238U and the reference values was less than 1%. The research collaboration Action Sheet-1 
successfully demonstrated the technical feasibility of applying NRTA for the determination of the 
amount of SNM in particle-like debris generated in a severe nuclear accident [5,6]. However, to be 
compliant with the requirements for a compact NRTA system further development is needed. It is 
assumed that the compact NRTA system uses a D-T neutron source which has a 10 μs pulse width. 
2.3 PGA / NRCA 
PGA is one of the most efficient NDA techniques [11,12]. It utilizes neutron capture γ rays, which are 
characteristic of each particular nuclide. These provide the means to identify and quantify the 
elemental constituents of a sample. Thus, PGA has been used as a rapid, non-destructive method for 
performing both qualitative and quantitative multi-elemental analysis and is well acknowledged to be 
especially valuable for the measurement of light elements such as H, B, N, Si, S, and Cl, as well as Cd, 
Gd, Sm, and Hg which have large neutron capture cross sections. Therefore, PGA is utilized for the 
quantification of neutron absorber and particularly useful for the detection of explosives, because the 
most typical high explosive materials contain nitrogen.  
The principle of NRCA is essentially similar to that of NRTA [9]. It differs from NRTA in that it detects γ 
rays that are emitted in neutron resonance capture reactions. In general, NRCA has a better detection 
limit compared to NRTA for most elements. However, for high radioactive nuclear materials, NRCA 
may lose the advantage in the detection limit because the γ rays from radioactive materials increase 
the background in the γ-rays spectrum. 
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2.4 DGA 
DGA typically utilizes delayed γ rays emitted from the fission products in the neutron induced reactions. 
It seems to be a very promising NDA method for the spent nuclear fuels. The mass distribution of the 
fission products is correlated with the mass of the fissile nuclei, such as 235U, 239Pu and 241Pu. 
Therefore, the intensities of individual gamma-ray peaks in the DGA spectra allow us to determine the 
235U/239Pu and/or 241Pu/239Pu ratio. The DGA experiments have been performed using the Pulsed
Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA) at the JRC-ITU (Ispra) [13]. 
3. Experimental and simulation studies
Monte Carlo simulation programs, such as PHITS [14] and MVP [15], which have been developed by 
JAEA, was utilized to develop DDA, NRTA, PGA/NRCA and DGA methods, and to construct and 
evaluate the prototype system which is combined with DDA and PGA. In addition to the simulation 
programs, the resonance analysis program REFIT [16] is used in the development of NRTA and 
NRCA. Experimental measurements have been conducted at the JRC Geel site Linear Accelerator 
(GELINA) and the PUNITA facility at the JRC Ispra site. In the developments of DDA, 1) the effects of 
the fast and thermal neutron uniformity in the sample cavity were evaluated, 2) the selections of 
neutron reflector material and the optimization of thickness of the neutron moderator and neutron 
shields, etc. were investigated, 3) quantitative determination of matrix effects was conducted. In the 
developments of PGA, 1) the neutron and γ-ray shields, the γ-ray collimators and the layout of γ-rays 
detector system were optimized, 2) the quantitative and qualitative estimation of explosive (nitrogen)  
was performed, 3) the setup was reconfigured to accommodate a high count-rate detector: LaBr3(Ce) 
scintillation detector and a high energy resolution detector: HPGe detector. In the developments of 
DGA, 1) the detector setup was optimized for the measurements of high energy γ rays, 2) nuclear data 
of high energy delayed γ rays emitted by the radioactive fission product were obtained and evaluated. 
3.1 Progress on NRTA 
The most promising method in terms of the low-background measurements for high radioactive 
nuclear materials would be the NRTA method because the detector of NRTA can be located farther 
away from the high radioactive samples. NRTA is a well-established method to obtain accurate 
nuclear data, such as the total neutron cross section, the resonance parameters, and plays a key role 
in NRD which was developed in the collaboration Action Sheet-1. As already described above, NRTA 
allows us to accurately quantify the amount of SNM and MA. The current NRTA system requires a 
large accelerator to produce the intense pulsed neutron beam. Therefore, the aim of the project is to 
develop a compact system for NRTA with a DT tube.  We have conducted a simulation for a prototype 
NRTA system, which is shown in Figure 2 [17]. 
Figure 2. Schematic view of a compact NRTA system. 
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In the prototype system, a polyethylene and a stainless steel are used as a neutron moderator and a 
reflector, respectively. We optimized the thickness of the neutron moderator between the DT neutron 
generator and the flight path tube with MCNP simulation [17,18]. The fluxes of neutrons and γ rays at 
the detector position are calculated (See Fig. 3). Since the pulse width of DT neutron generator is 10 
μs, we have to utilize a time of flight of over 10 μs in NRTA measurements. Considering that the γ rays 
are one of the main sources of background interference, the moderator thickness of 1cm and 3cm can 
be accepted as candidates. The main issue in this study is to achieve a good ratio of direct to 
scattered neutrons because a compact NRTA system that has a short flight path is rather hard to 
avoid the scattered neutrons. Here, a scattered neutron is defined as a neutron scattered by reflector 
and / or shield in the neutron source part, and a direct neutron goes directly into the moderator from 
Figure 6. The NRTA spectra of spent fuel by 
1μs and 10μs pulse width neutron beams.  
Figure 4. The fluxes of direct (red) and scattered (white) neutrons at the detector position. 
Figure 3. The fluxes of neutrons and γ rays at the detector position are calculated with MCNP. The 
black, red and blue lines show the results with 1cm, 3cm and 5cm thick moderators, respectively. 
Figure 5. The ratio of direct to total 
(direct+scattered) neutrons at the detector 
position.  
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the DT neutron source. The scattered neutrons fly relatively long length compared to the direct 
neutrons. Therefore, the scattered neutrons will disturb the time-of-flight (NRTA) measurements. 
Figure 4 shows the fluxes of direct and scattered neutrons at the detector position for the flight times 
ranging from 36 to 2000 μs (corresponding to 0.03 to 100 eV). The highest fluxes of the direct and 
scattered neutrons can be obtained by the 3cm and 1cm polyethylene moderators, respectively. The 
ratios of direct to total (direct + scattered) neutrons are shown in Figure 5. The ratio of 3cm thickness 
has nearly the same value as that of 5cm. Therefore, the 3cm polyethylene moderator is considered 
as the leading candidate among the polyethylene moderators [17].  
The establishment of a compact NRTA system that can accurately quantify SNMs in spent fuel is the 
major goal of the project. We performed a simulation study for a spent fuel measurement with a 
compact NRTA system that utilizes a neutron source (1μs, 10μs pulse widths, 5x108 n/s) and has a
flight path length of 5m. Figure 6 shows the NRTA spectra of the spent fuel sample which has a 
diameter of 10cm and a thickness of 1cm. We assumed that the measurement time was 800s. The 
resonance dips of 238U, 239Pu, 240Pu and 242Pu were observed in both spectra. The difference in the
pulse width has negligible effects on the dips of 240Pu (1.03eV) and 239Pu (0.3eV), which exist in low
energy region. Although the dips in high energy region, especially 242Pu, are significantly affected, we
can obtain reliable results from these dips [17]. 
3.2 Prototype system (DDA and PGA) 
A prototype system for measurements in a MA-Pu fuel conversion facility was developed and installed 
at NUCEF in the JAEA Tokai-site. Figure 7 shows a photograph of the prototype system: Active-N 
(mark II) and the transparent view. Active-N consists of two individual measurement systems which 
are DDA and PGA. A D-T pulsed neutron source as the interrogation source was installed in the 
sample cavity. The neutron generator can produce a 14 MeV neutron flux of 1.0 × 109 n/sec. The
pulse width and the repetition rate are usually set to 10 μs and 100 Hz, respectively. The cross-cut 
views of Active-N are shown in Figure 8. The neutron generator is placed near the side wall of neutron 
reflector. The detector bank is mounted at the opposite side wall. As mentioned above, JAEA-DDA 
utilizes fast and epi-thermal neutrons for interrogation. Therefore, the inside walls are covered with 
Figure 8. The cross-cut views of the prototype system: Active-N (mark II). 
Figure 7. The photograph of the prototype system: Active-N (mark II) and the transparent view. 
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boron rubber to supress the thermal neutron in the cavity. The interrogation with fast neutrons has a 
significant advantage for the measurement of large samples, such as 200L waste drums because of 
good spatial uniformity in detection sensitivity [8]. However, the JAEA-DDA method is not appropriate 
for small samples because fast neutrons are difficult to be thermalized in such small samples. 
Therefore, the moderator, which surrounds the sample (see Fig.9), is used to slow down the neutrons 
to around thermal energy(0.025eV), and can drastically improve detection limit of JAEA-DDA 
measurements for small samples. The Monte Carlo calculations were conducted to find the optimum 
thicknesses of the moderator for a vial bottle (ϕ26 x 40mm). Figure 10 shows three simulated DDA 
spectra of Pu (0.1-15g) for three different values of the moderator thickness a) 3cm, b) 6cm, c) 10cm. 
The corresponding measuring time is 600 seconds. As the moderator thickness increases, the die-
away (decay) time also increases because the die-away time mainly reflects a neutron mean lifetime 
in the moderator (and sample). The results of simulations (Fig.10b)) show that in the most ideal case, 
the prototype system will be capable of detecting 0.1g of Pu. The relationship between the number of 
detected fission neutron counts and 239Pu mass for different moderator thicknesses is shown in figure
11. The simulation results indicate that there is an optimal value (around 5-7cm) for the thickness of
the moderator. 
Figure 10b. The simulated DDA spectra of Pu (0.1-15g) with moderator thickness of 6cm. 
Figure 10a. The simulated DDA spectra of Pu (0.1-15g) with moderator thickness of 3cm. 
Figure 9. The neutron moderator which surrounds the sample is utilized for small samples. 
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A dirty bomb is an explosive radiation dispersal device that combines explosives, such as dynamite, 
with radioactive materials. Most dirty bombs are very hard to release enough radiation materials to kill 
people with radioactivity. However, it could produce mass panic, and require time consuming and 
expensive cleanup operations. Detecting explosives can be very dangerous due to the hazard of 
explosion and toxic materials. Therefore, the developments of non-destructive inspection methods are 
important for the detection of explosives. Most of explosives are organic compounds or mixtures 
consisting of hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen, especially containing a relatively high 
percentage (by weight) of nitrogen. The ratios of nitrogen to carbon and oxygen are also used as the 
indicators. PGA is considered a useful tool in a non-destructive inspection process of explosives as 
described above because PGA can detect these light elements, which are used as the indicators. We 
conduct simulation experiments to verify the effectiveness of PGA in our prototype system for the 
detection of nitrogen. In this simulation, we used a slightly different system configuration, which is 
called as Active-N (Mark I). In Figure 12, we show the spectrum of the nitrogen obtained from the 
simulations using MCNP [18]. The excited 15N nucleus, formed in 14N(n, γ)15N reaction, emits a
number of γ rays (1678, 1885, 3678, 5269, 5533 and 10829 keV etc.). The 10.8 MeV γ ray peak of 
nitrogen was clearly observed in the spectrum.  
Figure 12. The energy spectrum of the prompt γ rays emitted in the 14N(n, γ)15N reaction.
Figure 11. The relationship between the number of detected fission neutron counts and 239Pu
mass for different moderator thicknesses. 
Figure 10c. The simulated DDA spectra of Pu (0.1-15g) with moderator thickness of 10cm. 
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4. Summary
JRC – JAEA collaboration AS-7 started to develop an active neutron NDA system for nuclear non-
proliferation and nuclear security. The collaboration aims at contributing to the establishment of an 
innovative non-destructive analysis (NDA) system for the quantification of SNM and MA in high 
radioactive nuclear materials, such as spent fuel, MA transmutation fuel, fuel debris etc. Several active 
neutron NDA techniques, namely DDA, PGA/NRCA, NRTA and DGA have been developed. We have 
conducted a simulation for a compact NRTA system. It seems reasonable to conclude that the 
compact NRTA system can quantify the amounts of 238U, 239Pu, 240Pu and 242Pu in spent fuel. The
combined NDA system, which enables the simultaneous measurements of DDA and PGA, has been 
developed at NUCEF in the JAEA Tokai-site. The Monte Carlo calculations were conducted to find the 
optimum thicknesses of the moderator and showed that in the most ideal case, the prototype system 
would be capable of detecting 0.1g of Pu. The 10.8 MeV γ ray peak of nitrogen was clearly observed 
in the PGA spectrum obtained from the simulation. Thus, PGA with the combined NDA system will be 
able to detect explosive materials. In the near future, we will have DDA and PGA experiments with the 
combined NDA system at NUCEF in JAEA. 
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Abstract: 
JAEA and EC/JRC have been carrying out collaborative research for developing new non-destructive 
assay techniques that can be utilized for quantifying high radioactive special nuclear materials such as 
spent fuel and next generation minor actinide fuels. In the research, accuracy of Monte Carlo 
simulation is important since it is utilized for design and development of a demonstration system of 
next-generation Differential Die-Away (DDA) technique in JAEA. In order to evaluate the accuracy, 
neutron fluxes in the sample cavity of the PUNITA device which utilizes JRC type DDA technique and 
the JAWAS-T device which utilizes JAEA type DDA technique were measured. The neutron flux in the 
target sample placed in the PUNITA sample cavity was also measured. The measurement results 
were compared with the simulation results. In this presentation, we report on comparison results for 
the neutron flux obtained by experiment and simulation. 
Keywords: Monte Carlo simulation; Differential die-away; Neutron flux 
1. Introduction
Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and European Commission Joint Research Centre (EC/JRC) 
have conducted collaborative research to develop a technique that can be utilized for quantification of 
high radioactive special nuclear materials such as next generation minor actinide fuels. In the 
collaborative research, JAEA has been developing the integrated system Active-N which consists of 
some active neutron techniques. In the study of a Differential Die-Away (DDA) technique[1], which is 
one of the techniques to be involved in the Active-N, JRC type and JAEA type[2-5] DDA techniques 
are compared to develop a next generation DDA. The DDA technique is one of the active neutron 
NDA techniques. The DDA technique interrogates an object of interest with neutrons to induce fission 
reactions and estimates amounts of nuclear materials by measuring the induced fission neutrons. The 
JRC type DDA technique utilizes thermal neutrons, which are moderated in the measurement system 
especially a graphite liner, as the interrogation neutrons. If a matrix of the sample has strong 
moderation and/or absorption effect on neutrons, the interrogation neutrons are absorbed by the 
matrix and also fission neutron is moderated and absorbed by the matrix. Thus, for such samples, the 
JRC type DDA technique has a large difference in the detection efficiency between internal and 
external parts. On the other hand, the JAEA type DDA technique utilizes fast neutrons as the 
interrogation neutrons and thermalize the interrogation neutrons by a matrix of the sample to induce 
the fission. In the central part of the sample, thermal neutron flux is higher and detection efficiency for 
the fission neutron is lower and thus position dependence of the detection efficiency for the fissile 
material is improved. However, additional moderator is required in the measurement of small sample. 
An accuracy of a Monte Carlo simulation is important since performance of the system is estimated 
and optimized by using the Monte Carlo simulation, in design of the Active-N. Thus, measured and 
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simulated neutron flux distributions were compared to evaluate the accuracy of the simulation. We 
obtained the neutron flux distributions in the sample cavities of the Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test 
Assembly (PUNITA) [6,7] which is a demonstration system of the JRC type DDA technique and the 
JAEA Active Waste Assay System – Tokai (JAWAS-T) which is a demonstration system of the JAEA 
type DDA technique by measurement and simulation. Furthermore, in the PUNITA, the neutron flux in 
the standard sample placed in the sample cavity was also obtained.  
2. Experimental apparatuses
2.1. PUNITA 
Figure 1 shows the PUNITA which is a demonstration system of the JRC type DDA technique. The 
PUNITA is designed for experimental studies in NDA methods for nuclear safeguards and security. A 
D-T neutron generator and a He-3 counter for thermal flux monitor are placed in a central sample 
cavity. The dimensions of the cavity are 50×50×80 cm3. The cavity is surrounded by a graphite liner 
with a thickness of 20.5 cm. The graphite liner is surrounded by a polyethylene layer for radiation 
shielding. Fission neutron counter modules are located in each of six sides behind the graphite liner. In 
the each module, 16 He-3 counters of 3040 torr and 100 cm length are embedded in polyethylene 
covered with cadmium which is thermal neutron absorber. On each of the vertical four sides, eight He-
3 counters of 3040 torr and 50 cm length, nominated source monitors, are embedded in the 
polyethylene shield behind the fission neutron counter modules. In the measurement, 14 MeV 
neutrons are emitted by the D-T neutron generator and a large number of thermal neutrons are 
generated by moderation in the graphite liner. The thermal neutrons induce fission in a sample and the 
total amount of fissile materials in the sample is estimated by measuring the fission neutrons by the 
fission neutron counter modules. The PUNITA has achieved very low detection limit by using high 
thermal neutron flux and high neutron detection efficiency with 96 He-3 counters.  
Figure 1: PUNITA system. Left side figure shows cutaway drawing of the system. Right side figure shows 
horizontal cross sectional view of the system. 
2.2. JAWAS-T 
Figure 2 shows the JAWAS-T which is a demonstration system of the JAEA type DDA technique. The 
JAWAS-T has been developed for measuring fissile materials in 200 L nuclear waste drums. The 
JAWAS-T has a central sample cavity with a size of 90×90×105 cm3. A D-T neuron generator, a He-3 
counter for thermal neutron flux monitor and three fast neutron detector modules are placed in the 
sample cavity. There are two types of the modules. One has 14 He-3 counters and the other has 8 He-
3 counters. In the both modules, He-3 counters of 3040 torr and 100 cm length are embedded in 
polyethylene layer covered with a cadmium sheet. The sample cavity is covered with a 2 mm thick 
cadmium liner to prevent inflow of thermal neutrons generated outside of the cavity. The cadmium liner 
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is surrounded by a 30 cm thick graphite layer, a 10 cm thick polyethylene layer, and a 10 cm thick 
borated polyethylene layer in order from the inside to outside for radiation shielding. In the 
measurement, the drum placed on the stage is moved to the centre of the sample cavity as shown in 
Figure 2 and irradiated by 14 MeV fast neutrons from the D-T neutron generator. The fast neutrons 
moderated to thermal neutrons by matrix of the drum and the thermal neutrons induces the fission. 
During the measurement the drum is rotated to make the neutron flux uniform. 
Figure 2: JAWAS-T system. Left side figure shows schematic drawing of the system. Right side figure shows 
horizontal cross sectional view of the system. 
2.3. Standard sample 
Figure 3 shows a standard sample fabricated for measurement of the neutron flux in the matrix. The 
sample has a cylindrical shape with a diameter of 120 mm and a height of 127 mm. The sample has 5 
holes for the small He-3 detector to measure the neutron flux. Each hole is assigned alphabet and the 
sample is irradiated by D-T neutrons from A and B side as shown in Figure 3 (c). The sample can be 
separated into two parts at the centre and a Pu source can be set to measure the neutron flux with 
and without the Pu source as shown in Figure 3 (a) and (b). Three samples were made of different 
materials which have different cross sections for neutron: polyethylene which has a large scattering 
cross section, stainless steel which has a relatively high absorption cross section, and lead which has 
a small total cross section. The samples were tested only in the PUNITA. 
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Figure 3: Standard sample for measurement of neutron flux in the matrix. (a) and (b) are schematic drawing of 
the sample. (c) shows an arrangement of measurement position and direction of D-T neutron. 
3. Comparison between experimental and simulation results
3.1. Neutron flux distributions in the sample cavities of the JAWAS-T and the 
PUNITA 
The experimental and simulation results for neutron flux distributions in the sample cavity were 
compared in the PUNITA and the JAWAS-T. In the PUNITA, the neutron flux is measured by small 
He-3 counter in each position shown in Figure 4 (a). A position A is the nearest to the D-T neutron 
generator and a position B is the centre of the cavity. The others are defined by moving the detector to 
five sides from the centre except the position A. The small He-3 counter with gas pressure of 760 torr, 
diameter of 1.27 cm, and length of 7.62 cm was used. The neutron flux is defined by an integral from 
0.6 ms to 2.0 ms of the neutron counts of the small He-3 counter since the neutron counts of this time 
region are dominated by thermal neutron counts, or interrogation neutron counts in the PUNITA. Then, 
a relative neutron flux distribution is evaluated by normalizing the neutron flux of each position by that 
of the position A. In the JAWAS-T, a small He-3 counter with gas pressure of 190 torr, diameter of 
2.5 cm, and length of 12.5 cm was used. Measurement positions are shown in Figure. 4 (b). As is the 
case in the PUNITA, a position A is the nearest to the D-T neutron generator and a position B is the 
centre of the cavity. The others are defined by moving the detector to six sides. Total neutron counts 
were defined as the neutron flux, since it is hard to distinguish the interrogation neutrons in the JAEA 
type DDA. In the simulation, both systems are modelled and the He-3 counter is set in each positon. A 
neutron capture reaction in the He-3 counter is simulated by a Monte Carlo simulation code PHITS 
ver.2.82[8] with JENDL 4.0[9].  
Figure 4: Schematic view of the measurement positions in both systems. 
Figure 5 shows the positon dependence of a C/E value which is defined as a ratio of the results 
obtained by the simulation and the experiment in each system. The C/E value is 1.00 in the position A 
since the flux of this position is used for normalization. The C/E was less than 1.00 in every position 
except the position A in both systems. The largest discrepancies between the experiment and the 
simulation results are observed in the position D with the C/E value of 0.84 in the PUNITA and the 
position H with the C/E value of 0.87 in the JAWAS-T. 
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Figure 5: A positon dependence of a C/E value for neutron flux in both systems. 
Figure 6: Comparison between measured and simulated time distributions of neutron counts in the position B in 
the JAWAS-T. 
In the JAWAS-T, to investigate the reason for the discrepancies, time distributions of neutron counts in 
the position B were obtained as shown in Figure 6. Since the simulation results are obtained in the unit 
of 1/source, the results are normalized by source neutron intensity of 3.0×1010 evaluated by the 
activation method using an aluminium sample. In Figure 6, the discrepancy is observed after 0.1 ms. 
Since the neutron flux in this time region is dominated by thermal neutrons in the JAWAS-T, the 
thermal neutron flux distribution was simulated by PHITS as shown in Figure 7. Each panel shows the 
neutron flux in each time intervals of those between 0.1 and 0.2 ms, 0.2 and 0.5 ms, 0.5 and 1.0 ms, 
1.0 and 2.0 ms, 2.0 and 5.0 ms, and 5.0 and 10 ms. Two lines in the right side of each panel in Figure 
7 are gaps in the cadmium liner for the moving part of the stage for the drum. As shown in Figure 7, 
the thermal neutron flux in the sample cavity after 0.1 ms is dominated by inflow of the thermal 
neutrons generated by moderation in the graphite layer. The reason of the large discrepancies is that 
the size and the position of the gaps are not incorporated accurately in the model of the simulation. 
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Figure 7: Time variation of the thermal neutron flux in the JAWAS-T. 
3.2. Neutron flux distributions in the standard sample placed in the PUNITA 
The experimental and simulation results for neutron flux distributions in the standard samples are 
compared in the PUNITA. Neutron flux is measured by using the same He-3 detector as described in 
section 3.1 at each position shown in Figure 3 with and without Pu source. As is the case in section 
3.1, the neutron flux is defined by an integral from 0.6 ms to 2.0 ms of the neutron counts of the small 
He-3 counter. Then, a relative neutron flux is evaluated by normalizing the neutron counts of each 
measurement by those of the measurement without standard matrix. The neutron counts of He-3 
detector are simulated by PHITS ver.2.82 with JENDL 4.0 and compared with experimental results. 
Comparison results represented in the C/E are shown in Figure 8 (a), (b), and (c) for polyethylene, 
stainless steel, and lead, respectively. In Figure 8 (d), plots represent average value and bars 
represent maximum and minimum values of the C/E for each sample. The simulation underestimates 
the neutron fluxes in the polyethylene and the lead samples especially in a farther position from the 
neutron generator. Because of a longer neutron path in the standard sample at the farther position, 
effect of the thermal neutron scattering is considered to be the cause of the underestimation. Since 
there are no S(α,β) data for lead and poor data for polyethylene, an accuracy of the simulation can be 
improved with more accurate S(α,β) data. 
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Figure 8: Position and material dependence of the C/E values for the neutron flux in the standard samples. (a), 
(b), and (c) show the results with a matrix of polyethylene, stainless steel, and lead, respectively. (d) shows the 
averaged C/Es for each material. 
4. Summary
In this research, we have measured and simulated the neutron flux distributions in the sample cavity of 
the PUNITA and the JAWAS-T and the neutron flux distributions in the standard samples placed in the 
PUNITA and compared measurement and simulation results. For the neutron flux distribution in the 
sample cavity, the simulation underestimates the neutron flux. There are rooms for improvement in the 
both models for the simulation, and thus an accuracy of the simulation can be improved. For the 
neutron flux distribution in the standard sample, the simulation underestimate the neutron flux in the 
polyethylene and the lead samples. The underestimation seems to be due to low accuracy of S(α,β) 
data for thermal neutron scattering law. 
In the design of the Active-N which is the demonstration system of the next generation DDA technique, 
to improve the accuracy of simulation, the gap of the moving part is covered with thermal neutron 
absorber to prevent the inflow of thermal neutrons. 
5. Acknowledgements
This work was done under the agreement between JAEA and EURATOM in the field of nuclear 
materials safeguards research and development. This work is supported by JSGO/MEXT.  
6. References
[1] W. E. Kunz, J. D. Atencio, J. T. Caldwell, ‘‘A 1-nCi/g Sensitivity transuranic waste assay system 
using pulsed neutron interrogation’’, LA-UR-80-1794, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (1980). 
[2] M. Haruyama, A. Ara, M. Takase, “High-sensitivity detection of fissile materials in a waste drum by 
direct interrogation of 14 MeV Acc neutrons” Transactions of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan, 
43(4], 397-404 (2001) [in Japanese]. 
[3] M. Haruyama, M. Takase, H. Tobita, T. Mori, “High-sensitivity detection by direct interrogation of 14 
MeV Acc neutrons, (I) Uranium-contained metal matrix in a waste drum” Transactions of the
Atomic Energy Society of Japan, 3(2], 185-192 (2004) [in Japanese]. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
700
[4] M. Haruyama, H. Tobita, M. Takase, T. Mori, “High-sensitivity detection by direct interrogation of 14 
MeV Acc neutrons, (II) Uranium-contained cloth matrix in a waste drum” Transactions of the Atomic
Energy Society of Japan, 6(1), 65-72 (2007) [in Japanese]. 
[5] M. Haruyama, M. Takase, H. Tobita, “Improvement of Detection Limit in 14 MeV Neutron Direct I 
nterrogation Method by Decreasing Background”, J. Nucl. Sci. Technol., 45(5), 432-440 (2008). 
[6] A. Favalli, B. Pedersen, “Design and characterization of a pulsed neutron interrogation facility” Rad. 
Prot. Dos., 126(1-4), 74-77 (2007). 
[7] A. Favalli, H.-C. Mehner, J.-M. Crochemore, B. Pedersen, “Pulsed neutron facility for research in
illicit trafficking and nuclear safeguards” IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., 56(3) 1292-1296 (2009). 
[8] T. Sato, K. Niita, N. Matsuda, S. Hashimoto, Y. Iwamoto, S. Noda, T. Ogawa, H. Iwase, H. 
Nakashima, T. Fukahori, K. Okumura, T. Kai, S. Chiba, T. Furuta and L. Sihver, Particle and Heavy 
Ion Transport Code System PHITS, Version 2.52, J. Nucl. Sci. Technol. 50(9), 913-923 (2013). 
[9] K. Shibata, O. Iwamoto, T. Nakagawa, N. Iwamoto, A. Ichihara, S. Kunieda, S. Chiba, K. Furutaka, 
N. Otuka, T. Ohsawa, T. Murata, H. Matsunobu, A. Zukeran, S. Kamada, and J. Katakura: 
"JENDL-4.0: A New Library for Nuclear Science and Engineering," J. Nucl. Sci. Technol. 48(1), 1-
30 (2011). 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
701
Simulation study of neutron moderator in a delayed gamma-ray 
measurement system using a 14 MeV D-T neutron source 
J. Takamine, F. Rossi, D.C. Rodriguez, M. Koizumi, M. Seya, 
Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Security and Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Tokai, Japan 
Abstract: 
Methods to determine the ratios of fissile nuclides (e.g U-235, Pu-239, and Pu-241) contained in 
nuclear materials (NM) are required for nuclear nonproliferation and security. At the Japan Atomic 
Energy Agency (JAEA), we are developing a delayed gamma-ray spectroscopy (DGS) system using a 
compact, pulsed neutron, deutrerium-tritium (D-T) generator. It is important to develop moderators 
suitable to decrease the 14-MeV energy of neutrons produced by the D-T generator into the thermal 
region for the purpose of increasing the possibility of fission reactions. The design of the neutron 
moderator system that consists of tungsten, graphite, and polyethylene is being developed using 
MCNP6. We present here the results our study of the time dependence and spatial and energy 
distributions of the neutron fluence in the system. 
Keywords: Delayed gamma-ray; Nuclear nonproliferation and security; 14-MeV neutron; Neutron 
moderator; MCNP 
1. Introduction
Measurement methods of nuclear materials (NM) such as purified NM (e.g. MOX fuel) and non-
purified NM with high radioactivity (e.g. spent fuel, vitrified waste, melted fuel from reactor accidents, 
and next-generation fuel cycle materials) have been studied for the purpose of nuclear security and 
nonproliferation in the world. Especially, the spent and melted fuels irradiate very strong gamma rays 
and neutrons. Since it is quite difficult to distinguish gamma rays irradiated from fissile nuclides in 
these NM from intense passive gamma rays from fission products, current NDA methods are not 
effective to quantify the fissile nuclide.  
In the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), delayed gamma spectrometry (DGS) [1-3] using 14MeV 
D-T neutron generator (D-T generator) [4,5] is under development to remove this deficiency. The D-T 
generators have the advantages of being more compact and cost effective than the photo-neutron 
sources of large particle accelerators. The generators also have higher intensity and are also easier to 
handle than radioactive isotope (RI) sources such as Cf-252 and Am-Be. Since D-T neutrons are high 
energy (14 MeV), it is important to develop moderators suitable to decrease the energy of the 
neutrons into the thermal region for the purpose of increasing the possibility of fission reactions in the 
fissile nuclides of interest (e.g U-235, Pu-239, and Pu-241). If a moderator consisting of only low-Z 
materials is applied for the D-T generators, it is presumed that many of the fast- and high energy-
neutrons are released from the moderator, because of the low elastic scattering cross-section at 14 
MeV.  
In the DGS technique, delayed gamma rays derived from the fission products produced from thermal 
fission is used to determine the ratio of fissile isotopes. The fission cross-section of U-238 is close to 
other isotopes above ~2 MeV, very different compared to the thermal region. Most NM of interest, 
such as spent fuel, contain high U-238 densities for which the fission reactions by fast neutrons are 
not negligible [3]. Additionally, decreasing fast- and high energy-neutrons contributes to prevent High 
pure germanium detector from being damaged. It is necessary to moderate as many 14-MeV neutrons 
as possible to the thermal region.  
In previous research [3,4], we demonstrated that combinations of tungsten, graphite, and polyethylene 
were appropriate as the moderator materials for 14-MeV neutrons by analysing simple spherical and 
more realistic cylindrical models using MCNP6. Neutron multiplication reactions are occurring between 
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nuclei in tungsten, and reducing the kinetic energy of the 14-MeV neutrons to evaporation spectrum 
with the most probable energy from 1 to 2 MeV. These lower-energy neutrons can then be slowed 
down by polyethylene and reflected by graphite easily.  
Effectiveness of the moderator model is confirmed by comparing energy spectrum of multiple MCNP6 
models. For the purpose of understanding contribution each region in the model, spatial distributions 
of neutron flux respective energy regions were also visualized. Since the time distribution have 
information specific to materials such as ability of moderation, time distribution measurements of 
thermal neutron counts using He-3 detectors were also simulated using MCNP6.       
We present here the results our study of the time dependence, spatial and energy distributions of the 
neutron fluence in the system. 
2. Calculation model
As mentioned above, it is necessary to moderate as many 14-MeV neutrons as possible to the thermal 
region for improved fissile quantification. In this section, we demonstrate that combinations of tungsten, 
graphite, and polyethylene are appropriate as the moderator materials for 14-MeV neutrons by 
analysing simple spherical models and more realistic cylindrical models using MCNP6. In this 
research, more details of the realistic moderator system than previous research are analysed to 
understand how well each region of the system contribute to slowing down or reflection of neutrons 
and making plans of future experiments. X-Z and X-Y sectional views of the model are shown in 
Figure 1.  
Each region is cylindrical shape. The hollow space in the cylindrical tungsten is where the D-T neutron 
generator would be positioned. The 14-MeV neutrons are emitted isotropically from the source 
position with neutron yield of 108 [n/s] based on a SODERN generator [5]. NM region is void, which is 
surrounded by high-density polyethylene (HDPE). We evaluate the quality of the moderation by 
comparing the neutron flux within the NM sample region. We call the modal WPC below.  
3. Comparison of energy spectrums
To confirm the contribution of tungsten, HDPE, graphite in WPC, four moderators based on WPC but 
lacking one or two regions are considered. The four models are: W has only tungsten region, WP has 
only tungsten and HDPE regions, PC has only HDPE and Graphite regions, WC has tungsten and 
Graphite regions. Neutron energy fluxes in the NM region are compared in Figure 2. Integrated values 
below 0.5 eV (thermal), above 1MeV (fast) and (red line) the thermal/fast ratio are shown in Table1.  
Figure 1. X-Z and X-Y sectional views of the realistic moderator model consisting 
of tungsten, HDPE and graphite. Each part has a cylindrical shape. 
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< 0.5eV (Thermal) 
[n/cm2/s] 
> 1MeV (Fast) 
[n/cm2/s] 
Thermal/Fast 
WPC 1.7×105 2.20×104 7.77 
WP 4.96×104 1.76×104 2.86 
PC 4.00×104 3.82×104 1.05 
W 0 2.29×104 0 
WC 9.04×103 3.62×104 0.25 
Table 1. Integrated flux of WPC, WP, PC, WC, and W for neutrons with energies below 0.5 eV 
(thermal) and above 1MeV (fast) and the ratio between these values. 
A large peak in the W spectrum is shown around 500keV. Neutron multiplication reactions seem to 
occur between nuclei in tungsten and reduce the kinetic energy of the 14-MeV neutrons. 
Adding HDPE effectively reduces the energy as seen by comparing the W and WP spectra. Many of 
the neutrons with most probable energy of 500keV are moderated by HDPE well, since the peak 
intensity is decreased and continues energy neutrons are seen from thermal to fast region. There is a 
large peak below 0.5eV not only in WP spectrum but also others except for W. The difference between 
WPC and WP mean that intensity of total energy neutrons are increased by reflection effects of 
Graphite. Especially, thermal neutron flux of WPC is 3.43 times higher than that of WP as shown in 
Table 1. On the other hand, fast neutron flux of WPC is only 1.25 times higher than that of WP. The 
graphite region contributes to increase thermal / fast ratio. The difference between WPC and PC 
means that tungsten reduces over 2 MeV neutrons and increase below 1MeV neutrons. The thermal 
flux of WPC is over four times higher than that of PC, and fast neutron flux of WPC is 0.57 of PC as 
shown in Table 1. The difference between WPC and WC means that moderation power of graphite is 
not enough to slow down neutrons derived from multiplication reactions in tungsten. HDPE 
surrounding NM region moderates neutrons above 1MeV well and increases neutrons below 0.5eV 
well as shown in Table1.  Since Thermal/Fast of WPC (7.77) is much more than others, we consider 
that each region in WPC contributes to increase Thermal/Fast well.     
Physical dimensions of tungsten, HDPE and Graphite regions were decided by parametric surveys, 
the weight and effective cost. In this paper, these results are omitted for simplicity.   
Figure 2. Neutron energy spectrums in the NM regions 
of WPC, WP and PC calculated by MCNP6 
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4. Spatial distributions
In section 3, it was shown that each region in WPC contributed to increase Thermal/Fast by 
compared WPC with some systems. In this section, neutron spatial distributions of three energy 
regions of WPC are observed, for the purpose of visual confirmation for effectiveness of the whole of 
WPC. The three regions are: above 10MeV (High energy), from 0.1 to 10 MeV (Fast), below 0.5eV 
(Thermal). X and Y direction of spatial meshes in the distributions are divided for every 10mm. Z 
direction is only one region from -25mm to 25 mm, centered on the source position. Spatial 
distributions with the three energy regions are shown in Figure 3.  
Horizontal and vertical axes in Figure 3 are X and Y in Figure 1. As shown in High energy of Figure 3, 
the neutrons above 10MeV are decreased in tungsten region rapidly by effects of multiplication and 
inelastic reactions. In graphite region, the neutrons are decreased slower than tungsten. Fast energy 
of Figure 3 shows that intensity of the neutrons from 0.1 to 10MeV becomes the maximum by effects 
of multiplication reactions and inelastic reactions in tungsten region. The neutrons are decreased 
rapidly by high moderation power of HDPE region. Thermal of Figure 3 shows a thermal energy 
neutrons distribution. The neutrons are spread entirely but concentrated especially in HDPE and NM 
regions. From above results, it is understood that each region in WPC contributes to increase 
Thermal/Fast well. 
5. Time distribution of neutron flux
Though the neutron energy can be estimated by simulation codes, it is difficult to know energy of the 
neutrons using simple detection systems. Detectors using neutron capture reaction such as He-3 
detectors can measure time distribution of thermal neutrons that are directly related to the specific 
materials. In this section, He-3 gas with pressure of 4 atm is filled with NM region in WPC, WP, PC, 
and WC. The time distribution measurements of capture reaction number are simulated.  The time of 
Figure 3. Spatial distributions with the three energy regions. The three regions are: 
 above 10MeV (High energy), from 0.1 to 10 MeV (Fast), below 0.5eV (Thermal). 
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releasing the 14MeV neutrons and time bins are set to 0 sec and 10 μsec respectively. These results 
are shown in Figure 4.  
As shown in Figure 4, lines of WPC and PC consist of a fast and slow decay component, and we 
consider that each component is caused by the reactions of hydrogen atoms and carbon atoms. Since 
slowing down of neutrons in WP and WC seems to be caused by hydrogen or carbon atoms, these 
plots consist of one component of fast or slow. Exponential approximations were performed by 𝐶 𝑡 = 𝛼 ∙ exp −𝜆!"#$ ∙ 𝑡 + 𝛽 ∙ exp −𝜆!"#$% ∙ 𝑡
Where 𝐶 is counts, t is elapsed time in 𝜇𝑠𝑒𝑐, 𝛼 and 𝛽 are constants of the two exponential components, 𝜆!"#$ and 𝜆!"#$% are decay constants of the two components. The constants derived from the fittings 
are shown in Table 2. The 𝛼 and 𝛽 of WPC are about 5 and 4.2 times of PC, which are caused by 
multiplication effect of tungsten.  𝜆!"#$ and 𝜆!"#!" of WPC are about 1.02 and 1.2 times of PC. We 
consider that comparatively high absorption cross-section of tungsten put the effect on HDPE and 
carbon regions.  The 𝛼 of WPC are about 2.9 times of WP, which is caused by graphite reflections. We 
conclude that by influencing the neutron time distribution of each system and comparing these 
coefficients of exponential fitting results, it is possible to ascertain the influence of each region on 
thermal neutrons. 
𝛼 𝜆!"#$ 𝛽 𝜆!"#$%
WPC 4.50E×104 14.6 3.38E×102 2.81 
PC 8.94E×103 14.4 8.92E×101 2.37 
WP 1.57E×104 18.2 - - 
WC - - 6.92E×102 3.11 
Table2. Constants derived from the exponential fittings of neutron capture time distributions 
             in He-3 detectors 
6. Summary
A neutron moderator system consisting of tungsten, HDPE, and graphite was designed for a delayed 
gamma-ray measurement system using a 14 MeV D-T neutron source by simulations using MCNP6. 
For the purpose of evaluation of the effectiveness, energy spectrums in the sample region of the 
system were compared using different combinations of the three material components. Each region of 
the system contributed to increase thermal neutrons entering the nuclear material region while the 
tungsten and HDPE decrease the 14-MeV and fast neutrons. However, it is difficult to measure 
neutron energy actually with simple measurement system. For preliminary study of experimental 
Figure 4. Time distributions of neutron capture number  in the 
 He-3 regions of WPC, WP, PC and WC. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
706
evaluation, time distributions of neutron counts in He-3 detectors in the moderator system were 
compared using different combinations of the three material components. The time distributions were 
fit with double-exponential functions to account for the fast and delayed periods, and the coefficients 
were compared. Since the coefficients showed moderation and absorption effects of each part well, 
we concluded that evaluation of the system using the method is possible experimentally.       
In the future, a moderator design of more detailed experimental environment will be performed. The 
effectiveness of the moderator system will be verified by measurement experiment of time dependent. 
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Abstract: 
In this paper we present the joint efforts of the partners under Action Sheet (AS) #59 “Cooperation on 
Improved Techniques for High Count Rate Non-destructive Assay Measurements” to conduct 
comparison testing of a high counting rate preamplifier developed at LANL with the currently installed 
PUNITA electronics in a pulsed, high neutron flux environment. Two of the PUNITA analogue 
channels (one close and one far away from the neutron generator) were upgraded with the LANL-
fabricated KM200 analogue electronics. In addition, remote switching of KM200 amplifier inputs and 
detector outputs allowing a newly developed LANL method for self-calibration of counting loss 
compensation to be applied. Side by side comparison of raw count rate data was made with the 
KM200 and original PUNITA electronics for a wide range of neutron flux intensities and different 
numbers of detectors per KM200modules. .  
The experimental data were analyzed to obtain the dependence of output versus input count rates and 
the corresponding dead-time (DT) loss error for a wide range of count rates. The comparison results 
indicated that the configuration with four preamplifiers per module will expand the count rate 
capabilities about 10 times while the configuration with two preamplifiers will expand the existing count 
rate capabilities about 5 times.   The LANL DT correction method will expand further the count rate 
capabilities in both cases. The abrupt drop in the corrected data noticed at extremely high rates may 
suggest a gain shift due to a space charge effect.  
The data analysis confirmed that dead-time losses in the He3-based neutron counters fit to the non-
paralyzable DT model, rather than the paralyzable DT model currently used by the community, but the 
equivalent DT at high counting rates is a few times higher than that measured at low counting rates. 
Keywords: preamplifiers; high signal rates; neutron counting; active interrogation; DDA 
1. Introduction
Non-destructive Assay (NDA) techniques for nuclear safeguards often require acquisition systems 
capable of handling high signal count rates.  In recent years, a general need has emerged to improve 
the existing detector analogue electronics for better performance in these high count rate applications. 
Recent examples of this need include an increasing emphasis on direct measurement of spent nuclear 
fuel (SNF), a need to measure accurately fissile material within samples exhibiting high (α,n) 
reactions, and measuring high neutron fluxes in pulsed neutron interrogation systems with safeguards 
applications.  In the last example, prompt neutron and gamma emissions from a sample are the most 
intense signatures that can be used to accurately quantify the material.  So far, the use of prompt 
emissions has, to some extent, been hampered by the difficulty in acquiring meaningful signals during, 
or immediately after, the burst of neutrons from the interrogation source.  Currently available 
electronics for processing gamma-ray and neutron signals (mainly based on Amptek A-111 and 
PDT10) perform poorly due to saturation of the electronics in the high flux environment.  In the case of 
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Differential Die-Away assay (when applied to SNF, nuclear waste, etc.), a majority of the signal of 
interest occurs immediately after the interrogation, and decays exponentially thereafter, typically 
resulting in that portion of the signal being lost to saturation. Better electronics are needed for DDA of 
spent fuel measurements due to the combination of gamma-rays and neutrons from SNF as well as 
the 14-MeV neutron burst from the neutron generator).  
Pursuant to the Agreement between the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the 
United States Department of Energy (DOE) in the field of Nuclear Material Safeguards and Security 
Research and Development, signed 2 November 2010 (AS #59), the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) and Euratom will undertake a cooperative effort to improve the performance 
and reliability of NDA Measurements in applications including high counting rate situations. The US 
DOE has developed new (KM200) high count rate electronics for proportional counters [1, 2, 3].  
This paper describes the activities and results related to the requirements of Task 1 – field trial of KM-
200 electronics for improvement of Differential Die-Away (DDA) assay at the Pulsed Neutron 
Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA) of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
[4,5]. By this cooperative effort, the U.S.-designed preamplifiers can be evaluated in a controlled 
environment involving active interrogation allowing a comparison of measurement results for U and Pu 
standards with previous measurements acquired with standard DDA electronics at PUNITA.  
The safeguards objective achieved by the testing campaign of the KM200 at PUNITA is to 
demonstrate the superior count-rate capabilities of this circuit compared with the standard amplifier 
circuits for proportional counters as used in a variety of safeguards instruments. The tests involved the 
installation of KM200 amplifiers, developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), in the PUNITA 
pulsed-source facility in order to assess the effectiveness of the KM200 for safeguards purposes. A 
new self-calibration method (also developed by LANL) for correcting DT losses in pulsed neutron 
experiments, was implemented and tested. 
With the KM200 enabling measurement in the period closer to the neutron generator (NG) burst, this 
enhancement should allow: 
• Significantly better counting statistics to be obtained on the signal component from detected
fission neutrons (thus lowering the limit of detection) without prolonging the measurement time 
• Better accuracy in safeguards verification measurements for samples of high neutron count
rates because of the reduced dead-time (DT) of the KM200.
• Evaluation of KM200 count rate capabilities in wide range of neutron flux conditions that that
are difficult to achieve with radioactive neutron sources
The self-calibration method for DT correction was implemented simply by changing the numbers of 
tubes per amplifier. This change accommodates higher tube neutron incident rates and uses that 
information for a quantitative comparison basis for dead-time losses. Furthermore, it allows an 
assessment of the performance improvement versus installation cost, and speeds-up the testing time 
for different measurements (i.e., since there is no need to open the junction box and change the HV 
circuitry). 
2. Description of the neutron detection system of the PUNITA facility and
experimental setup 
JRC’s PUNITA laboratory incorporates a main detection system composed of 96 3He proportional 
counters called fission neutron counters (designed to detect fission neutrons). These detectors are 
grouped into 24 modules. Each module includes a junction box containing one amplifier unit 
connected to four 3He tubes (Figure1).  
The PUNITA system is excited with a short neutron pulse from a neutron generator (NG). After a short 
thermalization period, the NG pulse produces a thermal neutron flux in the detectors that, by design, 
decays exponentially over a nominal 10 ms period (Figure2). Further detail is given in [4, 5]. 
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Figure 1: PUNITA depiction (expanded view). 
The detector response is a convolution of neutron interactions from the generator flux and the 
exponential die-away response determined by the graphite moderator and neutron absorbers in the 
system’s walls. The detectors and moderators in the wall are shielded from the thermal neutrons 
coming from inside the cavity.  The signal in the detectors follows an exponential decay as long as the 
dead-time losses are negligible, and the electronics are not saturated. 
Besides fitting each detector with a dedicated amplifier, a faster response amplifier circuit (providing 
less DT effect in the neutron counters) could benefit the PUNITA detection system by producing a 
faster return to the exponential decay of the counts from the neutron pulse. 
3. KM200-UPGRADE OF PUNITA Electronics
3.1. KM200 electronics 
The KM200 front-end electronics is a modular and flexible technology [1, 2] that can interface with a 
broad range of thermal neutron detectors and other applications.  It consists of a set of customizable 
circuit boards that can be used in new detector systems or as retrofit for existing ones. The 
customization consists of adapting the time constants and the gain in the KM200s for the specific 
application and user requirements, such as a more universal KM200-FAST and KM200-SLOW 
designed to works with all typical multiplicity counter tubes, or one optimized to have minimal dead 
time for a specific detector. The latter is likely for extreme application requirements such as an SNF 
DDA instrument, the IAEA Vitrified Waste Coincidence Counter, gross neutron measurements in fork 
detector, etc. 
3.2. KM200 retrofit design 
The installation of four KM200 preamplifiers (one per tube) with low DT compared to the single 
PUNITA preamplifier – serving four 3He tubes with time constants similar to the PDT-10A developed 
by Canberra – would improve substantially the count rate performance, but will require higher 
installation cost. In order to measure the level of improvement versus the installation cost, separate 
measurements with different (two or four preamp) in the box must be performed. Rewiring the 
connection in the junction box requires extensive and time consuming assembly and disassembly 
work on the detectors in the PUNITA instrument. Additionally, we will not know the magnitude of DT 
losses immediately following the burst, which are inevitable to some degree. Therefore, we have 
installed one relay that allows remote reconfiguration of the pre-amp so that measurements can be 
performed in the planned time frame. An additional advantage of the relay installation is that we can 
compare the measured count rates with incident neutron rates in the tube by using a newly developed 
by LANL self-calibration method for correction of DT losses [3]. A detailed description  of the dead 
time calibration and compensation method and proof of principle results are reported in [6] .The 
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additional hardware burden for implementing this remote-reconfiguration method is minimal 
(installation of only one mechanical relay with dual switching contacts per junction box). 
The PUNITA retrofit design (Figure 2) consists of four KM200 amplifiers (one per tube) mounted on a 
redesigned ground plate (preamplifiers on the top and HV circuitry with switching relay on the bottom) 
for each junction box. This design allows a drop-in replacement of the exiting ground plate which 
should ease the potential full replacement of PUNITA electronics without any mechanical work in the 
existing enclosures, and eases testing and troubleshooting the entire assembly outside the PUNITA 
detector. 
Figure 2: Top view of KM200 electronics installed in the junction box. The 5X2 header connector of KM200 was 
used for power and TTL signal daisy-chain connections 
3.3. Initial testing at LANL 
PUNITA staff communicated that their 3He tubes have Ar+CH4 gas admixture similar to detectors used 
in the HLNCC counters. Unlike the universal KM200-FAST preamplifier developed to work with both 
Ar+CH4 and CO2 gas admixtures [2], the KM200 was optimized to minimize the DT for this particular 
tube fill.  The plateau curves of individual and daisy-chained preamplifiers – after gain matching and 
double pulsing filter optimization, as shown in Figures 3a and 3b – provided uniform performances, 
with plateaus beginning at about 1600 V and having width of about 150V. The time interval analysis in 
Figure 3c shows uniform performance for all tubes with this version of KM200 having about 30% 
reduced DT compared to the KM200-FAST preamplifier reported in [2]. The hump in the Time Interval 
Histogram (TIH) at around 500 ns is due to some double pulsing that is acceptable for single rates 
counting of DDA application. 
Figure 3a: Matched plateau 
characteristic for the first module four 
KM200 set.   
Figure 3b: Matched plateau 
characteristic for the second module 
four-KM200 set.   
Figure 3c: Time interval 
analysis with one detector per 
amplifier (relay OFF) and two 
detectors per amplifier (relay 
ON) 
4. Testing of PUNITA and KM200 electronics
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4.1. Test plan and experimental setup 
Understanding the combined, quantitative effect of implementing KM200s and the dead time self-
calibration and compensation method on precise active interrogation measurements would require a 
larger-scale effort and a full upgrade of electronics and analysis algorithms. LANL and the JRC believe 
that the simple upgrade of two of the PUNITA analogue channels – one close to and one far from the 
NG, as shown in Figure 4. – and a simple set of experiments with the NG located at different distances 
from detectors A4 and B1 will provide a sufficient indication of improvement for making further 
implementation decisions. The location variations are necessary to overcome the limited range of the 
NG burst intensity allowing the evaluation of the KM200 electronics for a wide range of input count 
rates. We have to stress that this sort of study is possible only in a versatile, pulsed neutron research 
facility such as PUNITA. 
Figure 4: Layout of comparison testing experiment where the inensity of incident neutron flux is changed by the 
changing the distances from the neutron generator by moving Side A  and Side C. The blue modules contain 
PUNITA electronics, the orange modules - KM200 electronics 
4.2. Setup of KM200 parameters and evaluation of KM200 and PUNITA responses to 
NG bursts 
This activity determines saturation limits of the electronics for a 100% and 200% load per amplifier at 
different settings of the NG and compares the KM200 and PUNITA amplifiers: The original PUNITA 4 
bar (Ar+CH4 gas admix) 3He tubes (LND, Inc. have lower operating voltage, likely due to its 
respectively thinner (0.001”) anode wire than those commonly used in multiplicity counters, i.e., Reuter 
Stokes 4 bar 3He tubes with Ar+CH4 and 0.002” anode wire. The combination of relatively low 
stopping power of 4 bar gas and slower charge collection of tubes with thin anode wire leads to higher 
fluctuations in the charge collection time and commensurately excessive double pulsing effect when 
short shaping time is used. The plateaus of the KM200 electronics upgraded module C4 taken before 
and after the setup is shown on Figure 5. 
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Figure 5a: Initial plateaus for LND tubes taken with 
uniform settings of KM200 electronics (DPF=OFF, 
threshold 0.18V).  
Figure 5b: Plateaus for LND tubes after gain 
matching and DPF optimization. Upper curves: all 
preamps output for one and two preamplifiers per 
tube configurations (with a bad-performing Tube #3). 
Lower curves:  plateaus of individual preamps.   
Unlike the Reuter Stokes tubes, the LND tubes show very high spread of gain and plateau length 
(Figure 5a). The plateaus after gain matching show reasonable plateau even with bad performing tube 
#3. 
4.3. Experimental data 
The accelerating voltage of the NG was reduced about 15% in order to reduce the intensity of fast 
neutrons burst and avoid deep saturation of the first stage observed during preliminary 
measurements.  According to the setup on Figure 4, two sets of data (one with Relay Off and one with 
Relay On) were taken for each position of the modules A4 and B1. The count rate data (Figure 6) from 
A4/B1 modules close to the NG and C4/B1 modules far from the generator taken with closed PUNITA 
represent the data of normal operating conditions. 
Figure 6: Count rate response-tested electronics measured at closed PUNITA. Left: A4 (KM200) and B1 
(PUNITA) modules.  Right: Positions C4 (KM200) and D1 (PUNITA).  
5. Data analysis
Thanks to PUNITA’s single exponential thermal neutron die away time, count rate extrapolation can be 
made even in the period immediately after the NG burst, where dead-time loses are very large or the 
electronics is in saturation. The count rate response form NG burst shown on Figure 6 indicates 
substantially better count rate performance of KM200 electronics, but does not allow quantifying the 
DT losses versus input count rates. Therefore the following data analysis was performed.  We have 
selected a region of time with low DT losses for the measured data and used an exponential fit to 
extrapolate these data to the region with substantial DT losses. We used this exponential fit as an 
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input count rate Nin (zero DT losses) in order convert the time dependence of count rate 
measurements from Figure 6 to the well-known output (measured) versus input count rate. 
The plotted (Figure 7) count rates (especially from slower PUNITA pre-amplifier) flatten at counting 
rates many times the value 1/τd, where τd is the shaper dead-time (about 2µs) and have behaviour 
much closer to the system with non-paralyzing  dead-time (Nout=Nin/(1+Nin*τnp ) with maximal 
asymptotic count rate Nmax=1/τnp rather a system with paralyzing dead-time ( Nout=Nin*exp(-Nin*τp)) with 
maximal rate 1/(τp *e) at count rate 1/τp , where τp is paralyzable dead-time, τnp is non-paralyzable 
dead-time, Nin is the incoming count rate, and Nout is the measured count rate.  
Using the two most severe DT cases (PUNITA and two KM200 amplifiers) we can estimate an 
equivalent non-paralyzing dead-times as follows: PUNITA amplifier τnp = 5.6 µs and KM200 
preamplifier τnp = 1.4 µs (asymptotic count rate divided by two to find the count for single amp). We 
have to stress that the obtained equivalent non-paralyzing  DTs are over 2 times higher than the DTs 
measured at low count rates by the TIH (see data in Figure 3c). The observed DT behaviour is 
consistent with our prior measurements.  More detailed analysis and explanation of the phenomena 
can be found in [6]. 
Figure 7: Plot of measured versus input count-rates. The extrapolated exponential fit (in blue) represents a 
zero DT system. The horizontal arrows point toward the maximal count rate for each measurement 
We have used the obtained dependency between the input and measured count rates to calculate the 
relative counting losses as (Nout-Nin)/Nin  plotted in Figure 8.  
The plot on Figure 8 indicates that an upgrade with four preamplifiers will expand the count rate 
capabilities about 10 times where the upgrade with two preamplifiers per module will expand the 
current count rate capabilities about 5 times. 
The DT correction method will expand further the count rate capabilities in both cases. The abrupt 
drop in the corrected data may suggest a gain shift due to space charge effect.  Operation away from 
the plateau knee could mitigate this problem.  
Nout max=1.4E+6 cps (two amps) 
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Figure 8: DT losses error versus input count rate for the current PUNITA instrument, green plot. PUNITA: 
Red – two KM200 preamplifiers per module; Orange – four KM200 preamps for module; Blue – four KM200 
preamplifiers per module DT corrected   
6. Discussion of possible next steps
There are three future testing options for KM200 electronics in EURATOM safeguards assays: 
• Multiplicity counting. The AWCC coincidence counter was selected as a preferable candidate
for testing of KM200 electronics because of its higher detection efficiency and number of tubes
per amplifier than HLNCC-II. The need of sources or nuclear material that provides substantial
DT for comparison testing of current and KM200 electronics was outlined. Measurements
using different numbers of detectors per amplifiers (use of relay) will provide not only the DT
losses correction, but also will allow testing the counter at 2x DT using the same source).
• Gross neutron measurements with FORK detector. The exceptional stability of KM200
amplifier and ability for remote threshold sensitivity control will allow neutron measurements of
all type spent fuel assemblies without tedious recalibration.
• Full PUNITA upgrade. A decision to fully upgrade PUNITA electronics would allow analytical
measurements to be performed.
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Abstract:  
Most of the safeguards assay for quantitative characterization of SNM (mass, multiplication, random 
neutron contribution) are based on neutron measurements and rely exclusively on the counting 
information from very efficient, but slow He-3 proportional tubes. The response of neutron detection 
systems is inevitably affected by Dead Time (DT) losses that are generally caused by very complex 
and convoluted processes, which are difficult to take into account for corrections (for example, the DT 
losses for bipolar shapers differ from those of unipolar shapers). Therefore an empirical approach for 
calculating the DT losses assuming exponential (paralyzing ) DT using measurements with two Cf-252 
sources with known activities was established as current practice for many safeguards neutron 
counting systems. The availability of a very wide range of such Cf-252 calibration sources becomes 
the limiting factor for extending the deadtime correction calibration over a sufficient dynamic range to 
reach the conditions of real measured material. 
In this paper we present a novel self-calibrating method for the determination and correction of 
deadtime losses that uses directly the neutron signal from real measured material. The count rate from 
the material is measured with two configurations of the preamplifiers: a standard configuration of the 
preamplifiers and tubes, corresponding to a nominal (100%) load per preamplifier and a second 
“deadtime measurement” configuration, where every two neighbouring clusters of He-3 tubes are 
connected together to a single preamplifier, corresponding to 200% load per preamplifier. A proof of 
principle DT calibration measurement over a wide dynamic range exceeding 106 reactions/sec using a 
14 MeV neutron generator, demonstrated experimentally the viability of this method. The method 
produces the DT correction factor at every measured counting rate. The results show the very 
important observation that the correction factor does not fit with either fully paralyzing  or fully non-
paralyzing dead time models. Using either model could lead to substantial deadtime correction errors.  
Explanation of DT behaviour and implementation aspects of this method in typical safeguards neutron 
systems (already in use or to be built) such as differential dieaway, coincidence and multiplicity 
counting will be discussed.  
Keywords: neutron counting losses; dead time models; dead time correction;  self-calibration; KM200 
1. Introduction
The analytical measurements using pulse mode radiation detection systems rely on proportionality 
between incident and recorded radiation events. That proportionality is limited by the inevitable 
counting losses due to: a) random time distribution and intensity of the incident radiation events and b) 
the minimum response time of the detection system to process and record two separate detection 
events, called Dead Time (DT). The DT in a typical gamma spectroscopy measurement system has 
two components: a) one from the duration of shaped pulses resulting from convolution between the 
detector current pulse I(t) and time response (weighting function W(t) ) of the selected pulse 
processing  electronics and b) electronics time to detect the pulses above the event threshold, 
measure (typically the ADC measurement time) and record  the amplitude of the pulse. Because the 
emphasis of gamma spectroscopy instrumentation is on preserving the energy information,  unipolar 
shaping with time constant much longer than detector current pulse is used for better noise and 
ballistic deficit suppression. In order to correct these losses two DT loss models are conventionally 
applied: a) paralyzing DT model Nmeas=Nin*exp(Nin*Td), where Td is a deadtime constant used to 
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correct the losses due to pile-up of superimposed unipolar pulses that prevents a new event being 
detected and recorded before the pile-up pulse goes below the event discriminator threshold  and b) 
non-paralyzing DT model  Nmeas =Nin/(1+Nin*Td) used to correct the time for a pulse amplitude 
measurement process that is triggered by the event discriminator signal. These two models have 
similar behaviour at incident rate where DT losses are relatively low (Nin* Td <<1) but very different 
behaviour at elevated rates and high DT losses [1, 2]. The uniform pulse shape due to time constants 
longer than the detector pulse and low busy time amplitude dependence due to very low event 
detection threshold (set just above the noise) provided a good match with constant extension of the 
DT of the paralyzing model. Therefore the paralyzing DT model combined with very effective pile-up 
rejection became an industry standard for correction of DT losses in gamma spectroscopy.    
On the contrary, the emphasis in neutron counting systems is to preserve the counting information 
from the 3He detector despite the long (microseconds) and very fluctuating shape of the current pulse 
(see Fig 1a).  Therefore with almost no exceptions the signal processing of existing electronics 
(Amptek-11, PDT, KM200) is based on bipolar shaping with time constant much shorter than duration 
of detector current pulse in order to reduce the dead time [3] as it is shown on Fig 1b.  
Fig. 1a. Normalized charge pulses (left) and corresponding current 
pulses. The fluctuation of charge collection time (left) result in very 
wide amplitude and duration of the current pulses (right)  
Fig.1b Charge pulses  (top) of 
N2 gas fill He3 tube and 
corresponding bipolar output 
pulses from KM200-SLOW 
shaper [4]   
The fluctuation of differentiated current pulse causes artificial parasitic triggering (the so called double 
pulsing effect). This effect is the main factor governing the selection of time constant as a trade-off 
between dead time and minimal amount of artificial pulses. We would like to stress that the average 
value of a bipolar pulse is zero (the areas of positive and negative lobes are equal). This leads to 
substantial differences in high count rate behaviour between unipolar and bipolar shapers: 
• The pulse pile-up spectrum in a unipolar shaper is superimposed on the right (higher energy)
versus the original spectrum while the pile up in the spectrum from a bipolar shaper is
superimposed in both directions versus the original non-pileup spectrum.
• The pile-up of unipolar pulses causes updating dead time and is described very well with the
exponential dependence of the paralyzing DT model (zero output at Nin*DT >>1). Because
the bipolar pulse has zero average value, the average value of superimposed bipolar
pulses also will be zero regardless of the input counting rate.  The intuitive implication is
that the paralyzing DT model would not describe well the DT behavior of a bipolar shaper at
elevated DT.
2. Description of the neutron detection system of the PUNITA facility and
experimental setup 
As described in the previous section, the DT losses in neutron counting systems are very complex and 
convoluted processes, which are difficult to take into account for corrections.  Therefore an empirical 
approach for calculating the DT losses assuming exponential (paralyzing) DT using measurements 
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with two Cf-252 sources with known activities was established as current practice for many safeguards 
neutron counting systems [5].  
The following equations are used to calculate the deadtime corrected singles (SC) and doubles (DC) 
rates: 
4
MS
C MS S e
δ
= (1) 
MS
C MD D e
δ= (2) 
where SC and DC are the true singles and doubles rates, SM and DM are the measured singles and 
doubles rates, respectively, and δ is the total deadtime coefficient given by: 
( )610MA B S sδ µ−= + ⋅ ⋅  (3) 
where A and B are constants. The dead-time parameter B is approximated as B = A2/4. These 
standard deadtime correction parameters (A and B) are applied to the singles and doubles rate for 
both coincidence and multiplicity analysis. The triples deadtime correction uses the multiplicity 
deadtime parameter. The multiplicity deadtime parameter was approximated as A/4. 
It is important to note that there are several measurement methods that can be used to establish A 
and B for a particular detector system.  
1) Doubles to Singles Ratio – measure the singles and doubles rates from at least 4 252Cf
sources that span a large range in activity, plot ln(D/S) versus Singles rate, and use a
quadratic curve to fit the data and determine A.
2) Source Intensity Ratio – measure a strong and a weak 252Cf source with very well-known
neutron yields, set the ratio of the deadtime corrected doubles rates equal to the known ratio
of 252Cf yields, and iteratively solve the equation for A.
3) Paired Source – measure 2 high yield 252Cf sources separately and then together, set the
deadtime corrected doubles rate from measuring sources together equal to the sum of the
deadtime corrected rates from measuring the sources separately, and iteratively solve the
equation for A.
The system deadtime is affected by properties of detector (e.g. polyethylene design, detector fill gas) 
and by the signal processing electronics (e.g. number of preamps, shaping time). The deadtime loss 
of neutron pulses increases as higher count rate, and it can be corrected empirically [6,7,8]. These 
techniques can provide excellent results for measurement samples with count rates in the range of the 
calibration sources used. But applications such as spent fuel, plutonium waste and MOX storage 
canisters, uranium and trans-uranium ingots, etc. often require operation at count rates many times 
the count rate of the empirical calibration.   The reliance of the present deadtime calibration method on 
a single measurement point therefore introduces potential limitations, such as: 
• It is difficult to find and measure Cf-252 sources in the entire dynamic range of the detection
system. 
• The count rates and neutron correlation characteristics of Cf-252 calibration source are
different from those of measured SNM. 
• The last but not least, the dead time behavior of bipolar shapers used in the 3He electronics
can differ from that calculated based on the simple assumption of paralyzing DT model with a 
fixed deadtime constant even at low or moderate count rates. 
3. Self-calibration method for counting loss correction
In order to address the listed above challenges, LANL has developed a new self-calibrating method for 
the determination and correction of dead time losses that uses the neutron signal from real measured 
material directly [9]. It is based on measuring the same incident reaction rate in the detector (count 
rate) from the material, Nin, with two configurations of preamplifiers: a standard configuration of 
preamplifiers and tubes, corresponding to a nominal (100%) count rate load per preamplifier and 
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second “dead time measurement” configuration, where every two neighbour clusters of detectors are 
connected together to a single preamplifier, corresponding to 200% load per preamplifier. An 
illustration of the described measurement is shown on Figure 2.    
Figure 2. Illustration of detector switching method for dead time self-calibration. When the relay switch 
at the preamps’ input is in initial position, both channels see normal count rate load (𝑁𝑁100%). When the 
relay is switched, the bottom preamp sees no detector signal and the top sees double the count rate 
load (𝑁𝑁200%).  The TTL output of both preamplifiers are summed in OR circuitry.   
The expression for the dead time constant (𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷) and the corrected input count rate per channel (𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) 
can be found using the following analysis: 
First assuming the dead time in the system is paralyzing:  
𝑁𝑁100%(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠) = 2 × 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑎𝑎−𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷    =>  𝐼𝐼100%2×𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝑎𝑎−𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 /4/ 
𝑁𝑁200% = 2𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑎𝑎−2𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷  =>  𝐼𝐼200%2𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = (𝑎𝑎−𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷)2 /5/ 
Where,  𝑁𝑁100% is the measured count rate when one detector is connected to one amplifier, and 𝑁𝑁200% 
is the measured count rate when two detectors are connected to one amplifier.  
Observing that 𝑎𝑎−𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 is present in both expressions, we can eliminate the 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 unknown and simplify:  
𝑁𝑁200%2𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = �𝑁𝑁100%2𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 �2
Solving for 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, we get an expression for the incoming count rate that involves only measured 
quantities:  
𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼100%22𝐼𝐼200% /6/ 
We can also solve for the value of the paralyzing dead time. 
𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 =  −2𝐼𝐼200%𝐼𝐼100%2  ln �𝐼𝐼200%𝐼𝐼100%� /7/ 
Secondly we can apply the same method with the assumption of non-paralyzing dead time.  In this 
case the measured count rates are: 
𝑁𝑁100% = 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(1− 𝑁𝑁100% 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷)  and 𝑁𝑁200% = 2𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(1− 𝑁𝑁200% 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷). /8/ 
Then, 
𝐼𝐼100%
𝐼𝐼200%
= 1−𝐼𝐼100% 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷
2(1−𝐼𝐼200% 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷).
In the above equation 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷is the only unknown, so solving for 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷gives 
𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 = 2𝐼𝐼200% − 1𝐼𝐼100%. /9/ 
Substituting 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 in the equation /5/ and solving 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 for gives 
𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼100%𝐼𝐼200%2(𝐼𝐼200%−𝐼𝐼100%).
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4. FNEM detector and DT calibration using classical dual source method
The classical paired source DT correction method was used to calibrate a new a detector developed 
at KAERI called the Fast Neutron Energy Multiplication (FNEM) detector. This detector utilizes both 
FNEM and passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) methods. FNEM consists of two rings of three 
3He tubes where 1 ring is located close to the sample cavity and the other ring is located far from the 
sample cavity (see Figure 3). The FNEM method is sensitive to the induced fission rate by fast 
neutrons and PNAR is sensitive to the induced fission rate by thermal neutrons. The total induced 
fission rate is proportional to the amount of fissile material in the sample being measured.  
The efficiency for each ring of the FNEM detector was measured to be ~6.7% for the inner ring and 
~0.75% for the outer ring. Since the FNEM method is based on multiplication (induced fission) in the 
measured sample, this detector was designed to measure high count rate samples (>1 x 106 n/s) and 
thus understanding the DT correction is essential to its calibration and characterization [10].  
Figure 3. Picture and schematic of FNEM detector. 
Using the paired source method described earlier in this paper, the DT coefficients (A and B) for 
FNEM were measured using two Cf252 sources with intensities of 1.57×106 n/s and 1.55×106 n/s at 
LANL. The iteratively calculated coefficients for dead time were 2.147×10-6 for A and 1.152×10-12 for 
B, which were then applied in the INCC software. The fractional count loss of the inner ring was 
determined to be about 6.3% and 12.1% for the 0.12 and 0.25 MHz count rates, respectively. It should 
be noted that the incident neutron rate used for deadtime measurement corresponds to about 3% of 
the maximum expected emission from a high count rate multiplying sample.  
5. DT calibration using neutron generator and LANL self-calibration method
Because the exponential non-paralyzing Dt model may not fit the real behaviour of bipolar shaper of 
PDT-110A well, the extension of the calibration from two Cf252 sources by about 30 times may lead to 
substantial count rate (respectively SNM mass) correction error. Therefore, we have used a neutron 
generator placed in the centre of the FNEM cavity as a neutron source with variable intensity of 
neutron flux. It should be noted that unlike the radioactive sources , we don’t know the exact value of  
the NG neutron flux. 
The neutron flux was controlled by changing the neutron generator’s acceleration voltage and beam 
current, which provides a dynamic range greater than a factor of 10. Two types of measurements were 
performed: one with PDT-110A and another with KM200 electronics with a switching relay that allows 
us to measure 𝑁𝑁100% and 𝑁𝑁200% . The KM200 electronics were mounted on an aluminium junction box 
that contains the HV and a switching relay circuitry. The preamps were gain matched and the plateau 
characteristics were tested in both switching configurations to make sure that the additional 
capacitance does not change the threshold.  We switched only the top two detectors (#1 and #3) in 
the first ring of the FNEM shown on Fig.3. During the first measurement, each detector was connected 
to its own preamplifier. We recorded the individual count rates to make sure that each detector sees 
roughly the same count rate. We used the average of the count rates of detector 1 and detector 3 to 
represent 𝑁𝑁100%. The second measurement was performed with detector #3 disconnected from 
preamplifier 3 and connected to preamplifier 1 which provided the count rate in DT measurement 
condition 𝑁𝑁200%. 
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Fig.3 Left: Top view of FNEM with preamplifiers and switching boxes installed on inner ring of tubes. 
Right simplified switching diagram.  
The count rates   𝑁𝑁100% 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑁𝑁200%, corresponding to one and two tubes per amplifier, were measured 
for each intensity setting of the neutron generator. The load per amplifier and count rate data for each 
were recorded using a JSR-15 shift register.  Using the analytical expressions derived in section two 
based on paralyzing dead time, we have calculated the incident neutron rate 𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 per amplifier. The 
measured count rates for PDT-110 (one tube per amplifier) and KM200 (one and two tubes per 
amplifier) are plotted in Fig 4.  
The corrected output count rate Nout=Nin is used to calculate the dead time losses and corresponding 
dead time td based on the paralyzing DT model. In order to compare these results we also calculated 
and compared the KM200 and PDT-110A  dead time using classical empirical and self-calibration 
methods for correction of counting losses.; . The plot on Fig.5  compares the calculated DT behaviour 
for: 
• PDT  dead time from the paired source calibration (see section 2) calculated as 1.62 μs for 40
000 cps, and 1.54 μs for 83000 cps input count rate per tube;
• PDT-110A dead time using NG versus input count rate from self-calibration method ;
• KM200 dead time using NG and self-calibration method.
The results plotted in Figure 5 show significant dead time reduction (about 30%) between the 
calibrated and extended range of count rates as well as good consistency in PDT dead time behaviour 
using paired 252Cf source and NG. The deduced dead time constant (td) shows a reduction in value for 
higher count rates. This is a clear indication that the real dead time losses do not follow the 
exponential dependency of the paralyzing DT model. The correction of counting losses using 
equations /6,7/ for non-paralyzing DT model  provided even higher dead time constant dependence 
with positive slope. Therefore we used the correction data based on paralyzing DT that has lower 
dead time deviation at the maximal count rate range and thus fits better for that particular case.   
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Figure 4. Measured count rates per amplifier versus (determined) input count rates for the 
KM200 at 𝑁𝑁100% (blue) condition, KM200 at 𝑁𝑁200% condition (green)  and PDT110A amplifier 
(red) connected to one detector. The purple line represents represent the corrected count rate 
(Nout=Nin). 
Figure 5. DT versus input reaction rate. Green: PDT-110A DT using a pair of  252Cf sources 
[10]. Blue: PDT-110A DT using a NG and empirical method for correction of counting losses. 
Red: KM200 dead time using NC and self-calibration method for correction.  
It should be noted that neither the non-paralyzing nor the paralyzing models are accurate over a wide 
dynamic range of incoming neutron count rate. Therefore, it is necessary to perform dead time 
calibration near the intensities of the target measured source. This is where the proposed calibration 
method is most valuable. It does not rely on the extrapolation of a priori calibration at lower intensity.    
In order to explore and explain the count loss trend at higher count rates we ran the neutron generator 
in pulsed mode where the constant output emission rate is increased in reverse proportion to the 
generator duty cycle.  The snapshots of the unipolar (current pulse) and bipolar (shaper output) 
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signals from KM200 amplifiers, recorded at 10% duty cycle and  maximum intensity of the neutron 
generator are shown on Fig. 6. The estimated incident rates for that setting is about 13×106 cps (10 
times higher than maximum count rate from continuous output testing shown on fig.4.  
Fig. 6 Left: unipolar (current pulses)  Right: The bipolar pulse output shown in expanded time scale 
The pile up of detector current pulses appears as a single fluctuating pulse that does not reach the 
base line during the entire duration of the neutron generator pulse, consistent with the updating 
paralyzing dead time model. In contrast, the bipolar pulses pile-up in both directions and thus cross 
the baseline despite the severe pile-up (20+ pulses during the duration of shaper pulse) and thus 
continue to count. Because of the random phase of the pile-up the superimposed signal looks much 
wider than singe bipolar pulses shown on Fig.1b.  
6. Implementation aspects of this method and in typical safeguards neutron
systems 
6.1. Active interrogation 
Fission neutron detectors used in the pulsed active interrogation systems such as DDA assay for 
measuring of SNM have to operate at very wide dynamic range of incident count rates and thus are 
subject of severe counting losses. Implementation of faster tubes and electronics can improve the 
counting capabilities and allow analysis closer to the burst, but will not eliminate all of the counting 
losses. The implementation of this self-calibration method could further expand this capability by using 
simple switching circuitry without extensive retrofitting of existing electronics. The DT losses can be 
characterized by one time calibration that can give values that can be used for routine measurements. 
Because the DDA assay relies on singles rate measurements, DT losses are smaller and the accuracy 
of the calibration is not as critical as for assays based on neutron coincidence counting. Initial testing 
of this method in JRC PUNITA active interrogation system at JRC-Ispra will  be reported in [11]. 
6.2. Neutron coincidence counting 
Unlike singles rate measurements, neutron coincidence counting is very sensitive to the counting 
losses as the DT losses error of singles propagates with power 2, 3 etc, to the double, triples 
moments. The currently used DT loss calibration works well for low DT losses where the paralyzing 
DT model does not deviate much from the experimentally observed behavior of the DT losses. But an 
applications such as coincidence assay for measuring high mass plutonium canisters, spent fuel , etc, 
that are expected to operate at higher DT losses the current practice for calibration with low activity 
252Cf sources may lead to substantial errors. 
Here the measured count rates (S,D,T etc.) for the two hardware configurations (standard – i.e. 100% 
load and dead time – i.e. 200% load) can be used to extract and correct for dead time losses. Two 
possible methodologies are envisioned:  a) extrapolate dead time free count rates from the slope of 
the measured count rates for 100% and 200% load; b) iterative procedure to extract and correct for 
dead time losses. The former approach relies on linearity of the count rate variation with preamplifier 
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load, which will be explored and confirmed experimentally. For more complex situations, where 
nonlinearities in count rate variation with preamplifier load are observed, the iterative approach will be 
used. The iterative approach is foreseen to use the ratios   (e.g. 100%
200%
S
S
; 100%
200%
D
D
100%
200%
T
T
100%
200%
Q
Q
) for 
singles, doubles, triples and quads, that, if properly dead time corrected, should not depend on the 
load per preamplifier. We will use this fact to develop the iterative calibration procedure, where the 
initial estimate of dead time correction will be used to extract initial dead time corrected count rate 
ratios for both preamplifier loads. The dead time correction estimate will then be further iterated until 
close agreement between the dead time corrected ratios for 100% load and 200% load measurements 
is achieved. 
We would like to stress that the proposed method and hardware implementation is applicable for all 
currently used preamplifiers (such as Amptek A-111) electronics for both shift register and list mode 
data acquisition. 
7. Conclusion
We have presented a new hardware based method for the determination of counter dead time. This 
method can use the counting rates from actual unknown samples in order to determine the dead time 
correction constants and thus avoid the problem of extrapolating dead time coefficients determined at 
low counting rates to high counting rates. The hardware is relatively easy to retrofit to many existing 
neutron detectors. We have demonstrated the method for singles counting and shown that the dead 
time behaviour of typical neutron detector systems does not follow either paralyzing or non-paralyzing 
model precisely, but the paralyzing model is closer. The method can also be used for doubles and 
triples and higher moments of multiplicity counters. 
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Abstract: 
Ultra-intense lasers have demonstrated the capability of accelerating short pulses of intense ion 
beams. These ion beams have been used to generate short bursts of neutrons by irradiating a 
converter in close distance to the source, making this scheme a very compact and bright source of 
neutrons up to more than 100 MeV in energy. Using novel laser ion acceleration mechanisms directed 
beams of neutrons can be generated, which increases the brightness of these sources compared to 
previous attempts. We review the recent research and present experimental data using a mechanism 
based on relativistic transparency to drive the most intense laser driven neutron source and use them 
for first applications. 
Keywords: Laser; neutron sources; active interrogation; non-destructive testing 
1. Introduction
There is a growing need for small and medium sized neutron sources of high brightness [1] and 
ranging from thermal to multi-MeV particle energies. Applications include basic research, the use in 
material sciences and further industrial and medical applications. Since the advent of ultra-intense 
lasers the acceleration of intense ion beams has been one of the most exciting fields of research over 
the last decade. Those laser systems can accelerate ion beams using fields six orders of magnitude 
above the highest conventionally available fields and therefore have reduced the required accelerator 
length from meters to sub-millimeters. 
The basic concept of laser driven neutron sources is to replace large conventional accelerator 
structures by compact laser driven ion sources and use a small converter design to form a compact 
neutron source. Thus one combines the large cross section for neutron evaporation and related 
nuclear processes with the spatial and temporal advantage of a laser driven source.  
The most widely used mechanism had been discovered in 1999 and is known as the target normal 
sheath acceleration (TNSA) [2,3]. This mechanism is based on the charge separation at the rear 
surface of thin, micrometer-sized solid foils and results in short bursts of ions up to energies of 60 MeV 
in an exponential spectrum [4]. The ion beams usually contain protons as the predominant species as 
those have the highest charge to mass ration and are accelerated most efficiently by the quasi electro-
static potential. 
The short pulse duration of the ion beam results in a short burst of neutrons with highest brightness 
and allows for techniques not accessible with conventional drivers. 
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2. Prior research
Shortly after the discovery of laser driven proton beams by the TNSA mechanism those have been 
used to generate neutrons. Early experiments include the Li(p,n)Be reaction [5] and obtained 3x108 
n/sr-1 using the CLF Vulcan laser in the UK and 70 J of laser energy. They also observed an 
anisotropy with an increased yield in the backward direction towards the laser. 
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target (catcher) place 5 cm behind th coated Al-foil. The neutron TOF spectra
are shown in Fig. 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: (left) Oscilloscope trace of shots 05302302 (CD coated aluminum). The
green curve is a model spectrum for a 2.5-MeV ion beam oﬀ the target rear surface,
which is fusing in the catcher. The blue curve is a fit to the exponential decay of the
measured gamma signal added to the green curve. (right) Oscilloscope trace of shot
05312140 (CH-coated aluminum).
The laser energy and the neutron yields of the two shots are nearly identical,
with the latter being as high as 5 × 107. From the left picture, it is evident that
the first measured peak is at the same time (and therefore neutron energy) as
predicted by the model for d-d fusion. However, at later times a large number
of low-energy neutrons is visible, which are caused by deuteron breakup induced
by high-energy protons. The same late neutrons are present in the right picture,
caused by protons alone. Although the diﬀerential cross-section of the deuterium
breakup reaction d(p,n)2p could not be found in the commonly available databases,
it is interesting to look at the ratio of neutrons detected in beam direction and
perpendicular to it by the silver activation counters. While this ratio for pure
d-d fusion should be close to unity, in the left picture it is 5.17 and in the right
one 9.04. This indicates that a diﬀerent reaction is causing the most neutrons,
and also hints at a strong anisotropy of the breakup cross-section. The result of
these two shots shows that it is not possible to fully replace the protons in the
beam by just preparing a deuterated rear surface layer. Obviously, enough proton-
rich contaminants are absorbed at the surface before the shot to make up for a
dominant proton component.
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Fig.	1:	one	of	the	first	nTOF	measurement	for	neutron	generation	by	laser	driven	deuterons	(2000)	
at	LULI.	The	neutron	peak	at	2.45	MeV	is	clearly	visible	in	the	decaying	signal	caused	by	the	x-ray	
flash.	
Experiments of our group at the LULI laser system in 2000 resulted in 4x108 neutrons using the d-d 
fusion reaction when irradiating a deuterated plastic block with deuterons (see Fig.1). A clear mono-
energetic peak at 2.5 MeV was observed, which was boosted in energy in the forward direction by the 
beam fusion kinetics. 
In 2010 Higginson et al. continued the work on neutron production using the LLNL TITAN laser system 
[6] and obtained 1.8x109 n/sr-1 using LiF as a converter and 120 J of energy. They calculated those 
numbers to be sufficient enough for neutron resonance spectroscopy as a possible application. A year 
later the same group succeeded in getting 8x108 n/sr-1 via the same reaction using 360 J of laser 
energy on the same facility [7]. This time they also increased the neutron energy up the 18 MeV and 
observed a forward peaked intensity distribution. At a smaller laser system, but at a high repetition 
rate, the university of Michigan also obtained a direct d neutron emissi n up to 1x108 n/sr-1, energies 
up to 16 MeV and a conversion efficiency of 10-5 from laser to neutron energy using 1021 W/cm2 pulses 
[8]. Here the group used a deliberate deuterium contaminant layer at the rear surface to enhance the 
neutron production via the TNSA mechanism. As all the cross sections and the directionality of the 
emitted neutrons are energy dependent and the use of deuterium instead of protons is advantageous 
due to the additional neutron present in the latter a novel mechanism was investigated to enhance the 
neutron emission. 
3. Relativistic Transparency 
Relativistic transparency occurs, when the motion of the electrons in the laser results in an increased 
inertia caused by the relativistic mass increase as the electrons approach the speed of light. As the 
electrons are no longer able to follow the laser oscillation and their number is decreasing due to the 
expulsion by the ponderomotive force of the laser the target becomes transparent for the laser 
frequency. So a target becomes relativistic transparent when N/γ ≤ 1 < N with N = ne/ncr the 
normalized target electron density, ncr = meω02/(4πe2) th  critical electron density and γ=(1-(v/c)2)-½. 
At this point the laser interacts with the entire target volume and efficiently accelerates the bulk 
material [9]. In contrast to the TNSA now all the ions are accelerated, which opens the possibility to 
use the most efficient neutron conversion reaction. 
Two important developments were required to experimentally confirm this new mechanism, the 
reliable production of sub-micrometer free standing target foils [10,11] and the enhancement of the 
laser contrast, i.e. the ratio of unwanted light prior to the main pulse [12,13,14].  This mechanism, the 
so-called Break Out Afterburner (BOA), has been predicted using large scale 3D simulations on the 
first PFLOP computer at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) [15,16] and has meanwhile 
experimentally demonstrated at several laser facilities. 
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4. Neutron production
The most promising neutron generating reactions are the p(Be,xn)B reactions, widely used in 
conventional accelerator driven sources [17,18]. A highly efficient converter is therefore made of 
beryllium, where the length of the converter matches the range of the incoming ion beams. To further 
enhance the converter performance and to increase the directionality the Be converter is often 
surrounded by a cylinder of tungsten. If initially the proton beams is replaced by a deuteron beam the 
additional neutron generating breakup reaction of the deuteron yields a directed neutron beam in 
addition to the isotropic Be(p,n)B reaction.  
Fig. 2: nuclear reactions in the converter. In addition to the energy loss there are breakup 
reactions, nuclear excitation via (d,xn), (p,xn) and (n,xn) reactions in Be and W. The tungsten 
cylinder also reflects some of the neutrons back into the forward emission cone. 
The conversion of the incident ion beam into neutrons therefore is governed by the following 
processes (see Fig.): 1. breakup of the deuteron as it enters the converter material, 2. neutron 
emission due to the Be(p(d), xn)B processes according to the energy dependent cross sections, 3. 
energy loss of the ions inside the converter material, 4. pre-compound reactions in the converter 
material for the highest neutron energies, 5. neutron scattering and W(n,xn)W reactions in the 
tungsten wall of the converter casing. 
5. Recent Experiments
Whereas initial experiments on neutron production using the TNSA mechanism have resulted in 
neutron numbers that made them suitable for resonance spectroscopy, a higher conversion efficiency 
is needed for more demanding applications.   
Recently, our group used the BOA mechanism to generate an intense beam of energetic deuterons 
from the bulk of deuterized plastic foils at the LANL Trident facility. The BOA mechanism also offers 
the possibility to efficiently accelerate ions independent of their charge to mass ratio, preferential for 
accelerating deuterons [19]. Different converter materials were tested, starting with copper and then 
changed to an encapsulated beryllium target, about 5 mm behind the plastic foil. The BOA mechanism 
required a precise target thickness control as if the target is too thin the target becomes transparent 
too soon, before the laser pulse reaches maximum intensity and the interaction is inefficient. If the 
target is too thick the regime of relativistic transparency cannot be reached and the ions are 
accelerated by the less favorable TNSA mechanism [20] (see also Fig. 5). A typical experimental 
setup is shown in Fig. 3. A short focal length off-axis parabolic mirror (e.g. F/1.5) is used to focus tens 
of Joules of one micrometer laser light of a few hundreds’ femtosecond pulse. The on-target focus is a 
few µm in radius (1/e2-condition, containing >60% of the laser energy) with a peak intensity of up to 
1x1021 W/cm2. The laser pulse duration and beam parameters have to be carefully recorded during the 
whole campaign. Thin, free-standing, plastic (CH2) and deuterized plastic (CD2) foils with thicknesses 
from 200 nm to 3.2 µm were then used to generate proton and deuteron beams.  
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Fig. 3: Experimental setup at the LANL TRIDENT facility. The accelerator length in this case was 5 
mm to the converter (upper inset). The neutron emission was monitored with NTOF detectors and 
bubble detectors in different directions to get energy resolved, absolute, spatial neutron distribution 
function. 
Evaluation of the neutron generation performance requires detailed knowledge of the driver in terms of 
energy distribution, particle numbers and energy content, as well as beam divergence. Ideally one 
uses several independent diagnostics to characterize the driving ion beam for these parameters 
including an ion Wide Angle Spectrometer (iWASP) [21], Radiochromic Film Imaging Spectroscopy 
(RIS) [22] and Nuclear Activation Imaging Spectroscopy (NAIS) [23]. During the experiments at LANL 
in 2012, the optimum target thickness was approximately 650 nm for the CH and CD targets at which 
peak energies of up to 150 MeV have been measured for protons and deuterons, respectively. With 
thinner or thicker targets, particle energies and numbers drop rapidly (for more details, see Ref. [24]).  
Neutrons can be measured using activation techniques in different materials (In, Cu, Ag), neutron 
time-of-flight (nTOF) methods in different directions, neutron imaging camera systems [25,26] and BTI 
bubble detectors1,2 [27]. Details about our experimental setup can be found in [28]. 
According to the requirements in the previous chapter, the neutron converter has to have a sufficient 
length according to the stopping range of the deuterons, but not too long in order not to scatter or 
absorb too many neutrons in the desired forward direction. 
Laterally, the converter can be limited in order to maintain a small source size, e.g. for point projection 
imaging using high energy neutrons, but this reduces the total amount of neutrons, as the ion beam 
diverges and more deuterons start to miss the converter material. 
The neutron yield and distribution is made of two parts. a) The 4π emission of neutrons from the 
9Be(p,n)9B reaction for lower energetic protons and the 9Be(p,2n)8B reaction at higher proton energies. 
b) the forward peaked emission from the breakup if deuterons were used.
1	See	http://www.bubbletech.ca	for	BTI,	Bubble	Technology	Industries.	2	F.	Smecka	and	M.	Hajek,		AIAU	Paper	No.	2007-27607,	Technische	Universität	Wien,	2007. 	
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CD
CH
Fig. 4: Neutron spectra from a 400 nm CH foil and a 480 nm CD foil, measured with an nTOF 
detector. 
As can be seen in Fig. 4 the efficiency in forward neutron emission as well as the neutron energy 
strongly increases with the use of deuterium instead of protons. For the deuteron breakup experiments 
we have measured almost one percent conversion efficiency and around 0.2 percent for the proton 
reaction.  
Fig. 5 shows a result that clearly demonstrates the difference of efficient deuterium acceleration if the 
thickness of the target matches the optimum for the BOA mechanism with a strongly peaked neutron 
emission in the forward direction (0°). 
6. Results
So	 far,	 recent	 experiments	 have	measured	 record	 neutron	 yields	 close	 to	 3	 x	 1010	 n/sr	 (data	 from	
2014,	to	be	published	soon),	energies	well	exceeding	100	MeV	and	a	strongly	directed	neutron	beam	
[29,16].	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 due	 to	 the	 compact	 generation	 of	 the	 neutron	 beam	and	 the	
ultra-short	pulse	duration	of	 the	driving	 ion	beam	the	neutron	pulse	 is	extremely	short.	As	 the	 ion	
beam	 is	 generated	 and	 accelerated	within	 a	 few	 picoseconds	 and	 the	 total	 length	 of	 the	 system,	
accelerator	 and	 converter	 structure	 is	 less	 than	 15	 cm	 the	 total	 pulse	 duration	 is	 only	 a	 few	
nanoseconds	 for	 the	 entire	 pulse.	 In	 fact	 for	 the	 ion	 energies	 between	 100	MeV	 and	 4	MeV	 (e.g.	
required	for	activation)	the	pulse	in	forward	direction	has	a	total	length	of	6.5	ns.		
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Fig.	5:	Neutron	production	from	different	targets.	Whereas	the	isotropic	part	is	not	that	much	sensitive,	the	
efficient	deuteron	acceleration	is	strongly	correlated	to	the	target	thickness.	In	this	case	for	1021	W/cm2	at	
TRIDENT	710	nm	was	close	to	the	optimum	fort	he	BOA	mechanism.	The	neutron	emission	exceeds	1x1010	
n/sr.	
But	more	important,	the	pulse	duration	for	the	beamed	neutron	part	originating	from	the	deuterium	
breakup	 is	different	as	the	neutron	emission	closely	 follows	the	 initial	deuterium	kinetics.	Thus	the	
pulse	is	strongly	chirped	in	energy	having	an	excellent	time	to	energy	correlation	and	resembling	the	
initial	ps	pulse	duration.	This	would	allow	for	excellent	energy	resolution	for	fast	neutron	resonance	
spectroscopy	as	one	possible	application.	
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7. Applications
The high brightness, directionality and compact format of the neutron source opens up a multitude of 
applications. 
Radiography with neutrons.—With such an intense, directed and ultra-short neutron beam available a 
first laser-driven neutron image of a structured object was demonstrated [29]. The main detector for 
neutron radiography was a fast scintillating fiber array gated neutron imager, developed by LANL for 
fusion experiments at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) [26]. Neutrons, impacting into a 5 cm thick 
fiber array generate light that is transported through the fibers, down collimated by a coherent fiber 
taper, amplified by a gated micro-channel plate and finally detected in a high resolution cooled CCD 
camera. The scintillator is also sensitive to the large number of x-rays being produced during the initial 
laser target interaction. With a decay constant (1/e) of 2.5 ns, the x-ray contribution can be used for 
radiography or excluded from the measurement choosing a specific timing. Moreover, gating the 
detector well past the decay of the scintillating light caused by the prompt x rays and limiting the gate 
width allows for easy selection of the neutron energies, which is of special interest as this allows for 
the radiography of material imaging different neutron energies similar to recently observed neutron 
bursts using electrons as a driver [30], but with much higher neutron numbers. By varying the delay 
between the laser pulse and the exposure window of the imager, one is able to distinguish between 
the contribution of instantaneous hard-x-ray emission from the primary target and the exposure due to 
neutrons from several discrete energy intervals.  
As right behind the converter material the neutron flux is around 1020 N/(cm2s) the source is an 
excellent tool for tests on neutron damage of materials. 
One application that has recently been tested successfully is the active interrogation of sensitive 
nuclear material using neutron activation. This application can serve in security and safeguarding 
environments as well as to detect nuclear material that has been lost, buried or is not directly 
accessible (e.g. due to destruction in accidents). 
Nuclear, fissile material is exposed to the short burst of neutrons and the subsequent neutron 
emission is detected. Because of the short pulse duration the secondary neutron emission can be 
monitored shortly after the probe pulse and therefore very early in the exponentially decaying signal. 
Moreover, the delayed neutrons from the subsequent decay chain can be monitored as well as the 
response to thermal and epithermal neutrons, thus allowing for the detection of different isotopes, like 
235U,238U and 239Pu. A first experiment has been carried out in 2012 and 2014 and will be published 
elsewhere. This method of detection is quite insensitive to high Z shielding and therefore can be used 
in real environments, like container transport or behind radiation shielding. 
8. Summary
The generation of neutrons using laser driven ion beams has made significant progress in the recent 
years. The initial experiments using the TNSA mechanism to drive an ion beam have been followed by 
new acceleration mechanisms based on relativistic transparency of solids with the advantage of 
selected ion species at very high brightness. Using the most favorable reaction of deuterium on 
beryllium high brightness neutron sources driven by laser systems of a few Joules of energy have 
been realized and the unique neutron beam characteristics have been measured. First applications 
like neutron radiography, the test of detector systems and the use in active interrogation have opened 
the field to those compact sources. As this states the very early results of this new technique and 
given the rapid development of short pulse laser systems this will become an exciting field of research 
with many useful applications. 
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Abstract:  Lightly encapsulated 252Cf sources are commonly used to characterize and calibrate 
neutron detectors for safeguards applications without much attention being paid to what it means for 
the encapsulation to be neutronically “light”.  In this work we quantify the impact of encapsulation on 
both the neutron spectrum and neutron intensity.  We find that a 1.3 mm shell of copper reduces the 
mean energy by about 1 %.  Thus encapsulation can be used to deliberately adjust the mean energy 
to match, for example, that of the spontaneously fissile Pu nuclides.  The spectrum cannot be 
matched perfectly however and so the influence of encapsulation on a particular system calibration is 
case specific.  We demonstrate using encapsulation to match the Pu neutron detection efficiency for a 
common safeguards detector, the Active Well Coincidence Counter.  
Keywords: NDA; Monte Carlo; Prompt Fission Neutron Spectrum, 252Cf, encapsulation 
1. Introduction
Monte Carlo modeling is a well established way to make performance estimates of neutron assay 
systems for safeguards [1].  The models may be benchmarked against experimental results obtained 
using sealed sources containing 252Cf, which is a convenient source of spontaneous fission neutrons, 
as a surrogate for the materials of interest.  Often a correction is needed to allow for the difference 
between the energy spectrum of the 252Cf neutrons and the neutron emission spectrum of interest.  For 
a lightly encapsulated 252Cf source the prompt fission neutron spectrum from 252Cf may be approximated 
reasonably well by simple analytical shapes.  For instance in ISO 8529 [2] a Maxwellian distribution 
with a temperature parameter of 1. 42 MeV corresponding to a mean energy of 2.13 MeV is 
recommended.  Fröhner [3] makes the case for the next simplest macroscopic representation, namely 
the Watt spectrum, with a temperature parameter equal to 1.175 MeV and the fragment kinetic energy 
per nucleon parameter of 0.359 MeV corresponding to a mean energy of approximately 2.122 MeV.  
The meaning of light encapsulation is, however, not quantified in the literature. Presumably the 
Amersham X1 capsule [4] would qualify.  This is a cylindrical assembly about 10 mm long and 7.8 mm 
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in diameter with a combined wall thickness of roughly 1.6 mm of stainless steel.  But it is well established 
that even such a modest capsule perturbs the angular distribution from what would otherwise be a near 
perfect isotropic pattern coming from the small amount of 252Cf source material inside into a anisotropic 
distribution with near cylindrical symmetry about the axis of the capsule [4,5].  When calibrating a 
fluence measuring device correction factors for the anisotropic emission of the source must be made 
[4-7].  Less well known is the impact on the neutron spectrum caused by neutron interactions in the 
source encapsulation.  Whether the difference between a 1 mm and a 3 mm stainless steel container, 
or some other jacketing material, matters or not clearly depends on the detailed response function of 
the system.  However, the lack of general guidance on what constitutes a lightly encapsulated source 
and the general neglect of the effect of encapsulation on the neutron spectrum in the scientific literature 
means it is difficult to make an informed judgment.  In this work we take a step to resolving this dilemma 
by analyzing the effect of encapsulation on a specific system. 
In Section 2 we present a simple analysis justifying why encapsulation needs to be considered in 
neutron metrology and establishing that for common source types spectral indices might be expected 
to exhibit a linear behavior with wall thickness.  In Section 3 we draw on published results taken from a 
report [8] in which the authors were deliberately trying to moderate the spectrum of 252Cf and 
241Am/Be(α,n) sources as an alternative to using accelerator facilities to obtain a variety of spectra for 
calibration of neutron dosimetry instruments.  In particular we show how the mean energy from 252Cf 
surrounded by spherical shells scales roughly linearly with shell thickness.  In real situations we are 
concerned with the full energy distribution, as modified by all reaction channels, and also with potential 
losses and gains to the number of neutrons emerging per initial source neutron. This was studied in 
Section 4 through a series of Monte Carlo simulations using the Los Alamos MCNP6 code [9, 10]. The 
effects of spheres of common materials were simulated, along with some common commercial 
encapsulations. Finally the spectrum modification was coupled to the Active Well Multiplicity Counter 
(AWCC) [11] detection efficiency, and the source encapsulation was modified to match the detection 
efficiency of 240Pu. Manufactured cylindrical encapsulation was measured for verification. 
2. A simple analysis
We might intuitively expect that simple spectral indices of the emergent neutron spectrum will vary 
linearly with the thickness of the encapsulation when the thickness is small.  Consider as an example 
how the mean energy for a point emitter located at the centre of a thin spherical shell of encapsulating 
material will shift as a function of shell thickness under the approximation that the only reaction of 
significance taking place is elastic scattering.  Because of the assumption that the source is lightly 
encapsulated the probability, 𝑝𝑠, that a neutron will scatter on its way out is given, to first order, by 
𝑝𝑠 = 𝛴𝑠𝑡 ≪ 1 
where 𝛴𝑠 is the macroscopic scattering cross section of the shell material and 𝑡 is its thickness.  
Thus, a fraction (1 − 𝑝𝑠) of neutrons emerge without scattering and without suffering any energy loss.  
The neutrons that do scatter will lose on average an energy of half the amount of the maximum energy 
that can be transferred to the target nucleus as recoil kinetic energy under the additional assumption 
that the scattering is isotropic in the center of mass reference frame.  Thus, we can write the mean 
fractional neutron energy loss, 𝑓, as 
𝑓 =
2𝐴
(1 + 𝐴)2
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where 𝐴 is the ratio of the mass of the target nucleus to that of the rest mass of the neutron.  For an 
element we may take, to a good approximation, 𝐴 to be numerically equal to the molar mass in g.mol-
1. 
The mean energy of the scattered neutrons, ?̅?𝑠, is consequently lower than the mean energy, ?̅?, of the 
emitting source and can be expressed as 
?̅?𝑠 = ?̅?(1 − 𝑓) = ?̅? (1 −
2𝐴
(1 + 𝐴)2
)
The mean energy of the emerging spectrum of neutrons, ?̅?𝑒𝑥𝑡, is formed from the contributions of both 
the unscattered and scattered neutrons and becomes 
?̅?𝑒𝑥𝑡 = (1 − 𝑝𝑠) ?̅? + 𝑝𝑠?̅?𝑠 = (1 − 𝑝𝑠) ?̅? + 𝑝𝑠?̅? (1 −
2𝐴
(1 + 𝐴)2
)
which upon rearrangement and substitution yields 
?̅?𝑒𝑥𝑡 = ?̅? (1 −
2𝐴
(1 + 𝐴)2
𝛴𝑠𝑡) 
This formula predicts that for an idealized scattering capsule the mean emergent energy will fall linearly 
with wall thickness.  Real capsules can drop energies more effectively through inelastic processes and 
other channels such as (n,2n) interactions.  The latter is also an example of a neutron gain process, in 
contrast (n,α) interactions are an example of a neutron loss process.  Although we did not consider 
these kinds of interaction in the simple view presented, for a thin wall, the basic idea remains sound.  
Thus, we anticipate the ratio between the emergent mean energy and that of the ideal unencapsulated 
source to trend roughly as follows 
𝑅 =
?̅?𝑒𝑥𝑡
?̅?
= 1 − 𝑏𝑡
where 𝑏 is a coefficient specific to the composition and density of the wall material. 
3. Illustration using literature data
Hsu and Chen [8] performed a series of calculations in which 252Cf was placed at the center of spheres 
of various radii and of various materials to see if they could create reference spectra that would be 
useful for calibrating health physics instruments.  Spheres of radius 25.4, 50.8, 76.2, 101.6, 153.2 and 
20.32 mm were selected.  Twelve materials were studied Be, graphite, Al, Fe, Cu, Pb, LiD, H2O, D2O, 
polyethylene (CH2)n, glass and concrete.  Neutron spectra at 500 mm from the center were computed.  
The results are presented graphically and are difficult to interpret.  Gains and losses are not quantified.  
The mean energy as a function of wall thickness is given numerically only in the case of copper.  With 
zero wall thickness the mean energy is given as 2.54 MeV. This is far higher than the generally accepted 
value of about 2.12 to 2.13 MeV [2,3].  However, by forming the ratio of the emergent spectrum to the 
initiating spectrum we expect that this apparent bias will be largely suppressed.  The results of our 
analysis are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Summary of results taken from [8] for the case of 252Cf at the center of Cu spheres 
Sphere Radius 
(mm) 
Mean Energy Ratio, R Fit 
𝑅 = 𝑒−𝑏𝑡 
0 1.0000 1.0000 
25.4 0.8228 0.8182 
50.8 0.6692 0.6694 
76.2 0.5433 0.5477 
101.6 0.4449 0.4481 
153.2 0.2957 0.2981 
203.2 0.1992 0.2008 
Also shown in Table 1 is the result of a fit to the data of the form 
𝑅 = 𝑒−𝑏𝑡 
which reduces to the linear form (𝑅 ≈ 1 − 𝑏𝑡) expected for thin shell walls when 𝑏𝑡 ≪ 1.  In the 
present case the exponential fit produces an excellent fit across the whole range of spheres modeled 
with 𝑏 = 0.0079 𝑚𝑚−1.  This is also evident from Figure 1.  It is also apparent from Figure 1 that a 
copper sphere with a radius greater than about 10 or 20 mm cannot be considered thin in the context 
of our earlier simple theoretical development.  A radius (wall thickness) of a few mm falls in the linear 
range and we see that to get a 1% shift in mean energy requires a wall thickness of about 
0.01 0.0079 = 1.27⁄  mm of Cu; this equates to a shift of about 21 keV in the mean energy.  For the 
HLNCC-II (ref), a common thermal well counter with a single ring of 3He filled proportional counters, 
the fractional change in detection efficiency in the vicinity of 2 MeV is about 17% per MeV [12].  Thus 
a 21 keV reduction in mean energy translates into a projected relative increase in efficiency of about 
0.36% (from about 0.1750 counts per neutron to about 0.1756 counts per neutron.  This is a change 
which is readily measureable.  
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Figure 1. Plot of mean energy ratio, 𝑹, as a function of moderator radius, 𝒕, taken from [8] for 
the case of 252Cf at the center of Cu spheres along with the fitted result as listed in Table 1. 
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4. Detailed modeling
Although instructive the results of Hsu and Chen are not in a form and do not cover the range of interest 
relevant to our present discussion – which is the use of lightly encapsulated sources typical of those 
obtained from a variety of vendors and used routinely in safeguards laboratories.  For this reason we 
performed a series of focused Monte Carlo simulations.  These calculations give not only the mean 
energy shift but the shape of the spectrum and also allow losses and gains to be tallied.   
The model used the MCNP6 default energy spectrum of 252Cf with a mean energy of 2.13 Mev, starting 
at a point source at the origin. The energy was tallied over a sphere centered at the origin with a radius 
of 300 mm.  Figure 2 shows the average energy of neutrons crossing this sphere as a function of 
thickness of copper.  The mean energy of prompt fission neutrons from 240Pu spontaneous fission, again 
using the default MCNP6 energy spectrum is 1.93 MeV.  Using the exponential relationship shown in 
Figure 2, we would require a sphere of 13.9mm copper thickness to produce an average energy equal 
to that of a notional bare 240Pu source. 
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Figure 2. Mean Energy of neutrons escaping from a 252Cf in a copper sphere as a function of 
radius (1 cm = 10 mm) 
Figure 3 shows a comparison between the Hsu results [8] and our MCNP6 results.  The agreement is 
very good at all thicknesses. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of our MCNP calculations and the results of Hsu et al interpreted as a 
relative energy to remove the obvious mean energy discrepancy in that work. 
Table 2 shows the gains, losses, net neutrons, and average energy, for spheres of the materials 
calculated in MCNP for thicknesses between 1 and 20 cm. The gains, losses, and net values are per 
source neutron. Lead has the least effect on the average energy while polyethylene has the most. 
Beryllium’s (n.2n) reaction causes a 6.5% increase in emitted neutrons at a thickness of 15 cm.  
Stainless steel has a negligible net intensity effect but a potentially significant energy effect at the 
thicknesses of common encapsulations. 
Table 2. Effects of spherical encapsulation of various materials on a Cf-252 source 
Aluminum 
(cm) 
1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
Gains 6.28E-7 1.22E-6 1.73E-6 2.22E-6 2.64E-6 4.25E-6 5.71E-6 6.66E-6 
Losses 3.82E-4 7.50E-4 1.11E-3 1.45E-3 1.79E-3 3.33E-3 4.70E-3 6.00E-3 
Net 1.00E+0 9.99E-1 9.99E-1 9.99E-1 9.98E-1 9.97E-1 9.95E-1 9.94E-1 
Average 
energy(MeV) 2.07E+0 2.02E+0 1.96E+0 1.91E+0 1.85E+0 1.58E+0 1.32E+0 1.08E+0 
Beryllium 
(cm) 
1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
Gains 3.07E-2 5.87E-2 8.41E-2 1.07E-1 1.28E-1 2.02E-1 2.43E-1 2.65E-1 
Losses 2.00E-2 3.83E-2 5.50E-2 7.05E-2 8.50E-2 1.37E-1 1.78E-1 2.28E-1 
Net 1.01E+0 1.02E+0 1.03E+0 1.04E+0 1.04E+0 1.06E+0 1.07E+0 1.04E+0 
Average 
energy(MeV) 2.00E+0 1.87E+0 1.74E+0 1.60E+0 1.47E+0 8.78E-1 4.79E-1 2.48E-1 
Concrete 
(cm) 
1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
Gains 8.84E-7 1.47E-6 2.06E-6 2.72E-6 3.21E-6 1.04E-5 6.38E-4 5.81E-3 
Losses 9.42E-4 1.85E-3 2.74E-3 3.61E-3 4.48E-3 1.27E-2 4.96E-2 1.38E-1 
Net 9.99E-1 9.98E-1 9.97E-1 9.96E-1 9.96E-1 9.87E-1 9.50E-1 8.62E-1 
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Average 
energy(MeV) 2.05E+0 1.97E+0 1.88E+0 1.80E+0 1.71E+0 1.29E+0 9.21E-1 6.41E-1 
Copper (cm) 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
Gains 5.19E-5 9.91E-5 1.42E-4 1.82E-4 2.14E-4 3.25E-4 3.82E-4 4.07E-4 
Losses 2.22E-3 4.61E-3 7.22E-3 1.01E-2 1.32E-2 3.48E-2 7.05E-2 1.25E-1 
Net 9.98E-1 9.95E-1 9.93E-1 9.90E-1 9.87E-1 9.65E-1 9.30E-1 8.75E-1 
Average 
energy(MeV) 1.98E+0 1.84E+0 1.70E+0 1.58E+0 1.46E+0 9.75E-1 6.47E-1 4.26E-1 
Heavy Water 
(cm) 
1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
Gains 8.53E-4 1.64E-3 2.38E-3 3.06E-3 3.69E-3 6.20E-3 7.85E-3 8.92E-3 
Losses 7.43E-4 1.44E-3 2.16E-3 2.69E-3 3.24E-3 5.46E-3 7.03E-3 8.39E-3 
Net 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 
Average 
energy(MeV) 1.98E+0 1.83E+0 1.68E+0 1.54E+0 1.40E+0 8.54E-1 5.02E-1 2.91E-1 
Iron (cm) 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
Gains 3.25E-5 6.05E-5 8.59E-5 1.10E-4 1.31E-4 2.03E-4 2.43E-4 2.61E-4 
Losses 8.69E-4 1.70E-3 2.56E-3 3.41E-3 4.28E-3 8.90E-3 1.40E-2 2.05E-2 
Net 9.99E-1 9.98E-1 9.97E-1 9.97E-1 9.96E-1 9.91E-1 9.86E-1 9.80E-1 
Average 
energy(MeV) 2.02E+0 1.91E+0 1.80E+0 1.70E+0 1.60E+0 1.18E+0 8.79E-1 6.77E-1 
Glass (cm) 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
Gains 7.80E-7 1.34E-6 2.14E-6 2.84E-6 3.53E-6 6.15E-6 8.30E-6 9.46E-6 
Losses 1.23E-3 2.43E-3 3.62E-3 4.78E-3 5.92E-3 1.12E-2 1.59E-2 2.00E-2 
Net 9.99E-1 9.98E-1 9.96E-1 9.95E-1 9.94E-1 9.89E-1 9.84E-1 9.80E-1 
Average 
energy(MeV) 2.09E+0 2.04E+0 1.99E+0 1.95E+0 1.90E+0 1.65E+0 1.39E+0 1.14E+0 
Graphite 
(cm) 
1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
Gains 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 
Losses 1.37E-4 2.66E-4 3.87E-4 5.01E-4 6.09E-4 1.06E-3 1.42E-3 1.92E-3 
Net 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 9.99E-1 9.99E-1 9.99E-1 9.99E-1 9.98E-1 
Average 
energy(MeV) 2.08E+0 2.02E+0 1.96E+0 1.90E+0 1.84E+0 1.50E+0 1.17E+0 8.67E-1 
Water (cm) 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
Gains 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 6.62E-8 1.99E-8 1.99E-8 
Losses 3.28E-4 8.30E-4 3.11E-3 1.14E-2 3.06E-2 3.06E-1 6.25E-1 8.17E-1 
Net 1.00E+0 9.99E-1 9.97E-1 9.89E-1 9.69E-1 6.94E-1 3.75E-1 1.83E-1 
Average 
energy(MeV) 1.94E+0 1.75E+0 1.57E+0 1.41E+0 1.25E+0 6.93E-1 3.79E-1 2.08E-1 
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Lead (cm) 1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
Gains 5.24E-4 1.01E-3 1.46E-3 1.88E-3 2.27E-3 3.80E-3 4.81E-3 5.45E-3 
Losses 2.62E-4 6.06E-4 9.46E-4 1.25E-3 1.13E-3 2.98E-2 4.51E-3 6.31E-2 
Net 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 1.00E+0 9.99E-1 
Average 
energy(MeV) 2.07E+0 2.00E+0 1.94E+0 1.88E+0 1.83E+0 1.56E+0 1.33E+0 1.14E+0 
Lithium 
Deuteride 
(cm) 
1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
Gains 7.71E-4 1.45E-3 2.07E-3 2.62E-3 3.11E-3 4.84E-3 5.82E-3 6.35E-3 
Losses 1.89E-3 4.65E-3 9.46E-3 1.35E-2 2.03E-2 1.00E-1 2.71E-1 4.78E-1 
Net 9.98E-1 9.96E-1 9.93E-1 9.88E-1 9.81E-1 9.02E-1 7.32E-1 5.25E-1 
Average 
energy(MeV) 1.95E+0 1.77E+0 1.61E+0 1.44E+0 1.29E+0 7.06E-1 3.62E-1 1.79E-1 
Polyethylene 
(cm) 
1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
Gains 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 0.00E+0 
Losses 8.30E-5 9.10E-4 7.62E-3 2.98E-2 7.39E-2 4.81E-1 7.83E-1 9.14E-1 
Net 1.00E+0 9.99E-1 9.92E-1 9.70E-1 9.26E-1 5.19E-1 2.17E-1 8.59E-2 
Average 
energy(MeV) 1.89E+0 1.66E+0 1.44E+0 1.25E+0 1.08E+0 5.02E-1 2.34E-1 1.12E-1 
304 Stainless 
Steel (cm) 
1 2 3 4 5 10 15 20 
Gains 3.28E-5 6.29E-5 8.88E-5 1.12E-4 1.32E-4 2.06E-4 2.43E-4 2.64E-4 
Losses 1.47E-3 2.91E-3 4.34E-3 5.77E-3 7.18E-3 1.45E-2 2.39E-2 3.87E-2 
Net 9.99E-1 9.97E-1 9.96E-1 9.94E-1 9.93E-1 9.86E-1 9.76E-1 9.61E-1 
Average 
energy(MeV) 2.01E+0 1.89E+0 1.78E+0 1.67E+0 1.57E+0 1.13E+0 8.23E-1 6.10E-1 
While the previous information is interesting academically, most source encapsulation encountered 
is standard manufactured capsules from source vendors. Variations in the capsules are introduced 
through spacers in the source cavity void, inner and outer capsules of different materials, and the 
inclusion of threaded studs or other modifications. 304L Stainless steel is the most common capsule 
material in our experience, but Zircalloy-2 is also used.  
Physical information about the capsules as simulated is described in Table 3. The A3026 capsule is 
provided by Eckert & Ziegler [13]. The FTC capsules are provided by Frontier Technology Corporation 
[14], where s denotes a shorter version of the capsule.  The FTC 10 capsules are single encapsulation. 
The FTC 100 capsule is the second encapsulation that surrounds a FTC 10 capsule and both were 
included in the simulations.  FTC 10 and FTC 100 are the equivalent of Savannah River National 
Laboratory’s SR-Cf-1X and SR-CF-100 capsules respectively. X1 capsules are provided by Amersham, 
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now known as QSA [15]. Table 3 shows the physical characteristics and Table 4 shows the gains, 
losses, net, and average energy of the spectrum. Simulations demonstrated a negligible difference 
between 304 and 304L SS, which is to be expected as only the concentration of carbon atoms (less 
than 1% overall) change. 
Table 3. Common encapsulation’s physical characteristics 
Capsule Material Mass (g) 
Outer diameter 
(cm) 
Outer length(cm) 
A3026 304 SS 18.4 0.942 3.6 
FTC 10s 304L SS 1.7 0.551 1.19 
FTC 10 304L SS 2.9 0.551 2.46 
FTC 100 304L SS 15.9 0.942 3.76 
Amersham X1 SS 3.1 0.782 0.98 
Table 4. Common encapsulation’s effects on the emergent neutrons 
Capsule Gains Losses Net Average energy 
A3026 
1.8154E-5 7.5632E-4 9.9926E-1 2.0668E+0 
FTC 10s 
5.6432E-6 2.2208E-4 9.9978E-1 2.1115E+0 
FTC 10 
5.1108E-6 2.0717E-4 9.9980E-1 2.1128E+0 
FTC 100 
1.4108E-05 5.7600E-04 9.9943E-1 2.0825E+0 
Amersham X1 
1.0115E-5 4.4757E-4 9.9956E-1 2.0997E+0 
Figure 4 shows the launch spectra of bare 240Pu and bare 252Cf together with the calculated spectrum 
from a point 252Cf source inside a 13.9 mm radius sphere of copper. Although the mean energy can 
be easily matched, the spectra show that the shape of the tailored spectrum is non-the-less 
significantly different from that of 240Pu.  Whether this is important depends on the nature of the 
measurement configuration and the objectives of the experiment. For detectors with non-linear 
response functions matching the average energy is insufficient to match the measurement 
efficiency. 
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Figure 4. Normalized Spectra from bare 240Pu, bare 252Cf and 252Cf within a 13.9mm copper 
sphere 
A complete analysis of the effects of encapsulation is detector specific. The Active Well Coincidence 
Counter (AWCC) was simulated to find the encapsulation of 252Cf necessary to match the 240Pu 
efficiency and measurements were made to verify the simulations. A series of measurements were 
taken with cylindrical encapsulation of varying wall thicknesses of stainless steel, copper, and 
polyethylene. The encapsulations are shown in Figure 5. The 252Cf source was A7-869 in the A3026 
capsule. First, the exit spectra of the capsules were simulated. Then the measured and simulated ring 
ratios of the AWCC were compared. The AWCC non-linear detection efficiency as a function of neutron 
energy was simulated. Finally the AWCC measured and simulated efficiencies are compared, and an 
estimation of the encapsulation to match 240Pu efficiency is given. 
The AWCC can operate in thermal mode without thermal neutron absorbers or in fast mode with 
cadmium liners and a nickel reflection ring. In fast mode the sample cavity cadmium liner reduces the 
count rate in high mass samples and the cadmium liners of the interrogation source ensure a high 
energy interrogation flux for better penetration of large samples. In this study the fast mode was used. 
The cadmium liners absorb neutrons below about 0.7 eV.  
The exit 252Cf spectra from the capsules is shown in Figure 6, where the legend refers to the number of 
0.5cm shell thicknesses. The results show that increasing encapsulation amplifies the change in 
spectrum. The strong thermalization efficiency of polyethylene is demonstrated by the increasing flux 
at lower energies, indicating a relatively bimodal distribution compared to the other materials. The 
absorption resonances in copper at 0.002 MeV and other energies can be seen. 
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Figure 5. Encapsulations with wall thicknesses of 0.5cm 
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Figure 6. Exit spectra of encapsulation for the number of 0.5cm shell thicknesses. Note the 
log-log scale in the first figure. Individual materials are shown in a range of 0-3 MeV on a linear 
scale. 
The AWCC has two rings of 3He detectors at different depths of polyethylene, so as neutrons in a 
specific energy range are moderated their detection efficiency by one ring goes up while the other goes 
down, dampening the change in overall detector efficiency. This effect is more pronounced in neutron 
detectors with more rings, while single ringed neutron detectors such as the HLNCC-II [16] are more 
susceptible to changes in the source energy spectrum.  
The ratio of the neutron counts of the two AWCC rings indicates the mean detected neutron energy. 
The ratio is spectrum dependent, two different spectra with the same average energy will not yield the 
same ring ratio. This spectral dependence occurs because the ring ratio energy dependence is 
nonlinear. The measurements and simulations of the ring ratio were compared to verify the accuracy of 
the simulations. The values were normalized to the ratio of only the standard A3026 source 
encapsulation to remove bias in the simulation of the detector. The results are shown in Figure 7. The 
relative statistical uncertainty was too small to clearly plot and was less than 0.02% for measurements 
and 0.09% for simulations. The measurements and simulations agree within 2 standard deviations for 
all cases except the 2cm shell thickness of copper. The strong agreement demonstrates that the 
simulation accurately simulates the measurement.  
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Figure 7. Measured and simulated AWCC ring ratios relative to the bare A7-869 source for 
various encapsulations 
The AWCC response function demonstrates how a mean energy does not directly correspond to the 
efficiency. A spectrum of neutrons half at 0.5 MeV and half at 2.5 MeV will have a lower efficiency than 
neutrons at their average of 1.5 MeV. The response function was simulated and is shown in Figure 8. 
The peak efficiency is around 1.2 MeV. The inner ring has a higher efficiency due to geometric 
considerations and its peak energy is about 0.6 MeV while the outer ring peak energy is about 2.1 MeV. 
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Finally, the efficiency can be compared between the measurements and simulations to demonstrate 
the encapsulation’s effect on the detector response. This efficiency is modified by all reaction channels 
and is a more accurate detector response than average energy. The result of this is shown in Figure 9 
and is normalized to the efficiency of the A7-869 source in the A3026 capsule. The relative uncertainties 
were 0.07% for the simulations and 0.02% for the measurements, which are too small to appear in the 
figure. The strong agreement gives confidence to simulations of samples that were unable to be 
measured, namely a bare 240Pu source and a bare 252Cf source. The simulations of these give relative 
efficiencies of 0.992 and 0.980, which differ by an absolute efficiency of 0.27%. To give a bare 252Cf 
source the same efficiency as 240Pu, it can be encapsulated. The simulations demonstrate that 
surrounding it with A3026 encapsulation gives a relative efficiency of 1 and an additional 0.5cm of 
polyethylene gives a relative efficiency of 0.986, which differ from 240Pu by 0.008 and -0.006 and differ 
by absolute efficiencies of 0.18% and -0.13%. A shell thickness of 0.35cm gives a relative efficiency of 
0.992 and an absolute efficiency difference of 0.004% which is within one sigma uncertainty.  
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Figure 9. Simulated and measured efficiencies normalized to the A7-869 source in A3026 
encapsulation 
5. Conclusion
A few mm of metallic encapsulation influences the energy spectrum emerging from 252Cf to a degree 
that is measurable in safeguards systems.  This also means that the average energy of a point 252Cf 
spontaneous fission neutron source can easily be tailored to match any lower value.  This is a useful 
feature to exploit when using 252Cf to measure the neutron detector efficiency as a surrogate for Pu 
sources in cases where the detector response is a simple function of energy. The modified spectrum 
however shows significant differences from a Pu spectrum with the same average energy and thus is 
unlikely to be adequate for detectors with strongly non-linear energy efficiency profiles. In non-linear 
response detectors such as the Active Well Coincidence Counter, Monte Carlo simulations can be used 
to calculate the encapsulation needed. In the AWCC a cylindrical encapsulation of polyethylene around 
an A7-series source with a wall thickness of 0.35cm will match the efficiency of a bare 240Pu pure fission 
source. Conversely, this information shows the effects of unwanted encapsulation and guides the user 
towards a decision about an encapsulation being ‘neutronically light’. 
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Abstract: 
The identification of fast neutron interactions in liquid scintillation detectors, by means of the pulse 
shape discrimination method (PSD), has been demonstrated by many to be a valid technology both as 
an alternative to standard neutron detectors and as a direct detection method of fast neutrons.  We 
have previously reported on the use of this technology combined with a pulsed neutron source for the 
detection of coincident prompt fission neutrons in multiple liquid scintillation detectors. The intention is 
to develop this technique into a method for detection of special nuclear materials (SNM) in cargo 
containers.  In this paper we present a more detailed investigation of the effectiveness of two and 
three fold coincidences in observation intervals of 40 nanosecond duration.  The observation of 
prompt fission neutrons and photons in such coincidence events is a strong indicator for the presence 
of fissile materials. 
We use a pulsed 14-MeV neutron source in a graphite assembly as external neutron source.  In the 
time period of 60-125 µsec after the 14-MeV neutron burst practically only low-energy source neutrons 
persist.  These source neutrons are not identified as neutrons in the PSD analysis whereas the 
induced fast fission neutrons are.  Interrogation by only low-energy neutrons is achieved by time-
gating the acquisition.  The use of a neutron source with an energy component above cadmium cut-off 
is to assure detection of fissile materials which are deliberately shielded against an external thermal 
neutron source.  The paper shows the experimentally obtained sensitivities of the method to the 
detection of uranium samples. 
A scaled-up system based on the same detection principle as in the laboratory experiments is 
proposed based on Monte Carlo calculations.  The performance prediction of the scaled-up system 
applied to the case of air cargo containers is discussed. 
Keywords: SNM detection; neutron generator; PSD analysis; induced fission 
1. Introduction
Passive and active non-destructive assay (NDA) methods have potential in practical applications as a 
means to detect special nuclear materials (SNM).  The prompt emission from fission of neutrons and 
γ-rays appear to be useful signatures for the detection of SNM in shielded containers.  One reason for 
this is that a component of the prompt γ-rays from fission are of high energy and thus very penetrating 
and difficult to deliberately shield from detection.  Furthermore identifying the detected radiation to be 
originating from fission events is evidence of the presence of SNM in the object under investigation. 
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To this end it is useful to arrange the detection system to take advantage of the fact that during the 
fission event multiple prompt γ-rays and neutrons are emitted simultaneously [1-3].  
Using an external neutron source to induce fission extends the usefulness of this detection method to 
apply not only to spontaneous fissile elements but also to elements with a cross-section for neutron 
induced fission.  Pulsing of the external neutron source can provide further advantages to be exploited 
in the detection method.  This includes the fact that by proper timing (gating) of the detection period 
with respect to the neutron emission from the external source, the object can be interrogated by a low 
energy (epi-thermal or thermal) neutron flux only, providing the possibility to distinguish the fast fission 
neutrons from the low energy source neutrons in the neutron detection system [4].  
In the present work we study thermal neutron interrogation and epi-thermal neutron interrogation 
separately.  The thermal interrogation provides a strong prompt fission neutron signal proportional to 
the fissile mass [4]. In the epi-thermal interrogation the response is harder to interpret due to the larger 
proportion of gamma detection events during slowing-down of the source neutrons.  The epi-thermal 
interrogation however is important from a nuclear security point of view as these neutrons will to some 
degree penetrate any thermal neutron shield purposely placed around an object containing fissile 
material.  An instrument used in practice should apply a combined thermal and epi-thermal 
interrogation regime. 
2. Experimental setup
The Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA) of the Joint Research Centre is designed 
for experimental studies in non-destructive analysis (NDA) methods for nuclear safeguards and 
security.  Figure 1 shows a cross section of PUNITA and the positioning of the detectors used in this 
work.  The facility is composed of a large graphite liner surrounding a central cavity of volume 
50x50x80 cm3. The (D-T) pulsed neutron generator, the sample under investigation and the 
scintillation detectors used for coincident detection are located inside the cavity.  In total 96 one metre 
long 3He neutron detectors are embedded in polyethylene modules and shielded by cadmium (fission 
neutron counters in Figure 1). In the present experiments these detectors are used as reference 
detectors of the prompt fission neutrons. 
In Figure 1 is also indicated, as source monitors, bare 3He neutron detectors which are used to 
normalize detector readings in all experiments to the same total neutron emission from the generator 
target.  The neutron generator (Model A-211 from Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.) is pulsed at 100 Hz 
which is chosen based on the average thermal neutron lifetime in the graphite/cavity configuration. 
The generator is able to produce short and intense bursts of neutrons with no neutron emission 
between bursts.  This fact, together with the very short duty-cycle of one per mille, allow separation of 
the neutron interrogation into a fast/epi-thermal period from zero to 85 μs, and a thermal period from 
250 μs to 9 ms, respectively [4]. 
Figure 1: Sketch of PUNITA showing the permanently mounted neutron detectors and the neutron generator 
mounted inside the sample cavity (left picture). The right hand picture shows the positioning of the eight liquid 
scintillation detectors within the sample cavity of PUNITA. 
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The performance of scintillation detectors with respect to γ/n discrimination in the PUNITA facility is 
described in [4].  Due to the very fast response of the scintillation detectors the effect of the neutron 
generator burst can be followed in detail [5].  The liquid scintillation detectors used in this work are of 
the type EJ-309 from Eljen Technology (www.eljentechnology.com).  The anode output of the 
photomultiplier is connected directly to a signal digitizer.  The signal digitizers used in this work are 
from Signal Processing Devices Sweden AB (http://spdevices.com/).  Figure 2 shows the triggering 
and data processing scheme used in these experiments.  A detection event includes storage of a 
waveform from each of the eight detectors.  
The fact that the detection of fast prompt neutrons from fission is done in multiple (eight) detectors 
allows for counting not only single neutrons, which may be subject to misinterpretation in the PSD 
analysis and detection of fast generator neutrons in case of epi-thermal interrogation, but also 
detection of multiple neutrons from the same fission event in short observation intervals referred to 
hereafter as two or three fold coincidence events. Events of coincident neutrons are a strong signature 
of a detected fission event. 
Searching for fast neutron detections in the multi-detector setup can mean searching through tens of 
thousands single events, and two-fold or three-fold coincidence events.  These events are stored in 
each experiment for off-line analysis.  We use MATLAB [6] to perform the PSD analysis (n/γ 
discrimination) and plot the coincidences according to their multiplicity (two-fold or three-fold 
coincidence events) and kind (γ-γ, γ-n, n-n, etc.).  In case of single event triggering about 98% of 
stored single events were γ-rays.  The two-fold or higher order coincidences have a much higher 
fraction of neutron signals thus reducing the amount of data necessary to identify a significant quantity 
of detected neutrons.  For the coincidence experiments we used a (software) coincidence gate of 30 
ns. 
Figure 2: Block diagram of the data processing for digitizing and storing detection events on the eight scintillation 
detectors (lower half).  The trigger system (upper half) allows to limit acquisition to a given part of the PUNITA 
pulse period, and to select single-signal, 2-fold coincidence, 3-fold coincidence etc. trigger events. 
3. Experiments at the PUNITA facility
By adjusting the data recording period following the neutron generator burst (Figure 2, “Gate period 
from PUNITA”) the data acquisition can be tailored to a certain neutron energy range.  By means of 
slowing down in the graphite, the thermal flux caused by the 14-MeV source neutron pulse peaks at 
about 250 µs after the 14-MeV neutron burst [7].  Whereas thermal source neutrons persist for several 
milliseconds, the fast sources neutrons as detected in the scintillation detectors (through PSD 
analysis) are only visible for some tens of μs. Figure 3 shows the ratio of detected neutrons to all 
signals as function of time following the generator pulse at time zero. 
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Figure 3: Fraction of the neutron signals to all signals as function of the time following the n-generator burst (a). 
The insert, picture (b) shows the time behaviour of the thermal flux in PUNITA. 
The fast source neutrons disappear within few tens of μs indicating the presence of epi-thermal source 
at least beyond the first 100 µs of the PUNITA time cycle.  This assumption was supported in Monte 
Carlo simulations. 
For the study of both thermal and epi-thermal interrogation a series of five CBNM low enriched 
uranium samples (and an empty container) of same total mass but variable enrichments from 0.31% to 
4.46% 235U was used to vary the fissile mass.   
3.1. Experiments with epi-thermal neutron interrogation 
For the purpose of studying epi-thermal neutron interrogation a 95 μs period (from 28 μs to 123 μs 
after the 14-MeV neutron burst) was investigated. The result for total neutron counting (single 
neutrons) as function of fissile ass is shown in Figure 4 below.  In the analysis, the 95 μs period was 
sub-divided into three.  The earlier period (28-59 µs) does not show a response depending on the 
fissile mass.  The reason is likely due to source neutrons still being observed as fast neutrons in the 
detectors.  
Figure 4: Detected normalized rate of single neutrons in three time periods 
Also two and three fold coincidences (trigger scheme of Figure 2) were recorded in the epi-thermal 
range.  These coincidence signals however were dominated by gamma detection events and gave 
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poorer counting statistics and linearity as function of fissile mass than the single neutron detection 
events shown above. 
3.2. Experiments with thermal neutron interrogation 
Although the total neutron flux caused by the 14-MeV neutron pulse decays exponentially over time, 
the thermal flux only peaks at 250 μs after the fast pulse, and the number of thermal neutron induced 
fissions is still significant partly due to the higher fission cross-section at thermal energy.  
Many series of experiments were carried out to study the sensitivity to 235U mass as function of 
coincidence trigger level (single signal trigger, two-fold coincidence trigger, three-fold coincidence 
trigger etc.).  We found that three-fold coincidence events had the best sensitivity to fissile mass.  This 
means that events were counted where three signals or more (from the eight detectors) were found 
within a period of 30 ns, and at least one signal had a neutron PSD value i.e. coincidence events of 
the types (γ, γ, n), (γ, n, n) or (n, n, n).  As an example Figure 5 shows the response of recorded three-
fold coincidences as function of 235U mass.  
Figure 5: Example of three-fold coincidences as function of fissile mass of types : a: (γ, γ, γ), b: (γ, γ, n), 
c: (γ, n, n), d: (n, n, n). 
Figure 5 shows that pure gamma coincidences (a) are not dependent of the fissile mass.  In any of the 
types of coincidences including a neutron however, the linearity with fissile mass is visible although 
counting statistics deteriorate when multiple neutrons are selected. 
4. Monte Carlo simulations of a scaled up device for cargo containers
The experiments described above essentially applies equipment which can be acquired without 
exceptional requirements and budget.  The main components are readily available off the shelf, 
including the neutron generator, the graphite envelope, and liquid scintillation detectors.  Also the 
signal analysis is done using commercial signal digitizers.  
In order to estimate the performance a scaled up facility based on the same detection principle as 
applied experimentally in the PUNITA facility, we carried simulations using MCNP6 [8] of both PUNITA 
and a technically feasible installation that could be housed in a standard 20-foot shipping container. 
The two performance of the installations were compared by devising a figure of merit as the product of 
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the thermal neutron flux at the position of the fissile material and the prompt fission neutron detection 
efficiency in the detector configuration: 
FOM = [thermal-n flux] x [detector n-efficiency] 
We did not model the light output from the scintillation detectors for the estimation of the neutron 
detection efficiency in MCNP.  Instead we tracked the proton kinetic energy following neutron 
scattering interactions.  We assumed a (conservative) proton energy of 700 keV as the detection 
threshold considering the need to clearly distinguish neutrons in the PSD analysis.  The MNCP model 
corresponding to the PUNITA experiment (Figure 1) is given in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: The MCNP input model of the experiment in PUNITA.  The picture shows the position of the neutron 
generator (blue), the scintillation detectors (gray), and the graphite block (yellow,) polyethylene (green). Uranium 
samples were placed in the centre of the cavity. 
The scaled up device is a hypothetical instrument intended to be operated in airport cargo handling 
areas (non-public area).  The purpose of this device is to assay standard Unit Load Devices (ULDs) for 
air cargo transportation.  The geometry of Figure 4 would be sufficient to interrogate a socalled LD1 
device designed for Boeing 474-400 cargo of dimensions: 234 x 153 x 163 cm (4.9 m3).  As a standard 
matrix for this volume we used the MCNP material cellulose (C6H10O5) with a density of 0.15 g/cm3, 
yielding a total (cargo) mass of 735 kg. 
The MCNP input geometry is depicted in Figure 7.  The geometry includes 24 liquid scintillation 
detectors (four in each wall) of dimensions 7” x 7”, and a single neutron generator, of same operation 
parameters as PUNITA, located in the floor below the assay object.  The device would fit a 20-foot 
standard transport container. 
Figure 7: Model of scaled up device for assay of air cargo containers. The detectors are embedded in the 
graphite walls, floor and ceiling. The n-generator centered in the floor. The entire device fits into a standard 20-
foot transport container (green).  
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The MCNP calculations of the scaled up device showed not surprisingly the lowest FOM value for the 
centre position of the sample volume. The comparison of the MCNP simulations of the PUNITA 
experiment to the scaled up device described above, the following parameters are derived: 
Geometry comparison “ULD device / PUNITA”: 
• moderator volume ratio 11.9 
• sample cavity size ratio 31.7 
• detector volume ratio 21.8 
• neutron generator same (1x 108 /sec, 100 Hz pulsing) 
Preliminary simulation results “ULD device / PUNITA”: 
thermal n-flux ratio, centre pos. ϕth,ULD device /ϕth,PUNITA = 0.00606 ± 0.000238 
fission neutron det. efficiency εn, ULD device / εn, PUNITA = 0.379 ± 9.94x10-4 
FOM ratio 1/436 ± 1/11065 
Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235U in 
a 100 second measurement, using the 3-fold neutron coincidences as signature, the detection limit of 
the “ULD device” described above would be approximately a factor 436 higher or equivalent of 228 g 
235U. 
5. Conclusions
In the present work we have investigated a detection method for special nuclear material based on a 
pulsed neutron source of neutrons inducing fission is fissile isotopes, and the detection of fast prompt 
fission neutrons as a signature of the presence of fissile material. The advantage of this method is that 
low-energy neutrons do not produce a neutron signature in the liquid scintillation detectors, while the 
neutron energy is sufficiently high for the neutrons to pass through thermal neutron shielding, and 
induce fission in fissile isotopes.  The best suited energy range of the source neutron is selected by 
varying the delay of interrogation with respect to the pulse of 14-MeV neutron from a generator 
embedded in a strongly moderating detection assembly. 
Based on Monte Carlo simulations of experimental results of the prompt fission neutron response, a 
scaled up instrument of the same detection principle could be able to detect at the limit a few hundred 
grams of 235U in a measurement time of 100 seconds. 
More work is needed to better interpret the response of epi-thermal neutron interrogation. 
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Abstract 
The European Commission’s (EC) Joint Research Centre (JRC) was entrusted by DG-Home to carry 
out a far reaching ITRAP+10 programme aiming to assess the performance of 8 main families of off-
the-shelf instruments for the detection of nuclear and other radioactive materials. Over 170 
instruments from EU Member States (MS) companies and from the USA were tested (from 2011 to 
2014) against international standards (IEC, ANSI) and the IAEA’s NSS1 recommendations. The work 
was performed in collaboration with the US DoE/DNDO and the IAEA. In 2015, ITRAP+10 Phase II 
was launched by the EC and being implemented by the JRC with the goals to test the Mobile and 
Transportable Radiation Monitors (MTRM) family of instruments (in controlled and real environmental 
conditions) for the first time, build testing capacity within the EU MS and contribute to International 
standardization and certification of detection equipment. 
Keywords:  ITRAP, Nuclear Security, Detection, Illicit Trafficking, Standards 
a Contact (Technical manager): hamid.tagziria@ec.europa.eu 
1) Introduction:
Since the breakup of the soviet Union in 1991 the world has seen a dramatic increase in incidences of 
illicit trafficking of nuclear material and other radioactive material (NRM) which led the IAEA to 
conduct from 1997 to 2001 the first ILLICIT TRAFFICKING RADIATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 
(ITRAP) aiming to test and evaluate the performance of handheld and pocket radiation detection 
equipment in nuclear security. As the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) shows, the 
situation was further exacerbated following the 9/11 terror attacks which resulted in a number of 
nuclear summits, international conferences, national and international plans and initiatives to reinforce 
the fight against the illicit trafficking of NRM as well as strengthen international treaties and 
agreements (Amm. CPPNM, JCPOA, UN1718). The  drive to establish a sound nuclear detection 
architecture which incorparates a number of fundamentals, one  of which most importantly,  is 
adequate detection by instrument with all its prerequisites including standardization, has ever since 
been internationnally recognised and actively pursued.  
Within the framework of the European Commission’s (EC) CBRN action plan adopted in 2009, its 
Joint Research Center was entrusted by DG-HOME to carry out a far reaching ITRAP+10 programme 
aiming to assess from 2011 to 2014 the performance of the most families of commercially available 
NRM detection instruments and test them against international standards. 
Extensive data was collected and managed using a client-server based Data Collection System 
(DCS) the results of which were subsequently communicated to standards committees and to 
participating commercial companies thus helping them to improve the performance of their products. 
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EC funded projects such as SCINTILLA (FP 7) hugely benefited from ITRAP for its well recognized 
success in developing, testing and benchmarking alternatives to 3He-based detection systems for 
difficult to detect NRM. In June 2015, C-BORD which is an H2020 project was launched bringing 
together 22 EU commercial companies, research centers, universities and end users to develop 
systems to detect illicit trafficking in containers at borders, some of which will be tested within the 
ITRAP test bed facilities at the JRC. 
In 2015 ITRAP+10 Phase II was launched by the European Commission with the scope to 1) test the 
rest of detection systems or technologies which are either novel (eg. He-3 alternatives) or simply not 
previously tested such as the mobile systems  2) build testing capacity in EU member states and 3) 
provide feedback to participating industry and to international standards 
This paper aims to describe the testing and measurement campaigns carried out at the JRC in Ispra 
(Italy) within ITRAP+10.  
2) Test bed facility at the JRC in Ispra
a. Dynamic tests with sources:
These are carried out using the test bed facility shown in figure 1 which has the following 
characteristics:  
• 27 m long conveyor/rail
• Speed varying from 0.02 to 3. m/s
• 10 to 300 cm vertical elevation of source
• With/without moderator
• Various shielding arrangement
• 2 source mounting options: automatic and manual for testing with heavily moderated or
shielded sources
• Data Collection system (DCS) described below
Figure  1  : Dynamic test bed facility at the JRC in Ispra 
b. Static testing on purpose built irradiators
In another laboratory at the JRC in Ispra two purposely built irradiators (shown in figure 2) are 
installed with the following specifications: 
• 2 separate irradiators for neutron and gamma sources
• Full control of exposure time and duration
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• Complete record of instrument’s response
• Extensive data collection and management using a client-server based Data Collection
System
Figure  2: neutron and gamma irradiators at the static test bed facility at the JRC in Ispra 
c. The Data Collection System (DCS)
A client-server based Data Collection System (DCS) shown in figure xxx was developed by DNDO 
and implemented at the JRC Ispra the acquisition and management of data within ITRAP+10. Eight 
different databases have been created to accurately record any single piece of information that could 
help to analyse the results. This allowed a quality assured collection and management of vast amount 
of data (pictures, spectra etc) during these extensive testing campaigns. 
Figure 3: Schematic of the Data Collection System (DCS) at the JRC ‘s ITRAP facility in Ispra 
3) ITRAP+10 Phase I:
a. Introduction
From 2010 to 2013 the performance of the following 8 families of commercially available NRM 
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detection instruments was assessed and the instruments tested against international standards (IEC, 
ANSI) and IAEA’s NSS1 recommendations, in collaboration with the US DOE/DNDO and IAEA:  
1. Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD),
2. Spectroscopic Personal Radiation Detectors (SPRD),
3. Radioisotope Identifiers (RIID),
4. Gamma Search Detectors (GSD),
5. Neutron Search Devices (NSD),
6. Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM),
7. Spectroscopic Radiation Portal Monitors (SPRM),
8. Personal Radiation Scanner (PRS).
About 170 instruments were tested at the following laboratories in the EU and the USA using the 
same test procedures: 
1. EC JRC Ispra  (all except mobile, done in Phase 2)
2. DNDO - Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (RID)
3. DNDO: Savannah River National Laboratory and Global Testing Laboratory (PRD)
4. DNDO - Oak Ridge National Laboratory (RPM)
Following extensive data analysis and it was concluded that although most detection technologies 
performed well and fit the purpose, no one instrument or category fully passed all the standards tests 
and can fit all purposes. This implies that there is room for improving instruments (in some cases) 
or/and the international standards in others. The vast amount of test data collected was made 
available, in the shape of suitably targeted reports, to manufactures allowing them to assess and 
improve performance of their equipment and to international standards committees as feedback and 
input for improving standards. A full report was made available to the general public in early 2016 by 
the European Commission and the US Homeland Security [2].  
b. Conclusions of ITRAP+10 Phase I assessment:
 None of the instruments tested under ITRAP+10 passed the complete set of tests
 This fact implies that:
o The standards need to be updated to meet the limitations of
the actual technology.
o In some cases Instruments need to be improved
 Vast amount of test data available for improvement of detector technology and revision of
standards
 Numerous Reports including Public report no. EU 27958 (25 Jan 2016)
 Testing against standards assesses well for detectors performance even if testing is under
controlled conditions.
However, it is important to note that much progress and improvements have been achieved in last 4-5 
years and since e.g. the RPM tests in 2012 as demonstrated within SCINITLLA (FP7) and CBORD 
(H2020) EU projects for instance. The following case is most indicative of that. 
Data collected for instance at the Port of Antwerp (Belgium) in 2005 where 10000 to 15000 trucks 
transit daily past RPM reported between 100 and 200 innocent alarms per day (1.1 to 1.4 %). 
Data collected (2359 alarms) at the same port of Antwerp from June to Nov 2013 with systems 
developed within the SCINTILLA  Eu FP7 project reflect the great progress made whereby: 
 RPM with PVT NORM identification:  80% reduction in nuisance alarms
 Spectroscopic RPM (with NaI identification): 98% reduction.
 8800 alarms (normal PVT RPM N42.35 compliant) would be reduced to 1400 and 100
respectively
 While still able to reliably identify threat and medical sources
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4) ITRAP+10 Phase II
a. Introduction
The JRC was entrusted in 2015 by DG-Home to carry out Phase II of ITRAP+10 with the aim to: 
a) test the remaining families of instruments (mobile and transportable) at the ITRAP facility of the
JRC in Ispra and in real external environmental conditions.
b) build the capacity of a selected consortium of EU laboratories to test and (ultimately) certify
nuclear security detection equipment through the provision by JRC of testing procedures and the
organization of a round robin exercise based on a set of representative instruments (PRD, RID
and SRPM) which had been thoroughly tested in Ispra.
c) ITRAP+10 phase II also aims to make good strides and contribution towards improving
international standards and generally move towards certification of nuclear detection equipment
for nuclear security.
b. Measurements and Testing at the JRC
Figure 4 shows a panoramic view of the dynamic testing facility during the testing campaign of mobile 
and transportable systems also shown being tested in external environments (Figure 5) 
Figure 4 : Testing of mobile and transportable detection instruments in dynamic ITRAP facility at the JRC 
Figure 5 : Testing of mobile and transportable detection instruments in external environments 
c. Round Robin Exercise for capacity building in EU member states
The transfer of know-how to EU Member States' laboratories will be ensured through a round robin 
exercise (Figures 6 and 7) whereby:    
5) A  limited but representative set of instruments will be circulated namely:
a. Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD) – IEC 62401
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b. Radioisotope Identifiers (RID) – IEC 62327
c. Spectrometric Radiation Portal Monitor (SRPM) – IEC 62484
6) Test  procedures have been developed and validated at the JRC and provided to a
consortium of participating EU laboratories
7) Testing of instruments to be carried out at the JRC in Ispra
8) Testing of the equipment by the consortium of Eu laboratories using the same procedures
9) Results will be compared with those of reference measurements by the JRC in Ispra and if
meaningful between different laboratories (including JRC)
PRD RID Pedestrian sRPM 
Figure 6:  Three categories of instruments taking part in the round robin exercise 
Figure 7:   Schematic representation of the round robin exercise 
The consortium of participating EU laboratories funded by DG-Home is composed of: 
• IRSN (France)
• CEA (France)
• EK (Hungary)
• FhG-INT (Germany)
• Seibersdorf Lab (Austria)
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Testing within the round robin exercise (coordinated by France Expertise and implemented by the 
JRC) is planned to start in September 2017 as agreed during the kick off meeting held in Paris on 5 
May 2017 and will be completed by the end of 2018. 
10) Summary and Conclusions:
• Over 180 off-the-shelf radiation detection instruments commercialized in EU and USA were
assessed against international standards within ITRAP+10 from 2011 to 2016.
• A detailed picture of the state-of-the-art technologies was obtained for all families of detectors
(including mobile and transportable)
• Full reports were provided to the companies about their own equipment thus contributing to
improve performance and technologies.
• Feedback provided to international standards committees and to IAEA to improve standards
and progress towards certification.
• Capacity building and knowledge transfer to EU Member States within ITRAP+10 Phase II
through a round robin exercise
• User laboratory access benefited EU member states and international partners and
collaborators
• Strong EU contribution to enhancing nuclear security within the EU-CBRN action plan
• No single detector technology or category
• fits all purposes (not to be confused with «does not fit the
purpose» which fortunately is not the case as these are two 
totally different statements) 
• passes all standards tests which implies that either the
technology or (and) the standards need to be improved 
• Assessment within ITRAP+10 of all families contributed to R&D of detection technology and
to standardization
• Major progress made within projects such as SCINTILLA (FP7) and C-BORD (H2020); EU
consortia projects: industry, research centers and universities, end users..
• New He-3 free technologies now available and tested
• Good progress with communication tools and formats but much more needs be done.
• Most are N42.42 compliant but variations can create difficulties
• Newest detectors able to communicate with: USB, Bluetooth; WiFi; satellite phone via USB,
3G and web interface…
• Many new technologies and much progress made since ITRAP+10 phase I as regards
instrument performance, He-3 alternatives, methods and algorithms.
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Abstract 
As the nonproliferation regime continues to expand throughout the world, attention needs to be paid 
to cyber security. Cyber security is much more than the detection and prevention of malware and 
cyber-attacks. In the context of nonproliferation, cyber security is the implementation of tools and 
techniques to ensure the integrity and authenticity of equipment, infrastructure, and data being 
generated. This is important because the data is used to provide evidence of treaty compliance, 
whether it be the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or a future arms control regime. As an 
example, in international safeguards there is a push for increased use of unattended and remote 
monitoring to ease the resources burden on the IAEA due to the ever expanding number of monitored 
countries and facilities. Therefore, new equipment is being developed to facilitate such monitoring 
activities. Additionally, existing equipment is being modified to accommodate uses beyond its original 
intended use. In each case, there is the potential to inadvertently introduce vulnerabilities into the 
system which did not exist previously. By integrating cyber security into this development process, it 
may be possible to identify and mitigate these vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. The same 
concerns are present in arms control as well. Equipment which may be proposed for use in a future 
regime may be jointly designed or an existing commercial technology. While each case has specific 
advantages and disadvantages, the cyber security concerns remain the same; to generate and 
maintain trust and confidence in the authenticity and integrity of the equipment throughout the regime. 
This paper will identify and explore the cyber security challenges which exist in the nonproliferation 
regime, and will highlight the many ways cyber security can and should be integrated into current and 
future international safeguards and arms control regimes. 
Keywords: Cyber Security, Authentication, Treaty Verification, Arms Control 
1. The Role of Data in the Nonproliferation Regime
Globally, the nonproliferation regime is expanding to accommodate new states, facilities, missions, 
and challenges. This is occurring in the face of stagnant or shrinking resources and budgets. As an 
example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has significant responsibilities in the 191 
countries party to the NPT. In 2014, the IAEA spent the equivalent of 13,000 calendar days 
performing inspections and monitoring over 193,000 significant quantities (SQs) of material with a 
budget of 126.4M euros [1].  In 2015, these numbers increased to 13,248 calendar days monitoring 
200,110 SQs with a budget of 130.7M euros. In order to meet the increased demand on resources, 
additional efforts have spent to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards through 
modernizing technologies for attended and unattended systems, and improving the performance and 
security of information systems. These efforts have resulted in less in-field inspection days in certain 
states, but increased evaluation activities at IAEA headquarters, some of which is due to the 
increased application of unattended or remote monitoring of facilities and activities [2].  
Nuclear arms control is a successful strategic tool to increase stability between two or more 
competing countries. The best examples of this are the multiple nuclear arms control and reduction 
treaties implemented between the United States and Russia (and the USSR). These negotiated 
treaties include the use of agreed tools and procedures to confirm the agreed limits, reductions, or 
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eliminations of treaty accountable items. Historically, the treaties between the US and Russia have 
focused on strategic nuclear capable submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and nuclear-
capable bombers. Counting of these treaty accountable items is a fairly straight-forward process due 
to the size and lack of mobility of the delivery vehicles. Previous treaties have also included a limit on 
the number of deployed nuclear warheads. However, these limits are based more on attribution, 
attributing a specific number to a delivery vehicle or counting shrouded items on a launcher such as 
an ICBM, rather than true accounting of nuclear warheads. Technical radiation-based measurements 
to confirm the authenticity of a shrouded item on a re-entry vehicle are limited to only those bumps 
declared not to be a nuclear warhead. In fact, only the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 
allows radiation-based measurements to confirm the authenticity of a treaty accountable item [3]. As 
future treaties look to transition treaty accountable items from delivery vehicles and launchers to 
nuclear warheads, alternative tools and approaches employed to confirm treaty obligations may need 
to be developed. There has never been a regime where the main treaty accountable item has been a 
nuclear warhead. Therefore well-developed and vetted tools and approaches to gain high confidence 
in the equipment and data used to provide evidence that a treaty partner is meeting its agreed 
obligations remain in their infancy.  
To minimize the risk to data authenticity and integrity, cyber security should become a key 
consideration in any evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of new technology and modernized 
infrastructure. Cyber security is much more than the detection and prevention of malware and cyber-
attacks or protecting one’s computer. In the context of nonproliferation, cyber security is the 
implementation of tools and techniques to ensure the integrity and authenticity of equipment, 
infrastructure, and data being generated and used to provide evidence of treaty compliance, whether 
it be the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or a future arms control regime.  
1.1. International Safeguards 
The IAEA has a legal obligation to draw independent conclusions to determine whether a country is 
meeting its safeguards obligations and the state’s nuclear fuel cycle enterprise is used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. This is a significant challenge given the breadth and depth of facilities and 
infrastructure among the 191 parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and hence the 
need to make efficient and effective use of technologies and information systems. However, the use 
of and reliance on unattended/remote monitoring technologies and modernized information systems 
within the international safeguards regime adds additional risk to the collected, transmitted, and 
stored data ultimately used to provide evidence of compliance.  
Historically, IAEA inspections involved the use of technologies which were developed in-house or by 
trusted support programs. These technologies were developed specifically to IAEA specifications and 
ultimately were controlled, used and maintained by the IAEA. Data were either stored locally in 
protected enclosures and retrieved by inspectors, or digitally signed if possible and sent via a virtual 
private network (VPN) to IAEA headquarters. Moving to today and the future, missions have 
expanded and resources have not kept pace. Future IAEA monitoring is moving to identify more 
efficient ways to perform inspections and make independent safeguards determinations. The long 
term IAEA Research and Development (R&D) Plan identifies a number of desired solutions. Including 
the increased use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products, use of operators’ systems and
equipment, and secure communication between the field and headquarters to facilitate the use of 
unattended and remote monitoring technologies [4]. 
The move away from on-site inspections requires additional trust and increases the potential risk to 
technical equipment, infrastructure, and data. As this move occurs, the technologies and 
infrastructure transition from IAEA inspectors’ control to the State’s through the increased reliance on
unattended/remote or potentially joint use technologies where the equipment is resident in the State’s 
facilities and the data must travel through the State’s network and communication infrastructure. One 
example of how this has been done recently is given in Figure 1. Generated data, either digitally 
signed at the source or protected via tamper-indicating conduit, are stored locally at a trusted IAEA 
equipment cabinet (represented by the dark box on the left of Figure 1. Once data have reached an 
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IAEA equipment cabinet it can be secured and transmitted, in this example, using a wireless router 
and VPN, through State infrastructure and transmission lines, to the European Commission and 
ultimately IAEA headquarters [5]. 
Figure 1: Remote Data Transmission Scheme for Routine Data Transfer [5] 
The data flow described in Figure 1 highlights the reliance on the infrastructure through which the 
data travels. The IAEA has been monitoring countries since the NPT entered into force in 1970.  Over 
the last 47 years, equipment and infrastructure have been put into place in State’s facilities for
monitoring purposes, and at the IAEA in Vienna for collection, analysis, and evaluation.  Technology 
has continued to evolve based on newer technology, more efficient implementation, and identification 
of vulnerabilities.  However the IAEA has been slow to catch up.  In 2013, the IAEA implemented a 
program called the Modernisation of Safeguards Information Technology (MoSaIC) project.  The 
intent of the program is to begin to upgrade and replace aging and vulnerable equipment.  As of 2014, 
they were just in the planning stages of how to move forward on the project [6].  
1.2. Arms Control 
The same issues and concerns present in international safeguards, with respect to technologies and 
data, apply to arms control regimes where data are used to provide evidence of compliance to treaty 
objectives and to detect potential subversive activities. Therefore it is imperative that data can be 
trusted, e.g. to confirm integrity and authenticity.  
As the transition of treaty accountable items move toward warheads, and measurements are 
performed to determine presence and identity of special nuclear material in support of treaty 
verification objectives, the needs for confidence in equipment and data increase significantly from 
current practice. The National Nuclear Security Administration recently published a report on the 
technical collaboration efforts between the U.S. and U.K. in the area of arms control. One of the key 
lessons learned states “An overarching lesson learned is that the ability to strike a balance between 
information protection and information sufficiency is key to an effective monitoring and verification 
regime. A monitoring party must be able to obtain sufficient data to confirm declarations, while a host 
party must have assurances that their most sensitive information is protected throughout the 
monitoring and verification process.” [7].  
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The balance between information protection and sufficiency is a difficult issue which is a current area 
of technical research and development in arms control. It applies to all aspects of technology and 
approaches considered for use in potential future monitoring regimes. The challenge moving forward 
is not simply developing new widgets or technologies, but developing trust and confidence in 
proposed existing widgets or technologies, and striking the right balance between information 
protection and sufficiency. The methods by which these challenges are addressed are via inspector-
focused authentication and host-focused certification: 
 Authentication: A process by which a monitoring party to a treaty or agreement obtains
confidence that the information reported by the monitoring equipment accurately reflects the
true state of a monitored item and that the monitoring equipment has not been altered,
removed, or replaced and functions such that it provides accurate and reproducible results at
all times [7]
 Certification: A process by which a monitored party to a treaty or agreement assures itself that
an inspection/monitoring system meets required safety and security requirements and will not
divulge classified or proliferative information to a monitoring party [7]
2. The Role of Cyber Security in the Nonproliferation Regime
Typically, when cyber security is mentioned, first thoughts focus on issues like malware, ransomware, 
or denial of service attacks. While these are very important aspects of cyber security and are 
challenges facing the country in many sectors, e.g. critical infrastructure, financial, and commercial, 
they are less of a concern facing the nonproliferation regime. The area of cyber security with the 
greatest impact on the nonproliferation regime is Information Assurance, which is defined by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as “measures that protect and defend 
information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, and authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation.” [8]. These concepts are described visually in Figure 2. While 
these concepts are easily defined, the implementation of these principles in equipment and security 
procedures is complex. Each of these must work together to mitigate potential attacks, yet not make 
the equipment or procedures so cumbersome or onerous as to make them unusable. The remainder 
of this section will introduce these areas of Information Assurance and describe how they interact with 
and impact the nonproliferation regime in the context of new equipment or approaches. 
Figure 2: CIA Triad of Computer Security1 
1 http://geraintw.blogspot.com/2012/09/cia-infosec.html 
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2.1. Availability 
Availability ensures timely and reliable access to information and information systems [9]. In a 
traditional cyber security context, denial of service attacks are one example of impacts to the 
availability of systems. The importance of availability varies by the importance of the component, 
equipment, or process, and loss of availability can vary from a nuisance to catastrophic 
consequences. For example, loss of availability to safety systems in critical infrastructure can result in 
extreme danger to the public or loss of life.  
This concept becomes extremely important in the context of remote monitoring. Successful 
implementation of remote monitoring depends on being able to remotely access data upon request. If 
access is denied and the information becomes unavailable, then all benefits gained through remote 
monitoring may be lost and continuity of knowledge over safeguarded material or facilities may also 
be lost. The result of which is expending significant resources to reestablish continuity of knowledge. 
When the IAEA considers new equipment or how to safeguard a new facility, an assessment of where 
and how it will be used is performed. This identifies requirements and defines use cases within which 
the equipment must function properly. It also likely defines the safety and security requirements on 
the equipment and potentially the output data. Part of this evaluation process should also consider the 
importance of the availability, or loss of availability, of the equipment or data on the ability to draw 
safeguards conclusions. As a specific example, consider the impact if a database containing a state’s
Additional Protocol declaration or facility inspection results on the IAEA’s ability to make informed 
decisions on a state’s compliance. This can be a real issue with the desire to move toward information 
driven safeguards. 
An example impact from availability, in arms control, is the loss of opportunity to monitor a treaty 
accountable item (TAI) or process. Consider a monitored dismantlement regime with a portal monitor 
serving the function of monitoring declared pathways in an unattended mode, e.g. inspectors are not 
standing outside the dismantlement cell while dismantlement occurs. If the portal monitor fails, and 
the data is unavailable, then confidence that no diversion or substitution occurred may not be 
possible, as the host could not reassemble the TAI for a do-over and the inspectors have no evidence 
that no subversion occurred. This represents an extreme case which could result in the potential 
consequence of the inspection team not counting the dismantlement toward the host’s treaty 
obligation. 
One lesson learned from the above examples is the need for defense in depth. Availability impacts 
the usability of the equipment, process, or data. If the loss of any of these negatively impacts a 
regime, or the ability to provide evidence of compliance, then careful thought must be given to how to 
mitigate loss of availability. 
2.2. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including 
means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information [9]. As highlighted in the definition, 
confidentiality includes confidentiality of data and privacy concerns. Privacy is very important in terms 
of protecting personally identifiable information (PII). This is one of the main areas of concern for the 
public and private sectors and often times the target of hackers. Phishing campaigns and malware are 
typically focused on gathering this type of information to allow an attacker to gain access to one’s 
accounts or steal one’s identity.  
Within the nonproliferation regime, data confidentiality plays a much larger role and is a bigger 
concern. Data confidentiality assures that information is not available to unauthorized persons. 
Safeguards data may contain sensitive, proprietary, or export controlled information. The results of the 
data collected are not meant for public viewing or release and therefore must be protected from 
unauthorized access.  This is true whether the data is at rest or in transit. IAEA databases contain 
confidential safeguards information and analysis data on every monitored country. The impact of 
someone gaining unauthorized access to modify or remove the data could be severe as it may alter 
the independent conclusions drawn by the IAEA as mandated in their charter.  
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As indicated in Figure 1, the IAEA currently uses VPNs and encryption to protect data confidentiality. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that the use of VPNs by themselves may not guarantee 
confidentiality, as evidenced by the widely publicized breach discovered in some Juniper Networks 
VPNs in 2015 [10]. The use of symmetric cryptography, with secret keys, is a robust technique to aid 
confidentiality. The challenge though is that the secret keys absolutely must be protected. If they are 
stolen or compromised then all confidentiality is lost. Key management can be difficult and unwieldy if 
there is a proliferation of equipment or procedures requiring inspectors to maintain a large number of 
different keys. Public key encryption is another robust method to provide confidentiality, however it too 
is reliant on the security of encryption algorithm, security over the private key, and the overall security 
of the procedure or protocol in which encryption is utilized. One of the strengths of public key 
encryption is that it can be employed to ensure that a message can only be viewed by the intended 
recipient, and also to provide confidence that a message came from the expected source. This dual 
role makes it useful to maintain both confidentiality and integrity. 
Data confidentiality is a very serious issue for the host in any potential arms control regime. As the 
treaty accountable items move from delivery vehicles to warheads, the sensitivity of the data at risk 
significantly increases. The host will likely want to limit access to data as well as the quality of any 
data collected or released. One way this is accomplished is through the use of Information Barriers, 
which separates sensitive data from the very simple output necessary for verification. Data 
confidentiality is also the reason why the host may require review of all data prior to release to ensure 
that unagreed information is not made available or accidentally disclosed to unauthorized persons. 
Future techniques and technologies should consider how to balance confidentiality with the ability to 
provide sufficient evidence of treaty compliance. 
2.3. Integrity 
Integrity involves guarding against improper information modification or destruction including ensuring 
information nonrepudiation and authenticity [9]. Loss of integrity of equipment or data can have 
catastrophic impacts. For example, consider the ramifications if medical records were altered or could 
not be trusted to be authentic. Another more recent example of potential impacts due to loss of 
system integrity can be seen in the hacking of computer systems of presidential candidates and 
political parties [11]. 
Loss of integrity within the nonproliferation regime may be the most damaging to overall confidence 
and is an ongoing challenge. Equipment and data are used together to provide evidence of 
compliance. Within international safeguards, the IAEA has the obligation to ensure peaceful use of 
nuclear material and facilities. Equipment and data play key roles in gathering evidence to allow these 
conclusions to be drawn throughout the world. Unauthorized and undetected loss of integrity can 
affect global confidence in the IAEA. The evidence (and therefore the data and systems) must be 
demonstrably authentic, and should be sufficiently robust to ensure information nonrepudiation. 
In the context of integrity, there are both adversarial and non-adversarial threats facing the 
international safeguards regime. Adversarial threats include nation-states and insiders. In both cases, 
it may be possible to corrupt or modify equipment, infrastructure or data to alter safeguards data to 
hide or modify evidence of non-compliance or attempted cheating. Specific examples may include 
before lens tampering, targeting cables or transmission pathways (wired or wireless) or modifying 
data on computers and databases. Just these few examples highlight the potential difficulty of 
maintaining integrity, as well as the importance of the effort. As the IAEA considers developing new 
equipment, adopting procedures for facility remote monitoring, or upgrading new infrastructure either 
in the field or at headquarters, consideration for equipment and data integrity must be at the forefront. 
Non-adversarial threats tend to be the infrastructure itself, both at the IAEA and in the field. IT 
infrastructure has been in place at the IAEA since the 1970s and infrastructure in many states may 
also be decades old. Lack of upgraded infrastructure may leave data vulnerable to attacks, and it also 
may not be able to support remote monitoring technologies and data due to bandwidth and capacity 
challenges. 
Similar issues and concern exist in arms control as well. The host party has an obligation to protect 
sensitive and classified national security information. One way this may be achieved is through 
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managed access and the use and control of host-provided equipment as part of a monitoring regime. 
Because of these constraints, the inspecting party would have limited access to the equipment, and 
the data may be reviewed by host security prior to release to the inspecting party. Therefore, the 
challenge is to develop equipment, procedures, and manage data such that integrity throughout the 
entire process can be confidently achieved. The processes used by the host and inspecting parties 
are Certification and Authentication, respectively, as defined earlier. These processes can be 
complex, resource intensive and at times incompatible. However, as the collected and agreed data is 
one of the key pieces of evidence regarding whether or not treaty obligations are being met, it forms 
the cornerstone of current research and development efforts to identify techniques and technologies 
to develop monitoring solutions to confirm current and future arms control regimes.  
Technical solutions to maintain confidence in data integrity include, as examples, digital signatures 
and public key cryptography. Proper use provides a mechanism to allow users to have confidence in 
the authenticity or origin of data, and confidence that the data has not be substituted or modified 
through transit from the source to the user. Digital signatures provide a robust mechanism to generate 
and maintain confidence in the integrity and authenticity of data, as well as means to ensure 
nonrepudiation of the data. Therefore, new equipment or procedures being considered in either 
international safeguards or arms control should consider the inclusion or use of digital signatures and 
public key cryptography. Data that is not or cannot be signed requires alternative methods for 
maintaining confidence in its integrity and authenticity. One example is through the use of tamper 
indicating conduit to protect data cables. These cable runs can be long, expensive to secure, and are 
detrimental to the growth of remote monitoring, in the case of international safeguards, due to the 
need to inspect the integrity of the conduit. Within arms control, the use of digital signatures could 
ease the inspection team’s concern over host review prior to release to the inspection team, and ease 
the burden of chain of custody over the data throughout the process. 
3. Conclusion
The growing expectations and roles asked of the nonproliferation regime, in the presence of stagnant 
or even decreasing resources is a huge challenge facing the future of the regime. One potential 
solution to address this challenge is to utilize COTS or joint use equipment and take advantage of 
modern technology and information systems. Another complementary solution is to rely more heavily 
on unattended or remote monitoring systems to replace or minimize the need to spend large amounts 
of time in the field. The consequence of these solutions is a greater reliance on technology and 
information systems.  
Data and information, equipment, and information systems are used extensively in the 
nonproliferation regime to generate, analyze, and store evidence of treaty compliance. One aspect of 
cyber security, information assurance, is specifically focused on ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of equipment, data, and information systems.  These concepts form the foundation of 
computer security and techniques and technical solutions have been implemented successfully over 
the past few decades. The objective of this paper was to introduce the concepts of the CIA triad and 
introduce how they may be applied within the nonproliferation regime. A few examples have been 
highlighted in this paper to identify the issues and challenges facing the nonproliferation regime now 
and in the future. It also highlighted a few technical solutions utilized in information assurance to 
provide for confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data, equipment, and information systems. As 
new technologies, processes, and infrastructure are developed and deployed to provide more efficient 
and effective monitoring, the solutions already proven successful in information assurance could be 
integrated into the nonproliferation regime.  
Explicit consideration of the CIA concept within the nonproliferation regime may highlight issues or 
concerns which may not be realized otherwise, e.g. through piecemeal evaluation. The triad are at 
times competing, but a robust and secure infrastructure or piece of equipment requires the balance of 
all three. This process has been successfully demonstrated in cyber security, and looking toward the 
future, it can help ensure a trusted and robust nonproliferation regime. 
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Abstract: 
In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pursued innovative techniques and 
an integrated suite of safeguards measures to address the verification challenges posed by the front 
end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Among the unattended instruments currently being explored by the IAEA 
is an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS), which could provide automated, independent 
verification of the declared relative enrichment, 235U mass, total uranium mass, and identification for all 
declared uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders in a facility (e.g., uranium enrichment plants and fuel 
fabrication plants). Under the auspices of the United States and European Commission Support 
Programs to the IAEA, a project was undertaken to assess the technical and practical viability of the 
UCVS concept. Phase I of the UCVS viability study was centered on a long-term field trial of a prototype 
UCVS system at the Westinghouse Fuel Fabrication Facility in South Carolina, USA. A key outcome of 
the study was a quantitative performance evaluation of two nondestructive assay (NDA) methods being 
considered for inclusion in a UCVS: Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA), and Passive Neutron 
Enrichment Meter (PNEM). This paper will provide context for the UCVS and potential implementation 
concepts, a description of the UCVS prototype design, and an overview of the long-term field trial at a 
fuel fabrication facility. Selected field-trial results and interpretation are presented, including the 
performance of PNEM and HEVA for the verification of declared enrichment and 235U mass in over 200 
“typical” Type 30B cylinders. Example results from a modeling study provide a preliminary assessment 
of sensitivity to material-substitution scenarios, for the as-fielded NDA methods.  
Keywords: international safeguards; uranium enrichment; nondestructive assay; gamma-ray; neutron 
1. INTRODUCTION
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) current enrichment-plant safeguards approaches 
include attended weighing and nondestructive assay (NDA) of a subset of the plant’s cylinder flow and 
inventory, collection of bulk uranium hexafluoride (UF6) samples for destructive analysis, and 
environmental sampling for subsequent laboratory analysis. New safeguards measures that are more 
effective and cost-efficient than contemporary measures are needed, particularly for modern high-
capacity plants [1][2]. Detection of prominent misuse scenarios could be improved at enrichment plants 
if the IAEA could monitor 100% of material flows and periodically calculate independent uranium 
and 235U mass balances for the facility. However, human and financial resources preclude continuous 
inspector presence at the facility to measure all of the material flow, using today’s attended methods.  
Unattended instruments capable of continuously monitoring material flows, and of performing the routine 
and repetitive measurements previously performed by inspectors, without additional burden to 
operators, are central to the new safeguards approaches being considered by the IAEA. One of the 
instrumentation concepts being considered is an Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS). 
UCVS units would be located at key intersections of cylinder movement between material balance areas, 
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or at the operator’s accountancy scales (to take advantage of the facility’s cylinder weighing operations) 
and would autonomously verify 100% of the declared cylinder flow in the facility. The station could 
include technologies for cylinder identification, NDA of the cylinder contents, load cells, camera 
surveillance, and data transmission to an on-site computer or inspectorate headquarters. The NDA 
components of the UCVS would support several measurement objectives, including unattended, 
independent assay of cylinder enrichment (E235) and 235U mass (M235) for product, feed, and tails 
cylinders [3][4]. UCVS units would be owned and operated by the IAEA, but the data streams could be 
shared with the operator (e.g., for process control) or other regulatory body in conformance with IAEA 
requirements for shared-use instruments. A notional UCVS is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Concept of an integrated UCVS that includes unattended NDA instrumentation (blue panels), load cells, 
camera surveillance, and cylinder identification technology. 
If the potential of the UCVS concept can be realized, such an instrument could significantly enhance the 
efficiency of IAEA’s safeguards approaches at large-capacity enrichment plants, while simultaneously 
improving effectiveness for deterring and detecting diversion of material from declared flow. A UCVS 
could also provide benefits to the operators, for example: easing and expediting the release process for 
product cylinders; reducing the need for sampling and mass spectrometry for process control; and 
cylinder tracking.  
The technical and operational viability of the UCVS concept has been under evaluation under the 
auspices of the United States and European Commission Support Programs to the IAEA. The 
centerpiece of UCVS Phase I was a long-term field trial of a prototype UCVS system at the 
Westinghouse Fuel Fabrication Facility (WFFF) in South Carolina, USA. This paper begins with a 
description of an example UCVS implementation concept and the UCVS prototype design. An overview 
of the field trial and selected analysis results is then provided, along with example results from the 
modeling study that complemented the field trial.  
2. IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPT AT ENRICHMENT FACILITY
An example of how a UCVS might be implemented in an enrichment facility is shown in Figure 2, for 
unblended Type 30B product cylinders. UCVS tracking would begin as the empty cylinder is transferred 
from the storage material balance area (MBA) to the process MBA (steps 1 and 2). This initial scan 
would verify that the cylinder is indeed empty by industry standards (i.e., some residual “heel” material 
often remains in a cylinder labeled as empty). After the product cylinder is filled and homogenized in the 
process MBA, a UCVS scan is performed during the transfer back to the storage MBA (steps 3 and 4). 
In this scan of the full unblended product cylinder, the UCVS would independently measure E235, M235, 
and MU, and store these data in a way that supports automated comparison to operator declarations of 
those parameters. A collection of distinguishing characteristics (e.g., gamma-ray peak ratios and spatial 
variation) for each filled cylinder, labeled here an “NDA Fingerprint”, would also be collected and 
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archived during this scan [4]. Product cylinders would remain in the storage MBA until the operator is 
ready to ship the cylinder off-site. As the cylinder is removed from the storage MBA for shipment, the 
UCVS would re-verify the declared parameters and confirm the consistency of the NDA Fingerprint with 
previous scans. These UCVS data could be reviewed and approved by a remotely located inspector 
(e.g., at IAEA headquarters). This automated confirmation process could enable an expedited cylinder 
release process for facility operators (steps 5 and 6), when compared to today’s approaches that involve 
routine interim inspections and on-site inspector measurements.   
Figure 2. Conceptual overview of how an unblended product cylinder could be verified and released from an 
enrichment facility using a UCVS. 
3. CANDIDATE NDA METHODS
At the inception of UCVS Phase I, the IAEA identified two candidate NDA methods for UCVS, both of 
which were developed under support from the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of 
Nonproliferation and Arms Control: the Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array (HEVA) and the Passive 
Neutron Enrichment Meter (PNEM).  
HEVA uses an array of NaI(Tl) spectrometers with specially designed collimators to simultaneously 
measure the direct 186-keV signature from 235U, and via high-energy gamma rays induced by neutrons 
in 56Fe and the NaI(Tl) itself, the total neutron emission rate from the cylinder [5][6]. The 186-keV 
signature provides direct measure of E235. Under assumptions of known 234U/235U relationships in the 
plant, the total neutron signal can be calibrated to total M235 in the cylinder. In the Phase I field trial, 
three HEVA modules were positioned along one side of the cylinder (Figure 3, top), each module 
consisting of a 7.5-cm × 7.5-cm cylindrical NaI(Tl) spectrometer coupled to a Canberra Osprey digital 
photomultiplier tube base, and surrounded by a cylindrical collimator that includes iron and polyethylene 
layers to enhance neutron-to-gamma conversion [7]. Nonproprietary data acquisition and analysis 
software was developed.  
PNEM employs polyethylene-moderated 3He neutron detectors to measure the singles and doubles 
neutron count rates from the cylinder [8][9]. The singles counts come primarily from the 234U and under 
an assumption of known 234U/235U behavior, allow determination of 235U mass, a method used by the 
Uranium Cylinder Assay System (UCAS) deployed by the operator at a Japanese enrichment plant [10]. 
PNEM extends beyond singles neutron counting to use the coincidence (i.e., doubles) neutron signature 
that arises from induced fission in 235U, thereby allowing quantification of E235. The PNEM hardware 
consists of two polyethylene-moderated detector pods, each containing 12 3He tubes at a pressure of 
10 atm. Data acquisition and analysis are based on pulse processing electronics from Precision Data 
Technology (PDT), a Canberra JSR-12 shift register, and standard IAEA software for unattended 
monitoring systems: Multi-Instrument Collect (MIC), Radiation Review, and the IAEA Neutron 
Coincidence Counting software (INCC). 
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4. UCVS PROTOTYPE DESIGN
The UCVS team, in consultation with the IAEA, Euratom, and Westinghouse, developed a field prototype 
design consistent with field-trial objectives (see below), the IAEA’s preliminary user requirements, and 
the characteristics of the field-trial deployment location. A depiction of the UCVS field prototype is given 
in Figure 3 (top). The HEVA and PNEM modules were aligned alongside and below the cylinder support, 
respectively; load cells were mounted under the cylinder support. Two surveillance cameras were 
integrated, one with a large field of view to survey the entire field trial location (i.e., the Next Generational 
Surveillance System, NGSS, in Figure 4) and the other with a field of view focused on the cylinder 
nameplate (to support confirmation of operator-declared data and troubleshooting). An environmental-
sensor package provided temperature, humidity, and dew-point data. A push-button allowed the facility 
operator to indicate when the cylinder occupancy began, and the associated timer display informed the 
operator when the 7-minute minimum occupancy period had elapsed. A data acquisition cabinet, filled 
with components representative of (but not always identical to) the IAEA’s Unattended Monitoring 
Systems was located inside a utility building near the assay platform.    
The UCVS software architecture was composed of individual data acquisition modules for each sensor 
type (Figure 3, bottom). Raw data files and state-of-health information were saved to the local data 
acquisition computer and a server hosted at PNNL retrieved the raw data daily. No real-time analysis of 
the raw data was performed in Phase I; all interpretation and analysis beyond state-of-health monitoring 
of the instruments was performed in post-processing. No digital signing of the data was performed but 
a virtual private network (VPN) tunnel was used for transmission and IAEA’s Get RAINSTORM software 
was used for data retrieval, consistent with IAEA’s current remote monitoring processes [11].   
Figure 3. Top: Depiction of the UCVS field prototype. Bottom: Schematic of the UCVS software architecture. 
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5. FIELD TRIAL OVERVIEW
A visualization of the UCVS prototype as it was deployed at WFFF in April 2015 is given in Figure 4, 
along with a photo of cylinder placement on the prototype platform. In the nominal cylinder scanning 
sequence used in the field trial, a cylinder was lifted by crane from the transportation overpacks (located 
on the vehicle trailer located approximately 3 meters from the UCVS prototype) onto the UCVS cylinder 
platform. After the occupancy period was complete, the cylinder was loaded by crane onto the operator’s 
accountancy scale, which was located approximately 2 meters from the UCVS platform. A fork truck 
removed the cylinder from the accountancy scale before processing the next cylinder on the UCVS 
prototype. The intended full-cylinder handling procedure was not always observed, with the most 
significant impacts being that cylinders were sometimes left on the accountancy scale, or near the UCVS 
prototype, during the UCVS occupancy. For a number of occupancies, these nearby background source 
terms significantly perturbed the PNEM and HEVA signals. Analysis of the raw NDA signatures and 
camera images was used to identify and remove significantly perturbed occupancies from the cylinder 
populations used for the viability analysis presented in this paper. 
Figure 4. Top: UCVS prototype location at WFFF. The trailer on the left typically contains incoming (full) cylinders 
in transportation overpacks. The trailer on the right is periodically filled with empty (but with heels) cylinders. Bottom: 
Placement of a Type 30B cylinder on UCVS using an overhead crane. 
During the course of the 8-month field trial, over 300 cylinder occupancies were recorded. Approximately 
60 of those were repeated assays of the same cylinder to inform the viability of the NDA Fingerprint 
concept, several were used for benchmarking simulations, approximately 15 were shown to be perturbed 
by nearby cylinder movements, and another 14 were not analyzed due to a data acquisition failure. With 
these reductions, the number of occupancies corresponding to “Typical” cylinders filled to licensed 
capacity was 229. This population was labeled “Typical All.” It consists predominantly of cylinders 
produced in URENCO enrichment facilities but also includes cylinders from a conversion plant (natural 
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enrichment) and centrifuge facilities in China and Russia. Subpopulations of the typical cylinders were 
also defined to support quantitative investigation of facility-specific effects on the fidelity of cylinder 
assay, particularly as it pertains to the 234U/235U behavior and 234U-derived signatures collected by PNEM 
and HEVA. Characteristics of the subpopulations are summarized in Table 1. 
Shipping Facilities Number 
of 
Cylinders 
Range of 
Enrichment 
(wt%) 
Most 
Common 
Enrichments 
(wt%) 
Typical All Multiple centrifuge enrichment 
facilities, one conversion facility 
229 0.71 to 4.95 2.5, 4.4, 4.95 
URENCO All URENCO’s USA, Capenhurst, 
Almelo and Gronau facilities 
166 1.5 to 4.95 4.0, 4.4, 4.95 
URENCO A URENCO USA 66 2.5 to 4.95 4.0, 4.4 
URENCO B URENCO Capenhurst 50 1.5 to 4.95 2.5, 4.95 
AREVA All Multiple enrichment facilities of 
unknown characteristics 
34 1.5 to 4.4 2.6, 3.2 
Table 1. Overview of the Type 30B “typical” cylinder populations analyzed in this study. 
6. EXAMPLE FIELD TRIAL FINDINGS
A key technical objective in UCVS Phase I was quantifying the precision with which the NDA methods 
under test (e.g., HEVA and PNEM) could assay the cylinder-verification parameters important to the 
IAEA, particularly the declared enrichment and 235U mass. The typical-cylinder occupancies, nominally 
seven minutes in duration, provided the raw PNEM and HEVA data needed to define the calibration 
relationship between each NDA signature, or combinations thereof, and the operator’s declarations for 
E235 or M235. The precision of the PNEM- and HEVA-determined enrichment and 235U mass values is 
reported as the relative difference to the declared values, expressed in relative standard deviation 
(RSD). Six NDA signatures were calibrated and evaluated: traditional 186-keV (HEVAT), non-traditional 
singles neutron (HEVANT), HEVAhybrid, singles neutron (PNEMS), doubles neutron (PNEMD) and 
PNEMhybrid. The hybrid signatures for quantifying cylinder enrichment are a simple averaging (i.e., equal 
weighting) of the other two signatures for each NDA method, under an assumption that the total uranium 
mass is known (e.g., from the UCVS load cells or operator declarations). Previous work has indicated 
that the integration of signatures with a low degree of statistical correlation in their uncertainties can 
provide more precise and revealing verification results than either signature independently [5][6], and 
that hypothesis was examined further in this study.  
A summary of the PNEM and HEVA results for the assay of E235 is given in Table 2 and Figure 5. The 
field-measured uncertainties for one-time assay of typical cylinders are compared to the IAEA’s 
International Target Values (ITVs) for uncertainty in the assay of UF6 in cylinders using handheld 
spectrometers. The ITVs are based on gamma-ray spectrometers using the traditional enrichment meter 
analysis technique, a 5-minute count time, a well-calibrated instrument with negligible systematic bias, 
and the use of wall-thickness corrections using ultrasonic tools.  
Typical All 
(229) 
URENCO All 
(166) 
URENCO A 
(66) 
URENCO B 
(50) 
AREVA All 
(34) 
ITV 5.4 (HPGe) 5.8 (NaI) 
HEVAhybrid E235 5.4 4.3 3.5 3.5 4.3 
PNEMhybrid E235 10.6 4.9 1.9 3.4 5.0 
HEVAT E235 (186-keV) 5.5 5.3 5.9 4.4 5.8 
PNEMD E235 (Doubles) 14.8 5.7 2.4 4.9 7.6 
Table 2. Relative standard deviation (σE , in %) of measured enrichment values, as compared to operator 
declarations. HEVA and PNEM results are shown for five populations (cylinder counts in parenthesis) and two 
analysis approaches: hybrid and single-signature. IAEA’s International Target Values (ITV) for product-cylinder 
assay using high-resolution and medium-resolution handheld spectrometers are noted. Results are reported for 
cylinder enrichments greater than 1.5 wt%. 
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Figure 5. Relative standard deviation (σE , in %) from the operator’s declared values for cylinder enrichment, for 
HEVA and PNEM for the cylinder populations analyzed in the field trial. The ITV for high-resolution spectrometers 
is shown for comparison. 
A summary of the PNEM and HEVA results for the assay of M235 is given in Table 3 and Figure 6. 
ITVs for M235 are not available because the handheld devices used today measure only a small 
portion (<0.1%) of the UF6 volume in the cylinder and are therefore not capable of assaying the 
absolute mass of 235U in the cylinder. 
Typical All 
(229) 
URENCO All 
(166) 
URENCO A 
(66) 
URENCO B 
(50) 
AREVA All 
(34) 
UCVS Target Values 3.0 
HEVANT M235 (Singles) 7.6 5.7 3.0 2.6 5.4 
PNEMS M235 (Singles) 7.4 4.8 2.1 2.9 3.4 
Table 3. Relative standard deviation (σM , in %) from the operator’s declared values for 235U mass. HEVA and PNEM 
results are shown for five populations of Type 30B cylinders (cylinder counts in parentheses). IAEA’s target values, 
as given in the UCVS user requirements, are also shown. 
Figure 6. Relative standard deviation (σM , in %) from the operator’s declared values for 235U mass, for HEVA and 
PNEM for the cylinder populations analyzed in the field trial. The IAEA target value for 235U mass assay is shown 
for comparison. 
Additional field-trial results and interpretation for the candidate NDA methods, including preliminary 
findings on the viability of the NDA Fingerprint (not discussed in this paper) can be found in [12][3].  
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
780
7. EXAMPLE MODELING RESULTS
As a complement to the long-term field trial of the two NDA methods, Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) 
simulation studies were performed to more fully characterize the neutron and gamma-ray signatures 
collected by PNEM and HEVA, and to support analyses of material-diversion sensitivity for scenarios 
that are not easily measured. Simulations of different material substitution scenarios were combined 
with the field-measured RSD values to provide an estimate of partial-defect sensitivity for the full-volume, 
neutron-based PNEMS and HEVANT signatures. The average of the field-measured RSDs for the two 
largest facility-specific calibration populations, URENCO A and URENCO B, was taken as 
representative of the uncertainty for the one-time assay of typical cylinders (σ typ). The σ typ values for 
PNEMS and HEVANT, as calculated from Table 3, are 2.5% and 2.8%, respectively. 
The geometry used for the partial-defect scenarios is shown Figure 7. In this example scenario, depleted 
UF6 (DUF6) has replaced a portion of the low-enriched UF6 (LEUF6) in the interior of the cylinder such 
that there is a uniform thickness L of LEUF6 surrounding the diverted material. This geometry was 
chosen because it represents the most difficult scenario to detect based on a traditional (e.g., enrichment 
meter method) gamma-ray measurement taken uniformly around the cylinder walls and, thus, provides 
a conservative estimate of detection probability in that it maximizes reliance on neutron detection. 
Figure 7. Schematic of the partial-defect scenario in which LEUF6 in the center of the cylinder is replaced with 
DUF6. The dimension L is varied to create partial defects of varying relative mass fractions. 
Performance predictions for partial-defect detection were calculated in terms of the probability of 
detection at a given false alarm rate for various levels of diverted material. A false alarm rate of 1% was 
enforced by defining alarm thresholds above and below the mean net counts expected for a cylinder 
filled with material enriched to the declared value, assuming a normal distribution:  μ ± 2.58 σ typ μ, where 
μ is the expected, mean count rate for a cylinder with no material diversion.  
The probability of detection for each mass fraction level of diverted material is determined using the 
probability density function (again, assuming a normal distribution) of the count rate for the 
corresponding cylinder with diverted material (see Figure 8). For the DUF6 substitution scenario, the 
fraction of the probability density function of the diverted cylinder that falls below the lower alarm 
threshold, which is set based on the distribution of the cylinder with no diversion, is the detection 
probability.  
The probability-of-detection curves for PNEMS and HEVANT for the DUF6 substitution scenario are 
shown in Figure 8 for a 1% false alarm rate. The results indicate that PNEM can detect mass defects of 
greater than 8% with greater than 90% confidence in the one-time cylinder assay scenario. HEVA 
sensitivity is somewhat lower, at approximately 15% for the same confidence level. The reasons for 
superior PNEM sensitivity include a marginally lower uncertainty for singles neutrons (2.5% versus 2.8% 
for HEVA) and higher spatial sensitivity over the cylinder region in which the material substitution 
occurred. 
Additional modeling and simulation results, as well as interpretation related to the design and 
implementation of UCVS, can be found in [12][14].  
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Figure 8. Probability-of-detection curves for PNEMS and HEVANT for the DUF6 substitution scenario. 
8. CONCLUSION
The UCVS Phase I field trial was completed on schedule and achieved the objectives defined by project 
stakeholders. The functionality and reliability of the integrated UCVS prototype was encouraging: it 
operated in continuous unattended fashion for over eight months in an outdoor environment. The raw 
data collected during the trial, for various subpopulations of typical Type 30B cylinders, have supported 
comparative analyses of the candidate NDA methods for the one-time assay of cylinder enrichment 
and 235U mass, and compared to performance for today’s handheld devices. Both HEVA and PNEM 
demonstrated the ability to accurately and precisely assay E235 in a full-volume fashion, using the 
hybridization of NDA signatures. Both methods have the potential to provide assay precision comparable 
to or better than IAEA target values for handheld devices, without the need for wall-thickness corrections 
using an ultrasonic instrument. PNEM and HEVA precision for 235U mass assay, using total neutron 
signatures, were comparable over all populations, consistent with the fact that both are collecting 
essentially the same signature. Both methods offer the potential for full-volume assay of 235U mass. This 
would represent a new capability to safeguards inspectorates and support a significant improvement in 
the ability to detect material substitution and removal scenarios, as illustrated in the modeling-based 
results presented here. 
The findings and lessons learned from the Phase I field trial will inform a follow-on phase in which the 
NDA methods will be refined and the integrated prototype platform evolved toward the IAEA’s vision for 
an unattended cylinder verification station. The next phase of the study is expected to include, for 
example, the assay of a broader range of cylinder enrichments and Type 48 cylinders, and place a 
greater emphasis on collection of data from repeated cylinder assays—to inform the viability of the NDA 
Fingerprint concept. In addition, emphasis will be placed on demonstrating fully unattended operation 
(e.g., automated occupancy detection), analysis, and reporting. The iRAP software, currently being 
developed by Euratom and IAEA, was not ready for deployment in Phase I but will likely be included in 
Phase II.  
9. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Funding for this work has been provided by the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office 
of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) and the U.S. Support Program to the IAEA. The IAEA and 
Euratom have provided oversight and invaluable guidance to the project from its inception. The UCVS 
team is indebted to Westinghouse and the staff at the Westinghouse Fuel Fabrication Facility for 
supporting this measurement campaign, from the early planning stages through the final reporting.  
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
782
10. REFERENCES
[1] Cooley JN, Model Safeguards Approach and Innovative Techniques Implemented by the IAEA at 
Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. INMM Annual Meeting Proceedings. 2007.  
[2] Lebrun AR, et al., Improved Verification Methods for Safeguards Verifications at Enrichment Plants. 
Proceedings of the ANIMMA Conference. 2009. 
[3] International Atomic Energy Agency, Unattended Cylinder Verification Station (UCVS) User 
Requirements. SG-UR-12186. IAEA Department of Safeguards. 2013. 
[4] Smith LE, Lebrun AR, Labella R, Potential Roles of Unattended Safeguards Instrumentation at 
Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Journal of Nuclear Materials Management (42). 2013. 
[5] Smith LE, Mace EK, and Misner AC, Signatures and Methods for the Automated Nondestructive 
Assay of UF6 Cylinders at Uranium Enrichment Plants. IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science (57). 
2010. 
[6] Smith LE, Jordan DV, Kulisek JA, McDonald B, Mace EK, Viability of UF6 Cylinder Verification using 
the Hybrid Enrichment Verification Array. Journal of Nuclear Materials Management (43). 2015. 
[7] Zalavadia MA, Smith LE, McDonald BS, Kulisek JA, Mace EK, Deshmukh NS, Hybrid Enrichment 
Verification Array: Module Characterization Studies, PNNL-25066. Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory. 2016. 
[8] Menlove HO, Swinhoe MT, and Miller KA, A More Accurate and Penetrating Method to Measure the 
Enrichment and Mass of UF6 in Storage Cylinders Using Passive Neutron Self-Interrogation. INMM 
Annual Meeting Proceedings. 2010. 
[9] Miller KA, Menlove HO, Swinhoe MT, Marlow JB, “A New Technique for Uranium Cylinder Assay 
Using Passive Neutron Self-Interrogation.” Proc. IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards. 2010. 
[10] Miller KA, et al., The Uranium Cylinder Assay System for Enrichment Plant Safeguards. Journal of 
Nuclear Materials Management (39). 2010. 
[11] Morgan K and Brunhuber C, “Evolution of RAINSTORM,” Proc. IAEA Symposium on International 
Safeguards. 2014. 
[12] Smith LE, Miller KA, et al., Viability Study for an Unattended UF6 Cylinder Verification Station:  
Phase I Final Report, PNNL-25395. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. 2016.  
[13] Smith LE, KA Miller, et al., An Unattended Verification Station for UF6 Cylinders: Field Trial Findings. 
Submitted to Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research, A. April 2017. 
[14] Miller KA, Kulisek JA, et al., Viability of an Unattended Verification Station for UF6 Cylinders: Monte 
Carlo Modeling Studies. In preparation for Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research, A. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
783
Status of Safeguards R&D on pyroprocessing related facilities at 
KAERI 
Ho-Dong Kim, Se-Hwan Park, Seong-Kyu Ahn, Hee Seo, and Byung-Hee Won 
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon 
Daedeok-daero 989-111, Yuseng-gu, Daejeon, 305-353 Republic of Korea 
E-mail: khd@kaeri.re.kr 
Abstract: 
The Republic of Korea (ROK) has implemented the Safeguards By Design (SBD) concept in nuclear 
fuel cycle facilities. Since the early 1990s KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute) has 
developed several nuclear fuel cycle facilities for research activities on spent fuel treatment. Such 
facilities include the DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF), the Advanced spent fuel Conditioning 
Process Facility (ACPF), and the PyRoprocessing Integrated inactive DEmonstration facility (PRIDE). 
PRIDE is an engineering-scale R&D facility, handling non-irradiated depleted uranium and surrogates 
to develop and test key technologies for pyroprocess. The data obtained from this facility will be used 
to evaluate the feasibility of pyroprocessing facility in the future. DFDF consists of one concrete hot 
cell used for the technology development of the DUPIC (Direct Use of Pressurized Water Reactor Fuel 
in CANDU) fuel fabrication as well as for voloxidation of irradiated PWR spent fuel rod cuts to produce 
feed material for the electrolytic reduction process in ACPF. ACPF consists of two interconnected hot 
cells with two shielded rear doors for material transfer designed for research on electrolytic reduction 
of spent oxide fuel into the metallic form. Pyroprocessing related facilities which contain less than one 
significant quantity of nuclear material but which utilize technologies and equipment related to the 
electrochemical recycling of spent fuel have been treated as category III by the IAEA. The demands 
for robust safeguards applied to pyroprocessing facilities require the IAEA to develop new safeguards 
measures and techniques. The KAERI’s safeguards R&D will provide the IAEA and the international 
community with credible assurances regarding a State’s fulfilment of its safeguards obligations. 
Keywords: SBD; Safeguards Approach; Safeguards Measures; Nuclear Fuel Cycle; Pyroprocessing 
1. Introduction
Since the early 1990s, KAERI has developed safeguards systems of several nuclear fuel cycle 
facilities for research activities on spent fuel treatment. Such facilities include the DUPIC Fuel 
Development Facility (DFDF), the Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF), and the 
Pyroprocessing Integrated inactive DEmonstration facility (PRIDE). These facilities are now being 
used as facilities to develop and evaluate the pyroprocessing concept.  Pyroprocessing related 
facilities which contain less than one significant quantity of nuclear material but which utilize 
technologies and equipment related to the electrochemical recycling of spent fuel have been treated 
as category III by the IAEA. 
As part of a cooperative effort with the IAEA to find a safeguards approach for the pyroprocessing 
facility, the ROK designed a Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocessing Facility (REPF) and 
developed a safeguards system for the REPF that was reviewed by the IAEA. The IAEA plans to test 
the safeguards measures of REPF in KAERI pyroprocessing facilities through member state support 
program (MSSP) with ROK. The REPF is being upgraded to REPF+, which include the scale-up of the 
pyroprocessing facility and U/TRU fuel fabrication process. KAERI has developed a simulation 
program, Pyroprocessing Material flow and MUF Uncertainty Simulation (PYMUS) to assess the 
nuclear material accountancy system of the REPF. The PYMUS is under improvement to include the 
function of the statistical analysis of Near Real Time Accountancy (NRTA). 
KAERI is developing an advanced safeguards system, including nuclear material accounting 
technologies and new safeguards approach for pyroprocessing facilities in parallel with the process 
technology development and facility design. This paper addresses the main features of the safeguards 
R&D status of pyroprocessing facilities at KAERI. 
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2. Safeguards Systems of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities at KAERI
According to the “Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Korea and 
the Government of the United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” 
revised in 2015, KAERI has been using DFDF for preparing the feed material (porous pellet or 
fragment) from the spent PWR fuel generated in domestic nuclear power plants for the ACPF 
electrolytic reduction process. The ACPF at KAERI has been refurbished for the demonstration of the 
pyroprocessing technologies related to the electrolytic oxide reduction process of the PWR spent fuels. 
The safeguards approaches for the DFDF and ACPF have been developed, that include neutron 
counters and containment and surveillance equipment with a process and radiation monitoring system. 
The ACPF can provide a valuable opportunity to test various types of safeguards equipment for 
nuclear material accountancy, containment and surveillance, as well as process monitoring. At the 
moment, there are two types of safeguards equipment at the ACPF, i.e., ASNC (ACP Safeguards 
Neutron Counter) and ALIM (ACP LIBS Monitoring system) [1]. 
The ASNC, based on the passive neutron coincidence measurement technique, measures the amount 
of 244Cm. The amount of nuclear material in the ACPF can be determined by using the Cm balance 
technique, which multiplies the measured 244Cm amount by the Pu/244Cm or 235U/244Cm ratio to 
calculate the amount of nuclear material of interest (Pu or 235U). This ratio can be obtained by a 
destructive analysis, gamma-ray spectroscopy, or burnup-code calculation. 
In a previous study [2], the ASNC was installed in a hot cell of the ACPF and tested successfully with 
spent fuel rod cuts. However, its inner structure, with a horizontally-laid geometry, becomes deformed 
over the course of many years due to the weight and the ductility of the leaden gamma-ray shield. To 
address this problem, the ASNC was to be redesigned for a vertically-standing geometry based on the 
MCNP simulation and irradiation test results as shown in Figure 1. 
Fig. 1. Modified ACP Safeguards Neutron Counter 
The detection efficiency profile of the ASNC in the axial and radial directions was measured for a 
252Cf standard source in order to characterize the system and verify the MCNP model. Ideally, a good 
system shows the same efficiency regardless source locations, resulting in low measurement error. 
The system showed flat response in terms of the measured efficiency, as shown in Fig. 2. In addition, 
the simulated results showed excellent agreement with the measured data, which confirmed the 
accuracy of the MCNP model for the measurement system. The modified ASNC will be tested with the 
spent fuel rod cuts for calibration and with the input and output materials of oxide reduction process for 
evaluation of the performance. 
LIBS was recognized as a promising technique because material can be analysed without the careful 
sample preparation. The use of LIBS based on the fiber optics is a benefited applications of LIBS to 
hot cell environment by delivering the laser energy to the target and by collecting the plasma light. The 
Fiber-Optic LIBS (FO-LIBS) system to measure the Pu/U ratio of the process material of ACPF has 
installed at air cell of ACPF, and the performance will be tested as the spent fuel will be introduced to 
ACPF. 
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Fig. 2. Detection Efficiency Profile of the ASNC 
Fig. 3. LIBS installed at ACPF 
PRIDE is an engineering-scale R&D facility, handling non-irradiated depleted uranium (DU) and 
surrogates to develop and test key technologies for pyroprocessing prior to the development and 
construction of an engineering-scale facility. The demands for robust safeguards applied to 
pyroprocessing facilities require the IAEA to develop new measures and techniques to complement 
the more traditional safeguards systems. The bus bar system, together with portal radiation monitors, 
were selected and installed in the PRIDE facility to support IAEA safeguards implementation in this 
facility [3]. 
Process monitoring data such as voltage, current, temperature, and humidity are collected from the 
process equipment. Most of parameters relevant to the PRIDE safeguards are collected, and they are 
displayed and provided to the IAEA. PRIDE facility will be used for the testing how to develop the 
safeguards signature of process monitoring data, containment and surveillance (C&S) device, and the 
training of IAEA inspectors on the engineering-scale pyroprocessing facility 
Fig. 4. Front view and working area of the PRIDE facility 
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3. Safeguards System of Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocessing Facility
The ROK was working closely with the IAEA under the ROK’s MSSP to develop a model SG approach 
for a REPF. REPF design is part of the IAEA’s effort to develop an effective safeguards approach for 
pyroprocessing facilities. As a result of the project, a model Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ), a 
model Facility Attachment (FA) and a model SG approach were prepared [4].  
The concept of the REPF is now being revised to 30 MTHM throughput facility, REPF+, to investigate 
the scale-up effect of the safeguards. One of key features of REFP+ is the allowance of nuclear 
material mixing between campaigns, whereas the material mixing was limited in the REPF. A 
simulation program, PYMUS, has been developed to analyze the nuclear material flow and calculate 
the MUF uncertainty [5]. The PYMUS is being upgraded to evaluate the detection probability based on 
the statistical test for the various diversion scenarios. 
Based on the experience with the ROK MSSP, the IAEA is well on the way to establish effective 
safeguards for future engineering/commercial scale pyroprocessing facilities. 
4. Conclusions
KAERI has developed several nuclear fuel cycle facilities (DFDF, ACPF and PRIDE) for research 
activities on spent fuel treatment. The ROK designed the REPF through IAEA MSSP and developed a 
safeguards system for the REPF that was reviewed by the IAEA. KAERI is developing an advanced 
safeguards system, including nuclear material accounting technologies and new safeguards approach 
for pyroprocessing facilities in parallel with the process technology development and facility design. 
The application of Safeguards by Design (SBD) to these efforts will contribute to improving non-
proliferation and safeguards technology so that pyroprocessing technology can be realized in the 
future. It is expected that the deployment of these safeguards technologies would be useful for the 
advanced nuclear fuel cycle. 
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Abstract: 
The IAEA has proposed in its long-term R&D plan, the development of technology to enable real-time 
flow measurement of nuclear material as a part of an advanced approach to effective and efficient 
safeguards for reprocessing facilities. To address this, JAEA has designed and developed a neutron 
coincidence based non-destructive assay system to monitor Pu directly in solutions which is after 
purification process and contains very little fission products (FPs). A new detector to enable monitoring 
of Pu in solutions with numerous FPs is being developed as a joint research program with U.S. DOE at 
the High Active Liquid Waste (HALW) Storage Facility in Tokai Reprocessing Plant.  
As the first step, the design information of HALW tank was investigated and samples of HALW was 
taken and analyzed for Pu concentration and isotope composition, density, content of dominant 
nuclides emitting gamma ray or neutron, etc. in order to develop a Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport 
Code (MCNP) of the HALW tank. In addition, gamma ray source spectra simulated by Particle and 
Heavy Ion Transport code System (PHITS) was developed by extracting peaks from the analysis data 
with germanium detector. These outputs are used for the fundamental data in the MCNP model which 
is then used to evaluate the type of detector, shielding design and measurement positions. In order to 
evaluate available radiations to measure outside the cell wall, continuous gamma ray and neutron 
measurement were carried out and the results were compared to the simulation results. The 
measurement results showed that there are no FP peaks above 3 MeV.  
This paper presents an overview of the research plan, characteristics of HALW, development of 
source term for MCNP, simulation of radiation dose from the HALW tank and radiation measurement 
results at outside of cell wall.  
Keywords: Pu monitoring, High level liquid waste, Reprocessing facility, Non-distractive 
analysis 
1. Introduction
The IAEA has proposed in its long-term research and development (R&D) plan[1], development of 
improved tools and techniques to enable real-time flow measurements technology of nuclear material 
including Pu as an advanced approach to conduct reprocessing safeguards effectively and efficiently. 
The solution monitoring and measurement system (SMMS), which has been installed for continuous 
monitoring for reprocessing safeguards, can only monitor density, temperature and level of solution. 
Thus, direct Pu monitoring in the solution by SMMS is impossible. At JAEA, we have already designed 
and developed a neutron coincidence based non-destructive assay (NDA) system[2] to directly monitor 
pure Pu solution after extraction and purification. It has been confirmed that a total measurement 
uncertainty of less than 6% could be achieved, which could be applied as a partial defect verification.  
In the reprocessing plant, Pu including FP is being stored as inventory or retained waste. The Pu 
including FP has an extremely high radiation dose rate making it difficult to access and it’s a challenge 
to develop a technology for monitoring of Pu with FP. Establishment of monitoring technology is 
important in order to increase transparency of material control and accountability (MC&A). Thus, JAEA 
has initiated development of a new technique to monitor Pu with FP, through a joint research program 
under the United States Department of Energy (US DOE) and the Ministry of Education, Culture, 
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Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) of the Japanese government. 
2. OVERVIEW
2.1  Plan[7] 
Although the most suitable test area is the input accountability tank or first extraction process, the 
JAEA’s Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP) is no longer operating. Since HALW solutions contain both 
Pu and FP, the HALW tank (Fig. 1) was selected as the place where the technology will be 
developed and tested under this R&D program. The HALW tank is shielded by a concrete cell and it 
is possible to place detectors at the inside/outside of the concrete cell. Figure 1 shows the image of 
the Pu monitoring technology development. The purpose of the R&D is the development of a detector 
that can monitor Pu solutions containing FP.  
The development is carried out under cooperation with U.S. national laboratories: Los Alamos 
National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). At first, the 
radiation (type and intensity) from the HALW is characterized and measurement technology is 
selected. Then, appropriate detector is designed and developed. The optimized detectors are tested 
and evaluated at the HALW tank with changing liquid level as shown in Fig. 1. This technology has 
the potential to be applied to real time monitoring for the entire reprocessing plant.  
Fig. 1 Image of Pu direct monitoring technology development 
The study of development of a new technique to monitor Pu with FP is being carried out from 2015 to 
2017. The timetable for the project is shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 Timetable for establishment of Pu monitoring system (Japanese fiscal year) 
2015 
1. Design information and composition survey of HALW(JAEA)
The design information for HALW tanks and concrete cells was reviewed to develop a 
simulation model. Radiation (type and intensity) using alpha spectra and gamma spectra, 
and composition using mass analysis were investigated to develop an input file for 
simulation. Using HALW analysis data of gamma spectra and neutrons, the radiation dose 
rate in HALW tank was estimated for the input file for simulation. 
2. Radiation study (JAEA)
Gamma rays and neutrons were continuously measured outside of the concrete cell, 
where the HALW is located, to study placement of the detector and radiation 
characteristics. The detectors used were high purity germanium (HPGe) detector for 
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gamma rays and six He-3 tubes for neutrons [3]. 
2016 
2. Radiation study (JAEA/LANL)
Gamma rays were continuously measured inside of the concrete cell, where the HALW is 
located, to study placement of the detector and radiation characteristics. 
3．Evaluation by simulation (LANL/LLNL) 
     LLNL made a common model and simulate gamma rays to benchmark ion chamber 
measurements help JAEA with gamma detector design. LANL will use this common model to 
simulate the neutron flux from the HALW tank to support the neutron detector design 
development.  
2017 
2. Radiation study (JAEA/LANL)
Neutrons will be continuously measured inside of the concrete cell, where the HALW is 
located, to study placement of the detector and radiation characteristics. 
4. Detector design and fabrication(JAEA/LANL/LLNL)
Based on the analysis data, simulation analysis results, and preliminary measurement
results at the inside and outside of the concrete cell, candidate technologies and Pu
monitoring algorism will be considered. The test detector will also be optimized and
designed.
5. Detector setting, calibration and measurement(JAEA/LANL/LLNL)
Detector test with changing high level liquid waste amount. 
6. Feasibility evaluation for real time Pu monitoring(JAEA/LANL/LLNL)
The test detector will be demonstrated at HALW tank to validate its measurement 
capabilities.  
In the implementation of this technology development, JAEA has received the support of LANL/LLNL 
based on the implementing arrangement between MEXT and DOE concerning cooperation in the field 
of nuclear energy-related research and development.  
3. The results of composition research of HALW
3.1. Analytical tools for HALW solution 
Composition research of HALW for our target HALW storage tank (V35) 
which has the highest concentration of Pu in HALW tanks at TRP was 
conducted. Especially, Gamma-ray spectrum was measured in high energy 
range (up to 10 MeV). Figure 2 shows experimental setup of gamma-ray 
spectrometry. HPGe [COAXIAL TYPE Ge Detector (GC2020), 
CANBERRA] and multi-channel pulse height analyzer (MCA) [DSA1000, 
CANBERRA] connected to HPGe was used for gamma-ray spectrometry. 
Figure 3 and 4 show photos of HALW sample bottle and picture of 
experimental setting for gamma-ray measurement. HPGe detector and 
HALW sample is surrounded by Pb introducing to cut environmental 
gamma-ray. In order to reduce dose rate, sampled 1 [ml] HALW solution 
was diluted with nitric acid of same acid concentration to one million times 
because too high dose rate cause high dead time. Other analyzed items and 
methodologies are shown in Table.2.  
Ge 
detector
Plastic plate
Sampling bottle 
32 mm
Pb shielding
Fig. 3 Measurement chamber and sampling bottle       Fig. 4 Image of inside of the measurement 
chamber 
Fig. 2 Experimental setup 
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Table 2 Analysed items and methodologies 
Analytical item Unit Methodology 
Acid conc. mol/L Neutralization Titration with NaOH (Hiranuma COM-1600) 
Density g/cm3 Density meter (Anton-paar  DMA-35) oscillating U-tube type 
Cm conc. Bq/mL SEIKO EG&G using detector “alpha duo” 
Pu conc. mg/L Spectrophotometry using cerium nitrate with sludge dissolution by HF 
U conc. g/L Spectrophotometry(Shimazu UV-2450) using TOPO - Ethyl acetate -
Dibenzoylmethane (DBM)
Gamma 
measurement
Bq/mL Canberra using detector GC-2020 
Pu isotopic 
composition
wt% Mass spectrometer(Thermo TRITON) with sludge dissolution by HF, 
TEVA resin for Pu separation
U isotopic 
composition
wt% Mass spectrometer(Thermo TRITON) with sludge dissolution by HF, 
U-TEVA resin for U separation
3.2. Results of gamma-ray and neutron of HALW solution [6] 
The gamma-ray spectrum from HALW solution was measured and shown in Fig.5. It is used for source 
file of MCNP simulation. However, the measured spectrum didn’t show any of our target gamma-rays 
in high energy region [4,5]. We estimated neutron yield in V35 with calculation based on alpha spectra 
and show it in Table 3. The neutron yield can then be used in the input file for simulations. 
Fig.5 measured gamma-ray spectrum (Measurement time: 550000 [sec]) 
Table 3 Neutron generation yield in V35 
Nuclide Neutron yield [n/sec] 
244Cm 1.09×109 
240Pu 8.24×106 
242Pu 2.10×106 
238Pu 8.47×105 
241Am 1.22×104 
4. Development of irradiation source input file in HALW tank
4.1. Gross count of each peaks 
It was necessary to estimate the absolute gamma-ray counts emitted from HALW sample for the 
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gamma-ray source data in the MCNP simulations. Key points for making source data were (1) 
Evaluation for gamma-ray energy emitted from HALW sample, (2) Peak count quantity, (3) Estimation 
for emitted gamma-ray quantity. After, we conducted more precise energy calibration for the gamma-
ray spectrum and made peak count estimation. Then we calculated the attenuation ratio in the 
analysis geometry. As shown in Fig.6 each peak spectrum was cut with straight line in red. The gross 
counts from each peak was estimated with this original spectrum as shown in Fig.7. 
Fig.6 cutting spectrum with straight line (gross)      Fig.7 Net count of each peak 
4.2. Calculation of Attenuation ratio by PHITS model 
In order to confirm how well the HPGe detector could detect gamma rays at the inside of the 
measurement chamber, a model of the measurement chamber was developed as shown in Fig.8. 
Because the attenuation ratio of each peaks was different by each gamma-ray energy, we calculated 
attenuation ratio of each gamma-ray in analysis geometry by PHITS code [9]. The attenuation ratio 
multiplied to net counts (Fig.7), then gamma ray amounts at V35 tank by the each energy were 
calculated as shown in Table 4. The Bq values were converted to Ci to compare ORIGEN results. The 
evaluated absolute gamma-ray intensities were on the same order as ORIGEN and the analysis value 
as shown in Table 5. We succeeded to create gamma ray source file for simulation. 
Fig.8 Model of the measurement chamber  Fig.9 Case of the attenuation ratio of 50 [keV] 
Table.4 Net counts, attenuation ratio, total gamma ray amounts at V35 tank 
Nucleus Energy [keV] net counts 
Attenuation ratio 
 (PHITS) 
[deposit/source] 
count/mL 
(Sample 
bottle) 
Measurement 
time[s] Bq/mL Bq(V35) 
241Am(Ci) 59.54 8.23E+06 6.084E-02 1.352E+08 5.615E+04 2.41E+07 1.85E+15 
154Eu(Ci) 123.07 6.48E+06 5.785E-02 1.120E+08 5.615E+04 1.99E+07 1.53E+15 
134Cs(Ci) 604.80 1.00E+05 1.432E-02 6.983E+06 5.615E+04 1.24E+06 9.56E+13 
137Cs(Ci) 661.66 2.94E+08 1.343E-02 2.191E+10 5.615E+04 3.90E+09 3.00E+17 
134Cs(Ci) 795.95 7.77E+04 1.144E-02 6.794E+06 5.615E+04 1.21E+06 9.31E+13 
Table. 5 Evaluated absolute gamma-ray quantity, ORIGEN and analysis value 
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Nucleus Evaluation value [Ci] 
ORIGEN calculation value 
[Ci] 
Analytical value 
[Ci] 
241Am(Ci) 1.85E+15 4.40E+15 1.31E+15 
154Eu(Ci) 1.53E+15 5.03E+15 - 
134Cs(Ci) 9.56E+13 1.61E+14 - 
137Cs(Ci) 3.00E+17 2.66E+17 6.23E+16 
134Cs(Ci) 9.31E+13 1.61E+14 - 
5. Results of gamma and neutron measurements on the outside surface of
HALW cell 
5.1. Experimental setting 
The gamma-ray spectrum and neutron flux were measured outside of the concrete cell. Figure 10 
shows the measurement point for the gamma-ray spectrum and neutron measurements. We chose 
two tanks (these call for V35, V36) for these measurements. V36 tank has only nitric acid and is a 
spare tank. The result from V36 was compared to the other results. V35 tank has HALW. Figure11 
shows measurement setup outside the concrete cell. There is 1.9[m] thickness concrete between 
detector and HALW tank in outside wall of HALW cell measurement. The largest solid angle point was 
selected for measurement point that is the same level of HALW tank liquid height.  
Fig.10 Measurement point (floor plan) 
4.
0
m
HALW tank
1.9 m
Penetration pipe for thruster
Plug for shield
concrete
1.
5
m
1.
3
m
The first floor
The basemenr floor
cradle
Fig.11 Measurement setup (cross section view) 
Two detectors were used for the gamma-ray and neutron measurements. One was HPGe [GMX50-83-
A ORTEC] for gamma-ray measurements and its energy range was up to 10 [MeV]. The other was six 
He-3 tubes in high density polyethylene to measure neutrons (singles rate). Figure 12 and 13 show the 
HPGe and six He-3 tubes detector setup[1].  
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Fig.12 HPGe  Fig.13 Six He-3 tubes 
5.2. Result of gamma-ray measurement. 
Regarding to HPGe measurement, we could find only environmental gamma-ray peaks. It was 
determined that the 1.9[m] concreate was too thick to detect gamma-ray emitted from HALW tank and 
Pu monitoring of gamma rays outside of the cell cannot be conducted. Measurements should be 
conducted at points with less shielding such as inside penetration pipe or cell. 
5.3. Result of neutron measurement. 
Figure14 shows the results from the neutron measurement. The horizontal axis shows the 
measurement cycle number (1cycle means 1minute measurement) and the vertical axis shows 
neutron signal [cps].Each point corresponds to the neutron count rate in each cycle. The solid lines 
show mean value of same color points, respectively. As you can see in Fig.14, the neutron response 
in front of V35 was slightly higher than that of V36. Although this may indicate that we might be able to 
detect neutrons emitted from HALW tank outside cell which has 1.9[m] thick concrete, these value is 
insufficient for Pu monitoring because the mean value of V35 was less than 0.1 [cps]. 
Fig.14 Result of neutron measurement. 
5.4. Comparison with simulation results 
Model [7] 
Since Cm-244 is the dominant source of neutrons in the HALW, Cm-244 was used as the neutron 
source term [8] in the simulation. The input gamma ray source assumes gamma ray spectra measured 
with an HPGe detector multiplied by the efficiency curve calculated by PHITS code[9]. The results 
described in section 3.2 and 4.2 were used as the radiation source files. We assumed the number of 
particles was 1 million. Dimensions and model used for the simulation are shown in Fig. 15. Radiation 
that passes through from the concrete cell were simulated at the floor of the 1st floor and 3.28 [m] and 
1.52 [m] from the floor of the basement. The screw duct is depicted in Fig. 16. 
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Fig. 15 Model of whole HALW tank(V35)            Fig. 16 Structure of screw duct 
Results 
Gamma rays were simulated using the gamma ray destructive analysis (DA) spectrum from the 
measurement of the diluted HALW sample as an input file (see Fig. 17). We understood that gamma 
rays were almost completely shielded about 70 [cm] away from the inner wall. Based on the results of 
PHITS simulation using DA data as the input file, it seems difficult to measure gamma rays directly 
from the HAW tank at the outside of the concrete cell as same as measured gamma and neutron 
results .  
Fig. 17 Gamma rays simulated using gamma ray analysis data as an input file 
The neutron distribution was simulated using the neutron analysis data as an input file (see Fig. 18). 
Scattered neutrons were detected at 3.28[m] from the basement floor based on simulation as shown in 
Fig. 18. We assumed that radiation could be scattered because of the structure of screw duct as 
shown in Fig. 16. There was no neutron detection at 1.52 [m] from the basement floor based on the 
simulation results. Regarding the difference between 5.3 Fig.14 neutron measurements and the 
simulations, the simulation could not help explain the different results. 
Fig. 18 Neutron distribution simulated using neutron analysis data as an input file 
z axis
x 
axis 
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6. Conclusion
A project of development of a new technique to monitor Pu with FP has been carried out since 2015 
as scheduled. As the first step, analysis of the HALW to evaluate neutron/gamma-ray emitted from 
solution in the HALW tank (V35) which has the highest Pu concentration in HALW tank at TRP were 
conducted. Gamma-ray spectrum and neutrons emitted from 1mL HALW sample which was diluted 
with nitric acid of same acid concentration to one million times was measured. Based on the HPGe 
analytical results, the absolute gamma-ray value was evaluated with attenuation ratio calculated by 
MCNP and gamma-ray spectrum for the input source file. 
We performed actual measurements of gamma rays and neutrons at the outside of the concrete cell. 
Gamma-ray peaks emitted from HALW solution were not found in measured spectrum because 
shielding effect of the HALW tank’s cell which has 1.9[m] thickness concreate was too high. So we try 
to conduct gamma-ray spectrum measurement at the inside the cell which is less shielding effect than 
outside the cell. On the other hand, Neutron response proportional to neutron generation ratio in each 
HALW tank was obtained by neutron measurement at the outside of the cell wall. However, it will be 
also necessary to conduct neutron measurements inside the cell because differences of the mean 
value of neutron signal on each measurement was about 0.1[cps]. It is not enough count ratio to 
evaluate the difference because sampling error from HALW tank also has about 1% and it include the 
result this time.  According to the PHITS simulation, detection of gamma rays and neutrons at the 
outside of the concrete cell is difficult. On the other hand, they could be detected at the outside of the 
concrete cell near the duct at the basement floor. 
For the next step, we will measure gamma rays and neutrons at the inside of the concrete cell.  
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Abstract: 
The aim of the State-level approach to safeguards is to determine compliance of each State with its 
obligations under the NPT. The evaluation mechanism must be objective and transparent in both the 
procedures and the information used to draw conclusions. Objectivity implies the minimization or, at 
best, elimination of human judgment.  While data can be processed mechanically, the qualitative 
information must first be quantified. In addition, both quantitative and quantified data contain 
uncertainties. Some may be unintentionally erroneous, other falsified and all are corrupted by some 
level of noise.  Thus, design of an objective detector of non-compliance needs to take into account the 
uncertainties associated with all input data, in other words, there is a need to develop models for 
characterizing all information used as inputs to the detector.  
This paper presents a systematic approach for classifying all information available to the safeguards 
system by source, such as States, IAEA, open literature, etc., followed by the identification of 
attributes relevant to the detection of proliferation.  The proposed attributes are correctness, or 
accuracy with which the elements of a data record reflect the true values of the variables the record 
purports to represent, completeness, or the degree to which a data record contains all the data 
needed for a given task, transparency, or the degree to which a data record can be verified, and, 
timeliness, or the degree to which the time a data record is received by the time when the data in the 
record were generated. The attributes are quantified by assigning values in the range from zero (false) 
to one (true). A Bayesian approach can be used to update the assigned values using new information. 
These attributes are combined to calculate the relevance of each piece of information to a specific 
physical model indicator. 
Keywords: safeguards; data; quality; attributes; quantification 
1. Introduction
Nuclear safeguards aim to detect diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the 
development of nuclear weapons. Implicit in this objective is the assumption that a State is engaged in 
some form of peaceful nuclear uses. These cover a broad spectrum of activities from fundamental 
research involving radioactive elements to the production of radioisotopes for medical applications to 
the production of electricity using nuclear reactions to conducting underground nuclear explosions for 
peaceful applications1. A treaty prohibiting the latter has been negotiated and signed but not yet
ratified2. Although the CTBT has not yet entered into force more than 180 States out of a total of 196
have signed it indicating their commitment not to conduct any nuclear explosion for whatever purpose.  
It is worth noting that the text of the CTBT uses the term “nuclear explosion” without a precise 
definition of the meaning of the term.  
To cover all possible peaceful nuclear activities the nuclear fuel cycle has been defined that includes 
all activities involving radioactive materials from ore mining to the disposal of radioactive waste and 
States are obligated to declare all activities that are part of that cycle. The aim of classical safeguards 
has been to ensure that all nuclear material associated with the declared activities is accounted by 
auditing the State system of accounting and control of the nuclear materials3. Over the years, auditing
by the IAEA of the activities within the declared nuclear fuel cycles has generated findings that have 
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confirmed the validity of the State declarations with high level of confidence subject to a statistical 
noise. 
The confidence in the ability of classical safeguards to detect undeclared nuclear activities was 
shaken with the discovery of the clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq. While classical 
safeguards was designed to detect diversion of nuclear materials from declared nuclear fuel cycles, 
the Iraq case illustrates that the existing safeguards were not adequate to detect undeclared 
activities4. As a result, the concept of integrated safeguards was developed that aims to evaluate the
State as a whole5,6. Although not stated as such, the implicit aim is to detect clandestine nuclear
weapons development activities anywhere within a State in a manner that is objective and non-
discriminatory among the States. The approach involves enumeration of all possible paths to the 
developments of nuclear weapons referred to as critical paths and the physical processes comprising 
each path. The evaluation of the State as a whole is to be based on information related to each 
component of the physical model. By combining all that data, integrated safeguards is to detect 
diversion of nuclear material from the declared fuel cycle and clandestine nuclear weapons programs7.
These are two distinct objectives. The history of classical safeguards has shown that diversion from a 
declared fuel cycle is detectable. The case of Iraq is not so much a failure of classical safeguards but 
absence of detection system for undeclared activities.  
The effort to develop an objective and transparent mechanism for evaluating a State as a whole faces 
formidable obstacles. Objectivity requires the use of quantitative procedures that can produce 
repeatable results. These procedures encompass quantitative models of potential clandestine 
processes, measurements that are associated with such underlying process and detection algorithms 
that are sufficiently robust to identify clandestine activities with a reasonably high level of confidence.  
2. A challenging problem
The Additional Protocol provides the framework under which a State is to be evaluated as whole. It 
specifies the types of data a State is required to provide and time schedules for reporting them. It also 
specifies the types of data that the IAEA may collect during inspection visits and the manner in which 
such data may be collected. At the same time, it constrains the IAEA from using a “mechanistic” 
approach and “detailed material accountancy” to verify declarations. While the exclusion of detailed 
material accountancy implies absence of measurements for inventory and flow control, the term 
“mechanistic” excludes the use of systematic procedures and algorithms. Nevertheless, the evaluation 
of a State needs to be objective, transparent and non-discriminatory. 
The IAEA in its effort to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards 
through the application of the Additional Protocol is facing the challenge of developing an “objective” 
mechanism for verifying the declarations under this protocol without employing a “mechanistic” 
approach and without seeking to verify “systematically” the information contained in the declarations. 
These constraints are insurmountable obstacles to performing an objective evaluation of a State.  In 
order to analyze the impact of the Additional Protocol on the detection of clandestine nuclear activities, 
it is first necessary to clarify its role relative to the application of classical safeguards. One view is that 
the activities under the Additional Protocol would be in addition to and would complement those of 
classical safeguards. An alternative view could be that the application of the Additional Protocol would 
substitute some of the activities of classical safeguards. For either interpretation, strengthening 
effectiveness and improving efficiency means, in effect, increasing the probability of detecting 
clandestine activities while minimizing the cost of verification. 
On the premise that the activities under the Additional Protocol are complementing those under 
classical safeguards, effectiveness and efficiency imply measuring the differential gain in the detection 
probability relative to the increased cost of applying the Additional Protocol.  On the other hand, if the 
verification activities under the Additional Protocol are to be considered as substitutes for those of 
classical safeguards, effectiveness and efficiency imply that any reduction of the safeguards activities 
under classical safeguards would be offset by gains in the detection probability under the Additional 
Protocol. Either case requires a procedure for calculating the probability of the existence of a 
clandestine process using the data available to the IAEA8. A State engaging in clandestine
proliferation would follow one of the possible Critical Paths associated with the Physical Model. Then 
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the problem can be formulated as detection of the most likely proliferation path for a particular State, 
given the information available to the IAEA relative to that State.  
The design of such a detector requires specification of variables that describe the state of the process, 
in this case the potential clandestine process and the collection of sufficient measurements for 
identifying it. Optimal detectors are designed using the detailed description of the process and the 
variables associated with it. Evaluation of the State as a whole differs from a typical approach to the 
design of detectors in an important respect. Although each of the Critical Paths can be described in 
great detail, it is not clear whether the data required for detecting the existence of a particular critical 
path are sufficient and reliable. In other words, the relationship between the data available to the IAEA 
and the critical paths remains to be determined. Under the circumstances, a more productive effort 
would be first to develop procedures for extracting the maximum amount of information from the 
available data. The solution of this problem would create a picture of the state of all nuclear activities 
in a particular State as opposed to identifying which ones are associated with clandestine proliferation 
and would form a basis for the design of a clandestine proliferation detector. 
3. A generic classification scheme
The data available to the IAEA need to be placed into categories each with distinctly identifiable 
characteristics. At the highest level they form two major categories, those collected under classical 
safeguards and all other. The first category encompasses all data associated with the declared 
nuclear fuel cycles and they are directly associated with the underlying process. They have been 
specified by their contribution to the calculation of the materials balance in the cycle and they have 
deemed sufficient for all material in the cycle. We will refer to them as Category I Data. The second 
category, referred to as Category II Data, encompasses all data available to the IAEA for use in 
evaluating a State as a whole.  Category I data are associated with a bounded process, i.e., defined 
area of application (declared facilities) and defined activities within the particular area. They include 
information about the nuclear materials and facilities subject to safeguards that is necessary and 
sufficient to allow the IAEA to verify non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials. A part of the data 
set is generated by the States in the form of declarations and part by the IAEA in the form of 
inspection reports and installed instruments. In contrast, Category II data are associated with an open 
process, i.e., incompletely defined area of application (anywhere within a State), and partially defined 
activities within that area. For example, under the Additional Protocol, a State must declare location of 
facilities involved in nuclear fuel cycle-related activities that do not involve nuclear materials, but are 
“specifically related to any process or system development aspect” of any part of the nuclear fuel 
cycle9. One can easily identify many research and development activities that do not involve nuclear
materials but could be classified under the label of dual use.  This category also includes State 
declarations of data identified by the IAEA “on the basis of expected gains in effectiveness or 
efficiency” without a definition of an algorithm for measuring them. In addition, the application of 
integrated safeguards may include data offered by the States on a voluntary basis and data collected 
from open sources. The two categories and their relationship to the integrated safeguards regime are 
shown in Figure 1. 
There is a crucial distinction between the two categories. Category I data pertain to measurements on 
the declared nuclear fuel cycle and provide information on the conditions of specified stages of that 
cycle. Equally important the IAEA has in place mechanisms for verifying the accuracy of the data 
submitted by a State. In contrast, there are substantial ambiguities and uncertainties regarding the 
utility of Category II data in achieving the objective of detecting clandestine proliferation activities in a 
State or, conversely, reaching a conclusion that no prohibited activities take place in that State. The 
absence of a mechanism for verifying the data submitted by a State introduces uncertainties on the 
veracity of the declarations. Even greater uncertainties are inherent in data provided by a State 
regarding activities in another State as well as data collected from public sources. Information 
contained in these categories of data may be erroneous either accidentally or deliberately. 
Consequently, the absence of a robust data verification mechanism for Category II data, makes 
evaluation of a State as a whole problematic to say the least due to the uncertainties about the 
information content of this category of data. 
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Figure 1. Safeguards data and their relationship to integrated safeguards
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Given the breadth of the types of data in both categories another major partition is between 
quantitative and qualitative data. The former are the outcome of some form of measurement and can 
be machine processed directly to extract quantitative information. Qualitative data are descriptive, 
either written or oral. Although there exist algorithms for machine-processing of text and voice, the 
extraction of information still work in progress and human intervention is necessary to identify 
unambiguous information.  
Another partition is according to the source that generates the data. For safeguards purposes sources 
are divided into three categories: States, IAEA, open source. State-generated data are either given 
pursuant to safeguards agreements or voluntarily offered by States to the IAEA. The sources of IAEA-
generated data are inspectors and instruments. Open source data include any information available in 
the public domain be it in print, electronic form, broadcast media, or information provided to the IAEA 
by private entities. Table 1 shows the possible subcategories of data that result from the intersection 
of the two major partitions. 
Quantitative Qualitative 
States 
Safeguards X X 
Voluntary X X 
IAEA 
Inspectors X X 
Instruments X 
Open sources 
Public X X 
Private X X 
Table 1: Categories of quantitative and qualitative safeguards data 
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For classical safeguards, the verification system is defined through the specification of the process 
(declared nuclear fuel cycle), the procedure (materials balance) and the measurements (process 
variables, inventory). The primary factor affecting detection of diversion is the measurement noise.  
Thus, for any given declared value dv there an associated uncertainty v such that the values of the 
inputs are dv v and Pr{ }d d a dv v v v v v     , where av is the actual value. For the 
evaluation of a State as a whole, however, there is no well-defined verification system. The process is 
open-ended in that the characteristics of a clandestine program are, by definition, unclear, and the 
data available to the IAEA under integrated safeguards, may or may not be related to a clandestine 
program. The quantitative or measurable data differ in their characteristics. Locations of facilities or 
production capacity of plants are deterministic, because they can be measured and are subject only to 
measurement errors.  Quantitative data such as inventories or quantities produced over some time 
interval may be viewed as stochastic, because there is no specified procedure for verifying their 
validity. The quantities of material produced by a plant over a given time interval could vary from zero 
to 100% of production capacity. For any declared quantity, the range of uncertainty about the actual 
quantity may vary from zero to the maximum possible value associated with a particular facility. Thus, 
the characteristics of the input data would be of the form [0 Pr{ } 1]d av v   . Unless some 
independent monitoring system is in place, the actual number could be anywhere in that range.  
Similar uncertainties are associated with declarations of imported/exported quantities, although it is 
possible to construct a system for tracking import/export declarations on a global basis. Even under 
such a system, it would difficult to associate inevitable discrepancies with a specific State absent an 
inventory control system for each State. 
Under this formulation, the quantitative data for both categories differ only in the statistical profile of 
the respective uncertainties. The region of uncertainty for data collected under classical safeguards is 
relatively small; they may be characterized as verifiable. Absent any additional information, some of 
the data collected under integrated safeguards have a much larger range of uncertainty; they may be 
labeled as unverifiable. The data in each of the categories in Table 1 may then be partitioned into two 
broad categories, verifiable and unverifiable. The first category comprises data associated with the 
application of classical safeguards and includes the data collected by the inspectors. The second 
category comprises all data not subjected to systematic verification procedures such as those 
provided by States on a voluntary basis. Most of the data submitted to the IAEA under the Additional 
Protocol belong to this category, because the IAEA is prevented from undertaking systematic 
verification. Table 2 lists which categories of such data are verifiable and which are not. 
While the handling of quantitative data in the declarations submitted by the States presents some 
serious challenges in determining their statistical properties, the processing of the additional 
information available to the IAEA is even more problematic. Consider information, other than 
safeguards-related, submitted by a State either about itself or concerning another State. The 
submission could vary from being in good faith, True (1), to deliberately misleading, False (0). 
Furthermore, as political conditions between States change over time, the truthfulness or 
erroneousness of a given piece of information is also a function of time. Similar concerns can be 
expressed about information in the public domain. Any spoken or printed information about activities in 
a given State needs to be viewed through two filters, the medium and the source. Spoken and 
broadcast information is the most problematic. Verba volent. There is no objective mechanism of 
checking the validity of such information and the motivation of the person providing it. Similar 
challenges face the handling of data from archival media. Scientific and technical information in 
established professional publications can be taken at its face value with a high level of confidence 
Category Verifiable Unverifiable 
Location X 
Inventory  X 
Production capacity X 
Quantities produced X 
Export quantities X 
Export destinations X 
Import quantities  X 
Import sources X 
Table 2: Categories of verifiable and unverifiable safeguards data 
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derived from the process of peer review. Such may not be the case for non-scientific publications, 
even those using the reviewing process. The information may be colored by the values, beliefs or 
political objectives of the particular publication. A more difficult challenge is finding a mechanism that 
connects a piece of information in the open literature to a potential clandestine nuclear weapons 
program. There is a wide range of capabilities among the States for such a program. The time line for 
building a nuclear device would be much shorter for a technologically and scientifically advanced State 
than for one with rudimentary technological base and scientific pool. It would be a challenge to devise 
an objective and transparent procedure for drawing conclusions about the presence or absence of a 
clandestine program on the basis of information in the public domain. 
Even greater challenges arise in the utilization of qualitative information in an objective and 
transparent system. To utilize such information in a verification system it is first necessary to quantify it 
in order to be able to integrate it into the broader verification base. There are search procedures for 
identifying specific words in text, it is still an open question how `associate values with specific words 
and ascertain the veracity of the printed or spoken words. The challenge of “fake news” is a telling 
paradigm. Thus, for data not collected under a systematic verification regime, the first step for the 
development of an objective and transparent evaluation procedure in the assignment of values to all 
such data used in the evaluation. 
4. Learning to crawl before attempting to run
The outcome of an evaluation using data with large degrees of uncertainties is bound to be 
characterized with an even greater level of uncertainty and lead to outcomes that are neither objective 
nor transparent. To guard against such an undesirable outcome, a mechanism is needed for 
evaluating the relationship of the input data to the end objective, namely, detection of the existence of 
a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Absent a robust mechanism for verifying the accuracy of the 
available data the next available option would be to develop a mechanism for extracting the maximum 
amount of information from a given data set. Before one decides how to use a given piece of 
information, it is essential to determine the relationship of that data point and a potential clandestine 
proliferation activity. Thus, at the highest level of evaluation, the relevance of a piece of information to 
the end objective must first be determined. At a minimum, the attribute of relevance may be described 
by the following parameters: 
Correctness defined as the accuracy with which the elements of a data record reflect the true 
values of the variables the record purports to represent; 
Completeness defined as the degree to which the data record contains all the data needed for 
a given task; 
Transparency defined as the degree to which a data record can be verified; 
Timeliness defined as the relationship between the time the data in the record were generated 
to the time the record is received by the detection mechanism.  
For example, the completeness of a data record listing the number of items stored in a location, or the 
quantity produced in a given facility over a specified time interval measures the degree to which the 
record represents the actual number of items stored or quantities produced. Similarly, a data record 
may not be complete, if it does not include all categories of items or materials that could be used in the 
detection of a clandestine operation. The utility of a record is also a function of the time elapsed 
between the time the record was generated and the time it was received by the evaluating authority. 
The four parameters can be quantified by assigned values for each one in the range  v [0,1],Corr     
v [0,1],Comp  v [0,1]Trans   and v [0,1]Time  . Each of those values corresponds to the probabilities 
for correctness, completeness, transparency and timeliness of a given data record. For quantitative 
data records some narrower bounds for the values within these ranges could be determined by 
utilizing additional information. The correctness of an inventory record could be estimated by an 
inspection that falls short of detailed item accounting such as estimating the sizes of occupied and 
unoccupied spaces. These numbers could be further refined by evaluating similar records over time as 
well as performing cross-correlation of different categories of records such as items produced, items 
exported and items imported. One can then visualize the assignment of values for each of the four 
parameters as a process spanning space and time as illustrated in Figure 2 that illustrates the 
boundaries within which the value of a particular parameter may be.   
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Figure 2. A notional parameter space as a function of time and space
space timev v
Time
Space
v [0,1]Time 
v [0,1],Corr 
For descriptive data such as text or audio the conversion to a quantitative record for automated 
processing becomes a greater challenge. One potential tool for such a conversion is fuzzy logic10 11.
For a given data record X the value could range anywhere from 0 to 1. However, the mechanism for 
assigning such a value is not clearly defined or fuzzy. The input data record is mapped into a 
membership value in the range [0,1]. The mapping is done by membership functions that may have 
different characteristics as illustrated in Figure 3. Determining which type of membership function is 
applicable to a given data set is one of many challenges that need to be addressed in utilizing open 
source, qualitative information as an input to clandestine proliferation detector. 
X
( )X
1.0
0.0
Figure 3. Examples of different types of membership functions on a fuzzy data record
Under such an approach, the relevance R  of a given data record to a particular Physical Model
indicator δ can be expressed as a function of the four attribute parameters, namely, 
4
1
i i
i
R w a  

 , 
where aδi is the relationship of the ai attribute to the δ indicator of the Physical Model and wδi the 
significance of the particular parameter  to the relevance of the given data record. Under such a 
procedure, a mapping is possible for assigning to a data record a value in the range from weak to 
strong, namely, [ ] [weak strong]minR maxR    . 
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate how the methodology described in this paper could be utilized.  For each 
category of data, a corresponding value for relevance can be computed. As it should be expected, the 
range of uncertainty depends on the uncertainty values for each of the parameters and their relative 
weights. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
804
4. Conclusion
As it is envisioned by the concept of integrated safeguards, a State is to be evaluated as a whole.  The 
data available for such an evaluation belong to two major categories, those collected under classical 
safeguards and everything else. While the reliability of the former can be measured, that of the latter is 
Categories by type, source and frequency 
Attribute parameters 
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Type Descriptive Verbal 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Written 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Quantitative Instrument 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Observations 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Files 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Source IAEA-generated 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
State-generated Agreed safeguards 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Voluntary 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Open source  Public domain 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Private source 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Frequency Periodic 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Ad hoc 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Table 3: Attribute parameters for the categories of data available to the IAEA 
Categories of data by function 
Attribute parameters 
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Quantifiable Facilities: Location Storage 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Manufacturing 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Mining 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Concentration plants 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Operations: Scale Inventory 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Production capacity 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Quantities produced 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Exports Quantities 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Destinations 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Imports Quantities 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Sources 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Initial 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Frequency 
of 
Annual 
past activities 
0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
declarations Advanced 
planned activities 
 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 0↔1 
Table 4: Attribute parameters for data submitted by the States 
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questionable. Given that the objective is to generate a reasonable assurance that a State is not 
engaging in some form f clandestine proliferation, it is first necessary to have a mechanism for 
ensuring confidence in the quality of the data used for such an evaluation. In this paper we have 
shown that there are many uncertainties inherent in the evaluation of a State as a whole. There are no 
reliable models for clandestine proliferation activities. The data collected beyond a declared nuclear 
fuel cycle contain uncertainties with unknown characteristics. Validation of stochastic proliferation 
models is difficult because of the scarcity of data. Linking the data collected under the integrated 
safeguards concept to clandestine nuclear proliferation activities poses serious challenges. Instead of 
tackling this very difficult problem directly, this paper has described a procedure for filtering the data to 
maximize the information content relative to the safeguards objectives as a preliminary step to the 
development of detection algorithms.   
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Abstract 
Currie’s paper [1] on estimating the minimum detectable activity (MDA) applied a Gaussian 
approximation to either Gaussian or Poisson data and remains the standard method to estimate 
radiological detection limits.  This paper revisits the Currie method with attention to the false alarm 
probability (FAP) in Poisson and Gaussian data in non-destructive assay (NDA) by gamma detection. 
The Currie detection limit LD is an estimate of the smallest net signal count rate Nλ  that can be 
detected with high probability and low FAP in the presence of non-zero background count rate Bλ
that has been previously estimated. The MDA is the sample activity or mass corresponding to Nλ , 
defined as 
ν
DL=MDA , where in the case of gamma-based NDA, the calibration factor ν  (a
product of gamma ray yield, detector and geometric efficiency, counting time, and other factors) has 
measurement error that introduces systematic error in the estimate of the MDA.  Kirkpatrick et al. [2] 
showed how to account for systematic uncertainties in the estimate of 
ν
DL=MDA using a modified 
version of Currie estimation [2,3]. The present paper combines the approach in [2] with a tolerance 
interval approach. It is shown that the FAP in signal detection can be significantly different from the 
nominal FAP if the nominal FAP is not based on a tolerance interval, and if the nominal FAP is based 
on a tolerance interval, then the MDA will be larger than Currie’s estimated MDA. 
1.Introduction
The Currie detection limit LD is an estimate of the smallest net signal count rate Nλ  that can be 
reliably detected with low specified FAP in the presence of non-zero background count rate Bλ [1]. 
The MDA is the sample activity (or mass through a conversion) corresponding to Nλ , defined as 
ν
DL=MDA , where the calibration factor ν  (a product of gamma ray yield, detector and geometric 
efficiency, counting time, and other factors) has measurement error that can introduce systematic 
error in the estimate of the MDA.  Kirkpatrick et al. [2] showed how to account for such systematic 
uncertainties in the estimate of 
ν
DL=MDA using a modified version of the Currie estimation [2,3]. 
The MDA can be used prior to data collection to compare different instruments and measurement 
scenarios, and can also be used as a quantitative measure on an item-specific basis after data 
collection. In gamma-ray spectroscopy, the background is often estimated from the continuum 
beneath the peak(s) of interest, so the MDA is specific to the measurement conditions (including what 
other nuclides are present). 
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This paper revisits LD with attention to the FAP (denotedα ) in Poisson and Gaussian data, by using a 
tolerance interval approach [4,5].  Section 2 provides background, motivation, and example tolerance 
intervals. Section 3 provides a simulation approach and results for both Gaussian and Poisson data. 
Section 4 uses results from Section 3 to estimate the MDA while allowing for random and systematic 
errors in the calibration factor ν  in DLMDA =
ν
. Section 5 is a discussion. Section 6 is a summary. 
2.Background
Currie [1] provided approximate calculations of the MDA for the desired FAP α based on the 
assumption that the measurement data has a Gaussian distribution, denoted as ( )2~  , .X N µ σ
Because µ  and σ are unknown and must be estimated, the well-known frequentist approach to a 
confidence interval for µ  is 1 ,( 1) 1 ,( 1)ˆ ˆn nx t s n t nα αµ σ− − − −± = ± where 1 ,( 1)nt α− − denotes the
(1-α ) quantile of the t distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom, 
1
n
i
i
x x n
=
= ∑ and 
2 2 2
1
ˆ ( ) ( 1)
n
i
i
s x x nσ
=
= = − −∑ [1,4,5]. 
A tolerance interval is an interval that bounds a specified fraction of a probability distribution with a 
specified confidence (frequentist) or probability (Bayesian approach) [4,5]. Both frequentist and 
Bayesian approaches will be presented in this paper. In nuclear safeguards (Sections 3 and 4), one 
often seeks a threshold, denoted 0.95T here, that corresponds to α = 0.05. Instead of requiring an 
interval for µ , the need is to estimate the 0.95 quantile, 0.95T  (the upper limit of a one-sided interval) 
of the distribution of X if doing one-sided testing for a positive mean shift.  The frequentist tolerance 
interval estimators presented have the form 0.95ˆ ˆ ˆT k nµ σ= + , and the goal in both the frequentist
and Bayesian approaches is to achieve 0.95 0.95ˆ( )P T T γ≥ = , where γ is a user-specified probability
(the frequentist confidence level), such as 0.99γ =  [4,5]. In the Bayesian approach, µ  and σ are 
random unknown parameters so 0.95 0.95 , 0.95 0.95ˆ ˆ( ) ( )P T T P T Tµ σ≥ = ≥ is computed with respect to µ
and σ . In the frequentist approach, µˆ and σˆ are random while µ  and σ are fixed unknowns so 
1 20.95 0.95 , ,..., 0.95 0.95
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
nX X X
P T T P T T≥ = ≥ is computed with respect to random samples of size n. 
Background measurement(s) are often used to establish an alarm threshold that has a small nominal 
FAP, such as 0.05α = . In any frequentist approach, probabilities such as the FAP are calculated with 
respect to the distribution of X for fixed µ  and σ and  the “confidence” in a “confidence interval|” is 
the long-run relative frequency (probability) that an interval such as (0, 0.95ˆ ˆ ˆT k nµ σ= + ) will
include a future observation X from the same distribution as the training data used to estimate µˆ and 
ˆ.σ In any Bayesian approach, probabilities are calculated with respect to the joint posterior
distribution  ),(posteriorf µ σ for fixed X [5].  
To illustrate the frequentist approach, assume that n = 10 measurements are to be used to construct 
an upper limit that bounds at least p = 0.95 (so the FAP is 0.05 or less) of future data with probability 
0.99. Fig. 1 plots a single realization of the n = 10 measurements and compares the Currie limit to the 
tolerance interval limit.  To achieve a user-specified FAP for future measurements aimed to detect 
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whether any signal is present in a background measurement, Currie [1] used the detection threshold 
ˆ ˆ1T kB Bµ σα= + −  where α−1k  is the (1-α ) quantile of the Gaussian distribution, and
2 2ˆ ˆ ˆB nσ σ σ= + , where the term 
2ˆ nσ is the estimated variance of the estimate of the unknown
mean Bµ . Regarding notation, in this paper, the subscript B denotes background, and the subscript N 
denotes net, and both the B and N subscripts will sometimes be omitted, depending on the context, to 
avoid cluttering the notation. This value of T was regarded as an approximate value if the underlying 
data is non-Gaussian (such as Poisson, see Section 3). A small modification, to ˆ ˆ ˆ1T kBµ σα= + − , 
using 1 1 ( )nk t nα δ− −= with noncentrality parameter 𝛿𝛿 = 𝑧𝑧𝑝𝑝√𝑛𝑛 where 𝑧𝑧𝑝𝑝 is the 1-p quantile of the 
standard Gaussian, is exact if the underlying data has a Gaussian distribution [4]. 
Perhaps surprisingly, an exact expression for a tolerance interval is only available in the one-sided 
Gaussian case just described [4-7]. However, good approximate expressions for many other cases 
are available [5-7]. Alternatively, and in the approach taken in this paper, tolerance intervals can be 
well estimated using simulation to approximate an alarm threshold that is designed to contain at least 
1 α−  percent of future observations with a specified coverage probability γ (referred to as confidence 
in the frequentist approach) and as probability γ  in the Bayesian approach. Currie did not consider 
the probability γ and note from Fig. 1, that for γ  = 0.99, the decision limit is much larger than Currie’s 
limit, with 1 3.7 k = (tolerance) versus 2 1.7k = (Currie). As shown in Section 3, using the value
1 3.7k = corresponds to γ = 0.99 = 0.95 0.95ˆ( )P T T≥ , while using 2 1.7k =  gives γ = 0.52. 
Fig. 2 plots 0.95 0.95ˆ( )P T T≥  (Fig. 2a) and the true average FAP (Fig. 2b) for a range of sample sizes n
if the data is Gaussian for both the tolerance method (using 0.99γ = ) and the Currie method. The 
tolerance value for 1k (which depends on n), 0.95 0.95ˆ( )P T T≥ , and the true FAP are easily calculated
using simulation in R [8] as shown in Section 3. 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the tolerance 
limit 1 3.7k =  compared to the 
Currie limit 2 1.7k =  for future data 
in the case of using 10 Gaussian 
observations to estimate µ  andσ  
and the corresponding Gaussian 
quantile, 0.95ˆ ˆ ˆT k nµ σ= + ,
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Any Bayesian analysis specifies a prior probability for model parameter(s) θ , a likelihood (Gaussian 
or Poisson in this paper) P(X|θ ), and works with the posterior distribution of θ , ( )posteriorf θ . 
Bayesian tolerance interval construction then estimates T such that ( | ) 1 P X T θ α=< −  with 
specified coverage probability γ . In the Gaussian case with unknown µ  and σ , ( , )θ µ σ= . In the 
Poisson case, ( , )G Bθ λ λ= if both a gross count rate and background count rate are required, and 
( )θ λ= if the count rate at a single region of interest is required. For Gaussian and Poisson data, 
conjugate prior probability density functions (pdfs) are available, which have the convenient property 
that the posterior pdf is in the same family as the prior, but with updated parameters. . For example, 
the conjugate prior for the Gaussian with unknown µ  and σ  is the Gaussian-inverse-Gamma and 
the conjugate prior for the Poisson is the Gamma distribution [5]. 
3. Simulation to estimate 0.95Tˆ
The user seeks a threshold that is larger than 1 α− percent of the distribution, with a specified high 
probability such as 0.99.  Recall that there are frequentist and Bayesian approaches to tolerance 
intervals [4,5], neither of which exactly correspond to Currie’s approximation. 
3.1  A simulation-based trial-and-error frequentist approach for Gaussian data 
This example demonstrates a simulation-based trial-and-error based frequentist approach to estimate 
k. The simulation procedure is as follows.
1. Specify n, µ , σ .
2. For each of many (typically 105 or more) simulations, generate
( )2 ,  for   1,  2,  ...,,  ~  i i nX N µ σ =  
Fig. 2. The true value of 
0.95 0.95
ˆ( )P T T≥ in (a) and
true FAP in (b) if data is 
Gaussian. The tolerance 
interval method is 
conservative, so has a 
FAP that is smaller than 
0.05 by construction. 
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3. Compute 
ˆˆ k
n
σµ + for a grid of trial values for k using 
2
1 1
ˆ ˆ,  ( ) ( 1)
n n
i i
i i
x x n x x nµ σ
= =
= = = − −∑ ∑ . 
4. Select the trial value of k that includes at least 95% of the population (of future X values) with
probability γ = 0.99; that is, 0.95 0.95ˆ( )P T T≥ = 0.99, where 0.95ˆ ˆ ˆT k nµ σ= + .
For example, with n = 10 and for any values of µ and σ , the exact result is k = 3.738, and the 
simulation-based result in R [8] is k = 3.74, which is within the small simulation error in a large but 
finite number (105) or simulations. Similarly, simulation can also estimate the probability that the 
Currie-based k value bounds at least 95% of the pdf of X (so the FAP is 0.05 or less), and in this 
example with n = 10, there is a probability of approximately 52% that the Currie-based value of k has 
a FAP of 0.05 or less. 
One nuclear safeguards application for tolerance intervals for Gaussian data is inspector (i) 
measurements of operator (o) declarations of n items sampled for verification. In each of n values of 
( )j j j jd o i o= − .  In two-sided testing, if | |  jd kδ>  then the j-th item selected for verification 
leads to an alarm, where 2 2 ,T R Sδ δ δ= +  (with Tδ  the total RSD, Sδ  the between-period short-term 
systematic error RSD, and Rδ the within-period reproducibility) then k= 3 is a common choice that 
corresponds to a small α  of approximately 0.001),  The null hypothesis is 0µ = , and Tδ can be 
estimated by applying analysis of variance (ANOVA) [9-12].  If one assumes Tˆ Tδ δ= then choosing 
1.65k = corresponds to α =0.05 (Gaussian approximation); however, as an example, if n = 10 
paired measurements in each of 3 prior inspection periods are available, and 0.03S Rδ δ= = [9 12], 
then choosing k = 1.65 leads to an actual FAP of 0.05 or less with probability 0.38.  If one desires a 
high probability 0.99γ =  that the actual FAP is as small as the nominal FAP, then simulation [9,12] 
indicates, for example, that instead of , 1.65,k =  one must choose, for example, k = 2.58 for 5 
groups of 10 measurements, k = 2.94 for  3 groups of 10 measurements and k = 4.35 for 2 groups of 
5 measurements.  Unlike the single-component Gaussian case, these values of k depend on the 
values of the ratio S Rδ δ , which is unknown, so approximate frequentist or Bayesian methods are
needed. Note that any Bayesian method can be regarded as approximate because one almost never 
knows the exact prior probability distribution. The accuracy of these approximate methods can be 
assessed using simulation and/or by analysis of historical data. 
3.2  Poisson data 
Fig. 3 shows that the true FAP of Currie’s method can be quite different from the nominal FAP, so 
tolerance interval construction should be considered. In Fig. 3, the simulated data is n = 1 observation 
of X ~ Poisson( λ ), with  λ = 1, 10, or 100. A count time of t = 1 second is used to estimate the 
background and to test whether a subsequent measurement corresponds to the same background 
rate λ (See Section 5.1). For comparison, ( )tˆtest estP tX Tλ= > of the corresponding Gaussian 
distribution are shown, where 0.95 ˆ ˆˆ (1 1 )T k n tλ λ= + + . This expression is Currie’s [1] approach to
estimate T by using the Gaussian approximation for both Gaussian and Poisson data, and using the 
factor 1 1 n+ to quantify the impact of uncertainty in the estimated mean on the estimated 
background standard deviation. It is important to note (Fig. 3b) that for large values of λ (and/or large 
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count times) such as λ =100 or more, the Gaussian approximation (with the factor 1 1 n+  but 
without the notion of a tolerance interval) to the Poisson is adequate. The reason for this good 
accuracy is that the variance of the Poisson distribution is equal to its mean ,λ so the Poisson 
standard deviation can be estimated with less uncertainty than that of the Gaussian.  
Recall from Example 3.1 that estimating the standard deviation of the Gaussian requires n > 1, and 
that the notion of tolerance intervals is needed; the estimated threshold T is much too small if 
uncertainties in ˆ ˆ,µ σ  are not accounted for properly. Without using tolerance intervals, references [2, 
13-14] extended Currie’s treatment of Poisson data [1] by using the Poisson distribution rather than 
an approximating Gaussian. Particularly when count rates and/or count times are small, it is prudent 
to use the Poisson distribution rather than the approximating Gaussian. As an example (also used in 
Section 4), let n = 5, 10,µ = and 1 2 5, ,...,x x x are 10,12,10,10,8, so 10x = and Currie’s 
0.95
ˆ ˆ ˆ1T kB Bµ σα= + − =12.5, which is rounded up to 13 (and in 93% of10
5 simulations, test
measurements exceed the 13 limit, so the FAP can be much larger than 0.05).  
A one-sided tolerance interval using the R code in Section 3.2 leads to Tˆ = 21.5, rounded up to 22 for
99% confidence that the FAP is 0.05 or smaller. For the same example, a Bayesian tolerance interval 
with a prior probability density ( ) Gamma( 1, .075)prior prior priorf λ α β= = = ( the conjugate prior for 
the Poisson, and this particular prior has mean 1 0.075 13.3prior priorα β = = and standard deviation 
2 1 0.075 13.3α β = = ) has 
1
( ) Gamma( , ) Gamma(1 50,0.075 5)
n
posterior prior i prior
i
f x nλ α β
=
= + + = + +∑ , which has mean 
10.05 and standard deviation 1.41; see Fig. 4.  Note that the Gamma parameters, conventionally 
denoted as priorα and priorβ are not related to the FAP α or the nondetection probability .β  
Fig. 3.  The probability 
( )tˆtest estP tX Tλ= > versus k for 
λ = 1, 10, and 100. The 
corresponding normal approximation 
is also plotted. Currie’s factor 
1 1 2n+ = is ignored in (a), 
included in (b). 
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3.3  Simulation for Poisson data for frequentist and Bayesian approaches 
3.3.1 Frequentist approach 
1. Specify λ and n.
2. For each of many (typically 105 or more) simulations, generate
( ),  ~  1, 2,...,i Poisson i nX λ =
3. Compute ˆ ˆk nλ λ+ for a grid of trial values for k using ˆ xλ = .
4. Select the trial value of k that includes at least 95% of the population (of future X values) with
probability γ = 0.99; that is, 0.95 0.95ˆ( )P T T≥ = 0.99, where 0.95 ˆ ˆTˆ k nλ λ= + . 
For example, with n = 5, λ =10, the Currie approximation is .95Tˆ =12.5 and the exact value using
simulation (to within negligible simulation error) is .95Tˆ = 21.5. The probability that the FAP is 0.05 or
less is only 0.07 with the Currie value and is, by design, 0.99 with the simulation approach. Unlike 
with Gaussian data, for Poisson data, the value of k depends on λ , so λ must be replaced with λˆ . 
3.3.2 Bayesian approach 
1. Specify n and the parameters of the Gamma prior  and prior priorα β . In this example priorα =1 
and priorβ = 0.075 (a very wide prior with mean and standard deviation of 13.3. 
2. For each of many (typically 105 or more) simulations, generate
(~  , )prior priorGamma βλ α
( ),  ~  1, 2,...,i Poisson i nX λ =
3. Compute
1
n
post i prior
i
xα α
=
= +∑ and post priornβ β= +  
4. Choose the quantile of the posterior (~  , )post pospo t ts Gamma α βλ such that 
0.95 0.95
ˆ( ) 0.99P T T γ≥ = = . This is the count value that is greater than 95% of the distribution
of X for 99% of the λ values generated in the simulations.
The result is 0.95Tˆ =23.4. Recall that the frequentist 0.95Tˆ  from above is 21.5, and both values of 0.95Tˆ
are approximations. The Bayesian estimate of 0.95Tˆ is approximate because there is always some
Fig. 4. The prior and posterior 
distribution for λ for n = 5, 
10,µ = and 10x = . 
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mismatch between the true and assumed prior. The frequentist estimate of 0.95Tˆ is approximate
because it depends on the true value of λ so in practice, one uses ˆλ λ= . Recall that the accuracy of
these approximate methods can be assessed using simulation and/or by analysis of historical data. 
3.4 Example with two Poisson counts in each assay 
Gamma detection often requires measurement of both the nearby-in-energy “background” counts and 
the peak region “gross” counts (Section 5.1). The gross count rate is G B Nλ λ λ= + [2,13,14]. The
Bayesian approach is effective in this context for two main reasons: a conjugate prior (Gamma) can 
be specified for Gλ and Bλ , so the measured G and B counts each lead to
1
( ) Gamma( , )
n
posterior prior i prior
i
f x nλ α β
=
= + +∑ , and it is simple to enforce 0Nλ ≥   Although the 
choice of prior parameters α and β for both Gλ and Bλ is subjective, the user often can bound the 
range for both Gλ and Bλ from prior data, so priorα and priorβ can each be within some modest range. 
If the Bayesian approach is applied repeatedly, its long-run behavior can be evaluated to check, for 
example, whether the nominal FAP is close to the actual FAP.   For example, choose 1priorα = and 
prior
β = 0.075 for Gλ and Bλ as in the previous Bayesian example for Poisson data. Generate G ~ 
Poisson( Gλ ) and B ~ Poisson( Bλ ).  For each of many (10
5 or more) simulations, generate Gλ from its 
posterior Gamma(1 ,0.075 1)G+ + and generate Bλ from its posterior Gamma(1 ,0.075 1)B+ +  
and for those simulations for which G Bλ λ≥ (because 0Nλ ≥ ), compute G – B. Determine the 
threshold T for G – B such that with probability at least 0.99γ = , ( ) 0.05P G B T− ≥ ≤ . The result 
for example, for G = 30 and B = 10 is T = 34 (Currie) and T = 45 (Bayesian Tolerance, using the 
Skellam distribution, which is the distribution of the difference in two Poisson random variables). Then 
LD is an estimate of the smallest net signal count rate Nλ  that can be detected with high probability 
and low FAP in the presence of nonzero background count rate Bλ  that has been previously 
estimated. Ignoring errors in the calibration factor ν (assuming ν = Trueν  and for simplicity here also 
assuming Trueν = 1), the Currie-based MDA is 39 and the tolerance interval-based MDA is 77. 
Allowing for 5% RSD in the total error as in the previous example and assuming that 
(1 )Meas True S Rν ν= + + has a Gaussian distribution (any distribution is simple to accommodate here), 
then the Currie–based MDA, which corresponds to the net count rate assuming zero external 
background (see Section 5.1), increases from 39 to 45 and the tolerance interval–based MDA 
increases from 77 to 87. 
4. Implications for the MDA
Recall the Poisson example at the end of Section 3 for which Currie’s 0.95ˆ ˆ ˆ1T kB Bµ σα= + − =12.5, 
and the one-sided tolerance limit is Tˆ = 22 for 99% confidence that the FAP is 0.05 or smaller.
Therefore, the estimated MDA based on the tolerance interval limit will be larger than the estimated 
MDA based on the Currie limit. Specifically, if the mean count rate shifts from 10µ = to 19.5µ =  any 
future observation ~ Poisson( 19.5)X λ = satisfies ( 13) 0.95P X ≥ ≥  for the Currie mean shift and 
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~ Poisson( 34.4)X λ = satisfies ( 22) 0.95P X ≥ ≥ for the tolerance interval mean shift. The mean 
shift values 19.5λ = and 34.4λ = are easily computed by numerical search. The MDA is then 
calculated by converting the mean shift to an activity, which requires calibration. 
Recall that the MDA is defined as
ν
DL=MDA , where in this example DL 19.5= (Currie) or 
DL 34.4= (tolerance) and the calibration factor ν  (a product of gamma ray yield, detector and 
geometric efficiency, counting time, and other factors) has measurement error that can introduce 
systematic error in the estimate of the MDA.  References. [2,13,14] account for systematic 
uncertainties in the estimate of MDA using a modified version of the Currie estimation [2,3]. 
To allow for random and/or systematic errors in ν , (1 )Meas True S Rν ν= + + , implies that the mean 
shift when the signal is present has uncertainty. To illustrate, assume that it is desired to have at least 
99% confidence that the mean shift is above some limit. Assuming Gaussian calibration errors as an 
example, then, for example, assuming 5% relative standard deviation (which is assumed here to 
include both random and systematic components) in converting the mean shift to activity using
DLMDA =
ν
increases the estimated mean shift that can be detected with high probability from 19.5 
to 22.1 (Currie approximation) and from 34.4 to 38.( tolerance interval approximation). 
5. Discussion
This section describes three additional topics related to MDA calculations. 
5.1 Definition of the background 
In some γ -based NDA applications, the challenge to define and measure the relevant background is 
very important. For example, in attribute measurements of fresh fuel assemblies, one task is to 
assess whether a given assembly is a dummy (not containing 235U). In this case, the background is 
defined as the response of the detector to γ  emissions from neighboring assemblies if the assembly 
being measured were a dummy. That is, measurement behavior needs to be characterized if γ  
emissions could be measured from only the neighboring assemblies at the location of the assembly 
being measured. The measurement seeks to provide evidence that a signature from the item was 
detected (thereby verifying presence of 235U) and that the measured signature originated from the 
item, not from radiation outside the item.  
The minimum detectable quantity is not usually defined for attribute testing; however, it is sometimes 
desired (beyond the scope of this fresh fuel example) to estimate the probability that the test alarms 
for specified large mean shifts, such as 50% or more nuclear material missing. 
Gamma-ray detectors detect distinct γ -rays energies. Sodium Iodide (NaI) and Cadmium-Zinc-
Telluride (CZT) are common detector types.  The presence of 235U is verified in fresh fuel by 
estimating the area in the peak region of interest (ROI) associated with the 185.7 keV γ -ray. If the 
estimated peak area exceeds 3 times its estimated standard deviation, then there is high confidence 
that the peak is truly present. Because γ rays at such energies interact with materials primarily 
through both the photoelectric effect (in which the γ -ray transfers all its energy to the detector 
medium) and Compton scattering (in which the γ -ray scatters off an electron in the medium or 
surrounding mediums causing a partial transfer of its energy to the detector medium), each measured 
peak in a γ -ray spectrum will lie on top of a background caused by higher energy γ -rays that 
underwent Compton scattering,  as shown in Fig. 5 from a CZT detector. 
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In spent fuel verification scenarios where shielding and collimation can be used to detect γ -rays only 
from the selected assembly, the peak area is estimated as the difference between the total counts in 
the ROI that includes the peak (indicated by the red lines in Fig. 5) and the counts associated with the 
Compton background in that region (indicated by the area underneath the blue line in Fig. 5) (recall 
Example 3.3). To assist in determining whether the attribute test condition has been satisfied, most 
software programs automatically notify the inspector when the net area of the peak ROI above the 
Compton background is larger than 3 times its estimated standard deviation. 
In cases where attribute measurements are performed near other items containing the same type of 
nuclear material, a background measurement is needed to estimate the peak’s count rate as detected 
from the surrounding environment. The background-only measurement corresponding to the item-
plus-background measurement in Fig. 5 had a similar spectrum shape as that in Fig. 5, but the peak 
ROI counts were approximately 60% lower; for this background-only measurement, the same CZT 
detector as used for item-plus-background was placed in an empty slot of a storage rack containing 
fresh fuel assemblies. The background spectrum was measured during the same training exercise 
and for the same count time as the spectrum in Fig. 5, which was from an attribute test measurement 
of a fresh fuel assembly within that same storage rack. Assuming zero room background, applying the 
attribute test to the background spectrum would yield a positive (and incorrect) verification because 
the estimated peak area was approximately 13 times its estimated standard deviation. Therefore, to 
ensure proper verification of items using the attribute test, careful consideration must be given 
regarding how the room background is measured in order to reject the possibility that the measured 
spectrum was the result of room background and not from the item to be verified.  
When the background spectrum shows evidence that the peak of interest is present from measuring 
the surrounding environment, the verification of an item using the attribute test is executed using: 
(Measured rate) – (background rate) > 2 2
ˆ ˆ
3 ( ) ( )B M
B MT T
σ σ
+  
where ˆBσ  is the estimated standard deviation in the estimated peak area in the background
measurement, ˆMσ is the estimated standard deviation in the area of the peak in the measured
spectrum from the item, and 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵 and 𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀 are the count times corresponding to the background and item 
measurement, respectively. Both the measured and background rates are corrected for the 
background caused by Compton scattering by estimating the count rate of the net peak, which 
involves a difference of two quantities as in Example 3.3. In cases where the attribute test software is 
Fig. 5 235U spectrum from a CZT 
detector for the item-plus-
background measurement. The 
red lines indicate the ROI used 
to estimate the area of the 186 
keV peak while the blue line is 
an estimate of the Compton 
background. 
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unable to account for room background in automatically calculating whether the attribute test has 
been passed, the inspector performs the attribute test calculation for each item. The attribute test 
aims to answer the question ‘Does the item contain the material as declared?’, and an inspector’s 
time is quite limited, so inspectors sometimes apply more stringent statistical tests to help confirm the 
attribute test result. One example of such a stringent test is 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀 − 3 · 𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀
𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀
> 𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀 + 3 ∙ 𝜎𝜎𝐵𝐵
𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵
Inspectors typically perform the background measurement before performing the verification 
measurements, and the quantity on the right side of the stringent inequality is a single calculated 
value, which makes the evaluation simple to do while performing verification  measurements. 
Measurements that do not pass the stringent test can be tested against the more formal method. 
Recall that the Gaussian approximation to the Poisson is adequate for tolerance interval estimation if 
the Poisson mean 100λ ≥  (Fig. 3), so the factor of 3 used above is justified because for the data in 
Fig. 5, the quantiles of the Gaussian provide an adequate approximation to the true FAP, assuming 
λˆ λ=  (but one should be aware of the need for the factor 1 1 2 1.41n+ = =  as in Fig 3a versus 
Fig 3b).  A more complicated method than a sum of Poisson counts below and above the peak ROI is 
often used to estimate the background under the blue line in Fig. 5;so ˆBσ and ˆMσ can involve more
than the Poisson distribution (beyond this paper’s scope). 
5.2 Tolerance interval versus prediction interval 
A prediction interval is another potentially useful approach to the MDA, and will lead to MDA values 
that are larger than the Currie-based MDAs and smaller than the tolerance interval-based MDAs. The 
prediction interval approach averages over the parameter(s) θ so there is no probability statement 
regarding confidence in coverage [5]. 
5.3 Impact of analyzing predicted counts rather than estimated activity 
Zykov [15] describes a pass-fail criterion for verification measurements (operator declarations 
compared to inspector measurements, as in Section 3.1) regarding the minimum detectable defect 
size (the minimum amount of missing radioactive material) if analysis of the inspector measurements 
is based on measurements that are predicted using modeling and the operator declarations. Such an 
approach would avoid explicit inversion of measurements to activity or nuclear material mass, and 
simulations to be presented elsewhere suggest that the minimum detectable defect size would be 
smaller. The minimum detectable defect size would be based on a tolerance interval approach, 
because that is more conservative than the Currie approach, as this paper has shown. This 
methodology could lead to more efficient verification sampling plans. Regarding testing for patterns, 
recall that the overall test for a pattern is based on the average OID (known as the D statistic), 
[14], which could be defined on the basis of measured masses or on the basis 
of  predicted and observed measurements. However, whenever an estimate of the D Statistic (at the 
stratum, MBE component, or MBA level)  is  needed, e.g. for the detection of diversion into D through 
material balance evaluation, it would be necessary for the inspector to estimate item mass, so explicit 
inversion of inspector measurements to item mass would be required.  
6. Summary
This paper revisited the Currie method to estimate the MDA with attention to the FAP in Poisson and 
Gaussian data in NDA by gamma detection. It was shown that the FAP in signal detection can be 
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significantly different from the nominal FAP if the nominal FAP is not calculated based on a tolerance 
interval. If the nominal FAP is calculated based on a tolerance interval, then the MDA is increased 
compared to the Currie approximation.  A simple way to accommodate random and/or systematic 
errors in converting from a mean shift to an activity shift was illustrated. 
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Uncertainty quantification as presented in training courses for safeguards inspectors 
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Abstract 
     For safeguards evaluators to provide credible assurance that States are honoring their safeguards 
obligations, quantitative conclusions regarding the non-diversion of nuclear material from States’ 
nuclear material flows and inventories are needed. The statistical analysis used to reach these 
conclusions requires that each measurement method undergo uncertainty quantification (UQ). 
Inspector training for safeguards inspectors includes measurement error models that must account for 
variation within and between groups, where a group is defined to be an inspection period. A typical 
model for multiplicative errors for the inspector (I) is (1 ) ,ij ij Ii IijS RI µ= + + with
2~ (0 ),j II SS N δ
and 2~ (0, )Ii Ij RR N δ , where  is a short-term systematic error in group i (from 1 to g), and, for item j 
(from 1 to n),  is the inspector’s measured value,  is the true value, and  is the random error.  
This paper describes three main inspector UQ-related training topics. Topic one is analysis of variance 
to estimate the relative standard deviations (RSDs) SIδ  and RIδ (and the corresponding RSDs for the 
operator). Topic two is to use estimated RSDs to evaluate material balances and to plan inspector 
sample sizes based on estimated material loss detection probabilities. Topic three is an example 
involving the uranium neutron coincidence collar (UNCL) to illustrate the need for inspector UQ 
training to include an understanding of the most important factors that impact the RSDs, which in turn 
affect the rejection limits for comparing operator to inspector measurements. For the UNCL method, it 
is important for inspectors to understand the fuel assembly design and software input requirements.  
Incorrectly declared input is thought to be among the largest contributors to UNCL uncertainty (as 
quantified by the RSDs).  
Keywords: Bottom-up uncertainty quantification (UQ); top-down UQ, Grubbs estimation 
1. Introduction
Inspector measurements are a cornerstone of IAEA safeguards, so it’s important for inspectors to
understand UQ. This paper describes the three UQ topics listed in the abstract that are presented in 
training courses for safeguards inspectors. First, for background needed here, the guide to the 
expression of uncertainty in measurement (GUM) describes estimating and expressing measurement 
uncertainty [1]. UQ can be approached by comparing multiple measurements of the same item (top-
down) or by assessing each step in the measurement procedure (bottom-up). For a top-down 
evaluation, the multiple measurement on the same item can, for example, be repeated measurements 
by the same instrument during the same calibration period or replicate measurements across many 
calibration periods and/or laboratories [1,2]. The GUM indirectly addresses top-down methods, but is 
most known for bottom-up UQ using the measurement equation 
   1 2( , ,..., )NY f X X X=  (1), 
where Y is the estimate of the measurand, and the Xs are inputs. The inputs can include 
measurements, estimated calibration or adjustment factors, and can have a joint probability 
distribution with covariances among the inputs. To estimate the variance in Y, the variance of each X, 
denoted 2Xiσ , and covariances between Xs, denoted ,Xi Xj i jσ σ ρ , are propagated using the Taylor 
approximation to obtain      
  
2 1
2 2
( ),
,
1 )1 (1( )
2
i i j ji i
N N N
Y
x E X x E X
Xi Xi Xj i j
i i j i i
x E X
i j
f f f
x x x
σ σ σ σ ρ
−
= = = = ==
+
 ∂ ∂ ∂
≈ + ∂ ∂ ∂ 
∑ ∑∑            (2).        
     For verification, paired (operator, inspector) data are collected from inspections performed during 
site visits that occur once or a few times per year (Section 3), and relative operator-inspector 
differences defined as (and d is sometimes referred to as OID, for operator-inspector difference) 
o id OID
o
−
= =       (3) 
are compared to alarm thresholds to monitor for possible data falsification by the operator.  The alarm 
thresholds are estimated by applying a type of top-down UQ, using several years of prior paired (O,I) 
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data. An effective top-down measurement error model must account for variation within and between 
groups, where a group is an inspection period. One top-down multiplicative error model used for the 
inspector (I) (and similarly for the operator O) is 
(1 ) ,kj kj Ik IkjI S Rµ= + + (4) 
where  is the inspector’s measured value of item j (from 1 to n) in group k (from 1 to g),   kjµ is the 
true but unknown value of item j from group k, 2( ~  0, )Ikj RIR N δ (the ~ symbol means independently 
and identically distributed normal) is the random error of item j from group k, 2( ~  0 ),Ik SIS N δ  is a 
short-term systematic error in group k [2-4], which is randomly generated once per inspection period.  
2. Top-down UQ applied to paired (operator, inspector) data
The basis of the top-down approach to UQ applied to OIDs is analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
random effects. Such paired data arise when the operator and the inspector measure the same object 
once without measurement repetition. One goal is to estimate  
2 2 2 ,R RO RIδ δ δ= +
2 2 2 ,S SO SIδ δ δ= + and 
2 2 2
T R Sδ δ δ= + for the differences (see Section 3). Note that the 
errors OkjR  and IkjR include “item-specific” bias because the measured items are not true replicates; 
that is, the items can contain variability in matrix components and interferences that could in principle 
affect measurement error variance components [2-5]. 
     For the relative differences in Eq. (3) and balanced data with n paired differences in each of g 
groups (N = ng), the ANOVA decomposition: 
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( )  ( )
g g gn n
kj kj k k
k j k j k
d d d d n d d
= = = = =
− = − + − =∑∑ ∑∑ ∑  SSW SSB+  (5) 
leads to the well-known estimates 2 2ˆ ˆ,R S
SSW SSB SSW
N g n
δ δ −= =
−
 , where SSW is the sum of 
squares within groups, SSB is the sum of squares between groups, and 2 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆT R Sδ δ δ= + . 
     Another goal is to partition the variances of R and S into that due to the operator and to the 
inspector (see [6] and Section 3.2 on material balance evaluation). The Grubbs estimator assume an 
additive error model, so operator and inspector measurements (if they arise from a multiplicative-
model) are transformed using the natural logarithm to convert Eq. (4) to an additive error model 
(approximately, see [2], which develops a Grubbs-type estimator for a multiplicative model). The basis 
of a Grubbs’-based estimator [7] applied to log-transformed data generated from the model in Eq. (4) 
to estimate 2ROδ and 
2
RIδ is that the covariance between the log-transformed measurements (still 
denoted as (O,I) to avoid cluttering the notation) equals the relative variance of the true values 2µδ
while the relative variance of I conditional on the value of  equals 2 2RIµδ δ+  [2,3]. Therefore within 
inspection period k (lower-case i(o) for observed values of I (O), and similarly for the operator), 
    ( )
1 1
, ,
2 2
, ,
1ˆ  { ( ) ( ) }
1
n n
RI k k k k
j j
k j k j k ji i o o i in
δ
= =
= − − −
−
−∑ ∑ .         (6). 
Estimates from Eq. (6) from each of the g groups are averaged (
2
,
2 1
ˆ( 1)
ˆ
g
RI k
k
RI
n
N g
δ
δ =
−
=
−
∑
) to get the final 
estimate of the inspector’s random error variance, and similarly, the estimate of 2µδ is the average of 
the sample covariances computed within each group. To estimate 2SIδ , an extension of random effects 
ANOVA shows that the expected value of the between groups sum of 
squares, 2 2 2 2
1
{ ( ) ( 1)} ,
g
k RI SI
k
E n I I g nµδ δ δ
=
− − = + +∑  so a reasonable estimate of 2SIδ
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is
2
2 2
2 1
( ) ˆ ˆ
ˆ
1
g
k
RIk
SI
i i
g n
µδ δδ =
− +
= −
−
∑
 [8,9]. In sample size calculations (Section 3.1), it is not necessary to 
separate 2Sδ  into its components 
2 2 2
SI SO Sδ δ δ+ = , so the constraint 
2 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ
SI SO Sδ δ δ+ =  is imposed, which 
requires 2
1
1ˆ  ( )( )
1
g
k k
k
o o i i
gµ
δ
=
= − −
− ∑ [8]. There is no guarantee that 
2
µˆδ , 
2ˆ
RIδ ,or 
2
SˆIδ are non-
negative, but the corresponding true quantities are non-negative ( 2 2 20, 0, 0RI SIµδ δ δ≥ ≥ ≥ ), so 
constrained versions of the Grubb’s and ANOVA-based estimators are available [9-11]. 
     Figure 1 plots n = 5 OID values in each of 4 inspection periods; the inspector measurements are 
made using UNCL (section 4). For the 20 OID values in Fig. 1, the estimated RSDs from the ANOVA 
approach are ˆ ˆ ˆ0.07, 0.11, 0.13.R S Tδ δ δ= = =  And, the corresponding Grubbs estimates 
are ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0.04, 0.07, 0.04, 0.07.RO RI SO SIδ δ δ δ= = = =  
     Additional topics for top-down UQ include: methods to reduce the impact of on the uncertainty in 
2ˆ
ROδ and 
2ˆ
RIδ , screening for outliers (because outliers can have a large influence on variance
estimates), choosing the group structure if information suggests that grouping by inspection period is 
not effective, and assessing the uncertainty in the estimates 2 2 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,  and RO RI SO SIδ δ δ δ [9].  Also, recent
work is developing Bayesian options to include prior information, such as from bottom-up UQ 
regarding 2µδ ,
2 ,RIδ and/or 
2 ,SIδ and similarly for the operator [12,13]. 
3. Inspector sample size calculations and material balance evaluation
The estimates 2 22ˆ ˆ ˆRO RI Rδ δ δ+ =  and 
2 22ˆ ˆ ˆ
SO SI Sδ δ δ+ = are used sample size calculations (Section 3.1) 
and the estimates 2 2 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , and RO RI SO SIδ δ δ δ are used for material balance evaluations (Section 3.2). 
3.1 Inspector sample size calculations 
     Following top-down ANOVA to estimate variance components, there are two main IAEA verification 
tests applied to future sets of n paired (O,I) values.  First, the overall test for a pattern is based on the 
average OID, 
1
1 n j j
j j
o i
n o=
−
∑  , which are analysed in [14] but not discussed further here.  Second, the 
one-at-a-time test evaluates each of the n OID values.  If 3j Td δ> (in testing for overstatement 
Fig. 1. Example with n = 5 
o iOID
o
−
= values in each of
4 inspection periods. 
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falsification) where 2 2 ,T R Sδ δ δ= +  (or any alarm threshold close to 3 that corresponds to a small 
false alarm probability, FAP), then the j-th item selected for verification leads to an alarm.  Because 
the IAEA uses zero-defect sampling, the only acceptable (passing) sample is one for which no defects 
are identified.  Therefore, the non-detection probability is the probability that no defects are identified 
in a sample of size n when one or more true defective items (a defective item has an overstatement or 
understatement of the best accountancy value in an attempt to mask diversion) are in the population 
of size N.  For such one-item-at-a-time testing, the non-detection probability is given by 
   
( , )
(0, )
 = Prob(0 defects in sample of size )
Min n r
j j
j Max n r N
n A Bb
= + −
= ×∑  (7), 
where the term Aj is the probability that the selected sample contains j truly defective items, which is 
given by the hypergeometric distribution with parameters j, n, N, r, where n is the sample size, N is the 
population size, and r is the number of defective items in the population.  More specifically, 
j
r N r
j n j
A
N
n
−  
  −  =
 
 
 
is the probability of choosing j defective items from r defective items in a 
population of size N in a sample of size n, which is the well-known hypergeometric distribution.  The 
term Bj is the probability that none of the j truly defective items are inferred to be defective based on 
the individual d tests.  The value of Bj depends on 
2 2
T R Sδ δ δ= + and the alarm threshold.  Assuming 
a multiplicative error model for the inspector measurement (and similarly for the operator), implies that, 
for an alarm threshold of 3 Tδ , assuming no falsification, for
j j j j
j
j j
o i o i
d
o µ
− −
= ≈ , one must 
calculate 1 2( 3 , 3 ,..., 3 )jj T T Td dB P dδ δ δ= ≤ ≤ ≤ for one-sided testing, which is given by the 
multivariate normal integral 
3 3 1
1 2/2 1/2
( ) ( )1 ... exp{ } ...
(2 ) | | 2
T T T
j
j ji
j
B dz dz dz
δ δ
p
−
−∞ −∞
− − Σ −
=
Σ ∫ ∫
z λ z λ
, 
where under the equal diversion assumption, each of the components of λ  is equal to 
1SQ
r
 (SQ is a 
significant quantity; for example, 1 SQ = 8 kg for Pu, and r was defined above as the number of 
defective items in the population).  The term jΣ in the Bj calculation involved in the multivariate normal 
integral is a square matrix with j rows and columns with values 2 2( )R Sδ δ+  on the diagonal and 
values 2Sδ on the off-diagonals. 
     As an example, Fig. 2 plots the detection probability 1DP b= −  versus the number of 
overstatement defects (testing whether 3j Td δ≤ ) in a sample of size n = 50 from a population of size 
N = 200 with an alarm threshold equal to 3 Tδ  with 0.07, 0.11R Sδ δ= = , which are the estimates 
ˆ
Rδ and Sˆδ  for the data in Fig. 1.  To illustrate the importance of partitioning the total error variance
into its random and systematic components, the DPs in Fig. 2 are calculated in two incorrect ways and 
the correct way: assume 0.13Tδ =  consists entirely of random error, entirely of systematic error, or, 
correctly, as partly random and partly systematic. 
3.2 Material Balance Evaluation 
     Nuclear material accounting (NMA) provides a quantitative basis to detect nuclear material loss or 
diversion at declared facilities. NMA involves periodically measuring facility input transfers Tin , output
transfers Tout , and physical inventory I to compute a material balance (MB) defined for group (balance
period) k as 1 in,k out,kMB  = (I T  -T ) - Ik k k− + where 1 in,k out,k(I T  -T )k− +  is the book inventory (and 
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0I 0= ). In NMA, a collection of MBs is tested for the presence of any statistically significant large
differences and/or for trends, while allowing for random and systematic errors in variance propagation 
to estimate the measurement error standard deviation of MBk , MB .kσ Typically, many measurements 
are combined to estimate the terms Tin, Ibegin, Tout, and Iend in the MB; therefore, 
the central limit effect and experience suggests that MBs in most facilities will be approximately 
normally distributed with mean equal to the true NM loss kλ and standard deviation MBkσ , which is 
expressed as 2( ) ~  ,k k kX N λ σ , where X denotes the MB and the notation kσ  is a shortened version 
of MBkσ .  A sequence of n MBs is assumed to have approximately a multivariate normal distribution 
[13], ( )1 2,  ,    , )~ (nX X X MVN… Σλ , where the n-by-n covariance matrix 
2 2 2
1 12 1
2 2 2
21 2 2
2 2 2
1 2
...
...
...
...
n
n
n n n
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
 
 
 Σ =  
 
 
 
.  
     Estimating Σ is a key step required in NMA.  To illustrate, a simplified example model of a generic 
electrochemical facility with one input stream, one output stream, and one key inventory item will be 
used here [13]. Each measurement method is modelled using a multiplicative measurement error 
model for the operator (O), (1 ) ,jjj jS RM µ= + + with
2~ (0, )j SS N δ  and
2~ (0, )j RR N δ , where for 
item j, jM  is the operator’s measured value, jµ is the true but unknown value, jR is the random 
error, jS is the short-term systematic error, assumed constant for all items in the analysis period (so 
1 2 ...S S= = for all items).  Under those assumptions, the diagonal terms of Σ  are calculated as 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2
, , , , , 1 , 1 ,( ) ( ) ( )k kin in R in S out out R out S k inv R k inv R k k ink v ST T I I I Iδ δ δ δ δ δ δσ − −+ + + + −= + +           (8). 
And the off-diagonal terms in Σ  are calculated as: 
( )
[ ]( ) [ ]( )
2 2 2 2
, , 1 1 ,
2 2 2 2
1 , , 1 , , 1  1   (9).
k k k kkk in in in S out out out S k k k inv S
k inv S inv R k k inv S inv
k
Rk
T T T T I I I I
I I if k k I I if k k
σ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
′ ′′ ′ ′− −
′ ′− −
= + + + −
′ ′+ − = − + − =
     In the last two terms of Eq. (9), the random error of the inventory term is only applied if the 
condition is true.  Numerical examples of applying Eqs. (8) and (9) are given in[13] to estimate a 12-
by-12 covariance matrix Σ for monthly MBs over one year. The matrix Σ is the basis for applying 
sequential statistical tests to monitor for abrupt or protracted diversion. The false alarm and detection 
probabilities (FAP and DP) are estimated assuming that Sˆ Sδ δ= and ˆR Rδ δ= , and [13] provided a 
sensitivity study to assess the impact of estimation errors in substituting measured transfers and 
inventories and estimates Sˆδ and ˆRδ in Eqs. (8) and (9) on the actual FAPs and DPs.
Fig. 2. The DP versus the number of defects in a 
sample of size n = 50 from a population of size 
N = 200 with an alarm threshold TAδ for A = 3 for 
three assumptions regarding how 0.13Tδ =  is 
partitioned into random and systematic 
components. In Fig. 2, the FAPs are 0.065, 
0.021, and 0.001, respectively for purely random, 
a mix of random and systematic, and purely 
systematic, respectively. Although not shown 
here, the FAPs are all 0.05 if the alarm threshold 
A is 3.08, 2.71, and 1.65, respectively, and in that 
case, the DPs are larger for the purely systematic 
error case for a range of sample sizes. 
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4. Bottom-up UQ: UNCL case study
The Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar (UNCL) is an active NDA system that uses an AmLi
neutron source to induce fission in the 235U within a fresh fuel assembly [15-22]. Because 235U 
produces 0 to 10 neutrons per fission, detection of temporally correlated neutrons (“correlated” means 
that the neutrons arise from the same fission chain) is a unique signature of fission. To detect 
neutrons, 3He proportional counters are embedded in polyethylene slabs surrounding the assembly 
like a collar (Fig. 3). The UNCL can be configured to detect either thermal neutrons (thermal mode) or, 
with the addition of a Cd liner, to detect fast neutrons (fast mode). Using a shift register and the 
International Neutron Coincidence Counting program (INCC [16]), detector signals are analysed to 
infer the number of detected coincident neutrons (known as doubles). The doubles rate is related to 
the number of fissions of 235U and hence to the 235U mass. The UNCL measures a small portion of the 
entire length of the fresh fuel assembly, so is calibrated to convert the measured doubles rate to a 235U 
linear density for the assembly. By combining the measured linear 235U density with a measurement of 
the active length of the assembly, the total 235U mass of the assembly can be inferred.  
     The equation to convert measured doubles rate X to Y (gms 235U per cm) is 
  
1 2
kXY
a a kX
=
−
 (10), 
where 1a  and 2a  are calibration parameters, and 0 1 2 3 4 5 k k k k k k k= is a product of correction factors
that adjust X to  item-, detector-, and source-specific conditions in the calibration [2,14-18]. Therefore, 
Eq. (10) is a special case of GUM’s Eq. (1), where in addition to the reals count rate X, the calibration 
parameters 1a  and 2a and k0 ,k1, k2, k3, k4 , and k5 are among the X’s in Eq. (1) [2,16]. The calibration 
factors, 1a  and 2a , and the  k-factors help to identify UNCL error sources. 
Fig. 3. Schematic of UNCL measurements of a BWR assembly (left) or PWR assembly (right). 
4.1  UQ for UNCL 
     Based on this UNCL overview, uncertainties arise from three primary sources: the measured 
doubles rate X from the induced fission of 235U, the estimated calibration curve [17] in Eq. (10) used to 
convert the X into a 235U linear density, and the active length measurement. Although uncertainty 
determination appears to be relatively straightforward, complications arise when performing the 
measurement in the field.  One UQ complication is that an assembly contains a significant amount of 
238U that produces coincident neutrons via spontaneous fission. In order to determine the doubles 
counting rate that comes only from the induced fission of 235U, a second UNCL measurement is 
needed with the AmLi source removed to infer the background doubles rate from the spontaneous 
fission of 238U. The doubles rate from this passive assay is then subtracted from the active assay 
results to infer the doubles counting rate from induced fission of 235U.  
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
824
     A second UQ complication arises in applying a calibration curve to the net measured doubles rate 
X, because X is corrected to account for differences between the current measurement scenario and 
the physical characteristics that existed when the calibration curves were created. Reference [15] 
introduced correction factors to adjust the measured reals count rate X to the corresponding doubles 
rate observed in the calibration condition for a particular 1a  and 2a  coefficient pair.  Coefficient-pairs 
were defined for standard pressurized water reactor (PWR) and boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel types 
by [17].  Since [17], coefficient pairs have been estimated for WWER-440 and WWER-1000 fuel types 
[19]. The term,k0 accounts for uncertainty in the true Am/Li source strength (approximately 3.7% RSD 
in IAEA estimates) due to differences in detection efficiency and AmLi source strength between the 
specific UNCL and source used for calibration, and the UNCL and AmLi source used in current 
measurements The term k1 accounts for uncertainty due to electronic drift (considered negligible with 
modern electronics, so k1=1). The term k2 accounts for uncertainty due to differences in detector 
efficiencies (approximately 1.5% RSD). In general the correction factors k0-k2 are determined based 
on performance of the specific UNCL system being used in the field and assuming the UNCL 
continues to operate as it was initially setup, remaining constant for the various inspection periods. 
     The term k3 accounts for effects of burnable poison that may be present within the assembly, which 
impacts both the availability of neutrons to induce fission and the rate at which neutrons escape the 
assembly. The impact of burnable poisons can be minimized (<10% correction) by operating the 
UNCL in fast mode, but the fast mode measurement time is significantly longer than thermal mode. 
The burnable poison correction factor for thermal mode was recently updated to account for modern 
assemblies that contain a larger number of burnable poison rods or a larger Gd content than 
considered with the initial correction. As the correction for burnable poisons is empirical, inspectors 
must understand its limitations in terms of properties of the assembly (number of poison rods, Poison 
content, U enrichment, etc). . The term k4 accounts for differences in the total uranium loading (U-
total/cm, because this loading impacts neutron multiplication as well as scattering and reflection of 
neutrons3) between the calibration case and the measurement case. The term k5 accounts for all other 
effects (eg spacers, bagged assemblies). To apply the k3, k4, and k5 correction factors to the 
measured net doubles rate, specific and accurate information regarding the assembly needs to be 
input into the INCC program. This information includes the total number of rods present, the number of 
poison rods, the Gd content within the poison rods, and the 238U mass within the assembly. 
     A third UQ complication comes from the fact that the in order for the UNCL to measure the 235U 
linear density appropriately, the 235U enrichment must be constant throughout the effective 
measurement length of the collar.  Modern assemblies can contain zones of different 235U enrichments 
along the length of the fuel rods, as well as a mixture of different types of fuel rods within a single 
assembly. The inferred 235U linear density may only be accurate for that specific zone of the assembly. 
Because the total 235U mass of the assembly is to be verified, an assembly with multiple enrichment 
zones can require multiple UNCL measurements to infer the 235U linear density for each zone. The 
235U linear density of each zone is then multiplied by the length of that zone to determine the 235U 
mass for the zone, with the zone masses are summed to infer total 235U mass. It is often not possible 
to measure all enrichment zones, either due to the zone length being incompatible with an UNCL 
measurement or due to fuel handling limitations, so verification of single zone can be performed to 
calculate the paired Operator-Inspector data for the assembly.  
    MCNP [23] modelling suggests that there are additional uncertainty sources not captured by the k 
factors that are related to the variations that can occur in performing the UNCL measurement. One 
such source of uncertainty is a bias associated with the positioning of the assembly within the 
detector, particularly for BWR measurement as the BWR assembly is smaller than the measurement 
cavity of the UNCL, as seen in Fig. 1b. To minimize this bias, emphasis has been placed in training 
activities that the BWR should be placed 1 cm away from the slab containing the AmLi source as this 
orientation best matches the conditions associated with the original calibration of the UNCL for a BWR 
assembly [17]. An additional source of uncertainty relates to AmLi sources typically exhibiting a radial 
anisotropy in source strength (up to 1% variation in the apparent source strength as it is rotated in its 
holder). In cases where the radial anisotropy of the AmLi source is particularly strong, or can cause 
the normalization measurement to fail, procedures can be developed to indicate the proper orientation 
of the AmLi source within the UNCL, thereby minimizing the impact of this uncertainty source. 
4.2 Example Analyses 
     Reference [19] analyzed 9 real pairs of (X, 235U) values from Table VII for PWR from Menlove et al. 
(1990), fitting Eq. (10) with approximately 2% RSD. The 9 X values are 111.1, 132.0, 149.7, 158.8, 
164.1, 173.4, 176.0, 180.8, 186.5. The corresponding 9 235U values are: 16.20, 21.89, 27.59, 29.37, 
31.15, 33.28, 34.71, 36.84, 38. 98. Reference [19] used simulation in R [22] to apply a single noise 
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factor and 0 1 2 3 4 5 k k k k k k k= to introduce noise due to departure from calibration conditions . In each
simulation, cross validation was applied, in which 6 of the 9 (X,235U) pairs were randomly selected to 
calibrate, and the other 3 (X,235U) pairs were used to test. Varying amount of random error in k was 
applied, ranging from 1 to 5% RSD, which represented the aggregate effect of errors in each of k0-k5. 
In case 1, the same error RSDs were used in the 6 training as in the 3 testing pairs. In case 2 
smaller error RSDs were used in the  training pairs than in the  testing pairs, which represented error 
sources being present in testing measurements that are not present in calibration measurements; the 
simulations showed that the predicted 235U will have lower RSD in case 1 than in case 2 [19].  
     As an example of the results in [19], in case 1, for a total relative RSD of 0.03 in the inputs (in 
training and testing), the observed RSD in predicted 235U was approximately 0.10, which is in 
approximate agreement with ˆ 0.06RIδ = and ˆ 0.07SIδ = (so 
2 2ˆ (0.06 0.07 ) 0.09TIδ = + = ) from 
Section 3 in the top-down evaluation of 4 groups of 5 paired (O,I) values. In case 2, for a total relative 
RSD of 0.005 in the inputs in training, and 0.03 in the inputs in testing, the observed RSD in predicted 
235U was approximately 0.15.  Generally, if there are different error magnitudes in testing than in 
training, then bias can be introduced in the estimated 235U [2,18,19], and this bias contributed to the 
RSD of 0.15 in case 2.The message for bottom-up UQ is simple: understand and quantify the error 
sources in testing data so that training data for calibration can be obtained that has similar error RSDs. 
     Calibration can be done on real training data or on hybrid data that includes simulated error 
sources as in [2,18-20]. Assay challenges associated with new fuel and poison loadings have 
motivated synthetic calibration of the UNCL with Monte Carlo codes and this has led to a closer 
analysis of UNCL uncertainty. The factors k0, k1, k2, k3, k4, and k5 have been used for many years. 
However, there are recent assay challenges associated with new fuel and poison loadings, so the 
errors in the individual k factors are under investigation.  
4.3 Inspector Training 
    Inspector training for NDA includes top-down UNCL results such as those given above. The IAEA 
training section emphasize that it is important for inspectors to understand the assembly design and 
INCC input requirements.  Incorrect software (INCC) declaration input, which might be thought of as a 
“human factor,” is thought to be among the largest contributors to the observed UNCL uncertainty. 
This is an additional error source that is not included in the k factors, and should not be, because with 
better training, inspectors will provide correct INCC input, as explained next. 
     While UNCL uncertainties can be estimated through a bottom-up analysis, errors that occur in 
deriving the declared values of the assembly being verified can be completely random in frequency 
and in nature. This is especially true in modern fuel assemblies that consist of different types of fuel 
rods within a single assembly. While facilities are required to provide nuclear material accounting 
information for each assembly, there are many different permutations with which the same information 
can be presented to the inspector. Depending on the facility, inspectors may receive detailed 
information regarding the design of each type of fuel rod that is present within a given fuel assembly. 
Receiving information in this manner requires the inspector to calculate either by hand or by using 
software tools, the declared 235U mass for the entire assembly, as well as other parameters that are 
needed for the UNCL measurement. For fuel rods with multiple enrichment zones, the information for 
each type of fuel rod would have to be understood as a function of the distance along the length of the 
assembly to determine the zones with a constant enrichment that can be verified with the UNCL. As 
rods within a single fresh fuel assembly can have different number of enrichment zones, different 
active lengths, or even different overall lengths, combining the declared information of the various rods 
to determine the various parameters that are needed as input into INCC often requires the use of 
specialized programs or customized Excel spreadsheets. Complicating the calculation further is the 
fact that there are many various permutations that the same information for an individual rod type can 
be initially presented to an inspector. For instance, instead of specifying the 235U mass present within a 
fuel rod, the facility could specify the mass of a single pellet, the chemical composition of the pellet 
(e.g. U3O8), and the number of pellets present within the rod. This declaration requires additional steps 
to calculate the parameters that are needed for INCC which increases the likelihood that rounding 
errors or human errors will occur in deriving these parameters. 
     To mitigate the possibility of errors occurring in determining the declaration of an assembly, 
inspector training has evolved over the past four years to include exercises to illustrate how to 
determine the INCC inputs from realistic facility declarations for the assemblies and the possible 
impacts of mistakes in the INCC input on assay results. One impact of improperly calculated INCC 
input parameters could be an inaccurate Operator-Inspector difference due to a miscalculated 
declared 235U mass (the inspector has to translate operator declarations to 235U mass). Another impact 
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on the measurement results would be if the 238U mass for the assembly or zone were improperly 
calculated because this would impacts a correction made by INCC to the measured net doubles rate. 
     To illustrate the effect that the 238U mass declaration has on the UNCL results, hypothetical facility 
declarations have been developed for training purposes to allow inspectors to perform these 
calculations. A sample facility declaration used during training is in Table 1 for the central zone of an 
assembly containing 264 total fuel rods. The UNCL measurement only produces accurate results for a 
zone with no changes in enrichment along the length of the zone, so inspectors must determine the 
total 235U and 238U masses based on the information provided in Table 1 for the smaller of the two 
central zones, because only in that zone is the U enrichment consistent. This task includes 
determining the portion of 238U and 235U masses in the standard rods that exists within the shorter 
central zone of the poison rods, as well as determining the 238U mass from either the difference in the 
U mass and 235U mass, or by using the declared enrichment of the central zones for each type of rod 
along with total U mass to determine the 238U mass. Inspectors are also shown the IAEA-specific 
software tool developed for these calculations that requires design information for each type of rod in 
the assembly. This tool then multiplies the information for a single rod by the number of rods of that 
type that is present within the assembly to determine the parameters for the zone to be measured.  
    Looking at possible acceptable permutations of these calculations to the students can illustrate the 
impact that the declared 238U value can have on the resulting OID for this hypothetical assembly by 
varying the INCC inputs when analysing the data. Table 2 provides a representative sample of the 
range of OID values that can be obtained in the training course based on the method chosen by the 
inspectors to calculate the input values. It should be noted that the first three cases shown in Table 2 
are reasonable and scientifically valid means for determining the 238U mass based on the hypothetical 
declaration. The discrepancy between cases 1 and 2 arises from rounding errors between the 
declared enrichment for the two types of rods and the enrichment that can be calculated from the 235U 
and U masses provided. The discrepancy between the use of the computational tool and the hand 
calculation is a result of the number of operations performed on the initial declared values to calculate 
the INCC input parameters. In all three cases, it is assumed that the rods only contain 235U and 238U. 
The fourth case is an example of a common mistake that happens in training in deriving the INCC 
input in which the inspector confuses the total U mass for 238U mass. The OID’s shown in Table 2 for 
each case are the result of changing the 238U mass input into the INCC analysis of the UNCL data 
from the assembly. Other common mistakes, such as not correcting for the different lengths of the 
central zones between the two types of rods, can lead to either larger and smaller OID values than 
those shown. Through these exercises, the inspector can be exposed to the challenges of properly 
performing a UNCL measurement. 
Table 1 Hypothetical facility declaration for the central zone of a 264 rod assembly. 
U (g) 235U (g) Enrichment (%) Zone Length (cm) 
Total mass in 244 
standard rods 
393542 18347 4.6 335.3 
Total mass in all 20 
Burnable Poison Rods 
26204 581 2.2 304.8 
Table 2 Impact of declared 238U mass on UNCL measured results for hypothetical case. 
Calculation Description 238U Mass (g) k4 correction factor OID (%)
Add U mass and 235U 
mass separately and 
subtract the sums to 
determine 238U 
366709 0.983 1.3 ± 3.4 
Determine 238U mass 
for each type of rod 
based on U and 
Enrichment and add 
resulting 238U mass 
369905 0.979 2.0 ± 3.4 
Calculation based on 
individual rod 
properties using 
software tool 
371727 0.976 2.4 ± 3.3 
Using total U mass in 
place of 238U mass 
(human error) 
387082 0.957 5.9 ± 3.1 
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5. Discussion and Summary
This paper described three main inspector UQ-related training topics. Inspectors usually rely on the
safeguards evaluation section to calculate sample sizes that correspond to goal detection probabilities 
(Section 3.1), but it is expected that inspectors understand that such sample size calculations depend 
partly on measurement quality, for which top-down and bottom-up UQ are essential  MB evaluation 
also relies heavily on estimated measurement error RSDs (Section 3.2).  Several other UQ-related 
topics are provided in inspector training, including tolerance intervals [25], top-down software 
(OPTANOVA [9]), and uncertainty in estimated RSDs based on bottom-up UQ and based on top-down 
UQ. Once the uncertainty in the estimated RSDs is well understood, if bottom-up RSDs are 
significantly lower than top-down RSDs, and inspector training ensures that a consistent measurement 
protocol is followed, based on reducing known sources of error to the extent that is practical, a 
possible explanation is dark uncertainty, which is unaccounted for sources of error [26]. 
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Abstract: 
In the context of the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards effort to fully develop and apply the State-level 
concept for safeguards implementation, the International Safeguards working group at the research 
centre in Jülich has developed an approach which supports analysing acquisition paths including 
establishing and prioritizing technical objectives, identifying applicable safeguards measures, and 
conducting a strategic assessment (game theoretical analysis). To perform the game theoretical 
analysis, two types of quantities are required: Technical quantities (such as non-detection probabilities 
and the total amount of inspection effort involved) and nontechnical quantities. The nontechnical 
quantities are the State’s overall incentive to choose an acquisition path, State’s perceived sanctions 
in the event of detection, State’s false alarm cost for false accusation, Inspectorate’s loss in the event 
of detection (failed deterrence), Inspectorate’s false alarm cost (credibility loss) and Inspectorate’s loss 
in the event of non-detection. 
The results of the game theoretical analysis are Nash equilibrium strategies and the corresponding 
equilibrium payoffs. Because they depend on the specific values assigned to the two types of 
quantities, a sensitivity analysis is recommended in order to investigate the effect of a small change in 
one of the quantities on the game theoretical results. 
Because at present such a sensitivity analysis seems to be unfeasible for realistic acquisition path 
models, we focus on a relatively simple acquisition path model, generalize this model to any number 
of acquisition paths inspected, and investigate the influence of the payoff parameters on the 
Inspectorate’s equilibrium strategy and payoff (sensitivity analysis). In this model, it is assumed that a 
State, if it violates its commitments, will concentrate all of its effort on a single acquisition path and that 
the Inspectorate will inspect a certain number of these paths. 
Keywords: IAEA; state level concept; acquisition path analysis; decision support systems; game 
theory 
1. Introduction
In the context of the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards effort to fully develop and apply the State-level 
concept for safeguards implementation, the International Safeguards working group at the research 
centre in Jülich has developed an approach which supports analysing acquisition paths including 
establishing and prioritizing technical objectives, identifying applicable safeguards measures, and 
conducting a strategic assessment (game theoretical analysis); see [1], [2] or [3]. To perform the game 
theoretical analysis, two types of quantities are required: Technical quantities (such as non-detection 
probabilities and the total amount of inspection effort involved) and nontechnical quantities. The 
nontechnical quantities are the State’s overall incentive to choose an acquisition path, State’s 
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perceived sanctions in the event of detection, State’s false alarm cost for false accusation, 
Inspectorate’s loss in the event of detection (failed deterrence), Inspectorate’s false alarm cost 
(credibility loss) and Inspectorate’s loss in the event of non-detection 
The results of the game theoretical analysis are Nash equilibrium strategies and the corresponding 
equilibrium payoffs: A Nash equilibrium strategy combination of a non-cooperative game is defined by 
the property that any unilateral deviation from it does not improve the deviator's payoff; see, e.g., [5] or 
[6]. Because the equilibrium strategies and payoffs depend on the specific values assigned to the two 
types of quantities, a sensitivity analysis in the context of the strategic assessment is recommended in 
order to investigate the effect of a small change in one of the quantities on the game theoretical 
results. 
Such a sensitivity analysis for realistic acquisition path models seems to be unfeasible at present. 
Thus, we focus on a relatively simple acquisition path model (analysed in Avenhaus and Canty [4]), 
generalize this model to any number of acquisition paths inspected, and investigate the influence of 
the payoff parameters on the Inspectorate’s equilibrium strategy and payoff (sensitivity analysis). 
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the acquisition path model is described and the game 
theoretical solution is presented and discussed. Section 3 contains a sensitivity analysis of the 
Inspectorate’s equilibrium strategy and payoff in case only one path is inspected. A discussion and 
outlook concludes the paper. 
2. The game theoretical model and analysis
Assume that a State considers n acquisition paths for the acquisition of nuclear material. These 
acquisition paths are assumed to be placed in different locations. Thus, even if a path consists of 
several steps (e.g., chemical processes, etc.) it is assumed that all these steps can be gone though in 
a single location. By assumption the illegal activity can occur, if at all, in one location only. The 
Inspectorate will inspect 𝑚,𝑚 = 1,… , 𝑛, location(s) and will detect any illegal activity with certainty, 
should one take place. 
This conflict situation can be modeled as a two-person non-cooperative game between two players, 
an Inspectorate and a State; see [3] and [4]. The Inspectorate’s pure strategies consist of the locations 
for inspection, and the State’s pure strategies are to behave illegally in one of the locations or legal 
behavior. 
The payoffs to (Inspectorate, State) are given for all possible outcomes as follows: 
(−𝑎,−𝑏) for detected illegal behavior 
(1) (−𝑐, 𝑑𝑖) for undetected illegal behavior in the 𝑖 − th location, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛 
(0,0) for legal behavior 
where it is assumed that 
0 < 𝑎 < 𝑐, 0 < 𝑏 , 𝑑1 > 𝑑2 > ⋯ > 𝑑𝑛 > 0 . (2) 
These conditions reflect the subjective preferences of both players: 𝑎 > 0 means that the 
Inspectorate's priority is the deterrence of an illegal activity. The worst outcome for the Inspectorate is 
non-detection, so that 𝑎 < 𝑐. The payoff 𝑏 reflects the State's perception of the consequences 
(sanctions) of detection and 𝑑𝑖 is its incentive to behave illegally in location 𝑖. These incentives are 
ordered without loss of generality ordered according to their attractiveness. Note that in the case of an 
illegal activity in location  𝑖 and inspection in location  𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, the payoff to the Inspectorate is − 𝑐, 
because we ignore real inspection costs in location  𝑗 but consider instead a political loss arising from 
not detecting the illegal activity in location  𝑖; see [3]. 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
831
Because this paper focuses on the case α = β = 0, only nontechnical quantities are considered in Eq. 
(1). Note that because false accusation, i.e. the raising a false alarm, is excluded, payoffs for that case 
need not to be introduced.  
The acquisition path model described above has been analysed by Avenhaus and Canty [4] for the 
case 𝑚 = 1 (see section 2.2) but taking errors of the first and second kind into account. Thus, this 
paper generalizes their model regarding the number of paths inspected, but also limits it due to 
α = β = 0. 
2.1. Inspection of one location (𝒎 = 𝟏) 
The case of inspecting one location (𝑚 = 1) has been studied by Avenhaus and Canty [4] (even taking 
errors of the first and second kind into account). For illustration, we start with four locations (𝑛 = 4). 
The bimatrix form of this game is presented in Table 1. 
State 
1 2 3 4 legal 
In
sp
ec
to
ra
te
 
1  −𝑏
−𝑎
 𝑑2
−𝑐
  𝑑3
−𝑐
  𝑑4
−𝑐
  0
0
2  𝑑1
−𝑐
  −𝑏
−𝑎
 𝑑3
−𝑐
  𝑑4
−𝑐
  0
0
3  𝑑1
−𝑐
  𝑑2
−𝑐
  −𝑏
−𝑎
 𝑑4
−𝑐
  0
0
4  𝑑1
−𝑐
  𝑑2
−𝑐
  𝑑3
−𝑐
  −𝑏
−𝑎
 0
0
Table 1: Bimatrix form of the inspection game with one inspection in one of four locations. 
If the Inspectorate inspects location 2 (say) and the State performs an illegal activity there, then the 
payoffs to both players (Inspectorate, State) are (−𝑎,−𝑏), while in case the State performs an illegal 
activity in location 1,3 or 4, the payoff the Inspectorate is always −𝑐 and the State gains 𝑑1, 𝑑3 or 𝑑4. 
Let 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, be the probability that the Inspectorate inspects location 𝑖, and let 𝑞𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛, be 
the probability that the State behaves illegally in location 𝑗. 𝑞𝑛+1 denotes the probability of behaving 
legally. Then the Inspectorate’s set of mixed strategy is given by 
𝑃1 ≔ {  𝒑 = (𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛) ∈ ℝ+
𝑛 :∑𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 1  } (3) 
and that of the State 
𝑄 ≔ {  𝒒 = (𝑞1, 𝑞2, … , 𝑞𝑛 , 𝑞𝑛+1) ∈ ℝ+
𝑛+1:∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑛+1
𝑗=1
= 1 } . (4) 
Let 𝐼1(𝒑, 𝒒) and 𝑆1(𝒑, 𝒒) be the expected payoffs to Inspectorate and State, respectively. Then 
𝐼1(𝒑, 𝒒) =∑𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
((−𝑎)𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐(1 − 𝑝𝑗))     and    𝑆1(𝒑, 𝒒) =∑𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
((−𝑏)𝑝𝑗 + 𝑑𝑖(1 − 𝑝𝑗))  . (5) 
As mentioned in section 1, we seek a Nash equilibrium [6] of the game, i.e. a pair (𝒑∗, 𝒒∗) of mixed 
strategies with the property that that neither player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from its 
equilibrium strategy 
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𝐼1
∗ = 𝐼1(𝒑
∗, 𝒒∗) ≥ 𝐼1(𝒑, 𝒒
∗) for all 𝒑 ∈ 𝑃1
𝑆1
∗ = 𝑆1(𝒑
∗, 𝒒∗) ≥ 𝑆1(𝒑
∗, 𝒒) for all 𝒒 ∈ 𝑄 .
(6) 
The game theoretical solution of this game is given in Theorem 1. Note that we do not consider 
equalities between parameters here and in the subsequent cases, because they cannot be estimated 
precisely. 
Theorem 1: Consider the inspection game with 𝑛 locations and 𝑚 = 1 inspections. The strategy sets 
to the Inspectorate and to the State are given by (3) and (4) with the expected payoffs (5), 
respectively.  
Let 𝑘1, 2 ≤ 𝑘1 ≤ 𝑛 be so chosen that 
∑
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑𝑘1+1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘1
𝑖=1
> 1  and ∑
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑𝑘1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘1−1
𝑖=1
< 1  . (7) 
(For 𝑘1 = 𝑛 the left hand inequality is omitted.) 
If 𝑘1 < 𝑛, then a Nash equilibrium strategy for the Inspectorate is given by 
𝑝𝑖
∗ = {
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑆1
∗
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑘1
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 𝑘1 + 1,… , 𝑛
(8) 
and for the State by 
𝑞𝑗
∗ = {  
1
𝑘1
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑘1
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 𝑘1 + 1,… , 𝑛, 𝑛 + 1
 , (9) 
with the equilibrium payoffs 𝐼1
∗ and 𝑆1
∗ given by
𝐼1
∗ =
1
𝑘1
(𝑐 − 𝑎) − 𝑐      and     𝑆1
∗ = (∑
1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘1
𝑖=1
)
−1
(∑
𝑑𝑖
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘1
𝑖=1
− 1) (10) 
If  𝑘1 = 𝑛, then the equilibrium strategy of the Inspectorate is not unique and that of the State is legal 
behavior: 
𝑝𝑖
∗ ≥
𝑑𝑖
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
,   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛     𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ   ∑𝑝𝑖
∗
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 1     𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑞𝑗
∗ = 0,   𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛, 𝑞𝑛+1
∗ = 1. (11) 
The equilibrium payoffs to both players are zero, i.e. 𝐼1
∗ = 𝑆1
∗ = 0.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Avenhaus and Canty [3] or, as a special case of 
Theorem 3, in section 2.3. □ 
Let us comment on the results of Theorem 1: First, Eqs. (8) and (9) imply that the potential locations 
for the inspection and for the illegal activity are concentrated on the 𝑘1 most attractive locations, i.e. in 
all locations in which the illegal activity is carried out with positive probability, the inspection is 
performed with positive probability and vice versa. 
Second, because 𝑘1 ≥ 2, at least two locations are inspected. Note that if location-dependent 
detection probabilities 1 − 𝛽𝑖 were considered, then the left hand inequality of (7) would be 
∑
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑𝑘1+1
(𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖)(1 − 𝛽𝑖)
𝑘1
𝑖=1
> 1 , 
and thus, 𝑘1 = 1 would be possible (e.g., 𝑑1 = 10, 𝑑2 = 6, 𝑏 = 2 and 𝛽1 = 3 4⁄ ). For details, see
Avenhaus and Canty [3]. 
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Third, although the State’s acquisition paths have different attractiveness (see Eq. (2)), its equilibrium 
strategy is a uniform distribution on the first 𝑘1 locations, which is surprising. 
Note that for the game in Theorem 1, a sensitivity analysis regarding the Inspectorate’s equilibrium 
strategy and payoff is performed in Section 3. 
2.2. Inspection of two locations (𝒎 = 𝟐) 
We now generalize the model discussed in section 2.1 to the case of the inspection of two locations, 
i.e. 𝑚 = 2. For this purpose, the Inspectorate’s mixed strategies are transformed, a trick which is also 
applied for the cases 𝑚 > 2 in section 2.3. Because this feature can be best understood in case 𝑚 =
2, we explain the derivations in some detail. 
For illustration, we start again with the case of four locations (𝑛 = 4). The bimatrix form of this game is 
given in Table 2. 
State 
1 2 3 4 legal 
In
sp
ec
to
ra
te
 
1,2  −𝑏
−𝑎
 −𝑏
−𝑎
 𝑑3
−𝑐
  𝑑4
−𝑐
  0
0
1,3  −𝑏
−𝑎
 𝑑2
−𝑐
  −𝑏
−𝑎
 𝑑4
−𝑐
  0
0
1,4  −𝑏
−𝑎
 𝑑2
−𝑐
  𝑑3
−𝑐
  −𝑏
−𝑎
 0
0
2,3  𝑑1
−𝑐
  −𝑏
−𝑎
 −𝑏
−𝑎
 𝑑4
−𝑐
  0
0
2,4  𝑑1
−𝑐
  −𝑏
−𝑎
 𝑑3
−𝑐
  −𝑏
−𝑎
 0
0
3,4  𝑑1
−𝑐
  𝑑2
−𝑐
  −𝑏
−𝑎
 −𝑏
−𝑎
 0
0
Table 2: Bimatrix form of the inspection game in which two locations are inspected. 
Suppose the Inspectorate inspects location 2 and 4 (say) and the State performs an illegal activity in 
location 2, then the illegal activity is detected and the payoffs to both players (Inspectorate, State) are 
(−𝑎,−𝑏), while in case the State performs an illegal activity in location 1 or 3, the payoff the 
Inspectorate is −𝑐 and the State gains 𝑑1 or 𝑑3.  
Let 𝑝𝑖1,𝑖2 denotes the probability that locations 𝑖1 and 𝑖2 ≠ 𝑖1 with 𝑖1, 𝑖2 ∈ {1,2,3,4} are inspected. The
probabilities 𝑞𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛, and 𝑞𝑛+1 have the same meaning as in section 2.1. Then, the 
Inspectorate’s set of mixed strategies is given by 
{?̃? = (𝑝1,2, 𝑝1,3, 𝑝1,4, 𝑝2,3, 𝑝2,4, 𝑝3,4) ∈ ℝ+
6 : 𝑝1,2 + 𝑝1,3 +⋯+ 𝑝3,4 = 1}  , (12) 
and that of the State by Eq. (4) for 𝑛 = 4: 
{𝒒 = (𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3, 𝑞4, 𝑞5) ∈ ℝ+
5 : 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 + 𝑞3 + 𝑞4 + 𝑞5 = 1} . (13) 
To derive the expected payoff to both players, we start with the State’s payoff: Using (12) and (13), its 
expected payoff is, using Table 2, given by 
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𝑆2(?̃?, 𝒒) = 𝑞1 ((−𝑏)(𝑝1,2 + 𝑝1,3 + 𝑝1,4) + 𝑑1(𝑝2,3 + 𝑝2,4 + 𝑝3,4))
+ 𝑞2 ((−𝑏)(𝑝1,2 + 𝑝2,3 + 𝑝2,4) + 𝑑2(𝑝1,3 + 𝑝1,4 + 𝑝3,4))
+ 𝑞3 ((−𝑏)(𝑝1,3 + 𝑝2,3 + 𝑝3,4) + 𝑑3(𝑝1,2 + 𝑝1,4 + 𝑝2,4))
+ 𝑞4 ((−𝑏)(𝑝1,4 + 𝑝2,4 + 𝑝3,4) + 𝑑4(𝑝1,2 + 𝑝1,3 + 𝑝2,3))  .
(14) 
Eq. (14) can be simplified if we introduce the probability 𝑝𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,… ,4, that location 𝑖 is inspected, 
which leads to the following relations between 𝑝1,2, … , 𝑝3,4 and 𝑝1 , … , 𝑝4: 
𝑝1 = 𝑝1,2 + 𝑝1,3 + 𝑝1,4, 𝑝2 = 𝑝1,2 + 𝑝2,3 + 𝑝2,4, 𝑝3 = 𝑝1,3 + 𝑝2,3 + 𝑝3,4   and   𝑝4 = 𝑝1,4 + 𝑝2,4 + 𝑝3,4 (15) 
with 𝑝1 + 𝑝2 + 𝑝3 + 𝑝4 = 2, because of Eq. (12). Thus, Eq. (14) simplifies with 𝒑 = (𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4) to
𝑆2(𝒑, 𝒒) = 𝑞1((−𝑏)𝑝1 + 𝑑1(1 − 𝑝1)) + 𝑞2((−𝑏)𝑝2 + 𝑑2(1 − 𝑝2))
+ 𝑞3((−𝑏)𝑝3 + 𝑑3(1 − 𝑝3)) + 𝑞4((−𝑏)𝑝4 + 𝑑4(1 − 𝑝4)) .
(16) 
The Inspectorate’s payoff can be deduced from Eq. (16) simply by substituting −𝑎 instead of −𝑏 and 
−𝑐 instead of 𝑑𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,… ,4. Therefore, we get 
𝐼2(𝒑, 𝒒) = 𝑞1((−𝑎)𝑝1 − 𝑐(1 − 𝑝1)) + 𝑞2((−𝑎)𝑝2 − 𝑐(1 − 𝑝2))
+ 𝑞3((−𝑎)𝑝3 − 𝑐(1 − 𝑝3)) + 𝑞4((−𝑎)𝑝4 − 𝑐(1 − 𝑝4)) .
(17) 
This illustration leads directly to the following strategy set of the Inspectorate: 
𝑃2 ≔ {  𝒑 = (𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑛) ∈ ℝ+
𝑛 :∑𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 2  }  , (18) 
where 𝑝𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, is the probability that location 𝑖 is inspected. The State’s strategy set remains the 
same and is given by Eq. (4). The expected payoffs are 
𝐼2(𝒑, 𝒒) =∑𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
((−𝑎)𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐(1 − 𝑝𝑗))    and    𝑆2(𝒑, 𝒒) = ∑𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
((−𝑏)𝑝𝑗 + 𝑑𝑖(1 − 𝑝𝑗)) . (19) 
The game theoretical solution of this inspection game is given in 
Theorem 2: Consider the inspection game with 𝑛 locations and 𝑚 = 2 inspections. The strategy sets 
to the Inspectorate and to the State are given by (18) and (4) with the expected payoffs (19), 
respectively. 
Let 𝑘, 3 ≤ 𝑘2 ≤ 𝑛 be so chosen that 
∑
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑𝑘2+1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘2
𝑖=1
> 2  and ∑
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑𝑘2
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
< 2
𝑘2−1
𝑖=1
  . (20) 
(For 𝑘2 = 𝑛 the left hand inequality is omitted.)  
If 𝑘2 < 𝑛, then a Nash equilibrium strategy for the Inspectorate is given by 
𝑝𝑖
∗ = {
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑆2
∗
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑘2
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 𝑘2 + 1,… , 𝑛
(21) 
and for the State by 
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𝑞𝑗
∗ = {  
1
𝑘2
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑘2
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 𝑘2 + 1,… , 𝑛 + 1
 , (22) 
with the equilibrium payoffs 𝐼2
∗ and 𝑆2
∗ given by
𝐼2
∗ =
2
𝑘2
(𝑐 − 𝑎) − 𝑐      and     𝑆2
∗ = (∑
1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘1
𝑖=1
)
−1
(∑
𝑑𝑖
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘1
𝑖=1
− 2) (23) 
If  𝑘2 = 𝑛, then the equilibrium strategy of the Inspectorate is not unique and that of the State is legal 
behavior: 
𝑝𝑖
∗ ≥
𝑑𝑖
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
,   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛   𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ ∑𝑝𝑖
∗
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 2     𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑞𝑗
∗ = 0,   𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛, 𝑞𝑛+1
∗ = 1. (24) 
The equilibrium payoffs to both players are zero, i.e. 𝐼2
∗ = 𝑆2
∗ = 0.
Proof: The proof of Theorem 2 is covered by the proof of Theorem 3; see Section 2.3. □ 
Let us comment on the solution of Theorem 2: First, the three comments made after Theorem 1 hold 
here as well, of course, accordingly modified (e.g., for the first comment Eqs. (21) and (22) need to be 
utilized, etc.). 
Second, from Theorem 1 and 2 we know that 𝑘1 ≥ 2 and 𝑘2 ≥ 3, respectively. Does 𝑘2 ≥ 𝑘1 hold? The 
answer is yes. Suppose 𝑘2 < 𝑘1. Then, 𝑑𝑘2+1 ≥ 𝑑𝑘1, and Eqs. (7) and (20) yield
2 < ∑
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑𝑘2+1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘2
𝑖=1
≤ ∑
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑𝑘2+1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘1−1
𝑖=1
= ∑
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑𝑘1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘1−1
𝑖=1
− (𝑑𝑘2+1 − 𝑑𝑘1) ∑
1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘1−1
𝑖=1
< 1 − (𝑑𝑘2+1 − 𝑑𝑘1) ∑
1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘1−1
𝑖=1
≤ 1 ,
(25) 
which is a contradiction. Thus, 𝑘2 ≥ 𝑘1. 
Third, considering the original game in which 𝑝𝑖1,𝑖2 denotes the probability that locations 𝑖1 and 𝑖2 ≠ 𝑖1
are inspected (for 𝑛 = 4 see Eq. (12)), an Inspectorate’s equilibrium strategy is, using Eq. (21), given 
by 
𝑝𝑖1,𝑖2
∗ = {  
𝑝𝑖1
∗
𝑘2 − 1
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖1, 𝑖2 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘2}, 𝑖2 ≠ 𝑖1 
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖1, 𝑖2 ∈ {𝑘2 + 1,… , 𝑛}, 𝑖2 ≠ 𝑖1
 . 
Note that the transformation from 𝑝𝑖1
∗  to 𝑝𝑖1,𝑖2
∗  is not unique, but they all lead to the same equilibrium 
payoff. 
2.3. Inspection of any number of locations (arbitrary 𝒎) 
To generalize the analysis of the last section, we consider 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛 inspections. Suppose the 
Inspectorate performs its 𝑚 inspections at the locations 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚 with 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛} and 𝑖𝑙 ≠ 𝑖𝑙′ for
𝑙 ≠ 𝑙′, and the State behaves illegally in location 𝑗. Then, using Eq. (1), their payoffs are given by 
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𝐼𝑚(𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚 , 𝑗) = {
−𝑎 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ∈ {𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚}
−𝑐 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ∉ {𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚}
 and   𝑆𝑚(𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚, 𝑗) = {
−𝑏 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ∈ {𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚}
𝑑𝑗 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ∉ {𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚}
 . (26) 
Note again, that we ignore real inspection costs in a location but consider instead only a political loss 
arising from not detecting the illegal activity in location. 
Let 𝑝𝑖1,…,𝑖𝑚 denote the probability that locations 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚 are inspected. Then the Inspetorate’s set of
mixed strategies is given by 
{?̃? = (𝑝𝑖1,…,𝑖𝑚) ∈ ℝ+
(
𝑛
𝑚
)
: ∑ 𝑝𝑖1,…,𝑖𝑚
𝑖1,…,𝑖𝑚: 𝑖𝑙≠𝑖𝑙′  for 𝑙≠𝑙
′ ,
= 1}  . (27) 
The probabilities 𝑞𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛, and 𝑞𝑛+1 have again the same meaning as in section 2.1. Then, the 
Inspectorate’s expected payoff is given by 
𝐼2(𝒑, 𝒒) =∑𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
(
 
 
 
 
(−𝑎) ∑ 𝑝𝑖1,…,𝑖𝑚
𝑖1,…,𝑖𝑚
𝑖𝑙≠𝑖𝑙′  for 𝑙≠𝑙
′
𝑗∈{𝑖1,…,𝑖𝑚}
− 𝑐 ∑ 𝑝𝑖1,…,𝑖𝑚
𝑖1,…,𝑖𝑚
𝑖𝑙≠𝑖𝑙′  for 𝑙≠𝑙
′
𝑗∉{𝑖1,…,𝑖𝑚} )
 
 
 
 
 . (28) 
Because 
𝑝𝑗 ≔ ∑ 𝑝𝑖1,…,𝑖𝑚
𝑖1,…,𝑖𝑚
𝑖𝑙≠𝑖𝑙′  for 𝑙≠𝑙
′
𝑗∈{𝑖1,…,𝑖𝑚}
(29) 
is the probability that location 𝑗 is inspected, the Inspectorate’s strategy set is, using Eq. (27), given by 
𝑃𝑚 ≔ {  𝒑 = (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , … , 𝑝𝑛) ∈ ℝ+
𝑛 :∑𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 𝑚  }  . (30) 
The State’s strategy set remains the same and is given by Eq. (4). Using Eqs. (28) and (29), the 
expected payoffs to both players are 
𝐼𝑚(𝒑, 𝒒) =∑𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
((−𝑎)𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐(1 − 𝑝𝑗))    and    𝑆𝑚(𝒑, 𝒒) =∑𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
((−𝑏)𝑝𝑗 + 𝑑𝑗(1 − 𝑝𝑗)) . (31) 
Note that 𝑚 enters Eq. (31) only through Eq. (30). Thus, it can be expected that the structure of the 
solution in Theorem 1 and 2 remains here, which is stated in  
Theorem: Consider the inspection game with 𝑛 locations and 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛 inspections. The strategy sets to 
the Inspectorate and to the State are given by (30) and (4) with the expected payoffs by (31), 
respectively. The Nash equilibrium strategies and the corresponding payoffs are given as follows: 
Let 𝑘𝑚, 𝑚 + 1 ≤ 𝑘𝑚 ≤ 𝑛 be so chosen that 
∑
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑𝑘𝑚+1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
> 𝑚
𝑘𝑚
𝑖=1
  and ∑
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑𝑘𝑚
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
< 𝑚
𝑘𝑚−1
𝑖=1
  . (32) 
(For 𝑘𝑚 = 𝑛 the left hand inequality is omitted.) 
If 𝑘𝑚 < 𝑛, then a Nash equilibrium strategy for the Inspectorate is given by 
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𝑝𝑖
∗ = {
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑆𝑚
∗
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑘𝑚
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 𝑘𝑚 + 1,… , 𝑛
(33) 
and for the State by 
𝑞𝑗
∗ = {  
1
𝑘𝑚
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑘𝑚
0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 𝑘𝑚 + 1,… , 𝑛 + 1
 , (34) 
with the equilibrium payoffs 𝐼𝑚
∗  and 𝑆𝑚
∗  given by 
𝐼𝑚
∗ =
𝑚
𝑘𝑚
 (𝑐 − 𝑎) − 𝑐      and     𝑆𝑚
∗ = (∑
1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘𝑚
𝑖=1
)
−1
(∑
𝑑𝑖
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘𝑚
𝑖=1
−𝑚) . (35) 
If  𝑘𝑚 = 𝑛, then the equilibrium strategy of the Inspectorate is not unique and that of the State is legal 
behavior, 
𝑝𝑖
∗ ≥
𝑑𝑖
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
,   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛   𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ ∑𝑝𝑖
∗
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 𝑚     𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑞𝑗
∗ = 0,   𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛, 𝑞𝑛+1
∗ = 1. (36) 
The equilibrium payoffs to both players are zero, i.e. 𝐼𝑚
∗ = 𝑆𝑚
∗ = 0. 
Proof: We start with the case 𝑘𝑚 < 𝑛 and show first, that 
𝑑𝑘𝑚+1 < 𝑆𝑚
∗ < 𝑑𝑘𝑚 . (37) 
Because 𝒑∗ ∈ 𝑷𝑚, Eq. (33) and the left hand side of Eq. (32) imply
𝑚 +∑
𝑆𝑚
∗
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘𝑚
𝑖=1
=∑
𝑑𝑖
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘𝑚
𝑖=1
> 𝑚 +∑
𝑑𝑘𝑚+1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘𝑚
𝑖=1
 , 
which gives 
(𝑆𝑚
∗ − 𝑑𝑘𝑚+1)∑
1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘𝑚
𝑖=1
> 0 , 
i.e. 𝑑𝑘𝑚+1 < 𝑆𝑚
∗ . Extending the summation index in Eq. (32) trivially from 𝑘𝑚 − 1 to 𝑘𝑚 and using E.
(33) again, yields 
𝑚 +∑
𝑑𝑘𝑚
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘𝑚
𝑖=1
>∑
𝑑𝑖
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘𝑚
𝑖=1
= 𝑚 +∑
𝑆𝑚
∗
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘𝑚
𝑖=1
 , 
i.e. 
(𝑑𝑘𝑚 − 𝑆𝑚
∗ )∑
1
𝑏 + 𝑑𝑖
𝑘𝑚
𝑖=1
> 0 , 
which shows 𝑆𝑚∗ < 𝑑𝑘𝑚. This inequality assures that 𝑝𝑖
∗ > 0 for 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑘𝑚.
We now prove that the Nash equilibrium conditions 
𝐼𝑚
∗ ≥ 𝐼𝑚(𝒑, 𝒒
∗) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙    𝒑 ∈ 𝑷𝑚  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑚
∗ ≥ 𝑆𝑚(𝒑
∗, 𝒒) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙   𝒒 ∈ 𝑸 (38) 
are fulfilled. For the Inspectorate’s equilibrium condition, we get, using Eqs. (4), (30), (31) and (34), for 
all 𝒑 ∈ 𝑷𝑚 
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𝐼𝑚(𝒑, 𝒒
∗) = ∑𝑞𝑗
∗
𝑛
𝑗=1
((−𝑎)𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐(1 − 𝑝𝑗)) = −𝑐 + (𝑐 − 𝑎)∑𝑞𝑗
∗
𝑘𝑚
𝑗=1
𝑝𝑗 + (𝑐 − 𝑎) ∑ 𝑞𝑗
∗
𝑛
𝑗=𝑘𝑚+1
𝑝𝑗  
= −𝑐 +
𝑐 − 𝑎
𝑘𝑚
 ∑𝑝𝑗
𝑘𝑚
𝑗=1
≤ −𝑐 +
𝑐 − 𝑎
𝑘𝑚
 ∑𝑝𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
= −𝑐 +
𝑐 − 𝑎
𝑘𝑚
𝑚 = 𝐼𝑚
∗  .
(39) 
To prove the State’s inequality, we obtain, using Eqs. (4), (31) and (33), for all 𝒒 ∈ 𝑸 
𝑆𝑚(𝒑
∗, 𝒒) = ∑𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
((−𝑏)𝑝𝑗
∗ + 𝑑𝑗(1 − 𝑝𝑗
∗)) =∑𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
(−(𝑑𝑗 + 𝑏) 𝑝𝑗
∗ + 𝑑𝑗)
= ∑𝑞𝑗
𝑘𝑚
𝑗=1
(−(𝑑𝑗 − 𝑆𝑚
∗ ) + 𝑑𝑗) + ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=𝑘𝑚+1
𝑑𝑗
= 𝑆𝑚
∗  (1 − ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=𝑘𝑚+1
− 𝑞𝑛+1) + ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=𝑘𝑚+1
𝑑𝑗
= 𝑆𝑚
∗ − 𝑆𝑚
∗ 𝑞𝑛+1 + ∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=𝑘𝑚+1
(𝑑𝑗 − 𝑆𝑚
∗ )
≤ 𝑆𝑚
∗  ,
(40) 
because 𝑑𝑗 < 𝑆𝑚∗  for all 𝑗 = 𝑘𝑚 + 1,… , 𝑛 and 𝑆𝑚∗ > 0; see Eq. (37). Thus, both inequalities in (38) are 
fulfilled. 
Now let 𝑘𝑚 = 𝑛. Then Eq. (36) implies 𝐼𝑚(𝒑, 𝒒∗) = 0 for all 𝒑 ∈ 𝑷𝑚, i.e. its Nash condition are fulfilled
as equality. For the State’s equilibrium condition we obtain, using Eqs. (31) and (38), 
0 ≥ (−𝑏)𝑝𝑗
∗ + 𝑑𝑗(1 − 𝑝𝑗
∗)   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛 , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ    ∑𝑝𝑗
∗
𝑛
𝑗=1
= 𝑚  , 
which is equivalent to the left hand inequality of Eq. (36), and which completes the proof. □
Note that all comments made after Theorem 1 and 2 hold – accordingly modified – here as well. 
3. Sensitivity analysis
In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis and investigate the influence of 
1) the Inspectorate’s payoff parameters 𝑎 and 𝑐, and
2) the State’s payoff parameter 𝑑𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, and 𝑏
on the Inspectorate’s equilibrium strategy and payoff for the game in which only one location is 
inspected. We focus on the Inspectorate because we are mainly interested in its equilibrium behavior. 
Ad 1) Because 𝐼1∗ as given by Eq. (10) is a linear function of 𝑎 and 𝑐, a small change of these
parameters will result in a small change of 𝐼1∗.
Ad 2) Because 𝐼1∗ is also affected by 𝑘1, a characterization of the set of all vectors (𝑑1, 𝑑2, … , 𝑑𝑛)
resulting in the same 𝑘1 is desirable: Let 𝒅 = (𝑑1, 𝑑2, … , 𝑑𝑛) be the parameter combination of an initial 
assessment of the model and 𝑘1(𝒅) be its respective threshold (using Eq. (7)). If a second 
assessment leads to a parameter combination 𝒅′ = (𝑑1′ , 𝑑2′ , 𝑑3′ , … , 𝑑𝑛′ ) with 𝑘1(𝒅′) = 𝑘1(𝒅), the
“distance” between 𝒅 and 𝒅′ does not have any impact on 𝐼1∗ (but on 𝑝𝑖∗; see below).
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For example, consider 𝒅 = (10,8,3,1,0) and 𝑏 = 3. Then Eq. (7) yields 𝑘1(𝒅) = 3. Which of the vectors 
𝒅′ = (𝑑1
′ , 𝑑2
′ , 𝑑3
′ , 𝑑4
′ , 0) with 𝑑𝑖′ ≥ 𝑑𝑖 for all 𝑖 = 1,2,3, and 𝑑3′ > 𝑑2′ > 𝑑1′  fulfill 𝑘1(𝒅′) = 3? In Table 3
several 𝒅′ are presented, where 𝑑𝑖′ ∈ ℕ, 𝑖 = 1,2,3 and 𝑑1′ ≤ 20 is assumed.
If, e.g., in a second assessment (by another expert) the 
parameter combination 𝒅′ = (20,14,8,2,0) seems more 
appropriate to his perception of reality, Table 3 implies that the 
Inspectorate’s equilibrium payoff will not change. 
Eq. (8), however, indicates that the Inspectorate’s equilibrium 
strategies will be different for 𝒅 and 𝒅′ even if 𝑘1(𝒅) = 𝑘1(𝒅′). Let
𝑝𝑖
′∗, 𝑖 = 1, … ,4, denotes the Inspectorate’s equilibrium strategies
for a vector 𝒅′. In Table 3, 𝑝𝑖∗ and several 𝑝𝑖′∗ are presented
(because 𝑘1(𝒅) = 𝑘1(𝒅′) = 3 we have 𝑝4∗ = 𝑝𝑖′∗ = 0).
𝑝1
∗ ≈ 𝑝2
∗ ≈ 𝑝3
∗ ≈
𝒅 = (10,8,3,1,0) 0.5401 0.4564 0.0035 
𝒅′ = (10,9,6,1,0) 0.4331 0.3858 0.1811 
𝒅′ = (11,8,5,1,0) 0.5028 0.3672 0.1299 
𝒅′ = (12,9,5,1,0) 0.5152 0.3939 0.0909 
𝒅′ = (13,11,9,1,0) 0.4247 0.3425 0.2329 
𝒅′ = (14,11,10,1,0) 0.4321 0.3105 0.2574 
𝒅′ = (20,15,13,1,0) 0.4617 0.3122 0.2262 
𝒅′ = (20,19,18,1,0) 0.3632 0.3343 0.3026 
𝒅′ = (50,49,48,1,0) 0.3461 0.3335 0.3204 
Table 4: Equilibrium strategies for some vectors 𝒅′ (rounded to four 
digits after the dot). 
Table 4 demonstrates that the equilibrium strategy components 
might differ considerably especially for large “distances” between 
𝒅 and 𝒅′. As a measure deviation between equilibrium strategies, 
their total variation 
∑ | 𝑝𝑖
∗ − 𝑝𝑖
′∗ |
3
𝑖=1
can be considered. In the range 10 ≤ 𝑑1′ ≤ 20, 8 ≤ 𝑑2′ < 𝑑1′  and 
3 ≤ 𝑑3
′ < 𝑑2
′ , the maximum of the total variation is 0.598 (attained 
for 𝒅′ = (20,19,18,1,0)) and 0.6463 if we increase 𝑑1′  to 50.  
Can the total variation also be used to assess the sensitivity of 
Inspectorate’s equilibrium strategies on the payoff parameter? If 
the “distances” between 𝒅 and 𝒅′ is small but the total variation 
between their equilibrium strategies high, then the model is seen 
to be (very) sensitive. If, on contrary, large “distances” between 𝒅 
and 𝒅′ result in small total variations, the model is (rather) insensitive. Thus, the quantity 
∑ | 𝑝𝑖
∗ − 𝑝𝑖
′∗ |3𝑖=1
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝒅, 𝒅′)
(41) 
needs to be studied. Because Eq. (41) depends on the specific definition of the 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 which itself 
depends on the meaning of the 𝑑𝑖 (in Jülich’s APA approach, 𝑑𝑖 is a function of the technical difficulty, 
𝑑1
′ 𝑑2
′ 𝑑3
′
10 8 3,… ,7 
10 9 4,… ,8 
11 8 4,… ,7 
11 9 4,… ,8 
11 10 4,… ,9 
12 8 4,… ,7 
12 9 4,… ,8 
12 10 4,… ,9 
12 11 5,… ,10 
13 8 4,… ,7 
13 9 4,… ,8 
13 10 5,… ,9 
13 11 5,… ,10 
13 12 5,… ,11 
14 8 4,… ,7 
14 9 5,… ,8 
14 10 5,… ,9 
14 11 5,… ,10 
14 12 5,… ,11 
14 13 6,… ,12 
… … … 
20 8 5,… ,7 
20 9 5,… ,8 
20 10 6,… ,9 
20 11 6,… ,10 
20 12 7,… ,11 
20 13 7,… ,12 
20 14 7,… ,13 
20 15 8,… ,14 
20 16 8,… ,15 
20 17 8,… ,16 
20 18 8,… ,17 
20 19 9,… ,18 
Table 3: Selection of vectors 𝒅′ 
with 𝑘1(𝒅′) = 3. 
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the proliferation time, and the proliferation costs for that path), an analysis of Eq. (41) is not performed 
here. 
4. Discussion and Outlook
We have performed a game theoretical analysis of a generalized acquisition path model including a 
sensitivity analysis regarding the influence of the payoff parameters on the Inspectorate’s equilibrium 
strategy and payoff. This sensitivity analysis is mandatory, because the selection of model parameters 
requires expert judgment. 
Although this relative simple acquisition path model has interesting features, future research in the 
context of the German Safeguards Support Programme to the IAEA has to focus on more realistic 
acquisition path models in order to increase the acceptance not only of Jülich’s APA approach but also 
of the benefits of game theoretical considerations at all. For that purpose, existing models (e.g., for 
Germany’s nuclear fuel cycle) can be analyzed with the APA software developed in Jülich, and a 
comprehensive sensitivity analysis can be performed. 
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ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 
AND TERRORISM  
Dr Tushar P Ghate 
drtusharghate@gmail.com 
Abstract: 
Onset of 21st century has made terrorism more organized. With so called internationalization of terrorist 
organizations; resources, efforts and targets have become universal cutting across international 
boundaries. Inception of asymmetric and lethal methods have made it necessary for all state and non 
state actors to join hands and address this menace in a coordinated way. The terror act inflected with 
innovative everlasting effect will mar the society more with ‘looming fear of unknown.’   
Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) agents in terrorist activities is not a threat 
but proven fact. There is an inevitable need of the day to isolate the epicenters of source of these 
materials and also secure the state borders in order to prevent influx of CBRN agents by respective 
countries. 
Nuclear fissile material used in nuclear reactors and radioactive material from commercial and research 
industries are two main sources that emits harmful radiations.  
Many countries have well defined and practiced regulations and guidelines for the handling of nuclear and 
radioactive material. These regulations and guidelines are in conformity with various rules and regulations 
promulgated by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and similar regulating agencies. However 
there is a requirement of revisiting the present mechanism in place to prevent illicit trafficking of 
radioactive material across the border. The paper recommends the approach as following:- 
- Proactive Intelligence 
- Continuous monitoring 
- Effective detection and Identification 
- Forensic  
Integrated measures like regular and remote Monitoring (during transportation and disposal), effective 
detection and identification (Nuclear Forensic) and knowledge sharing along with physical checks will 
prove an effective mechanism to counter this problem. Timely tracing, detection and seize of illicit 
radioactive and nuclear material will avert use of these materials by terrorist organizations.  
Keywords: Terrorism; Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN); acts; regulations and 
guidelines;  Nuclear forensic 
1. Introduction
Act of terrorism is a well thought set of activities planned and executed to achieve asymmetric political 
goals. Physically harming people by act of terror is not the only aim; the ulterior motive is always focused 
towards tearing social synthesis of the society. This is planned in a well thought sequential manner. 
Initially, terrorist organizations try to brainwash portion of the society with so called cause. While this 
happens, another section of society remains unconvinced with the cause and keep them in the main 
stream. However, the remaining section of society which constitutes a large percentage is very sensitive 
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and suffers from acts of terror in their day to day life. It is easy to exploit this section. To achieve this, 
terrorists generally adopt unconventional acts that create and propagate ‘looming fear of unknown.’   
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) agents used in terrorist activities is not a mere 
threat but startling reality. With change in operating methodologies of terrorist organizations, these 
activities are spreading pan-border. In order to contain this menace, there is an inevitable need of the day 
to isolate and eliminate the sources of these materials as well as prevent the transportation of CBRN 
agents across the border. 
2. Accessibility and Availability of CBRN Materials
2.1. Chemical and biological agents 
Variety of hazardous chemical and biological agents are easily available that can be used in terrorist 
activities by mixing in food, water or through direct dissemination in the open environment. Chemical 
agents like Cyanides, Mustard, Nerve agents and biological agents like virus, bacteria, fungi etc. are 
potential sources that can be incorporated in terrorist activities.  However, use of nuclear and radiological 
materials is more devastating in terms of its effects and longevity that looms physically and 
psychologically in public.  
2.2 Radiological agents 
Nuclear materials used in reactors and radioactive materials in commercial and research industries are 
two main sources that emits harmful radiations. Proliferation of these materials is a real threat to the 
society.  Even though many countries do have well defined stringent safety and monitoring framework in 
place in form of rules, laws and guidelines, this threat remains from rogue nations where these ensuring 
mechanisms are either very weak or even absent. Proliferation of radiological and nuclear materials from 
these states to other countries cannot be ruled out considering the vast boarders shared with each other 
where security related loopholes do exist. 
Considering above, there is a requirement of revisiting the present mechanism in place of individual state 
and synchronize the same with other nations to prevent illicit trafficking of radioactive material across the 
border. The suggestive successive approach for this is as following:- 
- Proactive Intelligence 
- Continuous monitoring 
- Effective detection and Identification 
- Forensic  
3. Proactive intelligence
Radioactive materials are used in Nuclear Medicines.  As per World Nuclear Association (WNA), more 
than 10000 hospitals around the world use various radio isotopes. Technetium-99, Cobalt-60, Iodine 131, 
Iridium-192, Palladium-103, Strontium-89, Samarium-153, Rhenium-186, Lutetium-177 etc are commonly 
used for diagnosis and treatment. Following other commercial and scientific activities also use radioactive 
materials 
- Neutron techniques for analysis 
- Gamma and X-Ray techniques for analysis 
- Gamma radiography 
- Gauging 
- Gamma Sterilization 
- Tracers 
- Age Determination 
- Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators 
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- Oil and Gas Operations 
It is evident from above details that, there is significant quantity of radioactive material present across the 
world that is used for various activities. State operated regulation bodies maintain the manufacturing and 
provision details of these sources. However two important aspect need to be addressed in more details: 
transportation and disposal post usage. For this, following measures are require to be adopted 
4. Regular and remote monitoring
Radioactivity level at the time of manufacturing, during usage and at the time of disposal is predictive with 
respect to half life. Routine radiographic signatures of all sources should be checked, compared with 
analytical reference and certified on regular basis. Similar to network mapping, the radioactive sources 
should also be digitally mapped and monitored. Remote online monitoring through networking of all 
detectors and CCTV cameras can be adopted for this.     
4.1 Transportation 
Today, the radioactive material meant for commercial usage is transported as per guidelines for transport 
issued by respective state agencies. However, while doing so, the transportation and security of such 
radioactive material is coordinated by private agencies and there is no presence of state representative to 
prevent any sabotage and proliferation. There is requirement to incorporate state sponsored security 
mechanism in the existing guidelines while transporting the source. 
4.2 Disposal. 
Post usage, the radioactive source is required to be deposited back to the issuing agency / defined body 
by the state. Very strict monitoring is required for its 
compliance. Lapse in this has resulted into incidents like 
Goiania (Brazil, 1987), Mayapuri (India, 2010) where the used 
radiological materials were not deposited back and were left 
unattended. This resulted in to radiation exposure to public. 
Sketch1.  Goiania victim 
4.3 Continuous monitoring 
Countries share vast borders with each other. Effective physical sealing and monitoring for radioactive 
source at borders should be addressed in two ways. 
4.3.1 Monitoring at check points 
Most of the countries have set up an effective 
monitoring system at the check points. These 
monitoring details /database however needs to be 
networked with neighboring countries to ensure the 
correctness of data. 
4.3.2 Monitoring at other than check-posts 
There is requirement to continuously monitor 
maritime borders. This a potential Point of Entry that    
Sketch 2.  Continuous monitoring at borders  can be used by terrorists to bring in illicit radioactive  
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materials. Combination of standoff fixed and aerial based monitoring can be incorporated for the same. 
Monitoring of sealed containers however remains a challenge, considering volume of transportation and 
detection limitations due to inherent shielding capability of the container material itself. 
5. Effective detection and identification
5.1 Nuclear forensic. 
This involves following:- 
5.1.1 Nuclear attribution 
This involves the process of finding out the source of radioactive materials, its point of origin, routes of 
transportation and contribution to prosecute the responsible. The attribution can be based on any of or 
combination of analysis of nuclear forensic, study of radiochemical and environmental signatures, known 
procedures to produce such materials and information/database available at law enforcement agencies. 
5.1.2 Categorization 
The goal of categorization of the incidence is to identify the risk to the first responders, law enforcement 
personnel and public and to determine if there is 
any criminal activity or threat to the nation. The 
magnitude may have wide range due to variance 
in environmental contamination, risk to the public 
health, proliferation concerns etc.   
5.1.3 Characterization 
It is performed to determine the nature of the 
radioactive material and associated evidence. It 
provides full elemental analysis of the radioactive 
material to include major, minor and trace 
constituents.   
Sketch 3.  Nuclear forensic procedures 
5.1.4 Nuclear interpretation 
It is the process of correlating the characteristics with production history. The goal of the process is to 
determine the method and time of the production. 
6. Summary
Along with lethal effects, radiological materials have infamous potential to impose psychologically 
terrifying consequences that lingers on for years. The world has experienced this through Chernobyl, 
Goiania, Three Mile Island, Mayapuri and so on. Incorporation of these materials in terrorist activities is 
not mere threat but a startling reality. Tackling this novice but dreaded activity, there is an inescapable 
requirement  to synchronize and synergize the existing laws and frameworks between all states in order 
to prevent and eradicate the options to use radiological materials in terrorist activities.   Timely tracing, 
detection and seize of illicit radioactive and nuclear material will help to avert the use of these materials 
by terrorist to great extent. 
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Abstract: 
In the 1970th it was demonstrated in Los Alamos that plastic scintillation detector is the most cost 
effective detector type for safeguarding nuclear facilities from unauthorized removal of radioactive 
materials and a concept of Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) has been introduced [1–3]. 
During the past 30 years thousands of similar RPM equipped with plastic scintillation detectors and 
single channel analyzers have been deployed all over the world in the framework of various nuclear 
security programs. Such systems measure number of detected photons in a single energy range without 
further distinguishing in energies of individual photons [4, 5].  
For RPM deployed at the border crossing point this results in huge number of innocent alarms caused 
by naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) [6]. Analysis of radiation profiles by operator of 
Local Alarm Station is the only technique at majority of installations to classify source of alarm as a 
NORM where appropriate and eliminate unwanted secondary inspections.  
Addressing this problem and investigating the whole potential of plastic scintillators, multichannel 
analyzers are now more widely used in the chain of signal processing electronics and corresponding 
energy windowing algorithms of categorization/identification of radionuclides have been suggested [7]. 
Theoretically usage of multichannel analyzer provides possibility to discriminate between different types 
of radionuclides based on the energy dependent differences in the Compton continuum of the measured 
spectra. In practice spectra measured within short time interval of the occupancy contain little number 
of counts in individual channels as well as in specific regions of interests what makes an energy 
dependent categorization of radionuclides difficult. 
In present work the rolling energy window algorithm for identification of radionuclides from the spectra 
measured by means of plastic scintillation detector is considered. 
Keywords: Radiation Portal Monitor, plastic scintillator, multichannel analyzer 
1. Introduction
Radiation signals measured with plastic scintillation detectors of conventional RPM are processed  using 
single channel analyzers and alarm decision is based on the comparison of the net signal value (S) 
measured by plastic scintillators during an occupancy with background (B) value measured when the 
detection zone of the RPM is unoccupied according to the following equation: 
N×Sigma =
ௌξ஻
When the measured value exceeds pre-defined N×Sigma threshold an alarm is triggered. Depending 
on the values of the low-level and upper-level voltage discriminators (LLD and ULD) certain widths of 
energy window could be selected and the highest possible N×Sigma value for specific radionuclides 
could be obtained.  
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The value of LLD is usually chosen as low as possible but high enough to cut low-energy electronic 
noise and the choice of the value of ULD depends on the task of the analysis. For example to get an 
optimal value of measuring parameter for detection of 235U, the values of LLD and ULD are set so to 
cover an energy range from about 20 to about 150 keV, but to get an optimal detection threshold for 
137Cs the value of ULD has to be set above Compton edge of 137Cs (above 480 keV). 
It can be demonstrated that usage of a multichannel analyzer for processing of signals collected with 
the plastic scintillation detectors provides possibility to discriminate between types of radionuclides 
based on the position of the Compton edges. Comparing N*Sigma values in the fixed energy windows 
it is possible to discriminate between categories of radionuclides emitting low, medium and high-energy 
photons. Such algorithms of a number of fixed energy windows have been proposed before [7]. 
In the present article it is demonstrated that usage of a multichannel analyzer for processing of signals 
collected with the plastic scintillation detectors provides possibility to discriminate between types of 
radionuclides based on the energy dependent differences in the Compton continuum of the measured 
spectra. 
In present article the rolling energy window algorithm for categorization/identification of radionuclides is 
suggested and is described on the example of three sources for relatively high N×Sigma values.  
The algorithm is also probated at low N×Sigma values and for the short measurement time using NORM, 
Special Nuclear Materials and industrial radionuclides. 
2. Materials and methods
Radiation signals have been measured by means of plastic scintillation detector installed in a master 
pillar of a Vehicle RPM, model TSA VM-250AGN [5]. Instead of a single channel analyzer the signals 
measured with the detector have been processed using multichannel analyzer (MCA), model CHRPR 
[8]. Two versions of MCA have been used: with 256 and with 512 channels. 
3. Experimental results
3.1. Description of the algorithm 
The algorithm is described on the example of three sources and for relatively high N×Sigma values. 
Description of sources and corresponding energies of photons is shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 – Description of radioactive sources 
Radionuclide Energy, keV Emission probability, % Energy of Compton edge, keV 
133Ba
81 
303 
356 
32.9 
18.3 
62 210 
137Cs (Ba-137m) 662 85 480 
60Co
1174 
1333 
99.85 
99.98 
970 
1120 
133Ba, 137Cs, 60Co spectra and background spectrum were measured for a period of 60 seconds. Sources 
have been placed in front of the detector and spectra have been collected with CHRPR multichannel 
analyzer. In all spectra a maximum count rate is in the beginning of energy scale and depending of the 
radionuclide a characteristic Compton edge can be clearly observed moving on the energy scale up 
(Figure 1). Spectra have been manually processed in order to get values of main measurement 
parameter (N×Sigma) for individual channels (Figure 2), for total energy window (Figure 3 – cumulative 
sum) and for the rolling energy window consisting from 20 measurement channels (Figure 3 – rolling 
sum). N×Sigma values have been calculated according to the following formulas: 
a) For individual channels
N×Sigma = 
ௌ೔ି஻೔ඥ஻೔ , where i is the number of channel 
b) For cumulative sum of channels (total energy window)
N×Sigma = 
σ ሺௌ೔ି஻೔ሻ೙೔సభඥσ஻೔ , where n is the last number of channel
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c) For rolling sum of channels (rolling energy window)
N×Sigma = 
σ ሺௌ೔ି஻೔ሻೖశ೘೔స೘ටσ ஻೔ೖశ೘೔స೘  , where k is fixed and m = 1, 2, 3 … n-k
Figure 1 – Comparison of 133Ba, 137Cs, 60Co and background measured with plastic scintillation detector 
and 256-channel MCA 
Figure 2 – Comparison of N×Sigma values for individual channels for the spectra of 133Ba, 137Cs and 
60Co sources measured with a plastic scintillation detector 
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Figure 3 – Comparison of N×Sigma values for cumulative and rolling sums of counts in 20 channels for 
the spectra of 133Ba, 137Cs and 60Co sources measured with a plastic scintillation detector 
As it can be seen from the figures, a comparison of N×Sigma values for the individual channels and for 
the rolling energy window consisting from the sum of 20 channels shows that rolling energy window 
algorithm provides higher values of maximum amplitudes of an alarm as well as more precise position 
on the energy scale of the maximum of the Compton edge. 
3.2. Optimal width of the rolling energy window 
With increase of the width of the rolling energy window, the maximum value of N×Sigma can be 
achieved, however at the cost of decrease of sensitivity in distinguishing between Compton edges 
characteristic for different radionuclides (Figure 4).  
For high N×Sigma values algorithm works, unless Compton edges of two different radionuclides are too 
close in energy to each other. For example as shown on the (Figure 5), 133Ba and 137Cs can’t be 
distinguished but 133Ba and 60Co as well as 137Cs and 60Co can be.  
Since on the energy scale from 20 keV to 3 MeV Special nuclear materials (235U and 239Pu) and medical 
radionuclides are characterized by dominant emission of photons with relatively low energies, industrial 
radionuclides (137C and 60Co) by emission of photons with medium and high energies and NORM 
radionuclides (40K and 232Th) by emission of photons with high energies, in principle it should be possible 
to discriminate between SNM + Medical and NORM radionuclides such as 40K.
In order to validate/probate algorithm such possibility has been investigated for low N*Sigma values, the 
values that could be expected during real cases of innocent alarms caused by transfer of cargo 
containing NORM. 
3.3. Deconvolution of N×Sigma profiles 
On the Figure 6 is shown a comparison of measured N*Sigma profile of 137Cs source with a 
deconvoluted N*Sigma profile obtained by subtraction of N*Sigma profile of 60Co source from N*Sigma 
profile of the 137Cs+60Co source. As it can be seen from the figure a Compton edge of 137Cs is resolved, 
however with some drop of N*Sigma values.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Channel
N
*S
ig
m
a
Ba-133 (cumulative sum of chn)
Cs-137 (cumulative sum of chn)
Co-60 (cumulative sum of chn)
Ba-133 (rolling sum, 20 chn)
Cs-137 (rolling sum, 20 chn)
Co-60 (rolling sum, 20 chn)
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
851
Figure 4 – Comparison of N×Sigma values for rolling energy windows consisting from k= 10, 20 and 
40 channels for the spectrum of 137Cs plus 60Co sources 
Figure 5 – Comparison of N*Sigma values for rolling energy window (k=20 channels) for sum of 
signals from 133Ba, 137Cs and 60Co sources; first 20 points correspond to cumulative energy window 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
N
*S
ig
m
a
Channel
10 channels - rolling energy
window (Cs-137+Co-60)
20 channels - rolling energy
window (Cs-137+Co-60)
40 channels - rolling energy
window (Cs-137+Co-60)
Cumulative energy window
(Cs-137+Co-60)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
N
*S
ig
m
a
Channel
Ba-133+Cs-137 (rolling energy window, 20 chn)
Ba-133+Co-60 (rolling energy window, 20 chn)
Cs-137+Co-60 (rolling energy window, 20 chn)
All sources (rolling energy window, 20 chn)
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
852
Figure 6 – Comparison of measured and deconvoluted N×Sigma profiles of 137Cs. 
3.4. Validation of the algorithm 
For the validation of spectra processing algorithm based on the rolling energy window spectra of different 
radionuclides characterized by  
a) low N*Sigma values, and by
b) low N*Sigma value and short measurement time of 1 second
have been measured and processed.  
On the Figure 7 count rates for the spectra measured within 60 seconds are shown, processing results 
with the algorithm for the average count rate per 1 second) are shown on the Figure 8.
On the Figure 9 count rates for the randomly selected spectra of the sources measured within 1 second 
are shown, processing results with the algorithm for these spectra are shown on the Figure 10. For the 
background average count rate taken from the 60 seconds spectrum has been used. 
Spectra have been measured with upgraded to 512 channels CHRPR MCA. Voltage divider of plastic 
scintillation detector has been changed and amplifier gain has been adjusted. 
As it can be seen from the Figures 9 and 10 the algorithm allows discriminate between SNM+Medical 
group of radionuclides, 137Cs, 60Co and 40K single radionuclides. 
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3.4.1. Validation of identification algorithm for low N×Sigma values
Figure 7 – Comparison of spectra of different radionuclides measured with plastic scintillator and 
512-channel MCA (measurement time 60 seconds) 
Figure 8 – Comparison of N×Sigma values for rolling energy window with a widths of 20 channels for 
different radionuclides for the average count rate measured within 60 seconds (first 20 points represent 
cumulative energy windows) 
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
C
o
u
n
t 
ra
te
, 
c
p
s
Channel
Background, cps
Ba-133
Cs-137
Co-60
Th-232
K-40
LEU
Pu-239
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
N
*S
ig
m
a
Channel
Ba-133 Cs-137 Co-60
Th-232 K-40 LEU
Pu-239
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
854
3.4.2. Validation of identification algorithm for low N×Sigma values and short measurement 
time
Figure 9 – Comparison of spectra of different radionuclides measured with plastic scintillator and 
512-channel MCA (measurement time 1 second) 
Figure 10 – Comparison of N×Sigma values for rolling energy window with a widths of 20 channels for 
different radionuclides for the spectra measured within 1 second (first 20 points represent cumulative 
energy windows) 
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4. Summary of experimental results
The use of a multichannel analyzer instead of a single channel analyzer for processing of signals from 
plastic scintillation detectors provides possibility to discriminate among types of radionuclides based on 
energy dependent differences in the Compton continuum of the measured spectra. 
The categorization/identification algorithm based on the rolling energy window allows enhanced 
identification of Compton edges. 
The rolling energy window algorithm provides a better N*sigma value compared to the single channel 
algorithm and allows more accurate identification of maximum energy position of characteristic Compton 
edge. 
The algorithm doesn’t bring any advantage in terms of improvement of the detection threshold compared 
to a standard detection algorithm based on the alarm comparison in a total energy window, since more 
alarm comparisons are made per single alarm comparison interval. 
The algorithm allows discriminate between SNM+Medical, 137Cs, 60Co and 40K radionuclides. 
5. Conclusion
In present article spectra processing algorithm based on the rolling energy window for identification of 
radionuclides by means of plastic scintillation detector was suggested and discussed. Applicability of 
the algorithm for discrimination between NORM and other radionuclides was considered.
The algorithm allows discriminate between SNM+Medical, 137Cs, 60Co and 40K radionuclides. 
Further investigations towards ability of the algorithm of categorization of other NORM radionuclides 
with multiple spectral lines (232Th and 226Ra and their daughters) and towards ability of deconvolution of 
multiple radionuclides should be made. 
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Abstract
Myanmar has views about nuclear that in order
for the utilization of nuclear energy to be
peaceful and secure, nuclear disarmament and
nuclear non-proliferation must be achieved on
the global scale. Myanmar has demonstrated its
commitment with the nuclear non-proliferation
regime as it has been a party to the Treaty of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) since
December 1992. Myanmar has signed the
Safeguards Agreement and the Small Quantities
Protocol pursuant to the NPT with the IAEA in
April 1995. As a member of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), it also
reaffirmed its commitment by signing the Treaty
on South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
(SEANWFZ) that entered into force in 1997. In
addition, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT) has been ratified on 21 
September 2016.
Myanmar has signed the Protocol Additional to
the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements
(AP) on 17 September 2013 and is currently
working on a step by step approach to
implement the AP.  Myanmar’s State System of 
Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material
(SSAC) has been established with well trained
staff. Myanmar, in cooperation with the IAEA
and the United States Department of Energy
(USDOE), has participated in the international
Safeguards Engagement Program so as to
strengthen the Non-Proliferation regime in State.
With the purpose of strengthening national
nuclear related legislation, the Department of
Atomic Energy (DAE) has just recently
completed the drafting of the Myanma’s
comprehensive Nuclear Law covering Nuclear
Safety, Security and Safeguards (3S strategy).
The main challenges in establishing the national
safeguards infrastructure as a newcomer
country includes the establishment of the  legal
framework, the implementation of the
safeguards regulation, the establishment and
implementation of an effective and systematic
nuclear material management system and the
development of human resources. This paper
will present the milestones achieved so far in the
implementation of safeguards and non-
proliferation activities in Myanmar, and will
elaborate on the steps to be taken to eventually
implement the Additional Protocol.
Keywords:     Additional Protocol; Nuclear Non-
Proliferation; 3S strategies
1. Introduction
Situated between China and India, Myanmar, is
a South-East Asian nation, with a Small
Quantities Protocol in force with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Myanmar joined
the IAEA as a member state in 1957 (number of
accession-59).
Myanmar has made a non-proliferation U-turn in
the recent years. Only a few years ago, the
international community regarded Myanmar as a
pariah State in connection with Democratic
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People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), expecting
possible nuclear–weapon ambitions [1]. In the
context of sweeping political and economic
reforms that began in 2011, Myanmar has made
significant developments in implementing
nuclear non-proliferation measures. After
President Barack Obama’s first visit in 
November 2012, Myanmar announced it would
sign the Protocol Additional to its
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (AP) [2].
On 17 September, 2013, Myanmar signed the
agreement, but is still required to ratify the
instrument.
It is important that the implementation of the AP
and of the modified Small Quantities Protocol
happens soon, especially since Myanmar
officials seem prepared to enhance their nuclear
activities. For instance, such an issue became
evident on 18 June 2015, when the Republic of
the Union of Myanmar signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Government of the
Russian Federation for cooperation in the field of
the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The international community, particularly the US
and other Western countries, make continuous
efforts to help Myanmar in implementing
disarmament and non-proliferation regime. At
present, Myanmar has neither nuclear research
reactors nor nuclear power reactors nor other
fuel cycle facilities. The utilization of radiation
sources and irradiating apparatus are limited to
the use in medicine, industry, agriculture,
livestock breeding and research. Nonetheless,
Myanmar government is aware of the
importance of nuclear nonproliferation and
safeguards. This paper is based on consolidated
efforts by Myanmar government in fulfilling its
commitments and challenges encountered
during some phases for implementing nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament regimes.
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2. Myanmar’s Legal framework for 
Safeguards and Non-Proliferation 
 
With regard to nuclear non-proliferation and 
safeguards, Myanmar fulfills its obligations 
No. Treaty/Convention Date of Signing Date of Deposit Enter into Force 
 
1 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests 
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water or Partial Test Ban Treaty 
(PTBT) 
14th Aug1963 15th Nov1963  
 
2 Sea-Bed Treaty: Treaty on the  
Prohibition of the Emplacement of 
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons 
of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed 
and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil 
11st Feb 1971   
 
3 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapon (NPT) (INFCIRC/140) 
2nd Dec1992   
 
4 Agreement between the Union of 
Myanmar and the IAEA for the 
Application of Safeguards in connection 
with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (with Protocol) 
Safeguards Agreement  on (INFCIRC-
477) 
20thApril 1995   
 
5 Small Quantities Protocol (SQP)  
pursuant to the NPT  
15th Dec2005   
 
6 Treaty on South East Asia Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) 
15th Dec1995  17th Jul 1997 
 
7 IAEA’s Additional Protocol (AP)  17th Sept 2013   
 
8 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) 
25th Nov 1996 21st Sep 2016  
 
9 Convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material and Nuclear 
Facilities (CPPNM) 
6th Dec 2016  5th Jan 2017 
 
10 Convention on nuclear Safety (CNS)   6th Dec 2016  6th Mar 2017 
 
Table 1: List of Treaties and Conventions 
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resulting from the following international legal 
instruments as listed in Table 1. 
 
Myanmar believes that nuclear weapon free 
zones and treaties are effective measures for 
nuclear weapon non-proliferation and nuclear 
disarmament. Therefore, Myanmar has made 
considerable progress on non-proliferation over 
the past few years, but there are instruments 
that they are yet to endorse and, just as 
important as they are yet to fully implement  
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 those they have recently adopted.  
 
No. Events Event Start Date/End Date Organized by 
1 Workshop on International Safeguards and 
Additional Protocol 
9-13 January 2013 MOST and USDOE 
2 National Awareness Seminar and Training 
Course on Physical Protection and Security 
Management  
21-24 May 2013 MOST and ANSTO 
 
3 Workshop on Modified Small Quantities 
Protocol and Additional Protocol 
19-21 August 2013 MOST and USDOE 
 
4 Workshop on State Systems of Accounting 
and Control 
26-28 August 2013 MOST and IAEA 
5 Regulatory Development Workshop 
 
 
18-20 November 2013 MOST and USDOE-
GTRI (Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative) 
6 Workshop on Additional Declaration 
Development and Associated Outreach 
16-20 June 2014 MOST and USDOE 
7 Sub-regional Workshop on Establishing a 
Register of Radiation Sources Based on 
the Regulatory Authority Information 
System (RAIS) 
23-27 June 2014 MOST and IAEA 
 
8 5th Annual Meeting on Asia-Pacific 
Safeguards Network  
1-5 September  2014 MOST and APSN 
 
9 IAEA National Workshop on Safeguards 3-5 December 2014 MOST and IAEA 
10 National Stakeholders Meeting for the 
Development of Detection and Response 
Capability at Borders for Myanmar, in 
Yangon organized by (4 resource persons 
and 30 participants) 
March 30  –   
April 1, 2015 
MOST and IAEA   
11 Workshop on IAEA Additional Protocol 
Implementation 
5-7 May,  2015 MOST and USDOE 
12 National Workshop on Threat Assessment 
and Design Basis Threat (DBT)  
4 to 7 August, 2015  
13 IAEA Additional Protocol and Commodity 
Identification Training (CIT) AP-CIT 
12-14 July, 2016  
14 Workshop on Challenges and Strategies in 
the Implementation and Ratification of the 
Additional Protocol, with Small Quantities 
Protocol  
20-22 March, 2017  
 
USDOE 
Table 2: List of Seminars, Workshops and Training in Myanmar 
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3. Engagement with IAEA, USDOE 
and other Organizations 
 
In Myanmar, the Department of Atomic Energy 
(DAE), formerly under the Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MOST), which is now merged 
with Ministry of Education (MOE), is responsible 
for the implementation of Safeguards 
agreements. The DAE, in cooperation with the 
IAEA and United States Department of Energy 
(USDOE), has participated in the International 
Safeguards Engagement Program, with 
emphasis on getting prepared for the 
implementation of the Additional Protocol. The 
cooperation between the IAEA and Myanmar 
remains critical for the implementation of 
safeguards.  
 
With the guideline of IAEA and under the 
auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy/ 
National Nuclear Security Administration Office 
(NNSA) of Nonproliferation and International 
Security (NIS), a Workshop on International 
Safeguards and Additional Protocol was held 
from 9 to 13 January 2013 and a Workshop on 
the Modified Small Quantities Protocol and 
Additional Protocol was conducted from 19 to 21 
August 2013 in Myanmar. Subsequently, 
Myanmar signed the Protocol Additional to the 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement on 17 
September 2013. It is a significant step towards 
supporting the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. 
 
Moreover, Myanmar organized a series of 
national workshops to support the capacity 
building and to provide for sharing of  
experiences regarding the implementation of the 
Additional protocol (AP), as well as the 
implementation of Safeguards Agreements to 
get better prepared to fulfill its obligations under 
the NPT. Myanmar is working step by step 
approach and is making all necessary 
arrangement to fulfill its international non-
proliferation commitments.  
 
3.1 Engagement with IAEA and USDOE  
 
As shown in Table 2, there are numbers of 
events as Seminars, Workshops and Trainings 
in Myanmar that have been already held. 
Safeguards and verification are important pillars 
upon which safe and secure global nuclear 
regulation should be built [3]. IAEA Safeguards 
is one of the cornerstones of the global nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. The Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement (CSA), its Additional 
Protocol (AP) and the modified Small Quantities 
Protocol (SQP) form a strong verification regime. 
According to the agreed work plan of USDOE 
and Myanmar, DAE is conducting a series of 
workshops with hands-on experiences which are 
mostly related to implementation of the AP as 
well as to understanding of how important NPT 
is. The US support programs to IAEA 
safeguards are key enablers for implementation 
of information-driven safeguards. The close and 
interactive co-operation gives an opportunity to 
establish new routines to include safeguards 
requirements both at the national and the 
international level and thus avoiding unforeseen 
and unpredictable obstacles, leading to 
improving performance in overall safeguards 
and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
 
3.2 Engagement with other Organizations 
 
Moreover, DAE is continuously improving 
cooperation with the Australian Nuclear Science 
and Technology Organization (ANSTO), Korea 
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Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control 
(KINAC/INSA) and the ASEAN Centre for 
Energy (ACE) under the Global Threat 
Reduction Imitative (GTRI) program. A national 
strategic trade control program is a fundamental 
requirement for the development of a 
comprehensive national non-proliferation regime 
as it provides the necessary mechanisms to 
control the flow of strategic goods and 
technologies in and out of the country.  
 
Myanmar officials initiated efforts to modernize 
and standardize customs procedures with a new 
trade law. This law requires licenses and permits 
for traders to import and exports goods. The 
New Nuclear Law in Myanmar will also cover a 
comprehensive strategic trade controls program. 
In May 2017, the Australian Border Force (ABF), 
in cooperate with the Government of Myanmar, 
will organize a workshop on border trade control. 
This will be another commitment of Myanmar to 
the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and 
the potential economic advantages associated 
with this endeavor.  
 
Gained experience of international cooperation 
in safeguards is being used for development and 
further implementation of projects in the field of 
nuclear weapons non-proliferation and 
strengthening nuclear security. Finally, 
assistance to train the next generation of local 
experts is one of the most important standpoints 
for ensuring that non-proliferation remains 
focused on in Myanmar over the long term. 
Every effort should be made, therefore, to 
provide non-proliferation training to young up-
and-coming Myanmar nationals. 
 
3.3 Establishment of SSAC, and 
Legislative and Regulatory Issues 
 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a threat 
that also urges cooperation at all levels. 
International, regional and state systems must 
work closely together, and there is need and 
space for everyone. The modern enhanced 
SSAC combines safeguards, security and safety 
in prevention, detection and response [3]. Strong 
SSAC is a prerequisite for peaceful use of 
nuclear energy in Myanmar.  
 
After signing the AP, the State System of 
Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material 
(SSAC) team in Myanmar has been established, 
under the guidance of the former Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MOST) and other 
relevant government authorities. The SSAC is a 
system not a governmental body which is 
coordinated by the State Authority responsible 
for safeguards. Myanmar has worked with 
DOE/NNSA and the IAEA to receive training on 
matters relevant to establish a State System of 
Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material 
and to prepare the county to create a legal 
framework to support the Implementation of the 
Additional Protocol and other nuclear 
safeguards agreements.    
 
Reliable accounting for and control of nuclear 
material is fundamental to member states’ ability 
to fulfill their international obligations. The DAE’s 
is the State Authority in Myanmar responsible for 
establishment and maintenance of the SSAC.  
DAE is keen to fulfill all requirements for the 
strong SSAC. This development work will lead to 
not only enhancing SSAC and also extending 
cooperation with international and regional 
organization. 
  
Moreover, IAEA has supported Myanmar in the 
development of staff through Regional Training 
Courses on States Systems of Accounting for 
and Control (SSAC) of Nuclear Material every 
year. These courses use lectures, workshops, 
group discussions, and facility tours to provide 
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knowledge and skills on the basic concepts of 
IAEA safeguards, SSAC requirements and 
safeguards tools to government officials who are 
responsible for implementation of safeguards 
and to operators who are engaged in nuclear-
material accounting and control. It is believed 
that the international cooperation is important 
and helpful in the establishment of the SSAC 
and other necessary infrastructures for state 
nuclear regulatory body for developing 
countries. 
 
As a legislation issue in Myanmar, DAE enacted 
the Atomic Energy law on 8th July 1998 and it 
was mainly based on radiation safety, did not 
cover safety, security and safeguards (3S 
strategies). Myanmar officials have hosted 
numerous seminars and workshops to learn how 
to establish regulatory frameworks and fully 
implement the Additional Protocol and modified 
Small Quantities Protocol. Myanmar is currently 
also reviewing their nuclear regulations following 
recently completed drafting the  comprehensive 
Myanma Nuclear Law, that prohibits the use, 
production, storage, distribution and 
import/export of nuclear materials, radioactive 
materials or irradiation apparatuses without 
government license and  to meet the current 
standards and requirements. All relevant stake 
holders are taking part in the drafting process.  
It is currently under for review with the 
parliament for its second reading. Myanmar 
officials are also translating the provisions of the 
Additional Protocol and modified Small 
Quantities Protocol into local language so that 
relevant stakeholders can learn about the 
obligations and proceed with the 
implementation. Myanmar has to take necessary 
steps to fulfill the obligations in respect of 
international treaties, conventions and 
agreements relating 3S that the Government 
has ratified or intends to be ratified.   
 
4. Challenges and Opportunities 
 
On this occasion, Myanmar faces several 
challenges to pursue making its efforts for 
implementing nonproliferation. As Myanmar is 
opening up to the world and in the transition 
towards democracy that seems in good 
progress, its officials have multiple priorities and 
strengthening their capacity to address them 
adequately. Many of those priorities are more 
important than non-proliferation. They include 
peace building within Myanmar, the 
maintenance of social cohesion among local 
ethic groups, economic development and 
poverty alleviation, etc [1].    
 
Before Myanmar will be able to submit its first 
AP declaration and to receive a complementary 
access by the IAEA, there are still some 
obstacles remained to overcome. It requires 
support for some entities that still do not 
understand how they are relevant to AP 
implementation in Myanmar and they have a 
lack of knowledge on the AP requirements, type 
and content of information to be provided to the 
IAEA, as well as on how to prepare and submit 
timely AP declarations. 
 
The main challenges for the establishment of an 
effective national safeguards infrastructure as a 
new comer country includes the establishment 
legal framework, implementation of safeguards 
regulation, effective and systematic nuclear 
material management system and human 
resources development. Myanmar primarily 
needs assistance for non-proliferation 
implementation in addition that more efforts 
should be made to strengthen its nuclear 
legislation and regulations.  
 
At first, there is a need for legislation, regulatory 
body, contact point, international agreements 
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and then finally practical implementation of the 
safeguards in the nuclear related fields. There 
are a lot of issues to be prepared in advance to 
facilitate the IAEA’s implementation of 
verification activities successfully, effectively and 
with the good quality. 
 
Some of the challenges are related to how  to 
effectively and efficiently collect, process 
manage and provide high quality safeguards 
relevant information to the IAEA, how to best 
facilitate IAEA verification activities, how to 
contribute to the achievement of objectives, and 
finally how to draw conclusions on the 
exclusively peaceful use of nuclear materials in 
the state. 
 
But with those challenges also opportunities 
emerge. As has been discussed in this paper, 
the continuous, reliable, and free-flowing 
communication with the IAEA and USDOE has 
reduced or in many cases, alleviated the 
challenges related to safeguards in Myanmar. 
Early and continuous engagement with the IAEA 
for any newcomer state is fundamental to the 
success. 
 
5. Recent Significant Events 
 
Despite some challenges in implementing 
nonproliferation commitments, particularly in 
regard to resources, capacity, and knowledge, 
Myanmar is moving in the right direction by 
implementing several key conventions and 
treaties. This requires working with the Ministries 
in Myanmar responsible for the framework and 
for implementation, and other decision makers.  
 
Myanmar recently joined main conventions in 
nuclear safety and security including accession 
of Convention on Nuclear Safety, Convention on 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and 
Amendment to the Convention on Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material on 6th December 
2016. Next steps for Myanmar are signing and 
ratifying other major nuclear security and safety 
conventions. Safety and security in nuclear 
activities are main components, together with 
safeguards, that provide public acceptance of 
nuclear technologies. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
As a member of the NPT and IAEA, Myanmar 
will continue to build confidence and 
transparency with the international community to 
honor its nuclear non-proliferation commitments 
[2]. Myanmar has much more to do, such as 
ratifying the IAEA Additional Protocol, 
concluding the Small Quantities Protocol, and 
formulating the Strategic Trade Control Law. 
However, Myanmar lacks expertise and relevant 
legal framework in the context of formulation and 
implementation of global nuclear non-
proliferation regulations and instruments. Thus, 
technical support, capacity building, training and 
political encouragement are required for 
Myanmar’s government to execute its 
international non-proliferation obligations and 
procedures.  
 
Myanmar government will reinforce efforts in 
developing nuclear non-proliferation and 
disarmament regimes and will promote peaceful 
uses of nuclear materials by enhancing greater 
compliance with the United Nations and the 
IAEA. The government will intensify its respect 
for United Nations Security Council resolutions, 
particularly with regard to relations with the 
DPRK. International allegations about 
Myanmar’s ambitious nuclear program are 
unsubstantiated.  
 
The government supports peaceful use of 
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nuclear energy for civilian purposes, such as for 
medical, research and energy, and it opposes to 
any type of proliferation. Myanmar has no aim to 
develop an atomic weapon, and technical and 
financial constraints mean it cannot afford to 
even dream of a costly nuclear program. In the 
meantime, the world should be optimistic about 
Myanmar’s efforts and developments to realize 
its goal of nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful 
use of nuclear energy. 
 
To strengthen safeguards obligation with active 
co-operation with IAEA and USDOE, regional 
safeguards system is a necessity in fulfilling 
today’s requirements. To ensure that non-
proliferation progress continues in Myanmar, the 
US, other developed countries and border 
international community should continue to 
engage Myanmar officials and continue to 
provide them with non-proliferation assistance. 
Next steps in implementation of international 
safeguard are ratification of Additional Protocol 
to the safeguards agreement and introduction of 
integrated safeguards. Myanmar will notify the 
IAEA on the entry into force of the AP when the 
Government is prepared for its implementation. 
With the support of IAEA, USDOE and other 
member states, Myanmar will continue to live up 
to the expectation of the international community 
in ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy, 
while contributing to the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.  
 
Acknowledgement 
 
The author would like to express highly 
appreciation to the United State Department of 
Energy, Office of International Safeguards, and 
Pacific North-west National Laboratory (PNNL) 
for their financial support to attend this 
symposium as well as for their continuous 
cooperation and encouragement in 
implementing Safeguards and Non-Proliferation 
regime in Myanmar. Special thanks go to her 
colleagues and especially to Ms. Andrea 
Braunegger-Guelich, Safeguards Training 
Officer, Division of Concepts and Planning, 
Departments of Safeguards, Internatioanl 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Dr. Aung 
Tharn Daing, Department of Atomic Energy, 
Ministry of Education, Myanmar, who has been 
supportive of writing this paper, for fruitful 
discussions and valuable suggestions. 
 
References  
 
[1]. David Santoro,     Special Report, ASPI, 
Australian Strategic  Policy Institute, March 2017 
  
[2]. Aung Ko Min, Deputy Director, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Myanmar, Myanmar-DPRK 
relations: Disarmament   and nuclear 
nonproliferation dimension, May 2016 
 
[3]. Marko Hämäläinen, Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK), Helsinki, Finland Olli 
Okko, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK), Helsinki, Finland Tapani Honkamaa, 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), 
Helsinki, Finland Elina Martikka, Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Helsinki, 
Finland, SSAC at your service: Promoting 
Cooperation between IAEA and Finish SSAC for 
Safeguards Implementation (within EU), 
Symposium on International Safeguards SG 
2014, 20-24 October 2014  
 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
866
Interlaboratory comparison on 243Am 
reference material for nuclear safeguards and security 
M. Crozet1, D. Roudil1, C. Bertorello1, C. Maillard1, C. Rivier1, R. Jakopič2, A. Fankhauser2,Y. 
Aregbe2, S. Richter2, T. Altzitzoglou2 
1Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA/DEN), Centre de Marcoule, BP 
171, 30207 Bagnols-sur-Cèze cedex, France 
2European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Directorate for Nuclear Safety and Security, 
Standards for Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards, Retieseweg 111, 2440 Geel, Belgium 
Americium is a transuranic element produced by neutron capture in nuclear reactions. In spent 
nuclear fuel, 241Am and 243Am contribute greatly as their daughters 237Np and 239Np to the 
radiotoxicity of long-lived radioactive waste. Americium contamination in the environment as 
a result of leakage from repository nuclear facilities also presents a great concern.   
The need for an americium spike Certified Reference Material (CRM) was expressed at the 
last IAEA Technical Meeting on Reference Materials for Destructive Analysis in the Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle and in the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit: 243Am spike CRM is needed for accurate 
measurements of 241Am in nuclear materials. In nuclear forensics, such a CRM can be applied 
in Am/Pu chronometry to determine the elapsed time of the last chemical purification of 
plutonium and enables the determination of "the age" of plutonium material. Currently there is 
no 243Am spike CRM commercially available. 
In 2014, CEA/DEN Marcoule (France) and JRC-Geel (EC) initiated a joint project for the 
production and certification of a highly enriched 243Am reference material. The source material, 
about 3 mg americium (88 % 243Am and 12% 241Am) was provided and purified by extraction 
chromatography at CEA/LAMM (Material Analysis and Metrology Laboratory) and shipped to 
JRC-Geel for final processing, packaging and certification. A total of 587 units were produced, 
each containing about 3.5 mL of diluted nitric acid solution with an americium mass fraction of 
about 1.5 µg·g-1. This reference material, produced in compliance with ISO Guide 34, was 
certified by JRC-Geel: certification relates to 243Am and 241Am amount contents, 
n(241Am)/n(243Am) and n(242mAm)/n(243Am) amount ratios.  
Furthermore, CEA/CETAMA organises an interlaboratory comparison (ILC) on this material, 
prior to the release of the material and issuance of the certificate. Measurands of this 
comparison are the 243Am and 241Am amount contents, n(241Am)/n(243Am) and 
n(242mAm)/n(243Am) ratios, i.e. the measurands certified by JRC-Geel. About ten international 
laboratories (from Europe and US) have registered to participate in this comparison exercise. 
Participating laboratories are asked to report their results before the end of March 2017. The 
results to this interlaboratory comparison will be compared to the certified values obtained by 
JRC Geel. 
The approach for this interlaboratory comparison organization on this 243Am spike and the first 
results of the ILC will be presented.  
Keywords: Americium, Nuclear Safeguards, Nuclear Forensics, Interlaboratory Comparison, 
ILC, Certified Reference Materials 
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Abstract: 
Under the collaboration between the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and European 
Commissions’ Joint Research Center (EC-JRC), development of four active neutron-interrogation non-
destructive assay methods for nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are in progress. The 
techniques under the development are differential die-away analysis, delayed gamma-ray analysis 
(DGA), neutron resonance transmission analysis, and prompt gamma-ray analysis. Information 
obtained by each method is used complementarily to characterize a sample. DGA utilizes moderated 
pulsed neutrons from a D-T neutron generator to induce fission reaction of nuclear materials. Delayed 
gamma rays from the fission products (FP) are measured to determine the ratios of fissile nuclides 
(e.g. 235U, and 239,241Pu) in the sample. Experimental studies of the DGA method are in progress. 
Delayed gamma ray spectra from nuclear materials were successfully observed with the Pulsed 
Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA) in EC-JRC Ispra. Here we present an overview of the 
study plan of these DGA experiments along with the latest results. 
Keywords: Non-destructive assay (NDA); active neutron NDA;
1. Introduction
Increasing global applications using nuclear materials (NMs) requires improved characterization
methods for nuclear security and safeguards. Mass verification of NMs is generally performed using
passive non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques for low radioactive samples with destructive analysis
(DA) techniques applied for accurate analysis of nuclide composition. A sample with high radioactivity,
however, is difficult to characterize through passive NDA methods and careful sample treatment is
required for DA that also produces a vast amount of radioactive waste.  Active NDA techniques that
utilize interrogation particles (such as photons and neutrons) to induce nuclear reactions are
potentially applicable to extract information of NMs from a high radioactive sample.
An active-neutron NDA system equipped with a D-T pulsed-neutron generator was proposed by the
Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) [1]. Multiple techniques are under consideration for the system:
Differential Die Away Analysis (DDA) [2,3] for the determination of total fissile content, Delayed
Gamma-ray Analysis (DGA) [4–7] for the evaluation of relative mass ratio of fissile nuclides (i.e., 235U,
239Pu, and 241Pu), Neutron Resonance Transmission Analysis (NRTA) [8] for quantification of U and
Pu isotopes, and Prompt Gamma-ray Analysis (PGA) [8] for detection and quantification of specific
nuclides. Information obtained by each method is used complementarily to characterize a sample.
Technical developments of these methods are in progress under the collaboration with the European
Commission’s Joint Research Center (EC-JRC).
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Among those four techniques, DGA measures decay γ-rays from fission products (FP) produced by 
the neutron induced fission reactions. The observed γ-ray peak intensity ratios of a spectrum are used 
for determining the ratio of the original fissile nuclides. Using the high-energy (HE) delayed γ-rays from 
the relatively short-lived nuclides avoids the prominent background γ-rays from long-lived FP in a 
sample [6, 7]. This paper describes the DGA development program and experimental results [9].
2. A System for DGA for Nuclear Material Characterization
The mass distribution of fission products is
characterized by the parent nuclide (235U, 239P, and
241Pu) and the incident neutron energy. Significant
differences in distribution of nuclide produced by
fission reaction between each fissile nuclide are seen.
Because of the difference, a different delayed gamma-
ray (DG) spectrum is observed for each fissile nuclide
enabling the ratios of fissile nuclides (235U, 239Pu, and
241Pu) in a sample to be evaluated. According to the
nuclear data the FY distribution dose not changes
much for interrogation neutrons with energies between
the 0.0253 eV (thermal) and 500 keV (intermediate).
At 14 MeV (high), however, the FY distribution
changes significantly. This would make the analysis of 
DGA difficult. In addition, the fission cross-section of
238U, which is usually the dominant nuclide in a sample, is 108 times smaller than that of the fissile
nuclides at less than 104 eV, and suddenly increases at more than around 1 MeV to become as large
as those of the fissile nuclides. The fission cross section of 238U with about 1 MeV neutrons is,
however, still about 104 times less than that of fissile nuclide with thermal neutrons. Nevertheless, the
contribution of fission of 238U with about 1 MeV neutron will not be negligible if such high energy
neutrons exist much. Because of that, well-thermalized neutron field is preferable for DGA application.
In our project, a deuterium-tritium (D-T) neutron generator is used for DGA measurement because it is
compact and has a relatively high neutron flux. The kinetic energy of the neutrons from a D-T neutron
generator is as high as 14 MeV. Therefore, a well-designed moderator and reflector system is required
to obtain an intense and well-thermalized neutron field. Figure 1 shows a conceptual view of a system
for DGA with a D-T neutron generator [10]. The W ring around the D-T generator is for neutron
multiplication by the (n, 2n) reactions [11]. The high density polyethylene (HDPE) is used for neutron
slowing down. The graphite reflector reduces neutron
escaping from the cavity. The shuttle system carries
in and out a sample for neutron irradiation and
measurement in a low background environment. This
also reduces the neutron damage to the detector.
3. DGA Experiments with PUNITA
Experimental studies to develop a DGA system are in
progress with the Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test
Assembly (PUNITA) [11, 12] at EC-JRC Ispra. The
test assembly consists of thick walls dominantly made
from a graphite inner layer and a high-density
polyethylene (HDPE) outer layer. The inner cavity is
50 cm in width and length and 80 cm tall. A standard
pulsed 14-MeV D-T neutron generator (Thermo
Fisher Scientific Corp., A-211, 2 × 108 n/s neutron
emission) is placed in it. Around the generator, 4.5-
cm thick tungsten rings can be used for neutron
multiplication.
In DGA experiments, one of the cavity walls is
partially open for sample transportation between the
cavity and a γ-ray detector system, which is about 1 
Fig. 2. Horizontal cross-sectional geometry
for a simulation of PUNITA. Additional
moderators and reflectors were installed in
the PUNITA cavity. The HDPE sample box
is placed as near as possible.
Fig.1. A conceptual view of DGA setup. 
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Table 1. Evaluated neutron flux normalized by
108 n/s neutron emission from a neutron
generator. The unit of the flux is ×103 n/cm2/s.  
geometry (a) (b) (b’)
thermal 150 8.4 4.8
14-MeV 7.7 2.5 5.4
m away from PUNITA. This open channel allows some escape of neutrons to decrease the neutron
flux in the cavity. To recover the reduction and to further thermalize the neutrons, additional moderator
and reflector material are introduced in the cavity. An optimal condition was surveyed by using MCNP
[13]. Figure 2 shows an adopted geometry. In the cavity, a carbon block of 26 cm (W), 26 cm (L), and
38 cm (H) with an 18-cm-square tunnel for sample
transportation was installed. The sample volume is
placed close to the neutron source point, and is
surrounded by a 3 cm thick HDPE filter. The carbon
block works for reflecting neutrons (i.e., preventing
them from going away) and the HDPE box for
reflecting and slowing down them.
Neutron flux was evaluated using MCMP code with geometries as follows: (a) neutron flux in the
HDPE sample box of Fig. 2; (b) neutron flux at the center of the cavity without the additional moderator
and reflector, and with the cavity wall closed; (b’) neutron flux of (b) without the W rings. The results
are given in Table 1. The thermal flux is the integral through 0.5 eV, and the 14-MeV flux is an integral
from 13 MeV to 15 MeV. Comparing (b) and (b’) indicates that the W rings increase thermal neutrons
and decrease about 14 MeV neutrons. Thermal neutron flux obtained by the geometry (a) is much
larger than that of (b) which represents the normal use of PUNITZ.  For DGA experiments, available
HDPE and carbon blocks were piled up so as to reproduce a modified but similar moderator structure.
Two HPGe detectors were used for measurement concurrently: CANBERRA GR-2520 (P-type 25%),
and ITECH Instruments NIGC 50220 (N-type 50%). The outputs of each HPGe detector were sent to
two different data acquisition (DAQ) systems. One was a conventional NIM based system consisting of
spectroscopy amplifiers (Ortec 672 and 673) and a dual-input multichannel analyzer system (Otrec
Aspec-927). The other was a waveform digitizer (CAEN V1730) equipped with pulse height analyzing
firmware (CAEN DPP-PHA) that analyses an input waveform to evaluate the pulse height of each
event and stored with the associated time stamp (list mode measurement).
A sequence of 50-s neutron irradiation, 5-s transportation to the measurement position, 150-s
measurement, and 5-s transportation back for irradiation was repeated for each measurement. The
start signal of the one sequence was given manually because of a rule of safety operation. The signal
is sent to a digital delay/pulse generator (BNC 575), which controlled the neutron irradiation (100-Hz
neutron generation), transportation, neutron flux monitor, and γ-ray measurement. The sequence 
repeated 20 times for one DGA measurement (i.e., approximately 1.2 h). Figure 3 shows a result of a
uranium oxide standard sample (CBNM-446) measurement that contained 169-g total Uranium
sample with a 4.46% concentration of 235U. Peak assignment was based on the ENDF database [14]
and comparison to Refs. [4–7]. Many of identified γ-ray peaks are from parents nuclides with a lifetime 
in a range from few 10 sec. to several minutes: 87Br, 89,90,90m,91Rb, 95Y, 95Sr, and 136I. 208Tl is contained
radioactivity in the sample. Neutron activation products of 27Al(n, γ)28Al, 27Al(n, α)24Na, and 16O(n, 
p)16N were also observed, the last two indicative of high-energy neutrons (~10 MeV) interactions.
Fig. 3. A γ-ray Spectrum of a CBNM-446 sample. The triangle marks indicate that the same peak 
identification of the upper spectrum.
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4. Summary and Prospect
We are developing DGA technology to determine the ratios of 235U, 239Pu, and 241Pu in a sample. This
NDA method is especially useful for measuring samples with high radioactivity, where conventional
passive low-energy γ-ray spectroscopic methods cannot be applied. Experimental studies with 
PUNITA have started at EC-JRC Ispra with prominent γ-ray spectral peaks from 235U and fissile Pu 
were observed.
In order to increase a neutron flux and to reduce the sample transportation time, we modified PUNITA.
A small square opening of (10 X 20 cm) was made in the bottom of the cavity. The small opening is
expected to reduce the escape of neutrons and allow a linear transport system to be placed in the
opening. An HP-Ge detector will be placed the under PUNITA with the irradiated sample transported
to in front of the detector in a second. This will allow us to observe the decay γ-rays from short-lived 
FP nuclides.
To analyze an experimental spectrum, a DGA Monte Carlo simulation code is under the development.
Inputting the calibrated neutron spectrum, sample composition, time sequence of irradiation-transport-
observation, and materials around the detectors (neutron filters and γ-ray shielding) results in DG 
spectra comparable to measured data. Consequently, the code will be incorporated into an analysis
program to fit an experimental spectrum using an Inverse Monte Carlo (IMC) method [15].
In addition to the development of DGA method, nuclear data such as FY must be confirmed and
improved in accuracy and availability. Measurements of FY of NMs are in preparation.
5. Acknowledgements
This technological research and development was supported by the Japanese government (MEXT),
and implemented under the agreement between JAEA and EURATOM in the field of nuclear materials
safeguards research and development.
References
[1] M. Kureta, et al., "JAEA-JRC Collaboration on the Development of Active Neutron NDA
Techniques”, in the Proceedings of 37th ESARDA Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Manchester, UK 19-21 mat 2015), p. 111-120.
[2] I. Israelashvili, C. Dubi, H. Ettedgui, A. Ocherashvili, B. Pedersen, A. Beck, E. Roesgen, J.M.
Crochmore, T. Ridnik, I. Yaar, Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research A 785, 14
(2015).
[3] A. Ohzu, M. Koneda, M. Kureta, N. Zaima, Y. Nakatsuka, S. Nakashima, Transactions of the
Atomic Energy Society of Japan 15, 115 (2016) (in Japanese).
[4] D. H. Beddingfield and F. E. Cecil, Nucl. Instr. and Meth. in Phys. Res. A 417, 405 (1998).
[5] C.E. Egnatuk, “Identifying short-lived fission products by delayed Gamma-ray emission”, Thesis
of Univ. Texas, 2009.
[6] L.W. Campbell, L.E. Smith, and A.C. Misner, IEEE Transactions on Nucl. Sci. 58, 231 (2011).
[7] B. Ludewigt, V. Mozin, L. Campbell, A.Favalli, A. Hunt, E. Reedy, and H.Seipel, “Delayed Gamma
Ray Spectroscopy for Non-Destructive Assay of Nuclear Materials”, LLNL-TR-677606, (2015).
[8] H. Postma, and P. Shillebeeckx, in Encyclopedia of Analytical Chemistry, edited by R.A. Meyers
(John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2009) p. 1.
[9]   M. Koizumi, F. Rossi, D.C. Rodriguez, J. Takamine, M. Seya, T. Bogucarska, J.M. Crochemore, G.
Varasano, K. Abbas, B. Pederson, M. Kureta, J. Heyse, C. Paradela, W. Mondelaers, and P.
Schillebeeckx, to be published in EPJ web conferences.
[10] J. Takamine, D.C. Rodriguez, M. Seya, and M. Koizumi, “Design study of neutron moderator and 
filter in a delayed gamma-ray measurement system using a 14 MeV D-T neutron source”, in the 
65th Annual meeting of Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM).
[11] A. Favalli, H.-C. Mehner, J.-M. Crochemore, and B. Pedersen, IEEE Transactions on Nucl. Sci.
56, 1292 (2009).
[12] H. Rennhofer n, J.-M. Crochemore, E. Roesgen, B. Pedersen, Nucl. Instr. Meth. in Phys. Res. A
652, 140 (2011).
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
871
[13] X-5 Monte Carlo Team, "MCNP - A General N-Particle Transport Code, Version 5" Volume I:
Overview and Theory, LA-UR-03-1987 (2003, updated 2005).
[14]  Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File of National Nuclear Data Center
(http://www.nndc.bnl.gov/).
[15] D.C. Rodriguez to be submitted.
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
872
Investigation of the Measurement Capabilities of an Advanced In
Situ Gamma Spectrometry Service
Ludovic Bourva*, Patrick Chard*, Blanche Vendittozzi*, Thomas Kirk*, Xavier
Ducoux**, Gabriela Ilie***, Henrik Jäderström***, Wilhelm Mueller***
*Mirion Technologies (Canberra UK) Limited, Harwell Oxford, Building 528.10 Unit 1,
, OX11 0DF United Kingdom
** Mirion Technologies (Canberra France) SAS, 1 rue des hérons, 78180 St Quentin-
en-Yvelines, France
*** Mirion Technologies (Canberra Inc.), 800 Research Pkwy, Meriden, CT 06450,
USA
Abstract: 
Mirion Technologies’ In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) is well established as a numerical tool 
for calibrating spectrometric gamma-ray detectors performing quantitative assay of nuclear material. 
The code allows through a set of geometry templates complex measurement geometries to be quickly 
modelled and mathematical calculation of the detector’s efficiency response to be derived. This 
technique can be used with field-deployable mobile detectors to perform in-situ assays on challenging 
items in difficult environments. Complementary to the determination of an efficiency result, the ISOCS 
Uncertainty Estimator tool (IUE) can be used to calculate defensible systematic calibration 
uncertainties associated with the ISOCS efficiency data. However, these measurement uncertainties 
mainly depend on knowledge/assumptions of the properties of the item being measured, alongside 
assumptions made on the uniformity of the gamma nuclides location in the modelled active source 
volume. In the case of measurements performed on poorly characterized items, legacy waste items, or 
with objects showing a significant degree of source non-uniformity, these systematic calibration 
uncertainties can lead to potentially very large total measurement uncertainties and these are common 
to any traditional Non Destructive Assay technique. 
Mirion Technologies has launched a new ISOCS–based advanced in-situ gamma spectrometry 
(AIGS) services tool in order to provide more accurate assay solutions. This tool is based on 
generating and comparing a range of candidate geometry models that can be ranked by figures of 
merit indicative of improved consistency between modelled data and available diverse measurement 
data. The models are compared allowing a best-fit model to be developed, with corresponding 
efficiency calibration data and matching uncertainties.  
The present work reports on the expansion of previously published work on the evaluation of the 
capability of the AIGS approach to provide improved accuracy over standard ISOCS analyses. In 
particular, we present here detailed results on a set of measurements performed with a multiple-
nuclide line source (
133
Ba, 
137
Cs, 
152
Eu and 
241
Am) positioned at varied locations in a fairly dense 200
litre waste drum and comment on how the AIGS results are affected by assumptions taken in the 
AIGS geometry optimisation process. In particular, we focus on the function and performance of AIGS 
in dealing with potential non-uniform distributions of activity in the form of potential multiple hotspots 
co-existing in a drum and density uncertainty. 
Keywords: Gamma Spectrometry, ISOCS, AIGS, Numerical Calibration, Systematic Error
1 INTRODUCTION
Mirion Technologies In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) [1,2] is a well-qualified numerical
calculation software used to determine absolute efficiencies of gamma ray detectors when performing
quantitative gamma spectrometry. The ISOCS application relies on pre-set geometry templates to
model a given measurement geometry. The specific geometry of the measurement conditions hence
rely on discrete entries of key parameters. The efficiency results obtained from ISOCS therefore carry
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
873
some intrinsic systematic errors associated with the validity of the assumptions taken to describe the
measured item/measurement geometry. Conscious of this limitation Mirion Technologies has further
developed the ISOCS capability to support an ISOCS Uncertainty Estimator (IUE) [3,4]. This
automated application allows for distributions of values for all parameters to be specified so that, still
using a traditional ISOCS template, those can be sampled to generate through multiple ISOCS
calculations distribution of efficiency results. The result is a powerful tool allowing for the importance of
key parameters influencing the efficiency results to be established. ISOCS-IUE also allows calculating
from the overall distribution of efficiency results an estimate of the overall modelling systematic
uncertainty associated with an ISOCS efficiency calibration.
Although the capability to reliably estimate the systematic uncertainty associated with an ISOCS
efficiency calibration is of great advantage to accurately bound uncertainties associated with some
measurement applications, the real gain in terms of cost disposal clearly lies in being able to reduce
these uncertainties, and in providing more accurate quantifications. Reducing the ISOCS systematic
uncertainty could be achieved by identifying which ISOCS models generated within the IUE
automation process are indicative of improved consistency between modelled data/derived activities
and some available measurement data.
The Advanced In-situ Gamma Spectrometry (AIGS) services offered by Mirion Technologies as part of
an ISOCS based spectroscopy measurement service also includes an ISOCS geometry optimisation
step. This step is aiming at improving the accuracy of the measurement results. For each IUE
generated model, the AIGS algorithms calculate a set of Figures of Merit (FoM) allowing ranking the
consistency of the model’s efficiency results against specific measurement data/results. For example,
in the case of the measurement of a radionuclide emitting several gamma-rays the Line Activity
Consistency Evaluation (LACE) which looks at the consistency of the derived nuclide activity across all
energies can be used as a FoM to evaluate the validity of the shape of the ISOCS efficiency curve.
The AIGS analysis can also be performed by evaluating the consistency of the ISOCS results
obtained when analysing multiple spectra collected when measuring the same item under different
fields of view (sides, below, above, specific angles...)
Note that the AIGS approach is simply based on inferring how some of the model assumptions are
clearly not consistent with the observed results. It is therefore perfectly conceivable that, within the set
of modelling assumptions, several models may return consistent answers through the calculated FoM,
yet yielding a spread of activity results. This is taken into account in the AIGS analysis by reporting an
uncertainty result on the “best optimized efficiency” that is illustrative of the level of convergence of the 
optimisation. The AIGS analysis supports ISOCS model generation using different numerical methods
[5]. This allows a very significant reduction of the computation times that would otherwise be required
if using only a pure random sampling of the model’s variable parameter space. Mirion Technologies
has also performed several exercises to evaluate the AIGS capabilities and demonstrate the practical
benefits that can be realised [6,7].
Early reported work focussed on laboratory applications and also 200 litre drum measurements using
152Eu point sources, which represent idealised sources for physics testing [8]. More recent efforts have
been directed towards applications in waste management, such as those reported for the
measurements and AIGS analysis for a set of measurements using a 200 -litre waste drum filled with a
low-density matrix [9]. This work focussed on 241Am assay, representative of typical Very low level
plutonium assay in low density soft wastes, and showed overall some degree of improvement in the
accuracy of the assay results. The present work is an extension of the results reported to date [10]
and concentrates on the analysis of a set of measurements performed at the Harwell facility in 2015
and their subsequent analysis using the AIGS approach.
2 EMPIRICAL WORK
The object that has been used in the empirical work was a 200-litre reference calibration drum filled
with uniform particle board (density 0.681 g.ml-1).  The diameter of the drum is 570 mm and the height
of the drum is 870mm.
A short line source, ≈ 280 mm long, was placed in the drum inserts. Measurements were made with
the source at 2 different heights (Top/1 and Middle/2) and 3 different radial positions: one at the edge
of the drum (Position 7/case c) one at a mid-radius (position 3/case b) one and the last in the centre of
the drum (position 0/case a). The empirical data set used in the present work consisted of 6 spectral
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sets (1a – 3 spectra/1b – 24 spectra /1c -24 Spectra /2a – 12 spectra /2b – 24 spectra /2c -19
spectra.)
Figure 1. Side and Top view of the drum
Figure 2. Source Positioning in the Calibration Drum
The drum was static during the measurement and only rotated (by 45 degrees step) between
acquisitions to generate different counting geometries. Each source position could therefore produce
up to 24 spectra (8 angular positions by 3 detector heights), each representing 2000 s of live data
acquisition. Overall, this data set probably holds far more information than would reasonably be
expected to be available when assaying a single 200-l waste drum. However it constitutes a good set
to evaluate the sensitivity of the AIGS approach to the availability of measured data.
The measurements were made with an ISOCS characterised Broad-Energy Germanium detector
(BEGe-2830), and a 180° opening, 50 mm thick lead collimator. The front face of the detector end-cap
was positioned at 70 cm of the drum edge. The short line source contained 4 different nuclides with
the evaluated activity listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Reference activity of the line source when decay corrected to the measurement date
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3 ISOCS MODELLING
3.1 ISOCS Geometry
Standard ISOCS models of the waste drum were developed using the complex cylinder template of
the geometry composer application, as shown in Figure 3. These models, one for each detector
position, assume a uniform distribution of the source activity in the particle board matrix. A secondary
model introducing a small “hot spot” concentrating all the activity of the waste was also developed to 
perform ISOCS-IUE and AIGS analysis. All standard ISOCS models assume the same declared matrix
material composition and reference density of 0.681 g.ml-1.
Figure 3. Standard ISOCS model of the measurement geometry with the detector in the H2 position
3.2 BASELINE AIGS ANALYSIS
The details of the AIGS analysis performed on the measured set of empirical spectra have been
reported elsewhere [10]. However to present a consistent set of results an allow easier comparison
the present paragraph will briefly introduce baseline AIGS results. The ISOCS geometry optimisation
was run using both “Best Random Fit” (BRF), in other words, pure random sampling, and the 
“Simplex” acceleration algorithm. The optimisation was performed only on the basis of a multi-spectra
FoM.
Best efficiency results computed by the AIGS application for each detector positions were
subsequently used to analyse the measured spectra. From these computations one can observe the
following:
• BRF and Simplex optimisation results are consistent with each other for all cases
• AIGS results tend to slightly overestimate the know 152Eu activity in the drum, especially
when the source was located at the “Edge” of the drum
• Standard ISOCS results perform poorly for this measurement set-up and AIGS provide a
significant improvement
Overall activity results for all four nuclides for the 6 source positions are shown in Figure 4. The 6 plots
show graphically how the AIGS analysis improves significantly the baseline assay results
independently of the line source position in the drum.
The graphs, shown in Figure 4, show that the AIGS quantifications yield significant improvement on 
the overall accuracy of the waste assay. AIGS results obtained when the source was positioned at a 
radial position show almost perfect agreement with the reference data. Positions with the source 
positioned at the centre of the drum shows a tendency for AIGS results to slightly over-estimate the 
reference values, although within the stated uncertainties. The overall assay results and relative 
difference relative to the line source activity are given in Table 2.  
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Figure 4. Graphical representation of the overall nuclide activity quantifications using ISOCS and AIGS analyses
for 6 source positions
3.3 FURTHER AIGS ANALYSIS
The results shown in the previous section have shown that both AIGS analyses performed well under
the conditions and amount of data available to perform the optimisation. To further evaluate the AIGS
approach complementary work was performed to study the reliability of the obtained results with
changes in optimisation parameter assumptions and amount of available measured data to perform
the AIGS geometry optimisation.
3.3.1 Measured Data Availability
To evaluate the impact of the availability of measured data the AIGS analysis was repeated with only
6 or 4 or even only 2 measured spectra to conduct the AIGS optimisation process. The list of spectra
retained for this study and the corresponding angular position/height of the detector are shown below:
• 6 Spectra: H1-P3, H1-P7, H2-P1, H2-P5, H3-P3, H3-P7
• 4 Spectra: H1-P3, H1-P7, H2-P1, H2-P5
• 2 Spectra: H1-P1, H3-P5
The AIGS optimisation using BRF and Simplex approach was performed for the position 1b case
where the line source positioned at a mid-radial position in the waste drum had been measured at 8
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angular positions and with the detector at 3 heights (24 spectra in total). Figure 5 shows the overall
nuclide activity results derived from the AIGS analyses. The study kept all other modelling
assumptions (Number of hot-spots, matrix density…) unchanged compared to the optimisation results
shown earlier.
Table 2. Overall Nuclide Activity Results for the 6 Source positions
Figure 5. AIGS Random (LHS) and Simplex (RHS) optimisation nuclides activity results for a variable number of
available spectra and the line source in position 1b
This study showed that, for the selected modelling assumptions, a significant reduction of the number
of available spectra does not result in the collapse of the algorithm. As previously observed, simplex
and BRF results were judged comparable, with a significant gain in computing time for the Simplex
approach. The quantitative results, although returning larger associated uncertainties, still provided a
very good level of agreement with the line source reference activities. From a practical stand point,
this means that AIGS simulation based on a reasonable set of measurements, such as 4 or 6
measurements, can provide reliable estimates. On this basis further evaluation of the sensitivity of the
AIGS optimisations to modelling assumption were carried out with the assumptions that only 4 spectra
were available.
3.3.2 Hot-Spots Modelling
The next study looked at evaluating the dependency of the AIGS simplex results to the number of hot-
spots defined in the ISOCS-IUE model to perform the geometrical optimisation. Additional models
based on 2, 3, 4, and 5 Hot-Spots present in the waste volume were used as the basis for the Simplex
optimisation. Figure 6 shows the obtained nuclide activity results.  This study is of interest for
assessment of unknown drums because, for the present measurements although it is known that a
single source is present in each case, this cannot be known in the general case, therefore one must
consider the possibility that multiple Hot-Spots may be present.
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Figure 6. Dependency of the AIGS Simplex nuclide activity results with the number of hot spots simulated in the
waste
This exercise seems to indicate, for this particular counting geometry, that as the number of Hot-Spots
increases from one to two or even three the overall consistency of the optimisation becomes harder to
achieve and thus leads to increased uncertainties on the assay results. The overall accuracy of the
results for the 2 and 3 Hot-Spot model is also slightly worse than the other cases. As the number of
Hot-spots increases to 4 or 5, although computation time also increases, the optimisation algorithm
seems to perform slightly better in finding more consistent representations of the measured object.
Modelling of more than 5 Hot-spots may further improve the consistency of the optimisation but this
may impact too much the overall computation time of the simulations.
3.3.3 Waste Density Range
The density of the waste drum used in this work was well established and the initial part of the
modelling exercise assumed a matrix density equal to the reference value of 0.681 g.ml-1. It is
reasonable to assume that a waste drum can be weighed and a bulk apparent density derived for the
drum. Consequently, although local variation in the matrix material may result in different effective
densities for the gamma radiation emitted through the waste, this should nevertheless give a starting
point in defining matrix density assumptions in the AIGS modelling process.
To study the dependency of the AIGS results to uncertain waste matrix modelling assumptions, a set
of models covering various density ranges have been used. Those covered increasingly larger ranges
of lower and upper density bounds. Additionally, a range that didn’t include the declared density was
also added to the study to how the AIGS simulation would perform in this case. The various density
ranges are shown below.
   [0.01; 1.20]
   [0.10; 0.50]
   [0.20; 1.00]
   [0.30; 0.90]
   [0.40; 0.80]
The simulations were run with 4 available spectra like previously and assumed a single Hot-Spot not
to add further source of complexity in the interpretation of the results. Only the Simplex algorithm was
used to provide timely results. Figure 7 shows the obtained results for the 5 simulated density ranges
and the known Line source activities.
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Figure 7. Distribution of the nuclide activities quantified by AIGS optimisation for various waste density
assumptions
The AIGS results show some sensitivity to the density assumptions. However, more significantly the
reported uncertainties (alternatively known as the precision) associated with the AIGS activity results
also show some relationship with the accuracy of the results. Figure 8 plots the relative accuracy (that
is, the deviation between the measured and known activity value) of the AIGS results for 133Ba and
152Eu against the reported uncertainty (i.e. consistency in the AIGS optimised efficiencies) associated
with the derived activity values.
Figure 8. Relationship between AIGS Accuracy and Precision
From the latest plot it can be suggested that although user inputs may impact on the overall AIGS
accuracy, as shown in Figure 8, the evaluation of the uncertainty associated with the AIGS results,
which in other words is an evaluation of the consistency of the best computed solutions by the
geometry optimisation algorithms, provides a mean to infer which parameter set will yield more
accurate results.
4 CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
The work presented here aimed at demonstrating the capabilities of the AIGS optimisations to
generate accurate nuclide activity quantification when measuring items presenting a non-uniform
source distribution. Although the measurement case described in this study and the subsequent AIGS
analysis carried out on a set of empirical measurements only represents a small set of data to fully
qualify the AIGS capabilities, it has shown that this approach returned accurate results that are far
more reliable that what can be achieved by a standard ISOCS based quantification.
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The limited sensitivity analysis reported in this work on the impact of input assumptions in the AIGS
optimisation process/model specification has shown that the AIGS result followed the expected
behaviour. It also suggested that the AIGS accuracy obtained when comparing optimisation results for
a number of “best” geometries appears to be a good means to judge of the validity of the AIGS results.
Computation yielding significant spread in the derived efficiency data seems indicative of an unreliable
optimisation. Although further sensitivity analysis work is needed to fully evaluate the overall behaviour
of the AIGS optimisation results with optimisation process/model specifications, this preliminary result
provides some confirmation that AIGS is capable of providing more reliable and accurate
measurement results for waste sentencing, and represents a comprehensive performance
demonstration and validation of the AIGS methodology for assay of 200 litre drums
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Abstract:
The JRC and  i-Science in collaboration with DG-ENER have developed xFuelBuilder a user-friendly 
software and Monte Carlo (MC) Simulation (MCNP) application which allows a nuclear inspector (with 
no prior expertise in MC) to perform the analysis of Neutron Coincidence Collar simulations and 
measurements of fresh fuel assemblies (BWR & PWR) thus saving valuable human resources and 
effort. It is an open graphical framework for an interactive creation of PWR and BWR Nuclear Fuel 
Elements with a 2D Synoptic and 3D OpenGL representation of the assembly composition in term of 
single rods. For this purpose, xFuelBuilder includes Monte Carlo-based modelling tools that enable the 
user to set up specific collar detector geometry, run an MCNP simulation and perform a Pulse Train 
Analysis to extract Total, Reals and Accidentals. Easy and direct access to simulation is enabled from 
the 3D panel to compare simulations to measurements and finally view and store the final results 
Keywords: Monte Carlo, NDA, Nuclear Safeguards, Neutron Coincidence Counting,xFuelbuilder
a 
Contact: hamid.tagziria@ec.europa.eu
1. Introduction
Extensive human resources and effort are expanded by EURATOM and IAEA nuclear safeguards 
inspectors to verify the operator’s declarations generally using expensive and difficult (if not sometimes 
impossible) measurement campaigns [1-4]. A number of complications are often encountered such as 
the need for specific calibrations (not always possible), interpretation models (not always applicable) 
and correction factors e.g. to take into account burnable poisons and/or various heterogeneities.  
xFuelBuilder [5] which follows on work previously carried out  [3] to analyse MOX fuel in fabrication 
plant (MoxManager) is an open graphical framework for an interactive creation of PWR and BWR 
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Nuclear Fuel Elements with a 2D Synoptic and 3D OpenGL representation of the assembly 
composition in term of single rods. It aims thus to support the nuclear inspectorate in the analysis of 
active Neutron Coincidence Collar (NCC) measurements of fresh BWR and PWR fuel assemblies.
For this purpose, xFuelBuilder includes Monte Carlo-based (MC) modelling tools that enable the user 
to set up specific collar detector geometry, run an MCNP simulation and perform a Pulse Train 
Analysis to extract Total, Real and Accidental count rates.
This paper aims to provide the reader with an overview of the tool and its main capabilities.
2. The inspection/verification paradigm
Real-time simulation of neutron counters as we envisaged it and described in references [1-2] would 
obviously change the way we are used to applying NDA measurements for the verification nuclear 
material and would require a mentality change too from the inspector’s perspective. It is not simply the 
fact that one would introduce a physical modelling as an integral part of the experimental process, but 
also the verification paradigm is changed from one that previously compared operator declared mass
against measured mass, to a new paradigm that instead compares expected to measured count rates. 
The classical verification scheme is illustrated in Figure 1 whereby the sample and its declaration are 
given by the operator to inspector who measures it using suitable counting systems that would yield 
either Reals count rates in coincidence counting, or Singles, Doubles and Triples in multiplicity 
counting. These count rates are converted to measured mass through a model relating physical model 
calculations to experimental values, namely  either a calibration law, R=f(m), in coincidence counting or 
a solution of the point model equation system in multiplicity counting. Finally, taking into account 
measurement uncertainties, the measured mass is compared to the declared value in order to either 
positively confirmation or reject the sample verification.
Figure 1: Classical verification paradigm
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In contrast as shown in Figure 2, real-time simulation changes the scenario whereby both the 
measurement and the simulation, which is based on the declaration, are run in parallel to  yield the 
measured count rates and expected (or simulated) count rates respectively. These count rates with 
given uncertainties are subsequently compared and a conclusion on their consistency is made 
without computing the measured mass. This can be easily accepted when there is agreement, 
confirming the conformity of sample with the declaration. But it can be insufficient if there is a 
discrepancy, in which case the inspector would like to know how different is the measurement from the 
declaration in terms of material mass.
Some solutions to this shortcoming can be easily envisaged. For instance a gross calibration curve can 
be pre-built and the mass error can be approximately derived by using the derivative of the calibration 
FXUYHǻP į5įPmeas ǻ5
Another possibility is to use the perturbation theory or sensitivity analysis. The influence on the count 
rates of a mass change can be computed by running an ad joint problem. This of course would double 
the computing time.
Figure 2: Real-time simulation paradigm
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3. Description of xFuelBuilder capabilities
This section will describe xFuelBuilder application and its capability to:
x Manage, define and configure PWR and BWR fuel assembliesx Set a collar detector geometryx Run an MCNP Simulation and PTA Analysisx View and store the final results
3.1. The xFuelBuilder Assembly Manager
The assembly manager panel expose the list of the actual stored assembly in an interactive table:
Editing the widgets field user can query into the local assembly repository with the search criteria 
are based on:
x Assembly IDx MBA Codex Creation date
Using the icons: one is able to:
x Delete a specific assembly from the repositoryx Run and analyse a specific assemblyx Create a new assembly using the associated panel
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The measurement toolbar:  
allows one to:
x Add a new measurement to the analysis 
listx Delete a specific analysisx Save current measurement list into the 
local DB
The Import/Export Assembly configuration are available from the menu file:
3.2. The Assembly Configurator
The assembly configurator panel is used to edit the assembly rod by rod.
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The info window at the bottom of the panel provides information about each single rod in the assembly: 
x Rod positionx Isotopic compositionx Empty tubesx Forbidden positionsx Enrichment stratification
The button bar on the top starting from the left expose the following functionalities:
x Set the mouse as a pointer to query rods in the assembly viewx Set the mouse as a pointer to zoom the assemblyx Set the mouse as a pointer to pan the assembly viewx Allow multiple rods selectionx Manage multiple rods assignmentx Manage forbidden positionx Manage empty positionx Come back to the assembly manager panelx Save assembly modificationx Move to the rode configuration panelx Move to the Simulation Panelx Move to the Analysis Manager Panel
The File Menu provides the following functionality:
x Load an assembly from the library folder on file systemx Save an assembly to the library folder on file systemx Export a snapshot of the assemblyx Print a snapshot of the assemblyx Set-up the printerx Exit from the application
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The Rod Edit Menu: 
Launch of the Rod Profiler Panel will present the user with the following:
The top bar above enables one to:
x Open a specific rod definitionx Save a specific rod definitionx Activate the interactive viewx Zoom the viewx Pan the rod visualizationx Move back to the main pan
Whereas the GUI on the right defines the rod 
stratification with widgets dedicated to:
• Rod active length setting
• Clad material definition
• Dimensional parameters of the fuel pellets
• Fuel density
• Layers characterization
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The Assembly Edit Menu:
enables the following functionalities:
x Edit the general assembly parameter (e.g. assembly length, pellet density….)x Set the rods composition using the appropriate panel x Manage multiple rods assignmentx Manage forbidden positionx Manage empty position
3.3. The simulation Manager
The simulation manager panel enable the user to run Monte Carlo Simulation for the selected 
assembly. 
It is provided with the following top bar:   for view manipulation and with a 
slide that sets the collar position along the assembly:
The user can verify the correct position of the collar along the assembly by the composition window 
which gives information about isotope stratification and U235 Enrichment rod by rod:
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The detector Setup Menu: 
Enables the following 
functionalities:
x Detector selectionx Cadmium slab insertionx Set source intensity
The Neutron Transport Simulation Menu allows the user to:
x Set the general MCNP parameter using the following panelx Set the simulation time vs events modalityx Run the MCNP simulation with and without assembly and using the active source modality.x Open the last executed analysis 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
890
3.4. The Analysis Manager
This allows logging all the measurements and the simulation for the current assembly.
The toolbar:    allows the user to:
x Add a new measurement to the listx Remove a specific analysisx Save the current list into the Databasex Back to main assembly definition panelx Back to the 3D analysis panel
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4. Summary
xFuelBuilder which is a Monte Carlo (MC) based application has been fully developed and successfully 
demonstrated to EURATOM inspectors allowing them to efficiently and effectively analyze Neutron 
Coincidence Collar (NCC) simulations and measurements of fresh fuel assemblies (BWR & PWR) 
without the need for specific calibrations (not always possible), interpretation models (not always valid) 
or correction factors for instance to take into account burnable poisons and/or ant heterogeneities. The 
user friendly application allows an inspector (non-expert in MC) to define fuel assemblies,  set up collar 
detector geometry,  run  Monte Carlo (MCNP code) simulation and pulse train analysis (PTA) with 
direct access to simulation from a 3D panel, compare simulations to measurements and  finally view 
and store the final results. In essence, it enables the inspector to verify the operator’s declaration by 
comparing measurements carried out with NCC’s and Monte Carlo calculations saving valuable time 
and effort.
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Study on the Application of Gaussian Energy
Broadening on MCNP Simulated Detector
Performance
Dr Andrew M Evans
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Summary
The particle transport code MCNP6 [Ref 1] has been used to model the effect of
Gaussian Energy Broadening on detector performance. This report details the
underlying mathematics using a binomial expansion and linear fit for calculating the a,
b and c parameters required by MCNP6 from a detector’s performance specification
sheet.
MCNP6 deals with Gaussian broadening through the a, b and c variables. These are
connected to the FWHM through the following equation
2
00 cEEbaFWHM ++= [1]
where 0E  is the energy of the centre of the peak. It is not immediately obvious the
impact and sensitivity that a, b and c have on a peak’s profile. The challenge is to
develop a technique to extract values for a, b and c from the performance data sheet
of a gamma detector.
1) Binomial expansion approach
The starting point with this approach is equation [1]
( )2
1
2cEEbaFWHM ++= [2]
Expand using the binomial expansion
2
1
11 




 ++=
cE
EcbaFWHM [3]





 ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅−++= 228
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2
11
EccE
EcbaFWHM [4]
[5]
Since the width of a pulse is much smaller than its energy, we are justified in ignoring
the fourth term. Rearranging we obtain
EcbFWHM .= + 




 +
c
ba
2
[6]
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This analysis has demonstrated that the a, b and c variables can be derived from a 
straight line graph of FWHM against E .  Drawing this graph from the information 
contained in a detector’s data sheet we immediately see that the gradient and intercept 
can be further processed to understand their dependence upon the a, b and c 
coefficients. 
Gradient = cb            Intercept = 




 +
c
ba
2
[7] 
2) NaI Gamma Detector Response Function.
To advance this further, consider now the specific case of the NaI gamma detector 
[Ref 2] used by Salgardo et al.  
Typically, a detector’s data sheet will contain a value of its FWHM at two different 
energies; from these two points a linear fit can be imposed. In contrast, Salgardo 
actually measured the detector’s FWHM response at six energies ranging from 58.18 
keV up to 661.8 keV. The data was then fitted with the function displayed in equation 
[1],  and coefficients for  a, b and c extracted.   
2.1) First Approximation 
The FWHM at two energies (58.1 keV and 661.8 keV) have been extracted from 
Salgardo’s paper in order to replicate the information that one might extract from a 
detectors performance specification sheet. Figure 1 shows a graph of FWHM against 
E  for this detector with an imposed linear fit. A spreadsheet has been developed that 
takes the two given data points and generates a third from the calculated mid-point. 
The spreadsheet also calculates and outputs a value for the gradient and intercept. 
0.0000
0.0100
0.0200
0.0300
0.0400
0.0500
0.0600
0.0700
0.0800
0.0000 0.1000 0.2000 0.3000 0.4000 0.5000 0.6000 0.7000
Energy (MeV)
FW
HM
 (M
eV
)
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
895
2.2) Calculation of a, b and c coefficients 
MCNP is already formatted to take the a, b and c variables as inputs. To calculate 
these three parameters, three independent equations are required to be solved. These 
equations were generated from information filtered from the detector’s performance 
specification presented in Figure 1 and are 
2
111 cEEbaFWHM ++= [8] 
2
222 cEEbaFWHM ++= [9] 
2
333 cEEbaFWHM ++= [10] 
An overview of the elimination process is as follows. 
Eliminate a by subtracting [8] from [9] and [8] from [10]. This generates two new 
equations in b and c.  
2
11
2
2212 cEEbcEEbWW +−+=− [11] 
bWW =− 12 ( )211222 cEEcEE +−+             similarly [12] 
bWW =− 13  ( )211233 cEEcEE +−+ [13] 
Dividing [13] by [12] eliminates b
=
−
−
12
13
WW
WW
2
11
2
22
2
11
2
33
cEEcEE
cEEcEE
+−+
+−+
[14] 
NaI Detector 
E FWHM 
E1 0.0582 0.0112 
E2 0.3600 0.0402 
E3 0.6618 0.0692 
Gradient = 0.0960 
Intercept = 0.0056 
Figure 1: Graph of EFWHM /  and spreadsheet calculation of gradient and 
intercept for NaI gamma detector. 
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The values of 1W , 2W and 3W are connected such that ( )1213 2 WWWW −=− . Therefore 
 
( ) 2112332112222 cEEcEEcEEcEE +−+=+−+     [15] 
Writing 
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with the application of the binomial expansion this becomes 
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Ignoring the third term we can write 
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If the third term is not  ignored, we generate a quadratic, whose determinant points to 
imaginary roots. 
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Therefore equation [15] can be written 
 





 +−




 +=










 +−




 +
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
12 11331122
cEEcEEcEEcEE    [22] 
 
22
22
2
3
1
1
2
3
3
3
2
3
11
2
3
22
cEEcEEcEEcEE −−+=−−+     [23] 
 
1321
2
3
1
2
3
32
3
1
2
3
2 2222
EEEEEEEEc −+−=










+−−     [24] 
 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
897
321
2
3
3
2
3
12
3
2 222
EEEEEEc +−=










−−       [25] 
 










−−
+−
=
22
2
2
3
3
2
3
12
3
2
321
EEE
EEE
c         [26] 
 
The benefit of deriving an expression for c is that it is now relatively easy to solve. 
 
Using this value of c  we can find b by substituting into equation [7] and taking the 
value of the gradient from the graph in Figure 1 
 
cbGradient =           [27] 
 
c
Gradientb =           [28] 
 
Again from equation [7], and using the calculated value of the intercept from Figure 1 
 
Intercept
c
ba =+
2
         [29] 
 
c
bIntercepta
2
−=          [30] 
 
Actual values taken from Figure 1 will be used from here. From equation [26] 
 
2
6618.0
2
0582.036.0
6618.036.020582.0
2
3
2
3
2
3
−−
+−
=c             [31] 
 
0602.0
145.0
−
−
=c           [32] 
 
4086.2=c           [33] 
 
From equation [] and using data from Figure 1 
 
4086.2
0960.0
=b           [34] 
 
061828.0=b           [35] 
 
From equation [30] and using data from Figure 1 
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 4086.22
061828.00056.0 −=a         [36] 
 
014745.0−=a          [37] 
 
Comparing these values with those quoted in Salgardo’s paper, a difference is seen. 
The signs of the three variables are correct, but there is a difference in the absolute 
magnitude. 
 
MCNP GEB coefficients Salgardo’s values Binomial expansion values 
   
a  -0.002400 -0.014745 
b  0.051650 0.061828 
c  2.858380 2.4086 
 
 
2.3) Discussion of Discrepancy between Coefficients 
There are a number of aspects of this approach which can contribute to the differences 
seen between Salgardo’s published figures and those calculated in this report.  
2.3.1) The biggest delta is that the approach used in this report applied a linear fit on 
two data points in order to replicate the situation one would find in extracting the 
relevant information from a detector’s performance specification sheet. In contrast 
Salgardo experimentally measured the FWHM at six different energies from 58.18 keV 
to 661.8 keV, fitted equation [1] to the data, and extracted the a, b and c coefficients 
from the fit. 
2.3.2) A detector’s response has greatest non-linearity at low energy whereas the 
approach outlined in this document has assumed a linear response for all energies.  
2.3.3) The a  coefficient appears to have the largest percentage error. The a  
coefficient represents the detector’s inherent spread at zero energy 
 
As E approaches 0 ,  2cEE +  tends to 0 , and hence 
aFWHM =                    as 0→E  
 
This is the residual spread function of the detector at zero energy.  
 
2.4) Comparison of MCNP6 Signal Profiles for NaI detector 
MCNP6 was run using both sets of the a, b and c coefficients to assess the difference 
produced in the simulated output profiles. Both output amplitudes were normalised to 
1 and the resulting profiles are shown in Figure 2.  
 
The coefficients calculated in this report and used in the MCNP6 simulation generate 
a Gaussian pulse with a slightly narrower FWHM than that generated with Salgardo’s 
coefficients. The difference in FWHM is small (<5%) despite Salgardo’s more rigorous 
approach. This exercise has demonstrated the integrity in using a binomial expansion 
approximation and just two detector response data points as an alternative approach 
for the generation of the MCNP6 a, b and c coefficients.  
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3) HPGe Gamma Detector Response Function
A study was conducted on Gaussian energy broadening for the HPGe detector used 
by Zadeh et al [Ref 3]. A new set of a, b and c values were calculated. Comparing 
these values with those quoted in Zadeh’s paper, a difference is seen. The signs of the 
three variables are correct but there is a difference in the absolute magnitude. 
MCNP GEB coefficients Zadeh’s values Binomial expansion values 
a 5.86828E-4 1.724E-4 
b 3.95113E-4 1.01E-3 
c  7.46793 1.188 
Once again, the main reason behind the discrepancy seen in the a, b and c coefficients 
is because Zadeh had the luxury of being able to fit the function in equation [30] to a 
number of data points (eleven), whereas the binomial expansion approach worked with 
just two values. This decision was deliberate in order to replicate the conditions 
expected when using a detector’s performance specification sheet.  
3.1) Comparison of MCNP6 signal profiles for HPGe detector 
MCNP6 was then run using the two sets of coefficients in the table above to assess 
the difference produced in the output profiles. Both output amplitudes were normalised 
to 1 and the resulting profiles are shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 2: Comparison of MCNP6 generated Gaussian profiles using both sets 
of coefficients 
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Even though there appears to be a measurable difference in the FWHM of both 
functions, the expanded scale means that obtaining a quantitative value for the 
difference is not possible. As was seen in the Salgardo case, the Gaussian function 
generated using the coefficients from the binomial expansion is marginally narrower 
than the Zadeh Gaussian function generated using the fit to multiple data points. 
 
4) Matlab fit approach 
The Salgardo and Zadeh published values of FWHM for different energies for their 
respective detectors are displayed in figure 4 below.  
 
 
Salgardo 
NaI 
detector 
Energy 
MeV 0.0581818 0.12 0.181818 0.243636 0.341818 0.661818 
FWHM 
MeV 0.011186 0.018686 0.024915 0.031017 0.0401695 0.0691525 
 
 
 
Zadeh 
HPGe 
detector 
Energy 
MeV 0.040118 0.05954 0.080997 0.12206 0.244697 0.344287 
FWHM 
MeV 
6.68224 
E-4 
7.35514 
E-4 
7.186916 
E-4 
7.6915887 
E-4 
9.121495 
E-4 
1.05514 
E-3 
       
Energy 
MeV 0.356012 0.661657 1.173228 1.332492 1.460822  
FWHM 
MeV 
1.021495 
E-3 
1.366355 
E-3 
1.879439 
E-3 
2.089719 
E-3 
2.283177 
E-3  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of MCNP6 generated Gaussian profiles using both sets of 
coefficients. 
 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of Salgardo and Zadeh published values of FWHM  for 
different energies for their respective detectors. 
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These two sets of data were loaded into Matlab and each was fitted with the custom 
line of equation - 
 
2cEEbay ++=  
 
Matlab outputs the a, b and c coefficients for each graph. The two graphs of FWHM
against Energy  and the corresponding a, b and c coefficients are displayed in figure 
5 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Matlab fit to published data for NaI and HPGe detectors with a, b and c 
coefficients. 
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The a, b and c coefficients produced by this approach match exactly those published 
by Salgardo and Zadeh. 
 
5) Concluding Summary 
This poster reports modelling gamma detector performance in MCNP6 through the 
application of Gaussian Energy Broadening. 
  
5.1) A methodology was developed that relied heavily on Gaussian mathematics and 
binomial expansions that generated the a, b and c coefficients required by MCNP6 in 
the modelling of gamma detector performance. This approach only needed values for 
the FWHM at two different energies and is typically the approach one would adopt 
with access to only the detector’s performance specification sheet. 
5.2) The a, b and c coefficients generated by the binomial expansion approach were 
used in MCNP6 together with published values and the resulting Gaussian functions 
compared. Excellent agreement was seen. 
5.3) A curve fitting application in Matlab was also used to generate the a, b and c 
coefficients. This approach matched exactly with the published data. 
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NDA quantification of Nuclear Materials in containers 
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bKEP Technologies High-Tech Product, 7 rue de l’Oratoire, Caluire, 69300, France 
Abstract: 
The precise determination of the amount of nuclear material within a container has long been a 
challenge, and especially with complex matrix and lack of homogeneity.  
A measurement approach combining calorimetry, gamma spectrometry is presented as an integrated 
nuclear material characterization system. 
Calorimetry is one of the best solutions to determine the overall quantity of nuclear material on a wide 
range of mass, from a few milligrams up to kilograms of radionuclides. It has many advantages as it 
features a non-destructive method which remains independent of matrix effect or the chemical 
composition. Modern technological developments within the calorimetry field give the promise of faster 
measurement times and precise measurements with low levels of uncertainty. Gamma spectrometry 
allows the determination of the isotopic abundance to qualify precisely each radionuclide.  
Until now, calorimetry allows to measure at the lowest 0.5 to 1 mW for samples but nowadays, thanks 
to new technological breakthroughs, KEP-Technologies calorimeters are able to measure as low as 50 
µW for 40 liters samples and less for a few liters containers. 
This new calorimeter named µLVC is based on a new design with twin cells, a new temperature 
regulation loop and a heat-flow measurement system inside a vacuum chamber (Patent deposit 
P005299 LA/VL). The µLVC is a differential heat-flow calorimeter for precise measurement 
independent of the residual fluctuations caused by environmental changes. 
The new calorimeter is an industrial product able to work in environmental conditions with wide 
temperature variations. Its software is friendly user and allows measurement time optimization and 
uncertainty calculation. 
A device combining calorimetry and gamma spectrometry is designed as a new tool for quantification 
of nuclear material to characterize Pu-Am samples, i-graphite, and low tritium samples with high 
precision and reliability. 
Keywords: calorimetry, gamma spectrometry, quantification, container, 
1. Introduction
Large Volume Calorimeter (LVC) from KEP Technologies has been designed for the non-destructive 
assay (NDA) of nuclear materials and in particular the assay of nuclear materials that emit α and β
nuclear radiation (e.g. Plutonium (Pu + 241Am), Tritium). Calorimetry provides an accurate means to
quantify the total Pu or tritium content, when used in combination with knowledge of the relative 
isotopic composition obtained from high resolution gamma spectrometry (HRGS). 
The calorimetric signal results from the measurement of the heat flow between the measurement cell 
containing the radioactive sample and the thermal block [1]. This thermal heat flow generates a signal 
(µV) based on time which is recorded by a data acquisition card. When the heat flow signal is 
stabilized, this one is converted to a thermal activity (W) by means of the linear calibration curve. 
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Calorimetry is used as a nondestructive assay (NDA) technique for determining the power output of 
heat-producing nuclear materials. The heat is generated by the decay of radioactive isotopes within 
the item. Hence, the knowledge of the isotopy easily allows mass of each isotopes calculation: 
Where Mi is the mass of the ith isotope, Rj isotope fraction, Pj specific power and W the thermal power
measured with calorimeter. is the effective specific power of the mix (Peff). 
2. A new design
KEP Nuclear has developed a new type of calorimeter, called µLVC (Figure 1) meaning microwatts-
Large Volume Calorimeter, able to measure tens of microwatts for a container volume from 1 to 40 
liters. 
Figure 1 : 3D view of the µLVC calorimeter 
The µ-LVC is based on a differential heat flow calorimeter designed with twin cells, temperature 
sensors and heat-flow measurement system inside a vacuum chamber (Patent deposit P005299 
LA/VL). Differential heat-flow calorimeters are designed with twin cells for a precise heat flow 
measurement. Thus, residual fluctuations caused by environmental changes are approximately 
cancelled out by the signal difference formed between the two cells. The calorimetric signal results 
from the measurement of the heat flow between the measurement cell containing the radioactive 
sample and the thermal block. The temperature of the thermal block is maintained constant thanks to 
resistive heater. This thermal heat flow generates a signal (µV) based on time which is recorded by a 
data acquisition system. When the heat flow signal is stabilized, this one is converted to a thermal 
activity (W) by means of the linear calibration curve. The  
Figure 2 shows a schematic view of the calorimeter. 
Figure 2 : Schematic view of the µ-LVC 
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
905
There are two modes for the regulation of the thermal block: 
• Wheatstone Bridge Regulation (WBR): the temperature between the reference
cell and the measurement cell is measured with a sensitive resistance wire
arranged in a Wheatstone bridge configuration. The advantage of a Wheatstone
bridge measurement is that measuring a difference of resistance between the
terminals of the bridge provides a differential measurement (lower measurement
range - higher sensitivity). Wheatstone bridge cardboards were developed by KEP
Technologies in 2015. They allow measurement with a noise of 20 nV equivalent
to 5 μ °C with a stability of 50 to 100 nV or 10 to 20 μ °C.
• SRFT (“Système de Régulation de Flux Métrique”): the heat flow between the
calorimetric block and a mass of high thermal inertia - which serves as a
reference of temperature - is regulated. The information on the heat flow is given
by a thermopile installed between the reference mass and the thermal block. The
signal coming from the thermopile is kept constant and close to zero in order to
bring the calorimeter at its thermal equilibrium. This principle allows achieving
high temperature stability and a very precise regulation. In the case of the
calorimeter μLVC, the reference mass is the reference cell and the calorimeter
block is the thermal block (see
• Figure 2).
The limitation of thermal leaks of the calorimeter is ensured by the use of a high vacuum (< 1.10-6
mbar) thermally regulated. 
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Figure 3 : Pictures of the µ-LVC 
3. Calorimetry-gamma spectrometry combination
3.1.Alpha and beta emitters heating 
First of all, it is important to understand how heat is produced by alpha and beta emitters. 
In the case of beta emitter, the total reaction energy is shared between the beta particle, neutrino, the 
excitation energy and recoil energy of the daughter. The characteristic distance of 2 MeV electrons is 
a few millimeters in the matrix and all of the kinetic energy of the beta particle is absorbed by the 
sample. One 200 keV or 2 MeV electron in polyethylene produces respectively ~0.15 keV and 
~11 keV X-ray due to bremsstrahlung radiation. . The neutrino is not absorbed, so its energy is lost. At 
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last, the thermal power measured by a calorimeter from beta emitters is the product of the activity and 
the average beta-particle energy, plus the de-excitation gamma-ray energy deposit taking into account 
the decay scheme. The gamma-ray contribution can be calculated with Monte Carlo code, e.g. 
MCNPX [2]. 
The heat produced by the decay of alpha emitter as for 239Pu, in case of complete stopping of particles
is distributed as follows :  
- Alpha particle: 98.17% 
- Recoil: 1.67% 
- Conversion electrons: 0.1% 
- Auger electrons: 0.035% 
- X-rays: 0.01% 
- Gamma-rays: 0.001% 
The range of 5-6 MeV alpha particles is around 5 µm in common materials. Thus, all of the energy 
released by charged particles during the alpha decay will remain within the item as heat. Low-energy 
gamma-rays and X-rays can be assumed to be totally absorbed in the matrix and the specific power of 
alpha emitter is directly deduced from the Q-value. The gamma-rays and X-rays contribution can also 
be calculated with MCNPX [2].  
Because the heat-measurement result is independent of material and matrix, it can be used for the 
inspection of any material form or matrix. The specific powers and the associated uncertainties are 
listed in Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable. for all plutonium isotopes and 241Am.
Isotopes 
PANDA database [Erreur ! Signet 
non défini.] 
specific power 
[mW/g] 
Relative Standard 
Deviation (%) 
238Pu 567.57 0.05 
239Pu 1.9288 0.02 
240Pu 7.0824 0.03 
241Pu 3.412 0.06 
241Am 114.2 0.37 
Table 1. Specific powers and uncertainties (gamma-rays and X-rays are assumed to be totally 
absorbed in the matrix). 
The calorimetric block is insulated by alternating layers of insulating and conducting materials to 
protect the blocks from external disturbances (external temperature variations). The insulating layers 
constitute a thermal barrier designed to filter short term and long term (between day and night) 
disturbances. To increase calorimeter temperature stability, and therefore its performance, thermal 
leakage between the sample and the environment must be perfectly controlled and reproducible. This 
is achieved by having the optimized insulation with a well regulated external temperature 
3.2 Gamma-rays spectrometry 
The estimation of the isotopy of a plutonium and uranium sample is a well-developed technics. To 
calculate the amount of nuclear materials, the global system needs to well-known the isotopic fractions 
and the specific power (mg/W) for each isotope. 
A planar HPGe detector is used commonly. With a front surface area of 2000 mm2 and a thickness of
20 mm, this type of detector gives a good compromise between resolution and efficiency (figure 4).  
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Figure 4 : Gamma spectrum of waste drum. 
The multi peak analysis of all gamma emitted in the 60-300keV energy range allows to determine the 
isotopic ratios with MGA [3] or PC/FRAM [4] software with accuracy better than 1 %. 
The measurement time is less than 1h. 
The system can use a rotation platform for the sample and scanning equipment in the case of a tall 
container. The design allows being applicable to samples of arbitrary size, geometry, age, chemical 
composition and isotopic composition.  
The precise determination of isotopic fractions depends of a good energy resolution (less than 0.6 keV 
at 122 keV) and of the quality shields positioned between detector and canister. 
4. Conclusions
A complete solution using a calorimeter with an integrated gamma-ray spectrometer is a very precise 
and well adapted device for the special nuclear material containers measurement.  
Thanks to the high accuracy of the calorimetric technology it is possible to know the amount of each 
radionuclide with a low uncertainty. The major contribution for the uncertainty determination is the 
isotopic measurement by gamma spectrometry.  
KEP Nuclear [5] has developed a new calorimeter able to measure less than 100 µW with an 
uncertainty lower than 10 % (k = 1) for containers from 1 to 40 liters. This calorimeter called µLVC, is 
based on a differential heat flow calorimeter designed with twin cells in a vacuum enclosure according 
to a patented design. The optimized SRFT and WBR regulation modes ensure a very low detection 
limit (less than 50 µW for 40 liters containers and below for smaller volume). The µLVC has also been 
designed to work under air, which is an advantage for containers not adapted to work under vacuum. 
Further measurement will be necessary to completely qualify the measurement under air but actual 
results show a detection limit inferior to 700 µW. Further tests are also already planned at KEP 
Nuclear to improve the detection limit under vacuum. Indeed, the vacuum is to be regulated in order to 
decrease the noise on the measured differential heat flow. 
[1] D. S. Bracken, and Clifford R. Rudy, “Principles and Applications of Calorimetric Assay”, PANDA 
2007 Addendum. 
[2] https://mcnpx.lanl.gov/ 
[3] R.Gunnink, MGA : A Gamma-Ray Spectrum Analysis Code For Determining Plutonium Isotopic 
Abunbances, LLNL report UCRL-LR-103220, April 1990. 
[4] Thomas E. Sampson, Thomas A. Kelley and Duc T. Vo, Application Guide to Gamma-Ray Isotopic 
Analysis Using the FRAM software, Report LA-14018, Los Alamos National Laboratory, September 
2003. 
[5] www.kep-nuclear.com/ 
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IN-SITU MONITORING OF RADIONUCLIDE POLLUTIONS
IN NATURAL WATER RESERVOIRS
A.Sokolov, A.Pchelintsev, A.Kails, V.Gostilo
Baltic Scientific Instruments, Riga, Latvia
Abstract:
We show the results of the development of an automated spectrometer based on a coaxial HPGe
detector for in-situ radionuclide monitoring in natural water reservoir. The newly developed spectrometer
is clearly superior to traditional laboratory measurements, at least with regard to the fact that it does not
require a large quantity of water samples to be taken. By measuring directly at the reservoir bank, the
spectrometer provides a MDA for the activity of the radionuclide
137
Cs of not more than 2.5 Bq/l for a
measurement time of 1000 seconds. At that the absolute registration sensitivity to a 662 keV gamma flux
is 15x10
-3
pulse/quantum. The device background is less than  0,003 pulse/s.
Keywords:in-situ radionuclide analysis, environmental pollutions, radionuclides in water
1. Introduction
Radioactive pollution of the environment is the most serious ecological effect of radiation accidents that
involve radionuclides release. An analysis of the aftereffects of the accidents at the Chernobyl and
Fukushima nuclear power plants (NPPs), shows that the extent of the radioactive pollution of the natural
environment was determined by the dynamics of the radioactive release and the meteorological
conditions during the release, which resulted in a complicated patchwork structure, in which different
radionuclides are found in different parts of the territory [1,2].
The dynamics of the release of the radioactive materials, as well as the evolution of contamination over
time in natural objects such as soil, forests and natural ponds, greatly depends on the specifics of those
objects. Radioactive products may reach natural water ponds as a result of deposition on the water’s
surface, drainage from the polluted area and underground aquifer flows. As a result, the picture of
radiation pollution of natural reservoirs changes constantly.
As a result of the accident at the Fukushima NPP, all ponds within a radius of 50 kilometers were
contaminated with radionuclides to different degrees [3]. Together, ten reservoirs for potable water and
irrigation in the surroundings of Fukushima-1 were found to have high concentrations of radioactive
Cesium after the accident.  Monitoring of the reservoirs, ponds, and rivers was started in September,
2011 so that scientists and ecologists could determine and understand the motion of radioactive
substances from mountains and forests and monitor the progress and effectiveness of decontamination
activities. In total, the specialists provide indicators monitoring of 73 reservoirs in Tokyo and seven nearby
prefectures. Sample probes were made approximately once every few months.
The standard practice of monitoring radionuclides and their activity in water reservoirs involves removing
water samples from the reservoirs and measuring them in a laboratory by means of shielded laboratory
spectrometers [4-6]. However, for a large number of samples, that monitoring technology might become
too labor-intensive and, thus, unworkable.
Our company has extensive experience in the development of equipment for monitoring radionuclides
and their activity in water for various applications: in laboratory conditions [7], in the first coolant circuit of
nuclear reactors [8], in waste outlets at NPPs [9-11], in deep water conditions on the sea bottom [12]. In
the present work we show the results of the development of an automated high-purity germanium (HPGe)
spectrometer for in-situ radionuclide monitoring in natural water ponds in the territory around the
Fukushima NPP. It goes without saying that such an automated spectrometer could be used for radiation
monitoring of natural reservoirs in any region.
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2. Spectrometer
A photo of the developed spectrometer  is shown in Fig.1. The spectrometer is based on a coaxial HPGe
detector with an efficiency of 40%. However, a detector of higher efficiency (up to 160% or more) could
be installed there if necessary. The application of HPGe detector in the present spectrometer was caused
by the necessity to monitor the dynamics of possible wide list of radionuclides in natural water reservoirs.
Fig.1. Automated HPGe spectrometer for in-situ radionuclides monitoring in natural reservoirs
The detector is installed in a U-type cryostat fabricated from radiation pure materials integrated with a 30
liters Dewar vessel that was equipped with a sensor to monitor the liquid nitrogen level. Although Stirling
electric coolers could have been used at present for HPGe detectors cooling, in this spectrometer we
have used liquid nitrogen cooling.  The cooling system is capable of providing uninterrupted operation
without refilling for at least 14 days. The energy resolution of the spectrometer is 0.9 and 1.8 keV for
photon energies of 122 and 1332 keV, respectively; the system is capable of recording photons over an
energy range of 50 to 2800 keV. To provide low radionuclide detection thresholds, the detector is
surrounded by a 70 mm thick lead shield.  A standard multichannel spectrometer with the SpectraLineGP
and Nuclide Master Plus software packages are used to identify radio nuclides and calculate their
activities.
The hydraulic system consists of a sampler based on a cylinder glass vessel, which embraces the
detector cap, a flow meter system with a valve unit and a mechanism for changing the sampler. The
cylinder glass vessel is manufactured from low sorbent glass. The rate of the measuring water flow can
be regulated with an input choke from 0.1 to 5.0 l/min, which allows a high rate of sample processing.
While measuring, the sampler can process up to 75 l of water in 15 min.  The hydraulic system works in
four operating modes: Measurement, Cleaning, Background Measurement and Sampler Exchange Mode.
The custom designed software controls all aspects of the spectrometer operation. The parameters of the
spectrometric and hydraulic subsystems are displayed on a computer monitor.
The dimensions of the developed spectrometer are 1300x580x480 mm3; the total weight is 170 kg. The
spectrometer is powered by a car battery and placed on a special antivibration surface in a Nissan
minivan, which could approach the bank of any reservoir and carry out in-situ water monitoring of that
particular (Fig.2).
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Fig.2. The connection of the pump on the reservoir bank before the monitoring
3. Metrological characteristics and their discussion
For the spectrometer calibration, a special gamma radiation source was made in the shape of the spiral
measurement sampler. To make this source, the sampler was filled with ion-exchange resin and
impregnated with a solution that contained the radionuclides 152Eu and 241?m at a known specific activity.
The activity of this calibration source has been determined on a standard gamma spectrometer whose
measurement inaccuracy does not exceed 2% (absolute). With that calibration source, installed in the
spectrometer in place of the measurement sampler, an efficiency curve for that particular geometry was
recorded. Further that efficiency curve was applied for calculation of radionuclide activity in measured
water samples.
For the developed spectrometer the absolute registration sensitivity to a flux of 662 keV gamma rays is
15x10-3 pulse/quantum. The minimal detection activity (MDA) for the radionuclide 137Cs assuming a
measurement time of 1000 seconds is not greater than 2.5 Bq/l. Fig.3 shows the background spectrum of
the spectrometer, acquired in 57168 s (approx. 16 hours). It is apparent that the background spectrum
contains only the natural radionuclides 40K and 232Th. In low energy range of spectrum X-Ray lines of
shield lead (K?&K?) are seen. Background level in range of (662±1.5) keV is low - less than 0,003
pulse/s.
Laboratory HPGe spectrometers with lead shield can provide better performance in terms of background
characteristics. HPGe detector with 40% relative efficiency provides MDA less than 0.9 Bq for 1l Marinelli
beaker and measurement time 1000 s for 137Cs [13]. Background level in range of 50-3000 keV is less
than 1.7-1.8 pulses/s, and in range of (662±1.5) keV is approximately 0.0018 pulse/s. However, during
laboratory measurements it is necessary to prepare manually large number of samples, load them into
the lead chamber and carry out measurements. The developed spectrometer is completely automated
and is able to carry out the whole measurement process, including system washing under control of
software. The developed spectrometer does not require manual sampling and preparation of water
specimen. Monitoring can be organized directly on the bank of natural water reservoir.
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Fig.3. Background spectrum of the spectrometer. Acquisition time was 57168 s
The monitoring results in the first natural reservoir have revealed besides the natural 40K only Cesium
radionuclides in the water. Fig.4. shows the spectrum of radionuclide pollution in this water reservoir. The
measurement time was 30 min. The spectrum distinctly shows the radionuclide lines 134Cs, 137Cs and 40K.
The water activity was ~ 6 Bq\l, as compared to a minimal detectable activity of less than 2.5 Bq/l for
137Cs.
Fig.4. Radionuclide pollutions spectrum in one of the natural pond.
The measurement time was 30 min.
4. Conclusions
The newly developed, automated HPGe spectrometer for in-situ radionuclide monitoring of natural
reservoirs is clearly superior to traditional laboratory measurements, at least with regard to the fact that it
does not require a large quantity of water samples to be taken. By measuring directly at the reservoir
bank, the spectrometer provides a MDA for the activity of the radionuclide 137Cs is not more than 2.5 Bq/l
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for a measurement time of 1000 seconds. At that the absolute registration sensitivity to a 662 keV gamma
flux is 15x10-3 pulse/quantum.
5. Acknowledgements. The authors are very thankful to Dr. Atsuhito Ennyu  (Japan Environmental
Monitoring & Scientific Co., Ltd.) for  assistance in spectrometer commissioning and testing.
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Numerical studies of CBRN effects on civil and military structures
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Abstract: 
Nowadays, satellites for e.g. navigation, communication, weather forecast, climate research have 
become integral parts for daily living. 
Technical failures or loss of these systems result in strong impacts on almost all kinds of civil and 
military structures. Typical sources of interference are electromagnetic pulses of high altitude nuclear 
detonations or large amounts of charged particles caused by solar winds. 
Experimental field studies of this topic, in particular high altitude nuclear detonations, are rarely 
known. Moreover, the access to experimental data is mostly restricted. Numerical simulations offer the 
possibility to investigate CBRN disaster scenarios in all facets where experiments and measurements 
are difficult to perform or almost impossible. Therefore, numerical studies complement the work of 
safeguards. 
For the current work, the numerical simulation system HEAT of the tms company has been in 
development for many years to support the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Civil Protection and 
Disaster Management for the cases of emergencies as a result of a CBRN incident. 
Originally developed for defence purposes, HEAT has become a powerful tool for fire brigades, 
disaster and consequence management. It gives the possibility to investigate not only electromagnetic 
pulse effects but also the temporal dispersion of nuclear, chemical and biological agents in urban and 
rural areas. 
Keywords: numerical simulation, dispersion simulation, CBRN effects
1. Introduction
Numerical studies are often performed where experiments are difficult to perform, almost impossible or
at least forbidden. Such cases are the release of chemical, biological or radiological toxic agents. The
distributions of CBRN materials in urban environments lead to severe health consequences for the
civil and military population. Mostly, these cases of emergency are results of military conflicts,
terrorism or industrial accidents. It is therefore of particular interest to study such events numerically
and to assess possible dangers in advance.
In order to support the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Civil Protection and Disaster Management for
the cases of emergencies, the software system HEAT has been in development for many years. The
purpose of this work is to present the current status of the program system HEAT and to demonstrate
its capabilities to support the prospective work of safeguard.
2. The software system HEAT
HEAT (Hazard Estimation After TBM Engagement) is a software system for the calculation and
visualization of the consequences of intercept, that can be the result from an engagement of a ballistic
missile (BM) fitted with an unconventional warhead. Such functionality is indispensable for
39th ESARDA Annual Meeting - Symposium, 16-18 May 2017, Düsseldorf, Germany
915
assessment of the effectiveness of extended air defense weapons systems, as well as for operational
use in planning and early warning in the field of passive defense. HEAT is being developed by tms
within the scope of R&D studies contracted by the Federal Office of Defense Technology and
Procurement (BWB)1.
The dispersion model on which HEAT is based is a particle model. At the start of the simulation of a
transport and dispersion process, a cloud is generated from a variable number of warfare agent
droplets (or particles for biological agents or nuclear materials). The form, size and composition of the
cloud depend on various factors such as the warhead's damage degree, the engagement altitude,
type of warfare agent, velocity of the ballistic missile (reentry vehicle) and interceptor, etc. The
individual droplets precipitate depending on their size and the meteorological conditions. During this
precipitation process, droplets can change as a result of evaporation effects and aerodynamic heating.
If they hit the ground liquid droplets can continue to evaporate and therefore be the source for
secondary dispersion. The calculation results in a time-variable deposition, concentration,
concentration time product (dosage) matrix or hazard area.
Originally intended to support R&D studies, the software HEAT was developed further as a standalone
system and enhanced to include operational elements. Apart from its use in national simulations for
the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), this operational version of HEAT was used in
2000 to 2010 during the JPOW V - JPOW 2010 (Joint Project Optic Windmill) passive defense
exercises. In the spring of 2003, HEAT was requested by NATO during operation "Iraqi Freedom" and
was deployed to Turkey.
The calculation engine, on which the operational version of HEAT is based, was isolated as an
independent module and is therefore available as a dispersion module for all kinds of different
applications. Among other things, this simulation core has been integrated in the German Air Force's
Surface-to-Air-Missile Operation Centre (SAMOC). A new version of the HEAT calculation core has
been deployed to the German SAMOC in 2013. The calculation engine has been developed further to
include a fast running algorithm has been developed that allows the generation of ground effects from
intercepted chemical and biological submunition warheads as well as chemical unitary warheads
within milliseconds.
In the latest version of HEAT, the calculation is not limited to BM as the source of the warfare agent or
hazardous material dispersion. Ground-near sources, such as a continuous source from a container or
a dirty bomb release can be defined as the starting point for the calculation. HEAT therefore supports
the entire field of enhanced hazard prediction.
In addition to dispersion calculation, HEAT is also capable of performing evaluations according to
NATO ATP-45, as used in the detailed methods of hazard prediction. NBC2 and NBC3 reports can be
generated, which can be exchanged with other systems via the integrated communications module.
At the moment HEAT 8.0 is under development. It will be released by the end of 2017. Version 8.0 will
be the first version of HEAT to incorporate a new 3D user interface based on NASA World Wind. In
addition it will include fast running code that uses the power of modern hardware (multicore CPUs,
GPUs) to generate results from a complex extended air defense scenario in the matter of milliseconds.
HEAT 8.0 is based on Java technology which facilitates integration into new environments using well
established technologies (Web services, SOA, EAI) and supports effective reuse, development and
adaption in general.
3. Results
HEAT is a simulation system that generates all dispersion effects after the engagement of a non-
conventional warhead, not just the immediate effects. That means that normally the output of HEAT is
a hazard area of the complete dispersion process. HEAT incorporates a large set of model features. It
uses a German hydrocode database for engagement evaluation. Aerothermal (reentry) effects for
submunitions and particles are considered. Lagrange-type dispersion calculations and Gaussian
1
 now the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support 
(BAAINBw) 
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plume for fast ground release calculations has been realized. Moreover, comprehensive databases
such as for chemical and biological agents and population density data have been implemented.
Transport calculations are performed for debris, submunition as well as agent droplets or particles.
HEAT uses trajectory models of different complexity depending on the intended purpose. Three
degree of freedom (DOF) calculations are used for most of the debris, submunition and stages
calculations. Six DOF calculations can be used for stages and Magnus-rotor submunitions. Magnus-
rotor submunitions are submunitions fitted with small rotors resulting in a non-ballistic flight and a
larger area of sub-munition dispersion. For the calculation of agent dispersion the agent evaporation is
also calculated along its trajectory. Figure 1 presents different examples of hazard areas resulting
from debris and stages impacts (KV – kill vehicle, RV – re-entry vehicle, COI – consequence of
intercept).
Figure 1: Hazard areas resulting from debris and stages impact.
In order to perform transport calculation atmosphere as well as weather information is needed.
Therefore tms developed a HEAT Weather Service that is a weather server accessible through a web-
service interface. This server receives current weather information from e.g. the Bundeswehr Geo
Information Centre and is able to handle different weather formats. It can use simple wind profile data,
weather data defined in STANAG2 2103 (ATP-45) as well as data according to STANAG 6022
(METGM). In addition it uses METAR ground weather data generated at all commercial airports
worldwide. All this data is stored on a server and can be retrieved for simulation purposes using the
web service interface.
When agent is released on or near the ground near-ground dispersion calculations are performed. The
agent transport calculations described above are only relevant for non-volatile chemical agents
released from a unitary warhead or from submunitions above ground (e.g. from fused submunitions).
2
 Standardisation Agreement 
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For volatile chemical agents, biological agents and radiological material released on or near the
ground the near-ground dispersion has to be calculated. HEAT can do this using different source
terms, complex wind fields and different types of coverage data. The dispersion model used to
calculate these ground effects is a particle model.
In figure 2 the dispersion resulting from the explosive release of radiological material (25g of Cs-137)
is shown, a so called “Dirty Bomb” release. This picture also shows the result of using a complex wind-
field for the dispersion calculation process. HEAT can use different source terms.
Figure 2: Dirty Bomb scenario (Cs-137).
HEAT handles high altitude nuclear detonation and its impact on satellites as well. Currently all
unclassified satellites are integrated. Their position is constantly updated. The satellites affected by
direct x-ray radiation can be evaluated in the scenario. In addition the ground effects from the
generated electromagnetic pulse can be displayed. Refer to figure 3.
Figure 3: Satellites affected by X-rays (left) and electromagnetic pulse on the surface.
0.1 … 1 mSV 
0.01 … 0.1 mSV
Inhalation dose
ca. 20 km
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4. Conclusion and Outlook
Based on the results presented in this work, the program system HEAT gives the possibility to study
the influences on civil and military structures resulting from military conflicts, attacks through terrorism
or industrial accidents. HEAT performs dispersion calculations for a wide range of radiological,
chemical and biological agents.
These numerical calculations are of significant importance for civil protection and disaster
management. Due to the possibility to study almost all environmental effects resulting from an
uncontrolled distribution of nuclear material HEAT could be a valuable extension to the prospective
work of the safeguards.
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Closing Plenary Session 
18/05/17 
W. Janssens, ESARDA Vice President 
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CONTENT 
• Highlights of the Symposium
• Feedback of the technical sessions
• Feedback of the panels : AP & RG
• Observations of intl. partners : INMM & APSN
• Closing remarks
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HIGHLIGHTS 
• High number of EU and Intl. participants!
• Multi-disciplinary & rich program (125 submissions)
• Introduction of panel sessions (AP & RG)
• Nice combination with visit of FZ Juelich
• Excellent & pleasant networking opportunities
(Zum Schluessel, Rhine SUPER-cruise, Alt-bier,…)
• Invitation to all ESARDA Membership to contribute
in actively shaping the future of ESARDA (50+)
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199 Participants from 26 Countries worldwide 
151 Participants from 18 European Countries 
148 Participants from 16 EU-Countries 
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OPENING PLENARY 
• Very supportive German & local contributions
• IAEA very encouraging (Technology, SLC, AP…)
• Strong European Commission (ENER/JRC) engagement
• International partnership very enthusiastic (INMM, APSN)
• Special attention to role & power of Women (WIN)
• Indications towards synergies with other areas such as
Decommissioning and Waste Management, Disarmament
Verification and Nuclear Security.
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FEEDBACK FROM THE TECHNICAL SESSIONS 
Session Chairs were asked to kindly report on : 
• NOVELTIES (what was not known before)
• Most STRIKING and/or unexpected results
• Expected IMPACT on safeguards implementation
• RECOMMENDATIONS for making next step change
• Other ideas, messages, feedback & suggestions
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NOVELTIES 
1 New legal structure in Germany for the back end of the fuel cycle 
3 NNSA is funding quite a few new developments without constraints of prior proof of request 
4 CTBTO can combine info from multiple geophysical methods to generate site understanding 
6 Solutions  are presented  also for transfering and storing damaged spent fuel  
7 The use of Cf-252 as a replacement of AmLi and its “counter-intuitive background” is good 
8 In arms control a wider focus on the overall enterprise is recommended (not only weapons) 
9 Laser ablation trials and detector results in mass spectrometry / Automated Chemistry (ORNL) 
10 Spent fuel data evaluation with neural networks 
11 The training/qualification plans of NRC to meet gaps between experienced and new inspectors 
12 New development techniques for UF6 sampling and in-field analysis 
13 New techniques using fast neutron interrogation with very promising results 
14 Application of new concepts and methodologies in data generation, collection and evaluation  
16 Improved signal processing in high neutron count-rate fields 
17 Development of short pulse systems with potential applications in safeguards and security 926
MOST STRIKING RESULTS 
2 Evaluation of U and Pu IC with medium resolution gamma remains a  challenge 
3 Proposal for potential future Unobtrusive Surveillance with instantaneous accountability  
4 Video-like stationary 60-90 s snapshots from satellite imagery 
5 IAEA SLC may be a valuable tool for a systems approach to nuclear disarmament verification 
7 The figure of merit of 6LiF:ZnS(Ag) neutron coincidence counter 
9 Microparticle suspension trials and stability / Progress in Am-243 reference material  
10 The contribution of neighboring assemblies in DCVD verification 
11 Many training activities but very little on knowledge management (improvised panel) 
12 Long term projects of production & certification of Pu-244 will be finalised soon (US-Russia) 
13 Safeguards community realises that muons can be used for safeguards purposes 
14 Cognitive burden to understand in-field data decreases in-field navigation/ attention 
16 Ability to cope with count rates up 10E6 cps 
17 Neutron interrogation using D/T generator and liquid scintilators 
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IMPACT ON SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION 
2 Request confirmed for handheld and “agile” NDA equipment  (electrically cooled …) 
3 Support programmes to IAEA : essential input to IAEA safeguards implementation 
5 Increased awareness of (non)-technical challenges on verification of N disarmament 
6 For 1st time for final disposal SFG : as many solutions presented as open questions 
7 Helium 3 alternatives are well on the way to actually be replacements 
9 Greater traceability, efficiency and sensitivity for both bulk &  particle environm. sample 
10 SINRD (Self-indicating neutron resonance densitometry)  progress 
12 Improved (long-term stability) CRM for Safeguards inspectorates and industry 
13 We are very near to implement PGET and UGET techniques for safeguards eg 
encapsulation plants 
15 Need to clarifying the needs for the German dry storage safeguards requirements 
16 Future applications of active neutron counting e.g. for Fukushima molten fuel 
17 Further development and improvement of standards and technologies for detection 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEXT STEP-CHANGE 
2 Instrumentation (NDA) testing /intercomparison needed to demonstrate capabilities/limitations 
3 Novelties like using acoustics for density/mass flow measurements in GCEP need to be pursued  
4 Independent power supply for monitoring (seismic/georadar) after closing geological repositories 
6 Make an integrated “toolbox” for techniques and solutions for final disposal safeguards/monitoring 
8 Continue exploring verification concepts at both state and enterprise level for arms control 
10 Establish criteria to evaluate the impact of newly proposed methods on inspection conclusions 
11 Discussion on knowledge management recommended including all ESARDA WGs, ENER & IAEA 
13 Methods validation needed of new techniques for UF6  in-field analysis 
14 New data visualisation techniques to be developed for better comprehension in SLC  
 
 IDEAS, MESSAGES, FEEDBACK & SUGGESTIONS 
1 Challenge to keep performing technology up to date might exceed capacity of authorities 
4 Question : which ESARDA WG really takes up the future questions on geological disposal 
6 ESARDA sessions contributed greatly to push the tipping point of S/F Q&A  on final disposal 929
FEEDBACK FROM THE PANELS 
20 Y Additional Protocol (M. Whitaker & F. Medici) 
ESARDA Reflection Group (E. Martikka) 
FEEDBACK FROM INTL PARTNERS : MOU WITH ESARDA 
INMM (L. Satkowiak) 
APSN (C. Everton) 
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CLOSING REMARKS 
- ESARDA is preparing a second youth, through its membership, partnerships and through 
the novelties of the topics it deals with 
- ESARDA is open to learn from and contribute to “related” areas such as arms control 
verification, nuclear security, export control etc  
- Dedicated efforts are needed to “bridge” / interconnect communities (e.g. industry) 
- Knowledge Management, as horizontal activity, will gain attention in next year(s) 
- ESARDA will “rejuvenate” further through the upcoming REFLECTION GROUP to which 
all of you are invited to submit contributions ! 
- ESARDA is very well internationally connected and further expanding, including support to 
SFG in other areas of the world 
- Let us prepare together for a upcoming splendid 50th Anniversary based on the big 
success from this 39th Annual Meeting and the future input & ideas. 
- We will meet next in 2018 in Luxembourg and in 2019 on the Lago Maggiore! 
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